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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

321. Editorial Note

On May 31 Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi called in British Charge Hopson in Peking and delivered a verbal message to be transmitted to the United States. This was the same message, Chen explained, that Premier Chou En-lai had asked President Ayub Khan of Pakistan to deliver when they met in Peking on April 2. Ayub's scheduled trip to Washington had been postponed and Chou was concerned that the message had not been transmitted. Consequently, Chen asked Hopson to transmit the four-point message through London to Washington:

1. China will not provoke war with the United States
2. What China says counts
3. China is prepared
4. If the United States bombs China that would mean war and there would be no limits to the war.

Chen expanded upon these four points in an interview of over an hour. He indicated that China supported Vietnam unconditionally and viewed aggression against Vietnam as aggression against China. But he added that China would take direct part in the conflict only "if the war was expanded to Chinese territory." Hopson reported the message and the interview in telegrams to London on May 31 and June 1.

The British Embassy in Washington passed copies of the telegrams to the Department of State on June 2. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam (Misc IV)) On June 4 McGeorge Bundy sent copies of the telegrams to President Johnson with a covering note indicating that the Chinese message was so interesting that the President would want to read the telegrams himself. Bundy noted that Secretary of State Rusk's impression was that it was a relatively defensive message, and Bundy added that his own appreciation was mixed: "The basic trouble with the message is that it does not tell us at all at what point the Chinese might move in Vietnam itself in a way which would force us to act against China. And that of course is the $64 question." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI) On June 5 Bundy also sent the President an assessment of the message prepared in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. (Ibid.)

In a June 4 memorandum to the President, McGeorge Bundy proposed a meeting on Saturday, June 5, to discuss developments in Vietnam and "the appropriate shape of an answer to the Chinese." Bundy suggested that, in addition to the President and himself, participation in the meeting be limited to Rusk, Ball, McNamara, and possibly Raborn. (Ibid.) According to the log maintained in the White House, such a meeting took place on June 5 at the Department of State over lunch. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No other record of that meeting has been found. In a memorandum to Rusk on June 5, however, William Bundy noted that he had informed the British Embassy that Hopson should be authorized to reply to the Chinese that the United States had received the message. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)

 

322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department on June 1 at 9:11 a.m. and forwarded to the White House.

3989. For the President. We have spent most of the last week trying to work out a solution to the political impasse which arose when Quat tried to reorganize his cabinet./2/ I am sorry to say that no solution is yet in sight. Quat evidently did not have his ducks properly aligned when he held a public ceremony last Tuesday/3/ to introduce the new members of this cabinet to the National Legislative Council and Chief of State Suu. He had neglected to obtain the resignations of two ministers he was dropping for incompetence and incompatibility,/4/ and he had not anticipated that Suu would yield to the urgings of disaffected southerners, militant refugee Catholics, and out-politicians to interpose constitutional objections to the PriMin's right to fire Cabinet members. The provisional Charter of October 20, 1964,/5/ unfortunately is not specific on this point, though it seems pretty clearly the intent of the drafters that the PriMin would have the right to choose and dismiss his ministers and that the Chief of State would have no right of interposition. The confrontation between Quat and Suu which at the outset seemed little more than a misunderstanding susceptible of prompt settlement has now become an open battle between the followers of the PriMin and the Chief of State with the goal of the latter the fall of the Quat Govt.

/2/The developing political crisis in Saigon prompted extensive reporting from the Embassy during the last week in May. Telegrams 3902 from Saigon, May 26; 2712 to Saigon, May 26; 3931 from Saigon, May 28; 3953 from Saigon, May 29; and 3978 from Saigon, May 31 all dealt with the political impasse. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)

/3/May 25.

/4/Minister of Economy Vinh and Minister of Interior Hiep.

/5/The text of the provisional charter was transmitted in telegram 1204 from Saigon, October 20, 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XX, Cables)

Because of this situation, I felt obliged to postpone my return to Washington until it can be resolved--how long or how short this delay will be is hard to say. We have been meeting with the principal contenders daily to urge that the crisis be solved quickly and to impress on all concerned the over-riding importance of political stability at this time of increasing U.S. commitment and support.

The impasse has been another reminder of the basic lack of cohesion among the Vietnamese and of the irresponsibility of many of their leaders.

