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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 22, 1965, 10:52 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by McNamara, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Rusk (in draft), and approved by Unger.

2397. For Amb Taylor from Secretary Rusk. After Honolulu discussions McNamara has now recommended to the President the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 U.S. troops already in-country:

1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000 closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns at Chu Lai	6,200 closing 5 May
1 Australian btn at Vung Tau 1,250 closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000 closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn) at Quang Ngai	4,000 closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces	11,000 already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level	7,000 already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions	16,000 not yet approved

Upon completion of these deployments, the U.S. forces would include 13 battalions and would have a total strength approximating 82,000 men, and the Korean and Australian forces would include 4 battalions with a total strength of 7,250 men.

For your wholly private information, and subject to private Congressional consultation, the President is inclined to favor McNamara's recommendations, but before making a decision on them he wishes to obtain the opinion of the GVN. We believe the best way to pursue matter with Quat at this stage would be for you to make an exposition of the situation as a matter of your own judgment and recommendation, in essentially the following terms:

Instructions to Ambassador Taylor.

"The Embassy has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

Meanwhile the JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from US and third country sources.

The Embassy accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and subject to your views, I am prepared to recommend to the President that:

(1) The US assist the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time.

(2) As part of this effort, the US bring in additional US ground forces. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. I would propose that the US provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents.

You should seek to obtain the support of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out after Presidential review of your recommendations. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that if your recommendations are accepted the total US in-country strength would approximate 80,000.

You must emphasize to Quat that it is of utmost importance there be no leak or public disclosure of these matters which are of highest military and security importance to North Vietnam as well as to US.

You should also tell Quat that if he agrees with the proposed deployments it is not our intention to announce whole program now but rather to announce individual deployments at appropriate times.

Rusk

 

272. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 23, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX CO 312. No classification marking. Marked with an indication that the President saw it.

The following suggestions emerged from our conversations yesterday:/2/

/2/See Document 269 and footnote 8 thereto.

1. That we should accept the Cambodia Conference/3/ and transmit to Hanoi privately the word that we come prepared to discuss larger issues. The latter, of course, should not be said publicly. We do feel it important to let Hanoi know we are serious. Some key intelligence people believe your Easter statement/4/ flatly rejected the possibility of talks.

/3/See Document 263.

/4/Apparently a reference to the statement read by the President to news correspondents at the LBJ Ranch on April 17. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 857-859)

2. At the same time, and after clearance with Saigon, we should slow down our bombing. We should do this without announcing it simply by suspending raids for two or three days a week in some sort of pattern. We should also let Hanoi know that we are doing this in order to improve the atmosphere for talks.

3. We should then prepare for talks in Geneva--which should begin as soon as possible--with a detailed negotiating strategy. The beginning of this is in the George Ball paper./5/

/5/Document 267.

The basic assumption is that we want to get the war to the Conference table. We do not know if Hanoi is willing to negotiate, but we want to make it as easy for them to do so as possible.

By slowing down the bombing you are allowing them to talk without looking as if they are being bombed into submission. By not making a public announcement of the bombing let up, you do not get into the position of having to admit the failure of a peace effort if you resume raids. Hanoi will get the message anyway. If it fails we can always leak stories that we tried it and it didn't work.

We also agree that the present steady escalation, in the North, will get less and less result for more and more noise. The best way to stop it is to slow down for a while. Then you can buildup again, and have considerable impact without going above the present level.

After all, our political message--that we are going to stay--is pretty well understood. Therefore the real purpose of a continuing buildup would be to smash North Vietnam into submission. This kind of an approach will bring with it a substantial chance of Chinese intervention. Even Ho Chi Minh will probably prefer Chinese intervention to surrender.

We should also make a real peace effort before putting in many more ground troops. It is a lot easier to disengage planes than ground troops.

It is possible they don't want to negotiate. It may even be probable. But we should give this a try, and in a direct and low key way.

 

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 24, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. There is no time of transmission on the source text, but the telegram was received in the Department of State at 11:49 p.m. on April 23.

3504. Eyes only for Secretary McNamara. Ref. DEF-009653 231859Z./2/ I would like to amend the statement of my views expressed in the memo for the President dated April 21 in two respects.

