The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 13, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Secret; Nodis; Repeated to London. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 2:05 p.m.

3395. London--eyes only for Secretary. Pierre Salinger who is here on private movie production deal, has been in touch with Mike Sagetallyan, former TASS Bureau Chief Washington, now in headquarters Moscow. At dinner and evening at his apartment Tuesday May 11 Sagatellyan probed Salinger hard as to whether he was on some kind of covert mission and seemed unconvinced despite latter's reiterated denials. In any case, Sagatellyan, protesting he was speaking personally, talked at length about Viet-Nam. He wanted Salinger's opinion on hypothetical formula for solution approximately on following lines:

1. US would announce publicly temporary suspension of bombing DRV;

2. DRV or USSR or both would make statement hailing suspension as step toward reasonable solution;

3. Soviet Union would intercede with Viet Cong to curtail military activities;

4. De facto cease-fire would thus be accomplished.

5. Conference would be called on related subject (not specifically Viet-Nam). Viet Cong would not be participant but have some kind of observer or corridor status (this followed Salinger's expression of opinion US Govt would never accept Viet Cong as participant in any conference).

6. New agreement would be worked out on Viet-Nam providing for broader based SVN Govt not including direct Viet Cong participation but including elements friendly to Viet Cong.

Salinger refused express opinion on substance foregoing but in reply Sagatellyan's direct question said he would of course be willing carry any message back to Washington. Sagetellyan, repeating these his personal ideas, said he would talk with government circles and be in touch with Salinger later. He has in fact invited Salinger to dinner again tonight and latter will report results to me tomorrow.

During conversation Sagetellyan several times repeated Sovs could not control situation in Viet-Nam but implied that if they seemed responsible for bringing about cessation of bombardments influence with DRV and Viet Cong would be enhanced. Salinger felt Sagetellyan reflecting official Soviet feeling both Soviet Union and US enmeshed in Vietnamese situation to benefit ChiComs.

Kohler

 

302. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 15, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Vienna. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State on May 14.

3424. Vienna eyes only Secretary./2/ Embtel 3416./3/ Salinger had further four hour lunch conversation today with Sagetellyan and "Vassily" who identified himself as "Sergeev", latter dominated entire conversation, and told Salinger he was speaking this time officially and not as "an individual".

/2/Rusk was in Vienna for anniversary ceremonies for the Austrian State Treaty.

/3/Telegram 3416 from Moscow, May 14, reported on a dinner conversation on May 13 among Salinger, Sagetellyan, and Vassily Sergeyevitch, who was identified as a Foreign Office representative. In the course of a 4-hour conversation, the Soviet official confirmed the general nature of the proposal put to Salinger initially by Sagetellyan. Sergeyevitch told Salinger that the Soviet Union was prepared to convey such a proposal from the United States to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but would do so informally through Sagetellyan, so as to be in a position to disavow the contact if news of it leaked. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 142, Project Mayflower)

"Sergeev" said that after further discussion of idea put to Salinger in previous conversations and after additional clearances it had been decided that proposal as originally formulated was not feasible. He made it clear that the Sovs could not afford to be middleman in scheme and if US Govt should be interested in pursuing contact in private channels, middleman would have to be some Eastern European Socialist country and not Sovs. "Sergeev" was unwilling specify which Eastern European country would be suitable channel but when Salinger indicated that he had good contacts with Yugoslavs, he said Yugoslavia was not most suitable contact.

Moreover, "Sergeev" made clear that if idea should be pursued it must be amended to exclude possibility of American military presence in South Vietnam after neutralist-type govt agreed on and established as indicated para number three Embtel 3416. If this agreeable and if satisfactory Eastern European contact established then and only then would Sovs be able play role.

Confronted with this change in signals, Salinger attempted to probe Sov interlocutors for reasons. In doing so he expressed view that obviously Sovs after checking with appropriate allies had discovered that if they went through with scheme as originally outlined they ran real risk of being accused both by ChiComs and DRV of engaging in real sellout. "Sergeev" admitted this was fairly close to the facts.

In course conversation "Sergeev" said it would be very helpful in playing out scenario if President Johnson could take some "positive" action which would clearly indicate a real spirit of compromise. For example, the President might take certain undefined steps with regard to crisis in Dominican Republic or he might proclaim his willingness to take more conciliatory attitude toward Cuba. Salinger made clear this sort of proposal would be non-starter.

