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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

81. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. Prepared by Colby. For another record of this meeting, see Document 80.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting, 7 February 1965

PARTICIPANTS/2/
The President, Mr. Reedy, Mr. Cater, Mr. Valenti, General Clifton, and others

Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Vance, General Wheeler

Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Bundy, Assistant Secretary Greenfield, Ambassador Thompson

The Speaker
Senator Mansfield
Representative Ford
General Carter, Mr. Colby

/2/Also attending were Moyers, Bromley Smith, Mann, Dillon, and Rowan. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

1. The first part of the meeting was devoted to editing the White House release/3/ on the evening's developments. General Taylor had recommended that the reference to the Tonkin incident be taken out as it was only a one-time activity. State agreed with this position. It was decided, however, to leave the reference in a modified form.

/3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238-239.

2. Senator Mansfield suggested that the release give particular emphasis to the President's resolution to avoid any wider war and that it indicate that we are prepared to bring this incident to the UN or to a reconvened Geneva Conference. The President said that his advisors had told him that it was hopeless to expect anything out of the UN, which Mr. Ball confirmed from Ambassador Stevenson. With respect to the Geneva Conference, the President said that he would be prepared to consider this somewhat later but not at this moment. Mr. Ball emphasized that any Geneva Conference should only be entered from a position of greater strength than we now have.

3. Mr. McNamara then gave a review of the situation. He brought out that Ambassador Taylor had recommended that all additional targets not hit on the first run be undertaken on the second day. However, Mr. McNamara said he and Mr. Ball were of the opinion that additional U.S. strikes would not be appropriate but that a VNAF strike with U.S. support was not only appropriate but quite essential, in order to demonstrate full Vietnamese participation. Mr. McNamara and Mr. Ball based their recommendation on the desirability that Hanoi and Moscow not be led to believe that the U.S. had begun a full-blown offensive effort. They recommended that this be a matter of separate consideration and decision and not to be the result of bad weather. Mr. William Bundy reported that Ambassador Taylor will probably recommend such a steady increase in pressures but he also agreed that this should be considered separately perhaps after Mr. McGeorge Bundy's return. General Wheeler pointed out that the JCS believes that increased military pressures are needed but that these are not needed immediately and he agreed with the recommendation. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that another American strike could be construed as an American campaign whereas a VNAF strike would be comparatively easy to explain. The latter also left Kosygin some leeway. Senator Mansfield asked whether Kosygin would not consult with Peking on his way back to Moscow. Ambassador Thompson said that he might consult but that the leadership of the Soviet Union today is so much a collegial affair that no decision could be arrived at before Kosygin returned to Moscow to consult.

4. It was brought out that the VNAF alone might not do much but Mr. McNamara said they definitely should try. Mr. Dillon wondered at the possible bad effects of a VNAF failure. General Wheeler commented that they should be able to accomplish something, especially with full American assistance in navigation, flak suppression, etc. Senator Mansfield agreed with the current action as did the Speaker. The President said that he would agree with this step but wait for Mr. Bundy's return before making any decisions as to further courses of action.

5. Representative Ford stated that he found it difficult to understand why a plan that was considered appropriate last night was now stopped when only halfway completed. The President pointed out that the decision was to make a "prompt and adequate" response, that no one other than those present knew how many targets were contemplated and that the one target hit was by far the biggest and had the most potential for damage. He also said that he wished to have a chance to review the matter with Mr. Bundy on his return before making any decisions as to going further than the present. He added that a prompt, adequate and joint (with the GVN) reply was what was sought. Representative Ford indicated that he would prefer the original plan and Ambassador Taylor's recommendation. (Comment: Representative Ford's raising this was partly caused by his reading a CIA summary/4/ that preliminary post-strike reporting indicated that "at least some damage" was done. The President picked this up and asked whether CIA had any separate reports, which General Carter indicated was not the case. Mr. Vance and General Wheeler indicated that the reporting did indicate very substantial damage to the target area.)

/4/Not further identified.

6. Senator Mansfield stated that he believed that the purpose of the operation was to impress Ho Chi Minh, General Giap and so forth. He therefore agreed with Mr. Rowan and General Wheeler that it was necessary that Vietnamese participate in the operation, but that it was not necessary to go any further at this time. The President commented that he also intended to impress Kosygin and a number of others in the world, including our own citizens.

