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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

71. Telegram From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), at Saigon/1/

Washington, February 4, 1965, 3:31 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret. Repeated to the CIA for McCone. The date and time stamped on the source text indicate that it was received in Saigon on the morning of February 5, although the hour is illegible.

CAP 65030. Saigon for McGeorge Bundy--deliver opening of business. For your information, President reacted sharply to UPI report from Saigon/2/ saying Khanh appeared to be snubbing you by turning down invitation to Friday/3/ reception for Vietnamese military leaders at Westmoreland's home.

/2/The text of the UPI bulletin was quoted in telegram 1617 to Saigon, February 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Bundy)

/3/February 5.

The President told me that assuming this was true, we should start looking hard for someone who could replace Khanh. He would like you to get full rundown on possible replacements. (We did not then have Embtel 2400.)/4/ I listened and then explained how you were handling postponement of call on Khanh (Embtel 2399)./5/

/4/Document 68.

/5/Document 67.

Subject did not come up in President's press conference./6/ State is cabling text of President's comments on Vietnam and on your mission.

/6/For the transcript of the President's press conference on February 4 at 11:20 a.m. in the White House, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 131-139.

 

72. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/

February 4, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret; Exdis. The source text indicates the conversation was conducted over a secure line. The conversation apparently took place at about 8 p.m. Washington time, or 9 a.m. February 5 Saigon time, and was tape recorded at the National Military Communication Center. A draft transcript made at the NMCC is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S.

M. Bundy: Is there anything that we need to know on the President's press conference?/2/

/2/See footnote 6, Document 71.

W. Bundy: No, the President made a general statement of our sticking to our present course and our determination and also was asked what would happen if the Government ever asked us to get out and he did not deal with that question, he said he did not think that this was likely to happen. That was all that was really substantive and I think that it came out in the evening papers as his sticking to the basic line.

M. Bundy: We should not expect any impact back from that. What did he say on other subjects--what did he say about visiting the Soviet Union?

W. Bundy: He did say that there had been exchanges about his visiting the Soviet Union and the strong implication was that this was a very active possibility.

M. Bundy: Those are the two questions which I have immediately in my mind. Do you have further instructions or guidance perhaps and in particular do you know what the plans are for next week?

W. Bundy: No, we do not have particular instructions for you. As to next week's plans, there is nothing set up at the present time on your return. Secretary Rusk has gone to Florida and does not now plan to be back before Thursday,/3/ but if you bring back action recommendations, either he might come back or the President, of course, might wish to go ahead without him so the short answer is really no definite plan and if you have suggestions that will require adjustments of schedules, it would be helpful if you let us know by way of at least a general indication before you leave.

/3/Rusk was suffering from the flu. The Thursday referred to was apparently February 11.

M. Bundy: We will try to make a summary--I have--incidentally this is a classified line--we will try to get a summary of our current thinking to you tomorrow because Sunday/4/ we will be going back into the field and we should have as much of the picture as we would like you to have in outline at least by that time. My current estimate is that we will not return with urgent and immediate requirements for decision making meetings because of the continuing fluidity of the local situation here. On the other hand we may, we will I think, wish to have some development of alternatives, and I think therefore that the current pattern in which the Secretary will be out of the town for two or three days is an acceptable one, certainly for our purposes today. Have you got all that?

/4/February 7.

W. Bundy: I understand you perfectly. We will do nothing to change our schedule unless you indicate otherwise in terms of what you might propose. I of course will be on hand Sunday morning--and indeed tomorrow and Saturday--to get your messages. If you have some indication, well and good, otherwise we will just sit tight and wait until you arrive.

M. Bundy: I missed your last transmission, would you say again?

W. Bundy: I said that we will do nothing to change Secretary Rusk's schedule unless you so indicate in your message which we presume you will send tomorrow night.

M. Bundy: That makes good sense. I would like to shift to another subject and say that our first bare impression is that the confrontation which was foreshadowed as a possibility in one of the Ambassador's telegrams (Saigon 2391)/5/ is not immediately likely. It appears that other local forces, military primarily, have indicated strong opposition to the contingency which troubled us. There is no immediate likelihood that contingency will happen. On the other hand, there is no indication either as to what a resolution of the present interim status will be and there is no agreed opinion that I can solicit on our side as to what the preferred solution is. We hope to direct attention to the development of preferences but we do not expect during this business to engage in active indication of positive US preferences. I would be glad of your comments on this.

