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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

87. Summary Notes of the 547th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, February 8, 1965, 10:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The meeting lasted until 11:35 a.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) For another record of the same meeting, see Document 88.

The President asked Secretary McNamara to begin the meeting by reporting on the results of the U.S. raid in North Vietnam which took place yesterday against the Dong Hoi barracks.

Secretary McNamara said that bomb damage photographs indicated ten buildings were hit, two damaged, others burning. He described the raid as being moderate to good. He also reported on the air strike carried out by the South Vietnamese Air Force, with U.S. assistance, against the Chap Le army barracks. He said there were very good results from this strike based on reports received so far.

Acting Secretary Ball spoke of the effect of the North Vietnamese attack on Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Hanoi. He said it may be that Soviet Union was not aware of plans for the North Vietnamese attack. If so, they may have been mouse-trapped by Hanoi. If they had known of the attack, the Russians might not have sent Kosygin to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese action has put the Russians on the spot. We have talked to the Russians in an effort to explain why we had to retaliate as we did. Our hope is that they will understand why we acted as we did, at least to the extent of being annoyed by the North Vietnamese action.

Mr. Ball informed the group that we had sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations a letter/2/ stating our case. The purpose of this letter was to preempt any effort of a UN member to call a UN Security Council Meeting to discuss the situation in Vietnam. We are quite ready to explain our case to the Security Council but we wish to control the circumstances of that discussion. He recalled when we had proceeded in a similar manner following the DeSoto Patrol incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241.

Ambassador Thompson summarized his conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. He said he had told the Ambassador that we had canceled a proposed patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin to be certain that no embarrassing incident would take place during Mr. Kosygin's visit to Hanoi. However, we had been forced to react when the Viet Cong attacked our personnel, wounding a number of men and killing seven. (Summary of the Thompson-Dobrynin conversation is attached, Tab A.)/3/

/3/Document 82.

The President asked all of those present to preserve the secrecy of the various ways we communicate with the Russians. He said he had authorized the discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin because of the importance of conveying our views to the Russians. He did not want such conversations to become known to the public.

The President then summarized our present position as follows:

1. Last December we had approved a program of further pressure against North Vietnam but did not initiate actions for the time being, in order to allow Ambassador Taylor a period of time in which we hoped he would be able to assist the Vietnamese in creating a stable government in Saigon. In addition, we delayed action pending the time when U.S. dependents could be evacuated from the area.

2. We are now ready to return to our program of pushing forward in an effort to defeat North Vietnamese aggression without escalating the war.

3. We were surprised by the attack on our personnel at Pleiku but we had to respond. If we had failed to respond we would have conveyed to Hanoi, Peking and Moscow our lack of interest in the fate of the South Vietnamese government. In addition, the South Vietnamese would have thought we had abandoned them.

4. There is a bad governmental situation in Saigon but it is our hope that current U.S. action may pull together the various forces in Saigon and thus make possible the establishment of a stable government. He concluded by saying that U.S. dependents would be out of Saigon in about two weeks.

Representative Ford asked if he had understood correctly that we had cancelled a patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin because of Kosygin's presence in Hanoi.

The President replied that we had canceled the patrol because we wanted to avoid any appearance of provocation while Kosygin was in North Vietnam. Despite this action on our part, the Viet Cong had carried out an attack which was highly provocative to us.

McGeorge Bundy then summarized the findings and recommendations of his report to the President. (A copy of the report is attached. Tab B)./4/

/4/Document 84.

The President then read a battle damage report of the attack on the Chap Le barracks and on the Dong Hoi target. (The document from which he read is attached. Tab C.)/5/

/5/Attached, but not printed.

In response to the President's question, General Wheeler spoke of the difficulty of insuring the security at the Pleiku base. He described the dropping of mortars and went into the details with respect to what he described as a skillful sneak attack. He said the only real security for an airfield is full combat control of the perimeter two miles out from the field. In guerrilla warfare such as exists in Vietnam, there are no rear areas. He called attention to the fact that we must rely on the Vietnamese to carry out the security task because our forces are there as advisers and are insufficient in number to insure security of such an area as the Pleiku airfield.

Further details of the Vietnamese attack were given by General Goodpaster who, as a member of the Bundy group, had just returned from the area and had discussed the attack with those who were engaged.

The President added that we were up against highly skilled guerrilla fighters. He said there is no way to insure against such attacks as that which occurred at Pleiku short of sending a very large number of U.S. troops to Vietnam.

Representative Ford asked whether McGeorge Bundy was now recommending the program proposed last December./6/

/6/Ford was referring to the program of action that Ambassador Taylor apparently described to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 3, 1964; see vol. I, p. 974.

The President responded by saying that Mr. Bundy had brought back from Saigon the views of our country team there. These views had been discussed with the President's advisers and an agreed recommendation had been made to the President.

Representative Ford asked whether the program involved additional U.S. personnel and additional financial assistance.

The President replied that our present needs are met. If the response to our action is larger than we expect, we will then of course make a request for a larger amount of U.S. military assistance and will need additional personnel.

McGeorge Bundy said that events had forced us to act as we have--that action had not been based on his group's findings. A rolling consensus as to the proper course of action had developed after he returned to Washington from Saigon.

Representative Ford asked whether all we intended to do was to react to Viet Cong provocations.

The President replied that all Viet Cong actions did call for a response but we did not intend to limit our actions to retaliating against Viet Cong attacks.

Senator Dirksen asked what effect on the morale of our forces in Vietnam and on South Vietnamese government itself would result from our decision to move our dependents out of Saigon.