7. The President then emphasized the necessity that the VNAF strike's success be assured by the fullest possible support from the American side. He also directed that an extensive effort be made to determine the extent of the damage done in the first strike. He said that he would consider General Taylor's recommendation but that he would await Mr. Bundy's return before any additional steps.

8. With respect to dependents, it was pointed out that Ambassador Taylor preferred a 15 to 30 day evacuation on a deliberate scale in order not to create any feeling of panic. The President indicated considerable impatience with this saying that this 15 day type of operation had been going on for 15 months and he wished it to move. Secretary McNamara indicated that he preferred a rapid evacuation and wondered whether the President would accept a one or two week period. The President stated that he did not wish to have the number of days precisely fixed but he wished to push Ambassador Taylor to all deliberate speed, to provide him with all facilities, etc. However, he preferred that the matter not be exposed to public discussion until an agreement with Ambassador Taylor could be obtained. He therefore directed Secretary McNamara to consult with Ambassador Taylor on the phone in order to seek some agreement. Senator Mansfield commented that it might be good to scare some of the Saigonese who have participated too little in this war to date.

9. The President then went around the room asking for any additional comments. With respect to CIA, he asked whether it had any reports he should be made aware of or whether it had any suspicions as to what may happen. He commented that he did not wish to be told later that we had suspected something. General Carter said that all our reporting had been made available and that we had no reservations.

10. Ambassador Thompson then commented that he anticipated the possibility of an action by the Communists in Laos, and by the Chinese to strengthen the defenses of North Vietnam. He believed that the result would be more apt to divide China from the Soviets than to put them together. General Wheeler anticipated additional Viet Cong pressure in South Vietnam.

11. Senator Mansfield said he had spoken frankly in response to the President's invitation but wished to assure him, now the decision was made, that he would work to support him.

12. The President made clear his insistence that all avoid comment on the meeting and refer questions to the State and Defense Departments.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

 

82. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 7, 1965, 11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted, approved, and initialed by Thompson.

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin, USSR
Ambassador Thompson

I told the Ambassador that I had asked him to come by my house in order that I might discuss with him the events that had taken place in Viet-Nam over the week-end. As he knew, a sneak attack had been made on American personnel in an American compound and at an airfield as well as other attacks in South Viet-Nam. I told him that a destroyer patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin had been scheduled but that we had cancelled it when we had learned of Mr. Kosygin's visit to Hanoi in order not to embarrass him or cause any misunderstanding. I said we had also asked the South Vietnamese to suspend some actions which might have been misinterpreted. As he knew, the President had sent McGeorge Bundy to Saigon and the other side had made this attack on our personnel which had killed seven and wounded a very large number. These were not the first attacks of this kind, but in the circumstances in which these took place, and by their nature, we believe that our failure to act would have been misunderstood. We believed in fact that this was a deliberate attempt on the part of Hanoi to, as we would put it, "mouse trap" Mr. Kosygin. We believed they thought their action would enable Hanoi and Peiping to say that they had demonstrated that the United States was a paper tiger.

I said that as he knew, the President had suggested an exchange of visits with the Soviet leaders in order to try to resolve our problems. The President was very sincere in this and our policy with respect to Southeast Asia remained as it had been, namely, that if the North Vietnamese aggression in this area was ended and if North Viet-Nam would respect the integrity of its neighbors, we would be delighted to withdraw our forces from that area.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if I had been authorized by the President to make these remarks and I replied that I was acting under his instructions.

Dobrynin asked whether the President would be making a statement to the nation or holding a press conference about the matter and I said that a report on what had happened would be made by the Pentagon, but I did not think that the President intended to hold a special press conference.

Dobrynin said that he would, of course, inform his government of my remarks. He said that our action in hitting another state was different from a guerrilla action and he thought that his government would consider our action as a deliberate provocation. I pointed out that it was not we that had taken the first action and on the contrary we had taken steps to avoid this development. All we are asking is for the carrying out of the Geneva Accords./2/

/2/On February 9 Dobrynin, on instructions from his government, made a formal oral reply to Thompson regarding the U.S. reprisals against North Vietnam. The Soviet Government refused to accept U.S. justifications for the bombing. Thompson's memorandum of their conversation, in which he quotes Dobrynin's oral statement, is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, 1965. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in volume XIV.