/5/Document 59.

W. Bundy: I agree completely with your suggestion that you take no active role while you are there. As you can see from our cables we are very concerned about any appearance of an active US political role in any case, and we were concerned, as you have now cleared up, that the issue stated in Saigon 2391 was not likely to be immediate and was somewhat more black and white than any case that we would be likely to confront in the immediate future. Your evaluation of the immediate situation does seem to confirm what we have been getting principally from CAS reporting. I should think we had to see how the situation settled down before any of us could be sure how we would like to use US influence and whether we would want to take any risks of having our hands show very clearly. Those are just preliminary reactions but I think they accord with your thinking.

M. Bundy: That is exactly the way we see it here. We have had a serious exchange of messages with McCone/6/ and I think it would be worth your while to have a talk with him directly and to say that I mentioned this exchange to you.

/6/See Documents 62 and 66.

W. Bundy: I understand that and I will be in touch with Mr. McCone. The message that he sent after seeing the President was seen by Mr. Ball and myself and I have not seen your reply but I will get in touch with him in the morning and will be brought abreast of that.

M. Bundy: There is no reason to view it tonight your time. Tomorrow is OK, I just wished to be sure you were aware of his transmission and his view of thinking there.

W. Bundy: Yes, we were fully aware of that and I think we also saw the difficulty in producing the results suggested immediately and I have not yet seen your response but I will do so tomorrow morning the first thing.

M. Bundy: In essence what I said was precisely that. It was easier to make the prescriptions than get the answers and in particular it was not so clear that we could have won for them a working alliance that would be practical for us between the two parties specified in his message, but you will be over to see my answer. This conversation has been exactly what was needed for our guide. I am very grateful to you.

W. Bundy: All right I have nothing further at this end. If you have nothing further I guess we can call it quits now.

M. Bundy: That is all I have. Thank you again. Over and out.

W. Bundy: Over and out.

 

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 6, 1965, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

2409. Following are highlights of one and one-half hour conversation Bundy and I had with Khanh noon February 5. Also present were Admiral Cang, who appeared to be taking detailed notes, and Ambassador Unger, Generals Westmoreland and Goodpaster, Messrs. McNaughton and Flott.

Khanh said he was having difficulties in forming promised 20-man Military-Civil Council (MCC). Explained his difficulties in getting Catholics to serve, and seemed to be trying to convey impression that these difficulties had no deeper roots than usual reluctance of Catholic hierarchy to designate members of political or governmental bodies. Also remarked that notables, of whom there were to be six, tended also to be prima donnas, and would not accept permanent assignments. As a result, he hopes now that each of 4 religions would sponsor one lay notable and armed forces would sponsor two more, thus giving twenty members. After the formation of the Council, it would choose a Chief of State (probably Suu) and approve a Prime Minister and cabinet. All this he hoped to accomplish by February 13.

Khanh asked Bundy three main questions. After Bundy had explained determination of President, USG, and American people to support SVN as long as necessary and in any way necessary, Khanh asked what about going North. Bundy replied that USG was willing to consider appropriate means for bringing pressure on North Vietnam, but this would be feasible only if it involved frank and loyal partnership with a stable and reasonably popular GVN. In discussing this, Khanh several times referred to U.S. assistance in "liberating the North". Bundy set the record straight in a very deliberate manner. He explained that while it was U.S. policy to assist SVN, it was not U.S. policy to liberate the North. Measures would be taken against the North only insofar as they support the above-stated U.S. policy objective of winning the war in the South.

Khanh's second question was whether USG would object if National Council designated a military man as chief of government. Would USG insist on a civilian chief? Bundy avoided a direct answer, indicating USG would be [looking?] only for quality and results and for indications that the person chosen enjoyed sufficient popular support to stay in power for a reasonably long time. Bundy reiterated, as he did on several other occasions as well, the importance USG attaches to governmental stability in SVN.

Khanh's third question was to ask for an explanation of "U.S. strategy", by which he appeared to mean our policy objectives. Bundy replied appropriately, emphasizing that we are here to assist GVN maintain Vietnamese independence and freedom, but that we only advise and assist; main burden inevitably falls on Vietnamese, who must learn to work together more cohesively and effectively.