/2/Telegram DEF 9653, April 23, contained the text of McNamara's memorandum of April 21 to the President. (Document 265) It also noted an additional substantive point made in McNaughton's minutes of the meeting, namely that it was agreed that "tasks within South Vietnam should have first call on air assets in the area and that, if at any time there are not enough assets in the area to perform all necessary tasks, more air should be brought in." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Minutes of April 30, 1965 Honolulu Meeting)

A. II, paragraph 1. "This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from Viet Cong failure in the south as from DRV pain in the north and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate Viet Cong failure in the South."

Comment: This statement suggests that it may take a year or two to break the will of Hanoi to continue their present course even if we continue our bombing and introduce substantial U.S. forces. My view is that a favorable settlement should be possible from a combination of continued air attacks and by the introduction of sufficient U.S. and third country forces to demonstrate to Hanoi that the Viet Cong have no ultimate chance of success. This process will probably take months; how many is impossible to estimate.

B. II, paragraph 2. "All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or two, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period."

Comment: I subscribe to this statement less the phase "perhaps a year or two."

Taylor

 

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 26, 1965, 9:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Vientiane.

3539. For Greenfield. Pass USIA for Bunce, DOD for Sylvester. We have been giving some thought to press problems which will arise as Marines or other U.S. troops move to more active role against Viet Cong.

Officially and on the record mission spokesmen have restricted themselves to language used in DOD release of March 7, 1965, specifying that "limited mission of Marines will be to relieve GVN forces now engaged in security duties for action in the pacification program and in offensive role against Communist guerrilla forces."

On background spokesmen have answered affirmatively questions as to whether Marines would (a) fight if attacked and (b) engage in "patrolling in depth" to deepen Danang perimeter defense. With respect to (b) it has been explained that such patrolling in depth is necessary part of Marine primary defensive mission.

Speculative stories have appeared here on eventual combat role for Marines. Any additional input of U.S. combat troops will doubtless feed this speculation.

(An AP "news analysis" for example, datelined Saigon, April 22, speaks of the eventuality that involvement of U.S. ground troops in combat would raise the question of a joint command. While conceding that such a command "would have little practical effect on relations between the allies", the article states that it "would be a major diplomatic development that could spark powerful international reaction." Further, according to a statement attributed to "Vietnamese civilian and military leaders", the Vietnamese people would have to be "conditioned" to accept such a situation, and efforts would need to be made to counteract Communist propaganda to the effect that the South Vietnamese Government is the "lackey of American imperialists."

Under these circumstances we believe that the most useful approach to press problem is to make no special public announcement to the effect that U.S. ground troops are now engaged in offensive combat operations, but to announce such actions routinely as they occur. As the Marines move from their present posture of securing the Danang airbase "in depth" to actions which can be related only indirectly to Danang, military spokesman will be queried on whether Marine mission has changed and he will answer that, while we never discuss future, current operations speak for themselves. Eventually, of course, fact that Marines or other ground troops are engaged in offensive combat will be officially confirmed. This low-key treatment will not obviate the political and psychological problems mentioned above, but will allow us to handle them undramatically, as a natural consequence of our determination to meet our commitments here.

Our treatment, in short, should be patterned on the manner in which we presented the application of U.S. air power against the Viet Cong.

Taylor

 

275. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 27, 1965, 8:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1265A, Memos for the Record, 1 Mar-28 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book at the Johnson Library. The meeting was held at the Department of State. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Discussion with Secretary Rusk--Admiral Raborn attended

1. Rusk raised the question of a recent TDCS from Saigon/2/ indicating that "the Viet Cong were going north" in withdrawal paralleling that of 1954. He raised the question whether this meant the south to the north part of South Vietnam, or north to North Vietnam. I have not seen this cable, nor could I express an opinion on its credibility.

/2/Not further identified.

Note: I should look at this report immediately and report to Rusk.

2. I raised the question of the policy of the April 21st paper/3/ on the strikes against North Vietnam and reiterated the views expressed in my letter to Rusk, McNamara and Bundy on April 2nd/4/ and the new draft of April 27th/5/ which I intend to send to the President. I pointed out that the philosophy of the April 21st paper changed the purposes of the bombing and that I felt the DRV could ride out this kind of bombing and if we wanted to bring them to the conference table, we better "tighten the tourniquet". I said there were no indications they were seriously interested in negotiating on terms acceptable to us and this had been our estimate. Rusk said that we could not be sure that carrying the bombing north would bring them to the conference table. I pointed out that the existing extimate/6/ was that when the industrial north was threatened, they very probably would seek some form of negotiation. My point was that the April 21st paper brought in a new approach to the war and that adequate estimates of Communist reactions had not been prepared; that the estimate of April 23rd/7/ was a hurried one and was made after the fact. Rusk replied that the polices of the April 21st paper were not made hurriedly, that my letter of April 2nd had been thoughtfully considered, and the decision to pursue the war on the basis outlined in the April 21st paper was deliberately make after extended discussions between McNamara, Rusk and Bundy. I said it would be necessary for me to express my views to the President and I did not think my letter of April 2 had been presented to him.