The impatience of the military with this state of affairs was made clear by Air Force Commander General Ky in an after-dinner speech made in the presence of Quat and other civilian leaders; in effect, Ky warned that the generals would feel forced to resume political power if the civilians did not soon resolve their differences. The danger of military intervention will grow the longer the confrontation drags on.

A hopeful sign in this otherwise darkened political scene was the generally successful carrying out of municipal and provincial elections on Sunday. Although results from the provinces are not yet all in, it looks as though about 70 per cent of those registered exercised their vote. I visited some of the polling places in Saigon and while there was no air of great excitement, the voting was orderly and seemed well conducted. Present plans call for an electoral law to be promulgated by the end of June for elections to a national assembly to be held in October. Reports from Sunday's elections seem to show that voting in populated areas is feasible and that the Viet Cong are not a serious obstacle to balloting.

The upward trend in military activity which began last month continued during the early part of the week and peaked sharply at its end. There was a general increase of attacks, ambushes and sabotage of roads and bridges. Most of the increased activity occurred in the I and II Corps areas and reached a climax two days ago in the combat near Ba Gia, not far from Quang Ngai city. This was a sharp fight in which govt forces came out second best with two ARVN battalions decimated. There were disturbing indications of failures of leadership on the part of a number of key officers in the second division from which the troops came. General Westmoreland is having a close analysis made of this action to learn all possible from it. It may prove to be the opening engagement of the offensive which we have suspected the VC to be preparing during recent quiet weeks.

Taylor

 

323. Editorial Note

On June 1 President Johnson sent a special message to the Congress requesting the appropriation of an additional $89 million for fiscal year 1966 for the Agency for International Development. The additional funds were requested for the expanded program of economic and social development in Southeast Asia that had been outlined in the President's speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7. (See Document 245.) In press conference remarks on June 1, relating to the request for the additional appropriation, President Johnson noted that his personal representative, former World Bank President Eugene R. Black, had begun extensive negotiations to lay the international groundwork for a long-range development program for Southeast Asia. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pages 610-611) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, which appropriated the additional funds requested on June 1, was signed into law on September 6 by President Johnson. (79 Stat. 653)

 

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, June 1, 1965, 7:57 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Ball.

2769. To Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson only from Under Secretary. We have now reached a point in planning for successive Rolling Thunder operations where we must be clear as to precisely what we are trying to do.

In broad terms, there are two possible approaches to the Vietnamese struggle:

I. The major premise of the first approach is that the war must be won in the South. Under this approach, airstrikes in the North should be regarded as ancillary to our operations in the principal theater. Such air strikes should be designed to achieve three purposes:

A. To raise morale in South Viet-Nam and give credibility to our intention to stay the course.

B. To lower the morale of the North Vietnamese and to create concern in Hanoi that the USG might extend its bombing so as greatly to increase the costs of trying to overrun SVN by military means.

C. To harass supply lines and reduce the ability of North Viet-Nam to conduct effective infiltration of men and materials.

II. The second approach places much greater emphasis on the total contribution of the air attacks in the North to the ultimate decision. Under this approach our air offensive would so be designed as to impose increasing pressure on the North Vietnamese until they stopped their action against the South even though we might not be winning the war in the South.

The distinction between these two approaches has direct relevance to the conduct of the air offensive. Since, under the first approach, it is assumed that the war must ultimately be decided in the South, we should avoid those North Vietnamese targets (such as those in the Hanoi-Haiphong area) that would be most likely to trigger a greater Chinese and Soviet intervention. If, as suggested in Embtel 768,/2/ the tonic effect of bombing on South Viet-Nam morale is wearing off, do you believe that this effect would be heightened by intensifying the bombing of North Viet-Nam even though it might bring a larger Chinese and Soviet involvement?

/2/Reference is to telegram 3768 from Saigon, May 15, in which the Embassy reported that Buddhist leader Tri Quang had told Embassy officers that he believed that the psychological lift achieved by the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the landing of U.S. troops in South Vietnam was wearing off. (Ibid.)

