The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 1, 1965, 6:58 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted in the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by William Bundy.

1581. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor from McGeorge Bundy. Your 2365/2/ reviewed by President with visiting team. We recognize the hazards in striving for too much precision in the agenda and in over-organizing the visit. Thus, the following comments are suggestive and illustrative of our interests rather than hard and fast requirements.

/2/Telegram 2365, February 1, provided an agenda for 3 days of discussions during Bundy's visit to Saigon. (Ibid.)

In general, I am primarily interested in coming away with a sense of what kind of pressures you and your senior subordinates feel can be effectively applied to the VC and Hanoi. In this connection, I want to get your views without any constraints you may feel are imposed by existing policy or moods anywhere. For this reason, I am anxious that our discussions will be informal, uninhibited and as leisurely as we can realistically make them.

Specifically, with respect to Topic I, I wonder whether we can postpone "E" and "F" until we talk about Topic III./3/ It may well be, in fact, that we will want to save a definitive discussion of our future military and political policy and posture until we have disposed of most, if not all, of the other topics.

/3/Topic I was "Progress of Struggle Against Viet Cong." Topic III was "Extension of War Beyond SVN." Subtopics III E and F were "Ways and Means for Initiating Phase II" and "Necessary Preliminaries for Initiating Phase II--Political, Military."

Re Topic II,/4/ while the subject and the sub-topics all seem worthwhile, I hope that the discussion will be focused on what to me seems a basic question: Do we in fact need a stable government in order to proceed aggressively and effectively with pacification? Or to put it another way, how can we step up our pacification effort on the assumption that there will not be a stable government?

/4/"Stability of Government."

Re Topic III, I would like to pose for inclusion here the pre-emptive positioning of US and SEATO-member forces along the DMZ or elsewhere as appropriate as part of a Phase II action. (The Australians have expressed keen interest in this and we would like to get your views.) I am especially interested in your views re "III-F Political" and hope that we will leave ample time to discuss this.

As far as Topic IV/5/ is concerned, I wonder whether it is necessary to discuss this as a separate item. If a Khanh-controlled government has some staying power and is reasonably effective, I think we're probably stuck with it. If it does not, we run into some of the nasties in your Topic VIII/6/ and can face up to the problems at that point.

/5/"Other Possible Courses of Action."

/6/"Contingency Planning Against Unpleasant Political or Military Developments."

The President has expressed particular interest in Topic V (Evacuation) and in your 2369/7/ on this subject. The President will come to a definite decision on this question upon our return.

/7/Document 54.

Re Topic VI,/8/ I think that one or two of my colleagues can deal with many of the aspects and problems of third country aid prior to our discussion and consequently we probably will be able to dispose of the subject in very short order. In essence, I want to acquire a feel as to whether, all things considered, the overall benefits are worth the local costs, and whether and how much we should continue to solicit more help.

/8/"Third Country Programs."

Re Topic VIII, two nitpicks: I wonder if we should put much effort in "D";/9/ rather, I think we should give a bit of thought to the contingency of a fast deterioration involving a US withdrawal and/or a GVN-DRV negotiated settlement.

/9/"Shape of U.S. Negotiating Position." Subtopic VIII-D was "A Major Communist Initiative for a New Geneva Conference and 'Negotiated Solution'."

Aside from the specific points for discussion, a few other matters are worth noting:

(1) Included in our party will be General Goodpaster who is coming at the express wish of the President to ensure full military liaison on forward planning for any wider action.

(2) I am a bit worried about the three "receptions." Can we eliminate the one for the Diplomatic Corps? I do want to meet the GVN politicos and generals, however.

(3) I plan to take your advice and stay one extra day for the purpose of getting out into the country. I assume that Sunday/10/ will be the best day for this.

/10/February 7.

(4) I will make a bland arrival statement and have a press backgrounder on departure. (We will prepare and forward arrival statement here based on your suggestions.)/11/ Beyond this, we plan to keep our press contacts at minimum Zorthian permits. Announcement of the visit will be made by WH this afternoon./12/

/11/The text of the arrival statement has not been found.

/12/A transcript of the White House News Conference at 4:30 p.m. on February 1, during which Press Secretary George Reedy announced the composition of the Bundy mission and stated that it planned to depart the following day, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II.

(5) Please discourage GVN from arranging "spontaneous" arrival and departure demonstrations.

(6) We have postponed De Soto operation until after Tet. It is now scheduled for 7 February.

(7) I have not worked out a definite order of march for my colleagues. We will have a better idea upon our arrival, but in any case will play it fairly loose. We may find it worthwhile for some of my group to have separate discussions with other members of the Mission./13/

/13/In telegram 2376 from Saigon, February 2, Taylor informed McGeorge Bundy that the agenda was being revised in light of his comments and that the diplomatic reception was being eliminated from the schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Ball

 

57. Editorial Note

The mission headed by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, departed Washington during the evening of Tuesday, February 2, and arrived in Saigon on the morning of February 4.

In addition to McGeorge Bundy, the mission included Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John McNaughton; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Leonard Unger; Andrew Goodpaster, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff; Jack A. Rogers, Executive Officer in the Office of International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense; and two secretaries.

A revised schedule of meetings and activities for the mission is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Volume I.

 

58. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 3, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to the White House, CIA, DOD, and CINCPAC for McGeorge Bundy. Received in the Department of State at 2:58 a.m.

2382. General Huynh Van Cao came to see Alex Johnson at his residence yesterday evening. During course two-hour conversation, Cao said that General Khanh plans to make heavy play this weekend to have himself selected as Chief of State and that Cao is now convinced that if Khanh is successful he plans to lead country toward negotiation with Liberation Front and a neutralist solution, Khanh envisaging himself as the "Sihanouk" of SVN.

