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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATESVolume II, Vietnam January-June 1965
Washington, D.C. |
31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/Washington, January 21, 1965, 7:52 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Cooper, McNamara, and Rusk; and approved by William Bundy.
1509. For Ambassador from Secretary. Saigon's 2186./2/
/2/Document 28.
(1) Since it remains our view that dependents should be withdrawn we have studied carefully points raised your reftel and are providing following answers and comments to enable you discuss this matter with PriMin Huong. It is recognized that withdrawal of dependents will precipitate speculation and could alarm both South Vietnamese Government and people and third country nationals. We believe, however, that as long as Presidential statement explains evacuation on basis need to concentrate all US efforts on assisting Viet Nam to resist Communist subversion, evacuation would be understood in constructive context. It will remain true of course that it will be our actions more than our words which will help maintain morale but if evacuation of dependents is seen as an action in support of efforts to assist Viet Nam, it may even have salutary effect. Questions you have posed concerning other Governments and non-official Americans are troublesome but we believe not insuperable.
(2) In discussion with Huong (in which you may include Vien) please use only substance of proposed statement (see below); also make clear we are seeking his reaction and that decision to evacuate not yet taken here.
(3) Text of proposed statement set out your reftel appears acceptable in substance, subject to comments which follow, but we believe that it must be made initially in Washington rather than in Saigon as your text appears to suggest. As for text itself, last two sentences Para 2 B appear unnecessary. With regard to first of those two sentences we are also concerned lest initial release might invite communists to press terrorist actions. We also feel that final sentence Para 2A suggests too passive an approach on our part; for this reason would prefer final phrase to read "desire of U.S. to maintain a posture of maximum readiness to take whatever action may be required in support of those efforts."
(4) With respect to points raised Para 4 your message the following guidance is provided:
(a) We agree that notification other friendly governments should take place here first and it would be in essentially same terms we have proposed to discuss question with Huong. Although evacuation our dependents will bring in its train closing down of facilities and termination arrangements which may raise difficulties for dependents of other governments, each is obviously free to make its own decision on this matter. We recall that when we evacuated our dependents from Laos in 1960, dependents of most other friendly governments remained and never were withdrawn.
(b) With regard to dependents of private Americans and tourist travel we would envisage issuance general notices objectively describing situation and leaving it for individuals to make their own decisions, taking responsibility on themselves for risks if they visit as tourists or if, as private Americans, they keep their dependents on hand. We would of course still have residual responsibility to help them with emergency evacuation if there were real and immediate threat to their safety.
(c) We agree that there is distinct possibility Pan Am may drop its commercial passenger service to Saigon although we would expect that both here and through U.S. Mission Saigon efforts will be made to keep them coming. For most part dangers which make necessary withdrawal dependents do not seriously interfere with airline operations.
(d) We can also foresee possible added difficulties to securing additional free world personnel, particularly non-military, for service outside Saigon. We have some reason to hope that there will be cases where this will not be problem.
(e) Taking as much as one month to execute evacuation appears acceptable, even though a longer period than we would have thought would be necessary, provided the very announcement of evacuation does not increase risks to dependent population and there is no evidence of stepping up terrorist activities. If need for reprisal should arise we would wish to see simultaneous with reprisal a very much stepped up evacuation of remaining dependents.
(5) With foregoing in hand assume you will now open discussions with Huong and Vien.
Rusk
32. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 22, 1965, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to Vientiane.
2235. Ivory.
1. As we proceed with plans for further discussion of Phase II with GVN, it will be important that we clarify in our own minds, and seek to begin developing with GVN our agreed objectives, and negotiation tactics to be pursued in reading them. Broadly, the first question is whether our ultimate objective is to be establishment of new international agreement with respect to Vietnam and/or Laos or to base our policy on a return to observance of 1954 Agreements with respect to Vietnam and 1962 Agreement with respect to Laos. We have up to now generally taken the public position that the latter was our objective--"if the DRV would observe those agreements so would we"--"the basic problem in both Laos and SVN is that the DRV is violating those agreements," etc. Also in this connection the GVN letter of December 9, 1961 to the ICC stated the increased US military aid which it had requested because of the "flagrant violations of the 1954 Agreement" by the DRV "can be terminated as soon as the authorities of NVN will have ended their acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Accords."
2. Our objectives as now framed are to "get Hanoi and North Vietnam support and direction removed from SVN, and, to the extent possible, obtain DRV cooperation in ending VC operations in SVN" and "re-establish an independent and secure SVN with appropriate international safeguards, including the freedom to accept US and other external assistance as required."
3. The question is whether these objectives can be embraced within the concept of a "return of the 1954 Geneva Accords" or if a new international agreement will be required and, if so, its terms and with whom and how such an agreement would have to be negotiated.
4. This, in turn, involves the short-term question of the conditions (and their negotiation) under which we would be willing to suspend Phase II and other such actions against the North and the longer-term question of negotiating a new international agreement or whether it would be feasible to combine the two.
5. Of course, to the degree that the DRV finds the conditions difficult to accept, increased pressure on our part will be required with consequent increased possibility of other Communist bloc involvement in hostilities. Also related is the degree of support or opposition that we can expect from other free world countries.
6. As of possible helpfulness to the Department there follows some of our own preliminary thoughts on this subject together with some analysis of the pros and cons.
7. First, we suggest that while in our own minds it is necessary to recognize that the DRV probably does not have full control over all VC in SVN, at least to the extent of being able to bring about the surrender of all VC, we should frame our demands on the DRV in terms of the DRV "bringing about a cessation of VC armed insurgency", leaving to the DRV to plead its lack of control. Such a formulation gives us most flexibility in determining at the time what we feel is an acceptable degree of compliance by the DRV. In the absence of a substantial cessation of VC activity in SVN it also gives us maximum flexibility in determining the extent of our continued assistance to the GVN, or the carrying out of any offers we may make to the DRV, as until the VC insurgency has ceased we could point to the DRV failure to meet our conditions. The DRV will, of course, also perceive this and we could expect some tough negotiations on this point. Our conditions should, of course, also embrace Viet Minh withdrawal from Laos and freedom for the ICC to operate throughout Laos and, in particular, in the corridor area.
8. The next question is what we and the GVN might offer in return for DRV compliance with whatever conditions we establish. Implicit in our statements that we would observe the Geneva Agreements if they were observed by the DRV is a willingness to return at least to that level of military advisory strength in SVN which it was recognized we were entitled as replacements of the French, i.e., about 600. This, we could, of course, well afford to do if the VC armed insurgency and its support and direction from the DRV had, in fact, ceased. Progressive reduction of US advisory effort would, of course, have to be related to VC fold-up and GVN progress in long-term pacification program against remaining VC infrastructure and VC war zone complexes, since DRV likely [to] issue instruction for VC to go underground. It might also be possible to obtain GVN agreement to offer to enter into trade talks looking toward the normalization of economic relations between the DRV and GVN. Subject to faithful compliance by the DRV, we and the GVN could also give assurances that we would not use or support the use of force against the DRV. An essential part of any offer would also be an undertaking by the GVN (perhaps with ICC observation) to permit VC desiring to do so to return to the DRV and to grant amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms desiring to remain in SVN.
