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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

331. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Drafted by Harry Obst of the Office of Operations/Language Services Division and Robert Kent of EUR/GER and approved in the White House on June 29. The meeting was held in the President's Office.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
Harry Obst--Interpreter

German
Chancellor Erhard
Herman Kusterer--Interpreter

The President asked the Chancellor about the attitude of the German people with regard to South Viet-Nam. Did they understand what was going on there or was it for them just a faraway country?

The Chancellor replied that, although not everybody was concerned with it, Viet-Nam was important to most Germans because they regarded it as a kind of testing ground as to how firmly the US honors its commitments. In that respect there existed a parallel between Saigon and Berlin. He assured the President of his sympathies and understanding and stressed that the Federal Republic would always work closely together with the US and stand by it on these problems.

The President thanked the Chancellor for his understanding attitude. He observed that the US had serious commitments under the SEATO Pact and other treaties, and that it would raise serious doubts in other parts of the world if the US did not stand by its commitments in SE Asia. He told the Chancellor he could go home and tell his people that the US would firmly stand by its commitments.

 

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, June 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret: Immediate; Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 9:06 a.m. A copy of the telegram was passed to the White House, and McGeorge Bundy sent it to the President on June 5 with a covering note emphasizing the final two pages dealing with the military balance, which Bundy noted were "interesting, and also troubling." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Nodis, Vol. II (A))

4074. The following is an estimate of the political-military situation in South Vietnam as of 5 June 1965, drafted by the mission Intelligence Committee and concurred in by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland. Suggest it be passed eyes only to Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Raborn and Admiral Sharp.

Political Situation

Broadly speaking, the current unsettled political situation is a reflection of the traditional divisive force at work in SVN (particularly the religious and regional clevages), the inexperience of the Vietnamese with practical political processes, the frustrations of two decades of war without victory in sight, and the predominant weight of the Saigon "intellectuals" in the political equation. The Quat government did not create these difficulties but rather is a victim of them. Quat and his associates have failed as have past regimes to neutralize or balance the opposing forces before they reached such proportions as to constitute a strong challenge to his government. In the current confrontation Quat's opposition is composed primarily of the Sudistes, militant Catholic elements, and out-politicians seeking to improve their lot in any change of government. Fundamentally, the Sudistes and the militant Catholic elements have been opposed to Quat from the date of his investiture but have lacked the issues with which to mount a real confrontation. In seeking to render his government more acceptable to the opposition elements, Quat presented them with an opportunity to organize and orchestrate a campaign to bring him down. In this, they had enlisted the support of a pliable Chief of State and of elements of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects motivated primarily by regional and political sentiments.

The role of Chief of State Suu has been crucial and [in] the present confrontation he has provided both the issue (in the interpretation of the provisional charter) and the means to focus the political opposition. Suu's actions may well be motivated by long-term political ambitions as well as the short-term political considerations. He is strongly influenced by the Sudiste groups (Le Van Thu, Hoang Ho, Tran Van Van, etc.) responsible for his election as Chief of State. He is undoubtedly being used by this group. The more readily since he foresees for himself a more exalted and powerful role than that which he now enjoys as Chief of State with nominal powers. These ambitions are reflected in the projected draft constitution providing for a strong Chief of State along de Gaulle lines, which Suu has announced that he wishes to submit for referendum to the people, and by his call for early national elections. In the immediate situation he has been a willing tool of the opposition in raising constitutional and procedural questions in their confrontation with Quat.

The position of the military has been to withdraw progressively from the active political scene and to devote their efforts to fighting the war and putting their own house in order. The military appeared content with civilian rule so long as the government gave evidence that it could effectively maintain a degree of political stability and direct the affairs of state. Having withdrawn from the political scene under strong urging from Quat, the military have been loath to intervene actively in the current crisis. They much prefer to remain aloof in the current situation unless their intervention is officially requested or should prove necessary as they view the situation. However, the military leaders are upset and increasingly impatient at the apparent inability of the civilian elements to solve the current impasse. They desire above all a strong effective government and if prospects for this appear dim, they will undoubtedly move to assume power.