Secretary McNamara replied that our action would be explained on the basis of our intention to clear the decks for further action rather than as an indication of our intention to retreat.

Senator Dirksen asked what the effect would be if the United States pulled out of South Vietnam./7/

/7/In a February 8 memorandum to the President Carl Rowan noted, "When Senator Dirksen today raised the question of what would happen if we decided to pull out of Vietnam completely, I passed you a note indicating that a USIA study indicates that there would be dismay in many parts of the world, especially in countries like India and Japan. This note was based on a compilation of world opinion that I asked my Research Service to do just a few days ago." Rowan said he was forwarding this compilation to the President "in the event that you will find it useful in discussions with others who may be entertaining the notion that we can turn tail and run out of Viet Nam without suffering drastic consequences in other parts of the world." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVII, Cables)

McGeorge Bundy replied that if we pulled out there would be a strong feeling in the nations of Southeast Asia that we had failed to carry out our policy of assisting the Vietnamese to continue as an independent state. The consequences in Southeast Asia of our pull-out would be very large. In other parts of the world, the effect would also be very serious, even to the extent of affecting the morale in Berlin.

Senator Dirksen asked Director McCone what the reaction of the Chinese Communists would be.

Mr. McCone said we did not know as yet, but he recalled that Peking's reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin incident had been minor.

The President said that the Congressional Resolution on Vietnam plus the legal power of the Presidency made it possible for him to carry out at a manageable level an effort to deter, destroy and diminish the strength of the North Vietnamese aggressors and to try to convince them to leave South Vietnam alone. He said that the views of a few Senators could not control his actions. He intended to use the Congressional Resolution carefully but effectively. He repeated his view that we now have in Saigon the best possible people. Ambassador Taylor had his pick of personnel throughout the world. It is true that we have real trouble in Vietnam but we are not going to pull out.

Senator Dirksen asked what use could be made of the information which he had heard during the meeting.

The President replied that he had instructed McGeorge Bundy to talk to the press, telling them as much as he possibly could without affecting the national interest./8/ He referred to the outstanding TV presentation made yesterday by Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary Ball./9/ He said there was very little information which the government had which was not already in the public domain. We cannot say we are seeking to broaden the war, or say that we are going to withdraw. We can say that if the Vietnamese will cease their aggression, we will pull out. He asked those present not to discuss publicly our military actions but he said they could say that our actions would be kept at a manageable level.

/8/A transcript of McGeorge Bundy's and George Reedy's White House Background Briefing on February 8 is ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. I.

/9/For text of McNamara's opening statement at the news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 239-240.

 

88. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, February 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285, Meetings with President, 1 Feb-30 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the National Security Council,/2/ ex President

/2/This memorandum for the record covers the following meetings: the meeting in the Cabinet Room prior to the time the President joined the group at 9:48 a.m.; the continuation of that meeting from 9:48 to 10:30 (see Document 86 for another record); and the formal NSC meeting that began at 10:30 upon the arrival of Senators Mansfield and Dirksen and Representatives Ford and McCormack (see Document 87 for another record).

ATTENDED BY
McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, Generals Wheeler and Goodpaster, McGeorge Bundy, Cooper, Douglas Dillon, Carl Rowan, Ball, William Bundy, Thompson, Unger, Gaud and McCone

Bundy distributed his memorandum of February 7th on the situation in Vietnam/3/ and then gave an oral appraisal of the situation.

/3/Document 84.

McCone took the position that more dynamic action was indicated than reprisals. I stated that we should pursue a systematic series of attacks against targets, starting in the south sector of North Vietnam and that we should work toward the north. I emphasized that the capacity for defense by the North Vietnamese would unquestionably increase with the passage of time--and not very much time at that--and therefore we should get going. I therefore questioned whether our posture should be one of reprisal. I emphasized that we should implement Phase II of the agreed plan and if any thing, should step it up. I reported that this had been my recommendation to the President a few days ago in a private conversation./4/ (Note: The President, talking later with Ball, McNamara, Bundy and myself privately, recalled that I had warned him that some catastrophic event was bound to happen and that he had to take positive actions against the North.)

/4/Apparently a reference to McCone's meeting with the President at 3:25 p.m. on February 3; see Document 61.

Bundy generally agreed, indicating that his use of the word reprisal inferred a continuing series of actions, but that they would be "publicized as reprisals." He said he did not feel that we should just sit back until another Pleiku incident occurred and then start another reprisal. However, it was obvious that Bundy was shifting his ground somewhat as his paper pretty definitely ties reprisals to specific acts of the VC. Bundy warned of the danger of lifting the problem off the shoulders of the South Vietnamese and creating a North Vietnamese-U.S. war situation.

Ball agreed with my concept. He seemed to argue for positive action. He thought that slow action would be costly and quick action on our part and sustained action might very possibly affect ChiCom and Soviet reactions which would be more favorable to our purpose than otherwise.

Dillon stated that faster action may bring us to the conference table earlier than otherwise. Bundy raised the question of whether we should go to the conference table.

Secretary McNamara then summarized the situation as follows:

1. There was no disagreement around the table that more military actions by the U.S. against the NVN were indicated.

2. Actions against NVN would soon bring a confrontation with the MIG's and we must expect that we would be obliged to take the MIG's out in 3 to 6 weeks.

After an extended discussion it was agreed that Bundy and McCone were in substantial agreement that the action must be dynamic, must be positive, McNamara's statement that we would be in confrontation with the MIG's between 3 to 6 weeks was probably correct and that at that point we would have to take them out.