Sovs also disclosed during conversation that it has become clear that ChiComs do not want conference on Cambodia and, according to Salinger, clearly implied that since this was case Sovs would be unable to go along with Cambodia conference idea.

"Sergeev" asked Salinger to remain in Moscow for at least one more day to lunch again with Sagetellyan and him and suggested that it might be useful if he could bring along as guest Gordon McClendon, (Texas businessman, head McClendon Corporation--radio and TV broadcasting), who now visiting Moscow. Asked why he should bring along McClendon, "Sergeev" indicated that since McClendon very close to Johnson perhaps he too, like Salinger, in Moscow on special mission. Salinger vigorously refuted this idea pointing out that, like him, McClendon was here in Moscow on purely personal business. Salinger said, in any case, he could not remain in Moscow for another day. He planned depart in accordance with his original schedule. Salinger said that he would give a full report of his conversations with Sagetellyan and "Sergeev" to Washington on Monday. "Sergeev" said that he should continue to consider Zinchuk as Washington contact but only to inform Sovs of Eastern European country worked out as "drop"./4/

/4/Kohler concluded, in telegram 3426 from Moscow, May 15, that the Soviet approach to Salinger was authorized by senior officials in the Foreign Office and elsewhere in the Soviet Government, but was vetoed by higher levels in the government, probably after discussing it with the North Vietnamese Ambassador. Kohler suggested that Rusk mention the Soviet approach to Salinger in his conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna, to further test Soviet intentions. (Ibid.) Rusk responded, in Secto 27 from Vienna, May 15, that he viewed the Soviet approach as genuine, but he was not inclined to raise it with Gromyko unless Gromyko brought it up. Rusk did not believe that the substance of the Soviet proposal offered a promising basis for negotiations. (Ibid.) Ball called President Johnson at 10:40 a.m. on May 15 about the collapse of the Salinger channel, stating: "Our guess is that they [Russians] had talk with North Vietnamese Amb. in Moscow and cold water was thrown on it." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam I)

Kohler

 

303. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Vienna, May 15, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Project Mayflower. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Moscow. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 1:18 p.m.

Secto 29. Mayflower. For the Under Secretary from the Secretary. Have just returned from Chancellor's lunch for visiting dignitaries. After lunch Gromyko and I and our wives were at a small table for coffee. I commented to Gromyko that we were in something of a dilemma about Southeast Asia. We felt there might be some value in a serious exchange of views between our two governments but that we did not know whether they themselves wished to discuss it.

He commented with considerable seriousness that the Soviets will not negotiate about Viet-Nam. He said there were other parties involved in that situation and that the United States would have to find ways of establishing contact with them, and he specifically mentioned the DRV. He said they will continue to support North Viet-Nam and will do so "decisively". He then made reference to a fellow socialist country under attack.

I interrupted to point out that the problem was not that a socialist country was subject to attack but that a socialist country was attacking someone else. I said that American military forces are in South Viet-Nam solely because North Viet-Nam has been sending large numbers of men and arms into the South.

He denied these facts in the usual ritual fashion but added that in any event it was not up to the United States to be the judge between Vietnamese. I reminded him that he must know by now that a North Korean attack against South Koreans would not be accepted merely because both were Korean. He merely commented that there were important differences between those two situations.

He referred to Dobrynin's talk with me/2/ and said that the temporary suspension of bombing was "insulting". I said I could not understand this in view of the fact that Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow have all talked about the impossibility of discussions while bombing was going on.

/2/See Document 294.

At this point Chancellor Klaus joined the table to express great happiness that Gromyko and I were sitting together. Neither one of us dispelled his illusion.

I do not know whether Gromyko will pursue the matter further when the four Foreign Ministers meet briefly with Quaison-Sackey this afternoon or when we all assemble for the opera tonight.

Thompson and I both have the impression that Gromyko's attitude clearly means that the Salinger talk was of little substance and that we should now merely consider what kind of signal we wish to get back by way of Salinger as a part of the closing out process.

I do not believe that we should assume from Gromyko's remarks that we ourselves should not put to Moscow our own most serious views of the situation, whether they are willing to discuss them or not. It is quite clear, however, that Gromyko wanted me to believe that they are not prepared to work toward a settlement in Hanoi and Peiping and that, indeed, unless we abandon our effort in South Viet-Nam there will be very serious consequences ahead.