 

83. Editorial Note

The Bundy mission departed Saigon the afternoon of Sunday, February 7, and arrived back in Washington at approximately 10 p.m. As Bundy described their schedule upon returning to Washington, in a background press briefing:

"We were to have spent Sunday on a series of field expeditions in the neighborhood of Saigon examining various aspects of the fortification program but Sunday morning began for us as Sunday noon began here with the news of the attacks centering on Pleiku but not limited to Pleiku and we joined in the process of making sure that the views and opinions and attitudes of the country team were adequately and clearly reported to Washington while the President and the NSC were viewing the situation and making their immediate decisions. At the time I decided it would be more useful for us to get back here as rapidly as possible. We rescheduled the aircraft as early as it could be managed to bring it in from Clark Field. We cancelled the planned stop-over in Honolulu, came home the straight route. There was, however, time available before that return could be organized for General Goodpaster and for me to go with General Westmoreland to look at the airfield at Pleiku and fly over the compound nearby and then to visit the field hospital halfway back toward Saigon and then we took off Sunday afternoon, Saigon time." (Transcript of a White House Background Briefing by McGeorge Bundy and George Reedy, February 8, 1965; Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I)

For Chester Cooper's reminiscences of the journey back to Washington and Bundy's drafting of his report aboard the plane, see Cooper's "Fateful Day in Vietnam--10 Years Ago," The Washington Post, February 11, 1975, page A-14.

 

84. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

En route from Saigon to Washington, February 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II. top Secret. Bundy met with the President from 10:48 to 11:25 p.m. on February 7. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) At a press briefing at the White House the following day, Press Secretary George Reedy said that Bundy had met with the President about 11 p.m. the previous evening, but "there were no substantive conversations, he merely left with the President a few written notes, a few papers for night reading." (Ibid., National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II) This memorandum and annex were presumably among the papers left with the President.

RE
The Situation in Vietnam

This memorandum attempts to describe the situation, the stakes and the measures which I think should now be taken.

I. Summary Conclusions

The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears inevitable--probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next year or so. There is still time to turn it around, but not much.

The stakes in Vietnam are extremely high. The American investment is very large, and American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the Vietnamese themselves, and there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which offers any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a neutral non-Communist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist leadership, but no such force currently exists, and any negotiated U.S. withdrawal today would mean surrender on the installment plan.

The policy of graduated and continuing reprisal outlined in Annex A is the most promising course available, in my judgment. That judgment is shared by all who accompanied me from Washington, and I think by all members of the country team.

The events of the last twenty-four hours have produced a practicable point of departure for this policy of reprisal, and for the removal of U.S. dependents. They may also have catalyzed the formation of a new Vietnamese government. If so, the situation may be at a turning point.

There is much that can and should be done to support and to supplement our present effort, while adding sustained reprisals. But I want to stress one important general conclusion which again is shared by all members of my party: the U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men, and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. None of the special solutions or criticisms put forward with zeal by individual reformers in government or in the press is of major importance, and many of them are flatly wrong. No man is perfect, and not every tactical step of recent months has been perfectly chosen, but when you described the Americans in Vietnam as your first team, you were right.

II. The General Situation

For the last year--and perhaps for longer--the overall situation in Vietnam has been deteriorating. The Communists have been gaining and the anti-Communist forces have been losing. As a result there is now great uncertainty among Vietnamese as well as Americans as to whether Communist victory can be prevented. There is nervousness about the determination of the U.S. Government. There is recrimination and fear among Vietnamese political leaders. There is an appearance of wariness among some military leaders. There is a worrisome lassitude among the Vietnamese generally. There is a distressing absence of positive commitment to any serious social or political purpose. Outside observers are ready to write the patient off. All of this tends to bring latent anti-Americanism dangerously near to the surface.

To be an American in Saigon today is to have a gnawing feeling that time is against us. Junior officers in all services are able, zealous and effective within the limits of their means. Their morale is sustained by the fact that they know that they are doing their jobs well and that they will not have to accept the responsibility for defeat. But near the top, where responsibility is heavy and accountability real, one can sense the inner doubts of men whose outward behavior remains determined.

