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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
14. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/ Washington, January 11, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-026-69. Secret. SUBJECT /2/No record of Nolting's meeting with the President has been found. President Kennedy's log book indicates that Nolting, Harriman, and Taylor met with the President from 10 to 10:55 a.m. on January 12 and Secretary Rusk joined them for the last 10 minutes of the meeting. During an interview Nolting indicated that President Kennedy agreed during the meeting that the Ambassador should have overall authority in Vietnam and that the military commander's terms of reference should reflect this relationship. President Kennedy, according to Nolting, directed General Taylor, in the course of the meeting, to revise the draft terms of reference along these lines. (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Vietnam Interviews, Frederick Nolting, June 1, 1984) A record of a telephone conversation later on January 12 between Rusk and McNamara indicates that the President was presented a paper incorporating Nolting's views on the relationship between the Ambassador and military commander. The record says that the President handed the paper to Taylor. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 1/1/62-2/19/62) Possibly this paper is Document 17. For an account of the specific points at issue between Ambassador Nolting and the Department of Defense, see Document 18. Following a week of calls and briefings about town, Ambassador Nolting from Saigon will call on you at 10:00 a.m., Friday. I gather that all has gone well during his visit except possibly for his early reservations over the changed military set-up in Saigon. Although these have probably been allayed by this time, you may want to ask him how he views his future relationship with General Harkins. Among other topics which you may wish to discuss are: a. Nolting's impression of Diem's intentions and capabilities to fulfill his part of our bargain with him. b. The priorities as he sees them among the many measures planned for South Viet-Nam. c. His views of the defoliant program. d. The help we might seek from other countries. Maxwell D. Taylor/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
15. Editorial Note On January 12, 1962, from 2:10 until 4:20 p.m., Ambassador Nolting testified in Executive Session before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He was accompanied by Sterling Cottrell of the Vietnam Task Force and John P. White of the Congressional Relations Office, neither of whom contributed in any substantive way to the discussion. In his opening remarks Nolting emphasized the minimal extent of United States involvement in Vietnam and discussed the condition of the Vietnamese Government and the low level of public morals. In response to questions Nolting speculated on whether the motivation for the upsurge in Viet Cong/North Vietnamese activity during the preceding 2 years was economic or political, discussed the viability of the Diem regime, expressed his feeling that the situation in Vietnam was primarily the result of Chinese Communist expansionism, commented on biased press coverage in Vietnam, and answered queries from Senator Fulbright on the need for social reform in Vietnam. Some of the discussion was off the record and therefore not recorded. For text of Nolting's statement to the Committee and related questions and answers, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, volume XIV, pages 31-64.
16. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Information Agency (Neilson), to the Deputy Director of the Agency (Wilson)/1/ Washington, January 12, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field--Far East (IAF), 1962. Secret. Initialed by Neilson. SUBJECT PAO John Anspacher has briefed the Ambassador to discuss the following topics with us: 1. Washington News Leaks: Anspacher expressed concern about leaks of classified details of U.S. activities in Viet-Nam to the press in Washington. He argued that while it may be necessary to get some things on the public record for the benefit of the American people, it also would be desirable to inform the mission when such a leak is in the making so it can be prepared for press questions there. He also suggested that some people may be merely talking too much and these apparent leaks are actually slips. Comment: It is true that both leaks and slips have occurred in the Department, the Pentagon and the White House. There is, however, little this agency can do about either controlling such events or alerting the post before the fact. This is a matter that should properly be taken up with the agencies concerned. We have no choice but to go with the news as it develops. 2. Information Advisors in Viet-Nam: It has been suggested to the Ambassador that there is a need for American information/psychological operations advisors at the Presidency level in Saigon and at the province level throughout the country. Anspacher contends that while this is probably a proper role for USOM, in practical terms USIA is the Agency with the competent personnel in this field . . . . . . . . . . . 3. British Cooperation in the Advisor Field: Anspacher initiated talks with the British Embassy in Viet-Nam, suggesting that the British and Americans in Viet-Nam concert efforts to improve the whole Vietnamese information/psychological effort here. The British reportedly showed considerable interest and said they would write a letter to the Foreign Office on the subject. Comment: We think that the U.S. should keep control of the information/psychological operation in Viet-Nam and the British should not be involved at the policy level. If they wish to offer assistance at the operating level we might welcome it depending upon the circumstances and terms of reference. The British paramilitary mission has already caused us trouble by moving beyond its proper role. 4. Anspacher also suggested a week-long survey trip by Mr. Murrow to look into information/psychological problems the GVN faces and to make recommendations on how to solve them. He further suggested that one of the recommendations emerging from such a survey could be the appointment of an American information advisor to the Presidency, as mentioned above. Comment: The GVN has been surveyed by a great number of U.S. missions already. Another one is hardly in order at this time on such a touchy subject. Certainly there is no need for an official of Mr. Murrow's level to get involved in this, although IAF still is trying to get the Director to the Far East. . . . . . . . 