9. If the foregoing commends itself as a general framework for an arrangement the question arises as to whether it can be embraced within the concept of a "return to the 1954 Accords" or whether it inherently requires a new international agreement.
10. The 1954 Accords with respect to Vietnam embrace two principal elements: First the "agreement on cessation of hostilities" signed "for the CINC of the Vietnam Peoples Army" and "for the CINC French Union forces in Indo-China" and secondly the "final declaration" of the conference in which the GVN and USG did not join, but made separate statements.
11. Without attempting to go into details there is much in the first document of a transitory nature and much (such as the provisions on introduction of war material) that have been overtaken by events on both sides. However, both documents embrace the principle that they were not to be "used for resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy". The second document, i.e., the final declaration, contains the principle of respect by all the parties for "the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of "Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam," and "to refrain from interference in their internal affairs." Only the first document embodies the definition of the "provisional military demarcation line", i.e., the 17th parallel, the DMZ and the ICC.
12. Thus from a legal point of view the 1954 Geneva Accords leave much to be desired as a definitive international framework for an independent and secure SVN with appropriate international safeguards. However, all the basic elements are present in one form or another and thus it is our conclusion that a new international agreement with respect to Vietnam is not essential.
13. If this is the case, the question arises as to what needs to be negotiated prior to terminating Phase II actions against the DRV and how we should seek its negotiation.
14. It is suggested that in general terms our demands on the DRV could be encompassed in the following: strictly observe the spirit of the 1954 Geneva Accords with respect to SVN, that is, "refrain from interference in the internal affairs of SVN", specifically, stop infiltration into SVN and bring about a cessation of the VC armed insurgency in SVN, thereafter ceasing all support for and communication with any dissident elements in SVN. With respect to Laos strictly observe the 1962 Accords with respect to Laos, including the withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces and personnel from Laos and recognize that the freedom of movement granted the ICC in Laos under those accords is not subject to veto or interference by any of the parties in Laos.
15. In turn the GVN could offer safe passage to VC (including their families) desiring to proceed to the DRV and an amnesty to those peacefully laying down their arms. Subject to faithful compliance by the DRV with the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph the GVN could also give assurances that they would not use force or support the use of force by any other party against the DRV and that it would return over a period of time to the 1954 ceilings with respect to the presence of foreign military personnel in South Vietnam. Additionally, as noted above, consideration might be given to an offer by the GVN, subject to the same conditions, to enter into trade talks with the DRV looking toward some type of normalization of economic relations between the DRV and the GVN.
16. There are two aspects with respect to any negotiation within the foregoing framework. First, their timely and accurate communication to the DRV (as well as to others) emphasizing the limited nature of the demands and, secondly, if and when the DRV indicates any interest in accepting them, the actual negotiation of any agreement or understanding.
17. It will be noted that all of the conditions and offers with respect to Vietnam are framed in terms solely of the GVN with the thought that, in spite of the problems it will present, when it comes to an actual negotiation it will be preferable that the principle be that of a GVN/DRV arrangement, thus seeking to avoid the problems of a formal USG/DRV negotiation. With respect to the conditions pertaining to Laos it would not be entirely inappropriate for the GVN to put forward, in agreement with the RLG, proposals such as suggested herein inasmuch as the GVN was a participant in the 1962 conference and the conditions relate directly to the use by the DRV of Laotian territory for infiltration into SVN. Nevertheless, it will probably be necessary to seek to orchestrate simultaneous RLG/PL/DRV negotiation.
18. The concept with respect to Vietnam would be that if and when direct negotiations were undertaken between the GVN and the DRV they could take place at the military level in the DMZ under the auspices of the ICC. Throughout, it will be very important to avoid the twin dangers of, on the one hand, becoming involved in a cease-fire vis-a-vis the DRV accompanied by strung-out negotiations, or, on the other hand, making conditions so stringent as to be unreasonable from an international point of view. We should also avoid any acceptance of the National Liberation Front as a party to the negotiations.
19. It is well recognized that the foregoing concept presents many possible difficulties. Above all its success would depend on a degree of political and negotiating sophistication and capabilities which no one in the GVN, and especially the military, have thus far demonstrated. It also assumes an intimacy of relations and cooperation between ourselves and the GVN that we have thus far been unable to achieve. It is suggested that this might in part be overcome without entirely sacrificing the principle if the US were also directly to participate in the negotiation at the military level on the basis of the direct participation of US forces in the actions against the DRV.
20. It is also realized that the situation could so develop as to make such negotiating tactic entirely impractical. However, it is suggested that whatever the negotiating tactic the essence of our demands and offer would remain the same.
21. In any event, whatever the substance of our position and the negotiating tactics, we should at an early stage of our discussions with the GVN on Stage II, undertake also to discuss and arrive at agreement on our terms. At best, this will be a long job of education.
22. We would appreciate the comments and views of Vientiane and Bangkok, as well as those of the Department.
Note: In view Ambassador Martin's presence in US, this message not now being transmitted to Bangkok. Would appreciate Department making copy available in Washington to Ambassador Martin for his comments there. Or if he desires we will transmit to Bangkok for Charge.
Taylor
33. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 23, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; LOR. Received in the Department of State at 3:46 a.m.
2247. For the Secretary. Deptel 1508./2/ In the course of a call this morning with Alex Johnson on Prime Minister Huong, I discussed reprisal procedures in accordance with the authorization contained in reftel. Unfortunately, because of a breakdown of communications in the Prime Minister's office, Deputy Prime Minister Vien had not been invited to attend.
/2/Not found.
I opened the discussion by citing the document which we had transmitted to the Prime Minister at our meeting on December 7/3/ which included the following paragraph:
/3/For a report on the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, pp. 982-984.
"During the course of such intensified operations (i.e., against infiltration routes in Laos and at sea) the armed forces of the GVN and the US must be prepared and ready to execute prompt defense against or reprisals for any unusual hostile act by the other side. The US mission is prepared to work out with the GVN appropriate plans and procedures to this end."
I indicated that, because of the political events which followed shortly thereafter, we had not implemented this paragraph by the development of agreed procedures for the execution of reprisals for "unusual hostile acts". It now seems timely to develop such procedures.
I mentioned the strong feeling on our side of the need for rapid reaction if and when a decision were taken to execute a reprisal, indicating that a 24-hour reaction capability should be taken as the norm. To reach such a reaction capability, several preliminary actions should be taken. First, we could select possible reprisal targets in south DRV and work out detailed strike plans for them. In making such plans, we should be guided by certain principles, such as the desirability of joint VNAF/USAF participation regardless of whether the victims of an "unusual hostile act" were Vietnamese, US nationals or both. Another basic consideration would be that US participation would be at the request of the Vietnamese Government and that the first bombs would preferably be dropped by VNAF pilots.
Once these strike plans were jointly developed, they should then be approved by the appropriate officials of the GVN and USG for possible use in case a decision were taken by both governments to execute a reprisal. To implement such a decision, it would be important for agreed procedures to exist as to the channel of transmittal of such approval. I would undertake to expedite communications on the US side.
Finally, it would be useful to consider as a preparatory measure the need for explanatory statements to be issued by both governments in the time of execution of a reprisal strike.