After meeting had gone on well beyond scheduled time and as we were about to leave, Khanh announced that some twenty generals were in adjoining room and would like to meet Mr. Bundy. Although this was hardly fair play toward an unwarned guest, the meeting turned out to be a good thing, allowing Bundy on invitation from Khanh to make a few graceful remarks to the generals. Bundy emphasized President's determination to continue to assist Vietnam and his full support for his representatives out here. In praising Vietnamese armed forces and generals present, Bundy avoided any reference to General Khanh.

Taylor

 

74. Editorial Note

On the morning of February 6 McGeorge Bundy held a series of meetings at the residences of Ambassador Taylor and Deputy Ambassador Johnson with Vietnamese religious leaders, including Archbishop Nguyen Van Binh, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Saigon; Tran Quang Vinh, Cao Dai leader; Luong Trong Tuong, Hoa Hao leader; Thich Thien Minh, Buddhist leader; and Tran Quang Thuan, a prominent Buddhist layman. Ambassador Taylor took part in the first two meetings and briefly, along with Leonard Unger, in the meeting with Tran Quang Thuan. A schedule of the meetings is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I.

First Secretary of Embassy Frederick W. Flott prepared draft memoranda of conversation for the first two meetings. James D. Rosenthal of the Embassy's Political Section prepared draft memoranda of conversation for the last three. The memorandum of conversation with Thich Thien Minh is ibid. The other four are in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, ORG 7 Visits. Regarding Bundy's reaction to these meetings, see Cooper, Lost Crusade, page 257.

 

75. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 6, 1965, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1-1 VIET S. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was passed to the White House at 10:05 a.m.

2414. Exclusive for William Bundy from McGeorge Bundy. Please pass to Bromley Smith for President. Discussions here still continuing this evening. We have made considerable progress in discussions of dependent problem and contingency planning but have agreed that mission should present its views in separate telegrams so as to avoid joint recommendations as inappropriate for both Ambassador and me. Accordingly we now plan to prepare our own analytical report en route home rather than to send detailed comments now. Tomorrow will be spent in the field and should give additional color to conclusions which will contain few major surprises. Overall impression is that important decisions are necessary but that there is time in which to make them.

Taylor

 

76. Summary Notes of the 545th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:45-9 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The concluding time of the meeting is from the president's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) For other records of this meeting, see Document 77 and Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 124-125.

Reprisal Strikes in North Vietnam

(This is a partial record of the meeting because the writer was in and out of the Cabinet Room talking by secure phone from the Situation Room to McGeorge Bundy in Saigon.)

The meeting opened with a discussion of how to react to the surprise attack by the Viet Cong on the U.S. Army barracks at Pleiku in South Vietnam and other attacks on two South Vietnamese airfields. A recommendation was made that U.S. planes attack three targets in North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese, with U.S. air cover, attack a fourth target./2/ There was recognition that MIG's based near Hanoi might respond to the strikes.

/2/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 78.

General Wheeler: CINCPAC reports that if he receives an execute message by 10:00 p.m. tonight, his planes could be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3:00 p.m. their time.

The President gave the following figures on the four recommended targets:

Target	Troops	Military Casualties	Civilians
Dong Hoi Barracks	6,000	3,600	40
Vit Thu Lu Barracks	150	90	0
Chap Le Army Barracks	1,200	720	30
Vu Con Barracks	----	No Good Estimates	----

General Wheeler: The attack on Pleiku came as a surprise. There were no South Vietnamese casualties. Our forces were in a compound outside the town. The area has been quiet recently. At one time it was General Khanh's headquarters and formerly was pacified.

Secretary McNamara: However, the Viet Cong had recently been building up in this area.

Under Secretary Ball: We are all in accord that action must be taken. We need to decide how we shall handle the air strikes publicly. The Soviets may call for a conference. We must make clear that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are the same. We retaliate against North Vietnam because Hanoi directs the Viet Cong, supplies arms, and infiltrates men. We need to answer the question as to why we are striking North Vietnam when the Americans were attacked by Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

Deputy Defense Secretary Vance: Arrangements should be made for a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese announcement.

Under Secretary Ball: Should U.S. dependents in South Vietnam be withdrawn at once or only later at a time when the North Vietnamese may be responding to our air attacks?

General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara: Get them out now.

Ambassador Thompson: Should the U.S. dependents be evacuated so quickly that it appears we are running away?

The President: We cannot contemplate the loss of U.S. women and children in an attack by the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong in Saigon or elsewhere. We have long sought to get out the dependents and have been waiting only for the proper atmosphere.

