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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
31. Memorandum of Conversation Between Dr. Wesley Fishel of Michigan State University and the Counselor of Embassy in Vietnam (Mendenhall)/1/ Saigon, January 23, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 14. GVN 1962, Political Situation, General. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall on January 24. SUBJECT Dr. Fishel dropped by the office to correct certain information which he had passed on to me about conversions to Catholicism within the Vietnamese Government and Army (see memorandum of conversation dated January 16, 1962/2/). He said that he has since learned that the information indicating that three Cabinet Ministers, including Thuan, had been converted to Catholicism, is incorrect. There has been only one conversion to Catholicism among the Cabinet Ministers, and that is Huynh Huu Nghia, Secretary of State for Labor. /2/Document 23. Fishel said that he also believes that the earlier information that "thousands of officers in the armed forces" had been converted to Catholicism is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, he said that the best information he has been able to get indicates that the number has been large. It has often been based on the expectation that promotion comes faster to Catholics, but he has heard that this is by no means necessarily the case, since he has been told that Catholics are often passed over. In passing along this correction, Fishel specifically said that he had no reason to change any of the other information or conclusions which he had given me earlier.
32. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 24, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2462. Secret. Drafted by Johnson; a copy was sent to General Taylor. Dear Bill: The January 21 attack on a Cambodian village by Jungle Jim aircraft/2/ has greatly increased our concern over the implications of recent messages from the Chief MAAG in Saigon concerning the use to which these aircraft are being put in attacking villages in Vietnam. While we must heavily rely on the judgment of the people on the spot in the selection of suitable aircraft targets, it seems to us that the error made with respect to the attack on the Cambodian village and the civilian casualties resulting therefrom, point up the extreme difficulty of selective use of air power against native villages. /2/Telegram 956 from Saigon, January 24, reported that U.S. Jungle Jim aircraft, carrying mixed U.S. and Vietnamese crews, had mistakenly attacked a Cambodian village while on a mission against a Viet Cong concentration in an area west of Binh Hoa. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (62)19, GVN, Jan-Jun) I note, for example, in recent CHMAAG VN SITREPS that in response to VNAFL-19 identifications, apparently similar to those in the case of the Cambodian village, napalm bombs, rockets and 50 caliber ammunition have been employed against villages. Our fear is that unless identification of the target is very certain, the civilian casualties resulting from such air action may do severe damage to the basic objective of winning the people to the side of the government against the Viet Cong, whether or not the village is willingly or unwillingly sheltering some Viet Cong. I fully appreciate the extreme difficulty of identifying targets and assuring that only Viet Cong are the victims of attack. However, the stakes of winning the population to the side of the government are so great that it seems to me we should err on the side of caution in the selection of targets. It does not seem to me that we can afford to alienate people in the countryside even though at the moment it may appear that they are temporarily controlled by the Viet Cong. I would hope that our guideline could continue to be to separate the Viet Cong from the people, not to destroy people as a byproduct of the effort to kill the Viet Cong. If you agree, I suggest that it would be desirable to have this point of view translated into appropriate instructions to the military commanders concerned. Sincerely, /3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
33. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 24, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2462. Secret Priority; Eyes Only. 963. Reference: Deptel 907./2/ Informed Thuan today (Jan. 24), for President Diem, designation of General Harkins and new title for US Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam. Asked that Thuan inform Diem preliminarily, and requested to see President personally if he had any questions or problems. Thuan asked purpose of US move. I said purpose was to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and speed of US assistance to Viet-Nam in military matters. Thuan inquired what relationship would be between US Commander and Ambassador. I said that this remained to be worked out in precise terms; but that I thought relationship would be similar to present relationship-i.e., Ambassador would be senior US representative, US Commander would work in close contact and coordination with Ambassador and Task Force. /2/Telegram 907, January 23, reads: "Assume you are promptly discussing with Diem designation of General Harkins and new title for US command. Also awaiting your recommendations on handling public announcement and when Harkins may proceed." (Ibid., 751K.00/1-2362) When Thuan asked whether General McGarr would remain, I said I believed that he would remain as Chief MAAG. Thuan again asked what was purpose of move, implying that he felt Diem would have questions on score of US giving appearance of moving in on Vietnamese conduct of war. I explained that we felt need to bring heavy and increasing MAAG activities and substantial US military operations in Viet-Nam under a single military chief, in view of the importance of the operation and the increased workload; that this did not imply any US desire to "take control", our respective positions on this point being well understood. Thuan said he would take the matter up with President Diem and let me know. I told him that we intended to issue a low-key press release, which I would coordinate with him when prepared, and that General Harkins, who is in opinion of those who know him an outstanding officer for this important position, was available to come to Saigon as soon as necessary preparatory arrangements had been completed. (Pouched message referred Deptel 898/3/ not yet received.) /3/Telegram 898, January 20, drafted by Rusk, reads: "Eyes Only reply your telegram from Hawaii coming first available air pouch. If any problems arise meanwhile, please let us know." (Ibid., 751K.00/1-2062) Reference is to telegram 8140, Document 25. Nolting
34. Editorial Note On January 26, 1962, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson sent a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric agreeing to an increase to 200,000 men in the Vietnamese Armed Forces. For text of this letter, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pages 445-446.
35. Draft Memorandum by the Assistant to the Director for Regional Affairs (Far East), Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (Kent)/1/ Washington, January 26, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam . Secret. No addressee indicated. Attached to the source text was a note from Kent to Lansdale stating that Haydn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Regional Affairs), had requested the paper and asking for Lansdale's comments on the draft. SUBJECT 1. Introduction The outcome in Vietnam depends primarily on the risk analyses and resultant policies of the Communist Bloc and the United States. The current situation is the natural result of the opposed policies, marked by mutual caution. The Communists regulate their attack to preserve its ambiguity and avoid prompting increased external assistance for the GVN, and the U.S. limits its support to avoid being directly involved in combat. While these policies continue, the efficiency with which the GVN conducts the campaign against the Communists is a decisive factor. The effectiveness of the GVN will depend, as long as he remains in office, almost directly on the performance of President Diem. This paper is an analysis of the prospects for success in Vietnam under President Diem. 2. Characteristics The GVN directly reflects the personal characteristics and philosophy of President Diem. It is allegedly a corrupt government, but charges of high-level corruption have not been substantiated. Corruption may exist, but with the possible exception of Malaya, it is probably the least corrupt government in Southeast Asia. It is certainly authoritarian and over-centralized. It is not a popular government to which the population rallies in spontaneous support. This results in part from President Diem's aloof paternalism, and in part from the characteristics of the Vietnamese people. It is not an efficient government, but it has provided for its severest critics a demonstration of progress in the face of adversity. This progress is a testimonial of President Diem's ability and a clear indication that South Vietnam would have continued to prosper and develop under his leadership in normal times. The added burden of the growing Communist attack has arrested progress--not the deficiencies of President Diem's administration. President Diem is a man of notable strengths, admired for his austere dedication and courage, but he is also handicapped by several unswerving convictions which are critical weaknesses in the present phase of the emergency. They directly affect his capability to manage the military campaign in Vietnam. Only these weaknesses need be examined for the purposes of this paper. First, he is psychologically unable to delegate authority. Suspicious of the loyalty of all but a few of those around him, he deprives himself of required assistance and governmental efficiency inevitably suffers. He foregoes the services of able men who have incurred his displeasure and treats subordinates so harshly that they are overawed and afraid to present their views or unpleasant facts. In sum, though outstanding in personal ability, he lacks the characteristic of leadership most vital in the current circumstances--the ability to tap the superior collective capabilities of his subordinates. He is unable to compromise. This rigidity has lost him the support of nationalist politicians and impeded his conduct of foreign relations. But this characteristic has also been responsible for his most notable achievements in developing and unifying South Vietnam. He has illusions of omniscience. He is mandarin by training and inheritance. This, coupled with his natural personality, results in a reserve that can not arouse spontaneous public enthusiasm. In the society of Vietnam and during the current emergency, this characteristic