Cao said that the script calls for a meeting on Thursday, February 4, of Khanh's nominees for the Military-Civilian Council to lay out his plans for the council and attempt to persuade many nominees who were still hesitant to serve. (He said Khanh has offered Le Van Hoach the presidency of the council.) Khanh has called a meeting of all members of the Armed Forces Council for 9:00 a.m. Friday, February 5 (Johnson noted this was same hour Khanh has given for appointment with Mac Bundy) at which he will seek to obtain AFC approval for him to assume position of Chief of State. Having obtained AFC approval, the military members of the Military-Civilian Council will, as soon as the council has formed itself and agreed to assume charter functions of former High National Council inform Military-Civilian Council of AFC decision and ask for council approval under terms of charter.

Cao said he is convinced Khanh is already in touch "with Communists", possibly through his brother-in-law Tuoc, and unless USG took firm stand he could well be successful in carrying out plan. He said that while Khanh no longer had any real support in AFC (Cao named Dong, Commander of Airborne; Tho, Commander of Armored; and Khang, Commander of Marines, as Khanh's only real support) and generals realized the dangers, Khanh would, as he has in the past, be able to carry the day in large meeting of AFC where there is no organized opposition and generals not categorically certain of USG position. Therefore if USG wanted to stop this development important its position be made discreetly known to generals.

Cao said his conviction that Khanh in alliance with Buddhists and plan to lead country to neutralism reinforced by long lecture which Khanh had Tuoc deliver to generals at Vung Tau this past Sunday morning. It came out during lecture that Tuoc had apparently visited some Eastern European states during his trip and burden of his remarks was that primary US interest and concern was in Europe, there was growing opposition in US to involvement in Vietnam, etc., so that likely US would withdraw shortly and thus Vietnamese must now move to stand on their own feet. In response to Johnson's question as to what would have been Khanh's attitude on January 27 coup if US had threatened to withdraw support, Cao said Khanh would have "welcomed" this as this would facilitate his plans for SVN.

Johnson made no commitments pointing out difficulties of USG intervening directly with generals and saying that generals having ostensibly supported moves Khanh had been making which have led to present situation, it was up to generals to seek to resolve them, not to seek to shift responsibility to others.

Cao has been accurate reporter in past, giving us through Westmoreland first definite information on January 27 coup and information he gave to Johnson on January 29 on withdrawal Buddhist Institute commitments has also now been confirmed by other sources (FVS-11286)./2/ We are urgently seeking through selected other generals confirmation that AFC meeting called for Friday morning and anything that we can gather on their knowledge of Khanh's intentions.

/2/The same as TDCS DB-315/00350-65, February 2, which reported the decisions and discussion at the Armed Forces Council meeting on January 31 as described by Brigadier General Pham Van Dong, Commander of the Capital Military District. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVII)

Comments and recommendations follow.

Taylor

 

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 3, 1965, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIETS. Top Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to the White House, CIA, DOD, and CINCPAC. Received in the Department of State at 10:06 a.m.

2391. Embtel 2382./2/

/2/Document 58.

1. Although the info reported in reftel may not be a true blueprint of coming events, it does have enough plausibility to warrant us deciding now what attitude we should take to a new govt headed by Khanh. My following comments have in mind such a takeover under circumstances suggested by reftel but are generally applicable to the broad question of whether we can do business with Khanh as the controlling partner of a de Gaulle-Pompidou line-up. We know that he has yearned for such an alignment at least since last August and his present alliance with the Buddhists, shaky though it may be, may lead him to believe that now is the moment to try for it. What are the likely consequences of such a move insofar as U.S. interests are concerned?

2. First, let us assume that General Khanh succeeds and establishes himself as Chief of State after the de Gaulle model. His ability to stay in power will depend largely upon two groups--the Buddhist Institute leaders and the generals. To keep both groups in line appears to present contradictory requirements. The Buddhist leaders will not long be satisfied with a govt which does not comply with their behests and such subservience is likely to offend many of the generals. If Khanh does not play along with the Buddhists, sooner or later they can be counted upon to take to the streets and present Khanh with the same problem which he faced in August, 1964. At that time, he capitulated quickly under Buddhist pressure to the disgust of ods [his?] generals. If this situation were to be repeated, we would expect the generals to split on the issue of Buddhist domination with unpredictable results other than confusion approaching anarchy.

3. Let us suppose that Khanh, in spite of these obvious difficulties, somehow succeeds in keeping the generals in line while satisfying the Buddhists. In that case, the Catholics, the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai and the other elements generally suspicious of Khanh can be expected to cause him trouble. Whether their opposition would be sufficient to overthrow his govt may be doubtful but the consequences could well be serious and possibly include bloody outbreaks of religious strife.

4. [Garble] combination in which Khanh is maintained as the governmental leader with Buddhist support. We foresee a likely trend toward neutralism and anti-Americanism. The Buddhists are suspect on both counts and are so notified [identified?] in the public mind. We know General Khanh's deep feeling about the necessity of Buddhist support and have long suspected him of wishing to become the Sihanouk of South Vietnam able to treat the U.S. with similar disregard.

5. In summary, I can see no good coming out of a Khanh govt--not even that minimum stability which would allow us to continue the struggle against the Viet Cong and Hanoi at present levels of success. The probable outcomes as we foresee them would be either civil disturbance approaching anarchy or a neutralist Khanh in a Sihanouk role. Both are unacceptable solutions from the point of view of the U.S.

6. With this conviction in mind, we next raise the question of how to avoid a Khanh govt? Only with the acquiescence of the large majority of the influential generals can he accede to head of state. We know that he is politicking now to see whether he can get the necessary support. Unless the U.S. reps decide to let matters run their course without an attempt to influence them and take the heavy responsibility of doing nothing, it is most important that we communicate a timely message to the generals to persuade them to withhold a vote of confidence for Khanh and to prevent his coming to power. While the exact text of such a communication would have to be tempered carefully to the character of each of the generals contacted, the bare bones of such a message would be that the U.S. Govt will not recognize and will not support a govt headed by General Khanh. It is our opinion that such word conveyed at the proper time to selected generals and perhaps also to certain civil leaders would accomplish our purpose.

