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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

46. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Saigon, January 28, 1965.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, History Backup, #13. Secret. Prepared by Westmoreland. Copies were sent to Taylor, U. Alexis Johnson, and Manfull.

SUBJECT
Discussion With General Khanh

1. General Khanh accompanied me to Da Nang in the T-39 today. This trip stemmed from a request made to General Moore through General Ky. During the flight up we had a lengthy discussion summarized in the following paragraphs.

2. I told General Khanh that I was going to Da Nang primarily to look into the alleged report that ARVN soldiers had participated in the demonstration in Hue on Wednesday, which demonstration reportedly had an anti-government and anti-U.S. objective. This situation I viewed with grave alarm and concern and suspected that he was conducting an investigation to determine why such extreme breach of discipline and unacceptable conduct for an ARVN soldier would be tolerated. Khanh said he shared my concern and was having the matter investigated in detail. He agreed to give me a copy of the report of investigation.

3. Khanh explained that he was going to Da Nang on political business--distasteful to him but necessary under the circumstances. He expected to return to his military duty in ten days when new government would be formed. His commanders shared his distaste for politics but as a group they felt there was no one else capable of stemming the tide of deterioration in RVN. He had met for four days and nights with the Armed Forces Council and they had agreed that there were two essentials of success in this country:

a. A government supported by the people.
b. The support of the United States.

4. Upon questioning the motives of the Buddhists, Khanh said he had made a secret agreement with the Bonzes which he expected them to fulfill. This involved removing the Buddhist chaplains from the Armed Forces (this is part of a general policy to remove all chaplains which he stated was also acceptable to the Catholics); the Buddhist Institute would get out of politics; Tri Quang and Ho Giac would leave the country; and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would exile himself in a pagoda to pursue his religious studies. If the Bonzes continued to create trouble, he would be forced to take strong measures against them, if necessary "kill" them.

5. Khanh personally plans to appoint the members of the Armed Forces and People's Council (some may be "good" members of the former High National Council) which organization will select the Chief of State who will in turn appoint a Prime Minister and subsequently form a Cabinet acceptable to the Armed Forces Council. He expects both the Chief of State and the Prime Minister to be civilians and would prefer such an arrangement, although I received the impression that Khanh could easily change his views in this regard. The new government would be staunchly backed by the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces would retain the ministerial posts recently acquired plus that of the Minister of Interior.

6. Khanh does not expect any particular trouble from the Catholics since he had talked to Catholic leader, Bishop Binh, who had agreed to lend his support to his efforts to stabilize the situation. He was prepared to deal forcibly with the students if they create trouble.

7. Khanh has not made his plans public but intends to do so. His first step in this regard was at his press conference yesterday where he attempted to pave the way for further public explanation of his approach at later conferences.

8. If his efforts to form a new government are unsuccessful and destructive elements attempt to destroy his country, Khanh says he will have no choice but to take over as a military dictator.

9. I expressed my concern about the anti-Ambassador Taylor theme in recent demonstrations in Hue/2/ and Da Nang, pointed out that Ambassador Taylor was perhaps the best friend Vietnam ever had but more fundamentally an attack on the Ambassador was an attack on the United States Government since he was the official representative of the United States. Khanh said he well understood and stated that one reason that he was going to Da Nang was to explain this matter plus the fact that Ambassador Taylor supported the government of Vietnam and therefore its head. In the past, the U.S. Ambassador had supported Mr. Diem, General Minh, himself, and now Mr. Huong. The fact that the people in Hue and Da Nang did not like Mr. Huong was no basis for disliking Ambassador Taylor. "The people are simple minded and follow the old adage, 'The friend of my enemy is also my enemy'."

/2/Signs denouncing Taylor as a lackey of Prime Minister Huong appeared throughout Hue on January 23, the same day that a mob attacked the USIS Library in Hue. (Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 95)

10. As we returned to Saigon, General Khanh stated that he had spoken with approximately forty leaders from the northern provinces representing all political and religious factions and students. He had spoken for over an hour and then answered questions for another hour. He had urged them not to show animosity against Ambassador Taylor because of his support of Mr. Huong in his capacity as the head of government. He emphasized that the United States supports the government of Vietnam and not individuals. He thought his remarks were understood, well received, and accepted. He assured me that all "anti-Taylor signs" would be down or painted over in both Hue and Da Nang by morning.

W.C. Westmoreland/3/
General, United States Army
Commanding

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, January 28, 1965, 8:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy; cleared in substance by Ball, McNamara, and Unger; and approved by the President.

