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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATESVolume II, Vietnam January-June 1965
Washington, D.C. |
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1//1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. The text was received from the White House and cleared by William Bundy and by the Secretary in substance.
Washington, May 10, 1965, 8:39 p.m.
2553. To Ambassador Taylor from the President. I have learned from Bob McNamara that nearly all Rolling Thunder operations for this week can be completed by Wednesday noon, Washington time./2/ This fact and the days of Buddha's birthday seem to me to provide an excellent opportunity for a pause in air attacks which might go into next week and which I could use to good effect with world opinion.
/2/May 12.
My plan is not to announce this brief pause but simply to call it privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi as soon as possible, and tell them that we shall be watching closely to see whether they respond in any way. My current plan is to report publicly after the pause ends on what we have done.
Could you see Quat right away on Tuesday and see if you can persuade him to concur in this plan. I would like to associate him with me in this decision if possible, but I would accept a simple concurrence or even a willingness not to oppose my decision. In general, I think it important that he and I should act together in such matters, but I have no desire to embarrass him if it is politically difficult for him to join actively in a pause over Buddha's birthday.
We have noted your 3699/3/ and 3706/4/ but do not yet have your appreciation of the political effect in Saigon of acting around Buddha's birthday. From my point of view it is a great advantage to use Buddha's birthday to mask the first days of the pause here, if it is at all possible in political terms for Quat. I assume we could undertake to enlist the Archbishop and the Nuncio in calming the Catholics.
/3/Telegram 3699, May 8, reported that Thich Tinh Khiet's Buddha birthday message carried no appeal for a cease-fire. Taylor added that on May 1 he had asked Prime Minister Quat whether he saw any merit in the suggestion that there be a pause in air attacks during the celebration of Buddha's birthday. Quat responded that Buddha's birthday was not a national holiday akin to Tet, and he did not see any merit in such a suggestion. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12 VIET S)
/4/In telegram 3706, May 10, the Embassy reported that it had received from Tri Quang a copy of an appeal being made by Khiet calling for a cessation of hostilities on Buddha's birthday. Tri Quang said that the birthday message reported in telegram 3699 had not been Khiet's authorized holiday appeal. He added that should the United States heed such an appeal, its stock would go up significantly with the Vietnamese people. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
You should understand that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists. We have amply demonstrated our determination and our commitment in the last two months, and I now wish to gain some flexibility.
I know that this is a hard assignment on short notice, but there is no one who can bring it off better.
I have kept this plan in the tightest possible circle here and wish you to inform no one but Alexis Johnson. After I have your report of Quat's reaction I will make a final decision and it will be communicated promptly to senior officers concerned.
Rusk
289. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. No time of transmission is on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 11:45 a.m.
3731. For the President from Ambassador Taylor. Deptel 2553./2/
/2/Document 288.
Part I
Alex Johnson and I called on Quat this afternoon to take up matter raised in reftel. We explained feeling in Washington that there was need to vary pattern of our activity vis-à-vis Hanoi and give more flexibility to our operations. To this end, consideration was being given to pause of several days duration in air attacks against DRV which, it seemed to us, would offer several advantages. Such action would be viewed favorably by world opinion as an indication of our reluctance to proceed too rapidly in applying military pressures. It would also provide an opportunity to observe reaction of Hanoi leaders who are unlikely to respond other than with defiance while attacks are in process. Finally, we could anticipate some psychological effect deriving from quiet of several days of suspended action followed, if required, by resumption of attacks.
After pointing out advantages, we noted danger of misinterpretation and need for plausible reason for timing of our action. We said that observance of Buddha's birthday offered convenient peg upon which to hang our proposed action. We knew that from previous discussions Quat had not favored anything resembling cease-fire related to this period but we were raising matter again in an entirely different context.
Quat did not take issue with arguments in favor of pause of limited duration. He did suggest, however, that pause be introduced progressively, one day of air activity followed by another of quiet. I objected that this kind of pattern would not fully meet any of three purposes which we considered to justify suspension of air activity. He abandoned argument without much reluctance and indicated general agreement with pause concept (four or five days only) except for linkage with Buddha's birthday. He feels strongly that we should not publicly advance this occasion as reason for our action. To do so would cause him difficulty with local Catholics and would be embarrassing in other respects since his govt has declined to give official recognition and support to birthday period. Finally, he pointed out that Ambassador Lodge was alleged to have pursued pro-Buddhist policy and that he felt Americans would give support to this allegation if we justified pause on Buddha's birthday.
Without such pretext, we asked him how we could respond to inevitable press queries as to reason for lack of air activity. He said that this would cause him no difficulty as he and his spokesmen would simply respond that this matter of strategy about which they would make no comment.
While I did not mention plan to call suspension of air activities privately to attention of Moscow and Hanoi, I did comment on need of clear understanding of our motives on part of Communists and mentioned that it may be necessary to enter into some kind of communication with them on subject. Quat accepted this remark without comment.
In summary, Quat concurs in concept of pause from four to not more than five days provided there is no public linking of this action with Buddha's birthday. If speculation assumes this linkage, he would not try to dispel impression but would give no verification. Johnson and I recommend that we respect his objections and adjust our plans in consonance with them.
Part II
If decision is made to proceed with pause, we shall need additional guidance with regard to our public relations attitude. The following are some of factors which will have to be taken into account. (Some do not apply if we follow Quat's views with regard to Buddha's birthday.)
1. As pattern of daily announcements and briefings on air actions against North now established here and elsewhere, absence of announcement will immediately be noted and queries made as to reason.
2. Bonze Khiet's request for "cessation of attacks" is only for period 0000 hours to 2400 hours May 15. If we use birthday as pretext for pause of several days, we appear more Buddhist than venerable.
3. Quat will have to give some reasons for pause to his generals and something as to true motives can be expected to leak fairly promptly to press.
4. Press can be expected to probe hard to learn whether initiative for pause came from GVN or USG and, if latter, whether from Saigon or Washington.
Initially, press can be expected to perceive connection between pause and Buddha's birthday but to extent that pause extends beyond May 15 speculation as to other reasons can be expected to become intense both in local and international press, and correspondents will hound every possible source. Our refusal to answer questions here and well-known fact that Washington issues instructions on strikes can be expected to divert much of press pressure to Washington. We hope that as situation develops we can be kept fully informed on how matter being handled Washington, including all backgrounders, so that we and GVN can keep in step.
Taylor
290. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission is on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 12:27 p.m. May 11. A copy in the Johnson Library is marked with an "L" indicating that the President saw it (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II (A))
3727. For the President. The big event of the political week was the voluntary dissolution of the Armed Forces Council by the generals who composed it. Quat gets the credit for having engineered this operation, quietly pressing the senior generals toward this solution. We feel that it is a most happy development as the disappearance of the Armed Forces Council removes a mechanism which invited the generals to interfere with civilian government and engage in politics.