/3/Document 265.

/4/See the attachment to Document 234.

/5/Apparently a reference to Document 279.

/6/Document 139.

/7/Apparently the final version of Document 268.

3. Rusk raised the question of Mr. Joe Kraft, newspaperman going to Hanoi. Kraft received a visa; I strongly suggested he be given a passport.

Action: DDP should study whether there could be an operational opportunity here.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

 

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 27, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X. Top Secret; Nodis. The source text is a typed unsigned transcript that McGeorge Bundy forwarded to the President under an April 27 memorandum stating: "Max now recommends a 9-battalion decision. My own view is that we ought to decide something more limited--perhaps the items (a) and (b) in his third paragraph (6 battalions)."

3552. From Ambassador Taylor. Although Quat had not summoned us to resume the discussions reported in reference telegram,/2/ Alex Johnson and I went to see him this afternoon to find out the current status of his thinking on the introduction of international forces. We found that he was full of the subject, having discussed many aspects of the military manpower shortage with Generals Thieu and Minh over the weekend.

/2/Telegram 3511 from Saigon, April 24. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. IIA)

He is particularly impressed with the need and possibility of increasing the national effort beyond the present program of 31 additional ARVN battalions between July 1965 and March 1966 (the so-called second alternative). He sees numerous possibilities of utilizing certain specially trained regional force soldiers, ex-non-coms dismissed by Diem in the late 1950's, and officers presently assigned to civilian ministries. He also considers that the Nungs and Hoa Hao are capable of producing many more soliders and units than at present. He has charged General Minh with looking into these possibilities and of formulating a new program to superimpose on the second alternative. Knowing something of the problem of raising additional forces, I have doubts as to the feasibility of most of Quat's ideas, but his enthusiasm is certainly laudable.

With regard to additional US forces, we agreed that General Westmoreland should contact Generals Thieu and Minh and work out plans for the following movements: (a) three battalion equivalents to move into Bien Hoa-Vung Tau in early May; (b) three battalion equivalents, followed by three air squadrons, to move into Chu Lai early May; (c) three battalion equivalents to move into Qui Nhon-Nhatrang in mid-June. It is understood that in addition to these US combat forces, there will be substantial numbers of logistic troops brought in to add to the logistic support presently in-country, to provide support for the additional combat forces, and to improve the logistic facilities in the three areas mentioned above.

With regard to publicity, it was agreed that, as combat units are about to enter the country, as in the case of the Marines, there will be a simple announcement made, indicating that the additional forces come at the invitation of the Government of Vietnam.

We then passed to a discussion of third country forces. Quat made a fuzzy introduction which led me to believe for a moment that he was going to raise obstacles to non-US foreign troops. However, in a circumlocution which was difficult to follow, he concluded that since it was the position of his Government that the cause of South Vietnam is really the cause of the Free World, it would be entirely consistent for him to accept third country units. He noted in passing that he was aware of our US domestic problem and that the presence of other flags would be of assistance to us.

I told him that I felt sure the Australians were prepared to offer a battalion and that Ambassador Anderson would no doubt be seeking an appointment with him shortly. He replied that Anderson was already on his list for callers for tomorrow. He showed some interest in the possibility of a Korean reinforcement but was markedly cool to the thought of additional Philippine forces. We left both matters open with the agreement to obtain Ambassador Lodge's impressions of his visits to Seoul and Manila when Lodge calls tomorrow./3/ Also, Quat authorized Alex Johnson to discuss the matter of these foreign contingents with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do who we find is abreast of these matters.

/3/See footnote 3, Document 270.

General Westmoreland is undertaking planning at once with Thieu and Minh on the approved subjects./4/ As these matters were presented to Quat as being what I would recommend to Washington if he concurred, I now request approval of the introduction of the US Combat and Logistic Forces on the general schedule indicated above.