Prime Minister Quat's performance in the current crisis has not been reassuring. He has not projected an image either as a forceful leader or as an astute politician. In advancing his proposed cabinet reshuffle, he did not prepare the ground either with the Chief of State, the NLC, or the ministers concerned. When faced with the "constitutional issue,", Quat did not seize the initiative nor utilize his strong assets. Had he done so, at the outset he could have forced the pace and probably achieved his objectives before the opposition was strongly organized. His failure to act decisively has fed the opposition and allowed them valuable time to develop their campaign. His chief asset has been support from the military. Quite understandably, he did not wish to inject the military into the picture during the early stages of the confrontation; however, he has not played this card effectively when events appeared to be running against him. In short, when faced with his first real challenge, Quat has been found to be indecisive--an almost fatal posture in the arena of jugular-vein politics in Saigon. Having said this, any realistic assessment must admit that Quat and his close associates constitute perhaps the best group on the scene at present. No single leader stands out as a clear alternative and no group exists which shows promise of handling the affairs of state much better.

Until late on 4 June, Quat faced two general orders of problems: (1) the constitutional challenge posed by Suu to his right to dismiss cabinet ministers, and (2) the vocal opposition to his government articulated by the Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Sudiste politicians. Although the second order of problem was brought to a focus by the [garble], the fact of public opposition remains, even though the constitutional problem appears to be on the way to settlement.

The Chief of State has been asked to intercede with the religious groups on Quat's behalf, but it is not yet clear whether he will in fact do so, or if he does, whether he will pursue the task with energy and with the Prime Minister's interests in mind. Nor is it clear how receptive the respective opposition groups will be to his approaches and those of Quat. The Catholics, for example, have up to the present given every evidence of implacable hostility to Quat, with indication that this disaffection exists to a degree within the Catholic hierarchy itself. The southern Catholics seem to be united with northern Catholics on this issue.

In considering our own options, it will be important to determine the depth and extent of the opposition to Quat now that the constitutional deadlock has been broken and after soundings have been taken with these groups by Suu and the GVN to determine whether their grievances can be satisfied. In the interim period, our course of action should be to urge on all sides (the GVN and the religions) the importance of arriving at an amicable accommodation. We will also have to bear in mind the interests of such groups as the United Buddhist Association, who will not be direct parties, to be sure that they are not given a cause for grievance.

If such an accommodation--imperfect and vulnerable though it be--can be reached, the immediate obstacle will have been surmounted and we can perhaps look forward to this government surviving for some time more. If, on the other hand, the opposing interests prove irreconcilable, or the military situation continues seriously to deteriorate, we will have to assess the situation in the light of the facts as they emerge and consider various alternatives, of which a more active military involvement in the political situation may be best from both political and military points of view.

Military Situation

After a two-month relative lull, evidently spent in regrouping, re-equipping and training, the Viet Cong have quickened the tempo of the fighting. Since early May, main force units have returned to the battlefield in increasing numbers, engaging in a number of attacks and ambushes with forces up to regimental size. While the months of March and April were relatively favorable for the government forces in terms of casualty and weapons loss ratios, the trend in May became less favorable as Viet Cong pressure mounted.

Captured documents indicate the Viet Cong have embarked on a new military campaign which will probably extend through the summer. Both Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts have heralded this new campaign as a demonstration of the Communists' will and determination to continue to press the war despite increased U.S. involvement in both North and South Vietnam. The apparent aims of this campaign are to alter the balance of military forces in favor of the Viet Cong by inflicting maximum attrition on the government forces, including specifically the piecemeal destruction of regular ARVN ground combat units where possible, and to extend Viet Cong control in rural areas by constricting GVN forces to the principal towns and cities. The pattern of Viet Cong operations to date indicates the campaign will be pressed vigorously in all military regions, the major attacks and ambushes will be accompanied by intensified, small-scale guerrilla activity, particularly sabotage and harassment of lines of communication, and that the Viet Cong intend to consolidate their rural gains through intensified subversion and political action. Increased terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and installations in urban areas are also likely.

So far, the enemy has not employed his full capabilities in this campaign. Only two of the nine Viet Cong regiments have been heavily engaged (one in Phuoc Long and one in Quang Ngai), and probably only a similar proportion of their separate battalions has been committed. In most engagements, their main force units have displayed improved training and discipline, heavier firepower, and a willingness to take heavy losses if necessary to achieve their objectives. Their healthy respect for the effectiveness of U.S. and GVN tactical air support is reflected, however, in their reliance on ambush tactics instead of open assaults.