If on the other hand, we accept the logic of the second proposal, we should presumably be prepared to assume greater risks of Chinese and Soviet involvement in an effort to persuade Hanoi to stop. This means that we might logically proceed, within the relatively near future, to bomb the military installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Such an action would seek to achieve the ultimate US objective without the need to depend on victory in the South which would make the risks of a greater Moscow-Peiping involvement worth assuming.

The relevance of all this to the present situation is obvious. Action against NVN by US-GVN forces has now reached a critical point. We must decide whether to proceed on one of the three following courses:

The first is to continue progressively to move northward in our air attacks, recognizing that any further movement nearer the Hanoi-Haiphong area poses grave danger of a serious encounter with MIGs that could draw us into attacks on MIG bases and SAM sites and the attendant possibility of greater Chinese and Russian involvement. In fact, the Rolling Thunder operations, for several weeks, have been in areas where the MIGs might easily have engaged. Their failure to do so (except once) may well be because they are waiting for the early activation of the SAM sites. Attacks on Haiphong and Hanoi could be expected to offer the same dangers as strikes on the MIG bases.

A second possibility is to move northward but keep far enough west of the Hanoi-Haiphong area to avoid the range of the SAMs. This would be on the assumption--not yet proven--that this course would offer less danger of escalation. We would like your comments on the validity of this assumption. Would the Chinese permit us to approach nearer their territory without reacting?

A third possibility is to expand the present rules to include industrial and other non-military targets that would not entail high civilian casualty rates. This course would permit a continuation of bombing south of the 20th Parallel without providing reactions appreciably different from attacks on the present target systems.

In order to make these decisions we need your answers to the following questions:

1. Do you believe that our best hope is to seek to win the war in the South while employing air attacks in the North for the ancillary purposes outlined in assumption I above maintaining approximately the same level and geographical scope of bombing as Rolling Thunder programs to date?

2. Do you now believe that, in view of the military and political difficulties in SVN we should begin to shape our air effort against the North more in the direction of assumption II above?

3. Do you believe that we would have a reasonable chance of persuading Hanoi to quit by increasing the destructiveness of our air attacks so long as the Viet Cong were winning or at least holding their own in the South? If so, do you believe that such pressure could be mounted without unacceptable risks to the United States from an enlarged Soviet/Chinese involvement?

4. Taking into account your answers to the above questions, how do you apply these answers to the requested authorization for Rolling Thunder 17 tomorrow morning?/3/ RT 17 includes suggested strikes on target 43, Qui Hau Ammo Depot, which is 12 NM farther north than target 47.11 in RT 16 program,/4/ 3 NM closer to Phuc Yen (47 NM) and same distance (40 NM) from Hanoi; target 82.11 Ben Thuy Thermal Power Plant; and target 71/18.17 Ben Thuy Port and Ferry with estimated civilian casualty loss of 59 persons.

/3/In JCS telegram 3263 to CINCPAC, June 2, the JCS detailed the target list and intent of Rolling Thunder Seventeen and authorized CINCPAC to implement the bombing program. (Ibid.)

/4/Target 47.11, authorized as a bombing target in the execute message for the Rolling Thunder Sixteen program, was the Hoai An ammunition depot, located 26 nautical miles north of the 20th parallel. (JCS telegram 2672 to CINCPAC, May 22; ibid.)

Finally let us know how you feel about the method in which authorized strikes are carried out. Do you learn about targets sufficiently in advance? Do you favor existing authority to permit repeated restrikes of given target until given damage level achieved? Should strikes against North be run daily or intermittently?

Question of IL-28s is being given separate study here.

Rusk

 

325. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 2, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. The covering memorandum indicates that McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson on June 5.

While I was in Europe for the meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers, I discussed with U.S. civilian and military representatives the movement of IL28 bombers into Hanoi and possible U.S. responses./2/ Their views follow:

/2/See Document 318 regarding prior discussion of air strikes against the IL-28 bomber base in North Vietnam.

Ambassador Bruce: He does not believe that it is necessary for either political or military reasons to strike the bombers now or in the immediate future. Such an action would carry with it a high risk of escalation. He suggests it would be well for the U.S. to inform the Soviets, through appropriate private channels, that we view the introduction of these aircraft with great concern, and if they are used to strike our forces or military or civilian centers of the South Vietnamese, we would find it necessary to respond with great force. He emphasized the absolute necessity of "prior consultation" with the British in the event we do carry out a strike on Phuc Yen.