Thompson issued a word of caution. He thought that further strikes would cause the Soviets to move. He reasoned we should not do anything until the Soviets come in with their response and seemed to be implying that our whole South Vietnamese policy must be governed by what the Soviets say. Thompson reviewed his talk with Dobrynin in which he made the point that the North Vietnamese had mousetrapped the Soviets by conducting this Pleiku raid during Kosygin's presence in an effort to force Kosygin to make greater concessions to Hanoi. Thompson believed that the Soviets would invite a conference.

General Wheeler then spoke of the improving Air Defense of North Vietnam, the installation of radar and ground control equipment, the MIG's at Phuc Yen and the possibility of moving them south. Militarily, he said, the cheapest thing would be to take all the MIG's out right now. However, he agreed that a more gradual approach would probably be more feasible. McNamara then developed what he called the Y Theory, stating that we were now on the lower leg of a Y and would have to decide at some future time which branch we were to go on. Throughout this exchange there was considerable discussion as to the degree of escalation. Ball continued with the position that time increases the risk of outside involvement. Also Thompson entered into the discussion and urged that we not do anything for a couple of days until we see what signals come out of Moscow.

There was considerable discussion of the political stability of South Vietnam. In the final analysis it was Bundy's opinion and all seemed to agree that our actions could be used to influence Saigon to "pull up their socks." Bundy reviewed his two meetings with Khanh. The first, upon his arrival which was cold and distant, both kind of feeling their way. The second, after the Pleiku incident at which he informed Khanh of our decision to react, which was a warm, frank and entirely satisfactory meeting. Bundy has considerably more confidence in Khanh than is held by Ambassador Taylor or our Mission. Thompson then raised the question if we should exacerbate the situation in anticipation of the March 1st meeting of the Communist Parties. Throughout the morning he seemed to be raising issues designed to stop action rather than move.

Finally, McNamara stated positively that we should move forward and should keep going.

Bundy summarized the sense of the meeting that without dissent, all agreed to act, that we should apply force against the North, that it should be done against targets out of range of the MIG's, that we should use this decision to stimulate Saigon to form a government that was viable, that we should be careful and not announce this decision prior to receiving the signal from the Soviets and that the actions should stay at the low level, i.e., should be directed towards targets in the south rather than Phuc Yen Base.

The President entered and heard Bundy's summary.

The President then raised the question of a stable government, stating that he was concerned that in December we placed the establishment of a stable government as a first priority and things had gone down hill since then, not up. For that reason many of the decisions made in December were not carried out. Bundy confirmed that we had made contingency decisions, that they were very fluid, but nothing was done because of the internal South Vietnam political problem. Bundy then reviewed in some considerable detail the political developments in Saigon in December and January. The President raised the question of how to go about getting the best possible government in South Vietnam and the consensus seemed to be that since Max Taylor's efforts had been futile probably dynamic action on our part would help. Throughout the discussion Bundy indicated that in his discussions with many people, including Buddhist, Bonzes, Catholics, Military, etc., there was a feeling that perhaps the U.S. was going to pull out. Therefore, he reasoned that action on our part and a restatement of our position would be useful in reestablishing a strong government.

The President then re-asserted his determination to get the best possible government. He also re-asserted his determination to get the dependents out. He said that we were standing on shaky ground and he wished to avoid a rapid escalation and therefore favored a gradual approach. He summarized the choices as follows:/5/ Get out of the area through a Conference. He stated that in his opinion this was not the time as we would be admitting defeat; therefore hoped that by careful and sustained responses we would gain strength essential to stay in South Vietnam or gain an appropriate position for a Conference. The President recognized the problem of delaying until after Kosygin left Hanoi but he believed that Kosygin was there to give the North Vietnamese substantial help. He then raised the question of what specific instructions were to go to Taylor. Should it be the December Phase II decision, or this decision plus some more. He asked whether we want to commit regardless of what the Soviets say. All agreed to the course of action discussed above.

/5/There was apparently some confusion at this point in the dictation and transcription of McCone's memorandum.

At this point I expressed very strong opinion that I felt that our actions would not be positive enough, and would not be taken in a sustained and consistent manner. I urged that we organize to strike every day or at least every second day and that we carry it on regardless of what the Soviets say or what the Chinese Communists say or what anybody else says. In other words, my differing with the proposals of Bundy was that I proposed a more rapid cadence of the operation; furthermore I agreed that we should make a final effort to improve the government.

In summary of this part of the meeting, it appeared to me that starting with the idea of "reprisals" which would be taken against specific acts such as another Pleiku, the sense of the meeting turned in the direction of sustained action which I advocated and others fell into line although I am not sure from the discussions which ensued when the Leadership appeared, that the President is fully committed to this course of action.

Then Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Ford and McCormack entered. All others remained except Dillon, Gaud and 3 or 4 staff people. McNamara summarized the situation as mentioned above.

Ball mentioned the political problems such as Kosygin's presence, belief that the North Vietnamese mousetrapped Kosygin and stated that Stevenson had addressed a letter to the Security Council. Thompson reviewed his meeting at his residence on Sunday morning with Dobrynin, at which time he gave Dobrynin the estimate that Hanoi had acted to pressure Kosygin during his visit.

The President then reviewed the studies made in November-December, the instructions given to Taylor to (1) create a strong government, (2) remove dependents, and (3) to proceed with the courses of action agreed to and approved last November.

Bundy then made a report on his trip, emphasizing that things have been going down hill; that one of the serious problems was the doubt in the minds of a great many people concerning the U.S. intentions. He emphasized disappointment in SVN that the Tonkin Gulf incident, which gave a great lift, was not pursued further and this caused the SVN leaders to look over their shoulders at what was really the U.S. intention and long-range purpose.