In pressing their campaign, the Viet Cong are capable of mounting regimental-size operations in all four ARVN Corps areas, and at least battalion-sized attacks in virtually any province. The larger attacks can be supported by a limited number of 70-mm or 75-mm artillery pieces. Known dispositions indicate major actions are likely in the near future in the Binh Duong-Phuoc Thanh-Phuoc Long area north of Saigon, in the Quang Ngai-Quang Tin area in central Vietnam, and in Kontum Province. Major attacks could occur also in other areas, since the Viet Cong have shown that they are capable of concentrating in regimental strength without giving significant warning.

While the Viet Cong remain numerically inferior in over-all strength, they can achieve temporary local superiority at times and places of their selection. Their ability to do this is facilitated by the commitment of a large portion of the RVNAF infantry-type battalions to relatively static missions, while the Viet Cong main force and local battalions are employed only in an offensive role. During periods of intensive activity, the Viet Cong thus enjoy the initiative in that they can choose the time, conditions, and place of engagement; significant contacts rarely occur, even when RVNAF units are engaged in aggressive operations, unless the Viet Cong elect to engage. By posing simultaneous or successive threats in widely separated areas, the Viet Cong have demonstated an ability to offset [to] some extent ARVN's superior transportation resources.

Despite severe losses on occasion, Viet Cong forces have shown a remarkable recuperative ability. This has been facilitated by a systematic recruiting effort and an evidently effective replacement system, supplemented by the infiltration of northern draftees who have been integrated into Viet Cong units in the northern provinces. Access for recruiting purposes to the major portion of the population has enabled the Viet Cong not only to replace their losses but to continue to form new units. In addition to elements of the PAVN 325th Division already identified in the South, other units of this division and the PAVN 304th Division may already have entered or are stationed in the Laos border area. These elements represent a significant reinforcement capability for Viet Cong units in the I and II Corps areas.

Although GVN forces generally have responded well to the increased Viet Cong pressure, there have been several disturbing instances of poor performance in critical situations. Some units have broken under pressure and fled from the battlefield. These manifestations, coupled with the continuing high desertion rate in many units, reflect a generally marginal state of morale. The morale and confidence of the Officer Corps were buoyed up by the more direct involvement of U.S. forces since February. This improved spirit was enhanced by the period of relative inactivity of the Viet Cong main force units. The growing realization, however, that the increased U.S. commitment would not produce an immediate end to the war, together with ARVN's apparent inability to cope decisively as yet with the renewed Viet Cong offensive, apparently has caused morale to sag again. Unless the anticipated Viet Cong major attacks are effectively countered, morale will deteriorate further. Indeed, the cumulative psychological impact of a series of significant ARVN defeats could lead to a collapse in ARVN's will to continue to fight, despite the presence in South Vietnam of U.S. forces. To ward against the possibility of such a collapse, it will probably be necessary to commit US ground forces to action.

Conclusions:

1. The Communist leadership in Hanoi has not yet been shaken in its determination to continue the war. It apparently has elected to respond to the growing commitment of U.S. military resources in Vietnam by employing their principal weapon--the Viet Cong ground force reinforced by PAVN--in intensified operations in the South.

2. Having resumed major offensive actions in South Vietnam, the enemy is capable of continuing the recent pace of attacks and ambushes over the next several months, although there will probably be local cyclical fluctuations in the level activity. While the Viet Cong have suffered heavy losses, they have generally achieved their objectives in actions to date.

3. RVNAF general reserves have been barely adequate to deal with any one major thrust and are inadequate to counter simultaneous or successive thrusts in widely separated areas. Taking advantage of terrain and weather conditions, the Viet Cong appear likely to achieve further successes. To meet the shortage of ARVN reserves, it will probably be necessary to commit U.S. ground forces to action.

4. Further military reverses, coupled with the economic disruption caused by the harassment and blocking of lines of communication, will have a serious adverse impact on popular confidence and morale, exacerbating political instability in Sagion.

5. The political situation remains essentially unstable. Although the constitutional impasse appears to have been resolved, the Quat government continues to be faced with the difficult task of reaching an accommodation with strong opposition groups seeking its ouster and its life line is of uncertain length. The military and political situations are closely interrelated, and reverses in either area will have an adverse reaction in the other.