The situation is not all black. The overall military effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces in open combat continues to grow. The month of January was one of outstanding and genuine success in offensive military action, showing the highest gross count of Viet Cong dead of any month of the war, and a very high ratio also of enemy to friendly losses. We believe that General Westmoreland is right (and General Alsop wrong) when he says that the Viet Cong do not now plan to expose themselves to large-scale military engagements in which their losses on the average would be high and their gains low. (The operation at Binh Gia/2/ is analyzed as a special case, representing the taking of a friendly Catholic village as bait rather than a decision to force pitched battle--more such cases are expected and the particular military problem posed is difficult.)

/2/See footnote 5, Document 14.

Moreover, the Vietnamese people, although war weary, are also remarkably tough and resilient, and they do not find the prospect of Communist domination attractive. Their readiness to quit is much lower than the discouraging events of recent months might lead one to expect. It is probable that most Vietnamese think American withdrawal is more likely than an early switch to neutralism or surrender by major elements within Vietnam.

Nevertheless the social and political fabric is stretched thin, and extremely unpleasant surprises are increasingly possible--both political and military.

And it remains a stubborn fact that the percentage of the countryside which is dominated or threatened by the Viet Cong continues to grow. Even in areas which are "cleared," the follow-on pacification is stalled because of widespread belief that the Viet Cong are going to win in the long run. The areas which can be regarded as truly cleared and pacified and safe are few and shrinking. (An important exception to this is the area of Saigon and its immediate surroundings. The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any strangling siege of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent judgment on Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its precise measure of success, it is of great importance that this operation be pursued with full vigor. That is the current policy of the mission.)

III. The Political Situation

Next only to the overall state of the struggle against the Viet Cong, the shape and structure of the government is the most important element of the Saigon situation. We made it our particular business to examine the question whether and to what degree a stable government is a necessity for the successful prosecution of our policy in Vietnam. We reached a mixed conclusion.

For immediate purposes--and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe that the government need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw power while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US/GVN policy. That is about all it can do.

In the longer run, it is necessary that a government be established which will in one way or another be able to maintain its political authority against all challenges over a longer time than the governments of the last year and a half.

The composition and direction of such a government is a most difficult problem, and we do not wholly agree with the mission in our estimate of its nature.

The mood of the mission with respect to the prospect of obtaining such a government is one of pessimism and frustration. This is only natural in terms of the events of the past many weeks. Two dominant themes predominate: a government headed by Khanh will be difficult if not impossible to deal with and, in any case, would be short lived; the Buddhists (or, more specifically, the few politically activist bonzes) must be confronted and faced down (by military means if necessary) lest they maintain their power to unseat any government that does not bow to their every demand. We tend to differ with the mission on both counts.

Specifically, we believe that General Khanh, with all his faults, is by long odds the outstanding military man currently in sight--and the most impressive personality generally. We do not share the conclusion of Ambassador Taylor that he must somehow be removed from the military and political scene.

There are strong reasons for the Ambassador's total lack of confidence in Khanh. At least twice Khanh has acted in ways that directly spoiled Ambassador Taylor's high hopes for December. When he abolished the High National Council he undercut the prospect of the stable government needed for Phase II action against the North. In January he overthrew Huong just when the latter, in the Embassy's view, was about to succeed in putting the bonzes in their place.

Khanh is not an easy man to deal with. It is clear that he takes a highly tactical view of truth, although General Westmoreland asserts that Khanh has never deceived him. He is intensely ambitious and intent above all else on maintaining and advancing his own power. He gravely lacks the confidence of many of his colleagues--military and civilian--and he seems not to be personally popular with the public. He is correctly assessed as tricky. He remains able, energetic, perceptive and resilient, and in our judgment he will pursue the fight against the Communists as long as he can count on U.S. help. (If he should conclude that the U.S. was violently against him personally, he might well seek a way to power by some anti-American path, a path which would lead to disaster for both Vietnam and the United States.)

But our principal reason for opposing any sharp break with Khanh is that we see no one else in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of politics.