6. Critical News Coverage of the GVN: The Ambassador is rather exercised about critical items appearing in the commercial media. He feels that whereas the GVN is far from an ideal instrument it is all we have to work with and because of the sensitivities in the Palace a critical press has a directly adverse effect on our efforts to get our job done since the GVN is harder to negotiate with after each critical item appears. A particular case in point is the recent Newsweek story by Bob Elegant that caused that issue of the magazine to be banned. (Without mentioning Newsweek he expressed this general view at the Viet-Nam Task Force meeting yesterday.) After the banning of Newsweek we received a telegram from our PAO saying that Newsweek had decided to suspend distribution in Viet-Nam. We sent back a Task Force telegram instructing them to protest this censorship to the GVN. At this point the VOA carried the story on Pham Vuy Co. In his sharp protest to us about the VOA broadcast, the Ambassador referenced our telegram asking them to protest the GVN's censorship. As you know Mr. Murrow assured the Ambassador that there would be no repetition of this sort of VOA transmission. Anspacher has counseled the Ambassador that the image of the GVN in the world press can be no better than the face the GVN presents to the public and until it is willing to improve its press relations there is not much we can do about it. He also told the Ambassador that our media could not ignore stories that were getting attention in the domestic and foreign press without damaging credibility of our news coverage. We suggest that the following topics might be taken up with Ambassador Nolting: 1. What is the Ambassador's view of the role and mission of USIS in such emergencies as exist in Viet-Nam? How far should USIS go in support of the GVN's information/psychological activities? Do we have enough, and the right kind, of personnel? 2. What are his views on the problems of relations with foreign (British, French, etc.) correspondents in Saigon? (cf my memo to Mr. Harris of Jan. 4)/2/ We should take this opportunity to point out the pitfalls of American--only briefings and emphasize the idea that the best way to get a cooperative press is to offer all possible cooperation. /2/Document 5. 3. Is USIS-Embassy coordination adequate in his opinion? Is he getting the support he needs? 4. Is Washington support to the information program adequate? 5. Should we be looking to an expanded program in the next year? 6. Would it be useful to institute an adaptation of the Lao Muong Information Program in Viet-Nam? Ambassador Nolting will be accompanied by Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force./3/ /3/No record of this meeting has been found.
17. Terms of Reference for the Senior United States Military Commander in Vietnam/1/ Washington, January 12, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam 1961: Taylor Recommendations, Command. Secret. A covering note on White House letterhead, dated January 12, indicates that the revised terms of reference were transmitted to McNamara from General Taylor. The revision may have been the paper handed to Taylor by President Kennedy during the meeting with Nolting, Harriman, and Taylor by January 12. (See footnote 2, Document 14) Also on January 12, presumably in response to directions by Harriman acting on the President's instructions for revision, draft terms of reference were prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for use in a meeting with Secretary Rusk on January 13. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Vietnam 1961, Taylor Recommendations, Command) These were sent to Secretary McNamara in a letter of January 13 from Secretary Rusk. The changes made by the Department of State in the original terms of reference approved by President Kennedy on January 3 were less extensive than those in the version printed here, consisting only of the addition of the first paragraph, as printed here, and not including any of the changes made here in the fifth and sixth paragraphs (see Document 9). 1. The preservation of the independence of South Viet-Nam in the face of Communist attempts to take control of South Viet-Nam requires that all arms and agencies of U.S. policy operate in relation to each other and to the Government of Viet-Nam in intimate and effective coordination. To assure such coordination, the representatives of the various U.S. agencies in Saigon will continue to operate as a unified Task Force under the chairmanship and overall direction of the Ambassador. 2. Within this concept, the Senior U.S. Military Commander in South Viet-Nam will have the responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations and assistance in that country, and the authority to discuss both the U.S. and Vietnamese military operations directly with the President of Viet-Nam and the leaders of the GVN. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will also furnish advice to the GVN on matters relative to maintaining internal security in South Viet-Nam and to the organization and employment of the RVNAF or other paramilitary forces. 3. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have the title "Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command--Viet-Nam". 4. The Senior U.S. Military Commander will have direct access to CINCPAC and, through him, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. 5. The U.S. Ambassador, who as representative of the President is the senior U.S. representative in Viet-Nam, will be kept apprised by the Senior U.S. military commander, in advance, of plans in the military field, in order to assure proper coordination of U.S. activities and advice vis-à-vis the GVN. In case of differences of view, any member of the Task Force would be free to communicate such differences to Washington for decision in accordance with already-existing procedures. 6. While the Ambassador and the senior military commander will keep each other, and where pertinent other members of the Task Force, fully informed on all high-level contacts with the GVN and on major political and military plans, the operational command of U.S. military personnel will be the direct responsibility of the senior U.S. military commander.