General Lemnitzer: So long as there are no more than a small number of IL28's in North Vietnam (I reported to him that at present we estimate there are approximately 9 aircraft at Phuc Yen), he would be inclined to defer a strike against them. When the number becomes large and militarily significant General Lemnitzer would strike to destroy them. In his opinion, the Soviets would not respond to a U.S. strike against Phuc Yen with overt military action in Western Europe--they might harass the corridors to Berlin, and in that event General Lemnitzer would suggest we harass their seaborne commerce.

Ambassador Bohlen: He does not believe the Soviets will allow the bombers to be used initially against Saigon or other civilian targets in South Vietnam. For this and other reasons, he recommends against attacking the IL28's until they move south of the 17th parallel. If and when they do so, we should hit back hard. He said it would be a tossup as to how the Soviets would react if we strike the IL28's before they move south of the demarcation line. He pointed out the Soviets are in a bad spot: They do not want to become involved in the war in Southeast Asia, but they do have to protect their position in the Communist world, and the current regime does not have the stability of Khrushchev's. In the event we did strike first, he doubts that the Soviets would start any military action in Europe because they would recognize that to do so "would be committing suicide for fear of death." And he does not believe they would go to war in the Far East because they would think such action would lead to war in Europe. Their military reaction would probably be slight, but the international reaction to our move would be very bad, e.g., we would probably lose the support of the British. He made exactly the same suggestion as Ambassador Bruce, i.e., couldn't we get word to the Soviets that if the IL28's are used against us or against the South Vietnamese, "we will blast you."

Robert S. McNamara

 

326. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, June 2, 1965, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Chrono as DDP and DDCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret. Prepared by Helms on June 3.

SUBJECT
Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 1700 on 2 June 1965

PRESENT WERE

The President

For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Mann, Bunker, and Vaughn

For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance

For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Bromley Smith

For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

9. At 1810, Messrs. Mann, Bunker, and Vaughn departed the meeting and the discussion turned to Vietnam. Mr. McNamara presented the strikes plan under Rolling Thunder XVII. The President instructed Mr. McNamara to be sure that there was adequate CAP aircraft on each strike. Target 43 came in for much discussion after which it was decided to take it out of the Rolling Thunder XVII plan. Mr. Ball gave a detailed presentation of his concerns over the policy which was guiding the bombing in the North. He said he had sent a telegram to Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson, asking them to reply to certain basic questions./2/ He presented a case for the fact that the thrust of the bombings from this time onward ran every risk of escalating the war and pleaded for a hard look to be taken at the purpose of the bombings and a pattern which would be pursued. Admiral Raborn informed the meeting that our estimate on this general question would be available within the next forty-eight hours./3/ The meeting adjourned with the understanding that this question of the bombings would be the principal topic of conversation when Ambassador Taylor arrives for consultation.

/2/Document 324.

/3/SNIE 10-6-65, dated June 2, and SNIE 10-6/1-65 and SNIE 10-7-65, both dated June 4, all dealt with issues involved in U.S. air strikes in North and South Vietnam. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99) Regarding SNIE 10-6-65, see Document 318.

Richard Helms/4/

Deputy Director

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.

 

327. Memorandum of Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

Washington, June 3, 1965.

/1/Source: University of Montana, Mansfield Library, Mansfield Papers, Series 13, Box 69, Vietnam. Confidential. The meeting began at 10:39 a.m. Attending were the President, Vice President, O'Brien, Reedy, Valenti, and the following Congressional Democratic leaders: Senators Mansfield and Long, Speaker McCormack, and Representatives Albert and Boggs. Mansfield left at 11:43 a.m., along with McCormack and Albert. The Vice President and O'Brien left at 11:50, and Long and Boggs stayed until 11:55. Information on time and attendance is taken from the President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library.

At the Leadership meeting this morning, the President was quite optimistic about settling the Dominican situation but very pessimistic about Viet Nam. He said the Joint Chiefs and others within his circle have advocated the bombing of Hanoi and he has stalled them off for a week, at least, because he wants to wait until Taylor gets back and get his recommendations, and also because he fears this would bring China into the struggle. He said that this would create, almost literally, a Cuba for China and I agreed with him.