Having laid out the problem in the foregoing terms, I asked Huong for his reaction. If he were in general agreement, would he authorize the opening of discussions with his military leaders? In this connection, we were uncertain as to where the military contact should be made. Was it with new second Deputy Prime Minister Gen Thieu, Defense Minister Gen Minh or with C-in-C Gen Khanh?
The Prime Minister showed quiet satisfaction that we were now willing to undertake such discussions. He said that he had been very much surprised that no retaliation had taken place following the Bien Hoa and Brink incidents. He said that he was inclined to discuss the matter at once with Vien, Thieu, Minh, and Khanh. We discussed at some length the best way of broaching this matter with the military and ended by deciding that Johnson and I should call on Vien today and go over the same ground with him as we had with Huong/4/ and that, following the Monday/5/ meeting of the US mission and the Internal Security Council, Johnson, Westmoreland and I would meet on this subject in closed session with Huong, Vien and the three generals mentioned above. I believe this is a satisfactory arrangement and gets around the possible consequences of inaccurate reporting by Huong of our proposal to his colleagues. It is not that I would expect deliberate distortion, but we are dealing in matters in which Huong has no experience and hence is liable to error.
/4/TaylorTaylor and Johnson's conversation with Vien later that day is described in telegram 2260 from Saigon, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
/5/January 25.
34. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 23, 1965, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; LOR. Received in the Department of State at 4:28 a.m.
2248. For the Secretary. Ref: A. Deptel 1509./2/ B. Embtel 2247./3/ After the conversation with Huong reported in Ref B, we passed to the subject of dependent evacuation. I explained to Prime Minister Huong that there had long been doubt in Washington as to the soundness of our dependent policy in SVN. Many of our senior officials felt that, in a war-time situation such as we have here, it was psychologically wrong to have dependents whose presence suggested a desire for life as usual. I had had numerous discussions of this matter with Washington over the months during which time we had weighed carefully the pros and cons of a no-dependent policy.
/2/Document 31.
/3/Document 33.
Recently a new factor had been introduced--clear indication of the VC intention to make American personnel the target of terrorist actions. I cited the Brink Hotel incident on Christmas Eve and six additional incidents in the month of January, the most serious being the explosive charge placed in our Special Services swimming pool compound. It made no sense to expose our dependents unnecessarily under these circumstances. Inevitably in the course of a mounting terrorist campaign, heads of families would be diverted from the main effort of fighting the war by concern over the safety of their families. Thus there are now two strong arguments for changing the dependent policy, the long-standing one of the need of a posture of maximum readiness and now the new one of relieving dependents from exposure to danger and heads of family from concern for their safety.
I explained that a decision had not been reached although the weight of arguments for evacuation of dependents was inclining the scales sharply in that direction. If an affirmative decision were taken, it would be followed by a Presidential statement explaining the reason for our action, the initiation of a deliberate evacuation which might run a month or more. But before taking a final decision, we were most anxious to receive Huong's advice and frank reactions as we were aware of possible internal complications.
Huong took the news quietly but in clear recognition of its importance. He said that he would like to reflect on the matter before giving a reply. He said he could understand our position but was concerned that the Vietnamese population might regard it as a step toward US withdrawal. I responded that we too were aware of this danger and the consequent need of a reassuring statement to the public at proper time. We would stand in need of his assistance in this matter.
I asked that he keep this matter entirely to himself unless he wished discuss it with Vien./4/ He agreed readily to the need for security with the aside remark that it was difficult for Chief of State Suu's office to keep any secrecy because of the unreliable characters in it. I verified that he had no intention of mentioning to Suu at this time either the subject of evacuation or our conversation reported in Ref B.
/4/Later that day, after Huong had apparently discussed the matter with Vien, Taylor also discussed with Vien the possible evacuation of American dependents. Their conversation was reported in telegram 2261 from Saigon, January 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Taylor
35. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 25, 1965, 9:34 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted by McNaughton and Unger, cleared by Cooper, and approved by William Bundy and Rusk.
1535. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Embtel 2252./2/
/2/In telegram 2252, January 23, Taylor recommended that the Presidential statement announcing the evacuation of dependents also include announcement of military reinforcements in order to attenuate the impact of the evacuation. (Ibid.)
1. We agree that it is important that any evacuation, if and when it takes place, should give correct impression of clearing decks rather than withdrawal.
2. There is strong desire here to avoid increasing number of US personnel in South Vietnam above present authorized strengths.
3. According to our records, you have requests in the pipeline for more than 6000 additional military personnel. This figure includes 2400 engineers, 2100 logistic personnel, 502 for airfield security, 446 advisors to complement the GVN force level increase approved 23 January, 422 Marines with the Hawk Battalion (minus), 419 MPs for Saigon, 96 for 39th Signal Battalion, 35 for the 10th TASS, and 18 for SOG. Your Embtel 2252 refers specifically only to the Hawk Battalion and MPs.
4. Balancing all considerations, we are prepared to authorize some additional US military personnel, on the theory suggested in your Embtel 2252, if you believe it necessary in order to achieve evacuation of the 1800 or so US dependents without serious negative psychological impact. We believe that announcement of deployment of the Hawk Battalion (minus) involving 422 men would serve the purpose. Such deployment is hereby authorized and, subject to affirmative decision being made to proceed with evacuation, you are authorized to time the announcement pursuant to your proposal in Embtel 2252.
5. We wonder whether deployment of 419 additional MPs in Saigon will give us the best combination of military utility and psychological impact. However if you believe that announcement of something more, such as the MPs or the 446 additional advisors is required to give the clearing of decks flavor to the evacuation of dependents, let us know.
Rusk
36. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 26, 1965, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to Hong Kong, CINCPAC for POLAD, Moscow, Paris, London, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok. Received at 11:25 a.m.
2302. Following is our year-end political appraisal and outlook for North Vietnam on eve of lunar new year.
DRV probably looks back on 1964 with some measure of satisfaction. Its most important single enterprise, armed insurgency in South Vietnam, developed favorably. Viet Cong expanded area and scope of operations and enjoyed number of military successes despite increasing US assistance to GVN. Towards end of year they were able to challenge GVN forces boldly if briefly in several relatively major engagements, and scored several spectacular and well-publicized successes. With exception of Tonkin Gulf incidents,/2/ Hanoi's direction and growing support of insurgency went virtually unpunished outside borders of South Vietnam.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Documents 255-307.
Several strokes of good fortune helped DRV and Viet Cong. Political instability in South, manifested in series of govt upheavals and in recurrent unrest, furthered their cause, not only in its adverse effect on GVN military operations and pacification but also by encouraging or rationalizing Vietnamese feelings of lassitude and doubt about chances of putting down insurgency. It also combined with Viet Cong military successes, with which it vied for attention in US and world press, in furthering general pessimism in Western world about war in Vietnam, and it was a principal factor in US public debate about Vietnam policy towards end of year. Having seen and realized possible benefits of this instability, DRV and National Liberation Front attempted to support and even foment it, and their propaganda exploited it to maximum advantage.