7. There is, of course, always the possibility of an unfavorable reaction. The generals might rally to support Khanh because of this "foreign pressure." Then, if in spite of our efforts, Khanh came into power, we would have to do what we had promised, namely, withdraw recognition from the govt and await developments. It would not be necessary to withdraw all support at once because we would still have the hope that Khanh's opponents would shortly drag him down, although with the danger of civil disorders which has been cited at the outset of this paper.

In summary, I feel that the U.S. cannot win with Khanh as Chief of State and that every possible action should be taken to prevent his accession to power. Our main weapon available for this purpose is the use of the message referred to in para 6 above. If we fail, the consequences will be no more serious than if we had not tried. This matter will be made the first item of business with Bundy. After a full discussion, I will forward appropriate recommendations.

Taylor

 

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Ball, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC.

Washington, February 3, 1965, 5:20 p.m.

1601. Embtels 2386, 2389, 2391, 2382./2/ For what our thoughts are worth, we agree with type of action reported your 2389 to convey to military that we are not with Khanh all the way this time and that we sympathize with concerns of other generals. Risk that such a position will come back to Khanh's ears and make him if possible even more difficult to deal with seems outweighed by implication silence would have that we are in fact with him.

/2/Saigon telegrams 2382 and 2391 are Documents 58 and 59, respectively. In telegram 2386 from Saigon, February 3, Taylor analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of Khanh "as an individual and as a national political leader" and reviewed his administrative record. Taylor concluded that Khanh had failed to establish any base of popular support and that his motivation was almost exclusively personal ambition. In telegram 2389, also February 3, Taylor reported that Ky had repeated to a CIA officer the substance of what Cao had told U. Alexis Johnson (see Document 58). The CIA officer was planning to contact Ky again to inform him that the United States was "in no way propping up General Khanh or backing him in any fashion" and that it shared the generals' concern about the situation. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S.

At same time, we are deeply concerned, as we are sure you are too, at US hand showing too strongly in any outcome. It might be possible convey our position in more generalized form such as that US not supporting any particular individual but rather looking to Vietnamese and specifically armed forces to work out structure and personalities of government on their own. Such formulation would probably be our later explanation any position we take, and may also be wise to use with any military contacts who might turn out in the end to be on Khanh's side.

Second question would concern who might emerge if AFC did not in fact back Khanh. Previous discussions and cables have suggested Dong or Co might be most hopeful military candidates. If it becomes your recommendation that you be authorized act more strongly than 2389 line to block Khanh complete takeover, it would help us to have your judgment on personalities who might emerge worth our backing. In this regard we have in mind obvious disadvantage emergence any heavily "Can Lao remnant" slate which would only exacerbate Buddhist problem.

One way of getting our point across to generals would be to play up Le Van Hoach angle. It could be brought to their attention that Hoach said last July he was in touch with NLFSVN and implied Khanh's knowledge and consent this activity. We could stress that we informed Khanh of Hoach's reported activity and Khanh apparently did nothing about it.

Ball

 

61. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office. The meeting began at 3:25 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

SUBJECT
Discussion with The President re South Vietnam

I told the President that I was exceedingly worried about the developing situation in South Vietnam and that reports received today indicated the prospect of a more serious and immediate political crisis in Saigon than was earlier anticipated. I explained that all reports from the Embassy and the Station indicated that Khanh's arrangements with the Buddhists had come unglued and he apparently was in serious trouble with most of the Generals. Therefore I felt the reports that Khanh's "days or even hours" were numbered were probably true. I therefore concluded that there was a high probability of immediate trouble.

I then pointed out to the President the composition of the Kosygin mission, indicating that with the Chief of the Soviet Air Force, the Chief negotiator for aid, and the Chief Civilian Aviation Minister included in this party, leads me to the conclusion Kosygin would offer military equipment, at least for air defense such as surface to air missiles, supplies and materiel to continue and intensify insurgency and would provide logistic support. In the final analysis we felt that Kosygin would encourage Hanoi to intensify what they were doing now in the way of subversion, political action and guerrilla activities and to avoid overt military action which would bring a confrontation with the United States. The President read the 2 February Watch Committee Report/2/ and then said, "If you were President of the United States, what would you do about it?"

/2/Not found.

I responded that we must produce a viable Government by breeding acceptable military leadership with the Buddhists and other civilian segments to produce the best possible Government and while this appeared difficult, I did not think it was impossible.

I said even with this we could not win the way we were going and therefore we must take military action against North Vietnam. I advocated bombing of selected targets in North Vietnam, starting in the south and working north and carrying the raids on intensively, that is at least one a day. I said that we should gradually work towards the north but should not strike deeply into North Vietnam territory (as advocated by the JCS) at the start.

The President asked if this would not bring in the Chinese Communists in the air or on the ground. I said there was a possibility that they would come in on the ground but they had little capability in the air. I said we had to face this contingency and be prepared to handle any possible development but added that while Chinese Communist ground intervention was a possibility, I did not estimate it as a probability under the course of action advocated.

The President then asked that I communicate with Bundy through our Chief of Station and develop immediately a cast of characters that might formulate a compatible Government, i.e., military, Buddhists, etc. With respect to Catholics, I said they would be difficult to handle but I did not think they would resort to extreme measures unless the Government established in this way represented a threat to the Catholic community.

The President questioned me concerning consequences of our withdrawal from Vietnam and I said that it would pave the way toward Communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia. I mentioned current moves in Thailand, the situation in Indonesia, and the probable developments in Malaysia under such circumstances.

[Here follows discussion of the Soviet test of January 15 and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.]

 

62. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), at Saigon/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Secret. The date and time stamped on the source text are February 4, 11:13 a.m., which is apparently the time of reception in Saigon. This would make the time of transmission in Washington in the late evening, February 3.

