The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001.  Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date.  This site is not updated so external links may no longer function.  Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume II, Vietnam January-June 1965 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C.

96. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce)/1/

Washington, February 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327, January-March 1965. Secret. Bruce had returned to Washington on February 8 for consultations.

[Here follows an entry unrelated to Vietnam.]

At 11:30 I saw the President. We were alone for the most fascinating hour and a quarter I ever spent in Government. I came prepared to propound certain views, in accordance with a sketchy agenda he had requested. I never got to first base, for I was tagged out as soon as I started to run.

I expected to give him a review of political, economic, and financial affairs in Great Britain; advance ideas on how to keep ANF-MLF negotiations going in a low key; suggest he have a talk with Jean Monnet; speak about NATO and de Gaulle; and oppose a possible invitation to Sukarno to visit the United States. I did have a chance, during the morning, to speak to the last item; the President said he had no intention of inviting Sukarno, he had merely sounded out the British on the suggestion. We had, also, some conversation on the Congo, Nasser, arms to Jordan and Jewish objections thereto.

He started off by telling me, in considerable detail, of his plans for retaliation against the North Vietnamese. I confessed my ignorance of the area, but he insisted on my expressing an opinion on certain contingencies. I told him I hoped American ground troops would not be used in North Vietnam in the absence of massive attack by Chinese soldiers; but that we would be able to attain our objectives by air strikes. He said that General MacArthur, when the President visited him a day before his death,/2/ had passionately warned him against the use of American ground troops in Asia.

/2/MacArthur died April 5, 1964.

I have the impression that the President, so adept in the use of power in domestic politics, has been considering carefully how to exercise it in international affairs, and has reached certain conclusions that will be manifested in forthcoming decisions. He bitterly resents indignities against our establishments and officials abroad, such as burning of libraries, stoning of Embassies, and the rest. I think we may expect stern responses in the future to such actions.

After some conversation about his badly needed and imaginative programme to "make America beautiful," he reverted to Vietnam; he displayed a thorough familiarity with the types and numbers of planes operated by both sides there, the strength of guerrillas, rangers, partisans and regulars thus far engaged. During all our talk today, from time to time he made calls through the telephone switchboard in front of his chair. Once it was to tell the Pentagon to shift a squadron of aircraft nearer Vietnam, others to inform Senators Dirksen and Mansfield what instructions he had lately sent to Saigon, another to State approving a severe rebuke to the Kremlin regarding the attack on our Moscow Embassy,/3/ another to a member of the House congratulating him on the management of a Bill, another to Treasury relating to today's Balance of Payments message. At intervals he gave orders on other subjects through two squawk boxes in the Oval Room.

/3/On February 9 a demonstration involving more than 2,000 persons, including Vietnamese and Chinese Communist students, took place outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in protest over the U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam. The demonstrators hurled stones and other objects at the Embassy building, breaking more than 200 windows and badly damaging the facade. For text of the White House statement issued on February 10 regarding the attack on the Embassy, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 170.

[Here follows an entry unrelated to Vietnam.]

 

97. Memorandum of Meeting of Principals/1/

Washington, February 10, 1965, 1:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret. Prepared by Cooper on February 11. The source text bears the letters "OK" in McGeorge Bundy's handwriting at the top of the first page. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

PARTICIPANTS
Vice President Humphrey

State
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Bundy
Ambassador Unger

Defense
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Vance
Asst. Secretary McNaughton

JCS
Admiral McDonald
Treasury
Secretary Dillon

CIA
Director McCone

USIA
Director Rowan

White House
McGeorge Bundy
Chester Cooper

Secretary McNamara raised several questions with respect to retaliation for the attack on the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon (Biet Cuong Hotel):

1. Should we retaliate?--McNamara thought we should with a joint US-GVN operation;

2. When should we retaliate?--McNamara felt strongly that this should be done at the first daylight opportunity;

3. Against what targets?--McNamara recommended three targets: two just north of the 17th parallel (barracks), and one 50 miles north (supply base).