As I reported during the week,/2/ Quat is still uncertain as to the organization of the military high command./3/ He wants to get rid of General "Little" Minh, now Commander-in-Chief, because of his unpopularity with his fellow generals but does not know whom to put in his place. In view of the paucity of able generals for the senior positions, Quat may end up with General Thieu as both Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief. Organizationally this focusing of responsibility offers some advantages but it is also a dangerous concentration of power in one officer whose character is untested.
/2/See Document 284.
/3/Ambassador Taylor reported later in the day (telegram 3728) that Quat had resolved the question of the military leadership. General Thieu had agreed to take the Ministry of Defense, and General Tran Van "Little" Minh would become Chief of the General Staff. The title of Commander-in-Chief was being abolished. Quat indicated that he hoped to announce these and other changes in his government by the end of the week. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 VIET S)
Our two latest U.S. reinforcements, the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the Marine battalions for the Chu Lai Airfield, have arrived and are rapidly shaking down in their defensive positions. The impression of professional alertness and competence which they convey has had a good effect on all who see them but the future will hold problems in this regard. If they are not actively employed shortly, I suspect boredom is going to be a major factor to preoccupy their commanders. There is some limit on the useful work which could be done within their defensive perimeters.
The Viet Cong raised the tempo of their activity somewhat during the past week, particularly in the Mekong Delta region. There they committed a Viet Cong battalion to battle, the first time since March 8 that a unit of this size has been engaged. I have the feeling that the period of relative inaction is over and that the Viet Cong offensive may be under way. It may take the form of a large number of small actions rather than of the large headline filling types which the press is anticipating.
There is considerable action under way in preparation of the municipal and provincial elections which are scheduled for May 20. With their approach, the Vietnamese press has been paying greater attention to the need for elections for a National Assembly. Many of the editors show more fervor than good sense in urging general elections under the present conditions of insecurity in many provinces. Quat is thoroughly aware of what is realistic and can be counted upon keeping this enthusiasm within bounds. Incidentally, there is a higher interest in standing for office in the municipal and provincial elections than we had anticipated. We are told that there is an average of five candidates for each provincial council seat and nine for each municipal seat, a competition which is double that of previous elections. Working for the government appears to be gaining in appeal.
Taylor
291. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara, Raborn, and William Bundy.
Up to this moment, the knowledge of the President's plan for a trial pause has been restricted to the President himself and to those addressed in this memorandum.
The President now approves the extension of this circle to include in the State Department Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Unger; in the Defense Department Deputy Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and in the White House Mr. Bromley Smith. The President has further approved most private transmission of the existence of his plan to Prime Minister Wilson, Prime Minister Pearson, and Prime Minister Menzies, with explicit caution to each of these Heads of Government against revealing the substance of the President's plan at this time to anyone but his Foreign Minister. The President has himself informed Ambassador Taylor and Ambassador Johnson in Saigon, and he now authorizes a message to Ambassador Taylor instructing him to inform General Westmoreland./2/
/2/See Documents 288 and 292.
The President has consulted fully with Prime Minister Quat, who has expressed his understanding of the President's plan./3/
/3/See Document 289.
The President has authorized the Secretary of State to convey appropriate messages with respect to this plan to the Government of the Soviet Union/4/ and the Government of North Vietnam./5/
/4/See Document 293.
/5/See Document 298.
The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense to carry out the military aspects of this plan.
Beyond this point, the President has given no authorization whatever for any discussion or disclosure of this plan by anyone at any time with anyone inside or outside the Government. The President has directed me to emphasize the importance of complete discretion among those who are authorized to be informed, and he asks me to impress upon the Secretary of Defense and upon Mr. William Bundy, in Secretary Rusk's absence, the importance of insuring complete discretion in the State and Defense Departments. Needless to say, he has given me a similar caution with respect to the White House, and he omits this warning in the case of Admiral Raborn simply because he expects that no other office of the CIA will be informed at this time.
This operation needs a code word and the best that I can think of is Holiday.
McGeorge Bundy/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965, 7:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the Secretary.
2557. Strictly eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Deptel 2553; Embtel 3731./2/ Congratulations on your excellent presentation as well as your analysis of factors affecting proposal.
/2/Documents 288 and 289.
We have decided here to go ahead commencing on Thursday/3/ for period of approximately 5-7 days. Orders through military channels will place stand-down on basis "in order to observe reaction of DRV rail and road transportation systems" and will order increase in photo recce of DRV and bombing within SVN./4/ You should tell Westmoreland true basis for his personal use only so that you and he and Alex Johnson remain the only three Americans in Saigon aboard. We have informed Dobrynin tonight and are instructing Kohler to convey message to Hanoi through DRV Ambassador in Moscow. I will also be telling British and Canadian Foreign Ministers personally tomorrow and we will convey message to Menzies through Embassy here. However, each of these being informed only at highest levels and their Saigon representatives will not be witting.
/3/May 13.
/4/Orders to this effect were conveyed from Secretary McNamara to Ambassador Taylor and Admiral Sharp in telegram DEF 1900 to Saigon and CINCPAC, May 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
You should take following actions:
1. Inform Quat we are going ahead. You should not specify period but let us know if he raises question or still insists on as short a period as 4-5 days. Tell him we will definitely refrain at all times from associating action with Buddha's birthday and that our initial plan will be to refer all press queries to Washington and to hold as long as possible simply to operational factors as explanation. You should raise with him question of what he will tell generals urging in strongest terms that he tell them only what we are saying through military channel and preferably delay even this until question arises. If Quat raises question of what we are saying to Communist side, you will have copies tonight's talk with Dobrynin and instructions to Kohler by septels/5/ and may draw generally on these for his personal use only./6/
/5/Documents 293 and 294.
/6/In telegram 3737 from Saigon, May 11, Taylor reported that he had called on Quat to convey this information. Quat agreed with the plan as outlined, without any specific reference to the duration of the pause, but Taylor felt that Quat and his colleagues would become uneasy if it extended beyond 5 days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
2. To deal with any possibility adverse Catholic reaction you should inform Archbishop and/or Nuncio very privately that any variation in actions in forthcoming period will be USG decisions not related in any way to Buddha's birthday or any appeal or issue connected with it. You may of course also reiterate that any such variations have no effect whatever on our determination as clearly shown in recent months. We leave timing this approach to you but believe it should be done earliest before any speculation arises./7/
/7/Taylor responded that he and Johnson felt that it was unnecessary to approach Archbishop Binh or the Nuncio at that time. (Ibid.)
3. At appropriate time you should instruct Zorthian to report simply that no operations other than reconnaissance were conducted on each day and to refer press queries, preferably by indirection, to Washington.