18. Memorandum by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, January 13, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-628-71. Secret. SUBJECT Ambassador Nolting wishes the directive to the Senior U.S. Military Commander in South Vietnam to include specific language recognizing the Ambassador as the senior U.S. representative in Vietnam. He also wishes the Senior U.S. Military Commander to serve as a member of a unified task force under the chairmanship and over-all direction of the Ambassador. Finally, he wishes to make clear that the operational command of U.S. military personnel and units is the direct responsibility of the Senior U.S. Military Commander. The Secretary of Defense would be agreeable to specific language covering the first and third points of the Ambassador. That is, he does not argue the point that the Ambassador is the senior U.S. representative, nor that the command responsibility for U.S. Forces in South Vietnam rests with the Military Commander. He does not agree to placing the Commander under the over-all direction of the Ambassador as a member of the Country Team. He feels that this blurs the responsibility for the military program. He would meet this point by clearly setting forth the direct responsibility for military policy, operations, and assistance of the U.S. Military Commander, but would require him to keep the Ambassador informed in advance of his plans for the future so that the Ambassador could appeal to Washington if he disagreed with the U.S. Military Commander. MDT
19. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy/1/ Washington, January 13, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-026-69. Secret. At the top are written the words: "Read by HA." "HA" stands for "Higher Authority" and was regularly used in referring to President Kennedy. SUBJECT /2/No record of this meeting has been found. According to the President's log, McNamara and Taylor met with the President on an "Off the Record" basis from 10:50 to 11:20 a.m., January 13. It is my understanding that Secretary McNamara will discuss the following points with you during his visit this morning: a. Actions in the Department of Defense to further the counter-guerrilla program. I delivered your memorandum/3/ (copy attached) to him last night and discussed your feeling of the need to mobilize all of our resources behind this program. He understands and shares this feeling of urgency, and would like to indicate some of the actions he has set in motion. /3/Not attached to the source text; presumably a reference to a memorandum of January 11 from the President to McNamara on the importance of counterinsurgency operations. (JCS Files) b. Trip to Honolulu. He will discuss what he intends to do over the week end in his visit to Honolulu with General Lemnitzer. c. The directive to the U.S. Military Commander in South Vietnam. After Ambassador Nolting's visit to you I went into the issue which Nolting raised. I found that Nolting's paper which you read/4/ was a complete rewrite of a carefully drawn agreement worked out personally by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara./5/ Secretary McNamara considers that it is not feasible to re-open this issue in its entirety in the short time remaining before McNamara and Nolting depart for Honolulu. I think that Secretary McNamara will recommend to you, with Rusk's concurrence, that the agreed directive be promulgated with the understanding that it will be reviewed after a short test period. Personally, I do not think there are any great issues at stake, provided Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins behave like the sensible people I believe them to be. /4/Possibly a reference to Document 17. /5/See Document 9. M.D.T./6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
20. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-28-62 Washington, January 13, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, VN (Sensitive). Top Secret. A stamped notation indicates that the Secretary of Defense saw the paper. SUBJECT 1. Reference is made to memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 18 September 1961,/2/ which requested: /2/Not printed. a. An interim report by 15 January 1962 of the assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Forces and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) capabilities, and recommended changes in force objectives. b. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the adequacy with which certain points included in the 4 August 1961 decision/3/ by the President on Joint Programs of Action with the Government of Vietnam had been met. /3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 113. 2. This memorandum responds to subparagraph 1 a above. Subparagraph 1 b was answered by JCSM-321-61, dated 30 November 1961./4/ /4/Not found. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the currently authorized nine division equivalent force objective for Vietnam should not be increased at this time. However, provision of 5,000 working spaces in addition to the currently authorized 200,000 man force level is urgently required to provide Chief MAAG, Vietnam, flexibility in planning for many minor but important force structure changes such as augmentation for the RVNAF school system, support for additional light aircraft, scout dog handlers and cadre personnel for junk and river forces. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the current pressing military problems are to persuade the GVN to: (a) train, organize and utilize properly their existing military and paramilitary resources; (b) develop a counter-insurgency campaign plan; (c) implement clearing actions on a province by province basis; and (d) retain control over cleared areas. 5. A subsequent assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of strength requirements will reflect GVN and RVNAF capabilities and limitations, associated with implementing actions discussed at the Secretary of Defense Conference on 16 December 1961 in CINCPAC Headquarters/5/ and related to the problems indicated in paragraph 4 above. /5/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 324. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend: a. That the currently authorized nine division equivalent force objective for Vietnam not be increased at this time. b. Approval of 5,000 working spaces in addition to the currently authorized 200,000 man force level for Vietnam. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
21. Editorial Note On January 13, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to Secretary McNamara JCSM-33-62, which in 14 numbered paragraphs stated the strategic importance of the Southeast Asia mainland. For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pages 448-454.
22. Editorial Note On January 15, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Ambassador Nolting, Admiral Felt, General McGarr, and numerous other officials met at CINCPAC Headquarters in Honolulu for the second Secretary of Defense's Conference. A full record of the meeting is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (62) 19-GVN-DEFSEC-CINCPAC. For a summary record, see Document 29. Regarding the first Honolulu Conference, December 16, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume I, Document 324.
23. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Saigon, January 16, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, USIS, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Gardiner. POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST IN PRESIDENT DIEM'S
MEETING WITH PARTICIPANTS (This [is] not an attempt at a complete memorandum of conversation, which will be supplied for the record by Mr. Koren who took notes throughout the four-hour conversation. The purpose of this memorandum is to highlight certain points that were new to the drafting officer, and to comment on some of them.) 1. Diem's Anti-communist History Diem went to very considerable lengths in describing his role in Vietnam beginning in 1922 when he started in as a district official, and eventually rose to be a province chief and Minister of the Interior. As early as 1922, he had made a point of reading communist literature published in Switzerland, and this enabled him to obtain a true insight into the activities of the communists who were active throughout Central Vietnam in the '20s and '30s. Despite the fact that the commies then operated through various front and cover organizations, his knowledge of their techniques enabled him to be always alert, and his anti-commie tactics as a government official soon earned communist enmity. He was extremely critical of French policy at the time. The French government thought that local communists might be a force which could help contain and control the rising spirit of nationalism in Vietnam. This view was a sadly mistaken one. Communists here were actually in touch with Moscow headquarters only through Paris, and the presence of left-wing government in France in the 1930s, and the emergence of the Front Populaire in France in the mid-thirties, was a great encouragement to communist activity and dissidence in all of Vietnam. Diem spoke of his early connection with the VC General--Giap--whom he described as a person of great industry with great pride in self. Diem and Giap were born in neighboring villages, and Diem had known him, and known of him, for years, despite the fact that Giap is about ten years Diem's junior in age. Diem also mentioned his contacts with Ho Chi Minh, and emphasized the long absence from the soil of Vietnam which had characterized Ho's career. Diem's anti-colonialist and anti-communist convictions led to his withdrawal from the French civil service, and subsequently to his detention by the VC in the mountainous regions of North Vietnam. He emphasized that for all those forty years, from 1922 to 1962, his anticommunist convictions and purpose had never wavered. II. U.S. Errors Diem mentioned three major errors in United States policy since 1955 with considerable bitterness, although he said that he did not wish to engage in polemics. He implied, however, that present newspaper attacks on him and his regime were designed to cover up these errors of Americans whose careers might otherwise be prejudiced. The first error was the refusal to accept his proposal which he made to the JCS in 1957 in Washington/2/ to expand the military forces by 20,000 men. The second error was U.S. insistence on treating the Civil Guard as a rural police force rather than as a military force. This second error had only recently been corrected. The third error was refusal of the Embassy and USOM to accept his program for development of rural roads in 1957. Rapid expansion of the road network was an essential element in the struggle against communism. /2/Regarding Diem's visit to Washington in 1957, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. I, pp. 792 ff. The President remarked that in the Staley/Thuc Report/3/ his road program had been accepted, but that he was still disappointed at the extent of action so far in carrying it out. /3/Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 93. [The Thuc/Staley Report, in referring to the road program, mentioned the "construction of village roads with heavy use of local labor." That is all. The implementation of various measures contemplated in the report, of course, is dependent to a large extent on the availability of local currency funds, and six months were required for action by the GVN to take the steps in establishing the fiscal policy contemplated in the Thuc/Staley Report to provide the necessary finances for counter-insurgency efforts in both military and civilian In looking back at the history of the road program, it is important to note that the operations of the American contractors, who constructed three highways designed to meet military priorities as they were then established, resulted in training hundreds of Vietnamese workers in the use of road-building equipment, starting from scratch. The development of an adequately manned and staffed Highway Department was a prime object of USOM policy from 1958 onwards, and the reluctance of the ICA to provide unlimited new highway equipment was conditioned throughout by considerations of ability of Vietnam to utilize, maintain, and repair equipment with a reasonable degree of effectiveness, as well as by the fact that 2,000 pieces of heavy equipment, used by U.S. contractors, were intended to be turned over to the GVN--as has been done. Throughout most of 1960, the GVN had stored near Tan Son Nhut airport, unutilized, great quantities of earth movers bought with their own funds but kept idle pending use for the Da Nhim Dam project. During the summer of 1960, it was reckoned by MAAG that the ARVN engineers could have been 50% more effective in the use of their men and equipment had active steps been taken by ARVN to maintain units, 30% of which were then deadlined for one reason or another.]/4/ /4/These and following brackets are in the source text. The President also spoke with conviction on the need to regroup people in the countryside into defensible units, rather than having them scattered in homesteads remote from one another. Such a regroupment was an essential counter-guerrilla element at the present time, combined with appropriate village guards dedicated to the defense of their homes. Some progress was being made along these lines. He did not agree, however, that it was necessary to pay for the labor involved in this regroupment. It was characteristic of the agricultural economy of Vietnam that following varied activities in connection with the cycle of farm operations' labor had spare time on its hands, and at these periods it could and should be used for community improvements such as were involved in a program of regroupment. He also noted that the government had considered an increase in pay for both Civil Guards and village guards a year ago, but that he had been informed by his financial counsellors that the government could not afford to make increased funds available for these purposes. In another