The President then questioned General Wheeler about the security of our bases. He asked for an explanation of why better security could not be provided. Wheeler stated that security was in the hands of the SVN; long-range mortars had about a 2-1/2 mile range and the shorter range mortars about a mile or mile and a half range. He said the SVN had border patrols, but that they had been successfully evaded. He wound up by stating that in a guerrilla-type war it is impossible to protect an installation, particularly an airfield.

Action: I don't believe this is true. I think that the Clandestine Services might play a part here. It seems to me that we could create a net of informants in the villages around each one of the airfields and this might cost some money but would be so set up that we would be advised. I have spoken to Helms about this and wish to see if it is at all possible to work out a plan.

Dirksen then asked if the Vietnam troops were well trained. Goodpaster said, "Yes, generally, although there are some variations." Ford asked if Bundy's recommendations involved merely the carrying out of the operations agreed upon in December. All agreed. Ford then asked if more money and men are required. McNamara said, "not in the initial stages," but he reserved his position and stated that if any escalation beyond that expected developed, a supplemental would be called for. The President supported him in that. Ford then asked if our action was in response to North Vietnamese action. The President made it clear that this was what the case was. Dirksen asked what was the effect of the removal of the dependents on the morale. McNamara responded that he thought there would be some deterioration but it would not be bad because of the method that was being employed.

Dirksen then asked about the results of a U.S. pullout from South Vietnam, indicating that this would be hotly debated both in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on the Floor. Bundy outlined the consequences which were the standard argument.

The President then wound up the meeting by stating that it was incumbent upon him as President to conduct our activities in South Vietnam in order to stop aggression and to destroy the aggressor if necessary but in any event to take such actions as might be required in support of the free peoples of South Vietnam.

 

89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Henry of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs.

Washington, February 8, 1965.

SUBJECT
Soviet Reaction to Attacks on North Vietnam--Information Memorandum

We are inclined to expect a hard Soviet reaction to the North Vietnam strikes, despite the fact that Soviet propaganda has been rather mild thus far. (On important issues Soviet propaganda tends to be moderate and imprecise until a governmental decision has been taken.)

We believe that the Soviet Government will feel that it has received a direct insult and challenge because of Kosygin's presence in Hanoi. The Soviets will probably feel that their prestige has been seriously damaged and that they must take some positive action to save face. Moreover they will be impelled in the same direction by their desire to wean North Vietnam away from China, and by their need to prove to smaller Communist states that Soviet commitments are valid and Soviet protection dependable. Finally, the USSR would appreciably reduce its voice and influence in all of Southeast Asia by failure to respond to what the Communists must consider a challenge. The USSR could scarcely save its prestige if it failed to act, when Kosygin only the day before repeated the Soviet Government's commitment: "We sternly declare that the Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to the destiny of a brotherly socialist country and is ready to give the Democratic Republic of Vietnam all necessary assistance if the aggressors dare to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

The possibility that the Soviet Government will be angry with the North Vietnamese for getting them into this uncomfortable position does not reduce the pressures for action outlined above.

The Soviet reaction, we believe, will take two forms. First on the ground itself the Soviet Government will probably grant extensive and impressive military assistance to North Vietnam, particularly defensive and perhaps also offensive air armament. The USSR will also find its arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute weakened and be compelled to adjust itself, at least superficially, toward the Chinese viewpoint. This is not to suggest, however, that the Soviet Government will increase its risk of its own forces' involvement in the Far Eastern conflict.

Secondly, we believe U.S.-USSR bilateral relations will be affected adversely. The Soviet leadership will undoubtedly consider as a personal challenge the fact that the U.S. chose the moment of Kosygin's visit to attack North Vietnam, and will be little swayed by the argument that provocation was given. It is difficult to estimate how serious and widespread will be the damage to our bilateral relations. Obvious possibilities are the cooling off on the exchange of high level visits, demonstrations against our Moscow Embassy, a slowing up of cultural exchanges, or a recall of their Ambassador for consultation. Even increased harassment in Berlin can not be excluded.

In order to reduce the impact of these developments on our bilateral relations we suggest that we should attempt to be as forthcoming as possible on non-vital issues in those relations during the next few weeks. For example, we might make an extra effort to obtain ratification of the Consular Convention as soon as possible (if the temper of Congress is not too adverse). Any action on our part which would enable the Soviet Government to point to concrete gains for its "peaceful coexistence" policy would help to blunt the Soviet reaction to the North Vietnam attacks.

Since the above was typed we have received the text of a Soviet Government statement/2/ which tends to reinforce some of the foregoing points. In speaking of the effect on U.S.-USSR bilateral relations the statement says:

/2/Not found.

"This process is incompatible with aggressive manifestations in politics, capable of cancelling out various steps undertaken in the interests of improving Soviet-American relations."

The statement concludes:

"In the face of the above-mentioned U.S. actions, the Soviet Union will be forced together with its allies and friends to take further measures to safeguard the security and strengthen the defense capability of the DRV. No one should doubt that the Soviet Union will do this, that the Soviet people will fulfill its international duty to the fraternal socialist country."

 

90. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/

Washington, February 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Misc) I. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. The date is handwritten on the source text.

SUBJECT
Varying Estimates of Consequences for US Courses of Action in Vietnam

You may be interested in certain differences comparing the White House memorandum of February 7, "The Situation in Vietnam"/2/ with the unanimously agreed interagency intelligence assessments contained in DIA-CIA-State memorandum "Probable Communist Reactions to US Option C or C-Prime Measures" of November 26, 1964,/3/ and SNIE 10-65 "Communist Military Capabilities and Near-Term Intentions in Laos and South Vietnam" of February 4, 1965./4/

/2/Document 84.