may not be as serious a weakness--if a weakness at all--as it is sometimes considered to be by American observers incapable of empathic analysis. However, the real significance of this background is his growing conviction of self-righteousness. A series of experiences wherein he has rejected advice outright and later been proven right left a lasting impression with Diem. Some observers believe that he now is convinced that he enjoys something close to divine guidance. The following are selected important examples: In 1955, he attacked and won against the sects despite conflicting recommendations of some U.S. advisors. He was undoubtedly aware that General Lawton Collins had at that time recommended his replacement by someone more acceptable to the sects and the French. He saw the U.S. country team accept during 1960 his long-standing and long-opposed recommendations for the training and support of the Civil Guard along lines emphasizing their military rather than police function. At the same time his equally long-standing plea for increase of the Vietnamese armed forces was recognized. Moreover, for several years he had tried to convince both responsible U.S. officials resident in Vietnam and those who came as visitors that the internal security situation in Vietnam was a grave problem. U.S. actions in 1961 were [a] tacit admission that the threat existed as Diem had contended. And finally, until 1960, in the administration of the Military Assistance Program Diem gained the impression that U.S. officials believed that their problem was to prepare the VN armed forces to resist external aggression in a role consonant with U.S. contingency plans while the problem of counter-insurgency was not a basic U.S. concern. He has long understood and been alert to differences of opinion within the country team. This knowledge of conflicting opinion--even conflicting advice--has affected his evaluation of advice received. As a result of these experiences, he is cautious of U.S. advice. He is also probably incapable of concluding that the best interests of Vietnam would be served if he relinquished power. From the attempt by the Chief of the General Staff to overthrow the government soon after Diem's appointment as Premier, he has retained the conviction that military authority must be splintered and focused only in his own hands. His survival against coups and plots testifies to the effectiveness of the control that he has maintained, but the development of leadership in the armed forces and their efficient employment have seriously suffered as a result. He lacks military background. He has had little experience, even by observation, with the proven principles of military management. He has no real conception of staff work. When seeking recommendations from his own military officers he either goes to a selected individual, often heading the last men with whom he has spoken, or has a convention of all the Vietnamese Generals. At these latter formations "face" is at stake and generals of limited ability state sweeping generalities without the benefit of facts that normal staff procedures could develop. The faulty decisions thus derived have deepened Diem's mistrust of the ability of his military subordinates. 3. Prospects The Communist campaign against the GVN is now clearly in a critical phase because a series of reverses suffered by the GVN could cause a collapse of the will to resist before the effects of the measures to improve security now approved are felt. Only effective employment of all available military resources can assure a reasonable chance of GVN survival. Continuation of past practices by President Diem in handling of the military program would almost certainly seal the fate of Vietnam. The absorptive capacity of Vietnam for U.S. aid can only be increased to a limited extent--and that increase depends largely on efficient utilization of the resources being made available by the U.S. Attention then centers on the possibilities--and methods to realize them--of causing President Diem to accept advice and reforms. Past performance in this regard is not encouraging. The reforms of military significance which are now being urged upon Diem by U.S. representatives are the same ones that have been urged upon him for at least five years. Gradual progress has been made, but significant reform can not yet be identified. There are a series of encouraging signs, but each must be examined closely to determine whether it is a superficial or fundamental change. Unfortunately, the time required to observe reliably whether important changes are actually being made by Diem can not be risked. Recent creation of a national security council has been evaluated as an encouraging sign, but essentially the same body was in existence even before Chief, MAAG first formally proposed it to President Diem 13 April 1960. But its function was then described by participants as one where the "ministers assembled to take notes and not to talk". At the same time, creation of a central intelligence agency was proposed. It appears that real progress is being made with this vital program though the appointment as chief of the CIA by President Diem of an officer whom he had relieved from responsibility for the delta area, leaves doubt as to whether he will now permit a single effective intelligence agency. Most discouraging is the matter of delegation of authority to military commanders. Since assignment to the CG Field Command of responsibilities for control of field operations was recommended in 1959, no real control has been delegated. And more important, the position--and personality--of the Chief of the General Staff remain unchanged. As commander of all of the armed forces, his role should be more significant than that of the CG, Field Command. The steadfastly loyal but incompetent incumbent remains, not permitted to retire despite his personal desires, and serving no useful function except to exert a stabilizing influence on younger generals and restrain them from plotting against their superiors. Any real intention to place the military establishment on a sound basis must begin with the appointment of a functioning military chief. The question of removal of the province chiefs from the chain of command is debatable. Arguments have been presented to support both sides. However, U.S. officials have steadfastly urged over the years that the authority of the province chief be curbed. There is little indication that the U.S. view is now being accepted. Opinion of U.S. representatives over the years has been divided on the feasibility of exerting pressure on President Diem to cause him to adopt reforms. It has been generally held that an ultimatum to withhold aid could not be effective because Diem, fully aware of U.S. national interests involved in Vietnam, and knowing that the U.S. could not afford to let Vietnam fall, could not be bluffed. Only in the current critical phase has an U.S. ultimatum been credible. It has become credible because only in the present deteriorating situation was it plausible that U.S. officials were convinced that Vietnam would fall unless reforms were made. President Kennedy's message to Diem following the Taylor mission/2/ was couched in language that, judging by VN press reaction, was interpreted to be an ultimatum. President Diem did not yield. No fundamental concessions were made, and U.S. officials made clear that no ultimatum was intended. While it can not be assumed that Diem would have yielded had the U.S. position been resolutely maintained, it is highly probable that no future ultimatum would be seriously regarded. /2/Regarding this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 257 ff. 4. Alternatives A U.S. policy toward Diem based on compulsion through regulation of the level of U.S. assistance can not succeed. The crisis in Vietnam is presently too grave--and time is too limited--to determine whether Diem is now making the substantial changes in his administration that he has through the years declined to make except in superficial form. But changes must be effective if South Vietnam is to have reasonable chances of weathering the current crisis. There are consequently only two general lines of action: (1) to seek replacement of Diem and (2) to seek more effective means of influencing him. Replacement of Diem would gravely risk chaos at a time when chaos can only benefit the Communists. Though a replacement could be found in Vietnam, as in every nation in every age, the stakes involved in engineering a change that could not be directly controlled to ensure smooth transition are too great to risk now. Means to influence Diem then must be sought. Two general areas are most promising--to send senior U.S. officials to Vietnam in whom Diem has confidence and to seek to increase his confidence in U.S. advice through gradual but clear demonstration of its value. The first promises most immediate results. On the military side, individual military ability of the senior U.S. military representative is of secondary importance in comparison with his ability to gain quickly the confidence of Diem. Through the years even the most junior member of the MAAG has quickly recognized the deficiencies of the VN military establishment and no unusual qualifications are required to formulate a program for their correction. But the military representative in Vietnam is the member of the country team on whom Diem will most rely. If the military representative is accepted in Diem's "inner group" he will have value; if not, he could not succeed though he were a military genius. In the present crisis, selection of an individual whom Diem has known and in whom he already has confidence is the most promising alternative. Regardless of whether an effective senior U.S. military representative is assigned, progress can be made by demonstration that U.S. advice is sound and that recommended methods are applicable in Vietnam. Diem will respond to proven successes, particularly if U.S. proposals are tailored to his situation. For example, with full knowledge that Diem will not accept a proposal concerning the military chain of command that would dangerously increase his vulnerability to a coup, U.S. representatives must tailor their recommendations accordingly. They must seek to include in their recommendations provisions--checks and balances--which are a compromise acceptable to Diem. Otherwise only a paper facade will--as in the past-result. In these two areas lies the greatest promise of effective U.S. action at present. A third consideration might be to give Diem full ungrudging support of his programs once he has made his decision. Even though he may not have accepted U.S. advice, once he has made his decision he should have full U.S. support. The U.S. cannot now disassociate itself from Diem's success or failure. It is in our interest to ensure that he succeeds even in programs which do not fit our conceptions.
36. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 27, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2762. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. 980. Refs: Deptel 907 and Embtel 963./2/ Thuan told me today he had taken up with President Diem question new U.S. Military Assistance Command; said he had explained idea to Diem thoroughly; that President wanted to see me about it. I asked whether there were any particular questions or problems in his mind. Thuan said the only problem that Diem seemed to have was whether the U.S. Mission in Viet-Nam was to have "one or more heads". He said from point of view GVN it was essential that U.S. activities should head up to one person in Viet-Nam. I told Thuan that President Diem need have no concern on this score; as to details, this was a matter of internal U.S. arrangements which would, I felt sure, work satisfactorily from GVN standpoint. /2/See Document 33 and footnote 2 thereto. I have been waiting for ten days for clarification of matter referred to in Deptel 898./3/ Pouched message not yet received, and next pouch due late January 30th. I need to be in a position to speak with assurance to Diem on any questions he may raise in connection with new command set-up and would appreciate, if possible, telegraphic summary contents pouched message. Needless to say, I have not raised with GVN, nor with anyone here, question of internal U.S. relationships. /3/See footnote 3, Document 33. Nolting
37. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Assistant to the Director for Regional Affairs (Far East), Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (Kent)/1/ Washington, January 27, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam #5. Secret. SUBJECT /2/Document 35. Thank you for sending me a copy of your thoughtful analysis of President Diem and his relationship to military problems in Vietnam. It has a depth of perception unusual for an American military observer of a political personality! While you have included some hints of it in your paper, the main U.S. failure in working with President Diem has been our many attempts to squeeze him into an American-type mold labeled "Chief of State." Most of the Americans who attempted to do this had only the foggiest notion of what is needed in a Chief of State, not only in Vietnam, but elsewhere (including the U.S.). Thus, Diem has come to view most Americans as meddlers and quite naive meddlers. His long talks with U.S. officials, which they find so boring, are usually his attempts to inform them of even the rudiments of local truths. His real American friends, the ones he trusts, have always been able to speak to him with naked honesty about local problems--as long as they speak from first-hand knowledge. Whenever he has asked my views about a problem I knew little about, I always have told him I would have to look into it first; after I have done so, he has listened intently to what I have said, even when it was unpalatable. His trust and friendship for General Williams was based on this same principle. General O'Daniel arrived at much the same status with Diem. On the other hand, those Americans who just carried tales or seemed to be mere flunkeys for the personal whims of U.S. officials, lost their credibility with Diem--even when he still had an affection for them as old acquaintances. This is hardly unique among leaders of nations. On page 4, in the last paragraph, you note an adverse reaction in the Vietnamese press to President Kennedy's message to Diem. This simply is not true. Yes, there was a bad reaction in the press to U.S. proposals after the Taylor mission. But, these were not reactions to President Kennedy's message. They were reactions to a rather naked grab at taking away sovereignty from the Vietnamese, in the terms State instructed Ambassador Nolting to present to Diem. In a top-level meeting, after the Vietnamese reaction was noted in Washington, I pointed out the offending language in the message and asked if it expressed U.S. policy. Our policy-makers (including Secretary Rusk and General Taylor) seemed surprised at the inclusion of the offending phrases, said that this was not U.S. policy, and sent new instructions to Ambassador Nolting correcting the U.S. proposals./3/ /3/Regarding this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 257 ff. This is quite different from the picture you have-of a U.S. ultimatum and Diem not budging.
38. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, January 29, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/1-2962. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 983. Department's 899./2/ We completely agree expanded effort in military civic action should make important contribution to achievement our objectives in Viet-Nam. MAAG is trying to get civic action program developed by Army mobile civic action team accepted by GVN and believes supplementary team could not be properly used until program developed by previous team accepted. Embassy concurs MAAG view and will work with MAAG in trying obtain acceptance program by GVN. /2/Document 30. As Department aware we expect have what amounts to large scale civic action program in civilian field. Village improvement program announced by joint communiqué 3 weeks ago is civic action par excellence and all other USOM programs also directly bear on civic action possibilities. Progress now held up awaiting Washington approval of 1962 program and other relevant actions which subject separate cable Toaid 431./3/ Trust response thereto can be expedited. /3/Not found. Under circumstances do not believe civic action team could be profitably used at this time in either military or civilian civic action field, but quite possible might well be useful in helping organize for implementation in both fields. In meantime would be interested in Department's views on composition team and specifically what it might do here. Nolting
39. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)/1/ I-25146/62 Washington, January 31, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489 Sensitive 7-61. Top Secret. Secretary McNamara also received a copy. SUBJECT You gave me yesterday, for comment, General Taylor's request for a report on the "Binh Hoa" operation of 21 January./2/ Action on this request remains with General Lansdale's office. /2/Taylor's request, dated January 30, stated that the President wanted to learn more about the Binh Hoa operation. (Ibid.) Our inquiries from General Taylor's staff indicate that his concern stems from an account brought back by Roger Hilsman to the effect that the operation was far too much of a "set piece" and was not an effective form of counter-guerrilla warfare./3/ /3/For Hilsman's report on the Binh Hoa operation, see Document 42. I see that Hilsman is appearing before the Special Group tomorrow,/4/ and urge that you bring out his criticisms to the fullest extent. If necessary, I could arrange to follow up further. /4/The minutes of the meeting of the Special Group (CI) on February 1 indicate only that Hilsman briefed the group on his recent trip to Vietnam and outlined his February 2 paper. (Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62) Depending on the validity of Hilsman's criticisms, I think we should reconsider the question of a guidance message to the air people in South Vietnam, responding to Alexis Johnson's letter mildly rebuking us for the Cambodian village incident./5/ This came up at the SecDef/JCS meeting on Monday, and you will recall the sentiment was against sending such a message. However, my staff got the draft that had been prepared within the Joint Staff, which I attach./6/ It seems to me a quite reasonable message and not to interfere with the necessary freedom of action. /5/Document 32. /6/Not printed. After the meeting tomorrow, I suggest that you reconsider whether such a message would not be a good thing to do. A marginal benefit, of course, would be in our relations with State. William P. Bundy/7/ /7/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, February 1, 1962, 11:22 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-162. Top Secret, Niact, No Distribution; Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared with Manfull. 951. Embtel 993./2/ Following is text Secretary's January 20 letter to you: "I was disappointed to receive your message of January 17 from Honolulu./3/ Even before receiving it I had discussed Honolulu matter with Secretary McNamara and covered his personal talk with you. There is now no 'piece of paper'. There is no doubt you are Senior US Representative in Viet-Nam, responsible for coordination and supervision of US official activities there including, of course, relations with GVN. Further, there is no lack of readiness here to clear up promptly any misunderstanding which might arise as General Harkins settles down to his new job. He will need all help you can give him and I am sure he will want to give you maximum support." /2/ In telegram 993, February 1, Nolting reported that he had not yet received a reply through the pouch to his letter to the President of January 17. (Ibid.) /3/Document 25. "As to whether the background of this unfortunate affair makes it necessary to try to put the existing situation on paper, it is still my view that insistence on point, in absence of any actual misunderstanding, would almost certainly destroy very relationships which are critical to success in Viet-Nam. I would certainly not be willing produce paper effect of which would be make 'treaty' on constitutional and statutory responsibilities of President and members of his Cabinet. Letter from President to Ambassadors/4/ stands as heavy reliance on, and delegation to, Ambassadors in field." /4/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1345. "Having said above, let me add that I fully appreciate
difficulties which this matter may have caused for you,
particularly for your peace of mind, but you can be assured you
will have our full backing and support in what is one of most
critical tasks in our diplomatic service.
