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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

341. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 9, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam--Mansfield Memo and Reply. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Viet Nam

Pursuant to our telephone conversation last night,/2/ here are some additional thoughts.

/2/The President telephoned Mansfield at 5:05 p.m. on June 8. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A tape recording of their conversation is ibid., Recordings of Telephone Conversations.

The formal delegation of authority to Westmoreland to commit American combat troops comes at a time when the last semblance of constituted government (the Quat group) in Saigon is disappearing. As I understand it, Westmoreland will respond to requests from the Vietnamese military not the Vietnamese government. This underscores the fact that there is not a government to speak of in Saigon. In short we are now at the point where we are no longer dealing with anyone who represents anybody in a political sense. We are simply acting to prevent a collapse of the Vietnamese military forces which we pay for and supply in any event and who presumably are going in the same direction we are going. That reality is not going to be lost on any government--friend or foe--anywhere in the world.

It raises again the question, and it is a crucial one: In what direction are we going in Viet Nam? We can talk of negotiations, conferences and peace. We can talk of the independence and welfare of the people of South Viet Nam. We can talk of unconditional discussions. But the question is going to be asked increasingly: What do we mean when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam and for what specific United States or Vietnamese ends are we going to stay there? The question will be asked increasingly at home no less than abroad.

And it is the crucial question because the answer to it should control the extent and nature of our military involvement in Viet Nam. As I see it, at this point, we can mean one of three things when we say we are going to stay in South Viet Nam. I am no military expert but, on the basis of our past experience elsewhere and developments in Viet Nam since the first of the year, it seems to me that the military costs of each of these three alternatives would look something like this:

1. Do we mean that we are going to stay in Viet Nam until we or our Vietnamese military allies prevail everywhere south of the 17th parallel down to the smallest hamlet? If that is what we mean, we are talking in terms of years or decades, and upwards of a million American soldiers on the ground in South Viet Nam, assuming that the Chinese do not become involved with men.

2. Or are we talking about holding the military situation about where it is now? So far as I can judge, from second hand reports, this would mean that our side must retain the provincial capitals, the larger towns in the interior, Saigon, and the coastal cities and we must be able to maintain at least tenuous lines of communication on the ground in between. If that is what we are talking about when we say we are going to stay in Viet Nam, then the 300,000 McNamara estimate is probably too low but something in the range of 500,000 might do it, at least if Giap's army does not move in full and open force across the 17th parallel.

3. Or are we talking about staying in Viet Nam in order to hold a bargaining position for negotiations which might be expected to permit some reasonable choice--self-determination--on the part of the South Vietnamese people as to their political future, some protection for Vietnamese who have been on our side and some prospect of a bona fide peace based on eventual withdrawal of all foreign forces. If that is what we are talking about, then it would appear to me that instead of committing United States combat forces to the difficult-to-defend Vietnamese outpost cities and towns scattered in the interior, we ought to be drawing the Vietnamese garrisons in those towns into the coastal bases and into Saigon where they would add to our strength, rather than the reverse. And at the same time, we should stop waiting for signals but rather launch a powerful diplomatic peace-offensive to try to get to a conference table. Unless the situation is already totally hopeless, this kind of holding of South Viet Nam may be feasible--at least for a year or so with something on the order of 100,000 or less United States combat forces on the ground backed by powerful naval and air units.

Moreover, if a sustained peace offensive, simultaneously, succeeds in bringing about a conference during the next six months, new elements will inevitably be introduced into the situation and it is conceivable that they could begin to point the way to a resolution of the problem.

The absence of a decision as to which of the above approaches really serves our national interests, seems to me to be the crux of the difficulty which has confronted us all along. I think you know my personal view as to which course is preferable in the national interest. But as things are now going, it is apparent that you are being advised to continue to take at least the second course. The rate of commitment is accelerating and it is quite likely that it will lead rapidly to pressure to follow the first course, if not to go beyond it to all-out war with China. That may not be the way it looks now but a course once set in motion, as you know, often develops its own momentum and rationale whatever the initial intentions.

As for the question of Taylor's replacement, as I told you, Lodge's name may set off an immediate and hostile debate of the whole situation in the Senate. You have got U. Alexis Johnson out there already. He has played a major role and has had a major responsibility in this situation for years. It would seem to me that if we are going to continue on the course of getting in deeper he is the logical man to continue with it.

With respect to another Congressional resolution on the situation, I cannot see the value of it at this point whether it originates here or with you. The Senate cannot direct you in the conduct of foreign relations even if it wanted to and I think you know that there is no substantial group in the Senate which is going to take the initiative in urging you to put more American ground forces into South Viet Nam. I think you know too, that what has been done to date in the way of resolutions, however one-sided the votes, has been done with grave doubts and much trepidation on the part of many Senators. It has been done largely on faith, out of loyalty to you and on the basis of the general view that when the President has the responsibility and when he requests legislative support in a crisis, he should have it.