1559. For General Taylor from McGeorge Bundy.

1. The President sends thanks for your 2334/2/ and so do I. I look forward very much to visiting you. President sees force of your argument that my visit should not come when there is no government to talk with. On the other hand, it looks to us as if General Khanh for better or for worse is the principal present power. We see no early prospect of solid and stable administration, no matter what happens in the next few days. In order to get on with our own thinking about next steps, it does seem important for me to come quickly, although delay of a day or two beyond proposed arrival February 2 is manageable if you think it wise. As for Cabot Lodge, we are inclined to accept your judgment.

/2/Document 45.

2. It remains clear to us that however irresponsible they may be, Buddhist leaders as well as Khanh himself are essential elements in our problem, and we now wonder whether there are any Americans of lower visibility that might be worth bringing along or even sending ahead for the purpose of quiet and informal soundings with them or with generals. We may have further suggestions on this and would allow any you may have.

3. We do not have to decide departure time until 24 hours ahead, but would like your advice daily until decision made.

4. On the evacuation of dependents, the President's view is that it is not the timing of the decision but the decision itself that is important to him. He wants his people here and in Saigon to work out together the best way of clearing the decks, and is quite willing to have final decision on timing and method await my visit and talks with you.

5. A lot will turn on your first talk with Khanh. We think you should certainly seek from him a firm statement of determination to carry on with the war, and if, as we would expect, he takes this position, we think you should certainly respond that US is equally determined to go on supporting Vietnamese government and people. You could then make use of plan for DeSoto patrol next week as indication our position. Object of meeting should be to establish firmness of both sides and create atmosphere that would begin to bury past problems and get us into position to talk hard with him on all subjects including evacuation when I come or earlier if you think wise. So far we have been holding off on public statement our continued support, but we think we should make this just as soon as Khanh has made right noise to you. If trend of talk is in this direction, you are authorized join with Khanh in joint statement at time of call if you desire./3/

/3/In telegram 2347 from Saigon, January 29, Taylor reported on a meeting he had with Khanh that morning before receiving McGeorge Bundy's cable. Taylor stated: "I would not favor making any commitment now to this present interim government or to Khanh and would hold out any action such as the DeSoto patrol for use in connection with our plan for dependent evacuation." Taylor also suggested that Bundy delay his arrival until February 4 and offered reasons for reducing the number of people in the mission. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

6. My own current thought is that my party would include men like McNaughton, Gaud, Cooper, Colby, and Unger or Corcoran from Department. Central purpose of meeting would still be for me to have a conference with you and others as you think wise, but unless you object we would like to use the trip also for exchanges with country team members too. Statement on purpose of trip would be framed as you suggest.

7. Bob McNamara is lending us a plane. Let us know what we can bring you./4/

/4/In telegram 1563 to Saigon, January 29, McGeorge Bundy told Taylor that his telegram 2347 "makes sense to us, but we do persist in view that next week is best time for these talks and suggest we agree definitely on arrival early February 4." Bundy also offered further comments on the details of the trip. (Ibid.)

Ball

 

48. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/

Paris, January 29, 1965, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis; Noforn.

4295. EmbOff has been shown in strictest secrecy large portions of record conversations on Viet Nam held here between ranking officials of Quai on one hand and separately with Chinese Charge Sung and North Vietnamese delegate Mai Van Bo on other. Conversation with Bo took place December 22 and was renewed again last week. Latest conversation with Sung took place also last week and all above talks antedate Bundy speech of Jan 23,/2/ which was received in Quai with great interest (especially two paragraphs on negotiation) for reasons which will be obvious from info below.

/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 8, 1965, pp. 168-175.

In addition to discussion of international conference along Geneva lines, conversation with North Vietnamese [garble], essentially to three questions put by French (1) Would Hanoi accept and join in guarantees for neutral and completely independent South Vietnam? (2) Would Hanoi agree to knock off political and military subversion in SVN? (3) Would Hanoi accept some control mechanism more serious and with wider powers than present ICC? Total ineffectiveness of latter and paralysis through veto demonstrated, especially in Laos.

Mai Van Bo showed considerable interest in (1) and (3) and spoke of settling on basis 1954 Geneva Accords but was obviously embarrassed and evasive on (2), since affirmative response would have constituted confession. French told Bo frankly they could not accept Vietnamese protestations that there was only American intervention and that French were convinced of Hanoi subversive role. If Hanoi did not wish to own up, would they at least undertake guarantee not to engage in such activities in future?

At second meeting in January above questions explored further and French said that in order to discuss meaningfully, Bo should obtain precise answers from Hanoi on above three points. No answer yet received.