In summary, we have decided to make the air strikes. Our strikes should be arranged so as to hit in daylight hours. We need a recommendation from Saigon. One hundred and twenty U.S. planes would attack three barracks in the south of North Vietnam and a fourth target would be hit by South Vietnamese planes. A final decision is needed within the hour.

Deputy Secretary Vance: The four targets to be struck are those discussed earlier.

General Wheeler: A total of 132 U.S. planes will be involved, plus 22 South Vietnamese planes for a total of 154. Estimates are that we will lose no planes and the South Vietnamese will lose two planes.

There followed a discussion of several issues including the need for U.S. reinforcements following the air strikes, and whether a Congressional resolution was needed to insure the legal position of the Administration. Under Secretary Ball's position was that the quicker we have a resolution, the better.

Senator Mansfield: The North Vietnamese attack has opened many eyes. We are not now in a penny ante game. It appears that the local populace in South Vietnam is not behind us, else the Viet Cong could not have carried out their surprise attack.

The President said the group would meet again at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow to decide what additional forces should be moved into South Vietnam. The strike on the four targets was authorized and the request was made that commercial transports be used to fly out dependents. (Location of targets to be struck is marked on the attached map and target list.)/3/

/3/Attached, but not printed.

Bromley Smith

 

77. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:45-9 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. Prepared by Colby on February 7. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary at the Johnson Library. The meeting was the 545th meeting of the NSC. For another record of this meeting, see Document 76.

SUBJECT
White House Meeting on Vietnam, 6 February 1965

PARTICIPANTS
The President, Mr. Smith, Mr. Reedy/2/
Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General Wheeler
Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary William Bundy, Ambassador Thompson
Secretary Dillon
Director of USIA Rowan
The Speaker/3/
Senator Mansfield
General Carter, Mr. Colby

/2/Moyers also attended. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

/3/John McCormack.

1. Mr. Vance reported to the President a telephone conversation/4/with McGeorge Bundy which relayed the unanimous recommendation of the Country Team to authorize joint U.S./Vietnamese strikes at four targets in North Vietnam. There was some discussion of the number of aircraft involved, the fact that very slight resistance was expected and the need for a rapid decision in order to permit the strikes to take place during the remaining hours of daylight in Vietnam. Secretary McNamara pointed out that all the targets are in southern North Vietnam and all are directly related to North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. He pointed out also that the targets were deliberately selected to avoid the necessity of a large operation to take out the MIG defensive forces in the North in order to permit a strike.

/4/See Document 78.

2. The President's first question was whether the U.S. efforts would be apt to alert the enemy which then could take advantage of the follow-on by the Vietnamese, as the latter were expected to be slower in getting off. Mr. McNamara expressed his doubt of this and his belief in the great importance that the Vietnamese actually do participate. Mr. McNamara pointed out that the matter had been cleared in general with the GVN hitherto and would be in response to a GVN request on this occasion. Asked who the "GVN" would be, he replied General Khanh.

3. The President then questioned how the Viet Cong had been able to launch the attack on Pleiku and whether there was a failure of local security. This was discussed generally, it being pointed out that infiltration even into the Pleiku area is not too difficult.

4. The President then asked the estimated effect of the proposed air strike. The reply emphasized that the objectives were mostly military, the main effect would occur in the Dong Hoi attack and that the estimated casualty rates ran in the neighborhood of 4,000 military with few civilians.

5. The President then asked Mr. Ball's views. Mr. Ball pointed out that all agreed that a retaliatory strike was necessary and he suggested that the targets chosen were appropriate. He said that the main problem would be how to handle the publicity and the Kosygin connection. He emphasized the necessity of relating the Pleiku attack and the infiltration directly to Hanoi, and to permit Kosygin the belief that he had been mouse-trapped by the North Vietnamese.

6. The President then requested consideration of the dependents question. He was informed that the dependents could be gotten out in 48 to 72 hours. This met general approval and the Speaker commented that the removal of dependents at this time would indicate the firmness of our intentions.

7. The President then went around the room asking each person if he concurred. All but one did so, especially Mr. Ball who emphasized the necessity of establishing an adequate and prompt response to the Pleiku attack. General Carter pointed out that the U.S. stood down the DeSoto Patrol and U-2 flights in deference to Kosygin's visit, but the enemy did not provide any similar recognition of Mr. Bundy's visit. Ambassador Thompson indicated his belief that the Soviets would protest and denounce and might call for a conference but that inaction would be worse. No exceptional enemy reactions were anticipated from either the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, although the Viet Cong was expected to step up its efforts, according to General Wheeler.

