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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

261. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 17, 1965, 8:40 p.m.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, Folder D. Top Secret; Exdis.

3432. Following are personal observations of Alexis Johnson which he requests be considered in connection with referenced messages:

"I have just returned from spending greater part of three days in field, one day with PriMin Quat in Pleiku (II Corps) area and two in Da Nang-Hue area. On my return I have seen DOD 152339Z/2/ and related messages as well as drafts of mission council reply/3/ with which I most heartily agree, especially on basis of my observations in field."

/2/Document 256.

/3/Document 260.

My visit in Da Nang-Hue area included extended visits and informal conversations with all of Senior Marine Officers ashore, visiting all four Battalions in their field positions and talks with officers down to company level.

I fully appreciate considerations both internal and external to SVN which impel move on our part to bring this war to successful conclusion as quickly as possible. With this there can be no difference of view. However, I gravely question whether this result can be achieved at this time by massive input of non-Vietnamese military force. As we have learned, we are dealing with volatile and hypersensitive people with strong xenophobic characteristics never far below surface. We have thus far deployed our Marine Battalions to minimize direct contact with local population. This not only from our choice but that of GVN, especially General Thi. On this I think Thi is right. A hasty and ill-conceived deployment of non-Vietnamese forces in combat roles where they are substantially involved with local population could badly back-fire on US and give rise to cries by Buddhists (who are now moving in very favorable direction) and others to "throw out foreigners" and "return Vietnam to Vietnamese".

In next few weeks Marines deployed in Da Nang area will be testing degree to which non-Vietnamese forces can be successful in:

(1) Acting as reaction force in situations where ARVN has already identified enemy and developed an engagement.

(2) Patrolling in thinly populated VC held areas and developing engagements against an enemy who has always shown great skill in avoiding engagements except on his own terms.

In spite of urgency of situation I very deeply feel that we should not seek to deploy additional non-Vietnamese combat forces into Vietnam until both we and Vietnamese have an opportunity to observe, digest, and evaluate results which Marines are able to achieve. If Marines are able to achieve substantial results in offensive operations (as opposed to their static security missions which there is no doubt they can perform well) there should be climate here respective [receptive?] to further non-Vietnamese forces which will be able to apply lessons that undoubtedly will be learned from Marine experience. If Marine experience is not favorable presumably other forces will be equally unsuccessful and we may find ourselves caught in a situation in which we have taken on price and problems (both in SVN and elsewhere) of large non-Vietnamese combat force without achieving an offsetting gain. On other hand, if we wait reasonable period of time, say 60 days, until we see how Marines make out we should not lose greatly and may gain much.

With respect to para 6 of DOD 152339Z it is difficult to conceive of anything more counterproductive than setting up anything in provinces smacking of US Military Govt. If anything, Province Chief is already smothered with American Advisors and rather than increasing, we should probably in some cases be decreasing their number. However, to reduce and better to coordinate demands by American personnel and agencies on Province Chief and to prevent any suggestions of competition between them, there may be merit in considering appointment from personnel already in Provinces of single Senior American Rep as channel for all American relations with Province Chief. In some cases this might be military officer, and in other cases civilian official. It certainly should not be US military civil affairs officer imposed on top of present American structure in Provinces.

Taylor

 

262. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 17, 1965, 5:32 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXII, Memos. Top Secret; Nodis.

CAP 65120. From McGeorge Bundy to Ambassador Taylor (deliver opening of business 18 April 1965). Secretary Rusk and I have reported your concerns to the President in Texas and he has directed that all actions and visits be suspended until after McNamara's meetings with Westmoreland in Honolulu.

We hope you will give Westie fullest account of your thinking and when McNamara returns here, the President will review situation again and consult once more with you.

My own belief is your views and ours can be brought very close together if we work at it. You can be sure that we will try to respect your heavy responsibilities for the large-scale programs you already have entrain./2/

/2/Taylor was called by Rusk on April 17, apparently before McGeorge Bundy's message was sent, and "was ordered to proceed to Honolulu on Sunday, April 18, to consult with McNamara and party." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Diaries, T-272-69)

 

263. Editorial Note

On April 17 following a week-long visit to Moscow by the First Secretary of North Vietnam's Communist Party, Le Duan, the Soviet and North Vietnamese Governments issued a joint communiqué in which the Soviet Union promised additional military assistance to North Vietnam. The two countries also criticized President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech and expressed support for international conferences on Laos and Cambodia. For text of the communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 855-856. Analysis of the communiqué, as well as of Soviet Premier Kosygin's speech of April 19 in which he reaffirmed some of the points in the communiqué, is in Hughes' memorandum RSB-41 of April 20 to Rusk (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam INR Studies), and Cooper's April 20 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Johns Hopkins Speech Reactions). For text of the President's speech at Johns Hopkins, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pages 394-399.

The idea of a conference on Cambodia had first been broached publicly by Cambodian Premier Prince Sihanouk in mid-March. The Department of State's attitude regarding a Cambodian conference, which had also been proposed through diplomatic channels by the Soviet Government to the British Government, was contained in telegram 2363 to Saigon, April 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 CAMB.-VIET S) The Cambodian conference proposal was also discussed in a telephone conversation between William Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson on April 23, a memorandum of which is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, SEA Special Intell. Material, Vol. V)

 

264. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Honolulu, April 20, 1965.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Diaries, T-272-69. Secret.

I left Saigon on Sunday, April 18, for Honolulu and returned to Saigon on Thursday, April 22. Purpose of the trip was to discuss with McNamara and party DOD 152339Z, copy attached./2/ The main business was done in two executive sessions on Tuesday, April 20. The following attended:

/2/Document 256.

McNamara	McNaughton
Wheeler	Sharp
William Bundy	Taylor
Westmoreland

We first considered the question of the introduction of additional U.S. and third country combat forces. There was no disagreement in estimating the situation. We all considered that since we could not hope to break the will of Hanoi by bombing alone, we must do better in the campaign against the Viet Cong in SVN.

While conceding that bombing would not do the trick alone, we also did not believe that any combination of pressures could end the situation quickly, certainly not within six months. All favored mounting pressure against the North but no one advocated attacking Hanoi. All believed that the present target system, extended to include northern targets out of MIG range, dikes and dams, electric power plants and restrikes on old targets would keep our aviation busy for an almost indefinite period. I stressed that repetition of the same level of attack was in itself a form of escalation.

With regard to the need for additional U.S. combat troops, in view of the inadequacy of ARVN units presently operational or to become operational in 1965, we agreed on a Phase I which would call for the introduction into SVN of nine U.S. battalions and four third country battalions between now and the end of summer.

