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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

336. Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, EA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Vietnam Negotiations, Seaborn. Saigon, June 6, 1965, 11:47 a.m.

Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Ottawa, Moscow, Djakarta, Vientiane, Bangkok, Paris, London, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Printed also in part in Herring (ed.), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 44

4083. Canadian ICC Commissioner Blair Seaborn told EmbOff this morning results of his latest week-long visit to Hanoi, from which he had returned yesterday.

Seaborn said that he is persuaded from his conversations with diplomats and DRV officials that DRV is not now interested in any negotiations. He said that he was able to see new Foreign Minister Trinh but that discussion had revealed nothing new. Trinh followed standard line that US offer of unconditional discussions was "deceitful" since US continued build-up in South Vietnam and bombing of North. Seaborn pressed Trinh to elaborate on "four points," asking whether points intended to be seen as preconditions to talks or as result of talks or as ultimate goals. Trinh remained deliberately vague and gave no clear answers. Seaborn pressed specifically on point about withdrawal of US troops, but also only received vague and indefinite reply.

Seaborn said his discussion with PAVN liaison chief also turned into usual restatement of well-known positions.

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Seaborn said that his impression from all his meetings and discussions was that there had been no change in DRV position, or that it least they did not seem about to let such change be known./2/

/2/In telegram 4084 from Saigon, June 6, Taylor added that when Seaborn discussed his trip with Johnson, they had agreed that, in the absence of an initiative on the part of North Vietnam, further efforts through the Seaborn channel would not be useful and could be counterproductive. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) On June 8 the Canadian Embassy passed to the Department a copy of Seaborn's June 4 telegram reporting on his trip to Hanoi. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

Taylor

 

337. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Saigon, June 7, 1965, 11:35 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to JCS personal for General Wheeler and sent to CINCPAC personal for Admiral Sharp. Repeated to CINCUSARPAC for General Waters, CINCPACAF for General Harris, CINCPACFLT for Admiral Johnson, and C G FMFPAC for General Krulak. Sent to JCS with a request to pass to Ambassador Taylor.

MAC JOO 19118. Subj: US troop deployment to SVN (S). Ref: A. COMUSMACV 041133Z notal; B. JCS 2343 564-7; C. COMUSMACV 260040Z May notal; D. USASCV USG 65-TS 101 311200Z May notal; E.CINCPAC 052249Z (PASEP); F. COMUSMACV 201207Z May 65./2/

/2/None found.

1. As indicated Ref A, a broad review of force requirements has been conducted in light of the changing situation in Southeast Asia and within RVN.

2. There are indications that the conflict in Southeast Asia is in the process of moving to a higher level. Some PAVN forces have entered SVN and more may well be on the way. Additional jet fighters and some jet light bombers have been deployed in the DRV.

3. Specifically, elements of the 325th PAVN division are in the northern zone of II Corps. It is quite possible that the major portion, if not all of the division is now deployed in the Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon area. Elements of the 304th PAVN division are suspected to be in the panhandle and, therefore, capable of following the 325th. The recent heavy actions in Phuoc Long and Quang Ngai, and VC initiatives in Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Bon and Thua Thien are demonstrations of VC strength and their apparent determination to employ their forces aggressively. Recent events as well as captured VC prisoners and documents suggest that a summer campaign is now underway to destroy government forces and concurrently, to first isolate and then attack district and province towns.

4. So far the VC have not employed their full capabilities in this campaign. Only two of the nine Viet Cong regiments have been heavily engaged (one in Phuoc Long and one in Quang Ngai), and probably only a similar proportion of their separate battalions has been committed. In most engagements, VC main force units have displayed improved training and discipline, heavier firepower from the new family of weapons with which most main force units have been equipped, and a willingness to take heavy losses in order to achieve objectives.

5. In pressing their campaign, the Viet Cong are capable of mounting regimental-size operations in all four ARVN Corps areas, and at least battalion-sized attacks in virtually all provinces. Known dispositions indicate major actions are likely in the near future in the Binh Duong-Phuoc Thanh-Phuoc Long area north of Saigon, in the Quang Ngai-Quang Tin area in Central Vietnam, and in Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Binh Dinh Provinces. Major attacks could occur also in other areas; the Viet Cong have shown that they are capable of concentrating in regimental strength with little or no warning. Whether or not the 304th Div is in, or moving toward SVN, the DRV has a "doorstep" capability to reinforce the VC with sizable forces.