But if you make another request, at this time, in connection specifically with the use of ground forces, I am concerned at the possible reaction. It is not nearly as predictable as in the past when the requests have been for support of policy in general terms or for funds. A request at this time could set off a wave of criticism and of demands for inquiries which, in the end, even though a resolution were overwhelmingly approved, would not in any way strengthen your hand, render your task easier or make your burden of responsibility lighter./3/

/3/McGeorge Bundy responded on June 27 to this and two other Mansfield memoranda concerning Vietnam. See footnote 3, Document 334.

 

342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, June 9, 1965, 7:29 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy. Bundy initialed the source text to indicate that he had cleared the message in the Department of State with Rusk and in the Department of Defense with McNamara.

2847. Eyes only Ambassador Johnson from Secretary. We are considering here proposal to knock out IL-28's and SAM sites nearest completion through major single air strike including use of SAC B-52's. We would like your personal reaction, in consultation with Westmoreland only, if he is available, concerning such a course of action.

Intelligence community estimates that such attack would cause DRV to believe future attacks on urban centers much more likely and that general US actions might be stepped up. However, conclusion is that Hanoi would accept punishment as long as it believes it is winning in SVN and would not be led to make conciliatory gestures. Retaliatory VC raids and even possibly air strikes would be considered by Hanoi, but intelligence community does not believe DRV would react by overt invasion of SVN although it might step up VC support and increase DRV line units in SVN.

Estimate is that ChiComs would furnish additional support, which DRV would probably request, including additional fighter aircraft. Majority believe ChiComs would not engage in air combat over DRV from ChiCom bases but minority thinks this probable. Sovs would be put on major spot but would probably react initially by replacing most of destroyed equipment, though perhaps not IL-28's themselves at once. Sovs would probably reach general conclusion they had little choice but to increase aid to DRV.

On other hand, intelligence community estimates that not attacking these targets might lead to Communist conclusion US, at least for time being, has accepted certain limitations and ground rules in bombing of DRV. Sovs might take somewhat more rigid position though still hoping for negotiated settlement and Hanoi might conclude it could press war in South at no greater risk to key DRV areas. Intelligence community does not believe Sovs would necessarily increase build-up of offensive weapons, although they might do so. Also conclude that it is unlikely DRV now intends to use IL-28's in offensive operations with or without attack, although special circumstances might arise or Hanoi might conceivably try an individual raid with them.

Your comments should cover your general reaction and any comment you may have on above intelligence community estimates. I personally am not of course necessarily in agreement with the estimates but they are part of the material I must use in reaching my personal judgment. Request reply to reach here morning June 10 if possible./2/

/2/Ambassador Johnson responded with telegram 4134 from Saigon, June 10, sent as a personal message to the Secretary. Johnson noted that he considered the IL-28s and SAMs to be differing problems, in that the bomber was an offensive weapon and the missiles had a strictly defensive capability. On balance, taking into account the danger of involving Chinese forces in the conflict, Johnson concluded that the purpose of demonstrating U.S. resolve without broadening the war could be achieved by limited, selective attacks on SAM missile sites. He noted that Westmoreland concurred in this recommendation. Johnson added: "This is going to be a long war and there are no shortcuts yet in sight. We should not let our natural frustrations and impatience mislead us into ill considered efforts to find shortcuts." (Ibid.)

Rusk

 

343. Personal Notes of a Meeting With President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 10, 1965, 10:35 a.m.-1:05 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. The notes were handwritten by McGeorge Bundy for his personal use and were not an official record of the meeting. Bundy's attendance list includes the President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Vance, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Raborn, Taylor, Reedy, Moyers, and Russell. The President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library also lists Wheeler as attending. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary.

William Bundy also took notes at the meeting and used them several years later to prepare a 5-page summary of the discussion, which is cited in several footnotes below. (Johnson Library, Papers of William Bundy, chap. 26, pp. 10-15)

Problem of Public Information--People feel we are withholding information. President to tell 1) numbers 2) Mission--We ought to draft a speech. What are we trying to accomplish--how do we go about it. Russell joins us at 10:40 a.m. McN reviews Westmoreland recommendation--Points out the area of disagreement with--instead of 32 B[attalio]ns, 18. Would have cut out 14 Bns. to avoid too large an escalation &/2/

/2/According to William Bundy, "McNamara led off with his own view--the 95,000 level, or half Westmoreland's first add-on, and nothing at all on his second. Rusk concurred, and Taylor made the case that this appeared to be about right to prevent serious losses of territory and lead in the direction of a stalemate in the South."

Max [Taylor]: We should get in rapidly the forces that can be effective in Monsoon season.

RSM[cNamara]: A plan to cover us to end of year.

Johnson/3/ favors Westy-Sharp questions division.

/3/Presumably a reference to Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff.

MDT[aylor]: distinguishes between territorial clear-and-hold as against strategic strike.

LBJ: Why must we do it.