Similar line taken with Chinese Charge but less precisely, since discussion did not get much below shallows of Chinese reiterations of principle and calls for unilateral withdrawal of US (which solely to blame) from SVN as only basis for settlement. Charge described ChiCom contacts with US in Warsaw in terms almost exactly converse of those in Deptel 3600,/3/ saying that US merely reiterated, sometimes with violence, its propaganda positions and talks continued only because US wanted them.

/3/Dated January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)

When asked about American viewpoint, French have taken line with Sung and Mai Van Bo that French in no way authorized to speak for US but have given their estimate our position somewhat along lines of Bundy speech, mentioning USG negative attitude toward Geneva-type conference. French also said it was clearly unrealistic to expect Americans to agree simply to withdraw from SVN and that if one might doubt that war could result in clear cut victory for Saigon and US, it was equally illusory to believe Americans would ever negotiate on basis of position tantamount to defeat.

Net impression of our source was that DRVN reps more flexible and interested than Chinese, although latter do appear anxious avoid escalation and confrontation with US. Source referred to conversation between Chou and Chen Yi and Cambodia reps in Peiping (Embtel 4021)/4/ which he interpreted as advice of caution to RKG.

/4/Dated January 14. (Ibid.)

Comment: Above conversations do not appear as yet to have passed beyond soundings. They no doubt help explain public and diplomatic passivity of French and watchful waiting on Southeast Asia which Embassy has already signaled to Dept. disclosure of record to EmbOff was unauthorized and it is imperative that all above be closely held and not discussed outside USG. No mention whatever of contacts would be made to French Embassy Washington which has not been informed by Quai.

Bohlen

 

49. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 29, 1965, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, the White House, CIA, Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received in the Department of State at 10:27 a.m.

2342. Ref: A. Embtel 2308./2/ B. Embtel 2326./3/ C. Embtel 2292./4/ Alex Johnson and I called on Gen Khanh this morning, January 29, at the General Staff building primarily to find out what his plans really are with respect to the government. He had with him Admiral Cang, the CNO, and General Cao, the Secretary General of the Armed Forces Council. He asked if these two officers could be present and we readily agreed. This is a new development and probably reflects the desire of the other generals to have a third party account of Khanh's interviews with the Americans.

/2/In telegram 2308, January 27, Taylor reported on a meeting with Khanh in which Khanh summarized the decisions of the Armed Forces Council, and Taylor made several follow-up comments. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI)

/3/In telegram 2326, January 28, Taylor reported on General Khanh's press conference at 9:30 a.m. that morning, in which Khanh talked about the previous day's coup and outlined the organization, goals, and personnel of the new government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

/4/In telegram 2292, January 26, U. Alexis Johnson reported on his 45-minute meeting with General Khanh earlier that day, during which Johnson expressed his opposition to a change in government, contending that the present government could deal with the current crisis if given loyal military support. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

We opened the discussion by asking Khanh how we were to understand his statements on governmental procedure contained in Ref A with those made at his press conference, Reference B. In the ensuing discussion, the following facts were established:

Khanh says that his statements at the press conference were deliberately made to veil his ultimate intention which is to carry out the procedures outlined in Reference A. However, to have announced this fact at yesterday's press conference would have had the effect of labeling the ensuing government as Khanh's project. Hence, he preferred to outline the governmental organization which actually exists today without referring to what he hopes it will become later.

He says that he is on the following schedule. By the end of this week, he will have chosen the members of the Civilian-Military Council. This is the 20-man body which will include representation from what he calls the five pressure groups--the armed forces, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. Additionally, there will be six "Notables", two chosen from the north, center and south of Viet-Nam. Once this body is formed as a consultative organ of the AFC, he expects the members to recommend to him the procedure contained in Ref A. Thus, the new government will come about at the recommendation of this body broadly representative of the principal national groupings.

Once this recommendation is made to the AFC, it will be quickly accepted and the procedure will be carried out whereby the Civilian-Military Council will pick a Chief of State who in turn will pick a Prime Minister who will then present a new government to the Civilian-Military Council for approval. In short, the Civilian-Military Council will act as a reconstituted High National Council.

Khanh believes that all this can be done by the end of next week even though the Tet holidays intervene.

Johnson alluded to the obvious difficulty of getting good men to come into a government which the public understands will last only until elections. Khanh thinks this difficulty can be overcome, pointing out that the Civilian-Military Council may recommend a postponement of elections. In this case, the new government might continue indefinitely, even if elections are held, since the provisions of the old charter still govern which require a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in order to remove the existing government.