category of criticism which appeared to be directed primarily at USOM, President Diem referred to our reluctance in the early stages of the aid program in 1955 to believe that the Vietnamese, as distinct from French or Chinese, could play a useful and effective role in business enterprise. He pointed out that at that time there were only two Chambers of Commerce in Saigon, one the French and the other Chinese. Efforts which he had made had resulted in the establishment of a Vietnamese business group, who began as importers and who now were established with their own Chamber of Commerce and were working effectively in industry and trade. [Underlying this criticism, one might detect great sensitivity at frequently expressed American opinion that technical, industrial and commercial problems in Vietnam do require advice at the present time from those trained outside of the country.] In considering the use of military equipment now being made available in such large quantities through U.S. military aid, however, the President took a completely different view. He emphasized that it would be a great error to expect quick results despite the fact that this military equipment is now being made available in admittedly satisfactory quantities. The reason why he could not promise results was that Vietnamese military forces lacked the leadership to put it to full, immediate use. The reason for the lack of leadership was that the French had never trained an adequate number of officers, so that Vietnam was left with the problem of finding enough well trained generals, colonels and majors to mount substantial operations. The officers who are now in command lack sufficient knowledge of the abilities and resources of their troops, and this has led to frequent failures in operations. He sketched on paper, as an example, three columns of soldiers advancing on a given point. He said all too often the estimates of time required for each to reach the given objective were incorrect. The columns either arrived late, or else punctually but at the point of exhaustion, and therefore the operation would be ineffective. President Diem spoke with very great bitterness of the criticisms of himself and his administration written by journalists who lived off the fat of the land either here or in Hong Kong or in the United States, and who had no responsibility whatsoever for the conduct of the campaign against the communists. He was contemplating writing a letter to President Kennedy, asking for President Kennedy's views on the way to handle such unjustified and unwarranted criticism. He implied that this type of criticism played right into the hands of the commies. Communist propaganda could not usefully and effectively criticize the very adequate domestic programs of the GVN which had done so much to build up the economy of the countryside in Vietnam. It was very advantageous for the communists to be able to find material ready made by Free World journalists with which to criticize Diem himself and the top government officials. AZG Director, USOM
24. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Saigon, January 16, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, 350-GVN. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall on January 17. The meeting was held in Mendenhall's Residence. Another copy is in Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 14, GVN, 1962, Political Situation, General. Distributed throughout the Embassy, to CINCPAC, and to the Department of State. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Corcoran and I had a conversation with Dr. Fishel at my house following up the conversation (already reported by memorandum/2/) which I had with Fishel on January 5. The main points emerging from this conversation were as follows: /2/Not found. 1. Dr. Fishel said that he had now talked, during his two weeks here, with about 100 Vietnamese, of whom only three were supporters of the Diem Government, and two of those supported it with reservations. He said that these conversations included persons he had talked to on a 4-day trip he has just concluded to the Kontum area, Quang Tri and the 17th Parallel, and the Nha Trang area. Even outside of Saigon he said he often encountered the attitude, "I am willing to fight for my country, but why do it for the Ngo family." He said he knew 90% of the persons talked to from his 5-year stay in Viet-Nam from 1954 to 1958, and many of them were at that time strong supporters of Diem. He said that these conversations have reaffirmed the impression he expressed during our previous talk about the grave deterioration of the political position of Diem since his last visit in 1959. Fishel said he was so depressed by this that he almost wished that he had not come to visit Viet-Nam. 2. Fishel asked whether I was aware that thousands of officers in the armed forces had been converted to Catholicism because they consider this the way to get ahead under the Diem Government. I told him I had not been aware of this, and he said he received this information from Diem's own Father-Confessor, who was one of the original supporters of Diem and told Fishel this in great sorrow. Fishel said that he had direct experience bearing on this point during his travels the past few days in the countryside when a major he had known previously told Fishel about his conversion to Catholicism and cynically indicated that this was the way to get ahead under this Government. Fishel said he had also learned that three Cabinet ministers have taken up Catholicism, including Thuan. 3. Fishel described the discouraging, depressing atmosphere among the personnel of the Presidency, most of whom he has known closely for years. He said two of them even described with tears in their eyes the deterioration in the administration of the Government. He said they indicated to him that they are continuing to hold on to prevent "them" (meaning the Ngo family and close adherents) from taking over everything, and in the hope that some kind of change will occur. 4. Fishel said that his trip through the countryside had shown him that there are some basically hopeful factors in the situation (for example, the excellent training and morale of the Rangers he saw at the Ranger Training Center in Nha Trang, and the obvious dedication of many of the military personnel whom he encountered on this trip). He stated, however, that the military and economic reforms recently undertaken by the Government will not alone produce any fundamental change in the trend against the Government. What is needed in addition is a psychological shock. When asked just what he thought was necessary he decided to remain discreetly silent (obviously because it comes very hard for him to put forth suggestions adverse to the political fortunes of Diem to whom he has been close for so long).