Please pass this message in one copy only to McGeorge Bundy from Mr. McCone:

1. After reviewing all current traffic and today's Watch Report,/2/ I advised the President in a long private discussion/3/ that there appeared, first, a high probability of continuing political instability in Saigon and that serious dissension existed among the general officers. Secondly, analyzing Kosygin mission which includes high ranking party officer and officials of Defense, Civil Air Transport and Foreign Economic Relations, we were inclined to predict Soviet assistance to augment subversion and guerrilla activities, that they would warn Hanoi against overt military moves which would invite U.S. reprisals. President stated that we must exhaust every possibility of assisting the establishment of a Saigon government which would bring together discordant groups, most particularly military and the Buddhists, and felt that the USG, having had experience in SVN, might suggest particular military or civilian leaders who could accomplish this objective. President continues to feel that a reasonably viable and stable Saigon government is an essential prerequisite to other actions and asked me to communicate this view to you with the suggestion that you give attention to devising a cast of characters which might be able to accomplish this objective.

/2/Not found.

/3/See Document 61.

2. In discussion with my staff, they point out that this is an extremely sensitive problem because of the nationalistic and latent anti-American feeling now existent in Saigon. Furthermore we are not at all sure that Khanh is quite as flat on his back as today's cables indicate. Indeed it is considered possible that he might find his way through the present crisis and come out with some measure of strength. On the other hand, it is obvious that a political crisis precipitated by Khanh's opponents, which caused his removal would, in the absence of constructive planning along the lines mentioned above, create a vacuum in Saigon which would do grave damage to U.S. interests. The President therefore feels that you, in consultation with the Embassy and the Station, should attempt to identify and construct a list of individuals who could be brought together with some assurance they would work together in formulating a government; then to consider how the views so developed could be planted or otherwise communicated in Saigon in an unattributable but effective manner.

 

63. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Saigon, February 4, 1965, 9 a.m.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, Org 7 Visits. Secret. Drafted by Manfull. According to Taylor's diary he had a private meeting with Bundy at 9 a.m., and the general meeting began at 9:30 a.m. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-274-69)

PARTICIPANTS

Washington
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Leonard Unger
Mr. John McNaughton
Lt. Gen. Goodpaster
Mr. Chester Cooper
Mr. Colonel Jack A. Rogers

Saigon
Ambassador Taylor
Ambassador Johnson
General Westmoreland
Mr. Killen
Mr. de Silva|
Mr. Zorthian
Mr. Herfurt
Mr. Manfull

TIME & PLACE
0900 February 4, 1965, Embassy Conference Room

SUBJECT
Agenda Item I--Current Political Situation--Imminence of a New Khanh Government

After reviewing essential elements of situation as reported on February 3, Ambassador Taylor called for reports on results on contacts with key Vietnamese during the previous evening. Mr. de Silva, General Westmoreland, and Mr. Manfull supplied following new information:

(a) General Ky had been contacted by arrangement previously made and the following two points conveyed attributing them to Embassy (Embtel 2389):/2/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 60.

1) That we are in no way propping up General Khanh or backing him in any fashion, and

2) that we share the concern that General Ky says he and his colleagues have about the situation.

Ky received the information with welcome approval and said he was most happy to hear this expression of U.S. views. He said he would be seeing other members of the Armed Forces Council (AFC) on February 4 and would have more information at the next meeting.

(b) General Pham Van Dong had been contacted and a full account of the conversation had been circulated./3/

/3/See footnote 2, Document 58.

(c) General Stilwell saw General "Little" Minh who gave the impression of not being in the inner circle and unable to impart significant information.

(d) Colonel Metaxis saw General Co, Commander II Corps, who conveyed the impression that he had not been contacted by other members of the so-called "watchdog group" of the AFC.

(e) Luong Trong Tuong, Hoa Hao leader and respective Military-Civilian Council (MCC) member, said that the MCC had not officially convened as yet but was expected to convene today. He added that he personally would refuse to participate but that Hoa Hao would be represented by two or three others yet to be selected.

(f) One member of the AFC had observed that if General Ky took a firm position in opposition to Khanh, the floodgates would be open for the other AFC members to line up against Khanh.

In response to a question from Mr. Cooper as to the extent of Khanh's support in the military and as to what form AFC opposition to Khanh might take, it was pointed out by Ambassador Taylor that:

(a) Firm support for Khanh to date has been based primarily in the Marines, Airborne Brigade, Armor and Navy--not the Army;

(b) Opposition in the AFC to Khanh would probably take form of a vote of no-confidence in Khanh as a candidate for Chief of State and perhaps as Commander-in-Chief;

(c) The departure of Khanh from the scene would still leave problems since the Young Turks as a group were not particularly well-disciplined or responsible.

Mr. Bundy inquired whether Khanh had in the past played the card of strong US backing and apparent lack of any suitable alternative. Ambassador Taylor responded in the affirmative.

Mr. McNaughton asked whether the U.S. press was under the illusion that the U.S. was backing Khanh. Mr. Zorthian replied that the U.S. press was under no such illusion; however, other members of the international press and a considerable number of the local press believed this to be the case. Therefore, the state of public opinion was somewhat confused on this question.

In response to a question from Mr. Unger, Ambassador Taylor noted that Khanh's failure to obtain a representative MCC need not impede Khanh in attempting to dominate the Government. Khanh could either force the issue with the MCC as it exists or he could stand on the status quo with a pliable "Jack" Oanh as Acting Prime Minister. The latter was a likely possibility.

Ambassador Taylor then suggested the meeting address two problems:

(1) Should we proceed forthwith in conveying the same message as that conveyed to General Ky to other key military officers and to selected civilian personalities;

(2) Should we now request of Washington authority to invoke withholding of recognition of a Khanh Government should this prove necessary emphasizing at the same time that we would use only minimum U.S. pressure necessary to forestall a Khanh bid to become Chief of State.

With respect to (1) above it was the consensus that the immediate focus of action rests in the AFC and that approaches to civilians at present should not be made with the possible exception of Nguyen Luu Vien.

With respect to (2) above, it was questioned whether it is necessary to request such authority at this time. If Ambassador Taylor in effect puts in a PNG for Khanh, it might stop Khanh or on the other hand it might backfire. It was noted that there had been various Chiefs of State to date but none have wielded much power. Ambassador Taylor observed this was not the basic issue and reviewed in detail the analysis contained in Embtel 2391./4/ Ambassador Johnson added there is no magic formula, that we faced the dilemmas set forth in Embtel 2391. In response to Mr. McNaughton's question as to how confident the Saigon team was that Khanh's succession to the position of Chief of State would ultimately lead to chaos, Ambassador Taylor said this was the unanimous view of the Mission.