Good luck also helped DRV when Khrushchev was removed from power in USSR. His fall offered DRV some hope for reduction in acerbity of Sino-Soviet polemics and also offered good opportunity to improve relations with USSR without giving excessive offense to Chinese. Hanoi moved rapidly and skillfully to exploit opportunity and at this writing appears to have been at least in part successful. New Soviet leadership's apparent determination to reassert Soviet influence in Southeast Asia is also auspicious development from DRV viewpoint. It is not yet clear from here whether Soviets are planning to pursue this course over long run or whether they are merely following it as part of their post-Khrushchev policy review pending final selection and assignment of worldwide priorities and commitments, but Hanoi very probably welcomes development. Hanoi would hope that Soviet influence will offer powerful additional deterrent to any contemplated US action, as well as some counterbalance to Chinese dominance of the area.
Situation in Laos developed in manner less to Hanoi's liking. Though Pathet Lao with heavy DRV military support won Plain of Jars, this was counter balanced at least in part by Operation Triangle. Cooperation between neutralists and right wing developed favorably, if in fits and starts, and neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma appears to be taking increasingly tough anti-Communist line.
DRV domestic political scene remained relatively stable during 1964, with no change apparent in top-level leadership or in major policies. Possibly significant development was decline in public manifestations of internal struggle resulting from Sino-Soviet split. Editorials denouncing modern revisionists and listing their shortcomings fell off during spring and dropped further after Khrushchev ouster. Political personalities who had been principal spokesmen of emerging pro-Chinese line during 1963 (e.g., Nguyen Chi Thanh, Le Duan) receded into background, to be replaced gradually on center of stage by traditional national personalities such as Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ho Chi Minh himself.
Despite its successes during 1964, year was not all favorable to DRV, and Hanoi still faces host of problems in coming year. GVN military establishment performed better than might reasonably have been expected in view of political unrest, and was able to deal Viet Cong number of damaging blows. Moreover, increasing number of countries committed themselves behind GVN struggle. In 1965 Viet Cong victory by military means is still not in sight, unless political fabric in South tears completely or unless GVN Army is split and rendered ineffectual by internecine political struggle. Outlook is still for protracted struggle of indeterminate duration, with war becoming more expensive for North (increased pace of infiltration and accelerated supply of new and larger weapons). While there has so far been nothing to suggest that this has placed any significant strain on North Vietnam's economy, it might ultimately do so. DRV has also been forced into greater public involvement with Viet Cong by dispatch of Northern-born draftees to Viet Cong forces.
We estimate that Hanoi is more concerned about what might be termed "international political escalation" of conflict. Basic DRV goal, which appears increasingly difficult to realize, is to win wars in Laos and South Vietnam and to repay full and exclusive benefits of victory without bringing on excessive international attention or involvement. Large scale US presence and commitment represents clear and serious potential danger, of which Tonkin Gulf incidents served as powerful and painful testimony. Soviets and particularly Chinese, while offering welcome expressions of support, may well demand increasing voice as their own commitment and/or assistance grows. Indeed, if major powers become heavily committed, danger arises that they may ultimately reach accord among themselves which will not sufficiently take DRV interests into account. Ho Chi Minh's international political position is stronger than it had been in 1954, when he was forced to accept less than ideal settlement. He is therefore relatively well insulated against danger that this might happen again, but possibility cannot be excluded if major powers continue to increase pressure. Entire operation will become increasingly difficult and delicate for DRV, and will require extremely adroit and sophisticated political maneuvering.
Hanoi's ability to continue to walk ideological fence during coming year as successfully as during last months of 1964 will depend largely on events beyond its control. If Soviets and Chinese can arrive at arrangement which will permit worldwide Communist attendance at March 1 gathering and at subsequent conference, or if other means are found to reduce polemics, Hanoi's situation will be eased considerably. If, however, gap widens further and altercations become increasingly bitter, DRV may find it impossible to pursue relatively neutral course. In latter case, despite grave Vietnamese reservations about Chinese, it appears likely that Hanoi will choose to or be compelled to support CPR. DRV will nonetheless still do everything possible to maintain at least some ties to USSR as counterweight to Chinese predominance.
No major changes in policy appear to be imminent or even contemplated on domestic scene during coming year. New 5-year plan is not due to start until end of 1965. As in past, big question mark remains possibility that Ho Chi Minh, now 75, may pass away. No possible successor now in view has his personal prestige and authority, or could steer DRV through upcoming difficulties with same finesse as Ho.
We believe that problems outlined above will be of considerable concern to DRV leadership during coming year, but there is as yet no evidence that existence of these problems has led DRV to relax its militancy or to restrain its aggressive instincts. Instead, as new year begins, DRV gives every indication that it intends to maintain and even accelerate pace of insurgency throughout Southeast Asia, to accept negotiations only on its own terms, and to persist in its risky but possibly very profitable policy.
Johnson
37. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI, Memos. No classification marking.
I attach a summary of the Vietnamese situation which I think is better than the spate of confusing cables from all and sundry that we have had in the last two or three days. At the end of this memorandum (by my staff man Cooper) two choices are offered. One is to let the political mess play itself out in its own way, and the other is to try to keep it pinned together in roughly its present form at least until March. The latter is Cooper's choice, and it is clearly Max Taylor's as well. It has the advantage that in March under cover of a new National Assembly meeting there could be a reconstruction of the government without Huong.
It is certainly true that if Huong goes now, the Buddhists will be more irresponsible than ever. On the other hand, it is equally clear that Huong himself does not have the authority to govern without very heavy and visible U.S. support.
The one additional thought I have is that we might make one more effort to talk sense to the Buddhists through some American that they trust. Their particular hero is Cabot Lodge, but the dangers of sending him are obvious. The only way it could be done is on the basis of a direct invitation from Max Taylor, and I have asked my brother Bill to consider whether the idea is sufficiently promising for us to ask Max if he would like to do it. I feel sure myself that in this context Lodge would be a team player and I would be glad to know your own feelings about this.
McG. B.
Keep Lodge out of it./2/
See if you can find a way of using him.
Leave it to Taylor./2/None of the three options is initialed or marked in any way.
Finally, I continue to believe that a general discussion of Vietnam with Rusk and McNamara and myself is one of the two pieces of business that should be conducted before anyone goes to London./3/ The other piece of business is a Middle East problem on which I will report separately. I have asked Jack Valenti to check with you on these two appointments./4/
/3/Reference is to the U.S. delegation to the funeral of Winston Churchill, who died on January 24.
/4/Not further identified.
Attachment/5/
/5/Secret.
Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, January 26, 1965.
SUBJECT
Vietnam--The Present State of PlayThe Situation
In General:--Political maneuvering continues between the civilians and the military, between the Buddhists and the government and between various elements within the military. Indeed the situation in Saigon, Hue and one or two other cities is so fluid and (literally) flammable that we may, at least for the moment, have lost our ability to exert any significant degree of control or influence. Meanwhile, no unusual VC military activity has been reported, and GVN forces report several successful operations.
Political:--The weekend's attempt by Khanh to get Suu and Huong to resign has not yet run its course. Khanh saw Johnson today/6/ and insisted that both Suu and Huong had offered their resignations over the weekend (you remember that Huong denied this). Khanh claims he has made a deal with the Buddhists which involves inter alia the two chief troublemakers leaving the country. Johnson feels Khanh is encouraging the Buddhists by such dealings and may be thinking about taking over and assuming a Sihanouk-like role and posture./7/ He also thinks the events of the past few days (especially the on-again, off-again pressure on Huong) indicates that the Generals are deeply divided.
/6/Johnson reported on this conversation in telegram 2292 from Saigon, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)6
/7/The word "(neutralist)" is written in the margin of the source text at this point.