25. Telegram From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Nolting) to the Department of State/1/ Honolulu, January 17, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-1762. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Priority. Attached to the source text was a note from Battle to the Secretary indicating that U. Alexis Johnson had action on it and that no other distribution had been or would be made pending Johnson's recommendations to Rusk. The letter was never submitted to the President. For Rusk's reply, see Document 40. 8140. CINCPAC/Polad has requested that we pass the following. Eyes Only SecState from Nolting. Will you be good enough to discuss the following with Secretary McNamara and, if you and he have no objection, pass it to the President. Dear Mr. President: I am presently on my way back to Saigon still unclear in my mind on how the US operation in Viet-nam is to be conducted. You recall the brief discussion of the matter in our meeting last Friday./2/ In several long discussions with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, we have been unable to clarify the matter to our mutual satisfaction. Mr. McNamara and I achieved at Honolulu what is perhaps an agreement on words, but, I am afraid, not a meeting of minds, which is more important./3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 14. /3/Ambassador Nolting subsequently indicated that McNamara had stated to him during the plane trip to the Secretary of Defense's meeting in Honolulu that his hands were tied on the terms of reference for the commander of MAC by JCS opposition to placing a four-star general in a position subordinate to an ambassador. As a result, the basic problem of who had overall authority to conduct U.S. relations with the Government of Vietnam remained unresolved in Nolting's mind. (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Vietnam Interviews, Frederick Nolting, June 1, 1984) Like everyone else, I am concerned only to find the way to hold Viet-nam. I think this can be done without intervention of US combat forces; but the margin is not great. Clarity of concept, mutual confidence, team work, and a balanced, many-sided effort are required. I believe clear US organizational arrangements are essential to our chances of success. As you know, we must work through and with a sensitive sovereign government and a difficult man. We are trying to help them mount a many-sided effort to win and hold the allegiance of the Viet-nam people. In my view, this is essentially a political job under present conditions. The military component is very important and our military contributions large and increasing, but this fact should not, in my judgment, alter our basic concept nor our basic organization to carry it forward. I feel that one person must be clearly in charge of the conduct of our affairs in Viet-nam and of our relations with the Government of Viet-nam. If that person does not have good enough judgment to stay out of the line of operations of the various US agencies involved, he should be replaced. Especially is this true of military operations. I also think that the concept and function of the US Task Force (or Country Team) in Saigon ought to be continued under the chairmanship and overall direction of the Ambassador to assure proper coordination of US policy and action. Conversely, the ambassador should be held responsible for not infringing the operational responsibilities of the other agency heads, most especially that of the senior military commander. Finally, I believe that the direction you set in your letter to President Diem (in connection with the Staley-Thuc report),/4/ in which you imposed greater authority and flexibility in your representatives in the field, is sound and profitable. I do not think best results can be obtained from detailed direction of the effort from Washington or Honolulu. Needless to say, I consider the vigor and speed put into the military effort by Secretary McNamara and the Defense Department is all to the good, and I hope it will be matched by other agencies to keep the total effort in balance. /4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 114. I write this letter, Mr. President, because I feel there have been differences of view on essential matters of organization bearing on my responsibilities to you and to our government, and that efforts to reconcile them may have left scars. If the views expressed above do not accord with your own, or if there are scars which you think will impair my own effectiveness, I hope that you will tell me so and accept my resignation, which is, of course, readily available. In terms of personal relations with all concerned in this matter (including General Harkins with whom I had dinner last night), I feel that they are excellent, and that it is essential that they remain so if we are to succeed. A clear understanding on the above matters will, I am confident, assure this. With my high regard and respect. Sincerely, Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.