/3/Not found.

/4/SNIE 10-65 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XXVIII.

Incomprehensibly to me, the White House memorandum discusses the risks of sustained US air strikes against North Vietnam without examining Chinese Communist responses. However, the two intelligence community products estimate Chinese Communist air intervention to be quite likely at some stage in this very process.

Again in a reversal of our hitherto conventional rationale on this subject, the White House memorandum posits these strikes as primarily directed toward improving morale in South Vietnam, and only secondarily and eventually affecting North Vietnam's support for the war. The intelligence community estimate of November 26 anticipates an initial elation in South Vietnam followed by a further let-down if the attacks against North Vietnam do not lead quickly to successes over the Viet Cong. Finally, the White House memorandum tends to minimize Free World reaction to US escalation whereas the November 26 estimate sees it as overwhelmingly opposed to escalation once that threatens to engage Chinese Communist forces.

A textual comparison of relevant excerpts follows:

What Are The Risks?

White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 2: "We should be ready...for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power... It remains quite possible that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist counter-action."

SNIE 10-65, page 2: "The addition of air strength to the already formidable ground strength in the China/Indochina border area is also intended to strengthen Chinese/DRV defenses against the contingency that the US might ignore Communist warnings and take the war to North Vietnam and even to China."

Ibid., page 4: "They (China) would almost certainly attempt to use fighters against air strikes on North Vietnam and would certainly do so in the case of an attack on China:"

DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 6: "At this point [attacks on the balance of the 94-List targets]/5/ Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Vietnam against the US attacks."

/5/Brackets in the source text.

Ibid. page 5, INR footnote: "The increasingly severe US air strikes contemplated against DRV targets north of the 19th parallel would probably evoke the employment over North Vietnam of Chinese air from Chinese bases. The Chinese decision to construct the new Ning Ming airstrip, carefully located just over the DRV border and operationally ready in early 1965, already strongly suggests Chinese preparation to test US adherence to the privileged sanctuary concept."

What Are The Gains?

White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 3: "Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South--in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres... The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government. Effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. The determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence."

DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 9: "Initial South Vietnamese elation and support would almost certainly quickly wane if the war seemed to drag on despite the new US moves, and especially if the Viet Cong were able to increase their military and terrorist pressures."

Ibid., page 7: "In the event Hanoi felt assured of Chinese Communist rescue, it would probably fight on." INR footnote "believes that the Chinese Communists, despite their reluctance to become involved in fighting the US, would feel it necessary to assure Hanoi of its support and to come to Hanoi's assistance as the situation required."

How Will The Free World React?

White House Memorandum, Annex A, page 5: "A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable."

DIA-CIA-State Memo, page 12: "The US would probably find itself progressively isolated in the event the US sanctions did not soon achieve either a Communist reduction of pressures in South Vietnam or some progress toward meaningful negotiations, and would almost certainly find itself substantially alone in the event that the crisis developed to the point where a US-Communist Chinese war seemed imminent."

 

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/

Washington, February 8, 1965, 6:26 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; LOR. Drafted and cleared by McGeorge Bundy and approved by William Bundy.

1653. For Ambassador Taylor from the President.

1. Mac Bundy has given me a full report of his discussions with you and of the outstanding work which you and all your team are doing.

2. In our discussions in December we agreed upon the importance of undertaking appropriate action against North Vietnam. We then felt it important to establish as strong a government as possible, and you have been doing your level best to that end. It also seemed to me essential to get women and children out of the area, and now we have taken that decision. I am now prepared to go forward with the best government we can get, and accordingly I wish you to know that I have today decided that we will carry out our December plan for continuing action against North Vietnam with modifications up and down in tempo and scale in the light of your recommendations as Bundy reports them, and our own continuing review of the situation.

3. It is most important that this decision not be publicized until we have determined precise opening moves, and until Kosygin is safely out of Hanoi. Moreover, we wish to make our own plans after assessing Soviet reaction to recent events which should be more clear by time Kosygin leaves.

4. Evacuation of dependents should proceed as you determine. I hope you can meet the 7-10 days suggested in your last message./2/

/2/Document 85.

5. I am impressed by argument that the building of a minimum government will benefit by some private assurances from us to the highest levels that we do now intend to take continuing action. Therefore, you are authorized to convey this in general terms to key leaders and political figures as you see fit. At the same time you should say that we want to work with a unified and going government, and that the sooner they can work out such a government, the better we can plan and execute the continuing actions we have in mind./3/

/3/In telegram 2466 from Saigon, February 10, Taylor furnished the President his weekly report on the internal political situation in South Vietnam and the conduct of the war. In responding to the instruction in paragraph 5 of this telegram, Taylor reported that, on February 9, he and U. Alexis Johnson had tried to persuade Vien to accept the prime ministership, which Vien had declined when it was offered to him. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)

6. This brings my warmest good wishes to you and Mrs. Taylor, and my renewed thanks for all that you are doing for your country.

Ball

 

92. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam--Mansfield Memo and Reply. No classification marking. Mansfield was Majority Leader of the Senate.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

On the basis of the meetings of the National Security Council on Saturday night and Sunday morning,/2/ both of which I attended at your request, I endeavored to make my position clear on the situation as it has developed and may develop in Vietnam. I raised questions concerning the advisability of the action which you and your advisors proposed to undertake, not so much on the basis of the attack made on our installation but in view of the future possibilities which might be incurred by the retaliatory action.

/2/February 6 and 7; see Documents 77 and 80.