4. What should be the rationale for retaliation?--McNamara felt we should point to the recent terror against South Vietnamese civilians, including the blowing up of a railroad bridge, and the blowing up of the barracks.

Much of the rest of the discussion centered on the timing and composition of the attack. State (especially Ball and Thompson) and Vice President Humphrey felt that we should hold up the attack until Kosygin had returned to Moscow, or, in any case, until after he left Peiping following his visit to North Korea. The argument centered on the effect of an immediate attack on Sino-Soviet relations and the degree of commitment the Soviets might be forced to make. State felt that Kosygin's trip to North Korea was an affront to the Chinese and that an immediate attack would submerge or paper-over the difficulties that the Chinese and Russians would otherwise confront when Kosygin saw the Chinese on his way back to Moscow.

If a retaliatory strike were to be launched immediately, State felt that it should be a GVN rather than a U.S. effort. McNamara, and most of the others present, felt that the President would be hard-pressed to explain to the American people why U.S. planes did not retaliate immediately, especially in the light of our reprisal against the Pleiku incident.

While recognizing the merit of this, Ball emphasized that the biggest single question we confronted was how to avoid a substantial Soviet commitment to North Vietnam. Such a commitment might be postponed or minimized if we could delay our reprisal, or if the VNAF alone made an immediate reprisal.

Most of the participants discounted the effectiveness of a VNAF attack. McNamara pointed out that the VNAF attack had hit the wrong target the night before and, in any case, the difference between a VNAF strike and one which would involve U.S. planes would not make a significant difference in terms of the Soviet reaction. This phase of the meeting ended with several people, including McGeorge Bundy and Thompson and the Vice President, musing on the merits of delaying the retaliation for a few days, not only because of the Sino-Soviet matter but because of the remaining dependents.

The President joined the group at approximately two o'clock, at which time the NSC meeting began (to be reported on separately by Bromley Smith)./2/

/2/Document 98.

CLC

 

98. Summary Record of the 548th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, February 10, 1965, 2:07-4:04 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. III. Top Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but it was apparently Bromley Smith. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

Note: Minutes of a meeting of these participants prior to the arrival of the President are attached. (Tab A)/2/

/2/Document 97.

Secretary McNamara summarized for the President the latest information on the Viet Cong bombing of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon. As of that time, one U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20 missing. Presumably, the missing soldiers are buried under the rubble of the billet.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion of the Council members prior to the President's arrival. A response to the Qui Nhon incident by the U.S. in some form is agreed by all present. However, there is a difference as to what the response should be. Some believe we should not launch another raid while Kosygin is in the Far East. Some feel an attack now might force the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union together.

Acting Secretary Ball reported that the Soviet reaction to the earlier attack on North Vietnam had so far been mild. Mr. Kosygin is leaving for North Korea at 3:00 p.m. today our time. He will probably try to enlist the support of the North Koreans for the holding of the March 1 meeting of Communist Parties which the Soviets are planning despite Chinese Communist opposition. Kosygin is expected to stay two days in North Korea. U.S. action now puts heavy pressure on the Soviets. We should hold off any reprisal action until Kosygin leaves the area. Ambassador Thompson added that our objective should be to avoid any deeper Soviet commitment to the North Vietnamese. If the Chinese Communist Air Force comes in response to our retaliatory attack, very heavy pressure is put on the Soviets to come to the aid of the Vietnamese.

Secretary Dillon said he did not believe the Russians would make a major policy decision based on the whereabouts of Kosygin.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy pointed out that we cannot put ourself in the position of giving the Russians control over our actions by their moving Soviet diplomats from one place to another. If we take no action, the Soviets may think we are in fact a paper tiger.

Director McCone said that to base our action on a possible Soviet reaction would be to lose sight of our objective which is to help the South Vietnamese overcome aggression.