Rusk
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965, 8:19 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the Secretary. Repeated to Saigon. The text of the message conveyed in the source text is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 868-869.
3103. Strictly eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Highest levels have determined that we should undertake short trial cessation of bombing against DRV in order to test Communist reactions. I have seen Dobrynin tonight as reported septel./2/
/2/Document 294.
You should make earliest possible arrangement see DRV Ambassador Moscow to convey parallel message as set forth below. We are using you as channel to avoid using Soviets as intermediaries and also to insure that message is accurately and directly delivered. We leave appropriate method of arranging contact to you and are not concerned if Soviets should become aware you are making such contact. You should of course make maximum effort avoid any attention by any third party.
Message you should deliver should be oral but confirmed by written piece of paper which you should hand to Ambassador with request he deliver message to Hanoi. Message is as follows:
Begin text. The highest authority in this Government has asked me to inform Hanoi that there will be no air attacks on North Viet-Nam for a period beginning at noon, Washington time, Wednesday, May 12, and running into next week.
In this decision the United States Government has taken account of repeated suggestions from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives, that there can be no progress toward peace while there are air attacks on North Viet-Nam. The United States Government remains convinced that the underlying cause of trouble in Southeast Asia is armed action against the people and Government of South Vietnam by forces whose actions can be decisively affected from North Vietnam. The United States will be very watchful to see whether in this period of pause there are significant reductions in such armed actions by such forces. The United States must emphasize that the road toward the end of armed attacks against the people and Government of Vietnam is the only road which will permit the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States to bring a permanent end to their air attacks on North Vietnam.
In taking this action the United States is well aware of the risk that a temporary suspension of these air attacks may be misunderstood as an indication of weakness, and it is therefore necessary for me to point out that if this pause should be misunderstood in this fashion, by any party, it would be necessary to demonstrate more clearly than ever, after the pause ended, that the United States is determined not to accept aggression without reply in Vietnam. Moreover, the United States must point out that the decision to end air attacks for this limited trial period is one which it must be free to reverse if at any time in the coming days there should be actions by the other side in Vietnam which required immediate reply.
But my Government is very hopeful that there will be no such misunderstanding and that this first pause in the air attacks may meet with a response which will permit further and more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally constructive actions by the other side in the future. End text.
Rusk
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, May 11, 1965, 8:22 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by the Secretary. Repeated to Saigon.
3104. Strictly eyes only for Ambassadors from Secretary. I saw Dobrynin tonight and made oral statement confirmed by piece of paper/2/ following exactly same format on substance as message to DRV contained septel./3/ Only changes concerned first paragraph and first sentence of second paragraph with appropriate substitutions of Soviets and calling attention to Soviet specific mention of factors cited first sentence second paragraph.
/2/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-MAYFLOWER)
/3/Document 293.
I explained we were not indicating any precise number of days, that we retained freedom of action, and that we would convey similar message to Hanoi. I also said we would make no announcement although we expected press pressures, and made clear our action related only to strikes of any sort and not to continued reconnaissance. (Paper itself makes clear action confined to DRV and does not include Laos or SVN.)
I also said we did not know what to expect but that Hanoi knows what it is doing and can find a way to make its response clear.
Dobrynin noted we were merely informing Soviets and was clearly relieved we not asking them to act as intermediary. Asked about my trip to Vienna/4/ and indicated there might be further conversations there Saturday with Gromyko. Asked basically whether action represented any change in fundamental US position.
/4/Rusk traveled to London on May 11 for the NATO Ministerial meeting, May 11-12, and then to Austria for the 10th anniversary celebration of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty.
I replied that it did not and that this should be no surprise.
I reviewed recent indications that Cambodia conference blocked by Peiping despite favorable mention in DRV-Moscow communiqué/5/ and that three-party talks on Laos likewise in abeyance apparently following Peiping and perhaps Hanoi pressure. President on April 7 had tried open up discourse but thus far channels blocked. If attacks on DRV were part of problem, Communist response to present action might open up channels.
/5/For excerpts of the joint communiqué issued at Moscow on April 17, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 855-856.
Dobrynin said he thought we would get some answer but could not predict what.
I underscored importance action not be misunderstood in Hanoi. Hanoi appears to have impression they may succeed, but US will not get tired or be affected by very small domestic opposition or by international pressures. Hanoi cannot rely on Saigon instability. They may have wrong ideas on these points and important they not misunderstand our action.
Dobrynin responded he saw no danger of misunderstanding but problem was to find way.
Rusk
295. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
Honolulu, May 11, 1965, 5:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Limdis.
55813. Rolling Thunder Program.
1. With the completion of our fourteenth week of Rolling Thunder it appears appropriate to assess briefly what we have done and to suggest our future course. Any such assessment when related to the fundamental purpose of the air campaign must be inconclusive at this time. The possibility remains, however, that we are in more danger of minimizing the effects of Rolling Thunder than we are of exaggerating them. These air attacks have disrupted road and rail movements in North Vietnam. They have, in a few short weeks, completely changed the pattern of logistic support into Laos and it may be here that we first see concrete military results of our air attacks, because the Laotian Communists are more directly dependent on DRV support than are the VC. The cumulative effects of our interdiction campaign will be realized as the rainy season adds to the effects of our air interdiction.
2. Some doubt has been expressed as to whether or not much remains to be done south of 20 degrees N. Destruction of the DRV military and logistic support facilities and LOC's south of 20 degrees has just begun. Within four of the major barracks complexes attacked, roughly two thirds of the 674 known buildings remain undamaged. Of three major ammo stowage depot complexes attacked, 40 percent of the 46 known ammo stowage and 56 percent of the 93 known depot support buildings have been destroyed/damaged. Similarly, within two major support depot complexes attacked, 46 percent of the 90 known buildings have yet to be hit. The surface has barely been scratched on striking DRV shipping and port facilities. And, in spite of the success of our bridge attacks, the major portion of the bridge and ferry system remains intact. Newly developed, dispersed staging, rest and refueling are yet to be attacked.
3. In the development of a sustained air campaign, we must carefully weigh the capabilities and limitations of US air power operating within current political parameters and the vulnerabilities of the DRV within this framework. It is certain that we cannot expect interdiction, even when we attain a maximum feasible damage level, to stop completely supplies flowing to the VC through southern DRV and Laos routes. Further, we cannot predict how successful the VC will be in procuring weapons and ammunition through other sources and channels.
Although the immediate military objective is to reduce the movement of personnel and supplies to support the VC and PL/VM, in our effort to accomplish this we must develop and drive home to the DRV leadership the idea that our staying power is greater than theirs. To do this we should raise their direct costs in terms of manpower and military, logistic and support facilities and in indirect economic effects. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the characteristics of the air campaign should be such as to generate pessimism and a feeling of helplessness among the military and general frustration, anxiety, and fear among the people. Lastly, we should present the government and military with an ever growing management problem. The cumulative effect of these internal problems should serve to turn DRV attention inward rather than outward. The total impact would be realized in degradation of supervision, military training, cadre replacement and build up for Laos and RVN as well as in reduction of supplies. The concept of making it as difficult and costly as possible for the DRV to support insurrection in Laos and RVN should embrace the totality of these effects. Its success will be realized when the DRV is convinced that the cost of aggression is too high.