Rusk

 

304. Notes of a Meeting/1/

Washington, May 16, 1965, 6:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. The notes were taken by Valenti and transcribed later. The meeting was held in the President's office.

PARTICIPANTS
The President, Rusk, McNamara, Acheson, Ball, Raborn, Valenti

Rusk: In my talks with Dobrynin and Gromyko, they said the Russians were not going to trade with or negotiate. We must deal with Hanoi and Peking. Therefore, there is nothing on Russian side to cause us to hold off bombing.

Perhaps we should bomb again, then pause, and then bomb again.

The President: I thought we were going to pause only 5 days

McNamara: To achieve proper objective, we should go 7 days. One advantage is we will answer Times./2/ They wanted us to take a week. We can hold until Wednesday.

/2/In an editorial on Sunday, May 16, dealing with the bombing pause, The New York Times called for an extension of the pause to allow additional time for negotiations to develop.

The President: I would do it Monday. Start again then and that would make the pause six full days.

McNamara: We could start again on Tuesday evening our time.

Rusk: We can start bombing again--then get the Acheson-Ball plan/3/ all worked out. It will be launched by Quat.

/3/See Documents 287 and 300.

Ball: Essentially the plan is worked out on a local basis--going from military to political action.

Rusk: Gromyko is interested in the Cambodian Conference. Sihanouk is pulling back on his original insistence that Viet Cong be represented at the conference. French and British have talked to Russians and urged them to move forward on Cambodian meeting.

I think we ought to get telegram to Taylor to get his reaction to the Acheson-Ball plan. It will take at least three weeks to get plan launched.

Tonight we don't need any decisions--except when we start bombing and what we say about the resumption.

The President: If there was going to be any interest on part of Hanoi, we ought to have the reaction by now. You gave them notice on Tuesday. Monday will be six days. If you want to start the bombing on Tuesday, that's okay.

We can tell the Congressional leadership--that we had some adjustments out there. To me it's a pure question of what happens in this country. If we hold off this bombing longer, people are going to say "What in the world is happening." We can inform Mansfield, the NY Times, but we will never satisfy the Times.

Now, if this is what you all want, we'll go on Tuesday evening our time, but I would go Monday.

McNamara: What do we say to the press?

The President: We don't need to disclose every piece of strategy to the press. I would say to Mansfield, Kennedy, Fulbright that we notified the other people--and for six days we have held off bombing. Nothing happened. We had no illusions that anything would happen. But we were willing to be surprised.

We are anxious to pursue every diplomatic adventure to get peace. But we can't throw our gun away. We have laid off them for six days--meanwhile we have lost planes at Bien Hoa. No one has even thanked us for the pause.

McNamara: We ought to give this out on background. Mansfield ought to know Hanoi spit on our face.

The President: I'm afraid if we play along with this group, we will wind up with no one on our side. We tried out their notion and got no results.

My judgement is the public has never wanted us to stop the bombing. We have stopped in deference to Mansfield and Fulbright, but we don't want to do it too long else we lose our base of support.

The President: We will go Tuesday to satisfy you here tonight. I'd go Monday night myself. However, if you have good reasons, we'll go when you say.

We ought to talk to the leadership and tell them what we did. We can tell them we used the time for reconnaissance--and in deference to Buddha's birthday. We gave them all week. We told Dobrynin and we told Gromyko.

I'd call them in and tell them we are starting Monday night. And then you'll be requested to delay again--by the NY Times.

McNamara: Let's talk to the leaders on Monday and tell them we are starting again to bomb on Monday night.

The President: Rusk, do you buy that?

McNamara: Target #29/4/ is military barracks 10 miles further north than we have ever gone. I urge to leave this target in. Our own military will say we have gone soft if we take it out again. Also it can be our message to Hanoi and Peking.

/4/See Document 295.

The President: What do you think about the threats from Russia about coming in?

Rusk: There is a flash point in the Hanoi area in how far you can go without bringing the Russians in. Gromyko said he was going to help North Viet Nam and help them decisively.

The President: What about the SAM sites?/5/ Question is whether we let the clock tick or whether we take them out now.

/5/Reference is to a series of surface-to-air missile sites being established by Soviet technicians as an integrated anti-aircraft system in North Vietnam.