I asked about the Buddhist attitude toward this program--were they satisfied? Khanh seems to be sure that they will be, although it is far from clear to us why the Institute would be satisfied with only two representatives in the total of 20 of the Civilian-Military Council. I asked further about the status of the "treaty" between the armed forces and the institute (Reference C). Khanh says that the treaty is still valid although certainly the government which it is discussing looks nothing like the all-military dictatorship referred to in the "treaty". Khanh says that this was the extreme case and since the Buddhists had indicated a willingness to support such a military dictatorship, they certainly would be satisfied with a government considerably less drastic in form. He repeated that he expects Tri Quang and Ho Giac to leave the country and Thich Tam Chau to go into a remote pagoda. Prior to these actions, the Institute would presumably choose new leadership.

Khanh talked at some length about the need to eliminate the Buddhist chaplains from the armed forces since they were a source of subversion. He has in mind removing all chaplains of all faiths, at least for a period of some months. He anticipates difficulties with the Catholics in getting agreement, but by appealing to their patriotism he is hopeful.

We then talked at some length about the problems in the Hue-Danang area. Khanh is clearly concerned about the situation there which results, he says, from the traditional spirit of regionalism which dominates the provinces around Hue. I told him that we had viewed very seriously the anti-American demonstrations in that area and that I felt I had probably made a mistake in not withdrawing all Americans during that period. Even now although tranquillity had been restored for the moment, the same disruptive factors are present in Hue. Hence, I felt obliged to give continued consideration to the need to evacuate at least U.S. dependents from that part of Viet-Nam.

Khanh tried to explain away the anti-U.S. demonstrations as of limited importance and reacted strongly to the suggestion of withdrawing dependents. He urged me not to be precipitate and at least to wait until after Tet, thus providing a pause for the calming of emotions. After Tet, he suggested that we consult together again on the matter.

I agreed that it was important to move slowly but undertook no commitment to act one way or another.

We then talked about the public attitude which the Embassy should take toward the government. I told him that it was impossible to be more explicit at this time than to say that we were continuing routine operations with the interim government. Meanwhile we were waiting to see what government would emerge in a more permanent form. He agreed that this attitude was reasonable but showed concern that the public understand that we were in contact with him again. I told him that it was routine for us to inform the press at the end of the day whom I had visited in the government and that such an announcement would be made today. We would not indicate, however, the discussion of any specific items. Khanh agreed to this proceeding.

Khanh then talked somewhat about the future form which he had in mind for the government. He is thinking of forming the ministries into three groups, one including Defense, Information and Interior to constitute the war-making bloc; a second, a Finance and Economics bloc; and the remaining ministries (less Foreign Affairs and Justice) categorized as the development bloc. Foreign Affairs and Justice would report directly to the Prime Minister. We made no particular comment upon this proposed organization other than to mention the desirability of keeping the Bureau of the Budget directly under the Prime Minister.

In general, Khanh tried to paint to us a picture of the armed forces thoroughly in control of the situation and ready to deal with the Buddhist Institute as one of several power groups which must be taken into account in the formation of a government. I told him that the situation was being viewed quite differently abroad where the overthrow of the Huong government is being interpreted as a Buddhist Institute victory over a government supported by the United States. Since no one believes that the Buddhist Institute could have done this alone, it is a natural inference that the armed forces were allied with the Buddhist Institute in sabotaging Huong. Khanh insists that coming events will soon disprove this theory and that the Buddhist leaders will be shelved, as was Huong. I told him that this would be all to the good when it occurred but meanwhile we should all be thinking about ways and means of dispelling the impression of a Buddhist Institute victory which may be the first step toward a neutralist government.

We are not at all sure whether Khanh really believes that he can carry out the program which he has outlined to us. Even if sincerely committed to it, he is going to encounter difficulties in setting up the Civilian-Military Council, in getting it to act in accordance with his behest, and finally in obtaining suitable ministers for the new government.

It may be that he recognizes these facts but wants to make the visible effort. If he fails he can always say that he tried and continue to live with present interim government. The composition of the latter must be particularly appealing to him, with vague old man Suu and Chief of State and pliable "Jack" Oanh as acting Prime Minister. We can think of no better lineup from his point of view to allow indirect control of the government by Khanh and his generals.

Taylor

 

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, January 29, 1965, 7:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

1565. Embtel 2345./2/

/2/In telegram 2345, January 29, Taylor analyzed the political prospects of the new government following the coup, emphasizing the likelihood of continuing political instability given Khanh's precarious alliance with the Buddhists, potential opposition within the military, and Khanh's concern with personal power rather than national interests. (Ibid.)