With the present in-country strength of about 33,000, this reinforcement would bring the U.S. personnel to about 82,000, with something over 7,000 third country troops in addition. We recognized that it might be necessary to follow with a Phase II and III which would include a U.S. division, a ROK division minus and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force. Final totals in that case would be 123,000 U.S. and about 22,000 third country combat forces.

We agreed to a new text of instructions for me as Ambassador conforming pretty generally to my previous recommendation.

We were generally opposed to the encadrement of U.S. soldiers in ARVN units and to the extensive use of USA civil affairs personnel in the provinces. We supported the concept of an international force, the extended use of mobile dispensaries and a three province test of a new U.S pacification organization.

Principal attitudes of interest were (a) desire by certain Chiefs of Staff for a dramatically heightened escalation of bombing (Wheeler disagreeing); (b) JCS emphasis on need to introduce troops for possible contingencies rather than for primary use in curbing the Viet Cong.

It was understood that McNamara would carry back our agreed recommendation and endeavor to secure authority without delay.

 

265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 21, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII. Top Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 705-706. The memorandum follows very closely McNaughton's minutes of the Honolulu meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Minutes of the 4/20/65 Honolulu Mtg.) For another account of the meeting, see Document 264; for recollections, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 342-343; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 132; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp. 77-80; and William Bundy's unpublished manuscript, chap. 25, pp. 2-8. (Johnson Library, Papers of William Bundy)

Mr. William Bundy, Mr. McNaughton and I met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. Following is my report of that meeting:

1. None of them expects the DRV/VC to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.

2. With respect to strikes against the North, they all agree that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a shared view, that it is important not to "kill the hostage" by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the "Hanoi do-nut." They all believe that the strike program is essential to our campaign--both psychologically and physically--but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone. They all considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks.

3. None of them sees a dramatic improvement in the South in the immediate future. Their strategy for "victory", over time, is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improvement in the South, but all emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding--for psychological and morale reasons--a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm.

4. To bolster the GVN forces while they are building up, they all recommend the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country (including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):

1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000 closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns at Chu Lai	6,200 closing 5 May
1 Australian btn at Vung Tau	1,250 closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000 closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn) at Quang Ngai	4,000 closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces	11,000 already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level	7,000 already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions	16,000 not yet approved
Total: US 13 btns	82,000
ROK & ANZAC 4 btns	7,250

5. Possible later deployment, not recommended now, include a US Air-Mobile division (9 btns--15,800) to Pleiku/Kontum, and I Corps HQ (1,200) to Nha Trang; and even later, the remainder of the Korean division (6 btns--14,500) to Quang Ngai, and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (3 btns--24,800) to Danang.

6. All agreed on the action to be taken to meet the seven points of the April 15 message: Def 9164/2/ (see the attached Appendix I for a summary of the seven points and related action).

/2/Document 256.

7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:

a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2 above.

b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.

c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed deployments.

d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II),/3/ relating to his discussions of the proposed deployments with the GVN.

/3/Not printed here, but for the instructions as sent to Taylor on April 22, see Document 271.

e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:

1) The contemplated deployments.

2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.

3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix I.

Robert S. McNamara/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Appendix I/5/

/5/Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

ACTIONS RELATING TO THE 7 POINTS OF DEF 9164

A. Points 1, 2, & 3

The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of ARVN units.

At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph 4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison personnel to each independent US platoon and to "brigade" US forces with ARVN troops in counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.

B. Point 4

The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the expansion of the Vietnamese forces.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but rather in training facilities, trainers and leadership. These problems are being surmounted. They expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.

C. Point 5

The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.

Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a detailed program.

D. Point 6

The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).

At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. It was suggested that in these three provinces the US effort would be put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a civilian. It is understood that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.

E. Point 7

The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of military personnel.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.

 

266. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 21, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The meeting was held from 11:15 a.m. to 12:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) McGeorge Bundy's handwritten notes of the meeting are ibid., Papers of McGeorge Bundy. For Ball's recollection of the meeting, which he incorrectly dates April 20, see The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 393.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting/2/

/2/McCone mistakenly identifies this meeting as an NSC meeting. The 551st NSC meeting was held on April 2, and the 552d on April 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File)

ATTENDED BY

The President, Secretary McNamara,
Secretary Vance, Secretary Rusk,
Secretary Ball, William Bundy,
McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, and Admiral Raborn/3/

/3/McNaughton also attended. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

The purpose of the meeting was to consider Secretary McNamara's memorandum for the President, 21 April 1965, forwarding the conclusions of his meeting in Honolulu./4/ After reading the statement the President asked McNamara to explain the reasoning behind the report.

/4/Document 265.

McNamara stated that the deployment of additional U.S. forces is necessary to avoid serious losses of U.S. forces now deployed which he considered inadequate to meet the threat of a Viet Cong attack. Furthermore, committing of U.S. forces to combat would be effective against the Viet Cong and would release ARVN forces for more distant operations. McNamara proposed a continuation of the strikes against the North at the present tempo. He did not propose extending the area geographically although later in the discussion William Bundy stated this was a possibility. McNamara definitely opposed striking industrial targets, power plants, POL centers, or anything in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. McNamara stated that what he was in effect proposing was to extend the bombing for a protracted period of 6 months or a year or even more, but not to intensify it.

The thrust of McNamara's statement and subsequent discussions was to change the purpose of the bombing attacks on North Vietnam from one of causing the DRV to seek a negotiated settlement to one of continual harassment of lines of supply, infiltrations, etc., while the combination of SVN forces and U.S. forces were engaging in defeating the Viet Cong to such a point that the DRV and other interested Communist States would realize the hopelessness of the Viet Cong effort and therefore would seek a peaceful negotiation. McNamara estimated that he did not expect to move towards political settlement at least for 6 months, and possibly 12 months.

Secretary Rusk stated that he and Thompson had briefly reviewed the paper prior to the meeting and that they concurred in the level of bombing effort as outlined in paragraph 2.

Mr. Ball stated/5/ he thought we were making a major decision and that he was privately exploring an alternative scenario of action which he would like to discuss./6/ He said that he felt there was more room for negotiation than was popularly accepted and that the DRV's "4 points" was, in reality, a signal of a willingness to negotiate. Ball stated that the war we are engaged in has very serious risks, i.e. escalation, capsizing of the Saigon government and increased opposition of one sort or another from both the Soviets and the ChiComs (hence he did not feel that the Sino-Soviet differences would be eliminated but rather that they would take independent courses of action in supporting the DRV). Ball stated that in his opinion it was totally unrealistic to feel that we could sustain an operation of the type envisaged for a year or two without something of an explosive nature taking place.