McNamara: We can't go after the SAM sites unless you go after the MIG airfields. We don't think we are at that point now. Most you would lose would be 3 or 4 crews. They don't have one SAM operational right now.

We have to go after MIG airfields first. First.

B-52's to plaster the airfields at night. There may be civilians involved since all bombs won't hit target. Then fighter bombers go in. And then we take out the SAM's

This is a major operation from the Hanoi point of view.

Fair to say not more than one SAM site will be operational in 4 weeks./6/

/6/McNamara and Rusk agreed, in a telephone conversation on May 17, that it would be "a great mistake" to attack the SAM missile sites. Rusk felt that such an attack would guarantee a rapid escalation of the conflict. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)

(At this point meeting interrupted by call from Bundy)

The President: Now, Rusk will talk to Fulbright and Mansfield--talk about your visit with Gromyko.

I think you ought to show the leaders we are open and receptive to ideas--but nothing happened on this particular idea.

For six days we didn't touch them and we told them we weren't going to touch them. And yet Gromyko was tougher than he has been in his talks with you, Dean.

Acheson: Important thing is you haven't bombed in six days and now you are going to bomb again. This is good thing for people to know.

Rusk: I hope we can keep the barracks target off the first day's bombing--perhaps put it on the third or fourth day.

McNamara: Yes, we will.

The President: Ball is going to say our bombing will be keyed to their aggression.

Acheson: Actually the plan is a series of pauses--in which we interpret the results each time.

Acheson: First, we put into effect a plan to strengthen the Viet Nam government. They announce the plan. We give the other side two weeks to think it over. For two weeks we will take no offensive action. We defend ourselves, but no offensive action. Government will send troops and officials into all provinces. Perhaps nothing will happen in one province and something will happen in another. But we will find out the temper of the other side. For if this works, the rebellion is over. We will have a practical plan to test the response.

The President: We want Taylor's reaction to this--also I think we ought to put extra money into the USIA. Eisenhower thought we ought to spend much more than we are/7/--we have to give these people a will to fight and a will to win.

/7/At President Johnson's request, General Goodpaster briefed President Eisenhower on May 12 at his home in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the bombing pause in Vietnam. Eisenhower thought the plan was a good one and put the onus on the North Vietnamese to respond. If they failed to respond positively, Eisenhower felt that the United States should return to the bombing campaign, and use "everything that can fly." (Memorandum from General Goodpaster to President Johnson, May 13; Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower)

 

305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 17, 1965, 11:48 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/MAYFLOWER. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis; Mayflower. Drafted by Unger and approved by William Bundy and Rusk.

2600. Mayflower--for Ambassador only. Ref MACV 171100Z May./2/ JCS message 2230/3/ which you may already have seen orders resumption bombing against north and authorizes execution Rolling Thunder 15 starting 0600 May 18. Regret this leave you so little time for consultation.

/2/Not found.

/3/Dated May 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

You should see Prime Minister Quat as soon as possible to inform him of decision here and confirm his concurrence as per reftel./4/ At same time you should convey to him paragraph 2 of septel to London and Ottawa rptd you for info/5/ which explains outcome of our approaches to Soviets and North Vietnamese on this matter.

/4/In telegram 3803 from Ambassador Taylor to President Johnson, May 18, Taylor reported that he had received Quat's concurrence in the resumption of the air attacks against North Vietnam, and he added that Quat was quite happy over the decision to resume. (Ibid.)

/5/Paragraph 2 of telegram 7323 to London, May 17, reads as follows:

"You should convey message from me that we regret that the reception of the other side to the idea of a pause was not merely negative but hostile. Gromyko told Rusk that our message to Dobrynin on subject was 'insulting.' Nevertheless we do not exclude possibility of other such attempts in future." (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S/MAYFLOWER)

Third paragraph same message provides press guidance which should also be followed in Saigon when questions raised following resumption bombing./6/

/6/The guidance outlined in paragraph 3 indicated that there would be no public announcement of the resumption of bombing. The response to questions from the press would be that the pause in bombing was in response to operational factors, and such factors were never discussed publicly. (Ibid.)

Rusk

 

306. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

CM-616-65

Washington, May 17, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text reads: "Sec Def has seen."