1. From here analysis reftel indicates our problem is to deal with Khanh in manner which neither increases his prestige nor consolidates his power but leaves us in position to continue effective relationships with him should he make his coup stick. At same time it appears we must maintain flexible position in regard to potential opposition among other military leaders and useful contacts with Buddhists pending clarification Khanh's intentions and prospects.

2. To this end we propose take line in response press questions January 30 which corresponds to public attitude you discussed with Khanh in reftel i.e.:

a. We continuing routine operations with interim government.

b. Meanwhile we are waiting to see what government will emerge in more permanent form.

c. Question of recognition will not arise, if it does arise, until government structure further clarified.

d. We continuing to deal with Vietnamese Government at appropriate levels on subject of aid.

e. U.S. not taking positions on basis of individuals or on details internal Vietnamese affairs but hoping only for effective government exercising full sovereignty and based on support all significant elements of country.

f. If queried on Thich Tri Quang January 29 interview with Saigon Daily News and Saigon Post we should reply we have read this expression of views with interest.

g. If queried about your meeting with Khanh we would reply that you had a useful exchange on subject shape of future govt, but, as already noted, this remains unclear.

Ball

 

51. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-70-65

Washington, January 29, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet 381. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT
Reprisal to Significant Incidents in the RVS

1. US reprisals for Viet Cong (VC)/Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) significant incidents have been the subject of national policy deliberations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to review past actions on the subject and to provide their current views and recommendations. Initially, the concept of reprisal against the DRV appeared in NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964./2/ That NSAM recognized the DRV as the instigator, the motivating and sustaining force behind the VC and considered reprisals only by Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces against North Vietnam.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 87.

2. VC/DRV deliberate actions against US personnel and forces have increased. For a compilation of the 1964 incidents, see Appendix A./3/

/3/Attached but not printed.

3. Subsequent to attacks against US Navy destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, NSAM 314, dated 10 September 1964,/4/ ordered preparedness to respond against the DRV in the event of any attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against South Vietnam (SVN). On 1 November 1964, a mortar attack against the Bien Hoa Airfield resulted in the loss of a portion of a USAF B-57 squadron and the death of four US military personnel and the wounding of 72. A recent act--the bombing of the Brink BOQ in Saigon on 24 December--killed two US personnel and wounded 64 US and 43 Vietnamese.

/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 345.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff by JCSM-933-64, dated 4 November 1964,/5/ recommended strong reprisal actions be taken against the DRV for the attack on the Bien Hoa Airfield. In addition, by JCSM-955-64, dated 14 November 1964,/6/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that they considered the reprisals recommended for the Bien Hoa incident equally applicable for any subsequent provocation of a similar nature in Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1964, by JCSM-1076-64,/7/ again recommended an air attack be conducted against the DRV as a reprisal for the Brink BOQ bombing incident.

/5/Ibid., footnote 3, Document 395.

/6/Ibid., Document 411.

/7/Ibid., footnote 3, Document 472.

5. The lack of US response to major VC/DRV attacks against US personnel and forces in the RVN could be misconstrued, with the result that further anti-US incidents could take place, to include attacks against US dependents. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted Ambassador Taylor's views and agree with him that reprisal actions should be taken to dampen further terrorist acts.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the next such significant provocation should be met with a positive, timely, and appropriate response in order to demonstrate to the DRV that these provocations will bring prompt and destructive response from the United States. Reprisals should be undertaken, preferably within twenty-four hours, against selected targets in the DRV. GVN forces should be used to the extent feasible.

7. As you are aware, US military forces can respond to provocations on short notice. To apprise you of military planning actions, a resume of possible reprisal actions of varying intensities for which US plans are available for execution in a minimum of time is contained in Appendix B./8/ This resume sets forth strike forces available for reprisal actions in both Laos and North Vietnam, together with the target designations and sorties required for four preplanned actions.

/8/Attached but not printed.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. A US reprisal with VNAF participation as feasible be taken for the next significant provocative act.

b. This action be initiated promptly, preferably within twenty-four hours.

In order to reduce the time involved in the decision-making process, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, insofar as practicable, recommend reprisal actions based upon the actions contained in Appendix B./9/

/9/In a February 4 memorandum to Wheeler, Vance replied that he had noted the Joint Chiefs' comments and indicated that copies of this memorandum had been given to the Department of State and to McGeorge Bundy. Vance concluded by stating that the Joint Chiefs' views "will be given the fullest consideration in determining future courses of action." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Vietnam 381)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, January 30, 1965, 7:41 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted in the White House; cleared by William Bundy, McNaughton, and Unger; and approved by McGeorge Bundy.

