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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
43. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)/1/ Saigon, February 3, 1962, 12:05 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Repeated to the JCS, which was requested to pass it to the Vietnam Task Force This telegram was also passed to the White House. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: "Bundy--See last para." MAGPO 779. JCS pass to Task Force VN Wash. Reference: JCS 041835Z Dec 61./2/ /2/Not found. 1. Official GVN request has been received from Secretary Thuan for commencement crop warfare program. In his request, Thuan stated instructions are being given to RVNAF to avoid damage to crops belonging to government supporters and to take such preventive measures as may be required to avoid adverse political or psychological reaction. Action now being taken to determine if instructions meet requirements ref msg for resettlement displaced persons and alternated food supply system. VN Chairman, Joint Planning Committee for Defoliation and Crop Warfare, had previously been made aware of US position as stated in ref msg and is currently trying to ensure that instructions from DOD include appropriate provisions to meet requirement although in the past Vietnamese have been generally cool to idea of specific plans for resettlement and alternate food supply. VN position, not officially expressed, has stemmed from following arguments: A. Crop warfare is primarily a GVN show. All missions to be flown by VNAF personnel in VNAF helicopters against targets selected by Vietnamese. B. RVNAF is currently engaged in a crop warfare program. In their reparations in the field, VC crops and food caches are destroyed whenever found. Chemicals, therefore, are regarded as just another and more effective means of doing something RVNAF is already doing. C. Chemicals will only be employed in areas not under GVN control and where population either VC or VC supporters. Food supply has been a major concern of the VC. Denial of food would drive VC and their supporters out of their safe haven at last. They would then be handled as the individual situation dictated. The ideal being to resettle and reorient all except hard-core Communists. 2. After considerable US pressure to get defoliation program going, there are some indications that Vietnamese are now becoming impatient with US restrictions imposed on employment of chemicals. President Diem has always actively supported crop warfare program. Now that chemicals are here, VNAF helicopters equipped and target areas selected, GVN anxious to start. 3. There is always the possibility, no matter how great the precautions, that spray operations may produce an adverse effect among people who would support the government under more favorable circumstances. A similar risk is involved when conventional weapons are employed to reduce an area regarded as a VC stronghold. Even though we may [?] in having the Vietnamese develop a plan on paper that is considered satisfactory and meets the requirements of ref msg, we have no assurance that the provisions of the plans will be faithfully excused. once chemicals are released to the VN, it will be virtually impossible to determine if those targets scheduled to be hit are the ones that are actually sprayed. US can participate in planning for crop warfare but US participation in its execution has already been ruled out. 4. American Embassy has decided to take another hard look at crop warfare program to see if political disadvantages outweigh military advantages. They are currently in process of drafting a Task Force message on this subject to be coordinated in the near future. Above information submitted as background in the event Embassy now takes a position against any crop warfare. At such time as draft of Task Force msg received, MAAG will make specific comments and recommendations. At present time feel there are military advantages to be gained in crop warfare and that a complete reversal of US position would be hard to justify to Diem.
44. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 3, 1962--2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2-362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated CINCPAC for Polad. 1007. Reference: Embassy telegrams 756/2/ and 892/3/ and Embdesp 299. /4/ Following is summary January developments relating GVN implementation joint memorandum of understanding. /2/Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 305, footnote 4. /3/Document 7. /4/Dated January 22, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/ 1-2262) A. National Internal Security Council. NISC met January 5, 8 and 27 (Dec. Meetings on 13th and 22nd). Problems discussed included road construction, strategic hamlet program, population resettlement, and situation in Quang Nagi Province. Council appears at this moment to be primarily briefing forum rather than decision making or discussion body. MAAG aware one or two occasions where NISC apparently contributed toward solving particular problems, but still too early for more general assessment of institution. B. Military Command Structure. GVN considering abolishing field command and making corps directly responsible JCS. Impact and implication of such move now being studied. MAAG's initial reaction is that this is regressive step, but strong JCS might be preferable phantom field command. C. Intelligence. [1.] Preoccupation of key Vietnamese personnel with a wide scope of organizational and operational problems tended limit progress and precluded spectacular advance in any one field of endeavor. Previously programmed training courses for CIO, domestic inter service and police units, however, continued per schedule, and in general liaison arrangements were proceeding satisfactorily. 