Imperative that Harkins assume duty soonest. Expect you will promptly clear matter with Diem. Ball
41. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to President Kennedy/1/ Washington, February 2, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. A memorandum of February 2 from Harriman through Johnson to Rusk recommended that Rusk concur in the Department of Defense plan. (Department of State, Central Files, 951K.8158/2-262) According to a note on the source text, it was approved by McNamara and Rusk on February 2 and sent to Taylor. A memorandum of February 5 from Bromley Smith to McNamara indicates that President Kennedy approved the recommendation. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 370164) Listed as an attachment to the memorandum, but not found attached to the source text, was a map showing the areas contemplated for defoliation. SUBJECT On 3 January 1962 you authorized initiation of limited experimental defoliant operations in Vietnam./2/ These defoliant operations, conducted 13-16 January 1962, included spraying selected segments of road totaling approximately 16 miles along Vietnamese Route Number 15 between Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. A second spraying of each area covered in the initial operation will be required approximately three weeks after the first spraying. Conclusive evaluation of this experiment can be made only after the effects of the second spraying are observed. /2/See Document 1. The Vietnamese Government carried out a simultaneous public information campaign in the test area. To date there have been no adverse reactions in South Vietnam to the defoliant operations. Foreign reaction in non-Communist nations has been relatively light. However, on 21 January, Radio Moscow accused the U.S.-Diemist clique of ordering a chemical warfare plan to destroy food in South Vietnam. Radio Peking also mentioned the subject on 13 January 1962, and various themes have been used recently by the North Vietnamese. On 19 and 24 January 1962 Radio Hanoi broadcasts emphasized the destruction of natural resources and of crops by toxic chemical spraying. This is an intensification of Communist propaganda noted as early as 6 November 1961. The great variety of vegetation found in Vietnam includes species never treated in previous herbicide tests. The limited areas already sprayed do not include the variety of vegetation and conditions required for a full evaluation of the effectiveness of the chemicals employed and possible operational concepts for their use. It is important that we test all conditions of vegetation, as well as the effectiveness of defoliant techniques in specific situations, before proceeding with a larger scale program. To provide the diversified test data needed for full evaluation, CINCPAC and Chief, MAAG, Vietnam have recommended extension of the test program to include six additional specific target areas. These targets have been selected to demonstrate the operational effectiveness of defoliants against types and combinations of vegetation not found in the areas already covered and also to demonstrate defoliant effectiveness in specific situations. The proposed additional targets, indicated by corresponding numbers on the attached map, are as follows: 1. Route from coast to Father Hoa Base at Binh Hung (4 miles).--The vegetation of this area is mangrove. Also defoliation will clear a route from the coast which could be secured by Father Hoa's troops, so that cargo now being air dropped could be moved by lighter from coastal vessels to the beach, and thence to Binh Hung. 2. Bien Hoa Air Base perimeter.--The security of the air base requires that fields of fire and observation be cleared in the area. The irregularity of the features of the base will demonstrate the precision with which spraying missions can be flown. The vegetation includes mixed scrub, tropicaI grass, bamboo, and softwood trees. 3. Nham Go Air Field perimeter.--Eliminating surrounding vegetation at this small strip will show to what degree the requirement for security troops is reduced through defoliant operations. Vegetation of this area is dense broad leaf evergreen forest. There is high continuous canopy over intertwined woody vines and dense evergreen undergrowth. 4. Than Tuy Ha Ammunition Dump area.--This ammunition dump is vulnerable to sabotage. Vegetation clearance will improve observation. The vegetation within the depot area is low, moderately dense mixed scrub and rank tropical grass. 5. Route Number 1 (9.5 mile segment).--The vegetation along the previously sprayed segments of Route 15 was mainly mixed scrub growth, palmgrove and scattered hardwood trees. The proposed segments of Route 1 and Route 14 (target 6) will cover the majority of other principal species of vegetation found in South Vietnam. The dense rain forest with moderate undergrowth found along the Route 14 segment is generally typical of the plateau region of Vietnam. 6. Route Number 14 (7.5 mile segment).--The vegetation is mainly open forest with heavy undergrowth. It is recommended that extension of the present experimental defoliation program, as described above, be authorized. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation. Robert S. McNamara/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
42. Paper Prepared by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)/1/ Washington, February 2, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Reports and Memos, 1/62-2/62. Secret. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet, indicating that the original had gone to General Taylor; a transmittal memorandum from Hilsman to Taylor, in his capacity as chairman of the Special Group (CI), stating that the paper had been prepared as requested by Taylor and the President; and a table of contents. The table of contents indicates that maps, not found attached to the source text, were included with the original. At the President's behest Hilsman attended the Secretary of Defense's Conference at Honolulu on January 15, then went on to Saigon with Nolting to begin an inspection tour of South Vietnam. This report was based on that tour. Hilsman spent the latter half of January in Vietnam. Regarding the background of his visit, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 427. A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM I. Enemy Situation 1. Present Strength. Present Viet Cong strength in South Vietnam is as follows: a. Regular forces--12,600 b. Irregular forces--13,300 c. Supporters and sympathizers--100,000 2. Character of Viet Cong Forces. The regular forces are full-time, relatively well-trained and equipped personnel. The cadres for the regular forces are frequently from North Vietnam, but the bulk of the personnel is recruited and trained locally. The irregular forces are part-time guerrillas. They work by day and conduct operations at night, or they are brought together for a special operation to supplement a regular unit. 3. Areas of Concentration. Map 1 shows the present concentrations of Viet Cong strength. It is at once evident that these concentrations are principally in less populated parts of South Vietnam with the notable exception of the two heavy concentrations in the Mekong River delta. 4. Viet Cong Strategy. At present the Viet Cong forces are in a transitional stage from a guerrilla to a conventional type of warfare. As General Taylor's Report/2/ noted, the Viet Cong's preferred strategy is one of political denouement,--preparing for conventional warfare, but hoping for a noncommunist coup against Diem that would create confusion and an opportunity for them to take over the country by political-guerrilla action. The Viet Cong have an offensive capability greater than they have exercised to date, but have proceeded slowly in order to consolidate, regroup, and extend their control throughout the countryside. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 210. 5. Methods of Viet Cong Control. In many areas the Viet Cong have established overt or covert administrations, either setting up permanent, full-time government operations, or exercising a kind of shadow administration, functioning at night while the Government of Vietnam functions by day. We must not assume that the Viet Cong depends solely or even principally on terror. The Viet Cong forces purchase food and other supplies rather than commandeer them. They tax in areas they control and elsewhere raise funds by "squeeze" on bus lines and truck companies operating in or through Viet Cong territory, by robbing government officials and supporters, and by ransom. In the areas south of Saigon, the Viet Cong add to their revenues through considerable export trade by junks with Singapore, principally in tobacco. 6. Reliance on Local Resources. Much has been made of infiltration from North Vietnam. Except for money, however, very little in the way of weapons or supplies comes in from the North. In fact, the infiltration routes are used almost solely for bringing in trained cadres. These are important, especially to carry out the Viet Cong's phased objective to transform guerrillas into regular forces, but cutting off the infiltration route would not by itself settle the Viet Cong problem. It is the people and villages of South Vietnam that are the Viet Cong's real source of both supplies and recruits. Arms are largely those captured from the Vietnam forces, or are manufactured locally. 