/4/Westmoreland's follow-up meeting with Generals Minh and Thieu on April 28 is summarized in his memorandum of conversation that day. (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup)

 

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, April 28, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 2:06 a.m.

3559. For the President. Upon returning from my visit to Honolulu last week, I found the most active political issue in Saigon was related to the conference on Cambodia and the need to obtain the Vietnamese support for participation. We had anticipated considerable difficulty in presenting this matter and obtaining the support of Quat's government. However, the GVN made matters easier for us by a premature interview given by Foreign Minister Do/2/ expressing GVN willingness to participate in the conference. However, the interview was not fully cleared with Prime Minister Quat, who showed an understandable reluctance to appear too eager for a conference which might lead to discussions on Viet-Nam. Thus, Patrick Gordon Walker/3/ had a busy time, though he eventually accomplished his mission of securing GVN agreement. Whether Prince Sihanouk will now succeed in his apparent efforts to block attendance at the conference by the U.S., GVN and Thais remains to be seen.

/2/Tran Van Do made this statement in an interview with a Reuters correspondent on April 23.

/3/Patrick Gordon Walker, a Special Representative of the British Government, toured Asia April 14-May 4 to discuss with the Governments of Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Japan, and India the possibility of negotiated settlements regarding Vietnam and Cambodia.

Although the internal political scene was quiet on the surface, there are continuing indications of unrest among various political groupings who do not find themselves entirely satisfied by the Quat government. There has so far been little to unite these disparate groups of militant Catholics, some unhappy military leaders, southern regionalists, and the usual "out" politicians. Quat is well aware of the danger of these malcontents and is trying to placate those of any real importance. He told us April 27/4/ that insofar as the southern regionalists were concerned, he expected to give them additional ministerial seats in his next overhaul of the cabinet.

/4/As reported in telegram 3556 from Saigon, April 27. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 VIET S)

On last Friday, I received authority from Washington/5/ to sound out Quat with regard to the introduction of the additional forces recommended by the conference in Honolulu. Alex Johnson and I presented the matter to him the following day/6/ under somewhat disadvantageous conditions as he was being pressed at the time by the need to develop a government position on the Cambodian conference. In spite of earlier indications of reluctance to request additional foreign forces, Quat received our presentation quite calmly and indicated almost at once his personal concurrence in principle. Our understanding when we broke up was that he would discuss this matter cautiously with his principal military advisors and call us back for a second conference earlier this week.

/5/See Document 271, which Taylor received on Friday, April 23.

/6/Taylor described this meeting in telegram 3511 from Saigon, April 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. IIA)

Having failed to receive this call, Alex Johnson and I sought an appointment the afternoon of April 27 in which Quat gave his complete concurrence to the introduction of the U.S. and third country forces recommended in Honolulu. We agreed that Generals Westmoreland, Thieu and Minh would initiate planning at once and I have requested Washington for final approval for the phased introduction of the US troops./7/

/7/See Document 276.

Insofar as Viet Cong activity during the week was concerned, the lull in activity which has lasted for several weeks continued. The Viet Cong main force units are still avoiding contact with ARVN units and react only when the ARVN proceed against their controlled areas. While we always try to push the ARVN to take advantage of such a lull to harass and destroy the Viet Cong in their own bases, results in terms of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong during the week have not been impressive.

You may have noticed from previous reports that the term "pacification" has fallen into disrepute as being negative and ill-descriptive of the liberation of the country from the Viet Cong and that "rural reconstruction" has been substituted for it. Regardless of the change of name, progress in this field remains as undramatic as in the past. However, a great deal of work is being expended on the numerous actions programs which were discussed with you during my consultations in Washington earlier this month. Whenever security conditions permit, most of these programs are moving quite well but, unfortunately, reconstruction is hampered by security considerations in many provinces.

We may have to seek your help in the matter of the new chancery project which has run into trouble before Congress. You will recall your quick reaction to the bombing of the Embassy in urging and obtaining House authorization for the construction of a new chancery which would be both "permanent" and "dignified". It has been almost a month since the public announcement of the intention to initiate this construction/8/ but the legislation has, I understand, encountered obstacles in the Senate. Because of the political and psychological effect here in South Viet-Nam (apart from our urgent need for an efficient and reasonably secure Embassy), it will be most unfortunate if Congressional delays are allowed to blur the impact of your prompt reaction to the bombing of the Embassy.

/8/See Document 221.