Contrary to Ambassador Thompson's analysis of the situation, it appears to me that what has happened in North Vietnam will, in a sense, force Kosygin's hand for a number of reasons:

(1) Kosygin was there when it happened and he had just made a speech in which he said that the Soviet Union would supply assistance to North Vietnam in its struggle against the United States.

(2) A closer degree of cooperation by the Soviet Union and the Chinese will be brought about because in view of what developed, Kosygin will have little choice to do otherwise. It may well express itself in this situation by a resumption of major Russian military aid to China and transference through China of Soviet aid to North Vietnam. This would be most unfortunate because one of the hopes of Western policy was to encourage the split between the two great communist powers, a hope which will now, I believe, lessen to a considerable degree.

I raised questions about possible Chinese intervention and pointed out that the Communist Chinese had recently completed roads into Laos which could be used for troop and supply movements; that they had recently completed an air-field infrastructure in North Vietnam and that they had airfields and naval bases on the Island of Hainan, off the coast of the northern part of North Vietnam and South China.

Whether or not the Chinese will intervene is a factor which only the future holds the answer to, but an increase in at least indirect Chinese intervention is to be anticipated.

I pointed out also that South Vietnam has a very unstable government and that we could not depend upon it or the great majority of the population therein. That is proved by news stories from reliable American officials in today's press which state that there was plenty of opportunity for advance warnings on the Pleiku attack but that the attack when it came was, in effect, a complete surprise.

It is especially hard to understand why we were caught off-guard ourselves, in view of the attack of November 1st on our force at Bien Hoa, 12 miles outside of Saigon. Our own security arrangements were certainly lax there and despite the explanation given at our meeting on Saturday night, it appears to me they were lax at Pleiku. It is my understanding that the American base at Pleiku is situated on a high plain, dotted with brush here and there but certainly not the kind of jungle area which surrounded Bien Hoa. While McNamara and Wheeler said that it would be extremely difficult to provide security two miles out, this is, nevertheless, a matter which should be looked into especially in view of the fact that aside from the more distant mortar shelling of the base, rifle fire and hand grenades were used right inside the American compound and explosives were placed against the barracks. This makes it clear that the Viet Cong were in the compound as has been stated in the press and proves that the security which was supposed to be furnished by both the United States forces and the Vietnamese military was lax. It is my understanding that more than half of the 23,000 U.S. personnel in South Vietnam are stationed in Saigon. Certainly some of them could be used to guard U.S. compounds. The explanations given this morning by General Goodpaster and others, in my opinion, were not convincing.

At the recent meeting, I also pointed out that General Giap had an army of 350,000 men, well-trained, and that he was and is one of the best military tacticians in Asia.

It is disturbing to me, though understandable, that the retaliatory move was essentially unilateral, initiated by us and then we had to wait until the South Vietnamese government was informed in order that the protocol of the situation might be maintained at least on the surface.

In other words we had decided on what our moves would be without any request from the government of South Vietnam but only in anticipation of such a request.

I have grave doubts about the ability of General Khanh's government. I have no doubt but that the great majority of the population of South Vietnam are tired of the war and will give us no significant assistance. I have a full awareness of your feelings, which I share, because of the attack on Pleiku. I appreciate, too, your repeated statements that it is not your desire to spread the war. However, the prospect for enlargement now looms larger and I think it is only fair that I give you my honest opinions, as I did on Saturday and Sunday, because to do otherwise would be a disservice to you and to the Nation.

In this connection you will recall that I also stated at the meetings that before we make any moves that we understand their full implications, in terms of the costs involved, and the fact, as I see it, that if we went too far in North Vietnam we would be in a far worse position than we were in Korea.

For, in a larger sense, not only can we not depend on the South Vietnamese population, but we can also place very little reliability on the Laotians and the Thais and none whatever on Cambodia. Moreover, beyond Indochina, we could well be squeezed in a nutcracker by developing events throughout Southeast Asia over which the Chinese cast an ominous shadow. Events in Malaysia could under certain circumstances bring into force the Anzus Treaty which would call for our giving assistance to Australia and New Zealand.

Finally, as you know we have approximately 42 mutual security agreements of one kind or another with countries or groups of countries scattered over the face of the globe. Short of nuclear war, we have not got the resources or the power to honor those agreements if the demand-payments on them multiply. We are stretched too thin as it is and even with total mobilization there would be little hope of fulfilling simultaneously any large proportion of these commitments.

What the answer to the situation is at the moment I do not know nor does anyone else. But I am persuaded that the trend toward enlargement of the conflict and a continuous deepening of our military commitment on the Asian mainland, despite your desire to the contrary, is not going to provide one. I did suggest on Sunday, therefore, that the matter be referred to the United Nations and I am glad that Ambassador Stevenson has brought it up at the Security Council./3/ I did suggest further that the Geneva powers be convened again for the purpose of seeing what if anything honorably could be done. I did suggest that any other forum might be considered in a search for acceptable ways to contract and to end the fighting in South Vietnam.

/3/For text of Ambassador Stevenson's letter of February 7 to the President of the U.N. Security Council, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241.

I further suggested that Ambassador Kohler in Moscow could carry any or all of the above suggestions to Brezhnev in Moscow and that our Ambassador in Warsaw, who already has had in excess of 125 conferences with his Chinese Communist counterpart, follow the same procedure.

The purpose of this memorandum is to furnish you with a brief analysis of my views in writing on this most difficult subject as I have expressed them in large part in the meetings at the White House over the past three days.

Finally, you will recall that I stated to you that the burden of decision was yours but that, regardless of my individual views, I would do whatever I could to support you in the exercise of your grave responsibility.