/5/According to McGeorge Bundy's notes, Ball said, "This transforms our whole relation to the war. The world reaction will be very difficult."

/6/See Document 267.

McGeorge Bundy pointed out that the program outlined in the McNamara paper is quite different from the course of action heretofore considered, and should be carefully studied. An estimate should be prepared on the reactions in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow to the deployment of American troops in the numbers indicated and committing those troops to military engagement in SVN. He also raised the question of the effect of this new course of action on past estimates of VC and Communist reactions. I said the proposed course of action troubled me greatly. I felt that the level of our bombing against NVN had undoubtedly inconvenienced and created difficulties for the VC and the DRV in their supply and infiltration operations but had not brought them to a halt, and I felt a continuation of such bombing could be absorbed by the DRV and would stiffen their determination rather than bring them to the conference table. I pointed out that the current estimate/7/ states that bombing at this level against targets in the southern DRV would result in increased VC activity in SVN with greater support from the DRV and possibly from the ChiComs. I stated that I could envisage a gradual but deliberate build-up of these forces and that this would present our ground forces with an increasingly difficult problem requiring more and more troops, that what we were talking about now was merely an early stage in a big effort. I felt we would drift into a combat situation where victory would be dubious and from which we could not extricate ourselves. I agreed with Mr. Ball that the risks and dangers were great and the Saigon government, while appearing better today, was indeed fragile.

/7/Document 268.

The President asked if I opposed committing forces, and I responded that I did not, but the commitment of forces must, in my opinion, be accompanied by a more dynamic action against the north. I recommended air strikes against industrial targets, power plants, POL centers, and the taking out of the MIGs.

McNamara then summarized my views and indicated that the only difference between his views and mine was in the level of effort against the north, and that he felt that strikes against the north should be limited in the manner outlined in paragraph 2 of his memorandum. Rusk agreed./8/

/8/According to McGeorge Bundy's notes, McNamara said that the "situation in South is place for a signal[;] situation in North might bring Chinese in." The President then asked, "Are we pulling away from our theory that Bombing will turn 'em off?" McNamara responded, "That wasn't our theory. We wanted to lift morale; we wanted to push them toward negotiation--we've done that."

The President raised the question of the Quat government. McNamara quoted Amb. Taylor as stating that Quat is more confident than he has been, he feels morale is better, he recognizes dissension within the military but feels there is no coalition of dissident forces which will threaten his government. Rusk warned that we are setting a bad example for the Quat government by problems within our own camp and he indicated that the several U.S. organizations in SVN are not working together and, as a result, the Vietnamese are confused. McNamara felt that a great deal has been done to straighten out recent problems, details of which were not discussed.

The President raised the question of the kind of support we can expect from the U.S. public, the press, friendly countries, world opinion, etc. on the protracted program. He noted the amount of propaganda being directed against us and asked how serious it was. Secretary Ball stated that we were losing the propaganda war. McNamara contradicted this view by stating that he thought we were winning public opinion and that criticism appearing here and there did not amount to much. The President insisted that we must improve our propaganda and must do everything necessary to get our message over. He felt that his Baltimore speech/9/ and later statements had had little effect. Both McNamara and Rusk disagreed with him.

/9/See Document 245.

The President questioned whether there is an organized effort within the United States and elsewhere to discredit U.S. efforts in Vietnam and, if so, how would this develop under the proposed plan. He also questioned the effect on our normal friends of continuing the operations plus those which are now planned.

The President urged that all take the initiative in the propaganda war to put the Communists on the defensive. He urged that we emphasize the good things that we are doing in every area such as medical, supplies, education, construction, aid, etc., and likewise to emphasize the villainous and cruel things being done by the Communists.

It was agreed to meet again on Thursday at 11:00 o'clock/10/ to consider the estimate./11/ No action was taken on the McNamara recommendations although Secretary Rusk recommended that they be accepted. The President, however, was non-committal.

/10/See Document 269.

/11/Document 268. In telegram 2379 to Saigon, April 21, Rusk informed Taylor that McNamara had summarized the results of the Honolulu conference at a "highest level meeting" that day but that a final decision had been deferred at least a day to allow time to consider an intelligence estimate of "likely Communist views and reactions." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-3 VIET S)

At the conclusion of the meeting I called the group's attention to the improved casualty ratio, pointing out that for the 4 weeks (Feb. 13 to March 13 '65) GVN killed and missing action--2,132 and VC killed and captured--2,085. However, in the 4-week period March 14 to April 17 (with the days March 28 to April 2nd missing), the SVN killed and missing in action were 683 and the VC killed and captured 1,893. I stated that we had now analyzed the effect of the bombing within SVN as summarized in SC-04463 of 21 April/12/ and had concluded that the strikes had had a very considerable effect on the VC, that there was evidence that many VC had been killed and many VC compounds had been damaged or totally destroyed. I thought this was encouraging.

/12/Reference is to an intelligence memorandum entitled "Results of U.S. Air Strikes in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Intelligence Material, Vol. V)

 

267. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 21, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Political Track Papers. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
The Attached Memorandum

I am enclosing the memorandum regarding a possible approach to Vietnamese settlement which we discussed this morning./2/ I have dictated it hurriedly this afternoon in order to meet the schedule we agreed upon. For that reason, there are loose ends.

/2/Regarding this meeting, see Document 266.

The memorandum suggests some moves that we might make to take advantage of what may well be a diplomatic opening provided by the North Vietnamese. I believe that Hanoi, in its answer to the 17 nation declaration,/3/ has put out a feeler--in its peculiar Oriental way--that we should not ignore.

/3/North Vietnam formally rejected the 17-nation proposal in a statement issued on April 19. For text, see Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Vietnam, Cmnd. 2756 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 63-65.

I believe further that, if we are to settle this matter short of a major war, we must be prepared for a settlement that falls somewhere short of the goals we have publicly stated, but that still meets our basic objectives.

I would like to see us move on this promptly--certainly before any final decision for a 150 percent increase in our troop deployment in South Viet-Nam that would multiply our dangers and responsibilities while limiting your freedom of maneuver.

George W. Ball

Attachment/4/

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson

/4/Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but Ball describes his drafting of the memorandum in The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 393.

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Should We Try to Move Toward a Vietnamese Settlement Now?

I

The proposed program for increasing our force deployments in South Viet-Nam to over 80,000 requires an important decision of policy. This would be a quantum jump of 150 percent. It could not help but have major consequences.