Taylor

 

278. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 28, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Apparently dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. McCone retired as Director of Central Intelligence on April 28 and was replaced by Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. (USN, Ret.)

SUBJECT
Discussion with the President alone on 28 April 1965--12:00 Noon

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

4. I then reviewed my discussion at the NSC (restricted) meetings of last Thursday and Friday/2/ at which time I expressed some opposition to the April 21st proposal of Secretary McNamara/3/ and finally gave the President my letter of April 28,/4/ copy of which is attached and to which is appended my letter to Secty Rusk, Secty McNamara and Mr. Bundy./5/ The President asked if I had discussed the subject with Rusk and McNamara. I replied affirmatively, and told him I had also discussed this with McGeorge Bundy. The President accepted the letter and placed it on his desk without comment. I personally feel this is as far as I can go or, for that matter, as far as the Agency should go in this matter, which is of a strictly policy nature.

/2/See Documents 266 and 269.

/3/Document 265.

/4/Document 279.

/5/See the attachment to Document 234.

 

279. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 28, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV. Top Secret.

Dear Mr. President:

I remain concerned, as I have said before to you, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, over the limited scale of air action against North Vietnam which we envision for the next few months.

Specifically I feel that we must conduct our bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to hurt North Vietnam badly enough to cause the Hanoi regime to seek a political way out through negotiation rather than expose their economy to increasingly serious levels of destruction. By limiting our attacks to targets like bridges, military installations and lines of communication, in effect we signal to the Communists that our determination to win is significantly modified by our fear of widening the war.

In these circumstances the Communists are likely to feel they can afford to accept a considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and step up their insurgency in South Vietnam. If they take this line of action, in the next few months they can present us with an ever-increasing guerrilla war against the reinforced Viet Cong in terrain and circumstances favorable to the Communists.

If this situation develops and lasts several months or more, I feel world opinion will turn against us, Communist propaganda will become increasingly effective, and indeed domestic support of our policy may erode.

I therefore urge that as we deploy additional troops, which I believe necessary, we concurrently hit the north harder and inflict greater damage. In my opinion, we should strike their petroleum supplies, electric power installations, and air defense installations (including the SAM sites which are now being built). I do not think we have to fear taking on the MIG's, which after all the ChiNats defeated in 1958 with F-86's and Sidewinders.

I am not talking about bombing centers of population or killing innocent people, though there will of course be some casualties. I am proposing to "tighten the tourniquet" on North Vietnam so as to make the Communists pause to weigh the losses they are taking against their prospects for gains. We should make it hard for the Viet Cong to win in the south and simultaneously hard for Hanoi to endure our attacks in the north.

I believe this course of action holds out the greatest promise we can hope for in our effort to attain our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. This view follows logically, it seems to me, from our National Intelligence Estimate of 18 February 1965,/2/ which concludes that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to make an effort to "secure a respite" by some political move when and if, but not before, a sustained U.S. program of air attacks is damaging important economic or military assets in North Vietnam.

/2/Document 139.

I attach a copy of my memorandum of April 2nd,/3/ which may not have come to your attention, since it argues this case in a little more detail.

/3/See the attachment to Document 234.

Respectfully yours,

John A. McCone/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

280. Telegram From the Department of Defense to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, April 30, 1965, 7:29 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by McNaughton and concurred in by McNamara and Wheeler. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.

DEF 1097. This is a joint State-Defense message. Ref Saigon 3552./2/

/2/Document 276.

1. In response to your request in reftel, decision has been taken to deploy in early May, at your call, three battalion equivalents into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau and three battalion equivalents into Chu Lai; Marine air unit will be deployed later in May. Decision as to deployment of additional US battalions in June will be postponed until later, when decision is required to meet deployment schedule.

2. First movement, to Bien Hoa/Vung Tau, will begin 24 hours from time of your call and will reach SVN within about one day. Second movement, to Chu Lai, can reach SVN 5 May. Marine air will close Chu Lao on completion air strip there in mid-May.

3. Seabees, already authorized, are due to arrive Vietnam in time to begin construction at Chu Lai once Marine battalions in place there.

4. You should inform Quat of these decisions and schedules immediately and work out with him announcement or announcements in accordance recommendation para 4 your reftel.

 

281. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X. No classification marking.