Taylor

 

333. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV, Memos (B). Top Secret. The source text indicates that the President saw it.

SUBJECT
George Ball's cable to Taylor

1. Here is George's outgoing of June 1, and the answer from Taylor and Johnson./2/ What they say in essence is that they would like to maintain and increase pressure by air attacks as well as by efforts in the South. They would avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area except for an occasional selected target--and they believe a little more than we do that pain in the North will help bring a change of heart in Hanoi.

/2/Documents 324 and 328.

2. I share Bob McNamara's view that we can readily frame a specific program over the next month that will be acceptable to the Embassy without unacceptable risks of escalation. I myself am more attracted than Rusk and McNamara by the notion of an occasional limited attack inside the Hanoi perimeter--probably in the Haiphong port area.

McG. B.

 

334. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 5, 1965.

/1/Source: University of Montana, Mansfield Library, Mansfield Papers, Series 13, Box 69, Vietnam. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Viet Nam

Pursuant to Thursday's Leadership meeting,/2/ I want to stress my support for your resistance to pressures for an irreversible extension of the war in Asia. That is what the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong could well amount to. I say that because the bombing would be more than just another military measure. It would also be a political act of the first magnitude.

/2/See Document 326.

In keeping the lid on these pressures you are on sound historic and realistic grounds in terms of the vital interests of the United States. The word "vital" is used most advisedly because the following is what I believe would result from the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

1. The bombing is likely to have no significant value to us in the military situation because the Communists in Hanoi and Peking have long expected it and have undoubtedly made their plans accordingly.

2. The bombing is likely to forestall indefinitely any prospects of discussions with the other side, unconditional or otherwise.

3. The bombing is likely to provide another world-wide impetus to nations to disassociate themselves from the American position and, in Asia, this separation could begin to extend to Japan.

4. The bombing is likely to insure the irreversibility of the Chinese involvement and will act to seal Chinese domination over North Viet Nam.

5. The bombing is likely to freeze Russia into the role, at least, of principal outside supplier of military equipment for North Viet Nam and China.

6. The bombing is likely to bring about an enlargement and acceleration of the ground war in South Viet Nam and, hence, it will compel the rapid injection of more American forces on the ground, even to hold the situation in that region.

7. The bombing is likely to insure that the war eventually will have to be carried, in the search for decision, into North Viet Nam, into other parts of Southeast Asia, and probably into China itself. And who is going to carry the main burden of this extension if not United States ground forces? Secretary McNamara spoke of 300,000 Americans to deal with Giap's forces if they came south. That is but a beginning. If the expansion goes on to include combat with Chinese forces all over Southeast Asia, we had better start thinking in terms of millions.

These consequences of a bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong would do violence to the vital interests of the United States. For, at the end of the line, even if there is something which could be called a victory, we would be faced with a cost of an occupation and reconstruction in Asia which would dwarf anything which has yet been seen.

Getting in deep on the Asian mainland is a course which has been rejected repeatedly throughout our history and most emphatically by Dwight D. Eisenhower at the other extremity of Asia. As President, the choice was his to make in Korea. He could have pushed the air-war in the search for a clear-cut decision. He chose, instead, to negotiate a cease-fire in Korea, rather than to proceed to deepen the involvement by bombing beyond the Yalu. On the basis of that cease-fire in Korea, we held what was, in fact, already held on the ground and yielded to them what they already held on the ground.

It is clear that our side does not have much on the ground, even in South Viet Nam. But if we are determined to hold that entire region on our terms, it is going to have to be in South Viet Nam and not in the air over North Viet Nam that the ground has to be won. Indeed, the bombing of the North, after the initial sallies, appears to have made the military task in the South more difficult and costly. Certainly, it is related to the rapid expansion of our own ground forces in the South. And it would be my judgment that if we bomb Hanoi-Haiphong it will serve to raise the ante to us on the ground in South Viet Nam once again.

I think it is about time you got an accounting from those who have pressured you in the past to embark on this course and continue to pressure you to stay on it. It is time to ask, not only what immediate advantages it has in a narrow military sense, but where does it lead in the end: What was promised by the initial extension of the war in the air over the North? And what, in fact, has it produced to date?