6. ARVN forces on the other hand are already experiencing difficulty in coping with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than expected; in fact, four ARVN battalions have been rendered ineffective by VC action in the I and II Corps zones. Therefore, effective fighting strength of many infantry and ranger battalions is unacceptably low. As a result, ARVN troops are beginning to show signs of reluctance to assume the offensive and in some cases their steadfastness under fire is coming into doubt. In order to bring existing battalions up to acceptable battlefield strength, it will be necessary to declare at least a temporary moratorium on the activation of new battalions. Thus, the GVN VC force ratios upon which we based our estimate of the situation in March have taken an adverse trend. You will recall that I recommended the deployment of a U.S. division in II Corps to cover the period of the RVNAF buildup and to weigh the force ratios in that important area. We assumed at that time that the ARVN battalions would be brought to full strength by now and that the force buildup would proceed on schedule. Neither of these assumptions has materialized.

7. The problem of low battlefield strength in ARVN has forced us to plan the use of personnel now training in 11 new battalions as fillers for old battalions. In effect, these 11 battalions will be deferred and during the period from mid-July to early November no new ARVN battalions will become available. Thus the gap to be filled is both deeper and wider.

8. In summary, the force ratios continue to change in favor of the VC. I believe that the DRV will commit whatever forces it deems necessary to tip the balance and that the GVN cannot stand up successfully to this kind of pressure without reinforcement. Even if DRV VC intentions are debatable, their capabilities must be acknowledged and faced. Additionally, it is prudent to consider possible enemy air action, leading to significant escalation and a broadening of the arena of conflict. We must be prepared to face such a contingency./3/

/3/In telegram 2873 to Saigon, June 11, the Department of State noted that INR and CIA had assessed the military appraisal of the situation in South Vietnam provided in telegram 19118. While agreeing that it was serious, the intelligence analysts questioned the implication that there was a serious danger of complete military collapse within a relatively short period of time. This impression, the Department noted, was not supported by reporting from Saigon, and telegram 19118 did not reinforce the impression with reference to a dramatic or unexpected development in the military situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

9. In order to cope with the situation outlined above, I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN with additional U.S. or third country forces as rapidly as is practical during the critical weeks ahead. Additionally, studies must continue and plans developed to deploy even greater forces, if and when required, to attain our objectives or counter enemy initiatives. Ground forces deployed to selected areas along the coast and inland will be used both offensively and defensively. U.S. ground troops are gaining experience and thus far have performed well. Although they have not yet engaged the enemy in strength, I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the VC. The basic purpose of the additional deployments recommended below is to give us a substantial and hard hitting offensive capability on the ground to convince the VC that they cannot win.

10. In sub-paragraph "A" below, deployments and actions are recommended on which decisions should be made now. In subpara "B" we have identified further actions on which planning should start and on which separate recommendations will be forthcoming:

A. Actions recommended:

(1) Deploy at once to I CTZ the remaining two BLTs of the 3d Mar Div and appropriate supporting division and air elements (approximately 8,000 personnel). Reconstitute the SLF as a floating reserve.

(2) Deploy balance of increment 1 and all of increment 2 (as defined in Ref C) of army logistic and other support units in accordance with schedule set out in Ref D. (Approximately 8,000 personnel.)

(3) Deploy the US Army Air Mobile Division (and logistic increment 3) through Qui Nhon to An Ke, Pleiku and Kontum (approximately 21,000 personnel). Qui Nhon will be ready to receive the division approximately 1 August, upon the closure of increment 2 forces.

(4) Concurrently with the Air Mobile Division, deploy I Corps Headquarters (approximately 1,500 personnel).

(5) Deploy the ROK Marine RCT to Cam Ranh Bay as soon after 1 July as the unit can be readied for movement (approximately 4,000 personnel). Deploy balance of the ROK Division force (approximately 14,500 personnel) plus US logistic increment 4 (1,500 personnel), starting 15 September to the general area of Qui Nhon. (This answers Ref E in part--separate message on F86F will follow.)/4/

/4/Not found.

(6) Deploy additional tactical fighter squadrons to Cam Ranh Bay when expeditionary landing field complete at that location. Also provide naval aircraft carrier support of in-country operations as required; we believe this latter will engage one carrier full time.

(7) Hold the 173d Airborne Brigade in-country until the Air Mobile Division has deployed and is ready for operations.

(8) Continue air attacks against the DRV. (Ref F applies.)

B. Additional deployment that may be required and on which planning should begin:

(1) Three U.S. Army Hawk battalions to TN Bien Hoa, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh in that priority.