4. The concept we propose calls for an ubiquitous demonstration of U.S. airpower carrying out an around the clock program of immobilization, attrition, and harassment. Specific types of missions would be as follows:
A. Carry out extensive day armed recce of land and inland waterway routes south of 20 degrees, and night blockade tactics.
B. Continue and increase the route interdiction program south of 20 degrees.
C. Attack repeatedly, until no longer lucrative, the known military facilities within this same area which can be effectively attacked by a small strike force.
D. Seek out and destroy dispersed supplies, equipment and military personnel.
E. Step up interdiction of supplies by sea through attack on port facilities and recognized DRV shipping.
5. These missions would be accomplished on an incremental basis by scheduling appropriate numbers of aircraft for repeated strikes. We have more than enough air power to keep unrelenting pressure on North Vietnam. This pressure is somewhat less than it could be were it not for certain operational restraints which we have imposed upon ourselves. It is possible without altering the necessarily rigid control of our Rolling Thunder campaign to increase significantly the effectiveness of our air operations by combining greater numbers of armed reconnaissance flights with small precise bombing attacks on prebriefed military targets. We would then get maximum surveillance with its inhibiting effect on military movements in North Vietnam along with effective attacks on military objectives. Armed recce flights would be augmented by other small flights of pre-briefed or on call aircraft. Analysis indicates desired damage levels on certain type targets can be achieved with a lesser number of total strike aircraft per target, while at the same time maintaining maximum area harassment of repair efforts through these frequent and unpredictable patterns of attacks. Our operations should include a mixed bag of tricks including stepped-up night operations with flare ships, more frequent use of delayed fuze weapons to further harass repair activities and the establishment of fixed surveillance points immediately inside the DRV/Laos border. Flare plane assistance would be provided during the hours of darkness and the areas selected for surveillance would be the critical funnel areas of the route system leading to Laos. We would, in effect, be establishing aerial choke points. The total psychological impact upon the military, work crews and general populace generated by these frequent unpredictable attacks would be an important aspect of the campaign.
6. In addition to these small strikes and armed recce effort south of 20 degrees, we think that larger scale attacks have a role in the campaign. We should, however, get away from the concept of inflicting maximum feasible damage in a one day strike. As a desirable alternative I recommend we attack larger targets incrementally over a period of days as necessary and as indicated by our BDA. Our present tactic of carrying out a strike in a one day period has become too stereotyped. Incremental attacks would give us greater latitude in marginal weather, would provide for more effective employment of strike aircraft and would probably result in greater and more precise damage to the primary targets and should reduce our losses. Large scale strikes should be continued against the major targets south of 20 degrees. Later, large-scale strikes should be programmed against major military installations ranging northwestward to Dien Bien Phu. Timing of the large strikes should be left flexible. They would be mounted according to the developing situation as political and psychological considerations made them appear desirable. The Dien Bien Phu military complex could be attacked to attain maximum damage and destruction; attack on this prestige target complex would be felt throughout the Asian Communist world and its role in resupplying PL/VM forces in Laos cannot be underestimated.
7. Rolling Thunder should be complemented by increased and intensified psychological operations. We should continue to repeat in simple non-polemic language that we have no quarrel with the people and they should be warned to avoid all military installations. We should hammer home the main themes of our intent to destroy their military capacity and our determination to continue until the military leave their cousins in peace. Overt propaganda, on a world-wide basis, should echo the same themes; releases on mission accomplishments should stress our objectives as we highlight accomplishments.
8. Target and "Strike Zones" are as follows:
A. Initially, strikes should continue to be limited to the area from the DMZ to 20 degrees. All military facilities and LOC targets listed in the current AIF/PACOM CPFL-NVN should be considered for attack by small flights. We hold AIF/CPFL data on more than 225 military/LOC targets in the following categories: RR/highway bridges, ferries, RR yards, port facilities, warehouse areas, POL storage, naval bases, airfields, military headquarters/barracks, military schools/training areas/camps and military ammo/supply/depots. About 100 of these targets appear on the JCS numbered target system, but most of them qualify for attack under the concept expressed herein.
b. Northwestward from the 20th parallel, the following nine major military supply/ammo depots and barracks warrant large strikes:
(1) Target 29--Quang Suoi Bks NE (73 Bks/storage bldgs).
(2) Target 43--Qui Hau ammo depot w (23 ammo storage bldgs).
(3) Target 61--Xom Chang supply depot (17 storage bldgs with 10 Bks/7 support bldgs).
(4) Target 28--Ban Xom Lom Bks (Div HQ--363 Bldgs including 191 storage and 30 ammo).
(5) Target 46--Ban Phung How ammo depot (10 semi-revetted ammo storage, 5 prob ammo storage and 8 supply bldgs).
(6) Target 25--Son La Bks (complex is large military supply/Bks concentration containing 367 Bks/warehouse bldgs, of which over 100 are supply storage).
(7) Target 56--Son La Army supply depot (co-located with target 25).
(8) Target 63--Thuan Chau Bks/depot (571 bldgs).
(9) Target 25--Dien Bien Phu Bks (142 Bldgs). Dien Bien Phu complex includes airfield, radar, radio and HQ 316 div. As the large strikes progress towards Dien Bien Phu, we should extend the armed recce and small strike zone accordingly.
9. In summary, armed recce would operate as continuously as weather permits and with a high degree of flexibility. Ordnance loads would provide for surveillance and attack of fleeting targets on specified route sectors after attacking pre-briefed fixed targets with optimum munitions. On call strikes would be ready for unusual targets of opportunity. Random routing would be developed to avoid set patterns. Around the clock surveillance would be maintained over LOC funnels. Weather alternates would be standard.
10. I recommend that this concept be accepted and that concurrently numerical limits be lifted on armed reconnaissance and that these small controlled air operations be limited only by our capability to execute them.
296. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 12, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Your conversation with Governor Stevenson1. You are considering a decision to suspend air attacks on North Vietnam for several days. You would not announce this decision in any way, but you would call attention to this pause privately with Moscow and Hanoi. While this pause would not be a long one, it would indicate our own ability to move either way, depending upon the actions of the enemy. This pause would not be extended or repeated merely in return for a conference, but only if there were major reductions in the level of armed action in South Vietnam.
2. You would like to have this decision known to U Thant, but only if he could be told in a way that would protect us entirely against leaks. Does Governor Stevenson think he could tell U Thant on an entirely personal basis, so that Governor Stevenson and U Thant would be the only two people in the whole United Nations to know about this matter until the President was ready to discuss it publicly?