In the attached cable/2/ Max Taylor reports that he has relayed to Quat our basic decisions on the May deployments to Vietnam. His current plan is that there will be a joint announcement from Saigon on Monday,/3/ very early in the morning, our time. This timing may slip somewhat if the planned schedule is not met. The text of the announcement is at the second page in the marked paragraph./4/

/2/Telegram 3606 from Saigon, May 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/3/May 3.

/4/The text of the announcement reads as follows: "As a continuation of the GVN's efforts to assure security of key installations and to press the war effort against the Viet Cong more vigorously, the GVN has requested and the United States Government has agreed to furnish three battalions of United States airborne forces for deployment in South Viet-Nam. This contingent of United States forces will augment the security forces assigned to the vital Bien Hoa-Vung Tau military base complex. An advance party arrived on 3 May and the movement will be completed within the next few days."

McG. B.

 

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/

Washington, May 3, 1965, 1:37 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and cleared in substance by Rusk. Also sent to London, Paris and New Delhi.

1162. For the Ambassador. As a matter of urgency you should approach the Foreign Minister or other appropriate high-level official for a discreet discussion concerning the suggestions which have been made that the US stop its bombing of North Viet-Nam as a contribution to a peaceful settlement of the question. What we are particularly anxious to learn is whether his government, through whatever source or channel, has received any indications as to whether or not a cessation of bombing would cause Hanoi to stop the actions which it is now taking on its side to interfere in South Viet-Nam. It can be added that we have ourselves posed publicly and privately to the other side the question of what would result from a stop in our bombing, and we have had no indication of any response.

The reply of the Foreign Minister or other official would be appreciated soonest./2/ You should also emphasize that this whole question should be treated with greatest discretion.

/2/In telegram 1373 from Ottawa, May 3, the Embassy reported that the Canadian Government had no evidence that a bombing pause "at this time" would lead Hanoi to negotiate. (Ibid.) On May 4 the Embassies in New Delhi and Paris reported similar responses. (Telegram 3153 from New Delhi and telegram 6239 from Paris; both ibid.) The Embassy in London did not respond directly to the question, but Under Secretary of State Ball was in London May 3-5 for SEATO Council meetings, and British officials may have discussed the question of the probable effect of a bombing pause with Ball.

Rusk

 

283. Editorial Note

On May 4 President Johnson sent a special message to Congress requesting an additional appropriation of $700 million to meet expanding military requirements in Vietnam. Johnson indicated that the request was intended to cover the remainder of the fiscal year, and added that, "if our need expands," he might have to return to Congress for additional funding. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 864-868) Congress approved the request within 2 days and Johnson signed the supplemental appropriation on May 7. (Ibid., page 868) On May 18 the White House released the text of a memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President indicating how the appropriation would be allocated. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pages 559-560)

 

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State on May 4 at 10:51 p.m. and passed to the White House.

3645. For the President. The situation was comparatively quiet both on the political and military fronts during the past week. Quat is proceeding with plans for a reorganization of his cabinet, a desirable action provided that he does not go too far and recreate the image of governmental instability which we are trying to dispel. In eliminating the incompetent, he hopes to strengthen himself politically by bringing in more southerners and thus placating the most important group which is showing dissatisfaction with his government.

Quat also hopes that he is about to get agreement from his generals to dissolve the Armed Forces Council. This, also, is a good thing particularly if it can be done without reopening dissension among the generals. I have the impression that Quat probably could go faster in straightening out the military but is restrained by his instinctive fear of confrontations and tests of strength. Perhaps in the long run this caution will pay.

Although Quat has displayed considerable adroitness in handling his opponents, he is not escaping growing criticism in the local press. Some critics complain of corruption and weak officials; some of the need for national elections; others comment on an alleged over-eagerness of the Quat government to consider negotiations with the Communists. Also, there is the chronic impatience over a government which does not show quick and dramatic successes in a short period of time. One hears all of these rumblings at the moment but we are not inclined to attach too much importance to them yet.

I was deeply vexed by the unfortunate border violation in which USAF planes bombed a Cambodian village and thus gave Sihanouk his excuse to break off relations with US and perhaps later grounds for scuttling the Cambodian conference./2/ While the breach with Sihanouk was probably inevitable, it is most regrettable that it came about as it did. General Westmoreland is having a thorough investigation made of the violation and we will see that appropriate disciplinary action is taken.

/2/For text of a May 6 message from Rusk to the Cambodian Foreign Minister regarding the severance of relations between the two countries, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 716-717.