7. Use of Terror. The Viet Cong resort to terror in the areas they control on a far lesser scale than has generally been believed. Instead, they seek to win the cooperation of the villagers, and use terror mainly in retaliation against unpopular government officials or villagers who communicate with or aid the Vietnam forces. 8. Conclusions. a. The Viet Cong position in South Vietnam depends primarily upon maintaining access to the villages in areas under Viet Cong control or influence. b. Infiltration of supplies and personnel from North Vietnam is only of secondary importance. c. With their guerrilla tactics based on access to the villages and people, the Viet Cong since the latter part of 1961 have been inflicting roughly 1,000 casualties a month on the Vietnam forces and civilians. There is evidence, however, that the Viet Cong has now entered a transitional stage between guerrilla and conventional methods of warfare in line with the strategy expounded by Mao and Giap. d. The struggle for South Vietnam, in sum, is essentially a battle for control of the villages. e. This struggle cannot be won merely by attempting to seal off South Vietnam from the North. It must be won by cutting the Viet Cong off from their local sources of strength, i.e., by denying them access to the villages and the people. II. Friendly Situation 1. Strength of Government of Vietnam Forces. The military strength of the Government of Vietnam forces is as follows: a. Regular Army--175,000 b. Civil Guard--67,000 c. Self Defense Corps--54,000 2. Proposed Increases. It has been proposed to increase the Regular Army to 200,000. President Diem, however, desires a total strength of 278,000. It has also been proposed to increase the Self Defense Corps to 60,000. The present authorized but not actual strength of the Civil Guard is 72,000 3. The Problem of the Regular Army. The most frequent complaint is that the Regular Army is tied down in static defensive positions rather than used as a mobile force which can take offensive. In fact, however, if the Army units were taken off their defense positions, the villages, bridges, and other protected installations would be at the mercy of the Viet Cong, and the economy would grind to a halt. Furthermore, no amount of regular troops used offensively will solve the Viet Cong problem unless the villagers themselves are protected and the Viet Cong thus cut off from their sources of supplies and recruits. If access is not denied, two or more Viet Cong will be recruited for every one that is killed. 4. Inadequacy of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. As recommended in the Taylor Report, there should be a drastic increase in the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Steps have been taken in this direction, but more United States help is needed. With a population of 14 million there is only one Civil Guard personnel for every 210 people. Some provinces with a population of over one million have only 2,000 Civil Guards. Again, the Self Defense Corps is maintained at the ratio of only one Self-Defense Corpsman for every 240 people. In addition, the training of both forces is longer than is really needed. These men do not need to have all the skills of the thoroughly trained soldier. What they need to know beyond how to fire their weapons can be acquired in actual operations. 5. Conclusions. a. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps should be very substantially increased to provide protection for the villages--not so much to free the Regular Army units, although this would be a desirable consequence, but to provide the villages with physical security and to cut off Viet Cong access to rice and people. b. The present training period for the Civil Guard is now 24 weeks with a proposed reduction to 12 weeks. The Self Defense Corps is now receiving 6 weeks of training at special training centers. Training for both forces should be much shorter. Civil Guard training should be accomplished at the province or, better still, the district level. Self Defense Corps units should be trained in the villages from which they are recruited. c. The technical skills needed for the construction of defenses and the skills for training must be supplied by the United States--by getting American non-commissioned officers and lieutenants out to the district and village level. III. Political Situation 1. President Diem's Position. a. The people of South Vietnam want to fight and are basically anti-Communist. Morale is much better as a result of General Maxwell Taylor's mission and President Kennedy's decisions to support South Vietnam. But this boost will be fleeting if we do not find ways to continue the momentum. b. As General Taylor reported, President Diem is an old-fashioned Asian ruler who hesitates to delegate authority. Nevertheless, he does have the respect of his people. With due allowance for his shortcomings, it must be recognized that he is faced with real problems. His country is partly occupied and controlled by enemy forces which have a demonstrated capability of increasing the magnitude of their operations against his government. The very existence of his country is thus at stake. c. Because of the adverse military situation, Diem is also faced with the real possibility of coup attempts by elements within South Vietnam. He is convinced that the Viet Cong are hoping most of all for a coup which will give the opportunity for them to move in. Diem also occasionally has doubts about the Americans on this score. Although he seems to be convinced that present United States policy is to support him, he is concerned that the United States will someday decide to engineer a coup if he lets American influence in South Vietnam become too great. d. Finally, Diem does lack trained personnel, particularly at the lower levels. As General Taylor noted, there is no lack of dedication, but there is a great shortage of competence. 2. The United States Missions in South Vietnam. a. Some United States personnel in all agencies have been in Vietnam too long and carry old grudges and frustrations, or are unduly influenced by the views of various South Vietnamese "dissidents." These frustrated old-timers feed defeatist talk to the American press. They also talk to and encourage the "dissidents" among the French-educated South Vietnamese intellectuals who are concentrated in Saigon. b. What is worse, some of these so-called "dissidents" actually are stalking horses for Diem who take criticism of Diem back to him, and thus complete the vicious circle of suspicion of the United States, frustration, and defeatism. c. Moreover, the United States Missions in South Vietnam do not always work as a team. Each agency has its own views and concepts which have led to inter-agency jealousies and bickering. In all United States agencies, furthermore, much could be done to improve the quality of personnel. d. While the top United States leadership is rapidly developing knowledge of the strategic concepts for fighting guerrillas, there is as yet no real understanding of these concepts at the working level. The problem here is one of leadership and articulation. 3. Conclusions. a. Some easing of United States pressure on Diem for major reforms and reorganization of his government at the top seems called for. Although desirable, none of these are fundamental to the problem of cutting the Viet Cong's access to the villages and the people. b. We should turn our attention to providing help at the local level. What we need are sergeants, lieutenants, and Civic Action teams, including police trainers and public administrators, to work with the Vietnamese Government officials in the villages and with the troops in the field. c. As recommended in the Taylor Report, in sum, we need more "working level friends and advisers"--Americans with technical competence, imagination, and human sympathy, and with the willingness and ability to live and work in the villages. As General Taylor said, such personnel exist and can be found and trained for the job. d. Finally, there is an immediate need to develop a better understanding of the strategic concept for counterinsurgency war among working level Americans in all United States agencies in South Vietnam. IV. The Strategic Concept 1. Basic Principles. The strategic concept of an effective counterinsurgency operation in South Vietnam is expressed in the following principles: a. First Principle. The problem presented by the Viet Cong is a political and not a military problem--or, more accurately, it is a problem in civic action. The objective is to cut the Viet Cong off from their sources of supplies and recruits. Since both supplies and recruits come from within South Vietnam, this means cutting off the Viet Cong's access to the villages and the people. Measures must be taken to tie the villages into the network of government administration and control. Channels must be established through which information of the villages' needs and problems can flow upward and government services can flow downward. The instruments for this task are public administration officials, police, public information services, etc. b. Second Principle. An effective counterinsurgency plan must provide the people and the villages with protection and physical security. Physical security, coupled with controls on the movement of people and supplies, will protect the villagers from being intimidated into selling the Viet Cong rice and from being persuaded or intimidated into joining the Viet Cong, and will prevent Viet Cong sympathizers from surreptitiously providing the guerrillas with supplies. In addition, it is only by giving the people physical security that the intelligence problem can be solved. The intelligence problem in Vietnam is one of combat intelligence, not strategic intelligence. Espionage penetration of the Viet Cong will take too long to accomplish. And even then the results will not be satisfactory. For example, an agent in a Viet Cong unit will have a difficult problem in communicating. By the time he can get intelligence to the government on an impending attack, for example, the attack will probably have already taken place; by the time he can pass on information on the location of a Viet Cong unit he is with, the unit will have probably moved on. c. Third Principle: Counter-guerrilla forces must adopt the tactics of the guerrilla himself. Conventional military tactics are ineffective against guerrillas. 