We also differ from the Embassy in our estimate of the Buddhist leaders. The dominant Embassy view is that "the Buddhists" are really just a handful of irresponsible and designing clerics and that they must be curbed by firmness. We agree that they may well have to be limited at some point, especially in their use of mobs, but we also think they must be offered some accommodation.

We feel that the operative concept should be incorporation into the affairs of government rather than confrontation. This is easier said than done, because the Buddhists have many of the bad habits of men who have prospered by irresponsible opposition. Still there are signs that both Buddhist laymen and bonzes are now taking a more positive stance. We feel that the mission might do more in attempting to direct or channel the Buddhists into a more useful and positive role--an active rather than a passive approach. The Buddhists now play a key role in the balance of political forces, so that something more than "confrontation" must be achieved if there is to be any active government at all.

Having registered these two immediate and important differences of emphasis, we should add that in our judgment the mission has acted at about the right level of general involvement in the problem of Vietnamese government-making. American advice is sought by all elements, and all try to bend it to their own ends. The mission attempts to keep before all elements the importance of stable government, and it quietly presses the value of those who are known to be good, solid, able ministerial timber.

In a situation in which confidence is low and uncertainty great, strongly ambitious forces like Khanh and the Buddhists might react very vigorously against an overt American attempt to form or actively support a government against their liking. Anti-Americanism is a theme that is potentially explosive, and therefore tempting to those who feel that we are blocking their ambitions. This is one lesson, to us, of the outburst in Hue last month.

On the other hand, no power whose stake is as great and whose presence as clear as those of the United States in Vietnam can afford to stand aside entirely, and such a passive posture would not be understood or approved by the Vietnamese themselves.

It is important, therefore, that the mission maintain a constant and active concern with the politics of government-making. This it is doing. While it is very difficult to second-guess this effort, we do recommend a telegram of guidance which might take into account the marginal differences from mission thinking which are suggested above. In the light of further discussion, a message of this sort will be drafted for consideration.

IV. Strengthening the Pacification Program

If we suppose that new hopes are raised--at least temporarily--by a reprisal program, and if we suppose further that a government somewhat better than the bare minimum is established, the most urgent order of business will then be the improvement and broadening of the pacification program, especially in its non-military elements.

The mission fully concurs in the importance of this effort. We believe, however, that consideration should be given to important modifications in its organization for this purpose. In particular we believe that there should be intensive effort to strengthen our program at the margin between military advice and economic development--in the area which implies civil government for the soldiers and police action for the aid mission. These efforts, important as they are understood to be, are somehow at the edge of vision for both parties. General Westmoreland and his people inevitably think first of military programs, though they have been imaginative and understanding about the importance of other aspects. Mr. Killen and the USOM people are centrally concerned with problems of aid and of economic improvement, although they talk with conviction and energy about their increasing police effort. It remains a fact that its own organization for helping to provide real security for an area which has been "cleared" in crude military terms is unfinished business for the U.S. mission. What is true of our side is doubly true of the Vietnamese.

We do not offer a definite solution to this problem. We are inclined to suggest, however, that one important and unemployed asset is the Special Forces of the Defense Department. Because of the predominant role of the U.S. military, and because of the generous spirit and broad mind of General Westmoreland himself, we are inclined to believe that the easiest growing edge for this work may be through the use of some of these versatile and flexible units.

We would think it important, however, that an effort of this kind be coordinated at a high level between the Defense Department and AID, and we believe that a joint mission which would include either Director Bell or Mr. Gaud from AID is urgently needed for the purpose of building this missing link into our program.

V. A Sense of Positive Hope

Vietnamese talk is full of the need for "revolution." Vietnamese practice is empty of action to match the talk--so much so that the word "revolution" sometimes seems to have no real meaning. Yet in fact there is plainly a deep and strong yearning among the young and the unprivileged for a new and better social order. This is what the Buddhist leaders are groping toward; this is what the students and young Turk generals are seeking. This yearning does not find an adequate response in American policy as Vietnamese see it. This is one cause of latent anti-American feeling. We only perceived this problem toward the end of our visit. We think it needs urgent further attention. We make no present recommendations. We do believe that over the long pull our military and political firmness must be matched by our political and economic support for the hopes that are embodied to Vietnamese in the word "revolution."