3. If Governor Stevenson can give you this kind of assurance, you are strongly inclined to go ahead with this pause. If he cannot give you this assurance, you may have to reconsider the whole matter.
Stevenson sees U Thant around noon and this phone call should be placed as quickly as possible./2/
/2/Johnson's phone call to Stevenson was placed at 10:57 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
McG. B./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
297. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, May 12, 1965, noon.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-MAYFLOWER. Top Secret. The source text was transmitted to the White House on May 12 under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Read to McGeorge Bundy, which noted that Stevenson had dictated the report of his conversation with U Thant to the Department by classified telephone.
PARTICIPANTS
Governor Adlai E. Stevenson
Secretary-General U Thant1. Vietnam
In my conversation with the Secretary General on Wednesday, May 12th, from 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m., I informed him about the "pause" after his assurance that the information would go no further. His comments follow:
Hanoi is now more responsive to the USSR than to China, and the new Foreign Minister is more pro-Moscow than pro-Peking.
Last September, when he made his first sounding about private peace talks,/2/ Ho Chi Minh was ready to talk with the United States and South Vietnam alone, but a new element has now been introduced. While originally only Peking insisted that in any peace talks South Vietnam should be represented exclusively by the Viet Cong, Hanoi has now taken this position too.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 427.
In early March U Thant asked Algeria to inform the Viet Cong and Hanoi representatives in Algiers that it was unrealistic to insist on the Viet Cong as the exclusive representative of South Vietnam in any talks with the United States. So far he has had no reply. U Thant thinks that if the United States excludes any Viet Cong representation in any peace or cease-fire discussions, there will be no discussions. But he also believes a compromise possible, i.e. assuming there were six seated at the table, North Vietnam would be represented by two, the United States by two, and South Vietnam by two--one from the Viet Cong and one from Saigon. He cites the recommendation of the three factions in the Laos negotiations as pertinent.
If any such discussion relates only to hostilities over the frontiers, then in his view the representation should be just the United States and Hanoi, thus avoiding the Viet Cong problem. However, he doubts that Hanoi would talk on this basis.
While he doubts that there will be any response, as a result of the "pause" from Hanoi satisfactory to us, if the question of the Viet Cong representation could be worked out privately in advance he thinks there is a good chance of discussions starting. When it appears that the United States is being more than reasonable, he suspects Hanoi with Soviet encouragement will overrule Peking.
He would clearly consider with us making a public (or private) appeal for a cease-fire or for discussions of conditions for the cessation of hostilities, either during or after the "pause". He thinks it certain that Peking would oppose but assumes that the USSR and France would go along. He would welcome our views both as to language and timing of any such appeal. And when I suggested that it might include something as follows, he did not dissent:
"The United States has offered to discuss peaceful settlement in Vietnam, without preconditions. The United States has suspended its bombing temporarily. It is time the belligerents opened discussions of conditions for the total cessation of hostilities preliminary to discussions of peaceful settlement."
He seemed eager to cooperate in any way, and if we have any suggestions as to Viet Cong representation, he would clearly explore the possibilities (through the Soviet Union) privately, without in any way committing us in advance.
On the basis of previous experience with explorations in Hanoi, he thinks it might take ten days to two weeks to get a reply.
In view of the "pause" he did not press me for an answer on his proposal for a cease-fire appeal at this time.
2. Indian Proposal
I also discussed with him the Indian three-point proposal/3/ with which he was not very familiar. He proposes to discuss it with the Indian Ambassador and give him such encouragement as he can.
/3/See Document 285.
3. Cambodian Conference
U Thant sees little hope of doing anything through Cambodia and reported that he had asked Sihanouk to receive Narasimhan before his departure a fortnight ago. The reply was that no useful purpose would be served by such a meeting, that Sihanouk's position was well known--that the United States troops should get out of South Vietnam.
Narasimhan is on his way back; moreover he is confident that he would not have been received in Hanoi at this time.
U Thant's report was that in his soundings with Federenko about Vietnam he has always been brushed off, and he saw no hope of ever doing anything with him in New York.
298. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, May 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to London. No time of transmission is on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 10:35 p.m. on May 12.
3391. Ref Deptel 3105./2/ London for Secretary eyes only./3/ On receipt reftel (1905 local) I sought urgent appointment with Kuznetsov but when informed by MFA he not available I accepted appointment with Deputy ForMin Firyubin at 2100.
/2/Not found.
/3/Rusk was in London to attend the NAC meeting, May 12-14.
I informed Firyubin that as he must know from report of Dobrynin's conversation with Secretary US Govt has made decision which we hoped would be both understood and not misunderstood. I had been informed by several high Soviet sources that decision we had taken was precisely what was called for but none had been in position to predict reaction. Our purpose in reaching this significant decision was to attempt to ascertain if a way could be found to peaceful solution of current crisis in Southeast Asia. We had hoped we would be able to deliver oral communication conveying this decision to DRV authorities and I had attempted to do so today through DRV Ambassador. Unfortunately Amb let it be known that he did not wish to receive me personally and when his Emb was informed that the message I sought to deliver was of extreme importance it was suggested that we transmit the message through the Soviet Govt in its capacity as Geneva co-chairman. It was because of these circumstances that I had found it necessary to disturb Mr. Firyubin tonight. I pointed out that although DRV Amb had refused to receive me Emb had succeeded in delivering a copy of oral communication to employee of DRV Emb earlier this evening (2015 local) who agreed to bring it to attention of Amb. (Communication as set forth in Deptel 3103/4/ then translated in full for Firyubin with sole interruption being Firyubin's inquiry if cessation attacks applied only to those from air--which I confirmed.)
/4/Document 293.
After receiving confirmation from me that communication was of oral nature, Firyubin said he viewed communication as based on old erroneous conception on which US has proceeded, a conception which precludes US recognizing that the South Vietnamese people are fighting for their freedom and are struggling against aggression and control by Saigon puppets. Furthermore it indicated to Firyubin that we continued to view the picture incorrectly when we referred again to the struggle in South Vietnam as being organized and directed by the DRV. The absurdity of this view, he said, is obvious and naturally the Soviet Govt cannot agree with it as it has made clear in numerous statements. Firyubin could only view the communication as repetition of the threat against the DRV--now a threat of renewed and expanded aggression. This was the only way he could interpret the reference to the risk that a suspension of attacks involved. Obviously we are suffering from a gross misunderstanding if we think that such aggression will go unpunished, without response. The only constructive approach to a peaceful settlement of the situation in South Vietnam was to end the aggression, recall troops from South Vietnam and give the Vietnamese people the right to choose their own form of govt--a choice which can be made freely only if the so-called specialists should be withdrawn and their opportunity of exercising influence on the Vietnamese thus removed. Firyubin said that he well acquainted with the countries and peoples of Southeast Asia; he therefore was aware and could understand the feelings caused by our actions there as well as the reaction in many other parts of the world.