SUBJECT
Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam, 7 February 1965 through 30 April 1965

1. Between 7 February and 30 April 1965, US/RVN forces attacked sixty specific JCS-designated targets in North Vietnam. Of these, 43 targets were struck by US aircraft and 17 by VNAF aircraft. In addition, 86 armed reconnaissance missions were flown against lines of communication, targets of opportunity, and coastal ships.

2. The only two occasions when enemy aircraft interfered with our strikes were on 3 April when a MIG damaged a US aircraft, and on 4 April when two North Vietnamese MIGs shot down two US planes. In addition, one US aircraft on air patrol over the Gulf of Tonkin on 9 April was lost during an intercept with Hainan Island-based MIGs. Otherwise, enemy reaction has been limited to antiaircraft fire from weapons up to 57mm in size. The South Vietnamese have lost six planes and four pilots killed, missing and captured. US losses have been 30 planes and 17 personnel killed, missing and captured.

3. Our air strikes have not reduced in any major way the capability of the DRV armed forces to perform their mission of defense of the homeland, to train their own and infiltration forces for South Vietnam and Laos, and to provide logistic support at present levels of activity. The interdiction of lines of communication, however, has magnified DRV problems in providing logistic support to the southern portion of North Vietnam. Moreover, although supplies sufficient for their current military needs can still reach the area near the 17th Parallel, reduction of route capacities has degraded DRV ability to support any major offensive beyond its own borders into Laos or South Vietnam.

4. Although over-all economic effects are considered to be minor, the accumulating damage being inflicted on rolling stock and fixed facilities is forcing the DRV to expend greater effort to maintain distribution of essential supplies in the southern region of North Vietnam. The destruction of the Thanh Hoa electric power plant has reduced electric power available to the Thanh Hoa area by 60 per cent. The operation of phosphate and superphosphate plants and rice processing plants are the industries which will be most affected by the power shortage. Additionally, defense preparations both north and south of the 20th Parallel are believed to have diverted considerable resources from normal economic activities--a diversion the regime can ill-afford in view of its bare subsistence level economy.

5. Assessment of the impact of our air strikes on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese Government and people must continue to be deduced from the relatively small number of reports received by Free World sources and from statements made by DRV officials and citizens. Analysis of available evidence leads to the following conclusions:

a. The local population in North Vietnam is becoming increasingly aware of our air strikes and a sense of uncertainty has been generated among the populace. Western observers, however, see no signs that the people are pressing the regime for a settlement of the conflict. Rather, the popular reaction to the strikes seems to be that of "grim determination to continue the fight." In general, the populace appears to be responding favorably to the increased political and military controls imposed by the regime.

b. Early in April, Western diplomatic observers described the atmosphere in Hanoi as "fairly relaxed," although a suggestion of greater anxiety in official statements and in the press was noted. North Vietnam's propaganda output vigorously stresses the theme that the "army and the people" are stirred to profound hatred and are responding positively "to defeat the US aggressors." The tone of statements emanating from Hanoi gives no inkling that the DRV has weakened in its determination to continue supporting the Viet Cong while persevering in their resistance to US air actions against North Vietnam. Emphasis in DRV public statements, however, on the growing opposition within the US to the "aggressive war" being waged by the US may be an indication that the regime's leaders are hoping that the appearance of grim determination on their part and flagging resolve on our part will still permit them to achieve their objectives in South Vietnam.

6. In summary, our air strikes to date, while magnifying DRV logistic support problems in southern North Vietnam and reducing their current ability to support overt aggression outside their borders, have not reduced their over-all military capabilities in any major sense. Neither have we seriously hurt the North Vietnamese economy. The North Vietnamese regime, with no apparent opposition from its populace, gives every impression of being determined to continue on its present course.

7. At Tabs A through E are more detailed discussions of specific aspects./2/

/2/None printed.

Earle G. Wheeler

 

307. Letter From Clark M. Clifford to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 17, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letter of the Director of Central Intelligence, dated May 8, 1965,/2/ together with enclosures.

/2/Document 286.

I which to make one major point.

I believe our ground forces in South Vietnam should be kept to a minimum, consistent with the protection of our installations and property in that country. My concern is that a substantial buildup of U.S. ground troops would be construed by the Communists, and by the world, as a determination on our part to win the war on the ground.

This could be a quagmire. It could turn into an open end commitment on our part that would take more and more ground troops, without a realistic hope of ultimate victory.