1570. For Ambassador Taylor from McGeorge Bundy.

1. Thanks for your 2348/2/ confirming plans for visit. This message deals with preliminary thoughts for our talks.

/2/Dated January 29. (Ibid.)

2. I hope we can avoid extended organized briefings. I do not learn well that way, and in any case the point of this visit is to get a chance to exchange thoughts with you on hard fundamental future problems. The more time we can spend in very small groups on these central problems the better.

3. Nevertheless I think we need to compare our pictures of the existing situation and especially of two basic elements of it. First, how is the struggle against the Viet Cong going? In this we need to look (1) at Viet Cong capabilities now and in the future, (2) at present and future prospects for our pacification efforts, and (3) at state of Vietnamese morale, civil and military. Washington is assuming that the course of this contest has been generally unfavorable for more than a year and that in the absence of major changes it is likely to get worse. If in your view this assumption is wrong, we need to work hard on this specific question.

4. The other central aspect of current situation is the present and future prospect for "stable government." Present directives make such a government an essential prerequisite for important additional U.S. major action, but we now wonder whether this requirement is either realistic or necessary. If not, then we need to consider what actions are possible both within SVN and against the North while GVN lacks desired stability. We also need to consider what positive or negative effect additional U.S. action may have on this problem. Sample questions are, whether Phase II actions could be used to strengthen GVN and whether U.S. could organize its own efforts at all levels within SVN detached from political problems of central government.

5. These questions lead away from estimate of present situation to discussion of U.S. courses of action, and in this area we see particular importance in the following:

(1) Review of our existing efforts within SVN. One recurrent question here is that of size and shape of U.S. presence, both military and civilian. We sense possible differences of judgment on wisdom of more Americans in different fields.

(2) Review of planning for reprisals and discussion of relation of reprisal planning to Phase II.

(3) Possible value in SVN of stronger and clearer U.S policy statements.

(4) Shape of U.S. negotiating posture, going forward from analysis in your 2235./3/

/3/Document 32.

6. In addition to these broad aspects of present situation and U.S. policy, we see urgent need to discuss immediate problems, of which the most important are:

(1) The ways and means of evacuation of dependents, to include both timing and means of preventing misunderstanding.

(2) The third country programs.

(3) Contingency planning against unpleasant political or military developments in the near future.

Ball

 

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, January 31, 1965, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.

2359. Ref: JCS 004244 to CINCPAC, CINCPAC 301845Z./2/ From the point of view of the deteriorating situation in SVN, a DRV attack on a DeSoto patrol followed by immediate strong and effective U.S. retaliation would offer a priceless advantage to our cause here. I hope that in approving the February 3 mission that this thought is uppermost in our minds and that there is no doubt as to the decision which will follow a DRV act of provocation.

/2/Regarding JCS 004244 to CINCPAC, see footnote 3, Document 43. CINCPAC 301845Z provided operational details for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam (to be codenamed Flaming Dart) in the event the planned DeSoto patrol was attacked. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, DESOTO)

With regard to VNAF inclusion in retaliation plans, we have never discussed retaliation with GVN leaders except in context of reaction to VC actions in SVN. In view of the present turmoil in Saigon, I would recommend not considering inclusion of VNAF in possible retaliatory action arising from next DeSoto patrol. It may be desirable to take VNAF into our planning at a later date.

Taylor

 

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 1, 1965, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Received in the Department of State at 7:36 a.m.

2369. For McGeorge Bundy. The following document on dependent evacuation was approved this date as representing the latest views of the US Mission Council on the subject. It is proposed to use this paper as a basis for discussion during McGeorge Bundy's visit to Saigon.

Procedure for Announcing Decision To Evacuate Dependents

1. The decision has been taken to evacuate all US dependents from SVN as expeditiously as possible without giving the impression of a US retreat or creating uneasiness among the Vietnamese officials and public. This decision results from a consideration of the following factors:

A. A sense of growing potential danger to our dependents from VC terrorism and mob violence.

B. Need to clear the deck as a preliminary to any extension of military actions in DRV.

C. The political and psychological effect here and in US of an atrocity committed against dependents which might result in a stampede evacuation.

D. Desirability of freeing family heads of any concern for their dependents and of all domestic distractions.

E. Desirability of avoiding an increase in the US presence in SVN while meeting the continuing need for military reinforcements.

2. The foregoing are the honest reasons for reaching the conclusion that the dependents should return home. The problem is how to state our reasons publicly in such a way as to convince GVN and our own people of the reasonableness of our action. We must take into account that the explanation to these audiences requires differing shades of emphasis.