 

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/

Saigon, February 9, 1965, noon.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the White House, DOD, CINCPAC for POLAD, Bangkok, and Vientiane.

2445. We appreciate prompt decisions from Washington for reprisal attacks yesterday and today against selected military targets in the DRV. I consider this a significant forward step in demonstrating US determination not to continue to submit to VC offenses against US and Vietnamese personnel and installations without a suitable response on our part. The White House statement of February 7/2/ emphasizes that we seek no wider war, in pinning the responsibility on the DRV, and in carefully pointing out that our response was against military targets supporting DRV aggression and not the North Vietnamese population. This statement and our actions yesterday and today provide in my view a good foundation for embarking on a graduated reprisal program to bring increasing pressure on the DRV to cease its intervention in SVN, as discussed here at some length with Bundy and his party.

/2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238-239.

The general concept of such a program is that through a measured, controlled sequence of actions against the DRV taken in reprisal for DRV-inspired actions in SVN, significant pressures can be brought to bear on DRV to persuade it to stop its intervention in SVN. The program would be carried out jointly with GVN and would be directed solely against DRV military targets and infiltration routes, not against DRV population. While February 7 and 8 military actions were specifically tied to VC attacks in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, in the future we could look to a situation in which US/GVN reprisals could be initiated based on a general catalog or package of VC outrages, no one particularly grave itself, not necessarily to a specific VC act in each case. For example, we might announce that VC acts against specific targets (such as the railroad in SVN) will result in retaliation against similar targets in the DRV, our graduated reprisals with the general level of VC outrages in SVN, or if we so desired progressively raise the level of pressure on the DRV. Thus, it would be tantamount to the so-called Phase II escalation but justified on basis of retaliation.

In carrying out such a program, we believe that we should limit US/GVN publicity to the bare minimum necessary to balance Communist output. We would confirm our reprisal actions only when necessary and then as being in accordance with an established policy of reprisals.

Our current 34A operations (except any 34-A air strikes in the DRV) and the Yankee Team/Barrel Roll operations in the Laos corridor would of course continue. Additionally, we would progressively extend these operations into the DRV along infiltration routes.

Throughout the period of graduated reprisals we would convey clearly through appropriate intermediaries or other means to Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi the limited nature of our objectives and intentions, but at the same time our determination to achieve our objectives. Similarly, we would have to expand our discussions with Thailand and initiate discussions with the RLG and other friendly governments to bring them into the picture to the extent desired.

With regard to the GVN I would envisage more detailed discussions at an early date to develop firm arrangements for joint GVN actions and to begin a process of education by which GVN would begin to formulate its war objectives and ultimately reach agreement with US on the framework of demands to be made on the DRV as well as the general negotiating procedures. Both General Khanh and Acting Prime Minister Oanh have stressed the need for expanded discussions and of integrating the Vietnamese into a program against DRV. I feel it is most important that we do this and that we maintain a sense of momentum if we are to capitalize on the psychological factors which if exploited early could lead to a greater sense of purpose and direction both in the government and the military and awaken new hope for eventual victory on the part of the Vietnamese people. We should attempt to avoid in the present situation a general letdown in morale and spirit which followed our action in the Tonkin Gulf.

If the graduated reprisal program succeeds in mounting sufficient pressure on the DRV to the point where the DRV leaders have serious doubts as to their chances for ultimate success, we should have a general understanding of where we would like to come out. I believe rationale of simply returning to observance of the spirit of the 1954 Geneva Accords with respect to SVN and the 1962 accords re Laos as set forth in Embtel 235 (notal)/3/ is still valid. This formula has the advantage of simplicity, of avoiding pitfalls of new conferences, and avoiding negotiations. It is conceivable that cessation of DRV direction and support of aggression against the South could be achieved more or less tacitly in first instance and then confirmed through GVN/DRV negotiations at the military level. An added advantage is that it keeps us removed from direct negotiations with DRV. A separate telegram follows/4/ on how US/GVN terms for cessation of DRV support and direction of aggression in SVN might be stated.

/3/The reference is in error and should be telegram 2235; see Document 32.

/4/See Document 104.

In sum, I believe a Phase II program based largely on graduated reprisals offers the best available means of exerting increasing pressure on the DRV leaders to induce them to cease their intervention in SVN while at the same time being more manageable in terms of domestic and international opinion and with our friends. I recommend that we proceed along this track.

Taylor

 

94. Letter From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Senator Mike Mansfield/1/

Washington, February 9, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vietnam--Mansfield Memo and Reply. Confidential.

Dear Mike:

The President has asked me to respond to your long and thoughtful memorandum of February 8/2/ on the subject of Vietnam. The President feels that your careful questions deserve a prompt reply, and as he himself is heavily occupied today with other matters, he has asked me to answer in his behalf.

/2/Document 92.

Let me attempt to comment in order on the important points of your memorandum.

1. We agree that the episode at Pleiku and our response to it create pressures on Kosygin, but in our judgment responsibility for this pressure rests with Hanoi and not with us, and we believe that the Soviet Government will recognize this fact. Given the character of the attack at Pleiku, we are unable to see what other course was open to the President than to make an appropriate reply. We think that inactivity by the United States would have made it even more tempting for the Soviets to enlarge on their support for North Vietnam.

2. Our intelligence estimators are clear in their judgment that it is most unlikely that these events will have the effect of driving the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists closer together. Our Embassy in Moscow points out that the Soviet statement contains at least two elements which will be energetically disapproved by the Chinese Communists: it speaks of the desire for good relations with the United States, and it specifically limits its offer of assistance to defensive weapons.