Meanwhile, security forces have surrounded the Buddhist Institute in Saigon and banned all unauthorized entry. In Hue, local authorities have declared martial law, and have reportedly marked some areas where there are U.S. installations as off-limits to marchers. Press reports stated that one crowd of marchers had approached the U.S. Consulate, but all U.S. dependents have been relocated within the MACV compound. Most of the demonstrators have been orderly, but the theme of exhortations to them is anti-government and anti-Ambassador Taylor. The homes of the Vietnamese information director and of the local national police director were burned by students. A general strike in both Da Nang and Quang Tri, a sit-down strike in Nha Trang, and demonstrations in Hoi An, capital of Quang Nam Province are also underway.
More than 200 arrests have been made, including a number of monks. The government claims that some monks arrested have not been bona fide. Meanwhile, the Buddhists over the weekend called for further sacrifices, similar to that of the first monk last year to commit self-immolation. There are press reports indicating that some of the five monks on a hunger-strike may be in poor condition, but they are unidentified. However, government officials had a rumor that Tri Quang hoped to make Tam Chau, already frail, a martyr by allowing his death. A bonze-ess has burned herself to death in Nha Trang, and a Catholic was set on fire by a Buddhist in Saigon.
A State Department outgoing cable over the weekend/8/ suggested that the Buddhist problem might be defused, and a Khanh-Buddhist cabal, if any, curbed if Huong undertook a course of action which would maintain a firm posture against disorders, but simultaneously issue a policy statement guaranteeing freedom of religion and offering to meet Buddhist leaders and resolve any legitimate grievances. It was felt that this might undercut any developing Buddhist support. Huong, however, continues to indicate a preference for firm measures, isolating the Buddhist leaders by trying to separate sects from the United Buddhist Organization, and publicly attacking the Buddhists as tools of the Communists. No reply has as yet been received from Saigon.
/8/Telegram 1521 to Saigon, January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Military Situation
The VC has ordered a cease-fire for the period of the New Year (31 January through 6 February); unarmed "rebel" (ARVN) forces will be permitted to go through VC lines to visit their families. However, there are reports that military activities in the Saigon area are to be stepped up in the days immediately preceding the New Year. The detonations in the MACV compound yesterday (no casualties) may have been in response to this order. In general, however, VC activity during the past week was at a relatively low level.
The ARVN has been active during the past week or so. There was a very successful operation in the Delta which netted 51 VC killed and 26 PWs. Two other operations, both south of Saigon, were described by MACV as "highly successful"./9/
/9/Not further identified.
Evacuation
Johnson approached Huong and Deputy Prime Minister Vien on the evacuation issue./10/ They expressed concern over the effects on SVN morale, but agreed to think the matter over, especially in the light of possible compensating military reinforcements. Bill Bundy's sounding of the Australians here was inconclusive; the Ambassador felt the effect would depend on future U.S. policy and operational moves./11/
/10/See Document 34 and footnote 4 thereto.
/11/William Bundy described the Australian Government's response to evacuation of U.S. dependents in a January 25 memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, McCone, and McGeorge Bundy as "lukewarm, but not really striking weight one way or the other." (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Jan.-Mar. 1965)
In line with our conversation on Sunday,/12/ I am urging State to query nearby Far East posts on available school facilities. I am also looking into the question of AID establishing a special boarding school nearby (perhaps moving the school now in Saigon). We have not yet received a breakdown of dependents, but preliminary data indicate that about 60% are children.
/12/January 24.
Outgoing to Saigon today gives DOD OK to Hawk battalion for Saigon, and puts evacuation in context of "if and when"./13/
/13/See Document 35.
Infiltration
The edited, updated infiltration study was given to relevant Congressional Committees yesterday;/14/ Saigon gave a backgrounder today (preliminary reports indicate no static; questions mostly technical);/15/ Bill Bundy and I are backgrounding late this afternoon./16/
/14/See footnote 7, Document 9.
/15/No report on the January 26 Saigon background press briefing has been found.
/16/The Washington background briefing by Cooper and William Bundy was summarized in telegram 1540 to Saigon, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Outlook
We have two broad options:
A. Let the situation continue to slip and slide, use our presently limited assets to influence, guide and protest, and hope that the forces involved will reach some modus vivendi.
B. Take a more active role in a last effort to get a fix that will last at least until the National Assembly meets in March (at which time Huong can be replaced with some measure of legality).
I favor the latter in full recognition that it is easier said than done and that it may mean difficulties with Taylor, State and sundry others. I will have some specific, if far-out, ideas by noon tomorrow.
C
38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 26, 1965, 6:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, EP 6-1 HUE. Top Secret; Flash; Limdis. Drafted by Corcoran, cleared by W. Bundy, and approved by Unger.1
1539. 1. Concur line you have taken and are taking concerning possible evacuation US personnel from Hue (Embtels 2279,/2/ 2300)./3/
/2/In telegram 2279 from Saigon, January 25, Taylor reported on Buddhist-inspired, anti-American demonstrations in Hue. He said that with the agreement of the U.S. Mission Council, he, U. Alexis Johnson, and Westmoreland had met that day with Huong, Vien, and Generals Khanh, Thieu, and Minh and informed them that the United States was considering withdrawing all American civilians from Hue, except for Consul Samuel B. Thomsen and Voice of America personnel. Taylor also told the Department of State that he had given the Consul authority to evacuate all Americans at once on his own decision if the situation required. (Ibid., POL 18 VIET S)
/3/In telegram 2300 from Saigon, January 26, Taylor described how in a conversation with Vien that day he had expressed "renewed concern" for the safety of the Americans in Hue. Taylor also indicated that he and Thomsen had decided that they should probably plan to evacuate American dependents from Hue the following day. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
2. Have read with interest your 2295/4/ sorting out likely intentions of Khanh. All evidence available supports your theory of opportunistic de facto alliance between Khanh and Buddhist Institute leaders to bring down Huong government and replace it with regime which will be both weaker and more inclined towards negotiation with Communists.
/4/In telegram 2295 from Saigon, January 26, the Embassy speculated on Khanh's motives in permitting anti-government demonstrations by Buddhists. (Ibid., POL 23-8 VIET S)
3. Point on which we not clear is degree of opposition to such move within armed forces and effectiveness with which it could mobilize itself.
Three questions occur to us:
a) Is there in fact a possible combination of military officers capable of removing Khanh and neutralizing the current Buddhist effort by strong action?
b) Is there a possibility of backstopping such an effort by aligning some Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Dai Viet and non-Institute Buddhist elements behind Huong?
c) Can Ambassador Tran Thien Khiem play a useful role in developing the sort of military combination described in (a) above?
4. If the answers to at least (a) and (b) are yes, we would be inclined let it be known discreetly but immediately to the appropriate military officers individually that Khanh and the Institute are skating on thin ice in their undercutting of the lawful government and we should not be sorry to see them fall through.
Rusk
39. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1965.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI. Secret.
The attached intelligence memorandum represents a CIA assessment that a coup by Khanh is quite likely tonight. The State Department agrees that the chances are substantial, but rates them a little lower.
McNamara, Rusk and I all agree that we can't second guess Alexis Johnson from here. He is the man on the spot, Max Taylor being in Bangkok on a long-delayed visit.
