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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

344. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, June 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text does not indicate the originating office.

SUBJECT
US Options and Objectives in Vietnam

1. We take US objectives in Vietnam to be the reduction of Viet Cong insurgency to manageable levels and, as part of this, forcing the DRV to cease promoting that insurgency. More specific and limited objectives are dealt with in the following discussion of the particular options which appear to be open to the US under present circumstances./2/

/2/We do not include the extreme courses of withdrawal on the one hand or invasion of the DRV on the other. [Footnote in the source text.]

Option A

2. Course of Action: To continue with essentially our present course and objectives: that is, to bomb selected targets in the DRV (but not population centers, economic targets, SAM sites, and jet-capable airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area), and to build up US combat strength considerably in the South.

3. Objectives: To give the GVN/ARVN sufficient stiffening support to permit the reduction of the VC insurrection to manageable proportions; to lessen the DRV supporting increment to VC strength; and to cause DRV/VC leadership to cease or to tamp down the war, at least for some time.

4. Consequences: In our view, this will probably not permit us to impose our will on the enemy. The DRV would continue to reinforce the VC, and we doubt that US/ARVN forces could soon produce any decisive improvement in the military situation. The most likely results would be heavy US casualties, an over-emphasis on the military aspects of the conflict to the detriment of the political, and bogging-down of the war at higher levels of commitment and intensity, and, perhaps ultimately, a petering out of GVN/ARVN determination and intensity.

Option B

5. Course of Action: To continue to increase US forces to the extent necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, to increase sharply our weight of attack on the DRV, bombing virtually all targets; to impose a naval quarantine; to accept further difficulties with the USSR and the possibility of major hostilities with Communist China.

6. Objectives: Raised from those of a/3/ above, to compel the DRV to cease and desist in the South; to coerce Communist China into acquiescing in such a DRV decision lest it incur attacks on its own territory, perhaps including destruction of its nascent advanced weapons capability.

/3/Reference in the source text is unclear.

7. Consequences: This would risk convincing the Communists that the US intended to destroy the DRV regime and thus bring us close to the "flash-point" of Chinese Communist intervention. If they judged that the Hanoi regime was losing control of the country, they would probably enter the DRV unilaterally and might engage US air forces with their own.

Option C

8. Course of Action: To cease bombing in the North, to hold on in the South, and to seek to negotiate as good a Vietnam settlement as we can get.

9. Objectives: To settle for a Laos-type "neutralist" solution--guaranteed by other powers and by a continuing, but markedly lessened, US presence in South Vietnam--on the grounds that we cannot, at an acceptable cost, "win" militarily or impose our will on Hanoi.

10. Consequences: US overtures for negotiation would probably be rejected and, the enemy, scenting a weakening in US determination, would probably fight on, while raising his terms. Also, a sudden US turning in this direction, without punishing the DRV above present levels, would have a seriously dispiriting effect upon non-Communists in Southeast Asia.

Option D

11. Course of Action: To increase our weight of attack on the DRV; to increase US forces up to the 70,000 man strength already authorized; and, most importantly, to place major stress on a program of political, social, and economic action in South Vietnam.

12. Objectives: To prevent a collapse in South Vietnamese morale and military capabilities during the next few months; to accomplish certain improvements basic to the creation of a viable non-Communist state in the South, and, meanwhile, to keep open the preceding options.

13. Consequences: Though Option D also has its drawbacks, it has the following relative merits:

a. Heightened US pressure on North Vietnam would increase the difficulty of supporting the Viet Cong and make Hanoi pay an ever heavier price for continuing that support. Furthermore, it would demonstrate our willingness to accept heightened political risks.

b. It would involve the deployment of substantial US ground forces in the South--a prime requirement for the immediate future. Further, it would not convey to the GVN/ARVN the notion that the US was taking over the war.

c. It would give the US time and opportunity to increase the civic action, political, paramilitary, local defense, and administrative improvements which are needed to create a viable non-Communist state in the South.

d. The net effect of the foregoing would have some chance of persuading the DRV that time was no longer running their way and that they should move to negotiate.

e. The US would avoid the negative reactions abroad and at home which would be produced by all-out bombings of the DRV and ever-increasing US troop commitments.

 

345. Memorandum From Attorney General Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 7B Legality Considerations. No classification marking. The date is handwritten on the source text.