8. Senator Mansfield protested the decision, indicating that he thought that caution should be our watchword. He pointed out the lack of a solid government in Vietnam and indeed wondered what government we had cleared this operation with. He further suggested that the dependents should be gotten out before any actions were taken. He particularly emphasized that the implications and possible developments from this step be carefully analyzed, including the possibility of engaging in a large-scale conflict with China, the position the Soviet Union would take, probably assisting the healing of the Soviet-Sino split, and in summary believed that the results could be worse than Korea.

9. The President took the opposite opinion, emphasizing that he had kept the shotgun over the mantel and the bullets in the basement for a long time now, but that the enemy was killing his personnel and he could not expect them to continue their work if he did not authorize them to take steps to defend themselves. He commented that "cowardice has gotten us into more wars than response has." He particularly recalled the fact that we would not have gotten into World War I if we had been courageous in the early stages, nor World War II. He then said he realized that there was a risk of involving the Soviets and Chinese but that neither of these are friendly with us and the problem is to face up to them both.

10. The President then decided to authorize the strikes, move the dependents and to meet again to consider further steps at 8:00 a.m. The execute order would be conditioned on the Vietnamese government's approval. For the dependents, the President directed that the Defense Department provide such additional military transport as would be necessary in order to move them rapidly.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

 

78. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Viet 381. Secret. Prepared by Vance.

SUBJECT
The Events of 6-7 February in Vietnam

6 February

At 1505 I received a call from the NMCC giving initial reports of Viet Cong attacks on two compounds in the vicinity of Pleiku Airfield, on the airfield at Tuy Hoa and two villages in the immediate vicinity, and on a village some 15 miles north of Nha Trang. First reports dealt principally with the Pleiku area and indicated that there might be substantial U.S. casualties, both killed and wounded, and damage to U.S. aircraft. I reported the foregoing at 1509 in turn to Secretary McNamara and the President. I then called Mr. William Bundy but failed to reach him. I then called Secretary Ball at about 1515 to report this information and asked him to call Ambassador Taylor in Saigon and to request Taylor's, General Westmoreland's, and McGeorge Bundy's recommendations as to reprisal actions we should undertake. At 1520 I departed for the White House.

At the White House, I attended a meeting on Arms for Jordan. That meeting adjourned at 1700 and I then gave to the President the latest Vietnamese reports.

The President asked me what actions I thought would be recommended and I told him that I thought Option 1 would be recommended. I then discussed the targets included in Option 1. The President then asked me, General Wheeler, Mr. Ball, and Mr. Bill Bundy if we would agree with such recommendation. Each of us responded affirmatively. The President then inquired whether we had sent a message to Saigon requesting the views of the officials there. Mr. Bundy indicated that such a message had been sent an hour ago./2/ The meeting closed with the President asking that we let him know when the Saigon recommendations were received.

/2/Not found.

At 1830, I returned to the Pentagon and joined General Wheeler. There, we discussed the forces to be alerted, the number of persons to be evacuated, and the possible assets to be used for the evacuation. Additionally, we discussed the targets to be struck if Option 1 were recommended, and those to be struck if both Options 1 and 2 were recommended. I asked for a list of the forces available for use in the strikes and a list of those forces to be alerted--both to be used later in discussion with the President. During this discussion, General Blanchard and Admiral Mustin joined us.

At this time, Secretary McNamara called to say that he felt it desirable to call Saigon on the KY-9 secure phone and obtain Saigon's recommendations. I then called Ambassador Taylor but could not reach him and talked instead to Alexis Johnson on a normal telephone in his home. Using double talk, I asked if Washington's cable had been received and found that it had been. I told Johnson that it was urgent that we receive Saigon's recommendations as soon as possible and asked when this might be. Mr. Johnson replied that this would be within 30 minutes or so and also said that we could probably guess what their recommendations would be. In closing, I stressed again the urgency of early receipt of the recommendations, asking that they be given over a secure telephone.