A. It would materially change the scale and character of United States involvement in the eyes of both Moscow and Peiping. (Whether it would compel them to increase their involvement is presently being considered by our intelligence community.)

B. It would transform the character of the war in world opinion. Our friends--as well as the non-aligned countries--would tend more and more to regard this as a war in which the United States was directly engaging North Viet-Nam.

C. It would substantially increase United States' casualties. (Secretary McNamara has made clear that our own casualties will go up at a rate almost directly proportionate to the numbers deployed in South Viet-Nam.)

D. It would probably induce Hanoi substantially to step up the rate of infiltration. (This was the view expressed by Mr. McCone this morning.)

I recommend that you postpone the decision for a few days while we consider the possibilities of trying to move toward a settlement within the near future.

If we should decide to test the diplomatic water, you may still wish to commit the additional forces only provisionally--with the understanding that deployments might be changed at any time prior to actual landings in South Viet-Nam or that they might be stretched out over a longer time span.

II

Where We Are Now

We have now been bombing the North Vietnamese for ten weeks. We have mounted more than 2,800 sorties--increasing in intensity from 122 per week (February 7-13) to 604 per week (April 16-22). Our estimates show that we have damaged or destroyed 32 targets in Viet-Nam, including all the bridges on Route 1.

Deployment of additional United States personnel to date, and announcements of further deployments to follow, have amply shown our determination to assist Saigon.

There is evidence

--that these actions have improved morale and increased stability in Saigon.

--that the heavy air attacks in the South and air strikes against the North have--at least for the time being--somewhat impaired morale among the Viet Cong and decreased their efficiency.

There is no hard evidence that our air strikes have yet halted or slowed down the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese.

We are on the threshold of a new military situation. From mid-May to mid-September is the rainy season in South Viet-Nam. During that time our air operations against the Viet Cong will be impaired. The free movement of our forces in the interior of the country--whether by air or road transport--will be restricted.

Experience shows that this will benefit the Viet Cong, who are far less dependent than the United States and South Viet-Nam on motorized ground and air transport. For example, during the rainy season last July, Viet Cong activity reached record intensity (21 battalion-sized attacks).

There is evidence that substantial Viet Cong strength is being concentrated in South Viet-Nam so that it can be used during the rainy season against towns, airfields, etc.

III

Time to Reappraise Our Situation

Now is the time to take a hard look at where we are going. Specifically we should ask ourselves: should we try to set in train a possible diplomatic solution before the rainy season or should we wait until fall?

There are arguments each way.

On Hanoi's side, the argument for waiting is that, before seriously facing negotiations, they may wish to see whether they can exploit their tactical advantage during the rainy season to achieve a Dien Bien Phu. If they should succeed in a spectacular way in attacking an isolated point of prominence in the interior (such as Pleiku or Kontum for example) their bargaining position would be substantially improved.

On our side the argument for waiting is that, if we can get by the rainy season without permitting the Viet Cong a substantial victory, Hanoi may grow discouraged and be more amenable to a diplomatic solution on terms we could accept.

Risks of Waiting

But the risks for us in delaying a settlement are very high.

1. We cannot continue to bomb the North and use napalm against South Vietnamese villages without a progressive erosion of our world position. This erosion will be limited if we appear to be moving toward some kind of political solution. But that will take more than words. We have, in my view, passed the point where we can improve our world position more than temporarily by further public statements unless there is evidence of movement towards a political settlement.

For, even though we have a good answer, most of the world believes that Hanoi, in its recent statement to the Seventeen Nation Delegation, has substantially caught up with your offer of unconditional discussions. The general world opinion is that we and they have each stated objectives that appear to call for unconditional surrender by the other side.

2. I doubt that the American people will be willing to accept substantially increased casualties if the war continues over a substantial period of time and there are no signs of active diplomacy. Distasteful as it is, we must face the hard fact that large and articulate elements in the intellectual community and other segments of United States opinion do not believe in our South Vietnamese policy. In fact, to many Americans our position appears far more ambiguous--and hence far more dubious--than in the Korean War.

Until now, the American people have gone along out of their great confidence in you and because United States casualties have been less than a weekend's traffic accidents.

But even a doubling of the casualties would begin to make a difference.

3. We cannot expect Peiping and Moscow to sit still over a long period while we bomb North Viet-Nam on a systematic basis. Even though we do not escalate our attacks, the pressures within the Communist world for intervention by Peiping and Moscow will almost certainly mount. I do not believe in George Kennan's thesis that our military actions in Viet-Nam will draw the ChiComs and Russians together, but they can generate pressures that will compel each separately to increase its commitments against the United States.

IV

Present State of Diplomatic Manuevering

Our Diplomatic Position

We have advised the 17 non-aligned nations that we are prepared for "unconditional discussions" with the "governments concerned."

At the same time, we have made it clear that the basis for an ultimate settlement must be "an independent South Viet-Nam--securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others--free from outside interference--tied to no alliance--a military base for no other country."

Hanoi Position

Hanoi has advised the non-aligned nations that it will consider an international conference "in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam" provided its four-point proposal is recognized as "the basis for the soundest political settlement..." These four points are:

"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States Government must withdraw from South Viet-Nam all United States troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all United States military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Viet-Nam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet-Nam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States Government must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1959 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territory.

"3. The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the NFLSV Program, without any foreign interference.

"4. The peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference."

V

Do the Hanoi Points Provide a Starting Point for Further Exchanges?

Hanoi has set forth these four points for the purpose of staking out a beginning bargaining position just as we have staked out our objective of a completely independent South Viet-Nam.

We cannot realistically expect Hanoi and the other Communist governments to accept our formally stated objective as a pre-condition to beginning negotiations. They consider it instead as the result we would like to achieve through the negotiating process.

By the same token Hanoi obviously does not expect us to accept its four points as a pre-condition to negotiation.

The present posture is thus that each side has stated an objective that would represent total capitulation by the other side.

If we are to move off dead center we must define for ourselves what we really can accept. In other words, we must separate what we publicly state as our objectives from a realistic definition of the achievable and acceptable.

The best approach, it seems to me, is to try to find some common ground that would save face for Hanoi and permit it to pull back even though that action were only tactical and Hanoi hoped to prevail at some later date. In my view such a tactical withdrawal is probably the most we can realistically try to achieve short of totally destroying North Viet-Nam.

VI

Common Ground in Hanoi's Four Points

There is, in fact, much in Hanoi's four points that we could accept. I think it possible that these four points were deliberately drawn to test the possibility of beginning a dialogue--and we would do well to examine them in that light.