I do not think the situation is comparable to Korea. The political posture of the parties involved, and the physical conditions, including terrain, are entirely different.

I continue to believe that the constant probing of every avenue leading to a possible settlement will ultimately be fruitful. It won't be what we want, but we can learn to live with it.

Respectfully yours,

Clark

 

308. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, May 19, 1965, 7:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo 1965. Secret; Priority; Noforn.

6582. A. Asian Director told Pol Counselor in strict confidence May 19 that on May 18 just prior resumption bombings Mai Van Bo (head of DRVN delegation Paris) had made fairly pressing approach at Quai of which essentials follow:

1. Indian proposals/2/ involving Cordon Sanitaire by Afro-Asian troops on 17th parallel were not acceptable to Hanoi since they did not respond to situation in which South Vietnamese struggling for freedom and for which Geneva Agreements and ICC already existed. (Source dismissed this as usual propaganda position.)

/2/See Document 285.

2. Bo said French Govt should understand that four points enunciated by Pham Van Dong April 8/3/ (withdrawal US troops, respect for Geneva Accords pending reunification, internal SVN settlement along FNL lines and peaceful unification without foreign intervention) were to be considered not as prior conditions but rather as working principles for negotiation which should in DRVN view represent ultimate goal of settlement in Viet Nam. In response query, Bo said he speaking with authorization his govt. Our source opinion is that Bo was making approach on orders sent from Hanoi as result suspension US bombings.

/3/See Document 245.

B. Source referred to Indian mediatory role undertaken with Hanoi at USG request. Any info from Dept on this score would be most welcome to Embassy (Embtels 6454 & 6017/4/).

/4/Telegrams 6454 and 6017 (May 13 and April 24) both queried the Department of State about U.S. negotiations with the DRV over cessation of the bombing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

C. Source added that French Amb Peking has reported signs of Chinese embarrassment in face of various indices of desire to negotiate on Viet Nam from other parties involved. (In this connection Rumanain Ambassador has told Amb Bohlen that his ChiCom colleague has recently shown signs of greater flexibility in this matter.)

D. Source added that Asian Director recommendation to Couve that further approach be made to Sihanouk on Cambodian gambit was still under study. Meantime Quai has been filled in on Sihanouk letter to Wilson/5/ and considers this hopeful sign. Source said he considered this text more official than other Sihanouk lucubrations and GOF itself has had no indication that Sihanouk has withdrawn alternative which would allow SVN to be represented by Saigon Govt. Though obvious Cambodians prefer two-headed representation by GVN and FNL

/5/Not further identified.

E. Info re North Vietnamese approach here given by source without authorization and should be most closely held.

Bohlen

 

309. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) and the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Johnson)/1/

Saigon, May 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret. For background information on this paper, see Document 287.

FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS IN A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. As a guide to present and future discussions of possible ways to settle the Vietnam question, it may be useful to list a few of the fundamental factors controlling the attitudes of the principal parties concerned.

a. DRV/VC

(1) The DRV/VC objective is to unite the two Vietnams under a Communist regime. They will not give up this objective until it becomes clearly unattainable in the foreseeable future. Even then, they will defer their efforts, not abandon them.

(2) The DRV/VC strategy is now based on accomplishing their objective in three stages stretched over a period of years--first a negotiation between the NLF and some Government in Saigon for a coalition government; secondly, a take-over of that Government by the NLF; and lastly, an integration with the Hanoi regime. They believe they can attain their objective following this track. They cannot be talked or negotiated out of it until they are convinced it is a losing game, particularly since they feel that at Geneva in 1954 they were tricked out of accomplishing this objective which was then within their grasp. They are thus especially wary of "negotiating tricks".

(3) The DRV/VC expect that war-weariness, government instability, U.S. sensitivity to domestic and international pressures, and Vietnamese xenophobia will lead to a situation which will shortly permit them to accomplish the first stage, i.e., a coalition government.

(4) No amount of bombing of the North is in itself going to persuade the DRV/VC to abandon their strategy. They can be persuaded to abandon it only if they are convinced that the trend of events in the South is against them and the factors cited above are not panning out. They are not yet convinced that this is the case.

(5) The VC will never really disband their armed forces in South Vietnam until they are fully in control of the government. They might as a ruse "play dead" without giving up their arms--but that is all. By the same token no extended cease-fire is practical.