/4/Document 59.

Mr. McNaughton then referred to the possibility that Khanh's position as Commander-in-Chief might be in jeopardy and inquired as to likely successors. General Westmoreland replied that the prime candidates were General Co, General Pham Van Dong, and to a lesser degree General Thieu. Westmoreland felt that the first two were well qualified and that Thieu was bright, popular with his colleagues and nimble enough to keep himself in an uncommitted position so that he is not swept away in changes of regime. He had done an effective job on previous assignments and could be voted into office by his colleagues, although this is likely to prompt a Buddhist reaction since Thieu is both a Catholic and a Dai Viet. General Westmoreland believed that General Khiem also has a role to play in South Viet-Nam but not necessarily at the present time.

Mr. Unger inquired whether the Buddhists would not present a problem regardless of what evolved from the current situation. Ambassador Taylor responded that Huong was on the verge of success in his confrontation with the Buddhists until Generals Khanh and Thi deliberately withheld military support of the Government in mid-central Vietnam. General Westmoreland observed that General Thieu had informed him that the Generals had "learned a lesson" with regard to standing up to the Buddhists.

Mr. McNaughton asked for an estimate as to what would happen if we pulled out all stops and invoked threat of non-recognition of a Khanh Government. Mr. de Silva said that it depended a great deal on how we handled the situation. If American views were communicated informally but authoritatively our views would fall on receptive or fertile ground and could force a showdown tomorrow. Mr. Bundy inquired as to Khanh's reaction should information concerning our actions get back to Khanh. Mr. de Silva replied that Khanh would undoubtedly try to use it and to play up the anti-American theme to his advantage. General Goodpaster inquired whether the Generals to whom we would be conveying the "message" would fully understand the reasons lying behind the U.S. statement of views. It was pointed out that this could best be handled by confirming on our part the fears and concerns expressed by the military officers themselves. It was also noted that a communication of our views informally today, following the arrival of the Bundy party, would have a greater impact than similar statements made previously. Ambassador Taylor suggested that early action be taken to contact the key military figures believed to be receptive to our views in order to provide the necessary information on which to base judgment as to whether he should request authority from Washington to invoke the non-recognition threat if absolutely necessary. Ambassador Taylor emphasized that once a threat was invoked he would have to make good on the threat. It was further noted that the U.S. would be placed in an awkward position should Khanh succeed despite U.S. efforts.

Mr. Killen stated that the impression in Saigon and in the countryside is that Khanh is now running the country regardless of the position he occupies. The Vietnamese people are becoming more demoralized and discouraged. From his conversation with public spirited citizens, both high and low, it is evident that Khanh is thoroughly distrusted. Mr. Killen believes that regardless of the position Khanh holds he will, because of his power, be the effective chief of the ship of state. If we take a longer look regarding the necessity of reorganizing and revitalizing the government, in removing distrust of the government on the part of the people and in getting on with the struggle, it is evident that Khanh must be removed from positions of power. Mr. Killen believed that discussion of desirability of Khanh as Chief of State was only formalistic one, since Khanh exercised effective power.

Mr. Bundy asked whether anyone around the table differed with the above estimates of Khanh. Ambassador Taylor replied that no one from the U.S. Mission disagreed and in fact our objective was not only to prevent Khanh's becoming Chief of State but to work toward a better government.

Ambassador Johnson noted that if Khanh does not succeed in his ploy to become Chief of State his days are probably numbered as Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Bundy asked whether it would not be sufficient for Khanh's stock to go down dramatically if he fails in his ploy. Mr. Manfull observed that in this event Khanh would merely begin again to maneuver to assume power and would create further difficulties and instability in the future. Khanh will never give up in his drive for power. Mr. de Silva noted that it is significant that recently there has been a decided change of heart among the people who provide Khanh's base of support--the military.

Mr. McNaughton inquired as to what evidence exists that Khanh would tend toward a neutralist solution were he to assume power. It was noted that there was no hard evidence but plenty of smoke, which could be adduced from his alliance with the Buddhists, and activities of his brother-in-law Pham [Phan?] Quang Tuoc, and the fears of his colleagues. In response to Mr. Cooper's query, Ambassador Taylor said that Khanh would try to exploit publicly U.S. interference should he succeed in being appointed Chief of State and we in turn withheld recognition.

Mr. Unger noted the possibility that Khanh might be driven faster along the road to a neutralist solution if he becomes aware of U.S. action to block his path to Chief of State. Ambassador Taylor replied that he always had a feeling that Khanh was prepared to consider alternate solutions in any situation. General Westmoreland said that Khanh had accomplished many improvements in the strictly military field (better care for dependents, spot promotions, decorations for valor, etc.) but despite these actions his popularity with his colleagues has continually eroded. In his view the only commander of troops who would support Khanh in a pinch is the Commander of the Airborne Brigade, Dong. Dong was currently taking great pains to avoid his American counterpart.

Ambassador Taylor then posed the proposition: Should we proceed with conveying the "message" of last evening in the hopes of preventing Khanh from obtaining a vote of confidence at the AFC meeting on Friday. Mr. Bundy noted that there was a lot of territory between the statement conveyed yesterday and the flat statement that the U.S. would not recognize a government led by Khanh. He believed there were many things we could say but which would avoid a situation in which Khanh could say that Ambassador Taylor had tried to unseat him. In this connection it was pointed out that in effect the U.S. emissaries were merely associating the U.S. with the views these key military figures had already voiced in opposition to or concern over Khanh's motivations and intentions. It was recognized, however, that Khanh would undoubtedly become aware of our activities.