Analysis of the Four Points

Point One

Except for "unity", we can certainly agree to recognize "the basic initial rights of the Vietnamese people--peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity." We cannot, of course, accept "unity" as a basic right--except as it may be brought about by the free act of a South Vietnamese Government once the independence of South Viet-Nam is secure.

We have already stated that we will be prepared to withdraw our forces and return to the conditions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements--but only after Hanoi and the Viet Cong have stopped infiltration and aggression.

Point Two

We can certainly agree to return to the military provisions of the 1954 Agreements pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam. (We must insist, of course, that reunification can be achieved only by the free act of an independent South Vietnamese Government.)

But North Viet-Nam must abide by the same military provisions.

We have already made clear that we would not expect South Viet-Nam to enter into any military alliances or to maintain any foreign military bases.

Point Three

We can certainly agree that the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must "be settled by the South Vietnamese people" themselves.

But where Point Three sharply diverges from our position is by providing that the political settlement must be "in accordance with the program of the NFLSV" or that it must be achieved without United States assistance.

The NFLSV program, published in 1961,/5/

/5/For text of the manifesto issued by the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front at the time of its establishment in December 1960, see Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, vol. II, pp. 86-89.

(a) calls for the establishment of a national coalition government after the overthrow of the government of South Viet-Nam. Elections are to be held only after this coalition is established.

(b) provides that, once the coalition is created, the present constitution of South Viet-Nam would be abolished. A new National Assembly would then be elected through universal suffrage.

Point Four

We can certainly agree that "the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones", provided it is understood that reunification can come about only by the freely expressed decision of an independent and secure Viet-Nam.

VII

What are the Common Objectives?

From this analysis, it is possible to distill the following common objectives on which we should be able to reach at least verbal agreement with North Viet-Nam:

a. Peace
b. Independence
c. Sovereignty
d. Territorial integrity
e. Withdrawal at later stage
f. Mutual return to military provisions of 1954 Agreements
g. No military alliance or bases
h. South Viet-Nam control of internal affairs
i. Reunification under appropriate conditions of self-determination.

VIII

What are the Irreducible Differences?

In considering the basic differences between our objectives and those of Hanoi we must face up to a fundamental question that could furnish the key to a possible solution:

Would we be prepared under proper conditions to accept the continued presence in South Viet-Nam of native-born Viet Cong and accept their participation in the political processes of the country?

Obviously, we would not accept a coalition government of the Russian type. But should we reject an arrangement under which the Front would be given the opportunity--along with all other political parties--to campaign freely but without the use of terror or intimidation for political support among the South Vietnamese people?

In my judgment we will ultimately have to settle for something like this unless we are prepared to fight a very big war. I do not believe that we can ever compel the North Vietnamese to agree to the withdrawal of South Vietnamese-born Viet Cong unless we are prepared to go through with the total destruction of North Viet-Nam. Nor do I believe that we can realistically expect to exterminate the Viet Cong in the South without prolonging the struggle over a time span that would be unacceptable to the American people and the rest of the world.

What might possibly be achieved within the fairly near future is something substantially less but nevertheless good enough--an agreement by Hanoi to what it regards as a tactical pull-back. By this I mean that the North Vietnamese might be prepared to stop the infiltration and the fighting if they could be assured of the continual existence of a Viet Cong party in the South--which, in their view, could ultimately prevail.

We could not, of course, agree to any arrangement worked out on these terms without insisting that the Viet Cong units in the South be broken up and that the Viet Cong be absorbed into the national life of the country.

I do not think we should assume a priori that an arrangement of this kind would be impossible to achieve.

Those who know much more about South Viet-Nam than I advise me that if a free election could be conducted in South Viet-Nam today the non-Communists would win. If that is not the case then clearly our moral position is not what we claim it to be. Under those circumstances we could not honestly say that we were trying to help the majority of the South Vietnamese achieve their heart's desire but merely that we were trying to stop the Communists.

But, if I am correct in believing that we could win an election under fair and free conditions, then certainly the United States could improve its posture by making clear to the world that we would--under proper safeguards--accept a democratic test of strength.

IX

Outline of a Possible Settlement

The kind of settlement that we may have reason to hope for at the end of the road could contain the following elements:

1. All hostilities would be terminated. Hanoi would stop infiltrating men and equipment and the Viet Cong would stop their guerrilla activities.

The United States would halt its bombing and both the South Vietnamese and the United States would stop attacking the Viet Cong.

2. The Saigon Government would declare a general amnesty--subject to the faithful carrying out of paragraph 1 by Hanoi and the Viet Cong. As part of the amnesty all Viet Cong wishing to return to the North would be permitted to do so. Transportation would be provided and a regrouping encouraged--but not required--along the lines of that arranged in 1954.

3. An International Commission would undertake to police the cease-fire by the appropriate deployment of adequate inspection teams at key points throughout the country.

4. An agreed future date would be set for elections. The Liberation Front would be recognized as a political party and would be permitted to present candidates and conduct an election campaign by peaceable means.

5. An International Force would supervise the elections. Once the new Government was installed the United States would withdraw. However, the new Government would have the right to request assistance from the United States or any other country in the event that its independence were again threatened.

6. Reunification would be permitted at a specified future date if desired by the people of South Viet-Nam and their government.

X

How to take the First Step Toward Such a Settlement

There are various tracks that might be followed in order to sound out the North Vietnamese before the rainy season. Certain friendly nations have in the past been able to gain access to Hanoi--such as the Canadians. Alternatively we might try to use the channel of the Co-Chairmen.

We should ask our intermediary--whomever we may select--to approach Hanoi along the following lines:

1. An examination of the American and North Vietnamese statements disclose certain common objectives as set forth on pages 10 and 11 above.

2. In view of this course of apparent agreement on common objectives a political solution of the South Vietnamese problem ought to be possible--provided the North Vietnamese are sincere in what they say.

3. The principal elements of a solution would involve a stopping of the infiltration and a cessation of the fighting on both sides of the demarcation zone. Provided agreement could be reached with the U.S., would the North Vietnamese be prepared to phase down their infiltration for a test period of perhaps three weeks provided the U.S. agreed to scale down its bombing for the same period?

4. If all other provisions of the agreement were achieved would the North Vietnamese be prepared to call off the fighting in the South and disband the Viet Cong as a military force on the understanding that those South Vietnamese-born members would be permitted to remain in civilian life in South Viet-Nam and to participate peaceably in the political life of the country?

5. Would the North Vietnamese be prepared to take these actions provided free elections held in South Viet-Nam within an agreed period for the selection of a new government--such elections to be supervised by an appropriate international body? (While the issue of reunification could not be decided at that election it would be understood that the new government would have all the attributes of sovereignty--including the right to opt to join the North at some future point.)