The major events of the military week were the arrival of the advance party of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the announcement that Australia will send a battalion of combat troops to Vietnam. Both announcements were received with enthusiasm and, for the moment, constitute a lift to the local morale. What the eventual effect will be of the presence of so many foreign troops is still unpredictable.

There are many sensitivities in this country of which we foreigners are unperfectly aware. Recently, the local press picked up a report that a joint US/GVN command was being considered which has triggered many adverse comments both in public and in private. A joint command to the Vietnamese means one dominated by the US and such a subordination would be offensive to most Vietnamese. General Westmoreland is thoroughly aware of this sensitivity and will proceed cautiously in suggesting such changes of relationship as may be required by the presence of US ground forces in action.

I hope that your attention has been called to the highly successful anti-Viet Cong operation in Kien Hoa Province where the seventh division has just executed an extremely well planned operation. It resulted in the discovery of a large arms and supply cache and the capture of important documents giving considerable information on seaborne infiltration. It may well be that this discovery will be more valuable than the ship we sank at Vung Ro Bay in early March.

We enjoyed very much Cabot Lodge's visit last Wednesday and Thursday. He said the right thing to the right people and left much good feeling behind him. Many thanks for having him call on us.

Taylor

 

285. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, May 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV, Memos (B). Secret.

SUBJECT
The Radhakrishnan Plan for Vietnam/2/

/2/Indian President Radhakrishnan publicly put forward the plan outlined in this memorandum on May 24. (The New York Times, May 25)

You asked for our thoughts on the usefulness of the Radhakrishnan plan for a Vietnam solution.

The Plan: Originally Radhakrishnan's personal inspiration (proposed rather casually last month on receiving a newly accredited diplomat), this plan now has the full support of the Indian Government and should be taken seriously, if for that reason alone.

Essentially, the proposals are for (a) cessation of hostilities by both sides in Vietnam; (b) policing of the boundary between North and South Vietnam by an Afro-Asian force; and (c) maintenance of the present boundaries so long as the people concerned desire it. In more recent discussions, the Indians have indicated that (a) "cessation of hostilities" would not interfere with the GVN's right and obligation to preserve peace within its borders; (b) the proposal for Afro-Asian troops in the area did not imply a request for concurrent evacuation of U.S. forces (the Indians assume that U.S. forces would "pull back" into camps but would remain in South Vietnam); and (c) the Afro-Asian force would patrol the 17th parallel and also the Cambodian and Lao borders.

Status of the Plan: The Indians have now solicited support for this plan in most capitals of Europe, Africa and Asia, with the exception of Karachi, Djakarta, and Peking. They report favorable responses from Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito and Souvanna Phouma; they say that the Soviets find the proposal "interesting" and are ready to "use their influence with Hanoi". Peking has denounced the plan. The Indians are currently working on the command, recruitment, and financial aspects of the proposed Afro-Asian force; it is envisioned that such troops would come mainly from Japan, Nigeria and the U.A.R. (India is also ready to contribute, but its role has to be worked out so as not to prejudice its position on the ICC.)

The U.S. Response: Bowles and the Department have privately told the Indians of our interest in the Radhakrishnan initiative. We are not under pressure for an immediate public response, since the Indians themselves believe that the U.S. should refrain from public endorsement until Moscow and Hanoi have made their position clear. However, Bowles argues that a public statement that we are considering this plan would further demonstrate our reasonableness and flexibility, would help to build up Indian influence vis-à-vis China before the Algiers conference, would increase India's good will towards us at a critical juncture, and would test Hanoi's and Moscow's desire to end the fighting on honorable terms.

Embassy Saigon's Reaction: Embassy Saigon has just reported its views (Saigon's 3682)/3/ that the Radhakrishnan plan has attractive features and that we should encourage the Indians to develop it. Saigon also suggests that we refrain from public endorsement of the plan to avoid giving it the kiss of death in Hanoi. The GVN Foreign Minister is currently in New Delhi, and something further may come out of his talks with the Indians.

/3/Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Conclusion: This plan has considerable merit. At the very least, it provides yet another means to show our peaceful intentions and to test the other side; conceivably it might serve as the basis for a negotiated solution.

For the time being, we seem to be playing this one just about right; but we should be ready to move with some speed toward public endorsement if either Moscow or Hanoi makes such a move.

Jim

[end document]

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Increase in U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and consideration by the U.S. Government of a bombing pause,
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