I told Firyubin I had asked to see him to put a very simple question to him. Does the Soviet Govt agree to transmit the oral communication to the DRV? I said this was the whole purpose of my visit.
Firyubin said the DRV Emb had not put such a request to the Sov Govt. I must agree that for Sovs to act as intermediary between US and DRV is very unusual. Naturally he would report my request to his govt and if the DRV should request this service he would not exclude the possibility of transmitting the communication to the DRV Govt. Meanwhile he would be interested in knowing just how the DRV Emb had responded to our approach.
I again described for Firyubin our efforts to deliver the message to the DRV through its Emb in Moscow and told him that the end result was a suggestion by the Emb that we transmit the message through the Sov Govt in its capacity as Geneva co-chairman. Firyubin repeated his promise to report my request to his govt and to inform me of the results.
(At this point Firyubin passed a note to Kornienko who attended him and latter left the room, not to return until just before the conversation was concluded.)
I thanked Firyubin and then said I wished comment briefly on his remarks. I was well acquainted with the Sov view of the situation in Vietnam and since I had on several occasions expressed my govt's view to numerous Sov officials I was sure he was aware of the way we looked at the situation. We did not consider resistance to aggression as aggression. We could discuss our differences of view for hours but my purpose in calling on him tonight was not to enter into such a discussion but simply to ask the Soviet Govt to pass an important message to the DRV. We had noted the reported Soviet indications that if air strikes should be discontinued the situation might improve with respect to finding a way to peaceful settlement. Secondly we had read with great care the Sov Govt appeal several days ago in which the govt came out for peaceful solution of all questions in dispute. Finally we had noted and the President had responded positively to the appeal by the 17 unaligned nations,/5/ although so far as I was aware the other governments chiefly concerned--the Sovs, DRV and China--had not yet officially replied. I stressed that my govt considers the communication which we were asking the Sovs to pass to the DRV a genuine concession on our part toward finding the path to peaceful settlement about which the Sov Govt itself had expressed its view in its appeal several days ago. I hoped that this initiative would be correctly understood and taken in this light by the Soviet Govt.
/5/See Document 245.
Firyubin said he wished reaffirm his govt's support for peaceful solutions of all questions in dispute. However peaceful solutions are out of question when negotiations must take place under the gun. They cannot take place under pressure or when one side operates from a position of strength. He wished inform me again there had been no request from the DRV Emb that Sov Govt act as intermediary and he felt therefore that it would be more convenient for US to find another way "bypassing us."
I told Firyubin that I saw no purpose in continuing discuss substantive questions which should probably be the subject of conference if there should be one. I would merely point out that with regard to his remarks on "position of strength" that shooting and bombing are being carried on by two sides, not just one. I then said he should know that I had told him of our efforts to approach the DRV Emb simply as a matter of information. I did not believe the attitude of DRV had any bearing on the request I had put to Firyubin. I was asking Firyubin in the name of the Govt of United States to pass important communication to DRV. (During translation these remarks, Kornienko reappeared and handed note to Firyubin which latter read carefully.)
Firyubin then said flatly Sov Govt would not do this. The DRV Emb has not requested this service. He said there were number of ways of passing the message to DRV and it was our responsibility to find the most convenient way.
I said I wished to understand him correctly. Was he rejecting my request to transmit the communication to the DRV?
He said this was a correct understanding of the Sov Govt position. We must ourselves find the way.
I said that what I was seeking was the cooperation of the Sov Govt and Firyubin's remarks indicated clearly that the Sov Govt was refusing this. Firyubin said "I am not a postman" and again said we could find our own ways of transmitting messages.
I pointed out to Firyubin that the cooperation I had requested is a well-known and not unprecented process in international diplomacy. I had great difficulty in reconciling Sov Govt refusal to cooperate with its declaration in support of peaceful settlement of disputed questions.
Kornienko chimed in that he had recalled statement by both the President and Secretary of State on several occasions that the US Govt has channels for transmitting messages direct to Hanoi. On this the conversation ended but it should be noted that Firyubin made no effort to return to me the text of the oral communication which I had handed him at the outset of the conversation.
Kohler
299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 13, 1965, 12:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-MAYFLOWER. No classification marking.
The attached cable/2/ from Kohler gives an interesting account of his talk with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin on the pause.
/2/Document 298.
Kohler had a tough time getting his message to the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The North Vietnamese Embassy refused to receive the message on the ground that we did not have diplomatic relations and suggested that Kohler deliver it through the Soviet Government, as a Co-Chairman./3/ The Soviets refused to play this role, and Kohler eventually got the message delivered by having it handed to an employee at the North Vietnamese Embassy who accepted it.
/3/Reported in telegram 3378 from Moscow, May 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Kohler also gave a copy to the Soviets who refused to pass it on, but did not pass it back.
This cable makes it obvious that the whole Soviet Government is embarrassed by the notion of admitting that it has any middle-man's role with respect to Hanoi.
Yet there is evidence on other channels of real Soviet interest in a pro-Russian and anti-Chinese settlement in Vietnam (see Tab B)./4/
/4/There is an indication on another copy of this memorandum that CIA telegram CSDB 312/01196-65, May 12, was attached at Tab B. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X) Tab B was not found attached to either copy of the memorandum and was not found.
All this is very preliminary evidence of the impact of the pause. We are reviewing all our political plans and should have comment for you by the end of the day on Saturday./5/ Meanwhile, everyone's orders are to avoid comment on the absence of bombing. So far we have gotten through one day more than I expected, but I expect the noise to begin very soon.
McG.B.
/5/May 15.
300. Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/
Washington, May 13, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV. Top Secret. The source text is undated but was circulated under a covering memorandum of May 13 to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and William Bundy for discussion at 11 a.m. on May 15. Shortly before that time Ball told President Johnson that he was meeting that day with McNamara, "Bundy," and Acheson to discuss the plan. (Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Vietnam I) No record of a discussion of this plan on May 15 has been found, but see Document 304 for the discussion of the plan at the White House on May 16. Regarding the background on the plan, see Document 287.
A PLAN FOR A POLITICAL RESOLUTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
I.
Principal Features of the PlanThis memorandum proposes a plan for achieving our objectives in South Viet-Nam by shifting the struggle from the military to the political arena. The plan has two principal features:
a. The promulgation by the South Vietnamese Government of a Program for Social and Political Reconstruction. This Program is designed to invite the peaceful participation of Viet Cong adherents in the national life of South Viet-Nam. It should make it possible for political activity to be substituted for a shooting war in one after another of the provinces of South Viet-Nam.
b. A temporary halt of offensive military operations for a stated period to permit full dissemination and consideration of the Government's program throughout the country. These offensive operations would be resumed if the program meets substantial Viet Cong resistance.