(2) The remainder of the 1st Infantry Division or the 101st Airborne Division begining 1 October.

(3) One additional MAB to reinforce the III MAF.

(4) Tactical air units for support of increased U.S. force (additional airfields in SVN and Thailand may be required).

(5) Required combat and logistic support forces to include helicopter units to support the foregoing.

11. Message has been discussed with Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson. Ambassador Taylor is prepared to comment thereon during current visit to Washington./5/

/5/Admiral Sharp added his comments on these proposals in CINCPAC telegrams 072325Z to JCS, June 7, and 112210Z to JCS, June 11. Sharp concurred in Westmoreland's assessment of the deteriorating military situation in Vietnam and agreed on the necessity of expanded deployment of U.S. forces to meet the threat. He expressed apprehension, however, over the proposed deployment of the U.S. Air Mobile Division to the central highlands. Sharp argued that limited U.S. combat forces should be used to secure the more populous coastal areas of South Vietnam. (CINCPAC telegram 072325Z is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; CINCPAC telegram 112210Z is in Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 12305)

 

338. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Washington, June 7-12, 1965.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-272-64, Box 52. Secret.

The two principal topics discussed during this visit to Washington were further U.S. troop deployments to South Viet-Nam and the so-called Acheson political track.

With regard to the first subject, when I left Washington following the NSC meeting on Friday, June 11,/2/ President Johnson was to take three proposals for weekend reading to the Ranch. The first was General Westmoreland's recommendation/3/ which called for a total U.S. strength in South Viet-Nam of about 140,000, the CINCPAC/JCS recommendation/4/ which was the same as General Westmoreland's with the exception that no U.S. division would be deployed to the high plateau. Instead, it would be retained on the coast for reaction employment elsewhere within the country. The third proposal was Secretary McNamara's/5/ which would add to the present approved deployments a total of five battalions, two of which were Marine battalions to complete the division at Danang and the remainder was a brigade of three Army battalions to be located on the coast for reaction employment. I was authorized to inform the Senate Committees of the impending deployment or four additional battalions (already approved) totalling 18,000 men, thus raising our overall strength to about 70,000. The four battalions were assumed to be a brigade of three to Qui Nhon and a fourth battalion to the Saigon area to raise the strength of the Army troops there from two to three battalions.

/2/See Document 347.

/3/Document 337.

/4/Document 346.

/5/Apparently a reference to the proposal made by McNamara at a White House meeting on June 10; see Document 343 and footnote 2 thereto.

I had two discussions of the Acheson political track,/6/ one with Acheson himself, and the other at a meeting with George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Bill Bundy, and Acheson./7/ One important point established was that the plan was applicable only to a situation where the DRV/VC had become convinced that they could not win by their present tactics. It was agreed to prepare a paper/8/ which would represent the GVN's declaration of an appealing political and economic program which would induce good behavior in the VC and a willingness to participate in the government 's program. It would feature an offer of full citizenship to repentant VC and offer them the opportunity of full political and economic participation in the benefits offered by the Saigon Government.

/6/See Document 287 regarding the Acheson political track.

/7/No record of either discussion has been found.

/8/Not further identified.

Related somewhat to the Acheson plan was the Department feeling that the GVN should produce a statement of war aims to offset those promulgated by the DRV. On both matters, Department representatives undertook to prepare papers/8/ for transmission to Saigon.

For my detailed schedule and memoranda of record of important meetings, see enclosures./9/

/9/Not printed.

 

339. Editorial Note

On June 8, 1965, Department of State Spokesman Robert J. McCloskey acknowledged, in response to questions from reporters, that U.S. forces in South Vietnam "would be available for combat support together with the Vietnamese forces as and when necessary." (The Washington Post, June 10, 1965) McCloskey's statement followed a joint State-Defense message to Saigon, June 5, which reconfirmed General Westmoreland's authority to commit U.S. ground forces to combat support operations:

"This is to confirm your understanding that COMUSMACV has the authority to authorize commitment US ground forces to action in combat support on the basis of operational coordination and cooperation with RVNAF." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

On June 9 The Washington Post ran a lead story, based upon McCloskey's statement, which observed that a new phase in the Vietnamese war had been signaled with the announcement that United States ground forces could be used in a combat role in South Vietnam.