2. Example: Past and Present. The Third Principle merits elaboration by specific examples. Two have been chosen: the first from operations in Burma during World War II, and the second from the very recent operations in South Vietnam. a. The Heho-Lawksawk-Taunggyi Operation, Burma. In the Battle of Mandalay-Meiktila, an OSS group consisting of 4 Americans and 300 natives operated in the mountains along the Japanese secondary supply line, Meiktila-Taunggyi-Bangkok' in the Heho-Lawksawk-Taunggyi triangle (see Map 2). The DSS guerrilla force blew bridges to restrict the movement of Japanese artillery and ambushed Japanese truck convoys. Although the Japanese forces could ill afford it, a Japanese regiment of 3,000 men was taken out of the battle for one month to pursue the OSS guerrilla group. The Japanese method of operation, however, was conventional--they pursued with regiments and battalions along the major roads and attempted elaborate, set-piece traps. For example, when the guerrilla group was operating in the area just north of Taunggyi, the Japanese moved several battalions into a U-shaped position on the road feeding to Lawksawk and attempted to chivvy the OSS guerrilla group into the trap with the remaining battalion. Although the OSS group could easily have escaped by breaking into groups of two or three and assembling again at a later date, even this proved unnecessary. The OSS group marched north to encourage the Japanese to complete the execution of their plan and, at nightfall, turned west into the jungle and made their way into the mountains. The Japanese closed the trap on air. At the end of one month the Japanese had suffered something over 100 casualties, and the OSS group had suffered one. Had the Japanese adopted a different tactic, however, the guerrilla group would not have survived. What the Japanese should have done was to combine their greater mobility and discipline with guerrilla tactics. For example, they could have stationed half of their force at one of the major road junctions with trucks to provide rapid deployment so far as the road-net would permit. Then they could have divided the area in which the OSS guerrillas were operating into zones, and stationed a platoon or company in each of the zones with orders to operate as the guerrillas were operating, i.e., to patrol and ambush on all jungle trails and paths. Sooner or later one of these units would have met the OSS guerrillas. The mobile reserve could then have been deployed in order to ambush along the trails leading into the area and to reinforce troops engaged in combat. It is worth noting that once the OSS group were eliminated as an organized force by some such tactic, the Japanese should then have placed an effective administration over the area and its villages in order to prevent remnants of the OSS guerrilla force from returning as soon as the regular forces departed. b. The Binh Hoa Operation, South Vietnam. On January 21, 1962 a joint South Vietnamese-United States attack was undertaken against the Viet Cong at Binh Hoa (see Map 3). According to intelligence reports, there were 300 Viet Cone at Point A and a full Viet Cong battalion in huts around the edges of the Air Drop Zone. These reports were 4 or 5 days old, but air photos showed what appeared to be a munitions manufacturing installation at Point B and possibly munitions storage facilities at Point C. The plan, prepared by the senior United States Military Advisor to the Vietnamese Army 3rd Corps, called for prepositioning four battalions in boats on the nver during the night before the operation. At 0755 hours, B-26's bombed and strafed Point A. (The terrain here consists of flat jungle. The bombers actually attacked a village just on the Cambodian side of the frontier, one and a half kilometers away, and killed and wounded a number of villagers.) At 0800 hours, B-26's attacked Point B and C with 500-pound bombs, while T-28's attacked the huts surrounding the Air Drop Zone with rockets. When the first bomb exploded, the four battalions on boats disembarked. The bombing and strafing continued for 45 minutes. There was then a 15-minute lull, the beginning of which was marked by the firing of flares in front of each of the four battalions, which then began their advance. The two battalions south of the canal between Points B and C wheeled right into a blocking position along the canal, and the two battalions north of the canal advanced directly to their front. At-00 hours, an airborne battalion parachuted on the Air Drop Zone and attacked in the direction of Point B. In Phase II of the operation, all troops conducted a sweep north of the Oriental River. The plan was well and efficiently executed. It was, however, inappropriate in counterguerrilla warfare. The basic concept of creating a trap will rarely work against guerrillas. In general, counterguerrilla warfare requires that contact be made with the guerrillas by aggressive patrolling, and at that point troops should be brought up to form a trap by ambushing the trails and roads leading away from the area of contact. The prepositioning of troops in boats was very likely to give the guerrillas prior warning of an attack. The preparatory bombing also gave the guerrillas warning. In addition, it ran the risk of hlling innocent or at least persuadable villagers and thus recruiting more Communists than were killed. Preparatory bombing is suitable for attacks on prepared defenses in conventional war, but not for guerrilla war. There are no Siegfried lines in the jungle. The results of the Binh Hoa operation confirm this analysis. According to after-action reports, no contact with the enemy was made in Phase I of the operation. However, five civilians were killed and eleven wounded. (Reports are unclear as to whether these casualties did or did not include the Cambodians killed in the misdirected strike at Point A.) According to Mr. Socharyk of Life Magazine, who followed the airdrop by helicopter, those killed in action included a two-year old boy, a five-year old girl, and a seven-year old boy. Mr. Socharyk also maintains that he can document his statements with photographs. In Phase II of the operation--the sweep north of Oriental River--the Viet Cong lost 5 killed, 21 captured, and 60 suspects apprehended. Weapons and documents of intelligence value were captured. South Vietnamese casualties were six wounded. It seems obvious that such an operation is not only fruitless but creates more Communists than it kills. Let it also be said, however that General McGarr, Chief of MAAG, took strong and positive action to correct the misconceptions apparent in this operation, and spoke to the military personnel involved in strong and unmistakable language. In fairness, however, it must also be said that this is by no means an isolated occurrence. As a perusal of MAAG's military situation reports will show, operations by both Jungle Jim and military forces tend to follow tactics more appropriate to conventional, World War II situations than to guerrilla warfare. Also in fairness, it should be noted that counterguerrilla operations are both new and radically different from American military experience, requiring soldiers to unlearn old lessons as well as to learn new ones. It would be unfair and unreasonable to expect men to abandon overnight principles learned the hard way in bloody and honorable combat in World War II and Korea. The fact that this is precisely what is needed in no way condemns the soldiers or excuses those who would criticize them. As it turned out, the intelligence reports were essentially accurate. Local Vietnamese reported that one hour before the air strike an estimated 200 Viet Cong evacuated the Air Drop Zone. The question is, how should the Binh Hoa operation have been conducted to take advantage of this intelligence? In general, counterguerrilla operations should be so conducted as to make contact with the enemy through ground patrols before air strikes are mounted. The intelligence about Viet Cong activities in Binh Hoa was on the whole good. The utilization of this intelligence was ineffective. The