RE
Whether further Congressional approval is necessary or desirable in connection with proposed deployment and use of troops in South Vietnam

You have asked for my views as to whether further Congressional approval should be sought in connection with the proposed deployment and use of troops in South Vietnam. What is contemplated, as I understand it, is (1) an increase of 30 to 40,000 in the number of troops stationed in South Vietnam, now approximately 50,000 and (2) the use of such troops, in one to two-battalion strength, for attacks on concentrations of Viet Cong forces.

The use of troops being contemplated would involve some departure from the functions generally served by U.S. ground forces previously, i.e., as "advisers" accompanying South Vietnamese forces, or as guards engaged in protecting U.S. installations and forces against attack. The operations being contemplated would involve attacks on "targets of opportunity" located as much as 150 miles distant from U.S. installations. The objective would be to have the U.S. forces act as a light, mobile reserve to South Vietnamese ground forces, able to strike quickly at the request of such forces when heavy concentrations of Viet Cong forces are detected. All of the activities being contemplated would be undertaken with the consent of the government of South Vietnam and would be limited to the territory of that country.

It is my view that, as a matter of law, further Congressional approval at this time is not necessary.

I

Under the Constitution the President has authority, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (Article II, section 2), and as the sole organ of the United States in the field of foreign relations (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)), to deploy and use the armed forces abroad. This authority has generally been broadly interpreted, and the armed forces have been used without legislative authority on scores of occasions including those involving "acts of war."

In the absence of some action by Congress, the only legal limitation on the power of the President to commit the armed forces arises by implication from Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, under which only Congress is authorized to "declare war." I believe it is a fair, although not uncontroversial, summary of nearly two centuries of history to say that the power to "declare war" is the power to confer substantially unlimited authority to use the armed forces to conquer and, if necessary, subdue a foreign nation. Unless such unlimited authority is exercised by the President, his legal position in using the armed forces is sustainable. It has been argued that the President may, without Congressional approval, take only urgent defensive measures, or that he may take only minor police measures that are not likely to commit the United States to full scale war. However, the action taken by President Truman in Korea, which is not widely regarded as having been illegal, shows how extensive the powers of the President may be. The same illustration also shows how inextricably tied together the legal and policy issues involved in such a situation necessarily are.

On many occasions the President has asked for Congressional approval of his action. When Congress responds to such a request the strictly legal effects of its action, if short of a declaration of war, are likely to be to limit rather than extend his authority. In the absence of Congressional action, the President's legal position is sustainable so long as it is consistent with the Constitution, i.e., so long as his action does not amount to an infringement of the power of Congress to declare all-out war. There is authority, however, indicating that in areas where both Executive and Congressional powers are operative, the Executive must observe the limits of any Congressional authorization that may be enacted even though, in the absence of any authorization, his Executive powers under the Constitution would clearly go beyond the Congressional grant. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637, 661-662 (Justices Jackson and Clark); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178 (Chief Justice Marshall). The Congressional authorization obviously can serve indispensable political purposes and it may serve to allay the legal doubts of narrow constructionists. These advantages must be weighed, however, against the legal limitations that may be effectively imposed by a Congressional authorization and its legislative history.

It is my view that as President you would have the authority, in the absence of any action by Congress, to use the armed forces in the manner now proposed. The commitment involved is certainly far less than all-out war, and the likelihood of involving the United States in all-out war as a result of the proposed moves, assuming that to be a relevant consideration, is relatively slight in view of the limitations on both the size of the force committed and the nature of the mission. It should be noted also that none of the acts proposed is an act of war against a foreign nation; that is to say, the activity involved would take place solely within the territory of South Vietnam and at the invitation of its government, and would be directed against forces claiming to be insurgents rather than the forces of a foreign nation.

I also believe it is clear that you have the legal authority to take the proposed measures under the terms and legislative history of the Vietnam Resolution of August 10, 1964 (P.L. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384),/2/ and the appropriation of May 7, 1965 (P.L. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109). It was repeatedly stated in connection with those enactments that the military measures previously taken, including the bombing of targets in North Vietnam, were being approved by Congress. In my judgment the steps now proposed, being confined to South Vietnamese territory, are of a kind with the steps already approved. There is some legislative history to the effect that the Congressional approval did not extend to involvement in large-scale land war in Asia. In this regard, however, there were repeated references to war in "division strength." These limitations--if they exist--are not infringed by the limited measures now contemplated.

/2/This Resolution provides:

"The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

"Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

"Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress." [Footnote in the source text.]

I therefore conclude that, from a legal standpoint, there is no need to seek further Congressional approval at this time.