Secretary McNamara said that Ambassador Taylor, the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense recommended a retaliatory strike today at daylight. He said we will soon be facing the difficulty of taking Phase II actions even though there are no incidents created by the Viet Cong. However, the Qui Nhon attack provides us an opportunity today to retaliate immediately. He explained to the President the targets in North Vietnam which could be hit today. They are: Target 14, the Thanh Hoa bridge, which he said he would discuss later; Target 24, the Chanh Hoa army barracks, and Target No. 53, the Phu Vam supply depot, as a weather alternative. In addition to these two U.S. targets, he recommended that Target No. 32, the Vu Con barracks, be struck by the Vietnamese Air Force, assisted by U.S. planes with Target No. 39, the Chap Le barracks, as a weather alternative. (See attached target map with descriptions.) (Tab B)/3/

/3/Attached, but not printed.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that at an appropriate time we could publicly announce that we had turned a corner and changed our policy but that no mention should be made now of such a decision.

The President stressed the importance of preventing any leaks to newspapers. He appealed to the patriotism of those present and asked the Heads of Departments and Agencies present to survey their departments to ensure that leaks were not coming from their subordinates.

In response to the President's question, the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral McDonald, said he agreed with Secretary McNamara's recommendation. From a military point of view there is no reason to delay a strike.

The President asked what our team in Saigon recommended. Secretary McNamara read parts of a message from General Westmoreland recommending (Tab C) immediate reprisals. (Copy attached)/4/ Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that, having talked to Ambassador Taylor recently, he could summarize his views as follows: Reprisals should be undertaken at once, not only to improve morale in South Vietnam but also to give a clear signal to the North Vietnamese. He would not think that Communist behavior would be basically changed if we decided to delay a U.S. strike.

/4/Not found as an attachment to the source text.

Secretary McNamara said the United States has overwhelming air power in the Southeast Asia area. The Joint Chiefs do not want to add more military power to that already in the Western Pacific. However, he thought that we should move additional forces into the Southeast Asia area for political reasons. He suggested that rather than announce the movement of these forces into the area we could informally give the press the list of U.S. forces which would have been placed on alert for short notice movement to the Western Pacific.

In response to the President's question, Secretary McNamara said about 130 planes would be used in the strike recommended for approval. He then said he would drop Target 14, the Thanh Hoa bridge, which is much further north than any of the other targets. He suggested that Target No. 53, the Phu Van Support Depot be put in the plan instead of the prestige bridge recommended earlier. He felt that three targets were needed, two for the United States and one for the Vietnamese Air Force to attack. In response to question, he said the targets were not related to the railroad system because damage done to railroad tracks could be easily repaired.

Secretary Ball suggested that today's retaliatory strike be limited to two targets.

The President interrupted to ask whether any casualties had been reported as a result of the earlier strike. Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied that Hanoi had given no casualty figures but merely admitted there had been a loss of life.

There followed a discussion as to whether the last raid by the South Vietnamese/5/ had been successful. Secretary McNamara reported that after-battle information revealed that the South Vietnamese planes had hit a target other than one they were supposed to hit.

/5/The raid on February 8 on the Chap Le Army Barracks. A report on the raid was contained in a February 8 memorandum to the President from the White House Situation Room. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVIII, Cables)

The President asked whether all those present agreed we should launch a retaliatory strike.

In response to the President's direct question, the Vice President said he had some doubts as to whether the strike should take place today or whether it should be delayed until Mr. Kosygin left the area. He had mixed feelings about whether we should retaliate as Secretary McNamara had recommended. He shared the State Department's view that Kosygin's presence in Hanoi or in the Far East limited our freedom of action.

Acting Secretary Ball repeated his view that our action should be cautious. He said the strike as now planned, i.e., deleting the Thanh Hoa Bridge, minimized the effect on a possible Soviet reaction to the strike.

Ambassador Thompson recommended that the strike be delayed for a few days. He thought we should first give warning that the North Vietnamese must stop their aggressive action now or we would end the safe haven which they now have in North Vietnam. If they then continue their activities we should launch Phase II of our December plan for graduated military pressures.