VI. The Basic U.S. Commitment

The prospect in Vietnam is grim. The energy and persistence of the Viet Cong are astonishing. They can appear anywhere--and at almost any time. They have accepted extraordinary losses and they come back for more. They show skill in their sneak attacks and ferocity when cornered. Yet the weary country does not want them to win.

There are a host of things the Vietnamese need to do better and areas in which we need to help them. The place where we can help most is in the clarity and firmness of our own commitment to what is in fact as well as in rhetoric a common cause. There is one grave weakness in our posture in Vietnam which is within our own power to fix--and that is a widespread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience and determination to take the necessary action and stay the course.

This is the overriding reason for our present recommendation of a policy of sustained reprisal. Once such a policy is put in force, we shall be able to speak in Vietnam on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness.

One final word. At its very best the struggle in Vietnam will be long. It seems to us important that this fundamental fact be made clear and our understanding of it be made clear to our own people and to the people of Vietnam. Too often in the past we have conveyed the impression that we expect an early solution when those who live with this war know that no early solution is possible. It is our own belief that the people of the United States have the necessary will to accept and to execute a policy that rests upon the reality that there is no short cut to success in South Vietnam.

McG. B.

Annex A/3/

/3/Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 687-691. Previous drafts of this paper dated February 6 and 7, both of which were entitled "A New Approach to Retaliation," are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II.

Paper Prepared by the Members of the Bundy Mission

A POLICY OF SUSTAINED REPRISAL

I. Introductory

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam--a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.

While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher--and more visible to American feelings--than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam.

Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide--as it may--the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost.

II. Outline of the Policy

1. In partnership with the Government of Vietnam, we should develop and exercise the option to retaliate against any VC act of violence to persons or property.

2. In practice, we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the assassination of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official; we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not necessarily to a shot fired into a small shop in the countryside.

3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It should be possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped--and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam.

4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forbearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscriminately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible.

5. Having once made this announcement, we should execute our reprisal policy with as low a level of public noise as possible. It is to our interest that our acts should be seen--but we do not wish to boast about them in ways that make it hard for Hanoi to shift its ground. We should instead direct maximum attention to the continuing acts of violence which are the cause of our continuing reprisals.

6. This reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and pressure should be increased only gradually--and as indicated above it should be decreased if VC terror visibly decreases. The object would not be to "win" an air war against Hanoi, but rather to influence the course of the struggle in the South.

7. At the same time it should be recognized that in order to maintain the power of reprisal without risk of excessive loss, an "air war" may in fact be necessary. We should therefore be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an explanation should be that these actions are intended solely to insure the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and in no sense represent any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions should not be difficult to develop.

8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist counter-action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terrorism, especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of any action. They should be carefully reviewed--but we believe them to be acceptable.

9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular" outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort.

III. Expected Effect of Sustained Reprisal Policy

1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South--in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres.

2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes--and our own conversations confirm--that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable.

3. This favorable reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in pressing for a more effective government--at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and this new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts--and conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields.

4. The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government.

5. We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence.

6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other stimulants, the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is large enough so that we ourselves believe that a very major effort all along the line should be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible upward turn in pacification, in governmental effectiveness, in operations against the Viet Cong, and in the whole U.S./GVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have enduring long-term effects.

7. While emphasizing the importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of the force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.

8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy--they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy--to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency--will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam.

IV. Present Action Recommendations

1. This general recommendation was developed in intensive discussions in the days just before the attacks on Pleiku. These attacks and our reaction to them have created an ideal opportunity for the prompt development and execution of sustained reprisals. Conversely, if no such policy is now developed, we face the grave danger that Pleiku, like the Gulf of Tonkin, may be a short-run stimulant and a long-term depressant. We therefore recommend that the necessary preparations be made for continuing reprisals. The major necessary steps to be taken appear to us to be the following:

(1) We should complete the evacuation of dependents.

(2) We should quietly start the necessary westward deployments of back-up contingency forces.

(3) We should develop and refine a running catalogue of Viet Cong offenses which can be published regularly and related clearly to our own reprisals. Such a catalogue should perhaps build on the foundation of an initial White Paper.

(4) We should initiate joint planning with the GVN on both the civil and military level. Specifically, we should give a clear and strong signal to those now forming a government that we will be ready for this policy when they are.