(6) To the degree that we or the GVN seem anxious to negotiate from what the DRV/VC still estimate is a position of weakness on our side we encourage the DRV/VC to continue their present course. To the degree that we can impart to the DRV/VC a sense of calm confidence and willingness indefinitely to pursue our present course, the DRV/VC will be encouraged to look for ways out.

(7) At such time as the DRV/VC estimate that the tide has turned against them in South Vietnam it will be important to have a carefully thought out and agreed program that will further induce VC defections, facilitate DRV/VC acceptance of their defeat and "heal the nation's wounds" as promptly as possible.

b. ChiCom-USSR

(1) Neither country will go to war with the U.S. to save the VC. They will, however, take defensive precautions to see that the Communist regime in North Vietnam is not endangered. They will vie with each other vocally in condemning the U.S.

c. GVN

(1) The present government or its predictable successors will not tolerate recognition of NLF or the inclusion of VC in the government.

(2) No solution is acceptable which does not assure the end of infiltration from DRV and the break-up of the VC military apparatus in South Vietnam.

(3) There will be no agreement to a withdrawal of U.S. forces until the conditions of paragraph 2 above are met.

(4) The GVN will resist violently any political solution to which they are not parties from start to finish.

2. Although the foregoing attitudes are deeply entrenched, they are not unmovable. They are susceptible to the leverage of such forces as the universal fear of expanded war, international opinion, U.S. military power, and U.S. political and economic support. Our negotiating task is to accommodate those attitudes which are compatible with U.S. objectives and to apply effective leverage on those which must be changed.

 

310. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) and the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Johnson)/1/

Saigon, May 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret. For background information on this paper, see Document 287.

QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS RELATING TO "A PLAN FOR A
POLITICAL RESOLUTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM"/2/

/2/Document 300.

1. Why do we consider that the Viet Cong would offer the cooperation which is indispensable to the success of this plan?

Comment: We agree with the estimate expressed that the Viet Cong will be willing "to submit to heavy punishment rather than give up their long-sought objective of a Communist State covering the whole of Viet-Nam". We also believe that they consider that their present course of action will bring ultimate success. Hence it is hard to see why, under these circumstances, they would consider it advantageous "to move the conflict from the military to the political arena".

There is the suggestion (Part II. B.) that the DRV/VC will find the plan attractive because it will fatten the South Vietnamese sheep for the eventual enjoyment of North Vietnamese wolves at a later time. Also there is the implication that this "later time" might come to the Viet Cong as the result of exploiting the political advantages resulting from their infiltration of the South Vietnamese government. However, if this advantage is real enough to convince the Viet Cong that it is worth joining in a cooperative effort with the GVN to rebuild South Viet-Nam, the plan is probably too risky for us to engage in it.

2. Will the "carrots" contained in this package be more appealing to the DRV than those already suggested and thus far rejected by the DRV?

Comment: The President has made it fairly clear that the DRV could participate in many advantages if the leaders ceased their aggression against South Viet-Nam. This offer, coupled possibly with that of political recognition of Hanoi, might seem to be a more attractive package than the risks of cooperating with the GVN in the social and political reconstruction of the country. If such is not the case, we had better reconsider whether we are not risking too much in our own plan.

3. Why do we think that the promulgation of a new Plan for Social and Political Reconstruction would offer hope and credibility to either the South Vietnamese or the Viet Cong?

Comment: We have been engaging for several years in attempting the social and political reconstruction of South Viet-Nam, utilizing all the ideas and resources which the United States Government has been able to produce. From this experience, we have learned that the success of social, political and economic development is a function of security and effective government. Because of the security factor, conditions are favorable to development only in the cities and about 10 provinces; the conditions are spotty in about 22 provinces and are virtually impossible in about 12 provinces. As for the governmental factor, the record shows how feeble governmental performance has been since the fall of Diem. Performance is getting somewhat better now but still has a long way to go. Out of consideration of these two factors taken in combination, one can see little reason to hope that a newly promulgated program for social and political reconstruction will convince any large number of Vietnamese, north or south, that a new era is at hand and a new deal imminent which is too good to miss.

4. What is the precise purpose of the limited pause in military operations?

Comment: The paper (VII. A.) merely states the purpose as being "to assure that the other side gives serious attention to the plan". It is not clear whether, during the pause, the advantages to North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong would be spelled out specifically by GVN spokesmen. As indicated in the discussion of Question 1., the features of the plan which might be considered really attractive to the Viet Cong are such that one could hardly allude to them in public--certainly no GVN official could.

5. Under what circumstances during the pause would we revert to military operations? Specifically, if the DRV merely maintained their normal pattern of behavior, do we continue to respect the pause?

Comment: This question arises from the language in Paragraph VII. B. 3 and 4 and D. It seems quite likely that the Viet Cong would not change their pattern of conduct at least for a considerable time. Would this lack of favorable reaction invalidate the entire plan or is it considered feasible to carry on some parts of the plan even without Viet Cong cooperation? It would certainly not be satisfactory to the GVN (nor, we would suppose, to us) to cease offensive action both in South and North Viet-Nam if the Viet Cong adhere to their present level of aggression.

6. Under what circumstances and in what terms would we announce our willingness to withdraw U.S. forces?

Comment: This is a most sensitive subject for discussion within South Vietnamese hearing. There are always latent fears that the U.S. somehow will wriggle out of commitment to South Viet-Nam. On page 12 [V. C. 6] of the reference paper, there is a reference to a withdrawal of forces "on a phased basis" (assuming proper response from the other side)". We should be very clear in our own mind what would constitute a "proper response" before opening any discussion of this matter with our allies.

7. To what extent will Viet Cong or former Viet Cong be allowed to engage in political activities?

Comment: At the present time, Viet Cong defectors under the Chieu-Hoi program may take part as voters in local elections and, in principle, are not barred as candidates providing they are approved by the proper government authorities. If, however, unreformed Viet Cong are eligible to vote and run for provincial office and for delegates in a constituent assembly we would appear to be tacitly encouraging the eventual creation of the type of coalition government which, on past occasions, we have publicly equated to communization of South Viet-Nam. As we read the paper, we understand that under the amnesty Viet Cong who are willing to cease fighting will be offered full political privileges without renouncing Communism. If this is so, the point will be hard to sell to the CVN who have taken seriously our arguments against popular front governments.

8. How does the government go about seeking "to establish its presence with a minimum disruption of local administrative arrangements currently acceptable to local populace"? What functions would government officials attempt to perform in Viet Cong controlled areas?

Comment: Paragraph VI. C. seems to indicate that we would accept the status quo insofar as government control or lack of control of population and territory is concerned. On the other hand, in Paragraph VI. E. one contemplates at some point attaining a situation where "the government has effectively extended its authority throughout the country". As a practical matter, the Viet Cong will never allow government officials to operate in their areas of authority nor is it likely that we will find many government officials willing to try to enter Viet Cong bailiwicks unless amply supported by ARVN bayonets. Thus, if the thought is that government officials could at a minimum effect the registration of voters country-wide, we consider the possibility highly unlikely.

9. When, if ever, would there be a cease-fire and how would it come about?

Comment: By the time elections are taking place, presumably the shooting will have died down. We are not sure how this will have come about, whether by tacit agreement or by some more formal understanding. We do not see how we could have much confidence in the duration of a cease-fire if the Viet Cong have not been disarmed.

10. Under this plan, how do we ever assure the ending of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the dismantling of the Viet Cong military apparatus within South Viet-Nam?

Comment: As for infiltration under this plan, we see no reason why North Viet-Nam could not continue the clandestine infiltration of men and equipment as has been done in the past. Similarly, we do not see how the plan disposes of the hundred thousand odd armed Viet Cong who constitute at present the principal threat to security in South Viet-Nam. In the absence of reasonable assurances on these two points, it is equally unclear how the United States government can ever free itself of its present obligations in South Viet-Nam.

11. Can this plan be sold to the GVN?

Comment: We can see little if anything in this plan which would appeal to the GVN. Local leaders will be quick to see the danger of a coalition government and of the failure to assure the end of infiltration and to liquidate the Viet Cong military thread within South Viet-Nam. If we mention U.S. withdrawal, they will shy even more. In its present form, it is highly unlikely that the GVN would accept the plan without a great deal of unpleasant arm-twisting on the part of the Americans--perhaps not then. Such pressure tactics could only be applied at a very substantial sacrifice of the present good relations existing between GVN and USG. If the GVN yielded to this pressure, it is entirely possible that a military-Catholic coalition would overturn the government.

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 311 through 320