He said that there are no indications of any feelers from the other side, that the Russians are shipping a lot of stuff, some of which is getting through to North Viet Nam but the Chinese are holding up a good deal of the material. He said we haven't got many more targets left to bomb, that, in fact, they got most of them on the first strike and that the difficult period was now beginning with the monsoons.

Senator Long spoke up and said we have to face up to the $64.00 question and bomb China. I said as emphatically as I could, "I disagree with you completely and absolutely."

The President then turned to another subject.

After watching the blast-off and a discussion of a few legislative matters, I started to leave and the President said, "When Taylor gets back I want to talk to you about that area." I said I would be delighted and left./2/

/2/An additional sentence is handwritten at the bottom of the page: "He also mentioned the possibility of sending up another Resolution--along lines of Javits' suggestion--if the decision was to go ahead."

 

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority, Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 11:35 a.m.

4035. For the Under Secretary. Re: Deptel 2769./2/

/2/Document 324.

1. In answer to your questions, we do not see here that the line between the two possible approaches set forth in reftel is quite as sharp as it comes out in that telegram. The air campaign in the North and the anti-Viet Cong campaign in the South are, in our thinking, two parts of a single coherent program. The air attacks have as their primary objectives the termination of Hanoi's support for the VC whereas the campaign in South Vietnam has as its primary objective the destruction of the Viet Cong military apparatus within the country. In addition to their primary objectives, each program reacts upon the other. Thus, the anti-Viet Cong effort is made easier by any reduction of infiltration, and the will of Hanoi is sapped by evidence of failure of the Viet Cong effort in the South. Viewed in this light, there should be no question of holding back the air strikes in the North while maximizing the in-country campaign against the Viet Cong (Approach I) or of stepping up the air strikes to compensate for the deficiencies of the in-country program (Approach II). Rather, both should be maximized concurrently, not only for the purpose of attaining their primary objectives, but for the collateral effects in support of one another.

2. In further comment on Approach II, we should like to make very clear that we do not believe that any feasible amount of bombing of the North is of itself likely to cause the DRV to cease and desist in its actions in the South. Such a change in DRV attitudes can probably be brought about only when, along with a sense of mounting pain from the bombings, there is also a conviction on their part that the tide has turned or soon will turn against them in the South. Obviously these two conditions have not yet been met and our job in the coming months will be to bring them about. This may take a long time and we should not expect quick results. Holding this view, we do not here sense that our action against the DRV by US-GVN forces has yet reached a "critical point" in the sense that we must sharply change the pattern and objectives of our attacks against the DRV. We do think, however, that the pattern should be constantly evolving. Our air actions against Hanoi should always be on an ascending scale expressed both in weight of effort and geographical location of targets. It is true that the last two Rolling Thunders have had single targets progressively somewhat closer to the Hanoi-Haiphong area, but in general after commencing Rolling Thunder attacks, we quickly reached a plateau which is still being maintained. Also as set forth in our Embtel 3753,/3/ we feel that the pattern should be somewhat more random. This thought was to some extent incorporated in Rolling Thunder 16 and weather has also contributed by forcing on us a more random pattern. We understand that weather will be an increasing factor in the coming months.

/3/Dated May 13. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIV, Cables)

3. If our assumptions with respect to DRV reactions are correct, there is no strategy that can bring about a quick solution, but rather our strategy must be based upon a patient and steady increase of pressure following an escalating pattern while making maximum effort to turn the tide here in the South. This does not mean that we must "win" in the South to bring about a change in DRV attitudes, but rather the DRV must perceive that the tide has turned or is likely soon to turn. Hopefully at this point the DRV will seek to find some way out, and if and when it does, there could be a "bandwagon" effect that would so lower VC morale and so raise that of South Vietnam as to permit bringing major hostilities to a reasonable early conclusion.