operation gave the Viet Cong ample warning and they apparently took full advantage of it. The rationale for the preliminary air strike was human and understandable: paratroopers in the air are vulnerable, and an air strike will tend to protect them. Nevertheless, a preliminary air strike in counterguerrilla operations is indefensible. The rationale for the use of paratroopers is less understandable. The rationale was that since intelligence reported a full battalion of Viet Cong, a full battalion of ARVN was needed. The helicopters available, however, could deliver only half of a battalion in the first wave. Thus, an air drop seemed to be indicated. These arguments seem reasonable, but they are inappropriate to counterguerrilla warfare. In counterguerrilla warfare it is essential to distinguish between hard-core guerrillas and ordinary villagers, even though the latter may be sympathetic to the guerrillas. Contact must be made with the enemy before the air strike, not after, and surprise is all-important since guerrillas do not seek to hold ground but to influence and control the minds and hearts of the people. A preliminary air strike is therefore inadmissible in counterguerrilla operations. In addition, paratroopers are useful not as the attacking but only as the reinforcing element--after contact is made by patrols or other means, e.g., helicopters. It takes three to five minutes for a paratroop unit to reach the ground, and three to five minutes is time enough for a guerrilla unit to escape to the jungle. In general, the first contact must be made by units that operate in the same way as the guerrillas themselves--living for lone periods in the jungle, patrolling, ambushing, moving, and never sleeping two nights in the same place. The one exception to this rule is a force moved by helicopter. Flying three to five feet off the ground along roadways and canals, a helicopter discharges its troops only 12 seconds after the enemy sees and identifies it. The Binh Hoa operation might well have utilized helicopters. The helicopters available could have transported only half a battalion in the first wave. But these could have made contact with the enemy with no warning whatsoever. Once contact was made, the Jungle Jim unit could have been called in with effect--against a known and precisely located enemy. The paratroopers, orbiting at a higher altitude, could then have been introduced either to reinforce the helicopter unit already engaged or to block the routes of Viet Cong retreat. If the intelligence was faulty, no harm would have been done with such tactics and no villagers would have been killed. If the intelligence had been correct, however, these tactics would have prevented a warning to the Viet Cong. Their retreat would have been slowed up by the fire of the hoops brought in by helicopter, impeded by the strikes of the Jungle Jim unit, and blocked by the action of the paratroopers. V. The Plan/3/ /3/The basic approach followed in this plan was developed by Mr. R.G.K. Thompson, who played a major role in directing counter-insurgency operations in Malaya and who is now a Special Advisor attached to the British Embassy in Saigon. [Footnote in the source text.] 1. General Concept. The following plan consists of three phases, each of which involves a combination of military, political, civic action, economic, and social measures. This plan is designed to eliminate the Viet Cong from successive areas through a progression of steps, and to provide the villages with a security framework and a solid socio-political base to ensure that this elimination is permanent. The people of South Vietnam are the target, and the vast majority of the people live in the Mekong River delta and along the coasts (see Map 4). The first priority should therefore be the delta area and, for obvious international political reasons, the area around Hue, just south of the Demarcation Line. Phase I provides the security framework and socio-political base for these two first-priority areas; Phase II covers the other areas of heavy population density; and Phase III is designed to provide permanent protection at the borders and to eliminate the remaining Viet Cong in the mountains and jungles of the less populated regions. 2. Phase I. Zones of strategic villages will be established simultaneously in the two first-priority areas, beginning with provinces least heavily penetrated by the Viet Cong. As each zone is completed, work will begin on additional zones, fanning outwards until the entire province is covered, and eventually, at the end of Phase I, the whole of the two first-priority areas. Take, for example, the province of Binh Tuong (see Map 5). Let us assume for purposes of illustration that the white area east of zones I and II is virtually free of Viet Cong, that zone I is moderately penetrated, and that zone II is virtually free but subject to incursions by Viet Cong irregulars from the south. In the white area, strategic villages would not be necessary. Zone I would need strategic villages to protect its population from local Viet Cong, and zone II would need them to protect its population from incursions from the heavily penetrated area of the south. After zones I and II have been secured, the teams would move on to zone III. At the same time as these zones of strategic villages are being constructed work would begin on a belt of defended villages in zone IV along the edge of the population density line to serve as a cordon sanitaire. The regular forces of the South Vietnamese army would at the same time wage a sustained campaign of patrolling and appropriately conceived offensives against the regular Viet Cong forces with whatever troops it has available after discharging the essential tasks of defending vital installations and protecting the teams constructing strategic villages. Keeping the regular Viet Cong off balance is vital, since the Communists will make every effort to prevent the construction of strategic village zones. a. Strategic Villages. The creation of strategic villages in relatively secure areas involves the regroupment of village hamlets into one compact, easily defended area. The difficulties of this regroupment will vary with the village, depending on its size, population, and distribution of its hamlets. Each strategic village will be protected by a ditch and a fence of barbed wire. It will include one or more observation towers, guard posts, and a defense post for central storage of arms, as shown in the attached diagram (see Sketch). The area immediately around the village will be cleared for fields of fire and the area approaching the clearing, including the ditch, will be strewn with booby-traps (spikes, pits, explosives, etc.) and other personnel obstacles. In these tasks, the help of United States Army sergeants and lieutenants as advisors will be vital. Each strategic village will have field telephones and an alarm system connecting the watch towers and guard posts with the defense posts, as well as radio facilities enabling it to maintain direct communication with the government administrative and the military-security command structure at the district level, and ultimately up to the central government complex in Saigon. Here, too, the help of American advisors will be necessary. Each strategic village will be defended by a Self Defense Corps unit of 75 to 150 men, i.e., 1 squad per hamlet and 1 platoon per village. Each Self Defense Corps unit will be armed with carbines, 45 caliber grease guns and shotguns, and its arms and ammunition will be centrally located and guarded. The primary missions of the Self Defense Corps unit are to defend the strategic village from attack and to conduct daylight patrols outside the immediate vicinity of the strategic village. The areas between strategic villages will be covered by the Civil Guard. The Civil Guard will conduct night patrols between the strategic villages' lay ambushes, assist in guarding strategic government installations, maintain road check points, and constitute a mobile reserve, i.e., to relieve a strategic village when under attack or assist the Army in larger operations against the Viet Cong. Here, too, the help of American sergeants and lieutenants is vital. The Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps (along with the National Surete and the Municipal Police, the regular police services in urban areas) will also be responsible for enforcing curfews, checking identity cards, and ferreting out hard-core Communists and provide intelligence on the Viet Cong. In this respect, it cannot be stressed too strongly that the key to effective intelligence is not penetration of the Viet Cong apparatus (it would be too difficult and take too long to achieve this capability) but rather the mere fact of providing security to the villager from Viet Cong intimidation and terror. This security for him and his family will motivate the villagers to pass on information on the Viet Cong to government officials. The US Central Intelligence Agency should give high priority to the installation of road watchers as utilized in Laos. This is not to say that there is no room for clandestine intelligence operations. however b. Defended Villages. The creation of defended villages will follow essentially the pattern for strategic villages, i.e., regroupment of