I discussed with a number of people whether we should try to move Max back in a hurry. The consensus is against it. He has less personal influence with these people than Alexis and is perhaps slightly less skillful in palaver. But what is more important--if there is a coup, we do not want an emotionally explosive reaction from the Ambassador in the first twenty-four hours. We will want time to turn around, and it may even turn out that a change of government could provide the framework for a repair of our relations with these people.
Finally, no matter what happens in this particular rumor, there is strong feeling which I share that this back-and-forth in the government in Saigon is a symptom, not a root cause of our problem.
It is this basic issue of our own purpose and policy that I hope we can discuss in our 11:30 meeting with you tomorrow, and I will have a paper on that in the morning./2/
/2/See Document 42.
Attachment/3/
Intelligence Memorandum
0751/65
Washington, January 26, 1965.
/3/Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(as of 1400 EST)1. There are strong indications that General Khanh is preparing imminent action to remove Premier Huong, possibly tonight. Although Khanh has given no timing, General Thi, the commander of I Corps in the north, has told the press that there may be a change of government on 27 January Saigon time (tonight EST). On 25 January, Tri Quang stated that, in two more days, a "new element" would be involved in the Buddhist-Huong dispute. On the same day General Ky stated that he was charged with interviewing civilian candidates for a new government, with a three-day deadline. The US Embassy will not necessarily get advance notice, despite Khanh's promise.
2. Khanh saw Deputy Ambassador Johnson again on 26 January, and repeated the views he had expressed over the weekend, viz.: the problem with the Buddhists was grave; the Buddhists cannot retreat and Huong's handling of them is inflexible; and a blow-up in the near future is inevitable. Khanh still insists that Huong and Chief of State Suu have "offered" to turn over power to the military, and says he desires a US "go-ahead." There are signs that the military may try to move behind a figleaf of legality by convening a reconstituted High National Council, which would call for Huong's resignation.
3. Khanh maintains that he fears prolongation of the present situation will lead to Huong's downfall and a proneutralist successor. He says he has a written agreement from the Buddhists to a military takeover, a moratorium on Buddhist politics, and the departure from the country of some Buddhist militants. Although there is evidence that the Buddhist leadership is trying to induce a military coup and may be willing to use Khanh, the Embassy has observed to Khanh that Buddhist leaders cannot be relied on to honor any such agreement or to refrain from similarly obstructing or attacking any successor government. This appears to be a valid assessment.
4. Premier Huong maintains that he never offered to resign, he will not leave office unless forced out. He argues that the Buddhist leaders lack a solid following and can be isolated, provided the military support a strong course, at least until elections can be held. However, although the Buddhist anti-Huong campaign has until now lacked widespread public backing, the campaign is gathering steam. The Buddhist hierarchy has considerable influence among student groups, and the self-immolation by a Buddhist girl on 26 January in Nha Trang may further rouse passions in their favor. This is particularly true in I Corps, where the government's emissary General Thieu has described the situation as grave and where General Thi and his deputies show little inclination to curb Buddhist-student demonstrations.
5. Although Khanh's views of the present danger appear to be widely shared by the military, reporting indicates considerable disagreement among the generals over courses of action. There are reports of military opposition to Khanh, both by elements favoring cooperation with the Buddhists and those urging curbs on the Buddhists. Some early move against Khanh cannot be ruled out.
40. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 27, 1965.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, 1965 General, 1/65-2/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limit Distribution.
SUBJECT
The Situation in South Vietnam: the Quiet Coup/2//2/The implications of the coup were also analyzed in Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton's draft memorandum of January 27, which he showed to and discussed with Secretary of Defense McNamara at 7:45 a.m. on January 27. The memorandum is printed, along with McNamara's comments on certain points McNaughton raised, in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 686-687.
During the morning of January 27, Vietnamese Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Khanh, with the support of at least some of the other generals, initiated a series of actions to take control of the government of Chief of State Suu and Prime Minister Huong. Strong indications of Khanh's intentions were evident in reports from the US Mission in Saigon at least during the preceding 48 hours./3/
/3/See also CIA Intelligence Memorandum, The Situation in South Vietnam (as of 2:00 pm EST), January 26, 1965, No. 0751; and informal INR Note to Mr. Hughes (as of 1:30 p.m. EST), January 26, 1965. [Footnote in the source text. The CIA intelligence memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI; the INR note has not been found.]
1. At about 10:00 a.m. on January 27 (Saigon time), the Vietnamese Armed Forces Council issued a communiqué stating that in view of the inability of Chief of State Suu and Prime Minister Huong to cope with the current political crisis, the Council withdrew its confidence in the government and entrusted General Khanh with the task of solving the crisis. Khanh would immediately establish a 20-man council representing the armed forces, major religious groups, and regional interests and responsible for "advising the government in making important decisions." An announcement by Khanh shortly thereafter reiterated the actions and stated intentions of the Armed Forces Council. This was followed by a statement by General Dong, Commander of the Capital Military District, that (a) the proposed military-civilian council was the equivalent of the High National Council dissolved last December, (b) the new council would choose a Chief of State who in turn would appoint a Prime Minister, and (c) the Buddhist hierarchy had agreed not to interfere in politics and to send its leading three monks, including Thich Tam Chau and Thich Tri Quang, out of the country.
2. Khanh had indicated to the US Embassy and to MACV the previous day that he planned a "solution" along these lines. US protestations apparently did not dissuade him, but he agreed to inform Ambassador Johnson prior to proceeding any further. However, Khanh in effect presented the US with a fait accompli by informing General Westmoreland (through an intermediary) and requesting merely to talk with Ambassador Johnson at the Vietnamese General Staff headquarters virtually at the very moment Khanh was proceeding to execute his plan. Khanh then proceeded to outline his "solution" in greater detail to Ambassador Johnson, noting that (a) his proposed military-civilian council would probably reappoint Suu as Chief of State, (b) the Chief of State's selection of a new Prime Minister would have to be approved by this council, (c) there would be minimum changes in the government and military officers currently in the cabinet would remain, (d) Deputy Prime Minister Vien would serve as acting Prime Minister in the interim, and (e) the Armed Forces Council would be the supreme governmental body until these measures had been completed whereupon it would then revert to its function as the "executive body within the military." Khanh also stated that the Buddhist leaders had agreed to refrain from politics and that Tam Chau and Tri Quang would leave the country.
3. In subsequent talks with Suu and Huong, Ambassador Johnson confirmed that both Suu and Huong were not disposed to oppose Khanh's moves and that Suu had agreed to remain in a caretaker status at least until a new Chief of State was selected. Beyond this, Suu wished to wait and see "what kind of a government" would emerge before accepting reelection as Chief of State. Both Huong and Suu, as well as Deputy Premier Vien who confirmed that he agreed to serve as acting Premier, advised the US also to "wait and see" what develops, expressing concern nonetheless with the apparent alliance between Khanh and the Buddhists and with the political orientation of future developments.
4. Khanh's assumption of power was achieved without any fighting or public disorder. The coup was completely bloodless and, with the exception of some security forces apparently in the vicinity of Suu's and Huong's residences, no troops were deployed in Saigon. Neither has there been as yet any criticism or opposition by general public in or outside Saigon. In short, the general public attitude is one of indifference.