McGeorge Bundy summarized briefly the latest U.S. intelligence estimate of Hanoi's reaction to a new U.S. air strike. (A copy is attached.) (Tab D)/6/

/6/Not found attached.

The President suggested we discuss our position with the Soviet Ambassador, possibly sending a message to the Soviet officials as to why we have to react the way we are. McGeorge Bundy said Ambassador Dobrynin gave Ambassador Thompson yesterday a "personal" message from the Soviet Government which had a governmental rather than a personal tone./7/

/7/See footnote 2, Document 82.

The President asked whether we had any other channels of communication. He recalled the Seaborn channel. He was reminded of the conversations which are apparently being carried on informally by the French in Paris.

There followed a discussion of how much news should be made public following the air attack. The consensus was that we should not spell out in detail exactly what we had undertaken to do.

The President raised the question as to whether there should be Congressional consultation. He also asked whether the time had come for him to make a TV speech. He indicated his reluctance to state again what he had said many times previously.

The President then expressed an interest in any possible targets in South Vietnam. In response, Secretary McNamara said there were no worthwhile targets they had been able to find in South Vietnam.

Acting Secretary Ball said we must emphasize South Vietnam's participation in the air attacks. Selecting only two targets, one for U.S. forces and one for South Vietnamese forces, meant that the operation would be smaller than previously planned. The two targets chosen were closer to the demarcation line and thus an attack on them would be less likely to pull in the MIG airplanes based in North Vietnam.

The President said it had been proper and necessary for us to go into great detail publicly about our first raid in order to reassure the press but he did not think it is necessary following the proposed strike. Public statements should be limited to a generalized description of the new strike.

The President received affirmative answers when he asked Director McCone, Secretary Dillon, and Director Rowan whether they agreed with the recommended strike plan. Mr. Moyers said he thought the strike should be made to meet domestic public opinion requirements.

McGeorge Bundy summarized the consensus that news of the new strike should be released Thursday/8/ in Saigon and that special emphasis should be given to the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese character of the action.

/8/February 11.

Secretary McNamara then proposed that the strike be limited to two targets and that the justification for the strike would be a public statement separate from a report of the action.

The President authorized execution of the strike plan as revised. (The execution order is attached.) (Tab E)/9/

/9/Not found attached.

As the meeting broke up, the President reviewed a draft State Department telegram to Saigon giving Ambassador Taylor guidance on the political situation in South Vietnam. (Draft telegram attached.) (Tab F)/10/

/10/This was a draft of telegram 1677 to Saigon, February 10; see footnote 2, Document 105.

 

99. Memorandum for the Record /1/

Washington, February 10, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his office.

SUBJECT
Meeting at the White House, 10 February 1965--1:30 to 4:30 p.m./2/

/2/The meeting was the 548th meeting of the NSC, which began at 2:10 p.m., and a meeting of principals that preceded the NSC meeting; see Documents 97 and 98.

ATTENDING
President, Vice President, McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, Adm. McDonald for the JCS, Secty. Dillon, Carl Rowan, Ball, William Bundy, Unger, Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, Chet Cooper and McCone. Also Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Reedy and Watson (White House staff were in and out)/3/

/3/Bromley Smith also attended. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

1. McNamara explained the recent reported events in South Vietnam including the bombing of the enlisted quarters at Qui Nhon, the SVN/VC battle near Danang and a number of other incidents. McCone distributed the CIA summary of events of February 7-8-9, copy attached./4/

/4/Not attached and not found.

2. McNamara then raised the question:

a. Should we retaliate?

b. When?

c. What targets?

His recommendation was immediate retaliation on specified targets, including a bridge (Target 14) within 75 miles of Hanoi.

Secretary Ball took exception to timing. He and Thompson placed great importance on the presence of Kosygin in the Far East. He felt that action by us during Kosygin's stay would prompt a greater Soviet reaction than would be the case if we waited until Kosygin returned to Moscow. Thompson supported this view; he laid particular emphasis on the visit of Kosygin to North Korea, stating that this would widen the Sino-Soviet schism; furthermore he noted the complications and the competition between the Soviets and the ChiCom over the forthcoming March 1st meeting./5/ Ball, or more particularly Thompson, seemed anxious to tamp down any reaction on our part, deferring it at least until Kosygin's return to Moscow, and very possibly until March 1st.

/5/See paragraph 8, Document 55.

3. The Vice President expressed support of the Ball/Thompson position. He also made the point that the South Vietnamese have to fight. He raised the question as to whether the South Vietnamese should not conduct these attacks, rather than the Americans. He questioned why the NVN police state was so good and SVN in such turmoil and ineffective. McNamara noted that even in a "South Vietnamese attack," U.S. planes provide the cover, flak suppression and the navigation. Therefore, there is a presence of half or more U.S. planes in a SVN strike.

4. I expressed and advocated very strongly an immediate U.S./SVN strike of substantial proportions and urged that this be done promptly. I took issue with the arguments that we should defer action because of the Sino-Soviet split, the March 1st meeting and the totality of the political relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. I stated that the Sino-Soviet split, the issues and depths of the quarrel, was not wholly understood by us; that I did not think our actions would necessarily control it or its depth. Moreover, the March 1st meeting was an uncertainty and I did not think our actions would have a great deal of bearing on it. I said we must not lose sight of our purpose, which was to help South Vietnamese win freedom from Communist aggression and this could only be done by dynamic and positive action on our part which should not be compromised for collateral reasons. I pointed out the attack of Monday/6/ had already had salutary effects on the political situation in Saigon and that if we did not move in this instance, there would be serious disappointment and disillusionment. I therefore urged not only prompt retaliation but a program of sustained action against the North, selecting targets in the southern part of NVN, and predicted that this would cause Hanoi to reappraise and very probably modify their VC and PL support policies.

/6/February 8.

5. McNamara and Bundy exchanged views on whether we had turned the corner and had moved in the direction of sustained and repeated strikes, rather than occasional retaliations. McNamara took the view that retaliation was for all the actions of the NVN/VC in the South and not for any single specific VC operation; therefore we should keep going.

6. The President asked [for] the field recommendations. McNamara read the latest cable which supported his earlier recommendations. The President asked the JCS--Admiral McDonald said there was unanimity that we should go right now.

7. Dillon, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Unger, Carl Rowan, all expressed support of immediate action, with statements concerning how it should be kept in a low key, announced out of Saigon, etc., etc.

8. Thompson then suggested that we might defer action for a few days but announce that we were going to take retaliatory moves at a time of our choosing. This would permit Kosygin to get out of the Far East. This idea was vetoed. Thompson then suggested we work out communications to Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow concerning our purposes and see if they were not prepared to modify their tactics. It was agreed that we should keep open channels, which would probably be meaningless, as discussions would be on their terms, not ours.

9. The President then raised the question of VC targets in South Vietnam. He seemed to feel that with all the Viet Cong and their irregulars, totaling in excess of 100,000, there should be some lucrative camps as targets. McNamara explained that there weren't.

10. Ball than raised the question of what would happen when the MIG's came in. He developed a scenario of MIG opposition, followed by the need to take out the MIG bases in North Vietnam. This then would be followed by ChiComs introducing MIG's from bases across the NVN border; then this would escalate into the necessity to take out those bases. Hence, he could see we were starting on a course that would escalate into all-out conflict with China.

11. The question of China participation was raised. I stated that there was a possibility of Chinese volunteers coming in at any time and a capability to introduce them. They might do so. However, we did not believe they would introduce organized units now. At this point I said that the introduction of Chinese at this point was not considered a probable event, however, it was very definitely a possibility and in the consideration of our actions, we had to plan to take care of every single possibility, irrespective of how remote, and to be prepared to commit the forces, the resources, the money, etc., to this end. The President was in agreement with this point. Note: This was a repetition of what I had told him privately a week ago./7/

/7/See Document 61.

12. The President then raised the question of how we can prove that the support and direction of the VC was coming from Hanoi. McNamara and Ball quickly responded that this could be proven in the most positive and undeniable way and that State, Defense and CIA were working on papers which would convince even the most doubting people that this was true./8/ (I did not enter into this discussion as I am not familiar with this effort, and I am not sure that the case can be undeniably proven, although I am convinced that this whole operation is directed out of Hanoi.) (Carter follow this up.)

/8/See Document 171.

13. The President then invited a general discussion of the protection of our bases. McNamara repeated his position that it is impossible. It would take at least 100,000 men, 44 battalions, and the presence of such large forces in South Vietnam would be unacceptable for a variety of reasons. (I did not engage in this discussion as I don't believe this to be the case. I think that we can, and must, figure out some way to protect our bases and believe that a net of clandestine operations can be created by the intelligence community which would serve as "Paul Revere's" to furnish warning. (CIA follow this up.)

14. Finally, there was a general agreement that the strike should take place at first light or as soon as command in the field could organize the operation. The Target 14 bridge was withdrawn, also the strike should be conducted by both the South Vietnamese and the U.S. Ball concurred, Thompson continued his reservations, and William Bundy interposed no objection.

15. Following this meeting, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Dillon, and I remained to work out a press release. Bundy stated that the President had "turned the corner" and we were on the track of sustained and continuing operations against the North. I said this was a change from Monday, because I got the impression on Monday that he was approving a retaliation for a particular event. All in the room, and most particularly Dillon, stated that I had misunderstood the President's decision, that he did indeed turn the corner on Monday, and that a program of sustained operations, which was in effect the carrying out of "Phase II" was the order of the day. Despite this, I continue to feel that we are operating consciously or unconsciously on a "reprisal basis" and that if we were to run into a period of a lull for two weeks or three weeks in which no serious atrocities were conducted by the VC, our operations against the North would be automatically stood down. Despite all protestations to the contrary, I think this the frame of mind of State and McGeorge Bundy. It is my opinion that the only advocates of sustained phase of operations are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McNamara, and myself. (Note my telephone conversation with McNamara on 2/11.)/9/

/9/Not further identified.

16. At 6:15 we met in the President's lounge on the second floor of the Mansion with the Leadership and Principal Committee Chairmen, in addition to Mansfield, McCormack, and other leaders, Rivers and George Mahon, the President, the Vice President, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and McCone./10/

/10/See Document 100 for another record of this meeting.

17. The President opened the meeting by explaining the serious difficult situation that confronted us. He called on McNamara to give the details. McNamara repeated the reports from the field. Ball then expressed his views concerning the complications of Kosygin's presence in the Far East. The President then stated that the decision has been made to conduct the strikes. He asked me for an opinion of Soviet-Chinese Communist reactions. I said that in all probability there would be no Chinese Communist reaction to these strikes, although there was a possibility of the introduction of ChiCom volunteers into Laos and North Vietnam. I did not think the ChiComs would come in in organized units. With respect to the Soviets, I felt that they would probably increase their supplies of defense material and armament for use by VC insurgents, but I did not expect any military action, nor did I support the possibility of confrontation with us in other areas, i.e., Berlin and Cuba, etc.

18. Bundy then reviewed at some length his observations in South Vietnam, dealing with the political situation.

19. The President then went around the room and there was no objection to the courses of action decided upon. Mansfield, who was present, made no comment whatsoever. The President pointedly avoided asking him for an opinion or for comment. The meeting adjourned about 8:15.

20. Note: Throughout this discussion the emphasis was laid on retaliation and reprisal for the events which had been described by McNamara. There was no intimation given that we were engulfed on a program of sustained and continuing strikes against the north.

21. Following the meeting I had a brief private discussion with the President and told him I was going to leave for the south and would be there for a few days to get over this cold, would be available to call, would keep a plane standing by. The President agreed this should be done, saw no immediate crisis requiring my staying on hand. I told him General Carter would be acting.

[end document]

Continue:
Political instability within South Vietnam;
U.S. retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam,
January 1-February 11
Documents 100 through 105