26. National Security Action Memorandum No. 124/1/ Washington, January 18, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Secret. Attached to the source text were a memorandum to all Assistant Secretaries of State for regional affairs, January 26, from U. Alexis Johnson establishing State Department liaison with the Special Group; copies of letters to Ambassadors in Southeast Asia asking for views on counterinsurgency; a copy of a letter from Rusk to Lemnitzer, June 16, establishing a Task Force for Southeast Asia to complement the Vietnam Task Force and other papers from 1965 and 1966 relating to the revision of NSAM 124 and abolition of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). TO SUBJECT To assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries, a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) is established consisting of the following members: Military Representative of the President, Chairman On invitation: Other department and agency representatives, as deemed necessary The functions of the Special Group (C.I.) will be as follows: a. To insure proper recognition throughout the U.S. Government that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare. b. To insure that such recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces and other U.S. agencies abroad and in the political, economic, intelligence, military and informational programs conducted abroad by State, Defense, AID, USIA and CIA. Particular attention will be paid the special training of personnel prior to assignment to MAAG's and to Embassy staffs in countries where counter-insurgency problems exist or may arise. c. To keep under review the adequacy of U.S. resources to deal with actual or potential situations of insurgency or indirect aggression making timely recommendation of measures to apply, increase or adjust these resources to meet anticipated requirements. d. To insure the development of adequate interdepartmental programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries and regions specifically assigned to the Special Group (C.I.) by the President, and to resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation. In performing the above functions, the members of the Special Group (C.I.) will act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and will depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country or regional interdepartmental task forces (normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established. The Group will confine itself to establishing broad lines of counter-insurgency policy, subject to my direction and decision as appropriate, insuring a coordinated and unified approach to regional or country programs, and verifying progress in implementation thereof. It will also undertake promptly to make decisions on interdepartmental issues arising out of such programs. The critical areas initially assigned to the Special Group (C.I.) pursuant to paragraph d of this memorandum are set forth in the attached annex. John F. Kennedy
Annex To National Security Action Memorandum No. 124 I hereby assign to the cognizance of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) the following countries: Laos JFK
27. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, January 18, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/1-1862. Secret. Drafted by Johnson. Copies sent to Lemnitzer, Rostow, Harriman, Cottrell, and Nolting. Dear Max: Thank you very much for sending me a copy of the letter you received from Thompson,/2/ in Saigon. I have read it with much interest and trust that you will pardon a few personal reflections. /2/Dated January 3, not printed. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-026-69) While I defer to those who know more about Viet-Nam than I, I am impressed with what seems to me to be the reasonableness of Thompson's emphasis on the importance of cutting the link between the villages and the guerrillas at the first stage rather than expecting to seek decisive military victories against the Viet Cong regulars. This is, as he points out, a slow, methodical process which will require much emphasis on the Self Defense Corps, with the Civil Guard and the armed forces in a supporting role. However, I am encouraged by his independent assessment that the villages are in the main basically anti-Communist. While there is, of course, nothing new in the thought of strengthening village defenses, I am struck by his thesis that only when the population is protected and a steady flow of good intelligence obtained will it be possible to undertake the elimination of the Viet Cong regular units, and that thus, initially, the role of the Army should be to keep the Viet Cong regular units occupied and off balance. It is my understanding that the French attempted to pursue the opposite course. Such a strategy will, of course, not produce any immediate spectacular results, but my own feeling is that we will have to restrain our natural impulse to expect such results. I known this is also Fritz Nolting's feeling, and I think he is right. Sincerely, Alex/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
28. Editorial Note On January 18, 1962, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lemnitzer, transmitted to Secretary McNamara, CM-491-62, a four-paragraph memorandum on the Vietnamese command problem. For text of this memorandum, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pages 440-441.
29. Letter From the Commander in Chief, Pacific's Political Adviser (Martin) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/ Honolulu, January 19, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-1962. Top Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Cot: Encouraged by your letter of thanks for my letter/2/ reporting highlights of the first SecDef Conference last month, I thought I would repeat the performance for the second conference held Monday./3/ However, if you have full access to the Record of the Conference (as you indicated) and feel that my reporting letters are therefore superfluous please let me know. /2/Neither found. /3/January 15. I continue to think the confrontation of Washington, Honolulu and Saigon in an intensive all-day session produces a lot of worthwhile results, not only in terms of SecDef decisions but also in terms of mutual education and enlightenment. The Secretary several times expressed great satisfaction with the accomplishments of PACOM and MAAG Viet-Nam since the last meeting, particularly for what he called an "extraordinary effort" in the "movement of men and material". He indicated, however, that at the next meeting he would want to know what results had been accomplished in Viet-Nam by this splendid effort. At one point during the conference General McGarr presented the views of Diem and Thuan on counterinsurgency./4/ They felt that all forms of action, including military, should be designed to achieve permanent results. While U.S. efforts are greatly appreciated, we are pushing the young GVN too hard and too fast. GVN leadership cannot react as quickly as the Americans wish. American concepts, policies and capabilities do not always fit the oriental mind. Permanent victory depends on restoring the confidence of the people in the GVN and in themselves. It is necessary to separate the Viet Cong from the people; communism cannot be defeated by military means alone. The U.S. is pushing military plans faster than they can be absorbed, and they cannot achieve permanent results without a long-range approach. /4/For an account of Diem's views, see Document 13. The Secretary, I believe, recognized the validity of these GVN views, for he said we must move speedily to support Diem's program. He stressed the importance of holding on to