II.
The Case for Transforming the StruggleWe have, from the beginning, made clear that our objective in Southeast Asia is to bring about a political solution that would assure the independence of South Viet-Nam. We have so far assumed that we could achieve an acceptable political settlement only when our military pressure had reached the point where the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were ready to give up the struggle.
Yet now--or in the near future--we may well be facing a situation where each side will be led to accept more dangerous and onerous expedients in an effort to achieve its major objectives.
Presumably the North Vietnamese are worried about the costs imposed by our continued air strikes and the danger that those air strikes will be extended to urban and industrial areas. Hanoi may also fear the long-range consequences if it is forced to accept increased dependence on Peiping. But the experience of the French from 1945 to 1954 vividly testifies to Viet Cong willingness to submit to heavy punishment rather than give up their long-sought objective of a Communist State covering the whole of Viet-Nam.
The United States, on its part, cannot accept a Viet Cong victory. But continuance of the war on the assumption that--by military pressure--we can force Hanoi to say "uncle" may lead to a gradual escalation of the conflict and a progressively larger involvement of both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union.
Under these circumstances each side may find advantage in moving the conflict from the military to the political arena.
Given the present balance of relative military effectiveness, such a move is possible only under arrangements that would enable each side to conclude that it has substantially as good a chance of achieving its long-range goals in the political arena as by continuing military action.
A. Attractions of the Plan for the United States and South Viet-Nam.
The United States and South Viet-Nam would have a sound basis for concluding that the arrangements contemplated by the plan proposed in this memorandum would provide them with a reasonable chance of success through political action--at least as good as the chance of success through military action alone. The United States has the resources to move South Viet-Nam toward rapid economic development. We know that we will stay the course and not lose interest. The history of other former colonial nations in the post-war period has shown that, given the resources and opportunity to evolve their own political institutions, they will be likely to steer a non-Communist course.
B. Attractions for North Viet-Nam
Analyzing the plan in terms of their own doctrinal convictions, the North Vietnamese could also conclude that it offered them an adequate chance to achieve their long-range objectives. Ho Chi Minh demonstrated in 1954 that he was not in a hurry. The Vietnamese Communists have repeatedly shown their willingness to work within long time spans. While they would be prepared to absorb enormous punishment before abandoning the purpose they have sought for four decades, they might well be prepared to wait a few years longer to achieve that purpose--sustained by the conviction that the United States would lose interest in South Viet-Nam, that they could subvert any government that could be established in that country, and that over the long pull Communist success was inevitable.
It might take ten years or more to determine which judgment was right, but ten years is a long time in the present-day world. Within the next decades new elements could enter the equation that would fundamentally change the whole situation.
III.
Purposes of PlanBriefly stated, the purposes of the plan are--
A. To enable us to probe for a less dangerous means than military force alone--at present or higher levels--for preserving an independent, non-Communist South Viet-Nam.
b. To supplement the continuing military effort by offering the prospect of political and economic progress for the South Vietnamese people.
c. To provide a program having substantial positive propaganda value both in South Viet-Nam and throughout the world.
IV.
Advantages of PlanThe major advantages of the Plan are these--
a. It offers the chance to halt offensive military operations by both sides. Yet it at all times reserves to us the option of resuming full military operations if the plan is not achieving its purpose.
b. It does not require the Government of South Viet-Nam to enter into "negotiations" with the North Vietnamese Government or the National Liberation Front, but it would not preclude formal negotiations at other levels. We could and should maintain our posture of willingness to hold discussions with any "government concerned" and to participate in a formal negotiating conference if one should be called under suitable conditions.
c. It avoids any implication that the United States lacks confidence in the South Vietnamese Government or in the ultimate success of our cooperative military effort.
d. It would be offered by the South Vietnamese Government as that Government's own political act--an act made possible by the political and military achievements of recent months. It would not be presented as a bargaining proposal to be withdrawn if rejected by the Communists, but as the Government's considered plan for improving the lot of its people, to be pursued whether or not the Communists approve it.
e. It should help to unite differing factions in urban areas while giving the Vietnamese peasantry positive inducements for identifying themselves with Saigon's political fortunes.
f. As a display of political initiative, it should enhance the strength and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government, whatever the reactions on the other side.
V.
Substance and Execution of PlanA. Consultation and Coordination with the Vietnamese Government
1. Once the plan is approved by the President, Ambassador Johnson would be recalled to Washington. After he had reviewed the plan, he and Ambassador Unger would proceed to Saigon to explain it to Ambassador Taylor and other key officials in the United States Mission.
2. The outlines of the plan would be discussed with the Prime Minister of South Viet-Nam, one or two key generals (e.g., Ky and Thi) and perhaps a small number of Vietnamese officials. The Vietnamese Government would be encouraged to put forward the plan as its own with the fewest possible changes.
B. Private Communication to Hanoi and Moscow
Just before the public announcement of the plan, Hanoi and Moscow would be informed through secret channels of its essential provisions. This would provide direct, clear and credible evidence of our serious desire to move from a military to a political solution. Peiping would be left out of this consultation.
Comment: Although the North Vietnamese and the Soviets would inform the Chinese in due course, it seems preferable for the first reactions to be those of the North Vietnamese and the Soviets. This would leave Peiping last man in and, hopefully, odd man out. The risk of rubbing salt in Chinese wounds may be worth it.
The private word to the Soviets would come directly from us. The message to North Viet-Nam would go through a trusted intermediary speaking for us and for South Viet-Nam.
The timing of the private communication should precede the public announcement by just enough to give the other side a little time to decide its first reaction but not enough time to anticipate us by a political or military move of its own, such as recognizing a puppet Front Government or launching a large attack. Twenty-four hours would seem about right.
C. Announcement of the Plan
The Prime Minister of South Viet-Nam would make a speech or issue a proclamation that would--
1. Review the history of the Viet Cong insurgency emphasizing its instigation and direction by the North.
2. Describe recent military actions taken by the South Vietnamese and United States forces and their success.
3. State the Government's fundamental objectives--to achieve peace and reconciliation under a government free of foreign control, representing the Vietnamese people and capable of meeting their needs.
4. Outline the Program for the Social and Political Reconstruction of South Viet-Nam (as described in section VI).
5. Announce a limited pause in certain military operations in order to assure serious attention (as described in section VII).
6. Announce--in general terms--that once civil insurrection had ended, the Government would expect to establish trade and other forms of peaceful intercourse with the North and to examine other matters of common interest.
Comment: First announcement must be made by the head of the South Viet-Nam Government, rather than by any United States official. As soon as the announcement is made, the United States could express its full support, including concurrence in the military pause, and its willingness to withdraw forces on a phased basis (assuming proper response on the other side) and to furnish assistance for the economic and social aspects of the Government's program.