The White House issued a statement on June 9 that indicated that there had been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam:

"The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded. If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgement, the general military situation urgently requires it." (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, page 872)

The text of the statement was conveyed to Saigon in circular telegram 2470, June 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Secretary of State Rusk, interviewed on the NBC "Today" program on June 9, said that, while United States forces had been sent to Vietnam to defend certain installations, "obviously, we do not expect these men to sit there like hypnotized rabbits waiting for the Viet Cong to strike." (The Washington Post, June 10, 1965)

 

340. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, June 8, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Chrono as DDP and DDCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret. Prepared by Helms.

SUBJECT
Cabinet Room Meeting on Vietnam

PRESENT WERE

The President

For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, William Bundy, and Ambassador Taylor

For Defense: Messrs. McNamara, Vance and General Wheeler

For the White House: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

For CIA: Richard Helms

1. This meeting which ran from 1300 to 1430, with the President joining it at 1330, consisted of a rather wide-ranging discussion of the Vietnamese problem. No decisions were made, it being agreed that Mr. Bundy would convene a meeting with General Taylor on Wednesday afternoon/2/ to prepare points for decision which could be raised with the President at a session to be held on Thursday morning./3/ This procedure may, of course, be changed, but this was what was forecast as of 1430, 8 June.

/2/June 9.

/3/See Document 343.

2. There was considerable discussion of General Westmoreland's recommendations for United States military increases contained in telegram COMUSMACV-19118 of 7 June./4/ Mr. McNamara informed the President that if these recommended increases were put into effect, it would raise the total of United States forces in Vietnam to 151,000. This figure is made up of 70,000 in place by the end of August, plus 46,000 more requested in the Westmoreland telegram, plus 35,000 recommended for later decision. This total figure would go up to 170,000 if Korean, Australian, and other national units were included. General Taylor explained that the Westmoreland telegram grew out of MACV's concern over the poor fighting performance of the ARVN in recent battles and fear that a break-down of fighting morale might occur among the South Vietnamese. He pointed out that the principal failure was on the part of the Second Division and that steps had already been taken to relieve its commander. General Taylor also noted that desertions in the ARVN were of such a rate that between mid-February and mid-May there had been a net gain of only 11,000 in ARVN total strength. In other words, desertions were off-setting recruitments to a degree which had not been accurately forecast. (There seemed to be some disagreement between Mr. McNamara and General Taylor over the monthly rate of desertions, Mr. McNamara using the figure of 10,000 and Taylor using the figure of from 3,000 to 4,000.) By the end of the meeting, it seemed to be reasonably agreed that the logistics of the situation were such that only a certain number of American troops could be introduced into South Vietnam prior to September and that this in and of itself would tend to defer and to limit the basic decision as the whether the strength of American forces should be allowed to climb to any figure like 150,000. Mr. McNamara was advocating what he referred to as a "limited cost and limited risk" option, and this turns out to be almost identical with what the logistics will in any event permit.

/4/Document 337.

3. The Department of State representatives asked at what point in a build-up of United States forces does this war become a "white man's war". General Taylor replied that he did not know and that it was for this reason that he preferred a slow, "incremental" build-up. Mr. Bundy pointed out that a progressive build-up might develop to a size that was unacceptable, at which point the President discussed the problems we will have with the Congress and with our allies as we add substantial numbers of troops.

4. On the political side, General Taylor discussed the current squabble between Suu and Quat and indicated that he could well do without Suu right now. He said that Suu was constantly welshing on agreements, that he had no particular attributes or political base. General Taylor indicated that if the present government were to fall, the next one would doubtless be a military dictatorship.

5. Mr. McNamara received approval for Rolling Thunder XVIII. One question was raised as to whether this should include Target 43 or Target 28. It was decided to go for Target 28. Otherwise, there was no disagreement on targets.

6. Mr. Rusk asked if there was any evidence of substantial military movements in either Communist China or North Korea. I answered in the negative. (I have asked Mr. Jack Smith to report regularly on this query.)

7. The President asked General Taylor, upon his return to Saigon, to get the South Vietnam Government "on the record" as being opposed to any negotiation between it and the Viet Cong. In response to a question as to what the bombing in the North has achieved aside from giving the South Vietnamese Government some stability for the last ninety days, General Wheeler pointed out that there has been a sizable military benefit in the form of the difficulties which the North Vietnamese have had in moving men and supplies into the South. He said he was convinced that it had thrown a distinct block into the time-table of Viet Cong attacks.

8. The President asked that all options be reviewed, that our objectives in Vietnam be specified, and that recommendations be made later in the week as to how we should proceed with the Vietnamese war.

Richard Helms/5/
Deputy Director

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates that Helms signed the original.

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 341 through 343