Nicholas deB Katzenbach

 

346. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-457-65

Washington, June 11, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, Vol. I. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
US/Allied Troop Deployments to South Vietnam (SVN)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed US/Allied force requirements in SVN in the light of recent developments in Southeast Asia and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Findings and recommendations resulting from this review are set forth in the following paragraphs.

2. There are significant indications that the communists may be on the threshold of moving the conflict in Southeast Asia to a new and higher level of intensity. By JCSM-415-65, dated 27 May 1965,/2/ as supplemented by JCSM 442-65, dated 7 June 1965,/3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised you of their views that the deployment of increased numbers of jet fighters, some jet light bombers, and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to North Vietnam shows a communist decision to add a new dimension to the situation in Southeast Asia. Further, with respect to land combat, the Viet Cong (VC) have been engaged in a build-up of their forces and are capable of mounting regimental-size operations in all four corps areas and at least battalion-size operations in virtually all provinces. Many VC units are well trained and equipped and some are equipped with a new family of weapons. Elements of the 101st Regiment of the 325th North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) Division are in the northern zone of II Corps area, and it is possible that elements of two other regiments of the division are now deployed within the provinces of Kontum-Pleiku and Phu Bon or in nearby Laos. Elements of the 304th PAVN Division are suspected to be in Southern Laos, capable of early movement into the RVN. The communists recently have shown a willingness to take heavy losses to achieve their objectives. So far, the VC have not employed their full capabilities. Only two of the nine VC regiments have been heavily engaged and probably only a similar proportion of their separate battalions have been committed. Recent events as well as captured VC prisoners and documents suggest that a summer campaign is now underway to destroy government forces and, concurrently, first to isolate and then attack district and province towns.

/2/See Document 318.

/3/In this memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that they had reviewed Special National Intelligence Estimates 10-6-65, 10-6/1-65, and 10-7-65, and concluded that "these intelligence estimates sustain the judgments advanced to you in JCSM-415-65." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381)

3. RVN ground forces are in a precarious position as to their capability to withstand such an offensive. As a result of recent heavy engagements with the VC, COMUSMACV reports that some ARVN units are beginning to show signs of reluctance to take necessary offensive actions and, in some areas, their steadfastness under fire is coming into doubt. Planned RVN force build-ups have been suspended until November, because of the requirement to allocate available resources toward reconstituting units recently combat-attired. Thus, it is estimated that a further deterioration in the near term will occur through change of force ratios in favor of the communist units in South Vietnam.

4. While a formal appraisal in the form of a SNIE by the USIB has not been conducted, informal polling of the intelligence community indicates general agreement with the COMUSMACV views regarding the enemy and friendly situation in Southeast Asia.

5. In this unstable military situation, appropriate countermeasures are required. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the ground forces situation requires a substantial further build-up of US and Allied forces in the RVN, at the most rapid rate feasible on an orderly basis. The Appendix hereto/4/ summarizes US and Allied forces required now for this build-up, designed to provide a substantial and necessary increase in offensive capability. The recommended deployments were discussed with Ambassador Taylor on 9 June 1965/5/ and he foresees no political problems with the Government of Vietnam in the introduction of these forces. Lists in the appendix may be further refined by recommendations from CINCPAC and the Services.

/4/Not printed.

/5/No record of the discussion cited here has been found.

6. In addition to the above deployments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that air action against North Vietnam should be intensified to include increased armed reconnaissance of LOCs and strikes against militarily important targets. Such action is necessary to reduce DRV capabilities to support the VC and the PAVN, further punish the DRV, and further establish US intent to prevent a communist seizure of SVN.

7. In addition to the actions recommended in JCSM-415-65, JCSM-442-65, and paragraph 6, above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the deployments shown in the Appendix be approved now for implementation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

347. Summary Notes of the 552d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, June 11, 1965, 12:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. A list of participants at the meeting is ibid.

Vietnam--Taylor Report

The President opened the meeting by discussing the Administration's authority to act in Vietnam which is now based on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution./2/ The debate now going on in the Senate was referred to.

/2/Reference is to the Joint Resolution To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia, August 10, 1964, P.L. 88-408. See footnote 2, Document 345.

The President: We have a treaty obligation and we intend to keep our commitment. Some say we should get out of Vietnam while others say we should do more. We should seek ways of holding the situation so that we can carry out what we are committed to do.

General Taylor: It has been two months since my last personal report to you. General Quat is still in power. He managed to handle the South Vietnamese generals in such a way as to get General Khanh ousted and to end the Military Council. Political life is still determined by three groups--the generals, the southerners, and the Catholics. Minor or even major changes are possible because the political impasse still continues. Elections last Sunday/3/ turned out well, with a large number of voters registering. There was no effective VC opposition.