It was agreed to proceed with conveying the "message" of the previous evening to selected military officers; namely, Generals Pham Van Dong, Thieu, Ky, Linh Quang Vien, Cao Van Vien, Marine Commander Khang, Commodore Chung Tan Cang (through Ky) and General Co./5/ It was further agreed that based on results of conversations with the above officers a decision would be made at the end of the day regarding the necessity to request standby authority from Washington concerning non-recognition of a regime led by Khanh.

/5/See Document 68.

 

64. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Saigon, February 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Secret.

SUBJECT
Evacuation of Dependents; Lunch, Taylor-Johnson-Bundy-McNaughton-Herfurt

Max and Alex at lunch with Mac/2/ and me today expressed the following views regarding the evacuation of dependents:

/2/Maxwell Taylor, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy.

1. Until the past few weeks, when mob action and anti-American sentiment have become more menacing, they did not favor the evacuation of dependents at all. They did not and do not favor evacuation because of any risks incident to US reprisal actions; this because they believe the risks in such a case to be quite small. They both favor evacuation now, however, because of the new dangers from mob action.

2. They are very concerned about the psychological impact that evacuation of US dependents will have especially in Saigon. They describe the climate in Saigon as irritable and paranoid, with the "fabric stretched tight." There would be suspicions, despite our declarations that we are clearing the decks, that we are actually preparing to bug out--or, inconsistently, that we anticipate air attacks on Saigon and are removing our loved ones to safe havens. They see the "seeds of panic" in Saigon if the US evacuates dependents.

3. They described the best context for removing dependents as one in which we are initiating "Phase II" and increasing the US forces in Vietnam. (Initiation of Phase II, they say, requires a government here that is "at least able to breathe.") An acceptable, but soon thin, context would be a reprisal. Absent even one military action to buttress our verbal explanation for the evacuation, they believe that we need a combination of two things--(a) a minimal Vietnamese Government which can help sell the "clearing-the-decks" interpretation and (b) increases in US forces by a number exceeding the number of dependents evacuated. (Even this, they say, would only partially reduce the psychological damage.)

4. They fear that we may too soon find ourselves in the worst possible case--one in which we must evacuate after anti-American demonstrations and serious mob threats against US citizens. They foresee such demonstrations and want the dependents already to have been removed.

5. They reject as undesirable the idea of keeping wives here while evacuating children. They would not allow working wives to stay. They report that there is unanimity in the mission on this point.

6. They think action should be taken now to stop the flow of dependents. Furthermore, they see some merit in closing the dependents' school as of this coming fall. It might be announced this spring; perhaps the building could be used for a hospital.

John T. McNaughton/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

65. Editorial Note

At 3 p.m. on February 4 a meeting was held in the Embassy in Saigon to discuss the progress of the struggle against the Viet Cong. Members of the Bundy Mission who participated in the meeting were McGeorge Bundy, John McNaughton, Leonard Unger, Chester Cooper, General Andrew Goodpaster, and Jack A. Rogers. Participants from the U.S. Mission in Saigon included Maxwell Taylor, U. Alexis Johnson, General William Westmoreland, James S. Killen, Peer de Silva, Barry Zorthian, Jack A. Herfurt, and Robert H. Miller. A 30-page draft memorandum of the discussion prepared by Miller indicates that the meeting was devoted mainly to two topics: "Viet Cong Capabilities, Now and Future"; and "GVN Capability, Now and Future." A third topic, "Vietnamese Morale, Civilian and Military," received brief attention.

During briefings on Viet Cong capabilities, General Westmoreland noted that the Viet Cong were stronger and better organized and equipped than a year earlier, while Peer de Silva noted that the Viet Cong had gained ground in the war for population control but that "people's action teams" had been developed to counter VC efforts. Discussion focused on infiltration from the DRV, railroad sabotage, and the "people's action teams."

Regarding GVN capabilities, briefings and discussion dealt with efforts to improve the ineffective conscription system, army desertions, improvements in RVNAF organization and performance, the harsh treatment of prisoners, press coverage of military operations, pacification at the province level, budget problems, the economic situation, and psychological warfare. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, Org. 7 Visits)

 

66. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Saigon, February 4, 1965, 7:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears the handwritten notation: "Seen WP Bundy 2/5." Attached to the source text is another copy of the telegram forwarded by McCone to the White House for Bromley Smith's attention. A stamped date and time on this copy indicates that it was received at the White House at 4:07 p.m. on February 4.

Saig 1533. To Mr. McCone from McGeorge Bundy.

1. Thank you for your message./2/ Only an interim answer is possible overnight, but you should know that the immediate problem does not appear to be more than the quiet prevention of a total Khanh takeover which no one here believes would produce kind of government the President wants.

/2/Document 62.

2. We have pressed throughout the day to see whether any member of Country Team believes that we can prevent continued deterioration in the absence of a "reasonably effective and stable government." The Country Team appears to share the President's judgement that such a government is necessary on all counts. Getting it is something else again.

3. In particular, I think you should tell the President that a day of inquiry reveals no present prospect of a government acceptable to us which would also be acceptable to the leaders of the Buddhist Institute. The current situation among non-Communists forces gives all the appearances of a civil war within a civil war.

4. In this situation, the construction of a government of national unity may well require sharp confrontation with Buddhists before, during, or after the construction job.

 

67. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 4, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 6:51 a.m.

2399. Exclusive for William Bundy from McGeorge Bundy. Politics here require postponement of my call on General Khanh tomorrow, and good reason is necessary. We are going to tell him that I have been ordered to stand by for Washington telephone conversation from 8:30 onward Saigon time. To make this story good request you or Green execute call to General Westmoreland's office at about 9 Saigon time, 8 pm Washington time. If you use KY-9, there are some interesting things we could actually say.

Taylor

 

68. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 4, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, the White House, CIA, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received in the Department of State at 7:32 a.m.

2400. Reference: A) Embtel 2391; B) Embtel 2389; C) Deptel 1601./2/ Feeling that message conveyed to General Ky last night (Ref B) had fallen on fertile ground and sensing need for broader coverage today, I authorized similar message to be conveyed discreetly to seven other key generals. We have not yet heard their reactions thereto but will have round-up at end of day. Unless there is fairly clear indication that some stronger action on our part is necessary to give reasonable assurance that Khanh will not be choice tomorrow of Armed Forces Council for Chief of State, I do not see any present likelihood of requiring authority mentioned in Ref A).