The initial formal announcement should be followed by a saturation information effort employing radio broadcasts, speaker planes, leaflets, etc., to ensure wide dissemination of the South Vietnamese Government's program even in Viet Cong-held areas. Furthermore, there must be a continuing saturation campaign--keyed to local areas--advising of the success of the program and, especially, fixing the blame squarely on the Viet Cong in any areas where the program fails or cannot be put into effect.
VI.
Key Elements of the Program for the Social and
Political Reconstruction of South Viet-NamA. First Element: An offer of amnesty to all Viet Cong adherents who cease fighting
This offer (which could be portrayed as an expansion of the current Chieu Hoi Program) would be addressed to the Viet Cong members in the South rather than to its Northern commanders. This would permit the Government in Saigon to maintain the posture that it was not "negotiating" with the North or with the National Liberation Front.
The offer might appeal, most of all, to the Viet Cong local and district forces and sympathizers and to those provincial or main-force elements whose military position may be precarious.
Amnesty would imply the delivery of arms. But very few of the Viet Cong would be likely to come in and lay down their arms since that would involve their public admission of Viet Cong activities.
Since many of the Viet Cong adherents cannot be identified, amnesty in practice might consist merely of a halt in individual military participation and a return to civilian life by peasants who would never concede their past Viet Cong association.
B. Second Element: A phased schedule for establishing a Constitutional Government based on an electoral process in which all peaceful citizens, including peaceful Viet Cong adherents, would take part
Village council elections are already scheduled for May 30 in secure areas. The Program would provide for similar elections at later dates throughout the country. The Premier would promise--as soon as local elections had been held in areas containing a substantial majority of the population--to call together a constitutional assembly to draft and adopt a new constitution for South Viet-Nam.
Former Viet Cong adherents who had qualified for amnesty would be eligible to participate as voters and candidates. They would participate in the political life of the country as would the representatives of any political party that did not advocate the overthrow of the Government by force.
Comment: The 1956 Diem Constitution was modified in an authoritarian direction in 1962 and nullified in 1965. A "Provisional Charter" has since been drafted by the High National Council appointed by General "Big" Minh in the fall of 1964, but it has never been put into full effect. It is essential to this Plan that a constitution be approved by some representative body in which peaceful elements of the Viet Cong may participate.
C. Third Element: Pending the local elections, the Government would seek to establish its presence with a minimum of disruption to local administrative arrangements currently acceptable to the local populace
In Viet Cong base areas, this would involve leaving local administration more or less in present hands, but on the explicit condition that these administrators did not resist the right of Central Government officials to move freely and carry out limited functions within their areas.
In marginal or contested areas a delicate balance would have to be struck on a case-by-case basis. In areas where Viet Cong local administrations were operating by stealth and terror, the process of redress would proceed gradually as the power of the Government presence increased and inspired public confidence.
Where the actual authority is now exercised by Viet Cong adherents and there is no government authority, incumbents would not be disturbed until after village council elections. Future local administrative arrangements would depend on the results of the elections.
D. Fourth Element: Social and Economic Programs
The Government would immediately launch economic and social reconstruction programs with special emphasis on education, medical care, the provision of seeds and fertilizers, land tenure reform and debt cancellations or moratoria. The last feature would be particularly attractive to the Vietnamese peasantry.
The immediate launching of such a program is an urgent political necessity to match the land reform and other social programs of the National Liberation Front.
Obviously, substantial United States financial and technical assistance would be required to assure a prompt start and visible progress.
E. Fifth Element: Phased withdrawal of all foreign troops
The Prime Minister would announce he had arranged for the withdrawal of foreign troops, to begin when the insurgency stops and the Government has effectively extended its authority throughout the country. The withdrawal might begin when resistance ceases in all but the hard-core Viet Cong strongholds. The withdrawal could be completed when the Vietnamese forces are able to move so freely as to be able to certify that no large caches, camps, etc. remain.
VII.
Announcement of Pause in Military OperationsThe pause in military operations to be announced by the Prime Minister would (1) be limited in time; and (2) apply only to offensive military operations such as target bombing in North Viet-Nam and search-and kill operations in the South. It would not include suspension of the sea blockade, the bombing of supply routes in Laos, or full response to any Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.
A. Purpose of the Pause
The pause would serve the purpose of assuring that the other side gave serious attention to the Plan. It would also help both North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong to save face by providing an action to which they could more easily respond. And the pause would have propaganda value throughout the world.
The pause would be more effective if United States reinforcements were not introduced during the period but no promise should be made to this effect.
B. Duration of the Pause
In the Prime Minister's announcement he would make clear--
1) that the pause would last for a limited period--say two weeks--to permit full consideration of the Program for Social and Political Reconstruction;
2) that at the end of the two-week period the Program would be put into effect;
3) that offensive military measures would immediately be resumed wherever the Program was resisted by Viet Cong forces; and
4) that, if resistance was wide-spread, military pressure on the North would also be resumed.
C. Public Announcement of the Pause
On balance we believe there are advantages in announcing the pause publicly rather that in communicating it privately:
1) Its announcement in connection with the Program for Social and Political Reconstruction would help draw the attention of Viet Cong adherents to a future political path that would include a role for them.
2) It would avoid any inference of weakness that might be drawn from a secret proposal for a military pause by the South Viet-Nam Government to the North.
3) It would relieve the North of the embarrassment implicit in responding to such a secret proposal, and thus demonstrating to the world that it controls the Viet Cong.
D. Communist Response
Obviously, there would be difficulties in determining the Viet Cong response. Statistical analysis may not give reliable quantitative or qualitative measurements to show significant increases or decreases in the scale of Viet Cong operations. We must also decide whether our willingness to continue the pause should (1) be made dependent on no increase above the present level of Viet Cong activity, or (2) upon some further decrease below the present level.
Any public statement concerning the pause would probably have to list--as one of the expected responses--a halt of infiltration from the North. But we must recognize that such infiltration is not readily measurable in the short term. It is also--in a sense--irrelevant, since, if the Plan is succeeding, that itself implies North Vietnamese acquiescence--and thus presumably an end to infiltration. If we should detect substantial infiltration while the pause continues and other elements of the Plan are proceeding, we can consider responding by military reinforcements of our own.
VIII.
ConclusionThe recent improvements in South Vietnamese military and political performance furnish our first opportunity to probe deeply for the return of the contest of wills in Viet-Nam primarily to the political forum. If this opportunity is seized, great hazards may be avoided and lives saved in achieving our ends. Even if it fails--and the contest continues as primarily a military one--the Government of South Viet-Nam will have strengthened its political base, and confidence in the leadership of the United States in this cause will be greatly enhanced.
[end document]
Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 301 through 310