areas that have been cleared militarily. He also recognized that the process of clearing and holding would be a long one. Thus in approving a 12 1/2 million dollar communications package for Viet-Nam, he commented that the U.S. would probably be involved in Viet-Nam for a long time. While agreeing entirely with Diem that permanent victory cannot be won by military means alone, and that to hold areas cleared militarily the necessary "civic" infrastructure must be installed, I am skill convinced that the most urgent need now is to strengthen the military (including paramilitary) capabilities of the GVN. It does not yet appear capable of clearing and holding a substantial key area (such as the province of Binh Duong) without drawing off military forces from other areas to an unacceptable degree. It must reach at least this level of capability before the tide will turn. I have summarized below some of the other principal decisions and opinions of SecDef. On defoliants the Secretary wanted further experimentation to continue so that we could ascertain how effective the spray was on all types of vegetation. Only when this was done would we have a sound basis for judging the operational effectiveness of defoliants. In discussing training and personnel the Secretary manifested great interest in speeding up the arrival of advisers. He wanted them to get out to Viet-Nam as fast as they could be processed in Washington, even though the Vietnamese units to which they were to be assigned were not yet ready to receive them. He agreed with General O'Donnell that too many of our military personnel in Viet-Nam are on TDY with the result that tours are too short. More personnel should be sent on PCS rather than TDY. There was considerable discussion of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps. Both the Secretary and General Lemnitzer felt the CG and SDC should be given high priority attention. The Secretary expressed the opinion that the order of priority for expansion of size and training should be the CG, SDC and ARVN. He wanted recommendations on this by the next meeting. The Secretary also wanted to get carbines into the hands of the SDC as soon as possible. Rather than wait for the completion of a 12-week training cycle before such weapons are issued to an SDC unit, he suggested they be issued following a preliminary training phase just sufficient to teach them how to handle these weapons. He authorized the shipment of another 40,000 carbines to Viet-Nam (in addition to the 37,000 already on hand there) for the use of any GVN military or paramilitary units which could properly use them. During discussion of the province survey teams, the Secretary expressed regret that these teams were being confined to military and intelligence matters. He wanted the American members of the teams to send in comprehensive reports as soon as possible (without waiting for the combined US-Vietnamese report) which would give the American members' observations on political, economic, civic action and other matters as well as on military and intelligence questions. There was considerable discussion of plans for clearing and holding a single province or area. It was decided to eliminate Zone D as an immediate target, since it did not lend itself to the concept of clearing with the ARVN and holding with civic action teams, CG and SDC, being a sparsely populated, heavily forested area. Moreover, its military significance has decreased with the apparent evacuation of the Viet Cong "Nambo headquarters". The Chief MAAG is to work up a plan for clearing and holding an area where permanent results can be achieved. Such an area may or may not be confined to one province. The Secretary expressed great concern about the US press treatment of the GVN. He felt that the pessimistic anti-Diem line of the press was hurting our cause with Congress and the public. He directed that we step up public information programs at all levels--Washington, Honolulu and Viet-Nam. He left to the judgment of CINCPAC and Chief MAAG Viet-Nam what could be declassified to assist in these programs. Fritz Nolting cautioned that in briefing the press we should give full credit to the GVN and not make it look as though the U.S. were running the war in SVN, making the plans, or pulling all the strings. In a brief discussion of aid from third countries, Admiral Felt mentioned the interest of the ROKs in sending some of their forces to assist the GVN. The Secretary's reaction was that we would have to pay for this, and we might as well pay the Vietnamese to do the job themselves. As for Australian help, however, the Secretary said that if it were politically wise to accept Australian help we should do so. General McGarr said he would be glad to have small numbers of Australians if they were willing to serve under the MAAG. Sincerely, P.S. It strikes me that the concern expressed in Deptel 890 to Saigon/5/ re "leak" on helicopters is inconsistent with attitude of SecDef on declassifying as much as possible of our aid to GVN and our operations there in order to get better press. Unless State and Defense coordinate on this, I can see State frantically investigating items purposely "leaked" by Defense, MAAG, etc. /5/Telegram 890 to Saigon, January 18, asked the Task Force in Vietnam to consider whether to try to track the source of the leak concerning the introduction of U.S. helicopters into South Vietnam, in violation of the Geneva Accords. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/1-1862) E
30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, January 20, 1962, 4:03 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/1-2062. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Drafted by Peters on January 19; cleared by Cottrell, Peterson and Maechling; and approved by Rice. 899. Recent NSC directive to Departments of State and Defense/2/ reports President's concern that we may be missing opportunity for contribution by military forces to socio-economic development and his hope that civic action projects can be included in MAP and AID programs wherever practicable. Directive requires report to NSC by 31 March regarding programs built into FY 62 aid programs and by September 1 on activities included in FY 63 program. /2/Document 26. To spur civic action effort and be in position report resultant progress by 31 March, it is proposed that in immediate future (early February) small DOD-AID teams visit small number selected countries designated for development pilot programs. Teams would work with country team to assist in organization for new or expanded civic action effort. Though scale of activity and expenditures would necessarily be modest for FY 62, any required financing would be additional to presently scheduled assistance. Civic action defined as use indigenous military forces for projects useful to the populace in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation and others helpful to economic development. Properly handled, such projects can serve important aim of promoting close friendly relations populace with military so essential to inhibiting or combatting insurgency. Believe new or expanded civic action effort might make important contribution to achievement our objectives Viet-Nam, that proposed team might provide organizational boost to necessary effort and that undertaking logical follow-up to recent visit Army Civic Action Survey Team. Request Country Team views. No discussion with GVN at this time. Immediate reply necessary to meet deadline for designation pilot countries. Embtel 305 Sept 1 is pertinent./3/ /3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/8-3161) Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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