/2/Telegram 2391 is Document 59; telegram 1601 is Document 60. Regarding telegram 2389, see footnote 2, Document 60.

We should not be under any illusion about possibility of maintaining secrecy of these contacts we have made or to believe that General Khanh will not perceive our action. Except for Khanh's reaction, I would not anticipate any flare-up from other generals who, during show-down with Khanh last August, were openly seeking US position with regard to retention of Khanh. Fact that we supported him at that time was subject for open discussion in their debates. Hence, I am not particularly concerned now over an excessively conspicuous showing of US hand.

With regard to possible successors to Khanh, three leading candidates in our judgment remain Co, Cong and Thieu. We would not rule out Ambassador Khiem but his absence from scene makes him definitely dark horse.

In concentrating attention on possible selection of Khanh as de Gaulle-type Chief of State, we have perhaps commented insufficiently on possibility that Khanh will prefer to keep Suu and "Jack" Owen in office and continue to pull strings from behind. This situation will not require sudden and dramatic action on our part but will present us with problem which cannot be allowed drag indefinitely. I can well visualize necessity at some time of utilizing full US leverage to include that mentioned in Ref B) to induce our Vietnamese friends to get Khanh out of position of Commander-in-Chief (from which he pulls the strings) and to install their very best governmental line-up.

In past slates, they have never used all their best people.

Taylor

 

69. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 53-65

Washington, February 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 53-65. Secret; Limited Distribution. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of this estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except the Assistant Director of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Problem

To assess significant political forces and attitudes in South Vietnam, and to estimate the prospects over the next month or so.

The Estimate

I. Political Dynamics

1. Significance of the Immediate Situation. Recent events in Saigon underline the fact that apart from the Communists--and the US presence--the two primary political forces in South Vietnam today are the military establishment and the political bonzes who direct the "Buddhist movement." At present, US political leverage appears to be at a low point.

2. Neither the military nor the Buddhist leadership is homogeneous or monolithic; both suffer from factionalism and personal rivalries. Dominant power obviously rests with the military, but the Buddhists are strong enough to make unworkable any set of political arrangements their leaders care to oppose. Whatever legal or constitutional form the Government of Vietnam (GVN) takes in the near future, the military and the Buddhists will almost certainly retain an effective veto power.

3. The removal of Huong on 27 January was the product of cooperation between the Buddhists (under Tri Quang) and the military (more or less under Khanh). This cooperation has produced at least a temporary stabilization, though the balance struck is delicate and could easily be upset. There are rumblings within military and Buddhist ranks and in various other quarters, e.g., the Catholics, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and the students and other political elements in Saigon and Hue. However the events of 27 January appear thus far to have had almost no disturbing effect in the provinces. The course of political developments will depend on what the Buddhists do and on the degree of military unity. Either the Buddhists or the military or both may exploit anti-Americanism as a tactical device. The explosiveness of this issue will depend on how it is handled by all parties concerned, including the US. Notable Viet Cong military successes could also adversely affect the course of events.

4. Basic Political Determinants. South Vietnam is in the midst of a social and political revolution. In the political vacuum occasioned by the French departure, power was initially assumed by an elite of French-educated and predominantly Catholic mandarin types, of whom Ngo Dinh Diem was both symbol and archetype. Power is now passing to a much more "Vietnamese," militantly nationalistic and potentially xenophobic group of which the political bonzes, the students, and certain young generals are prime examples. This revolution is a formless thing, uncontrolled, and in many ways genuinely spontaneous. The Communists are obviously exploiting it. Nevertheless, it is something quite apart from the VC-directed insurgency; indeed those who aspire to lead this revolution claim that unless it is successful the Communist insurgency cannot be defeated. This shift in the alignment of fundamental political forces is responsible for much of the turbulence we are witnessing--and will continue to witness--largely on the urban scene, particularly since this process involves the striking of new power balances in the midst of a war and in a situation where no parliamentary traditions or institutions can effectively channel political conflict.

5. Tri Quang and the "Buddhist Movement." Because of the historical context in which this revolution has developed, contending factions tend to group under religious labels. The issues involved, however, are ones of political power, not religious doctrine. The "Buddhist movement" derives its political strength partly from the political acumen and demagogic skill of its leaders, but primarily from the fact that "Buddhism" has become the rallying point for emotionally charged though inchoate revolutionary aspirations. The bonzes who lead this "Buddhist movement" have found the exercise of political power both heady and habit forming. They do not appear to desire the responsibilities of office or direct participation in government, but they are determined to prevent a revival of what they consider Catholic dominance and to have a veto power over major GVN policies and personnel. Furthermore, as in many protest movements, no contender for primacy within the Buddhist leadership feels he can let a rival appear more "militant" than he.

6. Among these leaders, Tri Quang is the most influential and politically skillful. He seems to have outmaneuvered all existing or potential rivals within the Buddhist movement and is not likely to be deposed from within the movement itself. However, were Tri Quang to leave the scene, the Buddhist movement would probably continue essentially unchanged. Tri Quang is vain and hyper-nationalistic; thus he probably resents the extent of US involvement in Vietnamese affairs. Although he recognizes the present need for US support, he regards the US as incapable of understanding the political situation in South Vietnam and, over the long run, would like to see the US out of the country.

7. Tri Quang's short-run intentions are harder to divine and may not be systematically or consistently developed even in his own mind. He professes to be anti-Communist and at times appears to recognize that his position and the movement he leads would get short shrift under a Communist regime. Nevertheless, he has such a high opinion of his own political abilities that he may come to feel that he can outwit the Communists and use them for his own ends; indeed, he may have already reached this conclusion. The relevant evidence is conflicting and precludes confident judgment. On balance we incline to the view that he is probably not now deliberately working for a Communist victory or Communist-dominated "neutralist" settlement. Regardless of his intent, however, disruptive actions such as his thus far are serving these ends.