5. It is not entirely clear just how much support Khanh has mustered within the military leadership for his move. Previous reports had indicated a three-way split among the generals, the largest group reportedly not in favor of a military takeover. Some generals and even middle-echelon officers were apparently considering a pre-emptive coup against Khanh. It remains an open question whether the anti-Khanh elements will now move against him or adopt a wait-and-see position, pending further moves by Khanh, together with public and US reaction.
6. Khanh has almost certainly acted in conjunction with the Buddhist leadership. Buddhist religious and political leaders, Khanh, and some of the other generals, particularly Thi (Corps I Commander) and Ky (Airforce Chief), reportedly agreed on a "solution" similar to the one now in progress. However, this coalition is at best a marriage of convenience which cannot be expected to last given basic Buddhist suspicions of Khanh, not to mention the personal ambitions of Both Khanh and Tri Quang. Despite Khanh's apparent belief that he can control the Buddhists, he has voiced some concern as to their ultimate political direction, and there are already indications that the Buddhist leadership does not intend to hold to the alleged agreement particularly regarding the claimed willingness of Tam Chau and Tri Quang to leave the country.
7. Khanh's overriding ambition, coupled with his repeated maneuvers against known US positions, have in the span of one year precipitated five major crises in Saigon. In the process, he has seriously reduced if not almost eliminated any public respect for US political advice or for those who accept it. Moreover, his actions, coupled with those of the Buddhists, have fostered a rising crescendo of anti-American feelings.
These developments pose the serious question whether Khanh has considered an alternative course, i.e., a negotiated "neutralist" solution for South Vietnam. Should his short-sighted actions prompt him to explore this possibility, Khanh may ultimately overreach his power and be overthrown by his more dedicated colleagues.
41. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, January 27, 1965, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 9:31 a.m. Although the source text indicates 9 a.m. as the time of transmission, this was apparently an error, given the time of receipt in the Department of State and the contents of the telegram.
2322. For the President. I am afraid that we have overwhelmed Washington in the last 24 hours in reporting the action of the Armed Forces Council in withdrawing confidence in the Suu-Huong government and in charging General Khanh with responsibility "for solving the present political crisis."
While it is still too soon to evaluate with confidence the gains and losses of this latest "coup de force", my colleagues of the U.S. Mission Council agree with me in believing that several conclusions are valid even at this time. For one thing, it is evident that the overthrow of Prime Minister Huong has been brought about through an alliance between Khanh and the Buddhist Institute leadership. It is not clear to what extent the other senior generals supported Khanh with any real conviction in this action although he seems to have got a large majority vote at the conclusion of a long policy debate last night. Another conclusion is that the overthrow of Huong is clearly a victory for the Buddhist Institute leadership and places it in a position of dominant power and influence in the country. Khanh no doubt hopes to share this position with the Buddhists and use them to his advantage. Based upon our past experience, we are inclined to believe that it will be the Buddhists who will use Khanh.
The most sinister aspect of this affair is the obvious danger that the Buddhist victory may be an important step toward the formation of a government which will eventually lead the country into negotiations with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. The Institute-Khanh combination is a union--albeit perhaps a temporary one--of two elements adverse to U.S. interests.
While reasonably sure of the validity of the foregoing conclusions, we cannot be sure where we are until the announced procedure for forming the government is carried out. Historically, this procedure sets back the clock to last August when the military under Buddhist pressure, turned the power over to the civilians. The same institutions and procedures are being reconstituted to start moving once more down the road toward elections in late March for a national assembly. It remains to be seen whether we ever reach that destination or whether we are on a treadmill.
Until we see more clearly the form of the new government to emerge, I am of the opinion that we not commit ourselves publicly with regard to the action of the Armed Forces Council. I have recommended elsewhere/2/ that we should restrict ourselves for the time being to a simple statement that it is premature for us to comment on these events until we see more clearly their implication.
/2/In telegram 2316 from Saigon, January 27. (Ibid., POL 1 US-VIET S)
I know that the question of the evacuation of our dependents is constantly on your mind as it is on mine. We have been very much concerned during the last three days for the safety of our dependents--indeed of all Americans--in Hue area. While that danger appears to have subsided, these events in the North have been a reminder of the ease with which anti-American emotions can be whipped up. At the meeting of the U.S. Mission Council today, I found for the first time all members in agreement as to the need to evacuate dependents although none of us yet has a really satisfactory formula to overcome the very dangerous psychological problems in initiating this action. I believe that this latest change of government offers us a possibility to link evacuation of dependents with our acceptance of a new regime. I will forward recommendations on this score as soon as the governmental situation clarifies.
Taylor
42. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. VIII. Secret.
Washington, January 27, 1965.
Re
Basic Policy in Vietnam1. Bob McNamara and I have asked for the meeting with you at 11:30/2/ in order to have a very private discussion of the basic situation in Vietnam. In a way it is unfortunate that we are meeting the morning after a minor coup, because that is not the present point. All of us agree with Alexis Johnson that nothing should be done on that until we have particular recommendations from Saigon (though at that point we may well want to urge Taylor and Johnson to make the best of the matter and not try to undo it).
/2/On another copy of this memorandum a handwritten marginal notation by McNamara reads: "1/27/65 Mac & I presented these views orally to the Pres., who had already read this report, in a mtg with Dean Rusk Wed. mtg [January 27] B Mac." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam Statements and Supporting Papers)
2. What we want to say to you is that both of us are now pretty well convinced that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat. What we are doing now, essentially, is to wait and hope for a stable government. Our December directives make it very plain that wider action against the Communists will not take place unless we can get such a government. In the last six weeks that effort has been unsuccessful, and Bob and I are persuaded that there is no real hope of success in this area unless and until our own policy and priorities change.
3. The underlying difficulties in Saigon arise from the spreading conviction there that the future is without hope for anti-Communists. More and more the good men are covering their flanks and avoiding executive responsibility for firm anti-Communist policy. Our best friends have been somewhat discouraged by our own inactivity in the face of major attacks on our own installations. The Vietnamese know just as well as we do that the Viet Cong are gaining in the countryside. Meanwhile, they see the enormous power of the United States withheld, and they get little sense of firm and active U.S. policy. They feel that we are unwilling to take serious risks. In one sense, all of this is outrageous, in the light of all that we have done and all that we are ready to do if they will only pull up their socks. But it is a fact--or at least so McNamara and I now think.
4. The uncertainty and lack of direction which pervade the Vietnamese authorities are also increasingly visible among our own people, even the most loyal and determined. Overtones of this sentiment appear in our cables from Saigon, and one can feel them also among our most loyal staff officers here in Washington. The basic directive says that we will not go further until there is a stable government, and no one has much hope that there is going to be a stable government while we sit still. The result is that we are pinned into a policy of first aid to squabbling politicos and passive reaction to events we do not try to control. Or so it seems.
5. Bob and I believe that the worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role which can only lead to eventual defeat and an invitation to get out in humiliating circumstances.
6. We see two alternatives. The first is to use our military power in the Far East and to force a change of Communist policy. The second is to deploy all our resources along a track of negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major addition to our present military risks. Bob and I tend to favor the first course, but we believe that both should be carefully studied and that alternative programs should be argued out before you.