3. In our efforts to defeat Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, we must recognize that any U.S. action carries some risks of wider Chinese involvement, but we aim to keep the risk of that involvement as low as possible. As your memorandum generously recognizes, the President has always emphasized his own desire to avoid actions which would lead to direct conflict with the Chinese. We are making it clear in every statement and by every avenue that our central concern in Vietnam is to turn back the aggression in the South, and that our limited actions against the North imply no intent whatever to "liberate" or conquer North Vietnam.

4. We agree with you, of course, that there are important political problems of governmental stability in South Vietnam, and that there is a problem also in the degree to which the Communists have intimidated the local population and made it reluctant to report Viet Cong movements. If we had a stable government and if there were no fear of the Viet Cong, we would not have the problem that we do in Vietnam. Unfortunately stating the difficulties does not solve them, and it remains our best judgment that the vast majority of the people of South Vietnam do not wish to fall under Communist domination. The President has repeatedly made it clear that we cannot ourselves solve all the problems of South Vietnam. He has also insisted, however, that every possible step be taken to make our support for the Vietnamese people more effective and efficient. My own understanding of your position is that you agree with this course and do not wish to see us pull out of Vietnam or decrease our present assistance to the Vietnamese.

5. The President certainly shares your view that military security should be as effective as possible within the limits of our basic policy decision not to deploy large American combat units for guard duty in Vietnam. Able American professionals are giving their full attention to the problem of military security around installations such as Bien Hoa and Pleiku. The President is satisfied that General Westmoreland is an outstanding officer, and I myself observed the energy with which he followed up on the Pleiku incident. It remains true that in a contest as fluid as this one, in which small units are able to move undetected through large parts of the countryside, there can be no full guarantee against episodes of this kind. As in all warfare, we learn as much by experience as by forethought, and it was my observation that important lessons had been learned in the Bien Hoa incident. Undoubtedly lessons will be learned from Pleiku as well. The hazard of guerrilla attack will nevertheless continue until the course of the struggle has been turned strongly against the Viet Cong.

6. I can assure you that the decision to make a retaliatory response was in no sense unilateral. I talked myself with General Khanh and I talked with Ambassador Taylor just after his conversation with Prime Minister Oanh./3/ From these conversations and from earlier talks with Vietnamese leaders, I know they warmly support a policy of response against outrages like that at Pleiku. This general attitude was expressed to me by Vietnamese leaders from many different groups, and indeed no different judgment was expressed by any of the Vietnamese citizens with whom I talked during my visit.

/3/For a record of McGeorge Bundy's conversation with Khanh on February 5, see Document 73. Bundy's conversation with Taylor and Taylor's conversation with Oanh have not been further identified.

7. We recognize the danger of war weariness among the population of South Vietnam, but it seems to me wrong to conclude that the great majority of the population will give us no significant assistance. The fact is that while American losses come home with particular force to Americans, it is the Vietnamese who are taking the bulk of the casualties. The performance of Vietnamese armed units in recent months makes it clear that they are tough and resilient fighters and that their morale remains high. Moreover, when energetic programs of pacification are pursued, our junior officers report that the population is invariably responsive. The problem is one of maintaining the necessary energy and effectiveness, not just sporadically but on a constantly growing basis throughout the country. This task is certainly difficult, but I met no American in Vietnam who thinks it impossible.

8. You are certainly right to call attention to the wider environment of Southeast Asia, but your judgment on some of the countries involved seems harsh. We have had strong support from the Thais, for example, especially with respect to Laos, which is necessarily of most direct concern to them. Moreover, our own sea and air forces make us a most formidable opponent, as long as we are careful and measured and disciplined in our use of them.

9. More generally, it does not appear to me that the power of the United States around the world is "stretched too thin." We have been able to keep our commitments around the world for a quarter of a century and our country has never been richer or more at ease. While every single American casualty gives the President personal sorrow, we cannot say that the current level of American sacrifice in Southeast Asia is unduly heavy. We made a vastly heavier sacrifice in Korea--and one which was fully justified--and yet the stakes there were certainly not greater than those that are now on the table in Southeast Asia.

10. The President has considered your suggestion that we take the matter to the United Nations. He regrets that previous discussions of the question in the United Nations have not indicated any desire of the members of that body to take any action whatever. From the Secretary General on down, we are unable to find any expert on the UN who sees any prospect that it can act effectively in the present situation in Vietnam. Neither is the President aware of any prospect that any other conference or forum would currently lead to an agreement by the Communists to end the fighting on any terms other than those of surrender. But the President asked me to say again how much he will value any further suggestions you may have on this problem.

11. I think you know from our association in recent years how great is my personal respect and regard for you, not only as the leader of the majority in the Senate but also as one of the outstanding public servants of our time. I therefore regret that your judgment and that of the Administration should be at variance on this most important issue, and I beg you to understand that while I have tried to write directly and straightforwardly, I have done so with a feeling of deep respect not only for you but for your deeply held convictions.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

 

95. Editorial Note

At approximately 8 a.m. (Saigon time) on February 10 the Viet Cong detonated a bomb at a hotel in the coastal city of Qui Nhon being used as a billet for U.S enlisted men. Twenty-three Americans were killed and more than 20 wounded, the most American casualties incurred in a single incident in the war to that point. In telegram 2491 from Saigon, February 10, Taylor reported that he, U. Alexis Johnson, and Westmoreland had concluded that the attack on the Qui Nhon was "a serious VC atrocity" justifying a prompt air reprisal, which they recommended. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 VIET S) For Westmoreland's recollection of the incident, see A Soldier Reports, pages 116-117.

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 96 through 99