As I see it, and you know it is a view which I have long held, there are no significant American interests which dictate an essentially massive, unilateral American military effort to control the flow of events in Viet Nam or even on the Southeast Asian mainland as a whole. There is, on the contrary, only a general interest, shared with many other outsiders, in the stability, peace and progress of the region. That is not the kind of interest which we can serve by overwhelming the region with either our military strength or our substance. It is the kind of interest which requires us to do a share, along with the other outsiders whose tangible, political and economic and commercial stake in the region is in some cases much larger than our own. It is the kind of interest which, it would seem to me, calls for the minimum military effort which is necessary to hold the situation in the South from falling apart altogether and a maximum initiative on our part to get this whole sorry business to a conference table as soon as possible./3/

/3/Mansfield sent a memorandum to President Johnson on June 9 questioning the decision to commit U.S. troops to combat in Vietnam (Document 341) and another memorandum, dated June 14, to the President on June 22 that offered suggestions for settling the Vietnam conflict. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam, Mansfield Memo and Reply) On June 27 McGeorge Bundy sent Mansfield a memorandum, approved by the President, responding to Mansfield's three June memoranda. Bundy noted that the administration valued Mansfield's advice and agreed with him on the importance of limiting the bombing campaign in the north, focusing on the military situation in the south, and moving the conflict in the direction of an international conference to pursue a negotiated settlement. Bundy added, however, that the administration did not share Mansfield's pessimistic assessment of the political and military situation in Vietnam, and did not feel that an effective cease-fire would be as easy to arrange and enforce as Mansfield seemed to suggest. (Ibid.)

 

335. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, June 1965. Top Secret.

Washington, June 5, 1965.

SUBJECT
Negotiating Developments re South Viet-Nam

1. Bo Message and Seaborn Approach.

The Bo message of May 18 to the French/2/ still leaves the ambiguity whether recognition of the four points is a condition to any talks. The wording slightly shades the public formulations, but on its face does not change the sense of what Hanoi appeared to be saying, originally on April 8/3/ and later in April when it used the four points as its statement on the appeal of the 17./4/

/2/See Document 308.

/3/See Document 245.

/4/An authorized statement in English rejecting the 17 Non-Aligned Nation Appeal was broadcast over Hanoi radio on April 19.

We have given Seaborn a message designed to smoke this out./5/ He returns today or tomorrow, we believe, but we have no report yet on whether he was received by any senior person, which was a prerequisite to his delivering the message.

/5/See Document 317.

Meanwhile, the French have reported the approach to the British, who in turn have told the Australians. We ourselves told the GVN, and the Canadians know of it through our intelligence publications/6/ (as perhaps do the New Zealanders through the same channel, which was a technical mistake). Thus, there is a leak danger from these facts alone, and Senator Pell's mention of the subject at your hearing the other day/7/ strongly suggests that Alphand is at work peddling the line that the message did indicate Hanoi was ready for talks without preconditions, and also implying that we lost a chance by resuming so soon. Saigon 4062,/8/ in today, flags the leak problem and raises the question of what we should be prepared to say. I am drafting a reply, attached as Tab A./9/

/6/Not further identified.

/7/Rusk appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 3. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

/8/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

/9/Not printed.

More basically, Hanoi propaganda is now going all out to play up the four points, while Peking has flatly stated their acceptance is a precondition to talks. I am more than ever sure in retrospect that Hanoi was playing just for the French gloss they appear to be getting, while not in fact committing itself, and of course denouncing the pause in their public statements.

2. The Chen Yi Conversation with theBritish/10/

/10/See Document 321.

This took place on May 31, and was obviously meant to be conveyed to us. I told the British yesterday they could tell Chen Yi we had received the message. Hopson is seeing Chen Yi again soon.

On substance, Tab B is Lindsey Grant's analysis,/11/ with which I agree. Chen Yi was apparently being (a) tough about DRV resolve; (b) mild in the sense that he appeared to be saying China would not come in unless China itself were attacked; (c) tough as to China going all the way if it did come in.

/11/Dated June 3.

Perhaps the most interesting thing is that Peiping was so forthcoming to Hopson on his first call. While the substance was nothing new, the repetition of a specific message, allegedly sent once through Ayub though not clearly conveyed to us through that channel, plus the length of the discussion, does indicate Peiping wants a channel and has perhaps chosen this one at least for the time being.

Knowledge of the Chen Yi approach is confined to the UKG and USG among allies. It was held very close when first received but [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Thus, it is more widely known within the USG than it should be, but I hope we do not have a leak problem.

3. Indian Proposal and Letter to Shastri

The long draft letter to Shastri, by the President, was rejected as a single letter by the President, and has been revised into a shorter letter, with a long memorandum conveying what was taken out of the letter. We hope the President will approve this morning./12/ A major purpose of course is to encourage Shastri to keep the Indian proposal alive; latest word from New Delhi is that the Indians are shaken by negative Communist responses and might not really press it at Algiers, which is where it could play a real role.

/12/The letter and accompanying memorandum were transmitted to New Delhi for delivery to Shastri in telegram 2540, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 INDIA)

Meanwhile, Hanoi is blasting away at the Indian proposal almost daily, usually pairing this with its play-up of the four points (The Bo message also contained a more measured rejection, with reasons.) The purpose is obviously to move the Algiers nations to adopt the four points.

4. U Thant Status

On Monday, I gave Stevenson the full pause story, including the Bo approach and our Seaborn plans, and he saw U Thant Tuesday. Our short report/13/ does not specifically say what Stevenson conveyed, but I assume it was the works, together with urging U Thant to help the Indian proposal privately. U Thant thought the Indian proposal had little hope, but said he would talk further with Stevenson next week. He is apparently not very itchy, but might at any time revive his idea of a "cease-fire across the 17th";/14/ Stevenson has already tried to talk him in the direction--if he does anything at all--of a call for discussions of a broader cessation of hostilities, which we could buy.

/13/Not further identified.

/14/See Document 233.

5. Consultations with GVN

Ambassador Taylor did have his first talk with Quat and Do, and they were not far apart on ultimate conditions./15/ We have had a further exchange with the Embassy on our ideas for a wider GVN initiative, but of course this has not been broached to the GVN./16/

/15/See Document 319.

/16/See Document 320.

Meanwhile, Sullivan has a good short cable in,/13/ highlighting the need for a GVN statement to match the four points, the sooner the better. I think we would all agree, and perhaps we should be working to get the GVN onto a short general statement (a) using the sequence of our reply to the 17--cessation of aggression, end of "supporting actions" (bombing of the north, perhaps more), SVN to determine its future without external interference, US withdrawal, finally determination of relations between south and north by peaceable means; (b) going as far as possible about GVN willingness to determine the popular will as soon as possible, stressing local elections already held, perhaps implying ex-VC could participate in some formula: (c) saying frankly that the reunification issue could be faced eventually on the basis of a determination of free popular will (Michael Stewart said roughly this Thursday), perhaps even stating free elections right out. Points (b) and (c) would have particular appeal to the world, since Pham Van Dong's four points would simply put the Liberation Front in at once without elections, and the fourth point on reunification likewise makes no reference to elections.

If you approve, I could put this suggestion to Saigon today for their thoughts. However, if the Ambassador comes back over the weekend, we probably want to await his return. Moreover, we have the imponderable that part of the fire on Quat has been for alleged peace tendencies, and he may be particularly edgy right now. However, they will be in a bad way at Algiers if we do not have a summary statement by the middle of the month, to compete with the four points.

6. Cambodian Conference

The British again pressed the Soviets on June 2, without response. Meanwhile, you have probably seen Sihanouk's interesting letter to the Times yesterday, which repeats publicly that he will allow any SVN representation the great powers agree on, but is also remarkably frank that he would be swallowed by China if it got power in the area. (We have sent this out to posts, particularly for New Delhi use, in their soft approach to Nong Kimny.) The letter has an air of genuineness, almost of despair; maybe he is now hoping for mercy from the DRV, but he could be extending a wispy branch towards us.

7. Liberation Front Status

One interesting feature of Hanoi's latest propaganda/17/ is that it groups the four points with the Liberation Front statement of March 22 (which is harder on its face). This could be an attempt to build up the Front more--again with an eye to Algiers. One of the shoes that could drop at any time would be a formal declaration by the Front of government status (which Michael Stewart alluded to the absence of); I have always thought they might be waiting to capture a provincial capital to do this (Pleiku or Kontum might be best for their geographical reasons).

/17/Not further identified.

William P. Bundy/18/

/18/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 336 through 340