4. In extension of the foregoing observations, we would answer your questions as follows:

(A) Question No. 1--We do not believe in employing air attacks in the North for purposes precisely as expressed in Approach I. In particular, with regard to No. I-B, we would not take as our purpose to "create concern in Hanoi that the U.S. Government might extend its bombing so as greatly to increase the costs of trying to overrun South Vietnam by military means". This statement suggests that a fear of possible consequences alone is our main purpose, whereas it seems to us that there must be actual pain inflicted by attacks and, in addition, the fear of increased pain in order to have maximum effect in changing Hanoi's behavior. Of course, we would also like to raise morale in the South and lower morale in the North, but these benefits are coincidental to the drive on the Hanoi will to continue to support the Viet Cong. Also, we would like to do as much as possible in the harassment of supply lines to reduce effective infiltration, but we recognize and accept the impossibility of attaining this objective except to a limited degree.

(B) Question No. 2--We do not believe that we should re-shape our air effort with the idea that increased bombing will compensate for losses on the military and political fronts in the South. On the other hand, we would not cease to apply the kind of mounting pressure described in paragraph 2 above. While we should do everything possible to win on both fronts, North and South, we should not let up in the North because things are not going well in the South.

(C) Question No. 3--As we have indicated above, the chance of persuading Hanoi to lay off while the Viet Cong are winning or holding their own in the South is obviously not good. However, we repeat that this fact is no reason to limit the bombing effort in the North. It simply means that we must try harder in the South while bearing down on the North. It is impossible to say whether added pressure would create unacceptable risks of an enlarged Soviet-Chinese involvement except in terms of specific targets. Obviously, any extension of the present target system should be examined closely for [from] this point of view.

(D) Question No. 4--In consideration of our views expressed above, we have recommended the approval of Rolling Thunder 17 (Embtel 4004)./4/

/4/Dated June 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

5. With respect to the method of carrying out authorized strikes, the present pattern is generally satisfactory to us. We need approximately 48 hours, from receipt of the execution order to bombs on target, for me to clear with the Prime Minister and General Westmoreland the Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the RVNAF. A two-week program is preferable to a one-week program. Desirably, operating units should receive the warning order one week prior to execution in order to permit adequate planning. A two-week program with execution delegated to the operation level would provide flexibility in coping with the vagaries of the weather and other factors, including in-country competition for sorties. Whether strikes are made daily or intermittently would not seem to be significant, but experience suggests that more frequent strikes by fewer aircraft reduces losses. Additionally, varied and repeated strikes serve to complicate the problem for the DRV defenses.

6. In addition to answering your questions, we would like to make some specific comments on targeting, derived from the three courses of action discussed in reftel. As we understand these three courses of action, the first involves a progressive movement northward without consideration for the sensitivity of the Hanoi/Haiphong area; the second moves northward but sideslips to the west, and perhaps to the east, to avoid the SAM's; and the third confines our efforts south of the 20th parallel but includes industrial or non-military targets.

7. In consonance with the concept earlier expressed, it is important that we constantly add to the pressure on the DRV. If we continue to concentrate on lines of communications as in the past, the very repetition of our actions designed to disrupt and maintain the disruption of these communications is in itself a form of escalation. In addition, while maintaining this interdiction program, we would like to introduce variety by occasionally striking a target on a random basis outside of the LOONC [LOC?] pattern, such as a power plant, military installation, dam site, supply area, industrial complex. By so doing, we complicate the DRV defense problem and make it clear that we are limited to no single target plan. Thus, nothing other than populated areas is immune to attack.

8. Under this concept, we would avoid the sensitive area of Hanoi/Haiphong except for an occasional well selected target within the area struck to show that we can penetrate and that there is no sure sanctuary. We do not feel that an occasional selective intrusion into this area is likely to invoke a Chinese reaction even though we tangle with MIG's.

9. The number of industrial and other significant non-military targets below the 20th parallel are few and far between. In fact there are very few such targets outside of the Hanoi/Haiphong complex. We agree that non-military targets should be struck as a variation from the LOC pattern, but only occasionally and selectively, both North and South of the 20th parallel.

10. In summary we recommend a basic pattern of LOC targets varied occasionally by other kinds of targets both South and North of the 20th parallel to include the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Upon this pattern, we would superimpose a program of full fledged psywar operations as an integral part of Rolling Thunder. This would require only a slight increase in air effort. Leaflet drops should precede and sometimes accompany strikes, having the primary purpose of explaining the cause and nature of Rolling Thunder and of magnifying popular anxiety.