(5) We should develop the necessary public and diplomatic statements to accompany the initiation and continuation of this program.

(6) We should insure that a reprisal program is matched by renewed public commitment to our family of programs in the South, so that the central importance of the southern struggle may never be neglected.

(7) We should plan quiet diplomatic communication of the precise meaning of what we are and are not doing, to Hanoi, to Peking and to Moscow.

(8) We should be prepared to defend and to justify this new policy by concentrating attention in every forum upon its cause--the aggression in the South.

(9) We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a stand down of Viet Cong violence. A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable.

 

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 8, 1965, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 10:22 p.m. on February 7.

2430. For the President. Ref. Depcirtel 1443./2/ I feel obliged to appeal to you for assistance in permitting us to carry out the "orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam" announced in your statement of February 8./3/ By the flood of cables of various US agencies on my desk this morning, it is apparent that your decision is being interpreted as requiring use of standard emergency evacuation procedures. These procedures call for rapid outshipment of dependents on military aircraft to intermediate "safe-havens" where they are temporarily held pending a second move to destinations. Such methods are not required by or suitable for the situation here where we wish to give the impression of leaving SVN with dignity and composure. You are aware, I am sure, over our concern lest a precipitous departure alarm our Vietnamese friends and create unjustified fears.

/2/Circular telegram 1443, February 7, contained the text of the President's statement that day on the withdrawal of U.S. dependents from South Vietnam. (Ibid.)

/3/The statement was released on February 7; see footnote 4, Document 80.

Recognizing the inevitability of eventual evacuation of dependents we have been working quietly for some time on an orderly evacuation plan based on the movement of dependents to destination in commercial and MATS passenger aircraft without passage through safe-havens. We estimate that we can carry out this plan in a week to ten days with minimum discomfort and inconvenience to the hundreds of families who learned for the first time at breakfast this morning that their pattern of life soon must change. I earnestly request to be allowed to continue to proceed in accordance with this plan, which we have already begun to implement, calling on outside agencies for help as the need is determined here.

Taylor

 

86. Memorandum of Meeting/1/

Washington, February 8, 1965, 9:48 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret.

(Partial record of February 8, 1965, meeting with the President by a group which met before NSC meeting.)/2/

/2/The President's Daily Diary does not mention this preliminary meeting but indicates that the President went to the Cabinet Room at 9:48 a.m. and stayed there through the conclusion of the NSC meeting at 11:35 a.m. (Johnson Library) See Document 88 for information on attendance and another record of this preliminary meeting. For records of the NSC meeting, see Documents 87 and 88.

Secretary McNamara said that if we had to destroy the MIG airplanes now in North Vietnam we would have to adopt Phase II of the December program plus additional actions.

General Wheeler commented that sooner or later the MIGs would come in. As U.S. air strikes are made on targets farther north, intervention of the MIGs is to be expected.

The President asked if it were true that very quickly we would be required to take out the MIGs. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler said yes.

Secretary McNamara said it was not necessary for us to conduct a raid a day but one raid each week would be enough to keep morale up in Saigon. He said the situation might not come to a head for three to six weeks. We need not now say that we have approved Phase II but we should explain to Ambassador Taylor that our present decisions involve actions less than those contemplated in Phase II. As soon as we tell Khanh we are going to undertake future actions, we can urge him to move forward as quickly as possible to establish a stable government in Saigon.

The President said we face a choice of going forward or running. We have chosen the first alternative. All of us agree on this but there remains some difference as to how fast we should go forward.

In response to a question as to what the Congressional leaders should be told when they joined the group for the formal NSC Meeting at 10:30, the President said he would ask Secretary McNamara to report on the South Vietnamese raid and to give any new information about the U.S. raid of the day before. The President then said he would explain that in December we had decided that the time was coming for intensified U.S. efforts which required a stable government in Saigon. Before we could undertake these efforts we had to make a new attempt to create stability in Saigon and to withdraw our dependents. We haven't won on the stable government but unless we do something now, even the government which now exists will collapse. The dependents are coming home.

(At this point the Congressional leaders appeared at the door of the Cabinet Room and the President ended his summary.)

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 87 through 95