6. These questions would be raised with the North Vietnamese on the ostensible authority of the intermediary nation which would make clear that the questions had not yet been raised with the United States but that the intermediary would be prepared to talk with the United States if Hanoi's answers were at all encouraging.

These are obviously preliminary suggestions that have not had the benefit of staff work. I have not tried to deal in this paper with the refinements of any diplomatic approach that might be made or with the problems of clearance and agreement with the Government in Saigon.

The purpose of this paper is simply to raise a warning signal that we may be passing up an opportunity for getting negotiations under way. I think it important that we examine our position carefully before a decision is made that will greatly increase the American commitment in South Viet-Nam with all the dangers and responsibilities that entails.

George W. Ball/6/

/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

268. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

Washington, April 21, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG, 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 381 Vietnam Sensitive. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limited Distribution. The covering note, April 22, states that the memorandum was prepared by the Board of National Estimates with the assistance of senior personnel from CIA, DIA, and the Department of State; and that the "line-in, line-out changes were incorporated as a result of agreements reached on the morning of 22 April, 1965 during a review of the document" by McCone, Raborn, Hughes, and Carroll. Deletions in the text are set in canceled type [red text used here]; additions are in italics. A first draft of the memorandum, completed on April 21 before the views of Hughes and Carroll could be obtained, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIII. A covering note for the first draft indicates that McCone sent a copy to the White House on the morning of April 22 for study prior to the advisory meeting scheduled for later that day (see Document 269).

The Problem

To estimate Communist and general world reactions to a US course of action in Vietnam, stated below, over the next six to twelve months.

Assumptions

We assume that the scale and tempo of US air action against North Vietnam and against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam continues at present levels for the period of this estimate. We also assume that, within the next few months, additional US military forces are introduced into South Vietnam to bring the total US military presence there to approximately 80,000 and that these forces will have, as part of their mission, ground combat against Viet Cong troops. We also assume that approximately 5,250 Allied non-US combat forces are introduced.

Discussion

I. Introduction

1. The Present Situation. At present it appears that the DRV, with strong Chinese encouragement, is determined for the present to ride out the US bombardment. The Viet Cong, the DRV, and Communist China have hardened their attitudes toward negotiations, without categorically excluding the possibility under all conditions. They still consider that the tide is running in favor of the VC, despite the bombings in the South. They apparently calculate that the DRV can afford further punishment and that, in the meantime, US determination to persist will weaken because of the pressure of international and US domestic opinion, the threat of a broader conflict, and increasing DRV air defense capabilities.

2. The Soviets have exhibited increased concern about the trend of events, and Moscow has indicated a greater interest in negotiations than the other Communists involved. Nevertheless, the others have thus far rejected Moscow's efforts in this direction. In these circumstances the Soviets have been taking a series of steps, each of which increases their involvement and commitment, in an effort to vie with the Chinese as supporters of North Vietnam and the VC's "national liberation struggle." Soviet SAMs are almost certainly on the way, and the recent Soviet-DRV communiqué suggests that agreement has been reached on other forms of military assistance as well.

3. Non-Communist opinions are influenced primarily by two factors: fears that the war will spread beyond Vietnam, and judgments as to the relative chances of the two sides. On the first point, fears of a larger war are presently not high, but they lie fairly near the surface and work largely against the US. On the second, most world opinion judges that political weakness in Saigon, the success of Viet Cong guerrilla tactics, and the ground predominance of China will eventually lead to Communist victory. Another factor, one which works in the US favor, is the priority which some governments, notably the UK and Australia, attach to maintaining solidarity with the US in Southeast Asia.

Reactions to A Continuation of Present Courses of Action

4. If present US policies continue without the introduction of large additional forces or increased US air effort, the Communists are likely to hold to their existing policy of seeking victory in the local military struggle in South Vietnam. They will try to intensify that struggle, supporting it with additional men and equipment. At the same time, DRV air defenses will be strengthened through Soviet and perhaps Chinese aid. So long as the trend in South Vietnam appears to the Communists to be favorable, however, we doubt that they will open new fronts in Indochina, launch an overt invasion of South Vietnam, or challenge the US in the air in the southern part of the DRV.

5. As to the course of the struggle in South Vietnam itself, in these circumstances we think it unlikely that the Viet Cong and its supporters will come to believe that they can no longer support the war and must make concessions extending beyond the superficial in order to end it. They are more likely to believe that they are prevailing or at least holding their own.

6. If these estimates are correct, then some changes in world opinion are likely over the next six to twelve months we are here considering. Fears of a larger war would probably decline, but the conviction of ultimate Communist victory would be strengthened with the passage of time. Under these circumstances, therefore, the outlook is for a decline in support for the US, although the change might not be very great.

II. Reactions to the Assumed Greater US Involvement

7. The assumed US course of action would require the Communists to re-examine their estimates of US intentions. As the buildup of US and other foreign forces became clear, both Communist and non-Communist opinion would probably conclude that the US had taken a firm decision not to accept a military defeat in South Vietnam. Most of those who believed that US policy sought merely to create the minimal conditions for a face-saving withdrawal would abandon this belief. Many people, and in particular the Chinese, might believe that this US decision could be undone at a later stage, but all would perceive at least a temporary reaffirmation and strengthening of the US commitment. However, as it became apparent that US operations against the DRV were still being conducted on a limited basis, without maximum use of air and naval power, the Communists would be likely to conclude that US determination to prevail had not yet overcome its concern to prevent a widening of the war.

Initial Communist Reactions

8. In the circumstances thus created, the Communists might reason that military victory would now become very difficult or perhaps even unattainable. They might think this, not because they expected the new enemy forces rapidly to reverse the tide of battle, but because they feared they would be unable to continue a series of successful local operations and thereby to maintain the morale of the Viet Cong in a prolonged struggle. Additionally, they might infer from the increased US commitment that, if a stalemate persisted, the chances of a subsequent US resort to more aggressive actions were greater.

9. Alternatively, the Communists might reason that the new enemy forces would serve only to postpone the ultimate Communist victory. In this, they would be counting on such factors as the capabilities of the Viet Cong, the known aversion to "getting bogged down" in a land war in Asia, the political vulnerability of the Saigon Government, the pressures of world and domestic US opinion, and the evident unwillingness, at least thus far, of the US to expand the conflict by bombing northern North Vietnam.