3. In discussions with GVN officials, our explanations could cover all the points of paragraph 1 except for any mention of fear of mob violence. It will be most important to be able to emphasize 1B and 1E, stating that there can be no extension of military action until the dependents are gone and that their removal will be more than compensated for by the additional military units and individuals in the approved pipeline. We should ask the GVN officials for advice and cooperation in presenting the case for evacuation to the VN public.

4. In consideration of what kind of public statement to make, the following would appear to be the bare bones of the best explanation of our action: "The GVN and the USG announced today extensive plans and action for 1965 to raise the level of effectiveness of the struggle against the VC and to clear the boards for possible future contingencies. By agreement between the two governments, the armed forces of SVN will be increased as rapidly as possible from about 450,000 to around 600,000 and the National Police from 20,000 to over 50,000. The USG is increasing its military personnel in SVN from 23,000 to (this figure may be as high as 32,000, the strength recommended by MACV and at a minimum for the requirement of this announcement should exceed somewhat 25,300 to compensate for the departure of approximately 2,300 dependents), in order to support the proposed increase in GVN forces and to strengthen the air defense of SVN. For the latter purpose, the USG will introduce a battalion of Hawk surface-to-air missiles, the first appearance of this highly effective weapon in SEA. To offset this increase in the US military population and to assume an increased posture of readiness on the part of the US community, it has been decided progressively to remove all US dependents. Some have already departed and the others will depart as personal plans can be made for their relocation. In combination, the foregoing actions and others in preparation should permit major progress in 1965."

5. The effectiveness of such a statement is weakened by the public knowledge of the recent anti-American demonstrations and our known concern over the safety of our dependents in Hue. The American press, in particular, will probably bear down on this point and try to make it appear the real reason for our action. We can try to temper this reaction by background briefings but they are not likely to be effective unless we can be fairly explicit about the meaning of "clearing the boards."

6. The foregoing procedure is the best treatment of a highly sensitive problem which the US mission can suggest. It is predicated on Washington agreement to the following points:

A. The military reinforcements mentioned are definitely approved and will be carried out.

B. There is a firm intention to carry the war to the DRV following the evacuation of dependents.

C. As agreed in Deptel 1509,/2/ the evacuation may be spread over a month or more.

/2/Document 31.

Taylor

 

55. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

OCI No. 0341/65

Washington, February 1, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. III. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced a similar analysis of the Kosygin delegation on February 1. (Memorandum from Denney to Rusk; ibid.) Also on February 1, Robert Komer wrote a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy stating: "my hunch is that Soviets have decided we're probably licked in VN, and are climbing on bandwagon. Kosygin's visit, and inevitable aid promises when there, strike me as Soviet effort to prevent ChiComs from getting full credit for the victory." (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVII) In Special Memorandum No. 7-65, dated February 5, CIA's Office of National Estimates made a point similar to Komer's while emphasizing that Kosygin's trip reflected "a basic Soviet decision to contest the spread of Chinese Communist influence in the Far East." (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343)

THE KOSYGIN DELEGATION TO NORTH VIETNAM

1. Moscow's decision to send an unusually strong delegation headed by Premier Kosygin to Hanoi underscores both the USSR's desire to regain influence with the North Vietnamese and its concern over the possibility of escalation in the Indochina conflict. One of the main purposes of this mission probably will be to strengthen the credibility of repeated public statements since late November that the USSR "cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist country" and that it is ready to give Hanoi the "necessary assistance."

2. The presence of high-ranking military and economic officials on the delegation almost certainly foreshadows a substantial increase in Soviet economic and military assistance. This aid may well include such defensive weapons as surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft weapons, and naval torpedo and patrol craft. It is also possible, however, that Kosygin will offer advanced jet fighters.

3. A Soviet economic aid mission headed by M.N. Sulovey, a vice chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, is already in Hanoi to "study implementation" of existing economic aid agreement. Most of the USSR's economic aid under earlier programs is believed to have been utilized. The Soviet Union has extended North Vietnam about $370 million worth of economic aid since 1955, mainly in the form of factories and machine shops, power plants, and coal mine equipment. The last major Soviet economic credit--$200 million--was extended in 1960 to cover North Vietnam's first five-year plan (1961-1965). New economic aid probably will be designed primarily to provide equipment for projects covered by the second five-year plan.