8. The Military Establishment. Through a combination of luck and political skill, Khanh has managed to retain a paramount position within the military establishment, but he wears an uneasy crown. During 1964 there emerged a group of officers labelled the Young Turks who saved Khanh in September, but who suspect his motives and who, so long as they maintain their solidarity, constitute a potent threat to his position. Below the Young Turks (most of whom are now one-star generals) there is another unstructured but perhaps even more restless and ambitious group of colonels and majors--unit commanders who during the past year have borne the brunt of the fighting against the Viet Cong. Some of these officers commanded the units which made possible the military pressure plays of the past year.

9. By and large the military leaders are intensely nationalistic. They have no intention of abandoning the war, but are impatient and frustrated over the lack of progress. At the same time, however, they are divided among themselves and deeply involved in politics, and some have overriding personal ambitions. Many military officers do not trust Khanh and not a few are resentful and suspicious of the Buddhists. Khanh remains in serious danger of being ousted--particularly if he should make too obvious a bid for personal political power, if he appears to become overly subservient to the Buddhists, or if his efforts should not soon begin to produce some political stability or military progress.

10. The Communists. The military establishment and the Buddhist movement have long been prime targets for Communist penetration. The present military leadership seems resolutely anti-Communist even though the Viet Cong have almost certainly penetrated the military establishment at least enough to acquire considerable capabilities for collecting intelligence. The situation in the Buddhist movement is less clear, particularly since much of the Buddhists' agitation lends itself so easily to Communist exploitation. There is no evidence that the movement itself is Communist-directed or controlled, but there are strong presumptive grounds for believing that Communist penetration is having some success. The student movement seems to have been even more vulnerable to Communist penetration.

II. Present Power Relations

11. Khanh and Tri Quang. There is conclusive evidence that the dismissal of Huong on 27 January and the interim political solution then announced were based on an arrangement between Khanh and Tri Quang; the circumstances lead us to infer that they had cooperated for some time in preparing the crisis. This cooperation may have originated in the wake of the December dissolution of the High National Council by Khanh and the Young Turks, a move occasioned by pressures within the military establishment but which the US strongly opposed.

12. Not long after, the Buddhists, who had intermittently engaged in demonstrations against the government, renewed their campaign against Huong. They also emphasized anti-Americanism or, more precisely, opposition to the US Ambassador for his support of Huong. This gave the Buddhists' anti-Huong campaign an emotionally inflammatory ingredient it had hitherto lacked. It is extremely unlikely that the Buddhists would have dared stress this anti-US note without at least some confidence that the military would not interfere. In any case, this theme proved politically beneficial, and was probably personally gratifying, to Khanh. Tri Quang's political position was helped by the ouster of Huong, to which he was publicly committed. Khanh obtained at least temporary hold over the levers of power, and in such a manner that his opponents could do little but acquiesce. All this has so clearly been to the benefit of both Khanh and Tri Quang that it seems unlikely to have been fortuitous.

13. Any alliance between Khanh and Tri Quang must be inherently unstable. Each strongly distrusts the other. Tri Quang is not likely to abide by any commitments made; signs of this, in fact, are already beginning to emerge. Unless he assumes the responsibilities of office, which he is unlikely to do, Tri Quang's position as a militant leader of an emotionally charged movement almost requires that he continue to criticize governmental policy. On past form he is unlikely to be a constructive critic, though he will probably take some care not to alienate the Young Turks. Khanh, for his part, cannot afford to alienate the Buddhists--no Vietnamese politician can do this in present circumstances and survive in power--but neither can he be too accommodating to them without running the risk of being deposed by some of his military colleagues. Most politically influential Vietnamese, civilian and military, have generally acquiesced in the 27 January "solution," though there is apprehension in some quarters. Furthermore, there are influential officers who were not happy with these arrangements and are probably determined to prevent Khanh from making a personal bid for permanent political office and from giving in too far to the ever demanding Buddhists.

III. Near-Term Prospects

14. The present political arrangements in Saigon are avowedly temporary, and there is at least a faint chance that the scenario announced for the ensuing weeks may hold promise for improved political stability in South Vietnam. However, in the present political context, tolerable stability can only be achieved if there is a central government whose structure and ranking personnel are acceptable to the majority of the important military and the majority of important Buddhists--a contingency which cannot at present be judged likely. Nor is it likely that a National Assembly, even if convened in March, will devise a more permanent structure which meets Vietnamese desires and is adapted to current political power realities in South Vietnam. Yet if both these contingencies were met, the spring and summer might see the evolution of a stronger base for prosecuting the counterinsurgency effort than has heretofore existed. The odds on such a fortunate outcome are considerably less than even.

15. The course of events in the near-term future will be materially influenced by the ultimate effect of the extreme nationalist sentiments whipped up in recent weeks. Such sentiments, because of their xenophobic and anti-US overtones, will obviously cause considerable complications for the US effort. The regime is still aware of its need for US support, but even in the short run we expect that nationalist sensitivities will set severe limits on the degree to which the US can influence Vietnamese actions. The chances have increased that nationalist sentiments, in combination with war weariness and frustrations, will take a pro-neutralist turn which the Communists would certainly endeavor to fan and exploit. On the other hand, however, a vigorous nationalism identified with an indigenously devised government reflecting local political realities will be an essential ingredient for any dynamic and successful counter-insurgency effort.

 

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 4, 1965, 3:11 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Green, cleared by Richard Davis (EUR), and approved by William Bundy.

1608. Instructions going out by military channels to appropriate commands calling off De Soto patrol during and immediately after Kosygin visit to Hanoi. Latest info indicates Kosygin arriving Hanoi February 6 and remaining for approximately four days.

We feel that having De Soto concurrent with Kosygin visit or immediately thereafter would be seen as reaction to visit. Aside from seriously complicating Moscow-Washington relations, having De Soto patrol at time of Kosygin visit might invite reprisals in such a way as to bring Soviets in.

Commands will be informed soonest of date for rescheduling patrol.

Ball

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 71 through 80