10. Although there would be differences among them in general we believe that the Viet Cong, North Vietnam, and China would initially respond along the second of these lines of reasoning. Accordingly, they would probably try to offset the new enemy strength by stepping up the insurgency, reinforcing the Viet Cong as necessary with the men and equipment necessary. They would likely count on time being on their side and try to force the piecemeal engagement of US troops under conditions which might bog them down in jungle warfare, hoping to present the US with a de facto partition of the country. The Soviet Union would be more inclined to the first line of reasoning but, unless unforseen events had in the meantime produced a major change in post-Khrushchev policy, the USSR would almost certainly acquiesce in a decision by Hanoi to intensify the struggle.

11. There is a third possibility: that Hanoi and Peiping would choose the arrival of major new US forces as the moment for a general showdown. This could involve a large-scale invasion of South Vietnam by DRV troops, movements of Chinese forces into the DRV, and movements of DRV and/or Chinese troops into northern Laos or beyond. We do not believe, however, that they would react in this fashion, at least until they had had a chance to observe how the US intervention had affected the course of the war.

Communist Reactions at a Later Stage

12. Subsequent Communist reactions would depend upon the subsequent course of the struggle in South Vietnam. We cannot estimate how that struggle would evolve after new anti-Communist forces had arrived and the Viet Cong had in turn received new support. In general, however, we believe that the Viet Cong, the DRV, and China all rate the staying power of their side as inherently superior to that of their enemies. But the critical factor will be whether these beliefs are proved in combat validated in terms of the tides of battle, the casualties, and other indicators with US and SVN forces over another six to twelve months of fighting.

13. If the Communists concluded that the Viet Cong's military prospects had seriously worsened in spite of the reinforcements noted in paragraph 10 as a result of the US intervention and military successes then they would face a choice between taking steps to interrupt the conflict or shifting to a large-scale ground offensive along the lines of paragraph 11. In weighing these alternatives, we think they would recognize that by committing ground forces to offensive operations the US had acquired a greater stake in the war. Moreover, they would probably also recognize that the chances of overrunning South Vietnam in overt military operations had receded, and that if they tried to do this against large US forces, the US probably would not accept defeat without expanding the war to the DRV and China, perhaps using nuclear weapons. Thus, we think that, if and when this point is reached, the chances are somewhat better than even that the DRV and China would resort to political moves would seek at least a temporary political solution for a time rather than launch a major ground invasion.

14. The USSR is less concerned than the other Communist states to defeat the US in South Vietnam. Its chief motive is to prevent such a defeat from redounding to Chinese credit and its own discredit, to uphold its claims to leadership of the "socialist camp" and the "national liberation movement." These concerns provide Hanoi with considerable leverage over Moscow, and the USSR would probably provide general support and specialized military assistance to the DRV in any of the various levels of conflict here envisaged. But we note that the present level of Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia is a recent policy departure which reverses Khrushchev's tendency toward disengagement, and it is therefore possible that a sharp increase in risk might cause the USSR to revert to a more aloof posture.

Initial and Subsequent Non-Communist Reactions

15. Perhaps the most important non-Communist reactions would be those of the South Vietnamese. These reactions would probably be somewhat ambivalent, that is, On the one hand they would be considerably encouraged on the one hand but tending by the increased US support; on the other, there would be some tendency, with the passage of time, to relax efforts on the other because someone else would now do the fighting. The introduction of large numbers of US troops might lend credence to charges that the US had colonialist ambitions in Vietnam and cause a rise in popular support for the VC. The key determinant, however, would be the effectiveness of the total US effort. If this produced a slackening of VC pressures, US-South Vietnamese working relations would be fairly smooth. If, on the contrary, the war looked as if it would drag on with no particular respite from DRV/VC pressures, South Vietnamese war weariness and anti-Americanism would probably begin to threaten the US political base in South Vietnam.

16. There would be wide variations, ranging from very positive to very negative, in the reactions of the other non-Communist nations to the US course of action assumed here. However, their declarations and moves would, for the most part, tend to be unimportant, since only a few can have, or even hope to have, any noticeable influence on the countries most directly involved in Vietnam. The ultimate effect of developments in Vietnam on US relations with the bulk of these countries would continue to be determined by the eventual success or failure of US policy there and by the degree to which any individual country found itself becoming more deeply embroiled in the conflict.

17. Major NATO allies, such as Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, and Italy, which have heretofore largely supported US actions, would be almost certain initially to continue this posture. However, their concern at this further evidence of US willingness to enlarge its commitment, and at the implications for further escalation later on, would enhance existing desires for a negotiated settlement. While Rome and Bonn would be likely to remain passive, London and Ottawa would probably press Washington privately to show greater willingness to start talks with the Communists, while avoiding additional escalating actions, and also devise schemes for a de facto cease-fire or ultimate settlement. Nevertheless, both countries would go very far to avoid an open break with the US and to maintain their lines of communication to US policymakers.

18. Such allies as France and Pakistan, which are already negatively oriented to US policies in Vietnam, would deplore the assumed course of action, predict its failure, and step up their moves to mobilize world pressure, primarily on the US, but also on the Communists, to move to the conference table. India's reaction would be similar, though perhaps even more vocally hostile to the US. India and France might also seek to work out joint positions or even new initiatives with the USSR, but Pakistan may be more wary of such actions in view of Ayub's recent rebuff in Moscow and of the vulnerability of newly-established ties between Peiping and Karachi.

 

269. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 22, 1965, 12:34-2:20p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Feb-30 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee/2/--22 Apr 65

/2/The term "NSC Executive Committee" is McCone's and was not a formal designation of the group.

ATTENDING
The President, Secty Rusk, Secty Ball, William Bundy, Secty McNamara, Secty Vance, Gen. Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Raborn and Mr. McCone/3/

/3/McNaughton also attended. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

I briefed the group on the April 21st estimate on the probable Communist and world reactions to the proposed U.S. courses of action in Vietnam./4/ In my briefing I followed the exact wording of the sections of the briefing that are underscored and adjacent to the numbers that appear in the margin of the attached,/5/ modifying the wording as appears in ink. With reference to the statement that "We believe the Communists think time and tide is running in their favor," the President asked whether that was also our own estimate. I responded in the affirmative.

/4/Document 268.

/5/Not attached.

Secretary Rusk took some exceptions to my statements concerning world opinion, indicating that he believed that the intransigence of the Communists and their refusal to engage in negotiations would be understood and absorbed by world opinion and therefore world opinion would lean in our direction.

McNamara stated he agreed with the estimate, particularly the appraisal of the present situation in paragraph 1 and the appraisal of the probable ultimate reaction in paragraph 13. He said these two estimates defined our areas of maneuver. I immediately pointed out the implications and the importance of paragraph 10 in the paper and stated that in my opinion the Viet Cong build-up in South Vietnam initiated by the VC, NVN and Chinese Communists would probably be slow and deliberate and it would be progressive and would always confront us with an increasing demand for men, increasingly serious problems, and increasing casualties. I therefore, urged the group not to overlook the implications in paragraph 10.