4. The pattern of Soviet and North Vietnamese pronouncements in recent weeks suggests that both parties wish to work toward improving relations which have been rather distant and cool since Hanoi felt obliged to support Peiping in the period since the nuclear test ban treaty of August 1963. It is possible that the Kosygin mission, at the invitation of the North Vietnamese Government, is the culmination of an exchange of views since Khrushchev's downfall, particularly during Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to Moscow last November. Dong's junket apparently was intended as a fishing expedition to see what could be expected of the new Kremlin bosses in support of North Vietnamese objectives. It has been evident since his return that the North Vietnamese were intent on softening at least the public manifestations of their opposition to Soviet policy. A hard-hitting anti-Soviet piece, for example, was hastily scratched from the party journal Hop Tac last November, a few days after Dong's return. Subsequent developments, including the appearance of Soviet antiaircraft guns in North Vietnam, the harder Soviet propaganda line on the Indochina situation, and the dispatch of a major Moscow economic delegation to Hanoi, make it appear that Pham Van Dong probably received assurances of increased Soviet military, economic, and political assistance from the new leaders in Moscow.

5. It was not mere coincidence that almost simultaneously with Moscow's announcement of the Kosygin delegation, the leading North Vietnamese party paper published an editorial welcoming this visit in unusually warm terms. It expressed gratitude for past Soviet assistance and voiced "warm and profound sentiments toward the Soviet Communists" and for their "spirit of proletarian internationalism."

6. In addition to more favorable prospects for improving relations with Hanoi, the decision to send the Kosygin mission probably was motivated by growing Soviet concern that both sides in the Indochina conflict may be contemplating actions which could lead to a rapid escalation of the war. Over the past two months, the Soviets appear to have been searching for means of inhibiting the actions of both antagonists. An upsurge in Soviet diplomatic and propaganda attention to the Indochina conflict coincided with Ambassador Taylor's consultations in Washington in late November and early December and with the movement of substantial numbers of North Vietnamese troops into Laos in December. Soviet uncertainty and concern regarding US intentions probably was heightened not only by US air strikes against the infiltration routes in Laos but by a more general feeling that the US may be impelled to adopt more far-reaching military measures in an attempt to check the erosion in South Vietnam. One of Foreign Minister Gromyko's main purposes in his talks with US leaders in December apparently was to probe for signs of US plans which might lead to escalation and also for indications of Washington's attitude toward negotiations.

7. The Soviet leaders almost certainly hope that a substantial increase in economic and military assistance to North Vietnam will enable them to press for a greater voice in the formulation of Communist policy in South Vietnam and Laos. Kosygin probably will argue that the Viet Cong campaign is progressing satisfactorily and that North Vietnam should avoid actions which might provoke US reprisals. He may also discuss political initiatives designed to inhibit US freedom of action, such as greater pressure toward reconvening the 14-nation conference on Laos.

8. The presence of party secretary Andropov on the delegation suggests that the Soviets will exchange views on the general situation in the world Communist movement and set forth their plans for the proposed meeting of the Communist "editorial commission" in Moscow on 1 March. The North Vietnamese have maintained silence on the March meeting. The Soviets, however, may not have abandoned hope completely that Hanoi will decide to participate. In any event, the Soviets undoubtedly would feel they had nothing to lose by renewing assurances that they had no intention of "excommunicating" the Chinese and that the only purpose of the meeting is to discuss means of restoring Communist unity.

9. From Hanoi's standpoint, the growing strain in Hanoi-Moscow relations during Khrushchev's era was primarily a product of Soviet softness in political and propaganda opposition to US action in South Vietnam and Laos. It has always been clear that if Moscow were to firm up its support of North Vietnamese policy objectives in Indochina, Hanoi would tend to moderate the degree of its open support for Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and once again attempt to play up its assumed role of "honest broker" seeking to bring at least an operative unity between Peiping and Moscow.

10. It is unlikely that an increase in the Soviet presence in North Vietnam will bring about a change of Hanoi's tactics in prosecuting the Viet Cong war. Although factional differences appear to exist in the North Vietnamese party over certain areas of policy, it has always appeared that the party was basically united on the tactics to be used in the Viet Cong insurgency. The so-called "extremists" in the North Vietnamese party seemed most to resent the lack of political and propaganda support from Moscow over South Vietnam. More vigorous Soviet backing of Hanoi may tend to reduce the differences between the factions.

11. Moscow's desire to reassure the US that the Kosygin mission to Hanoi does not signal an abrupt shift in Soviet policy was apparent in an authoritative Pravda "observer" article of 31 January on President Johnson's State of the Union message. In sharp contrast to the negative tone of Moscow's initial reaction, Pravda for the first time warmly welcomed the President's remarks about expanding US-Soviet contacts.

[end document]

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Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
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