11. We appreciate this opportunity to present our views on these important subjects.

Taylor

 

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 3, 1965, 11:59 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received in the Department of State at 12:40 p.m. Repeated to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Vientiane. Passed to the White House, CIA, and the Department of Defense.

4038. Ref: Embtel 4003./2/ Alex Johnson and I have just seen Quat and Bui Diem at the end of the day, who outlined to us the outcome of today's long and generally fruitless discussions aimed at restoring normalcy to the internal political situation.

/2/In telegram 4003 from Saigon, June 2, Ambassador Taylor reported that he and Johnson had met with Prime Minister Quat to discuss Quat's meeting with Suu the previous evening. Quat said that Suu had indicated that the problem of the two contested ministerial positions could be readily resolved if Quat would write a letter to Suu, as Chief of State, asking for the dismissal of Hiep and Vinh. Quat signed and dispatched such a letter in the presence of Taylor and Johnson. (Ibid.)

At 10 AM this morning, Quat met with most of the former members of the Armed Forces Council. He explained to them the political situation and the constitutional impasse reached between him and the Chief of State. According to one of the military participants, Quat asked for the General's support, but they withheld any commitment, preferring to hear also the other side of the case from Suu and the Legislative Council.

In order to broaden the discussion in conformance with the Generals' request, at 14:30 Suu, Quat, the Cabinet, the Generals, and the Legislative Council all met at Gia Long Palace where they palavered for most of the day. Quat himself left the meeting at about 19:00 whereas some of the participants were still hanging about two hours later.

Quat summarized the accomplishments of the meetings as follows. It was agreed that Suu would put out an appeal to the population in the name of the government, the Generals, and the Legislative Council for the purpose of urging greater national unity in these critical times. It is my understanding that this appeal has been made by radio, although I have not yet been able to verify the fact.

Vice Premier Tuyen has undertaken to settle the matter of the two reluctant ministers who do not wish to resign. Quat is strangely vague as to what he expects Tuyen will do. However, Bui Diem seems sure that Tuyen is basically on Quat's side.

In view of the lack of enthusiasm of the Legislative Council to come to grips with the constitutional issue, Quat seems to consider it to have been satisfactorily arranged to let this matter drag on unsettled.

In order to satisfy the Generals who were very vocal in criticizing the civilians (and particularly but obliquely Suu) for their political bickering while the troops are dying on the battlefield, Quat has undertaken to formulate a statement of stronger policy which will guarantee a more energetic conduct of the war. He obviously did not know what kind of specific measures he might propose: his vagueness suggests that this will probably be more of a literary exercise than a change of behavior.

As Quat finished this summary of the outcome of today's session, Bui Diem came in, having lingered behind at Gia Long Palace. In response to Quat's question as to what had happened since Quat's departure from the meeting, Bui Diem announced that Suu wanted a meeting at 15:00 tomorrow with the Prime Minister and General Chieu of the Legislative Council to discuss the current crisis. This surprised us as we assumed that Quat's resume represented the consensus of action required to meet the crisis. Quat said that he thought Suu had primarily in mind discussing the Catholic issue and the possibility that the military will return to power if the civilians do not perform better. Quat said that General Thi in particular had become very emotional over the ineffectiveness of the civilian government and had left the meeting early in a rage.

Johnson and I then started asking questions designed to bring out the unsatisfactory nature of the day's events. I pointed out that there was a contradiction in striving for a stronger policy and a more effective conduct of the war with a decision to stall off a resolution of the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister. The latter could hardly be expected to do better in the conduct of the war with his powers clouded by the present controversy.

We asked why there had been no follow-up on the gambit started yesterday when Quat wrote his letter to the Chief of State, asking for agreement in the dismissal of the Ministers of National Economy and Interior (Embtel 4003). Bui Diem said that this partially completed action had been overtaken by events, but when we pressed him, he conceded that there was considerable merit in trying to carry it through as an easy, face-saving way of resolving the constitutional issue./3/

/3/According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Ambassador Johnson in Saigon and Leonard Unger in Washington, June 3, Suu did not act on Quat's letter, despite his earlier assurance. Johnson estimated at that point that the Quat government had only a 50-50 chance of emerging from the constitutional crisis with its position and authority intact. (Ibid.)