hamlets, construction of defenses, alarm systems, communications, etc. Defended villages, however, would be created along the periphery of Viet Cong concentration areas in such a fashion to form a belt of defended villages along a population density line covering roughly one-half of the Mekong River delta area and then swinging eastward toward the coast and running north along the coast to just south of Tourane, and then westward to the Lao frontier. Another major difference between the strategic and the defended village is that the latter is defended both by the Self Defense Corps and the Civil Guard units and initially, at least, by Army units. The defended village belt thus constitutes the forward security line against further Viet Cong expansion. The strategic villages constitute rear echelon sectors where mopping up and consolidation take place. The number of both the defended and the strategic villages would be expanded progressively to squeeze and isolate the Viet Cong and increase secured areas. Once zones of strategic villages with the Civil Guard operating in the intermediate areas are established, the Viet Cong will be effectively cut off from the sources of both supplies and recruits. If a Viet Cong unit ventures into such a zone, it will find itself in what is, in fact, a meat grinder. Sooner or later, the intruding Viet Cong unit will run into a Civil Guard ambush or patrol. This, in turn, will be followed by reinforcements by other Civil Guard and even regular Army units, called in by radio and transported by helicopter, and by ambushes on trails and roads leading to the area of contact. In addition, the controls on the movements of people and supplies will force an intruding Viet Cong unit to attack strategic villages to obtain food. And such an attack will, in turn, bring still more reinforcements and ambushes on the routes of escape. The Viet Cong, in sum, will be forced to attack and the advantage of ambush will pass from the Communists to the government. c. Role of the Army. In carrying out its primary mission of keeping the regular Viet Cong forces off balance, it is essential that the Army adopt the strategy and tactics used by the Viet Cong, exploiting at the same time the Army's advantages of numerical superiority, logistics, and air power. Mobility, surprise, and small unit operations are basic. The deployment of forces, however secure and well coordinated, along conventional warfare lines and the use of artillery or aerial bombardment for softening up the enemy only give advance warning of an operation, permit the Viet Cong to escape, and inevitably result in the death of uncommitted or wavering civilians whose support is essential for the Viet Cong's ultimate defeat. Artillery or aerial bombardment, therefore, should be introduced only after actual ground contact with Viet Cong forces has been made. The Army should also be utilized to reduce infiltration across the frontier. Ranger companies are best equipped to execute this mission. They should be committed to specified zones along the frontier area (see Map 4), particularly in the highlands along the Lao border, for periods of three to four months, at least. They should be highly mobile, never sleeping twice in the same place, and patrolling and ambushing at will. Here, again, US Army advisors are needed to assist and to set an example. Ranger companies contacting large Viet Cong units would be supported by air drops and paratroop reinforcement. To sum up, the role of the Army in Phase I is as follows: To continue to defend vital installations, province capitals, and other strategic points until relieved by the creation of local zones of strategic villages. To provide protection for the teams constructing strategic villages m the more dangerous areas. To use the remaining forces offensively against the regular Viet Cong units to keep them off balance. To operate themselves as guerrillas along the Viet Cong infiltration routes. d. Civic Action Teams. The single most important element in eliminating the Viet Cong is the so-called Civic Action Team. These teams were apparently originated on the initiative of the South Vietnamese. Each team is made up of 17-18 persons with the following specialties: 3 public administration In this plan the task of the civic action teams is to assist locals in the construction of strategic villages and to build the essenha1 socio-political base. The public administration members will set up village government and tie it into the district and national levels assuring the flow of information on village needs and problems upward and the flow of government services downward. President Diem has himself organized a youth movement of 300,000 members. The youth activities man on the civic action team would relate the youth in the village to the national government through this organization and use its members as recruits for the Self Defense Corps and other necessary tasks. The 2-3 police members of the team perform the essential task of issuing identity cards, instituting controls on the movements of supplies, food and people, and so filtering out the hard-core Communists within the local population. The public information member of the team has the task of explaining the need for relocating hamlets, the construction of strategic villages, as well as bringing political support to the national government. The agricultural credit member of the team will assist in solving the problems connected with the relocation of hamlets as well as agricultural credit programs. The medical technician will look to health and sanitation problems. The educational specialist will deal with and assist in the reconstruction of schools and school programs. The intelligence specialist will serve as liaison for channeling information obtained from the villages to district, province, and national levels. The Civil Guard liaison official will man the radio used for calling forth support of nearby Civil Guard units in case of attack. The Self Defense Corps trainers will recruit and train Self Defense Corps personnel in the village. There are now only some 30-40 civic action teams operating throughout South Vietnam. Two hundred are needed. In addition, each team should also include a United States Army sergeant or lieutenant to help in Self Defense Corps training and if possible an American civilian with public administration or police training. 3. Phase II. In Phase II the same methods would be used to extend the zones of strategic villages to cover the remaining densely populated areas. Secondly, Phase II will also include a stepped-up program of economic and social development. These measures should be designed to achieve maximum effect at the village level and to build up the progress made by the Civic Action teams during Phase I. Finally, during Phase II increased attention would be given to the security of the tribesmen in the Montagnard highlands (where it is difficult to apply the strategic village concept because villages are too far apart). For example, rice would be purchased and stored at protected sites and then sold once a week at about half the price to the tribal peoples on a closely controlled ration basis to deny it to the Viet Cong. 4. Phase III. Suitably hardy, loyal and tough villagers will be resettled in permanently defended, strategic villages along the Cambodian and Laotian borders. (The cost here is higher, since it requires clearing new lands and possibly permanent subsidies in the form of wages for duty by adult males as border guards.) Continuing its offensive, the regular army will pursue and destroy the remnants of the Viet Cong hiding in the under-populated mountains and jungles. Special economic, social, and political measures will be undertaken to win and hold the loyalty of the Montagnards. VI. Estimated Additional Personnel and Matériel Required 1. Civic Action Teams Now--30-40 This Plan--200 (based on the strategic village plan) Needed--South Vietnamese--1,200 additional personnel United
States Army--250 sergeants/lieutenants (includes 50 trainee/
administrative personnel) Training--At several central locations; now largely South Vietnam action and initiative; United States help needed. 2. Civil Guard (full-time amateurs) Now--67,000 personnel Needed--South Vietnamese--58,000 additional personnel United States Army sergeants and lieutenants--400 personnel (Administrative support exists; number of United States personnel needed is keyed to Civic Action plan) Training--At no higher than province and preferably at district level (now done at 5 centrally located training centers); and by 12 mobile Training Teams. 3. Self Defense Corps (part-time amateurs) Now--56,500 personnel South Vietnamese required--100,000 personnel, part-time only Training--Now in various centers; planned training course is 6 weeks. This Plan--In villages proper; two weeks training and several weeks of training--on-the-job. 4. Ranger Companies (For jungle work on infiltration routes) Now--75 companies 5. a. Total South Vietnamese personnel required Full-time--59,000 b. Total United States personnel required Military--1,000 c. Malayans/British Personnel required--100 6. Total Equipment required 3,000--radios, village and distant [Continue with the next documents]
Vietnam, 1962 Volume II Index | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |