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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

311. Editorial Note

On May 20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an instruction to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) ordering his staff to prepare a plan of implementation for the establishment of a small combined coordinating staff in South Vietnam to be headed jointly by the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (CINCRVNAF). The instruction indicated that the Secretary of Defense had approved the establishment of the joint staff, and noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed the Secretary that COMUSMACV was preparing a plan for a more formal combined command authority to be implemented upon the introduction of a significant number of additional US combat troops. (JCS telegram 122 to CINCPAC; Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, DEF 1) On May 24 Ambassador Taylor commented on this instruction in telegram 3855 to the Department of State. Taylor stated that while a small, joint coordinating staff might be a useful device, it would not be a good idea to put such a plan forward in the climate of opinion that existed in South Vietnam. "Joint command to the public here means subordination of Vietnamese forces to US command and is obnoxious to national pride." Taylor noted that the Embassy was far from ready to propose anything like the type of plan for a more formal combined command authority noted in the JCS instruction. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) On May 26 Admiral Sharp concurred with Taylor's assessment and concluded that "Premature experimentation with new command arrangements would be counter-productive should it weaken national unity within the RVNAF or promote a feeling of apathy in the countryside." (CINCPAC telegram 260332Z to the JCS; ibid.) The Departments of State and Defense agreed in a combined message sent to the Embassy in Saigon on May 27, that no action should be taken to approach the South Vietnamese Government on the question of a combined coordinating staff until it was politically feasible to do so. Any planning for a combined command authority was to be done unilaterally and in "a discreet manner." (Telegram 2730 to Saigon; ibid.)

 

312. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, May 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Rostow Papers, Southeast Asia. Secret. Copies were sent to Ball, Harriman, Thompson, William Bundy, Unger, and circulated to interested members of the S/P staff.

SUBJECT
Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars: The Case of South Viet-Nam

In the press, at least, there is a certain fuzziness about the possibility of clear-cut victory in South Viet-Nam; and the President's statement that a military victory is impossible/2/ is open to misinterpretation.

/2/An apparent reference to the President's address to members of the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White House on May 13. For text of the address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 522-526.

1. Historically, guerrilla wars have generally been lost or won cleanly: Greece, China mainland, North Viet-Nam, Malaya, Philippines. Laos in 1954 was an exception, with two provinces granted the Communists and a de facto split imposed on the country.

2. In all the cases won by Free World forces, there was a phase when the guerrillas commanded a good part of the countryside and, indeed, placed Athens, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila under something close to siege. They failed to win because all the possible routes to guerrilla victory were closed and, in failing to win, they lost. They finally gave up in discouragement. The routes to victory are:

a) Mao Stage Three: going to all-out conventional war and winning as in China in 1947-49;

b) Political collapse and takeover: North Viet-Nam;

c) Political collapse and a coalition government in which the Communists get control over the security machinery; that is, army and/or police. This has been an evident Viet Cong objective in this war; but the nearest precedents are Eastern European takeovers after 1945, rather than guerrilla war cases.

d) Converting the bargaining pressure generated by the guerrilla forces into a partial victory by splitting the country: Laos. Also, in a sense, North Viet-Nam in 1954 and the Irish Rebellion after the First World War.

3. If we succeed in blocking these four routes to victory, discouraging the Communist force in the South, and making the continuance of the war sufficiently costly to the North there is no reason we cannot win as clear a victory in South Viet-Nam as in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. Unless political morale in Saigon collapses and the ARVN tends to break up, case c), the most realistic hope of the VC, should be avoidable. This danger argues for more rather than less pressure on the North, while conducting the battle in the South in such a way as to make VC hopes of military and political progress wane.

4. The objective of the exercise is to convince Hanoi that its bargaining position is being reduced with the passage of time; for, even in the worst case for Hanoi, it wants some bargaining position (rather than simply dropping the war) to get U.S. forces radically reduced in South Viet-Nam and to get some minimum face-saving formula for the VC.

5. I believe Hanoi understands its dilemma well. As of early February it saw a good chance of a quite clean victory via route c). It now is staring at quite clear-cut defeat, with the rising U.S. strength and GVN morale in the South and rising costs in the North. That readjustment in prospects is painful; and they won't, in my view, accept its consequences unless they are convinced time has ceased to be their friend, despite the full use of their assets on the ground in South Viet-Nam, in political warfare around the world, and in diplomacy.

6. Their last and best hope will be, of course, that if they end the war and get us out, the political, social, and economic situation in South Viet-Nam will deteriorate in such a way as to permit Communist political takeover, with or without a revival of guerrilla warfare. It is in this phase that we will have to consolidate, with the South Vietnamese, a victory that is nearer our grasp than we (but not Hanoi) may think.

 

313. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, May 20, 1965, 7:35 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to Saigon and Moscow.

6612. Subject: Hanoi "Signal." Lucet, Director PolAffs Foreign Office, called in DCM May 20 to transmit officially Hanoi signal (Embtel 6582)/2/ to USG. Stated "We were not asked to convey message" but were doing so as "friend and ally."

/2/Document 308.

Message followed lines reftel with additional details:

1. Re "Indian propositions"/3/ (i.e. cessation of hostilities on both sides of 17th parallel, surveillance of "frontiers" of two Vietnams by Afro-Asian force, maintenance of demarcation line) DRVN had asked how North and South Viet Nam could agree on cease-fire since conflict not between Vietnamese but between Americans and Vietnamese. Furthermore, DRVN could not understand how India could propose Afro-Asian force since India knew ICC and Geneva Accords were existing instrumentalities designed to guarantee Viet Nam independence, territorial integrity and unity. Indian proposals would result in "consolidation of division" of Viet Nam; hence, they could only be rejected.

/3/See Document 285.

2. However, "with text in his hand," Bo stressed that four April 8 points including withdrawal of American troops, liquidation military bases, etc. should not be "isolated" from "declaration" which followed. Four points constituted "best base" from which to find "most just" solution. Recognition these "principles" would create favorable conditions for solution problem and would "open" possibility of convocation conference like Geneva 1954./4/

/4/A marginal note on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "differs from 6582."

3. When asked if Hanoi recognized that realization of its proposed "principle of withdrawal" of American forces would depend upon the "conclusions of a negotiation," Bo responded "exactly" and indicated that if there were agreement on the "bases", the "ways and means" of application of "principles" would be found and in peaceful manner; possibilities were many; a way out (porte de sortie) should be found for US; "our suggestion humiliates no one (sic)."

Quai officials seemed convinced that DRVN delegation head had been instructed by his government to make the foregoing approach as a matter of urgency during the cessation of US bomb attacks./5/ Lucet had no comment on discrepancy between Hanoi May 18 communiqué denouncing "so-called cessation bombings"/6/ and foregoing démarche except to indicate that former was for public consumption.

/5/In Washington the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research differed with the CIA over the intent underlying the North Vietnamese approach. The CIA felt that the démarche was intended to probe the U.S. position on a settlement, but did not see it as a response to the bombing pause. (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 1765/65, May 27; Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo 1965) Allen S. Whiting of INR felt that the French were correct in assessing the démarche as a response to the bombing pause. Like the CIA analysts, Whiting was prepared to accept the approach as genuine, and authorized by Hanoi, but, where the CIA saw a probe for flexibility on the part of the United States, Whiting saw a somewhat more serious effort to establish a basis for negotiations. (Memorandum from Whiting to Hughes, June 1; ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam Misc #IV)

/6/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 870-871.

Lucet expressed interest in Indian mediatory role in this matter and expressed intention seek details from Indian Charge.

Comment: Any information on this subject which Emb could pass on to Quai would help ensure continued flow from French sources.

Bohlen

 

314. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department at 10:24 a.m., and passed to the White House and to the Department of Defense, exclusive for McNamara.

3878. For the President. Abortive coup of May 20-21/2/ has been principal topic of conversation in Saigon this week. In this case, Quat and his senior officials acted promptly on info, part of which we contributed, to arrest about 40 military and civilian officials who were plotting overthrow of his govt. Since round-up, we have been trying to evaluate pattern and political motivation of those involved. Some of plotters had been connected with earlier attempted coup of February 19/3/ and had already been convicted in absentia. Others have Catholic or Northern connections but, on whole, there seems to be no ground for describing movement as being Catholic or regional in its character. Our overall impression is that conspirators are hodge-podge of individuals and small group disaffected for differing reasons but all responsive to string-pulling of perennial troublemaker, Lt. Col. Pham Ngoc Thao. We had warned Quat previously about danger of allowing Thao to remain at large to plot. Now I believe for first time police are sincerely trying to catch him.

/2/In telegram 3838 from Saigon, May 21, the Embassy reported Quat's account of the coup attempt. (Ibid.) The Embassy had received prior warning of an impending coup from General Don on May 17. (Airgram A-857 from Saigon, May 18; ibid., POL 23-9 VIET S)

/3/See Documents 141 and 142.

This morning (Tuesday, 25 May), Quat finally carried out cabinet changes at which he has been working for several weeks./4/ His difficulties in doing so have illustrated delicate balance of relationships holding his govt in place. He may not yet be out of woods as he is still encountering opposition from Chief of State Suu, who up to last minute has been expressing unhappiness at what he feels is Quat's failure to observe required legal niceties in changing his ministers. New members of cabinet include several southerners who, while not well known, should give greater regional balance to govt and will probably bring greater competence to their several ministries than that of weak officials whom they replace.

/4/The new cabinet appointments announced by Quat on May 25 included Nguyen Trung Trinh, Minister of Economy; Tran Van Thoan, Minister of Interior; Tran Thanh Hiep, Minister of Labor; Dinh Trinh Chinh, Minister of Information; and Lam Van Tri, Minister of Agricultural Reform.

Generals added to Quat's last minute difficulties by repeating past objections to General "Little" Minh even in his reduced role of Chief of Joint General Staff. Quat evidently felt that he is still not strong enough to challenge any important grouping of generals and agreed to sacrifice Minh. His replacement, General Co, is good man but we are likely to miss Minh who was competent professional staff officer of kind not overly abundant in Vietnam.

Viet Cong, while not notably active during week, conducted two successful ambushes of convoys and appeared to be concentrating attention on lines of communication around Saigon. They interrupted road traffic to Dalat, source of much of fruits and vegetables on Saigon market, and sabotaged several towers on transmission line carrying large part of Saigon's electricity from Danhim hydroelectric complex in Tuyen Duc Province. They can cause us serious trouble if they continue to attack power lines which pass through wild and difficult areas where defense, repair and maintenance of lines are very difficult. If we are looking for reason for retaliatory action against North Vietnamese power plants, we have one in this situation.

After several unsuccessful efforts, we have finally got Quat to agree to sit down with us to discuss factors in eventual political settlement. We are initiating this discussion with him tomorrow along with his FonMin. It may be significant that, in his speech today to Legislative Council, Quat emphasized that GVN must be master of its house in conduct of war and in eventual negotiation of political settlement. While it may be that Quat wished merely to offset anticipated criticism on this score, there is no doubt that he and his ministers are very sensitive to recurring charge that Americans are in control and that Washington is calling shots.

Taylor

 

315. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
A Diplomatic-Political Track for Vietnam

This memorandum was prepared for you at Mr. Moyers' request. It deals with certain diplomatic and political steps the U.S. might take over the next several weeks largely, but not entirely, in response to recent initiatives from Hanoi. This paper has been seen by Ambassador Unger, but has not otherwise been reviewed by either State or Defense.

The Background

On April 13, DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong put forward four points as "the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem". The points were incorporated in the Soviet-DRV communique of 17 April/2/ and can thus be assumed to have Moscow's blessing. Peiping, in its own treatment, made the four points appear to be negotiating preconditions--a position which went beyond Hanoi's original exposition. [A memorandum to Mr. Bundy exploring these four points from our own point of view is attached as Tab A.]/3/

/2/See footnote 5, Document 294.

/3/Dated April 24. All brackets are in the source text.

On May 19 Ambassador Bohlen reported that, according to the French, just prior to the end of the bombing pause, Mai Van Bo, Hanoi's representative in Paris, had made a "fairly pressing approach". In essence, Bo stressed that Pham Van Dong's four points were not to be considered as preconditions for negotiations, but rather as "working principles" toward an ultimate settlement. State has indicated its interest, but has told Bohlen that we would not like to see the French involved in the exchange and indicated its desire to explore direct channels to Bo or to a DRV representative in some other capital. [Key telegrams are attached as Tab B.]/4/

/4/Attached at Tab B were telegram 6582 from Paris, May 19 (Document 308), telegram 6650 from Paris, May 22, and telegram 2660 to Saigon, May 22. In telegram 6650 the Embassy in Paris indicated that the French Foreign Ministry was waiting for an official reaction from Washington to the North Vietnamese démarche, which the French saw as a sign of negotiating flexibility. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 2660, the Department informed the Embassy in Saigon that the response being made to the approach by the North Vietnamese in Paris was that the contact might be of some value in the future, but the United States did not want France to be involved in any exchange that might develop. (Ibid.)

In a separate, but possibly related, development, a Monsieur Devilliers, a French journalist and scholar specializing on Vietnam, was in Washington last week. He made two major points in his discussions with me and in a separate talk with Ambassador Unger: Pham Van Dong's proposals should be regarded as a serious intent to negotiate; the U.S. should proceed to engage in direct discussions with Hanoi, thus avoiding the complications implicit in the participation of other parties./5/ While Devilliers' exposition at this time may have been only coincidental, there is at least an outside chance that he was asked to float these ideas by the French Government and/or Mai Van Bo, with whom he professes to have good contact.

/5/Memorandum of conversation between Cooper and Devilliers, May 21. (Ibid.)

The Next Step

The Department, as indicated, is exploring possibilities for engaging in direct, private talks with representatives of the Hanoi regime if we get reliable indications that they are ready to talk without preconditions./6/ Once we have such indications and have settled on a site and forum, we might proceed along the following lines:

/6/On May 25 Secretary Rusk sent a memorandum to the President containing items for evening reading. One of the items assessed the possibility of private talks with North Vietnam:

"We are treating cautiously the French report to us of a sounding they believe indicates a North Vietnamese desire to discuss conditions for negotiated settlement in South Viet Nam. Amb. Bohlen is telling the French that we are interested in anything which the North Vietnamese may tell them on this subject. We have asked our Ambassadors in Vientiane and Rangoon for views on possible venues for private talks with North Viet Nam, should this lead prove productive, and Amb. Byroade recommends his capital. Amb. Bohlen sees disadvantages in trying to talk in Paris, but thinks the tenuous contact may not survive transfer elsewhere." (Department of State, President's Reading File: Lot 74 D 164, President's Evening Reading Items 1965)

The telegrams summarized in the memorandum are telegram 1013 to Vientiane and Rangoon, May 24; telegram 636 from Rangoon, May 25; telegram 6690 from Paris, May 25; and telegram 1924 from Vientiane, May 26. (All ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Schedule another "pause".

Inform Hanoi and Moscow privately of our intent. This to be done 48 hours prior to the beginning of our suspension of bombing.

Inform Hanoi (and possibly Moscow) that we are aware of Mai Van Bo's approach to the French, and are prepared to engage in quiet, bilateral exploratory discussion with representatives of Hanoi without preconditions. We accept that Pham Van Dong's four points, as modified and interpreted by Bo, would form part of the basis for discussion as would certain points we have put forward. We await Hanoi's response.

Select a small U.S. delegation which should be prepared to engage in preliminary or even definitive discussions.

If, after 3-4 days of pause (which, in effect, will have given Hanoi 5-6 days to consider our proposal), we get no response, resume our bombing attacks.

Note--it is assumed that the GVN and our key allies will be informed of our initiative. The approval of the GVN (but not necessarily of our other allies) should be obtained.

The question of whether or not bombing should continue during discussions with Hanoi requires further study.

Consequences of Undertaking This Approach

At best, we might be able to isolate Hanoi from Peiping and, with judicious application of carrots, sticks and general bargaining techniques, induce Hanoi to disengage militarily from SVN and cease its support and direction of the VC and (hopefully) bring an end to large-scale offensive action by the VC in the South, in exchange for our suspension of bombing. This could be tied to a second phase of negotiations involving the GVN and the VC, which, especially if the Acheson proposals/7/ had taken effect, might lead to a satisfactory political resolution within South Vietnam. The final phase of this process could be a relatively simple one: the ratification of the agreements by the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Accords.

/7/See Document 287.

At worst, negotiations might be undertaken and be broken off in bitterness and hostility. This might make subsequent attempts at a diplomatic resolution more difficult, but this is a risk attendant on any attempt to negotiate. Of less grave import, would be Hanoi's ignoring or turning down our initiative. In this case, we would leak or publicize our approach and the fact that we undertook such a serious and constructive step would buttress the Administration's image domestically and abroad. Finally, even if negotiations are carried out, there is the possibility that we might find, some time after our bombing has ceased, Hanoi was not keeping its part of the bargain and that our bombing would have to be resumed with all the attendant political problems this would raise.

Further Considerations

If the Acheson plan meets with approval at the highest level, steps should be taken to delay the initiation of direct talks with Hanoi until the plan has been set in motion by Quat. Since the essence of the Acheson scheme is to establish the authority of the GVN throughout South Vietnam and to offer the Viet Cong a political exit from their insurgency, it is important that this be in train prior to any negotiations with Hanoi.

A small group should be established to manage all aspects of our diplomatic-political approach as a full-time highest priority task. This group should be selected with a view that it will provide the nucleus for the US negotiating team. Immediate study should be given to the preparation of a US negotiating track taking into account Hanoi's four points as recently put forward as well as our own position and objectives.

The visit by the Canadian ICC representative to Hanoi on 31 May offers an opportunity to explore the possibility of direct talks, to inform Hanoi of an impending "pause", or to seek further clarification of Bo's initiative.

C L Cooper

 

316. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, May 25, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations, Seaborn. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Possible Messages to Hanoi via the Seaborn Channel

The Canadians told us Monday that Seaborn would be going on a normal visit to Hanoi on May 31 (Sunday evening our time) and would be staying about a week. This will be his first visit since early March,/2/ when he conveyed on our behalf a message (Tab A attached)/3/ simply restating what we had told the Chinese Communists at Warsaw. He saw only the liaison officer to the ICC--who is however quite politically sophisticated--and the same was true in his December visit,/4/ when we instructed him only to ask what Hanoi's reactions were to the longer messages we had conveyed in June and August./5/

/2/See footnote 7, Document 199.

/3/Telegram 942 to Ottawa, February 27, was attached at Tab A. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 436.

/5/See ibid., Documents 222 and 304.

We might in any event be considering a general message for Seaborn to have in the event he has any substantive conversations. However, there is the further possibility that we should use this channel for either or both of the following purposes: (a) to reiterate the substance of our pause message (Tab B attached),/6/ or (b) to indicate our awareness of the Bo message to the French that Pham Van Dong's four points are not to be considered preconditions but rather "working principles" (Tab C attached)./7/

/6/Printed as Document 293.

/7/Printed as Document 308.

The first possibility, reiterating our pause message, would entail no difficulty and seems desirable in any event, particularly the last paragraph suggesting the possibility of further pauses in the future. We have little doubt that Hanoi actually got this message, but the reiteration of the last paragraph after our resumption would have some weight and might become useful in the Acheson/8/ or any other context in the future.

/8/Regarding the Acheson-Cutler Plan, see Document 287. For text of the plan as circulated on May 13, see Document 300.

The second possibility raises somewhat greater difficulties. Bo's message to the French does state that the four points are not "prior conditions" but equally it appears to call for recognition of these "principles" as the essential bases for discussion. We certainly do not wish to get into the position of accepting the four points as a basis, but there would be some merit in language to the following effect:

"At the time of the resumption of bombing attacks on North Vietnamese territory, the USG noted indications received through third parties that certain conditions previously stated by Hanoi as the basis for negotiations were not to be considered prior conditions. The USG had previously been unable to determine this point and would be interested in whether Hanoi is now prepared for discussions without any conditions whatever, as has been proposed by President Johnson."

In other words, we could pitch the inquiry on the basis of "unconditional discussions" in the full sense and not on the question of discussions on the basis of the four points. This would not be a change in our basic position, although we should have to weigh whether the inquiry alone would tend to indicate to Hanoi that we were looking for a bilateral forum and a way out. Needless to say, any actual bilateral discussions would have to be weighed very carefully by us, and we would have to consider particularly whether the GVN would accept them or react unfavorably if they came to light. Although we have acted on the Bo message to the extent of exploring what the possible venue of bilateral discussions might be (Paris, through clandestine channels, Rangoon, and Vientiane are possibilities), we had been inclined against any initiative toward such discussions at the present moment (largely because we think an action/reaction sequence is more likely to be fruitful).

On the other hand, to remain silent in the face of the Bo message could be misconstrued. It is notable that Hanoi, in the Bo message, did use a wholly secret channel. It was probably trying to establish a credible position with the French and it may also have been saying indirectly to us that, if they ever did decide to talk, they would wish to use the French channel and not the Soviets or the British (through whom we had sent the pause message).

On balance, I am inclined to think that we should include in Seaborn's kit a paragraph along the lines quoted above.

The full text of a possible message to Seaborn incorporating these points is attached at Tab D/9/ for your consideration.

/9/Not printed.

WPB

 

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 27, 1965, 3:48 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Unger and Thompson, and approved by Ball and Rusk. Repeated to Ottawa.

2718. We are considering asking Canadians to instruct Seaborn to bear message to Hanoi, when he leaves May 31, for delivery to senior DRV official if and only if his first contacts with his normal liaison contact, in which he would inquire about availability senior officials, meet with forthcoming response and DRV initiative for appointment. We would not wish Seaborn to press for senior appointment and we would not wish him to deliver at lower liaison level any message other than that USG believes it has made its position clear and continues to await Hanoi's response.

Proposed presentation Seaborn would make to senior official would be as follows:

1. In my last visit,/2/ I conveyed a statement of US views concerning South Viet-Nam, which followed the lines of what the USG had stated to Peiping representatives at Warsaw. That statement, of course, remains valid. Its essential points have been repeated subsequently in public, and it would perhaps be wise to underscore particularly the manifest US determination to persist in the defense of freedom in SVN and to take those continuing actions which are, in the view of the USG, justified and made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

/2/See footnote 7, Document 199.

2. Since my last visit, the USG has of course further publicly stated its position in President Johnson's speech of April 7 and in the US reply to the note of the 17 non-aligned nations,/3/ in which the USG further defined its readiness for unconditional discussions, its objectives, and the sequence of actions that might lead to a peaceful solution of the problem.

/3/See Document 245.

3. The USG has been disappointed to note that actions in the South supported and directed by Hanoi appear to continue without change, and even to be currently intensified. The USG notes that Hanoi expressed no readiness for discussions in its reply to the 17 nonaligned nations, that it responded negatively to the proposal for a conference concerning Cambodia,/4/ and that it has been negative toward the recent Indian proposal/5/ even as a basis for discussions.

/4/See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 716.

/5/See Document 285.

4. In addition, the USG informed Hanoi on May 12/6/ that it was undertaking a temporary suspension of bombing attacks for a period of several days. The USG regrets that this action met with no response from Hanoi neither directly nor in the form of any significant reductions of armed actions in South Viet-Nam by forces whose actions, in the view of the USG, can be decisively affected from North Viet-Nam. Accordingly, the USG, in coordination with the Republic of Viet-Nam, was obliged to resume bombing attacks. Nonetheless, the USG continues to consider the possibility of working toward a solution by mutual example.

/6/See Document 293.

5. In making these points, the USG again must make it clear that in the absence of action or discussions leading to a political solution it must and will take whatever actions may be necessary to meet and to counter the offensive actions being carried out by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam and against American forces acting to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam.

6. If but only if senior DRV representative gets on to Pham Van Dong four points of April 8,/7/ Seaborn would reply that he has no message from USG on this subject. However, his study of four points would indicate that some might be acceptable to USG but that others would clearly be unacceptable. It has also not been clear whether DRV statements should be taken to mean that the recognition of these points was required as, in effect, a condition for any discussions. He would say that the USG appears to have made its position clear, that it would accept unconditional discussions in the full sense, with either side free to bring up any matter, and that he would be personally interested in whether the DRV representative wished to clarify the question of whether their recognition is regarded by the DRV as a condition to any discussions. End proposed text.

/7/See Document 245.

In presenting these instructions to the Canadians, we would explain that paragraph 4 represents a reiteration of the message conveyed to Hanoi at the time of the pause, and that paragraph 6 is an attempt to elicit clarification on the repeated DRV formulation of the four points. At the same time, we have not wished to appear to be taking any real new initiative for discussion. You will note also that the formulation, as well as the explanation to the Canadians, makes no reference to the recent Bo approach in Paris,/8/ on which we have not informed the Canadians and which we would not wish to seem to be picking up as such. At the same time, part of the reason for paragraph 6 is that we have some concern that the Bo approach might have been designed to have the French pass the word in diplomatic channels that Hanoi is actually ready for discussions without prior conditions, which might invite some unhelpful initiative by the French or perhaps by U Thant or others. If Seaborn should in fact use paragraph 6 and the DRV representative should respond that acceptance of the four points is a necessary precondition, we would have learned something; equally, it would indicate what might be a significant change if Hanoi should take a different position. We suppose that the former would be the result, based on our over-all reading of Hanoi's position at this time, but at least the point would be somewhat better nailed down.

/8/See Document 313.

Request your comments on this whole approach. If you concur, we should be going ahead with the Canadians tomorrow if possible so that instructions could reach Seaborn in time./9/

/9/In telegram 3927 from Saigon, May 28, the Embassy endorsed the proposed channel and message, with suggestions for minor revisions. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 2732 to Saigon, May 28, the Department informed the Embassy that the Canadian Government was being requested to instruct Seaborn along the lines indicated in telegram 2718. (Ibid.) On May 30 the Embassy cabled the Department that Seaborn had received instructions that stipulated that he should ask for an appointment with the North Vietnamese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister and take the initiative in raising the question of Pham Van Dong's Four Points as a basis for negotiations. The Embassy felt that this was contrary to the message outlined in telegram 2718 and asked Seaborn to wait for confirmation. (Telegram 3956 from Saigon; ibid.) The Department responded in telegram 2754 to Saigon, May 30, that the Canadian Embassy had confirmed that new instructions were being sent to Seaborn to bring his mission to Hanoi back into line with the intent outlined in telegram 2718. (Ibid.)

Rusk

 

318. Editorial Note

On May 27 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending air strikes against the surface-to-air missile sites (SAM) being developed by Soviet technicians in North Vietnam, and against the Phuc Yen air base outside of Hanoi, where Soviet-supplied MIG fighters had recently been augmented by five IL-28 light bombers provided by the Soviet Union. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 71 A 6489, Misc Sensitive Files, Vietnam 381) The Joint Chiefs considered that, although the offensive threat posed by the bombers was limited, "a failure to act could connote a weakening of US resolve to fulfill its commitment to defend Southeast Asia in the face of support of the DRV from the USSR." (Ibid.) McNamara considered the proposal, and his marginal notations on the memorandum, although difficult to decipher, apparently indicate his concern over the risk of losses involved in the proposed operations, as well as the risk of an embarrassing international reaction to such attacks.

On May 27 McNamara sent a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence to ask for an intelligence assessment of the probable and possible Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese reactions to the military operations proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 OSD-STATE) The CIA responded on June 2 with SNIE 10-6-65, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions", which concluded that the probable Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese reactions would be limited, and would not involve direct Chinese intervention nor a North Vietnamese invasion of the south. The Department of State dissented from the conclusion, and anticipated that the proposed attacks might prompt a response from air bases in mainland China. (Ibid., INR-NIE Files) The Department of State had indicated a similar concern on May 27 when Rusk called McNamara to discuss the rules of engagement governing immediate pursuit in connection with the Rolling Thunder bombing operations. Rusk asked that McNamara make it clear that pursuit operations against North Vietnamese aircraft include a caution against attacking air bases or other ground targets that were not on the designated target list. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) McNamara returned the call on May 28 and indicated that instructions had been issued that no North Vietnamese SAM sites or air bases were to be attacked by U.S. aircraft. (Ibid.)

On June 2 McNamara sent a memorandum to the President in which he indicated that three senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials in Europe recommended against attacks on the IL-28 bomber base in North Vietnam (Document 325).

 

319. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, May 29, 1965, 12:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House, the CIA, and the Department of Defense.

3941. Embtel 3874./2/ On Wednesday/3/ Johnson, Manfull and I had five-hour exploratory discussion with Quat, Do and Bui Diem on political settlement problems. We used as basis for discussion the questions contained in Embtel 3678/4/ which I had previously given to Quat. On the whole, it was a useful exchange. It was evident that they had not done much fundamental thinking on these problems. On the other hand they appeared quite realistic in their assessment of the situation and on prospects for achieving objectives for an eventual settlement. We were successful in introducing the major elements of our thinking and in eliciting a favorable or open-minded response on their part. We will have to see where we come out when we get down to specifics. I have the impression that certain of Quat's expressions of concern over sensitivity of Vietnamese political situation and public opinion stem in part from current constitutional battle with Suu. (Which was obviously on his mind throughout the discussion.)

/2/In telegram 3874 from Saigon, May 25, the Embassy reported that Quat had indicated that he was prepared for an exploratory discussion of the list of questions put to his government by the Embassy earlier in the month. (Ibid.)

/3/May 26.

/4/Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

I will bring copies of record of discussion/5/ but in meantime following are points, which I believe may be of interest.

/5/A memorandum of this conversation, which took place at the Presidential Palace in Saigon, was prepared by Manfull. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T 159-69)

At outset they stated broad GVN political objectives were restoration of peace with liberty, full sovereignty and independence of SVN. They noted reunification impossible at present and necessary accept division at 17th parallel until international situation permits further consideration reunification. They were firm that National Liberation Front (NLF) merely creature of Hanoi and SVN cannot accept NLF as element in GVN administration; that is, as a bloc or political force or organization. However, they acknowledged provision would have to be made for integration returnees into national life as individuals. Agreed that major steps need be taken to revitalize and expand Chieu Hoi program and to promote defections.

We responded with statement general political objectives as set forth in answer to question 1, Embtel 3678, noting these interrelated and that "security guarantee" is theme running through all objectives and raises basic questions as to whether GVN/US should seek restoration status quo ante or seek new international framework. This promoted lengthy discussion of: (A) suitability of Geneva Accords as basis for eventual settlement; and (B) importance and nature of security guarantees. Regarding (A) initial GVN reaction strongly negative with their citing problem of elections, ineffectiveness of ICC, prohibition of alliances, and their desire interpret Accords as armistice between French and VC but not as political document governing future SVN. They saw advantage of Accords in designation of 17th parallel as boundary and possibly with respect to eventual regroupment and repatriation of VC. However, in the ensuing discussion they came around considerably and agreed that elections really presented little difficulty, that ICC problem secondary one, and problem of prohibition of alliances presented greatest difficulty but not impossible of solution. Question was raised whether a security guarantee by US need be considered an alliance. Quat himself suggested further consideration of formula using Geneva Accords as acceptable basis for settlement providing certain provisions of Accords are modified or reinterpreted to bring them in line with current realities. We will return to this in later discussions.

With respect to security guarantees they drew parallel between "guaranteed or armed peace" under NATO after World War II and situation in SEA where no muscle provided to guarantee peace postulated under Geneva Accords. They felt SEATO ineffective to date and felt something strong essential. While they dwelt on multilateral guarantees, it was clear that they were primarily interested in obtaining bilateral security guarantee from the United States. They indicated this might take form of bilateral arrangements under which US would intervene at request of GVN in the event SVN security were threatened. We pointed out that problem of SEATO unanimity was dealt with in Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962./6/ Without commitment, we undertook to examine with Washington whether that interpretation of the SEATO treaty could be made applicable to SVN as a protocol state.

/6/For text of this communiqué, issued on March 6, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091-1093.

Under question 2 we had meeting of minds on estimate of situation and necessity of pushing on all fronts to convince Hanoi that everything of value in DRV will be destroyed and trend of military and political events in South is running against them thus leading Hanoi to conclusion negotiations are necessary. GVN representatives emphasized sensitivity of the political climate in SVN to such developments as recent moratorium on air attacks, Rusk-Gromyko talks, proposed Cambodian conference--all of which are exploited by Vietnamese press and opposition groups as indications that basic decisions concerning SVN being made without GVN being a party. Extreme sensitivity also displayed over when and how US troops might be withdrawn.

Extended discussion involved modalities reaching eventual settlement either through tacit arrangement or through more formal discussions or negotiations of an official character. They saw distinct advantages in tacit arrangement but acknowledged difficulties in predicting how confrontation of viewpoints with DRV could be arranged, as indicated Embtel 3914,/7/ they felt it was in many ways desirable for US initiate contacts with DRV. Here again they expressed concern because of sensitivity of Vietnamese political situation and public opinion. With respect to more open official contacts the following were discussed briefly: (A) Direct negotiations between GVN and DRV; (B) direct negotiations between GVN and DRV with GVN accompanied by US and DRV by USSR or Communist China; and (C) a larger formal conference of Geneva type. While recognizing that ultimate choice of means would depend on situation as it evolves, GVN would prefer the order as listed above. The larger conference was considered least desirable since question NLF representation would prove most difficult to handle under this formula. However, GVN representatives indicated they could live with NLF representatives as an integral part of DRV delegation.

/7/Dated May 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Considerable discussion revolved around question 3 A on what we should trade for cessation of US/GVN bombing and eventual reduction US forces. While it agreed that GVN/US basically desired cessation of infiltration and VC activities in SVN and destruction VC infrastructure, problem was how and what we offered on our side in exchange in view of difficulties in verifying DRV performance. Agreed we should not trade GVN/US air attacks against DRV for mere statement from DRV that it would behave. Discussion inconclusive and marked again by sensitivity that US would at some stage expect to withdraw troops.

Discussion of question 3 B confirmed judgment that in general it desirable to probe DRV attitudes and intentions and perhaps easier for us to do this. Agreed that such contacts should proceed from solid, agreed US/GVN position. Radhakhrishnan proposals discussed under this heading which reported separately (Embtel 3903)./8/

/8/Not found.

Regarding question 3 C GVN reps expressed general preference for matching specific offers to DRV to evidence of good DRV behavior, although GVN could say publicly that it is prepared to study at proper time general types of exchanges (commercial, cultural, individuals, etc.) with DRV. They noted difficulty speaking out on this subject at early stage since Quat's opponents likely to label speakers as "neutralists". GVN confirmed it could accept principle of reunification but stated that reunification would have to await more favorable international political climate. GVN can accept co-existence with DRV but not co-habitation.

Questions 3 D, 3 E, and 3 F were explored during above discussions but no specific conclusions were reached.

Under question 3 G importance of Afro-Asian conference stressed. Agreed that additional measures which GVN could take would be to dramatically increase its diplomatic and public information efforts abroad. In general believed that continued display our determination and firm adherence to our course of action against DRV and within SVN would have greater impact on DRV than public statements.

Questions 3 H, 3 I, and 3 J having been explored generally were held over for subsequent amplification.

In discussion question 3 K, it was agreed that not necessary for US and GVN say precisely the same things but that we should consult closely and in particular coordinate positions on any new departures.

In concluding, agreed that fundamental point regarding further discussion was following: Assuming desire on part of DRV to reach agreement up to what point can GVN/US justify continued bombing of DRV as means of forcing dissolution of VC structure in SVN.

Taylor

 

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, May 31, 1965, 3:56 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and cleared by William Bundy.

2761. Ref Saigon Exdis 3941./2/ Record of conversation with Quat and others on political settlement problems exceedingly useful to our thinking and planning here. Since your visit has had to be postponed, we are sending following observations which may be helpful in preparing thoughts you will be presenting to us on rescheduled visit.

/2/Document 319.

In general we see little serious disparity between position GVN leaders and ourselves. We agree with penultimate paragraph that it in fact important for GVN posture as sovereign independent government that it take its own position, as long as we are in close and constant consultation and understand each other on important matters.

Specific comments follow:

1. There continues to be active interest here in making of Chieu Hoi program as effective instrument as possible in pursuing struggle against Communists. We will be anxious to learn of conclusions Mission reaches in consultation with special group from Washington which has been looking into problem and we still ready to help with personnel or funds as necessary to maximize program's effectiveness. We realize one central problem related to Chieu Hoi is probably that of effecting major reform in prisoner treatment and rehabilitation and we will be interested in your recommendations as to how top government officials and military can be persuaded this must be done.

2. Re Geneva Accords, you should of course continue pursue line that these should form basis for eventual settlement, since any other line would be politically damaging and in fact we feel that Accords offer us several advantages and pose no insuperable problems. We are looking into possible application Rusk-Thanat communiqué to SVN and will let you know results.

3. Ref to "pushing on all fronts to convince Hanoi that everything of value in DRV will be destroyed" not clear. Is it meant to refer to importance of credibility of threat as influence on Hanoi's readiness turn to negotiations or does it relate to judgment about how military action against North should develop in future, with regard to intensity as well as location and character of targets?

4. Believe you can adequately reassure GVN on question US troop withdrawal since this is an action which we would not be taking without full consultation with GVN and not until we are satisfied that northern aggression no longer a threat and GVN capable handling security problem in South. In any case we envisage phased withdrawal capable being timed or even reversed in response developments.

5. Re modalities for reaching settlement we can envisage, if tacit arrangement being pursued, situations in which it might at no point be necessary to have confrontation of viewpoints with DRV even though some formal meeting to put international stamp of approval on settlement might be required.

6. With reference question 3G agree that actions will certainly speak louder than words with DRV. However, their own statements make it quite clear that Viet Cong and Peking and almost surely Hanoi as well are counting on governmental pressure (abroad) and private protest (at home) against US policies and actions to deter us from pursuing our objectives as fully and vigorously as may be necessary. More effective GVN efforts around the world, if such did not too seriously tax personal resources needed at home, could make significant contribution to our joint efforts. As you are aware, GVN Embassy Washington virtually a cipher and we are contemplating measures to bring about improvement. In considering public relations problem either here or in Saigon we are reminded again of Dang Duc Khoi and wonder if GVN prepared put him back to work.

Rusk

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 321 through 330