7. Both of us understand the very grave questions presented by any decision of this sort. We both recognize that the ultimate responsibility is not ours. Both of us have fully supported your willingness, in earlier months, to move out of the middle course. We both agree that every effort should still be made to improve our operations on the ground and to prop up the authorities in South Vietnam as best we can. But we are both convinced that none of this is enough, and that the time has come for harder choices.
8. You should know that Dean Rusk does not agree with us. He does not quarrel with our assertion that things are going very badly and that the situation is unraveling. He does not assert that this deterioration can be stopped. What he does say is that the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work. This would be good if it was possible. Bob and I do not think it is.
9. A topic of this magnitude can only be opened for initial discussion this morning, but McNamara and I have reached the point where our obligations to you simply do not permit us to administer our present directives in silence and let you think we see real hope in them.
McG. B.
43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 27, 1965, 8:48 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and McNamara, and approved by Rusk.
1548. Embtel 2322./2/ Your evaluation of situation most helpful.
/2/Document 41.
Meeting highest levels today concurred we should proceed immediately with evacuation on best possible basis. Such action would definitely be envisaged as clearing decks for further decisions.
We see two major problems on which we need your recommendations. One is timing and pace. Aim should be fastest possible schedule while avoiding appearance precipitate retreat in fear of anti-American demonstrations or actions by SVN population generally. We here inclined suggest commencement within next ten days and completion in about week or ten days thereafter.
As to rationale, believe this could now be linked to acceptance new regime only if Khanh and others make convincing statements determination continue forcefully with whole effort. Press here already starting play Khanh-Buddhist link and possible trend toward negotiation. We would need most forceful possible statements from Khanh and new PM offset this in any degree. Other elements previously stated rationale still appear valid but we would need maximum possible backgrounding against interpretation evacuation due to anti-American demonstrations.
Believe actions being covered septels/3/ will contribute to general impression forceful action and should be used to maximum with Khanh and Vien in that sense. Now seems to us crucial you discuss problem frankly with Khanh as real power source. Whether or not you can do that at once, please give us your thoughts and recommendations on points above soonest.
/3/JCS telegram 004213, January 27, authorized the use of U.S. jet aircraft in a strike role in South Vietnam in emergency situations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI) JCS telegram 004244, January 28, authorized preparation for a DeSoto patrol on or about February 3. (Ibid., DeSoto Patrol, 1965) In telegram 1566 to Saigon, January 29, the Department of State informed Taylor that these two JCS telegrams covered actions that would contribute to the general impression of forceful action. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
Rusk
44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, January 27, 1965, 9:46 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. The text was drafted in the White House and approved by McGeorge Bundy.
1549. For Ambassador from President.
1. Thank you for your very prompt and clearheaded account/2/ of the events of the last 24 hours. We are inclined to share your judgment of the immediate meaning of these events, and I have complete confidence in your judgment on the spot as you deal with this new situation.
/2/Apparently a reference to Document 41.
2. I am delighted to know that the mission is now unanimous in favor of the evacuation of dependents, and by separate messages/3/ we are asking for your fastest recommendations on the ways and means of putting this decision into effect with minimum damage to morale, and a maximum signal of our own continuing determination. In this connection I want you to know that once we get the dependents out of there, I am determined to make it clear to all the world that the U.S. will spare no effort and no sacrifice in doing its full part to turn back the Communists in Vietnam.
/3/See Document 43. This was apparently the only other instruction sent to Taylor at this time through Department of State channels.
3. As we look beyond the removal of dependents to specific courses of action in the coming months, I am most eager to have the closest possible sense of your own thinking and of the situation on the spot. For this purpose I am inclined now to take you up on your earlier suggestion that McGeorge Bundy come to Saigon, and if you concur, he would plan to leave on Sunday, arriving Tuesday morning, February 2. He would plan to stay for three days, mainly for conversations with you and your colleagues, but also for the purpose of conveying personal word of my own determination and of my own thinking to Vietnamese leaders of your selection.
4. It appears from your reports that, for better or worse, we may be increasingly dependent upon unreliable and unpredictable Buddhist leaders. It occurs to me that there is one man who has some unexpended personal capital with the Buddhists, and that man is Cabot Lodge. Unless you would find it objectionable, I am thinking of asking him to come in Bundy's plane for a visit which might later be extended to other points like Hong Kong and Manila. I would think it desirable for him to talk frankly and at length with Buddhist leaders as well as others with whom he has personal connections, always under your direction.
5. My own preference would be for a visit from you to Washington, but I feel that such a trip at this time would lead to further troublesome speculation and would also involve your absence during an important period of readjustment.
6. I count on you to give me your completely candid comments on this message. I know the subtle but important differences that do exist between the U.S. and Vietnamese views of things.
Rusk
45. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIETS. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Received in the Department of State at 8:11 a.m.
Saigon, January 28, 1965, 8 p.m.
2334. For the President. Ref. Deptel 1549./2/ Thank you for message contained in reftel. I am most happy to learn that you are planning to send Mac Bundy to visit us as he will be able to strike some effective blows here for the U.S. cause. My only problem is the timing. I feel that he will be most useful in talking to the principal members of the new government after they are installed and hence should arrive after its composition has been announced. If he arrives before that time, he will not know whom to talk to. Even if the fact of his impending visit is announced before the formation of the government, the news might cause Khanh to hold up decisions in order to be the only actor on the stage when Bundy arrives. Alternatively, Khanh might seize on the news as evidence of further U.S. interference in internal matters of SVN. (His press conference/3/ featured this note.) Khanh always seeks to make domestic mileage posing as the defender of SVN sovereignty. I would recommend no announcement of Bundy's trip until the new ministerial slate is in the clear. This may soon be the case--perhaps so soon that the suggested date of arrival, February 2, may be kept.
/2/Document 44.
/3/Khanh's press conference earlier that day is summarized in telegram 2326 from Saigon, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)
Whatever statement is made on his departure, I would like it to include point that Bundy is being sent to confer with me on recent events, the seriousness of which in the U.S. view prevents my being called to Washington.
How to relate this visit to our action on dependents is a matter to which I am giving immediate thought but have no present suggestion. I have just received Deptel 1548/4/ on the subject of evacuation which raises certain questions, not presently clear, but which may be covered in a supplementary telegram which I understand is en route. If time permits, I would like to withhold decision on evacuation until we have talked with Bundy.
/4/Document 43.
With regard to a visit by Lodge, I have considerable reservations. The sending of a special U.S. emissary to the leaders of the Buddhist Institute at this time will greatly enhance their prestige, already inflated by their victory over Huong and the USG. These political bonzes have been and still are attacking the U.S. Ambassador because the USG ventured to continue to support a government which they had decided to pull down and, to show further their displeasure, have conducted anti-American demonstrations and destroyed U.S. property. While all this has been taking place, Buddhist spokesmen have been making veiled statements which have earned them a country-wide reputation as probable neutralists. The picture of an American of Lodge's stature coming around the world to confer with them in their triumph somehow goes against my grain and may raise suspicions in a highly suspicious country that the U.S. is trafficking with neutralists. Even these unpleasant consequences would be tolerable if frank discussions offered any hope of changing the course which Tri Quang and company are following. Would it be reasonable to propose that we await the outcome of Bundy's visit before deciding about Lodge?
Taylor
[end document]
Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 46 through 55