MDT: If we don't, we may lose some territory. Don't you think it will be read as "land war in Asia." We have to explain this is not that--not a Korean War.

LBJ: reviews needs & what we have.

RSM: not so much territory as military losses.

LBJ: How many are fighting people & how many supporting people.

DR: 35,000 fighters--55,000 non-fighters

President wants to know what GVN is doing.

LBJ: Is there any question about our authority.

DR[usk]: None: powers of C-in-C., SEATO, SEA Res./4/--the

/4/Southeast Asia Resolution; see footnote 2, Document 347.

LBJ: Have we kept 'em informed?

DR: Yes we have--i.e. Congress/5/

/5/According to William Bundy, Rusk stated that the administration had made it clear to Congress that "forces were being committed in situations where combat was likely if not inevitable" but that "combat divisions with territorial responsibility would be different."

LBJ: Has Quat been informed? What does he think?

MDT: He has up to 80,000--but not, on the

LBJ: Anti-Americanism--a slackening off--

MDT: We watch for "take over" charge.

MDT: strike reserve role helping--gives Westy a lever.

LBJ: DR: get Meeker. Justice/6/

/6/Presumably a reference to securing legal opinions on the war. See Document 345 and Meeker's Memorandum of Law, June 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam)

Raborn on CIA troop deployment. VC estimates./7/

/7/According to William Bundy, Raborn provided the following CIA estimate of Viet Cong strength: 64,500 hardcore professional soldiers, of which 47,000 were in combat units; another 80,000 to 100,000 guerrillas, militia, and part-time forces; and 30,000 administrative personnel.

[International impact?]/8/

/8/It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to himself. Brackets in the source text.

LBJ: What if we don't do this? Would we get losses of what we've got.

MDT: We could lose a province--lose territory--lose towns.

LBJ: will this lead to more? How do we extricate ourselves?

MDT: If we can stalemate monsoon & go back in strong?

LBJ: What kind of losses? 400-4000?

RSM: another 400 between now & 1 October.

LBJ: More help from others? Australians no--ROKs only. UK: their govt could not survive--

DR: The Thais are helping.

(But this is a U.S.-GVN commitment.)/9/

/9/It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to himself.

LBJ: Paks?

DR: No.

LBJ: Have we had any DRV responses.

DR: No--& we don't expect 'em.

LBJ: What is the answer to the argument that the bombing has had no results?

DR: We never thought it would bring them running--it has had good military effect--the effect on mil. & civ. effort.

MDT: Effect on civilians in North.

Raborn: Reinforces it: fully agrees.

LBJ: The Pause?

MDT: Tho[ught ?] it was a neutral effect there.

LBJ: What do they want now?

RSM: Where are you taking us, is the question.

LBJ: Therefore?

Bob [McNamara]: I'd recommend more explanation./10/

/10/According to William Bundy, McNamara recommended a major Presidential speech.

LBJ: His reason for going North was to save morale in South.

LBJ: Sums up the critics--no policy--negotiate--economic--McGovern wants to talk to the Viet Cong.

LBJ: Reads a Mansfield memo./11/ And gets it answered line by line.

/11/Apparently a reference to Document 341.

DR: Spells out ABC of--efforts in last 20 years--& of "Kindergarten" of our present position

LBJ: They think they're winning--we think they're winning.

(President can keep the pressure on and ought to prove that he is steering carefully)

George Ball: We need to be careful not to regard this decision as defining or pre-deciding what we do after we see what happens in monsoon.

LBJ: McGB[undy]: What relation to bombing.

MDT: Two complementary programs.

LBJ: The Phuc Yen complex?

RSM argues against need for crash attack on it.

LBJ reviews parts of Saigon 4134./12/

/12/Telegram 3134, June 10, from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk discussed the pros and cons of air strikes against SAM sites and IL-28 bombers in North Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

LBJ: What are we doing this summer then with 95,000!

RSM: Not too much--general need--

LBJ: How fast?

RSM: Aim at 1 August--no commitment.

Raborn: We believe in build-up--faster the better.

Senator Russell: How to get us out and save face? Little knowledge I have, I'd send division in &/13/

/13/According to William Bundy, Russell "spoke only briefly and drily. Driblets were not the answer; if a division in the highlands would help, or bombing the SAM sites, these things should be done. He would like a way out, but did not see one that would keep our word."

Jack McCloy for India?/14/

/14/This and the following line are apparently notes Bundy made to himself.

Quat content

How effective our people are in combat--this is a really serious matter./15/

/15/It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to himself.

DR on danger of full-fledged debate--the Commies would use their whole apparatus to stir up trouble which might have serious international results.

LBJ: Fulbright & Stennis say we [illegible]./16/

/16/According to William Bundy, the meeting concluded with a "discussion of how the situation and new programs should be put to Congress," with the President debating "out loud the pros and cons of a new Congressional Resolution."

We owe P[resident] a draft of argument./17/

/17/Apparently a note Bundy made to himself.

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 344 through 347