McGeorge Bundy stated that Lodge had had satisfactory talks with the Australians and they are willing to provide the brigade indicated in the McNamara paper. His talks with Macapagal had been satisfactory but there had been no commitment, and the position of Korea had not as yet been determined. General Wheeler then stated that the JCS unanimously supported the April 21st paper./6/ He said it was necessary to deploy the additional men and to make preparations for still more men. He made no comment on the tempo of the bombing. He made no appeal for authority to bomb industrial targets, POL, power stations, etc. He expressed no concern over the idea that bombing would be carried on over a long period of time and, indeed, the operation itself would go on for a protracted period. He stated there was a need for more air power in South Vietnam because their air power was getting used up.

/6/Document 265.

Note (a): His position was diametrically opposite from that taken by Admiral Mustin, Director of Planning for the Joint Chiefs, in his briefing to me 10 days ago. In that briefing the Admiral said that we were using less than 5% of our air power and he strongly advocated bombing the targets which are excluded above.

Note (b): I did not at this point raise the differences as it was obvious that Wheeler's position had changed as a result of the Honolulu meeting.

The President asked for Quat's reaction. McNamara stated that we cannot tell. We assume that he will go along. Some work has to be done with the South Vietnamese military leaders to insure their enthusiastic acceptance of large U.S. and third country forces; that the command structure has to be worked out carefully, but he said no problems. I raised the question of South Vietnam public reaction pointing out that the Vietnamese might feel that the war was being taken off their shoulders and fought by others and therefore they would relax. Also, I pointed out that the lift in morale, if it came about, might be quickly offset by an adverse reaction if the war intensified. Rusk elaborated on my statements, confirming them and supporting the estimate in this regard. Wheeler stated that this did not happen with air and when U.S. air went into action, South Vietnam air stepped up their effort. He also said that General Thi finds no problem with the military brigades now in the first Corps area.

The President then made brief reference to the alternative proposal of promoted negotiations and the memorandum prepared by Secretary Ball/7/ (which has been seen by only Mac Bundy, McNamara and Rusk and no others), and expressed the desire to discuss this subject only with those directly concerned, i.e., State and McNamara.

/7/Document 267.

The President then discussed at great length the public reaction and the reaction on the Hill. He complained that no supporting speeches were being made and he felt that our Congressional support was very uncertain and wobbly and we could lose it rapidly. He felt that speeches by Morse, Gruening, Clark, and the statement by Fulbright would have their effect and he exhorted everyone to carry on an intense personal campaign with sympathetic senators and get them on their feet. He also thought that McNamara and Rusk should take every opportunity to make speeches, go on television, etc., and point out the reasonableness of U.S. policy and the ridiculousness of the suggestion that we stop bombing while the VC continue bombing of a type that has been carried on. The President in his remarks, which were extended and quite bitter and directed toward McNamara and Rusk, to me represented a feeling on the President's part that his chief lieutenants had failed to carry Congressional opinion and public opinion with us. He said his mail was running about 50 to 1 against our policy. All in all he seemed very dissatisfied with the public relations effort. He made some passing reference to my working on certain senators but I made no comment nor did I make a commitment. Admiral Raborn suggested that I make a nation-wide television speech. The President did not respond.

The meeting adjourned without action on the McNamara paper. It was obvious that the President wished to give the subject further thought. He wished to get the reaction from South Vietnam. He also wished to explore the diplomatic track prior to making a commitment./8/

/8/Following this meeting in the Cabinet Room, President Johnson met in his "little lounge" from 2:50 to 3:40 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found, but see Document 272.

 

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 23, 1965, 9:44 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC and received in the Department of State at 9:51 p.m. on April 22.

3491. Alex Johnson and I called on PriMin Quat 22 April to report in general terms on my visit to Honolulu. I explained that the purpose had been to continue the discussions of certain matters begun during my visit to Washington early in April. These matters related primarily to ways and means of improving the effectiveness of the in-country campaign against the Viet Cong as well as to the improvement of coastal surveillance of infiltration.

I reported the concern which was felt over the possibility of a new Viet Cong offensive growing out of the present period of relative quiet. US Chiefs of Staff considered it entirely possible that the in-country Viet Cong might be joined by units of the PAVN and take the initiative in the North. Also, we saw some signs of possible Viet Cong offensive intentions north of Saigon. Our chiefs considered that in order to reverse the trend in SVN the ARVN needed as many as 20 additional battalions. The question was how to obtain this added strength. I asked Quat whether he cared to comment on these matters.

Pointedly avoiding any discussion of the possible introduction of US troops to remedy this situation, Quat held forth at length on internal improvements which he hoped to make. He is not satisfied with the aggressiveness of many of his officers. He thinks that many commanders do not pay attention to the needs of their men and thus provide a cause for desertion. He has given thought to raising Nung contingents which he believes are available up to 30,000 men. Likewise, he wants to root out the officers working at non-military tasks in the Saigon ministries and send them to the field.

I told him that all these measures were excellent and that we should exploit all means to increase ARVN strength. However, there were limits to what could be achieved. For example, the shortage of leaders would always be a controlling factor. I also suggested that he discuss with Generals Thieu and Minh the reduced strength of the general reserve of which five battalions are now pinned down in Binh Dinh province.

We mentioned the two documents bearing on sea surveillance which Amb Johnson had left with him on April 19 (Embtel 3442)./2/ He said they were now being studied by his staff and that he would respond to them shortly.

/2/Dated April 19. (Ibid.)

I informed him of Ambassador Lodge's visit on 28-29 April,/3/ mentioning that it was confidential for the moment. He expressed pleasure and anticipation at prospect of seeing Lodge soon.

/3/Regarding Lodge's visit, as the President's Special Representative, to Seoul, Tokyo, Manila, Taipei, Canberra, Auckland, Saigon, and New Delhi, with a stopover in Rome on the return to Washington, April 19-May 1, see Lodge's memorandum to President Johnson, May 4, scheduled for publication in volume XXVI.

In response to a query, he indicated that he had no additional word on General Khanh but promised to clarify his future for us soon./4/

/4/In telegram, 3496 from Saigon, April 23, Taylor indicated that he had given Quat a general report on the Honolulu Conference, as described in telegram 3491 from Saigon, and warned the President there might be "serious difficulties" in obtaining Quat's approval of some of the projects under consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Taylor

[end document]

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Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
March 8-May 8
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