I reported the foregoing telephone conversation to both the President and Mr. McNamara. The President was pleased and asked when we could expect to hear from Saigon. I estimated that it would be within one and one half hours. At this point the President noted the need to evacuate dependents and asked me what our capability was to do so. I responded that this was being checked now. The President also emphasized that we should alert the strike forces and I told him General Wheeler had done so at 1800. Finally, the President asked about alerting other forces. To this, I responded that we were working on the problem now and that I would call him again when I heard from Saigon.

At 1905 I received a call from McGeorge Bundy in Saigon over an open telephone. He said that all in Saigon unanimously recommend a) that action be taken today; b) that targets 33, 36 and 39/3/ should be hit by Admiral Sharp's forces; c) that target 32/4/ should be undertaken in a joint effort by local forces; and d) that an announcement concerning the removal of dependents could be made immediately after any action. [Omission in the source text.] for recommendations as to the time-frame for evacuation of dependents, pointing out that the President felt strongly about it. Mr. Bundy replied that the evacuation should be done promptly but in an orderly fashion. Bundy also stressed the need for prompt decision by the highest authority on their recommendations because of the problems associated with the joint effort on target 32.

/3/The Dong Hoi Barracks, the Vit Thu Lu Barracks, and the Chap Le Army Barracks, respectively.

/4/The Vu Con Barracks.

I immediately called the President, told him that we had received Saigon's recommendations, and asked when he wished to meet again. The President suggested that we meet at 1945 and asked who should be there beyond the group that had met in the afternoon, plus the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President. I suggested that the CIA should be represented and the President asked me to call General Carter. At this point I called Mr. McNamara, told him of the meeting, and said that my car would pick him up at his home. I asked a member of General Wheeler's staff to notify General Carter.

Subsequently, I received a second call from McGeorge Bundy, this time over a secure telephone. Bundy said that they wished to make a joint announcement in Saigon after the strike prior to any announcement in Washington and reiterated the great importance of joint participation in the proposed strike action. I noted that this posed timing problems and read to him a proposed cable to Admiral Sharp. Bundy said that the cable as drafted put them in a time bind and asked if it were a decision by the highest authority to proceed as specified in our draft cable. I replied negatively but said that General Wheeler and I would so recommend to the highest authority. Bundy stressed again the need for a rapid decision. I expressed the hope that I could call a decision to him by 2015 and assured him I would call him as soon as a decision was reached. At 1920, General Wheeler and I left again for the White House.

The National Security Council convened at 1935. Those present included the President, Mr. McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Senator Mansfield, Speaker McCormack, Mr. Ball, Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Carl Rowan, General Wheeler, General Carter, Mr. Colby, Mr. Reedy, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Bromley Smith and myself.

At the beginning of the meeting, I reported on the McGeorge Bundy conversation and the recommendations made by Saigon. The President then asked me to describe the targets proposed to be struck, the North Vietnamese forces at these targets, and to estimate North Vietnamese casualties both military and civilian. In turn, he asked General Wheeler to explain the details of the proposed operation and to give his views of anticipated North Vietnamese responses. General Wheeler and I responded to these questions. The President then queried Mr. Ball as to his views on the recommended course of action and the difficulties involved. Subsequently, he asked for the views of everyone around the table as to the desirability of proceeding with the recommended course of action.

After full discussion, the President, on the recommendation of the NSC, authorized the execution of the proposed course of action provided that Vietnamese clearance was obtained.

I then left the meeting to communicate this decision to McGeorge Bundy in Saigon. I further told Mr. Bundy that the decision had been made to evacuate all dependents from Vietnam as rapidly as possible following the strike, and that there could be no reclama of this decision. Bundy said that we already had military clearance; political clearance would be had shortly. I indicated that we would await word of political clearance and stressed the need to have it as soon as possible.

After this conversation I returned to the NSC meeting where a proposed press release for issuance Sunday morning was being discussed. It was agreed that the NSC would reconvene at 0800, 7 February, to discuss actions to be taken on Sunday and the issuance of a public release.

Soon thereafter I received a call from McGeorge Bundy saying that political clearance had been obtained. I relayed this to General Wheeler and directed him to issue the order of execution, which he did. I also reported these actions to the President and those others still present in the NSC meeting. We then reworked the proposed press release to be issued after the NSC meeting on Sunday morning as well as a release to be issued on the evacuation of dependents. General Wheeler and I then left the White House to return to the Pentagon.

At the Pentagon I then cleared a proposed cable with respect to the alerting of additional forces for possible movement./5/ I also authorized the use of ten additional aircraft for the strike on target 33. And, finally, I authorized the removal of Farm Gate markings from U.S.-manned aircraft for the strike on target 32 if this could be done without delaying the strike.

/5/Not further identified.

General Wheeler and I then talked to Ambassador Taylor and Mr. McNaughton on the telephone. General Taylor asked that we delay the time over target for targets 33, 36, and 39 by one hour, making the new TOT 1600 Vietnam time. General Wheeler and I approved this change dependent upon Admiral Sharp's agreement. Thereafter, Admiral Sharp said that it was infeasible to make this change and Ambassador Taylor agreed to the original time over target of 1500 H.

At 2330 I met with General Burchinal, his staff, Mr. Lennartson and Colonel Smith. At this time I indicated the nature and content of the charts and maps which would be required for a background press conference on Sunday morning and discussed the necessary back-up materials. I then met with General Burchinal to review the status of our preparations, in particular a requirement for military aircraft for the evacuation of dependents. At this time I authorized General Burchinal to move MATS aircraft as far as Clark Field to be in position to expedite a dependent evacuation. I also asked General Burchinal to prepare another list of additional forces which might be required should the North Vietnamese and/or the ChiComs take escalatory action.

We also discussed the possible ChiCom reactions and the ability of the U.S. to move ground forces into the area if the ChiComs moved on the ground. General Burchinal said that he was satisfied that our plans were in good shape and that we could respond promptly.

7 February

At 0105, I received the first report of aircraft airborne on their mission--eight A1H planes had departed the Ranger on the way to target 36 with a predicted time over target of 0700Z (0200 Washington time)./6/

/6/The President's Daily Diary indicates that he received telephone calls from Vance at 3:40, 4:10, 4:55, and 5:10 a.m. on February 7, apparently reporting on the results of the air strikes. (Johnson Library)

 

79. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 7, 1965, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 3:13 a.m.

2420. To McNamara and Vance from McNaughton. Assure personal delivery prior to 0800 NSC meeting.

1. Following are the points I wanted to make on telephone but could not because no secure line available. They relate to theory of a graduated reprisal program which was discussed at length here by Bundy group with Taylor, Johnson and Westmoreland. This message is not intended as official transmission of any consensus, but is intended to flag a few points which may affect the characterization, by statements to the press, of the reprisal action now in process, and of our future intentions.

2. The concept would be that of a graduated reprisal program which, through a measured, controlled sequence of actions against the DRV, brought sufficient pressure to bear on the DRV to persuade it to stop its intervention in the South. An analysis, rationale and illustrative scenario for this program had been put in draft/2/ here yesterday, before the Pleiku incident.

/2/Apparently a reference to Manfull's draft memorandum dated February 6, "A Graduated Reprisal Program to Stop DRV Intervention in SVN." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVII)

3. Our thought now is that the first action (today's) would be a clear cut reprisal for a specific atrocity, but that hereafter reprisal actions would become less and less related to specific VC spectaculars and more and more related to a catalogue of VC outrages in SVN say in a prior several-day period of time. Presumably outrages such as assassinations, railroad destruction, and so on would, as the reprisal program progresses, no longer be privileged VC acts. They would be scooped up in the general statement of provocations which justified the then-current military action against the DRV. All along, care would be taken to make clear that there is no objective to destroy or conquer the DRV.

4. For the plan to work best, the GVN should participate prominently in the reprisals and in the public announcements. There is a feeling that the announcements in each case should be made here in Saigon.

5. Not much of a government is required for the GVN to play its role. The present government, for example, ineffectual as it is, is enough to participate in such a program of graduated reprisals. It is not good enough to carry out the pacification program, but that is another question.

6. The reprisal program thus gives something like a Phase II, but provides a much better international and internal-US posture. It also reduces pressure for negotiations. Feeling is that US should be very much in background when and if negotiations begin to make sense--that, if there is an adequate government in South Vietnam at that time, any talks should be between GVN and DRV, probably at a military level.

7. Related to all this is the judgment that the fabric of SVN is pulling apart, that things are going badly in the field as well as in Saigon, and just about only question is how long it will take for the situation to disintegrate. The judgment is that a regular program will probably dampen VC activities in due course and will probably inspire the South Vietnamese to more effective efforts. The belief is widespread among the South Vietnamese that the US is on the verge of bugging out.

8. Relevance of all of the above is that statements made Sunday and Monday/3/ will differ depending on whether Pleiku reprisal is thought of as a single-shot affair like Gulf of Tonkin or whether it is thought of as the start of reprisal-oriented squeeze. Bundy who has not seen this message, thought you would want to have this informal thinking in hand Sunday, since we are not due to arrive Andrews until late Sunday night. He will report his views on arrival. You can expect a message from Taylor on this subject later./4/

/3/February 7 and 8.

/4/Apparent reference to Document 93.

Taylor

 

80. Summary Notes of the 546th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, February 7, 1965, 8-9:45 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. For another record of this meeting, see Document 81

Reprisal Strikes in North Vietnam

There was a discussion of the statement to be issued from the White House announcing the reprisal air strikes in North Vietnam.

Senator Mansfield: Why cannot we handle this matter through the United Nations? Can't the Geneva powers act?

The President: This cannot be done.

Secretary McNamara: The surprise attack on our base at Pleiku resulted in 7 U.S. deaths and 109 wounded. Numerous U.S. planes were damaged.

In reprisal, four army barracks in North Vietnam were attacked. Three of the four targets were weathered in. Either the attack planes did not take off or they went to the target but could not see enough to drop their bombs. A total of 33 attack aircraft were involved, plus 8 planes providing aircap and 8 planes engaged in flak suppression.

As to our next move, Ambassador Taylor recommends we attack the three targets not hit because of weather./2/ Notwithstanding his recommendation, no U.S. planes should take part in a second attack. A South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable. We would provide an aircap of 4 to 8 planes plus 4 to 8 flak suppression planes to assist the South Vietnamese.

/2/This recommendation was made by Taylor in telegram 2419 from Saigon, 3 p.m. Saigon time February 7, and received at the Department of State at 2:08 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

Under Secretary Ball: The reprisal by the South Vietnamese would be for the Viet Cong attack on a South Vietnam village. This is a different situation from the strikes authorized yesterday. We need to avoid appearing to respond only when Americans are attacked.

Secretary McNamara is right in recommending that we should not hit today the three targets not hit yesterday. If we do so, the Communists will get a wrong signal and think that we are launching an offensive. Our officials in Saigon want a graduated response to the entire North Vietnamese military effort rather than merely retaliatory strikes to attacks by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

General Wheeler: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North Vietnamese effort is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the three targets are not necessary from a military point of view. However, a South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable.

Ambassador Thompson: We have completed our reprisal action for the North Vietnamese surprise attack. Another attack cannot be called reprisal. The punishment should fit the crime. No additional air strikes should be made now.

(The statement to be issued by the White House was approved and given to George Reedy for release to the press./3/)

/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238-239.

Secretary Dillon: If we encourage an air strike by the South Vietnamese, everyone will think it is a U.S. attack. Therefore, we should send along U.S. planes to ensure that the South Vietnamese strike is successful.

Representative Ford: Why should we only hit one out of four targets? If the plan to strike four was good, why should we not complete it?

Several Council members explained the nature of the decision to make a reprisal strike only.

The President: We need to know the extent of the damage caused by yesterday's strike. This will have a bearing on future decisions. We should give consideration to Taylor's recommendation but for the time being, we should approve a strike by the South Vietnamese only. Bomb damage assessment flights by U.S. planes should be flown.

Secretary McNamara, turning to the question of withdrawing dependents, circulated a text of a White House release covering the subject. It would announce the immediate withdrawal of dependents or their withdrawal in a two-week period, as Ambassador Taylor prefers.

The President: For 15 months we have been trying to bring about the withdrawal of dependents. Thus, a decision to do so within 15 days is acceptable. The number of days in which they will be withdrawn can be worked out so long as it is absolutely certain that the dependents are coming out.

Secretary McNamara: The Hawk Battalion will go ashore at Danang today. Some planes which were diverted and went on to Saigon can be used for withdrawing dependents. As many as 400 or 500 can be removed on these planes.

The President: Do we think that Saigon is going to be a target? If so, why should we make any announcement about the withdrawal of dependents? We should hold the announcement until we have talked to Ambassador Taylor by phone. The word "orderly" should be taken out of the announcement.

The announcement as finally released is attached./4/

/4/Not attached, but see ibid., p. 239.

Also attached is the transcript of the Press Secretary's briefing at 10:00 a.m. February 7./5/

/5/Attached, but not printed.

Bromley Smith

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 81 through 86