/3/June 6.

As to the military situation, the recent tranquility was due to retraining and re-equipping. Ten days ago, the monsoon campaign began. Its intensity will be greater than in years past. The South Vietnamese manpower shortage in their military forces is serious. Their problem is to raise the total military force and substantially decrease desertions. The superiority of South Vietnamese military forces over the Viet Cong has dropped from 5.4 : 1 to 3.9 : 1. This lower ratio is the justification for the introduction of additional U.S. forces. There are about 50,000 U.S. forces which will soon go to 70,000.

The present VC campaign will be terminated without serious losses. With more U.S. combat troops and more U.S. air power, the hope is that we will be able to push Hanoi into negotiations.

General Wheeler: U.S. force levels are now: 12,000 ground combat men; 7,000 attached to air combat; and 30,000 supporting including advisers, communication forces and logistic support for the GVN.

General Taylor: We estimate the Viet Cong forces at 42-50,000.

Secretary McNamara: Our estimate of the future Viet Cong strength is 64,000--a huge increase over last year.

General Taylor: The increase in the Viet Cong forces came before our bombing. North Vietnam infiltration has been slowed down by our bombing.

General Wheeler: Our bombing has slowed down the entire North Vietnamese transportation system.

Secretary Rusk: We have listed 13 channels which have been used to probe enemy intentions. There are now few tracks open or operating. A Geneva type conference proposal is still alive. One thought would be to have the seventeen-nations/4/ issue invitations to a conference of governments for talks without preconditions. The other side will turn down such a proposal, awaiting the outcome of the monsoon campaign.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 228.

Today we see no possibility of talks. Although we are alert to all tracks, none appear promising. We should not be too timid about the present U.S. position on North Vietnam. We have more support than the Communists say we have. (Summary of the peace probes/5/ was handed by Secretary Rusk to several Council members, including the President.)

/5/A copy of this summary was sent to Bromley Smith at the White House on June 11 by John P. Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV)

The President: We should get out the contents of this summary to the public by means of speeches and TV appearances. We should show what we have tried to do.

Ambassador Stevenson: The UN Secretary General should be asked to call for a cease-fire during negotiations. The Secretary General's proposal would probably be turned down by Hanoi. Even so, taking this initiative would prove that we have tried everything.

The President: This proposal should be explored with Secretary Rusk. When we tried a bombing pause, I didn't believe it would work, and it didn't. It did relieve the pressure of public opinion.

Secretary McNamara: General Westmoreland has sent up a proposal for the deployment of additional U.S. forces in Vietnam./6/ He recommends that the 13 battalions--70,000 man level now authorized be increased to 23 battalions--123,000 men. The Chiefs are opposed to the deployment of U.S. forces in the highlands of South Vietnam and want the new forces to be used as a mobile reserve near the coast./7/

/6/Document 337.

/7/Document 346.

General Wheeler: The ARVN forces did not do as well as we expected. The Chiefs are impressed by General Westmoreland's presentation of the need for more U.S. forces. The ratio between friendly plus U.S. forces as opposed to Viet Cong forces is now unfavorable. The Defense Department's proposal calls for deploying fewer troops now than either General Westmoreland or the Joint Chiefs recommend. The Chiefs favor taking a decision now on sending the number of troops recommended by General Westmoreland. The McNamara plan/8/ would send fewer forces now and keep our option open to send additional forces later.

/8/See Document 343 and footnote 2 thereto.

Under Secretary [Attorney General] Katzenbach: There is no doubt of our legal position to increase force deployments in Vietnam. It is doubtful that we should go back to Congress to get additional authority every time we take a new action. The President already has, under the Constitution, all the power he needs to deploy additional forces abroad./9/

/9/Legal opinions supporting this conclusion were submitted to the President by the Attorney General (Document 345) and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense on June 10, and by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State on June 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 7 B, Legality Considerations) A June 14 memorandum to the President from James Thomson of the National Security Council Staff on the question of the need for further consultation with Congress concerning an increased military commitment in Vietnam is ibid.

The President: We must delay and deter the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong as much as we can, and as simply as we can, without going all out. When we grant General Westmoreland's request, it means that we get in deeper and it is harder to get out. They think they are winning and we think they are. We must determine which course gives us the maximum protection at the least cost.

Bromley Smith

[end document]

Continue:
The bombing pause;
Assessment of the bombing program and U.S. troop requirements;
Change of government in South Vietnam,
May 10-June 12
Documents 348 through 350