In spite of the general inconclusiveness of today's conferrings, there is a new, important factor emerging in the form of the reappearance of the Generals on the political scene. They appear to have shown themselves genuinely reluctant to take sides in the Quat-Suu controversy, although their sympathies seem to have been on the Prime Minister's side. One of them has indicated that they would have declared for Quat had he directly requested it, but no such request was made. While being sharply critical of the civilian politicians, the Generals limited themselves to offering to serve as arbitrators between the contending elements if they were requested. In answer to our question as to what would be arbitrated, Bui Diem replied that it would be the whole question of the nature and content of the constitution and of the government. We agreed that it would be disastrous to bring the Generals back from the battlefield to fulfill such a broad and far ranging mandate.

Quat and Bui Diem seemed tired tonight and to lack incisiveness and self-confidence./4/ Just as former Prime Minister Huong could not keep off the subject of the menace of the Buddhists, Quat has become similarly fascinated by the dangers represented by the Catholics. He has heard a rumor that Archbishop Binh is now supporting Pere Quynh and his factious priests. He is happy with the fact that in the course of Tuyen's audience with the Pope, the latter undertook to write Papal Delegate Palmas a letter on the subject of Catholic avoidance of involvement in politics.

/4/On the evening of June 4 Bui Diem called Manfull to say that "the constitutional crisis was solved." Manfull called on Quat for details and found him in good spirits, confident that he had weathered the crisis. He had met with Suu and worked out an agreement on the constitutional questions at issue. The agreement would be embodied in a communiqué, and Quat said that he would send a decree on June 5 to Suu for his signature confirming the dismissal of the Ministers of Economy and Interior. (Telegram 4056 from Saigon, June 4; ibid.)

Taylor

 

330. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. A handwritten "L" in the margin of the source text indicates the President saw this memorandum.

The British and Vietnam

On a number of occasions you have showed your skepticism when one or another of us has remarked that the British have been very solid and helpful on Vietnam. And of course you have recollections, which the rest of us only have at second hand, of Harold Wilson's effort to telephone his way into a fancy trip to the White House at just the wrong moment./2/ Moreover, you feel the wounds of what Home said about busses and what Michael Stewart said about gas, although everyone else has long since forgotten those particular episodes.

/2/See Document 103.

It remains a fact that every experienced observer from David Bruce on down has been astonished by the overall strength and skill of Wilson's defense of our policy in Vietnam and his mastery of his own left wing in the process. The support of the UK has been of real value internationally--and perhaps of even more value in limiting the howls of our own liberals. It is quite true, of course, that we would get this kind of backing more or less automatically from a Conservative government, but support from Labour is not only harder to get but somewhat more valuable in international terms.

The only price we have paid for this support is the price of keeping them reasonably well informed and fending off one ill-advised plan for travel. This is not a very great cost. Moreover, we have had no leaks from the British, and no public expression of worry about the length of the pause. It is true that Gordon Walker has been making some moderately foolish noises lately, but he is not a member of the government.

My own feeling is that it is well worth our while to keep the British on board as long as it can be done simply by keeping them fully informed and giving them the feeling that they are in the know as we go ahead. To put it another way, I see no advantage at all in putting them at arms length and thus increasing the risk that they will be tempted to criticize./3/ You have taught us all a great deal about the advantages of Congressional consultation in the last year and a half--I myself believe that the same rules apply in diplomatic consultation. After all, we are dealing with human beings in both cases.

/3/On June 3 Prime Minister Wilson sent a message to President Johnson in which he warned against air raids on petroleum storage areas in North Vietnam, and argued for a limited concept of warfare in Vietnam. He reiterated, however, his continuing support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 448-449)

I attach Bruce's latest cable on this subject./4/

/4/Reference is to telegram 5835 from London, June 3, in which Ambassador Bruce commented on a statement made in the House of Commons on June 3 by Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. The statement dealt with Vietnam and was in line with the generally supportive position that the Wilson government had taken on the issue, despite an increasingly restive left wing within the Labor Party and growing uneasiness among the British public. Bruce noted, however, that, in order to manage their own party and the public, the Wilson government depended heavily on an undertaking from the United States to consult with them on any major changes in the policy or conduct of the war in Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

McG. B.

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 331 through 335