2. First military intelligence advisors arrived January for duty with corps and divisions. Future arrivals to be assigned provinces to work with sector commanders (province chiefs). D. Joint Provincial Surveys. Pilot project phase completed with Bien Hoa survey January 20. Reports now being compiled and recommendations studied. After allowing time observe utilization team recommendations, results will be evaluated to improve instructions to teams for further surveys. E. Border Ranger Force. January 11 President Diem agreed make available 11 corps total 10 Ranger companies for deployment along Laos/Viet-Nam frontier. January 23 DOD directed JCS implement President's decision. However, formation order Ranger Force not imminent. Availability Ranger units directly related ARVN force increase and CG/SDC ability assume security duties now being performed by Rangers. Moreover, provincial authorities actively opposing release of Rangers to border patrol. F. Military Coordination. 1. Joint Operations Center began functioning end January with limited VNAF participation. (Center controls air operations on basis RVNAF target selections.) It has functioned satisfactorily so far, though it recognized participation other services desirable. U.S. Army representative has been assigned to the Center. 2. Joint air, naval and helicopter operations continued during month. Coordination was satisfactory and no command problems arose. 3. MAAG advisors now participating all important ARVN operations. Working relationships excellent. G. Administration. No additional U.S. advisors yet requested by GVN. H. Measures to win public support and broaden sense of participation in war effort. 1. Provincial councils said to be in process formation, and Embassy told they will be in place by end of February. 2. Military training program for women concluded first phase January 26 with graduation ceremony which President attended. Of 1,450 trainees completing course only top 900 to be used immediately for provincial training programs; these scheduled begin March 1. 3. Military training program for government employees continues to spread, though GVN official described progress as slow. 4. National economic council adjourned January 30 after studying 5-year development plan and effect of January 1 economic measures. Group has received wide publicity. Next session probably July. Though too early evaluate effectiveness, its existence alone appears be having somewhat favorable effect. 5. GVN continuing take measures improve military morale. Nationwide campaign provide Tet packages for front-line soldiers and collect funds for other support activities being given wide publicity. Principal beneficiaries appear be soldiers in field. 6. Continuing to develop provincial service program for government officials, GVN announced late January calculation of seniority for promotion would henceforth be weighted to favor those with service outside cities. 7. Controversial and unpopular "Social purification bill" returned to National Assembly by President for amendment. 8. GVN has announced official Tet observances will take place within framework austerity. Usual celebrations at palace have been canceled and festivities in government ministries discouraged. I. Improvement of contacts between government and people. No special developments during period, but Cabinet ministers continue to travel (most by air) widely in country. J. More effective information program. DirGen info official told Emboff his office planned devote greater attention in future to vernacular press with view toward improving quality and standing local newspapers. K. Trial Non-commie Prisoners. 1. A close associate of leading oppositionist Dr. Den, under arrest since 1960 coup attempt, released by GVN early January. 2. Diem told . . . mid-January he considering releasing Den. However, no action so far. L. Amnesty Policy. DOD has developed four-part amnesty program relating (1) treatment of VC surrenderers and prisoners, (2) safe conduct system, (3) practices for inducing VC surrenders and (4) reindoctrination ARVN personnel captured by VC and released. Thuan has approved program and General Ty has instructed RVNAF to implement it, but necessary inter-ministerial coordination not yet arranged. While program still needs polishing, Task Force believes it should get under way, and may if necessary try to give it a shove. Nolting
45. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 3, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2-362. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. At the top, in Wood's handwriting, were the words: "Cot[trell]--good news." 1008. President Diem today gave his complete concurrence to new U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and said he is looking forward to meeting and working with Gen. Harkins. He said he had been worried about losing Gen. McGarr and hoped that he would remain, remarking that his advice and understanding of situation here were most valuable and appreciated. (I said I thought it likely that Gen. McGarr would continue here to perform MAAG functions.) Diem said my letter of yesterday/2/ (which he had received upon return from field trip) had reassured him on several points; that it was very important not to give credibility to Viet Cong propaganda, nor his own people reason for thinking that the U.S. has taken over direction of the war effort. It was for this reason that he insisted on "civilian head" of U.S. mission. (I told him this was clearly understood.) /2/Not found. We did not directly discuss press announcement of new command. Believe, however, announcement should be in low key, giving name of new command and commander and general purpose, but otherwise appearing to indicate business as usual. We will devise text and check it with Thuan, if desired (and if he is available over Tet holidays)./3/ /3/ In telegram 964 to Saigon, February 5, the Department of State concurred in the proposal to clear the announcement with Thuan and provided a draft text. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2-362) In telegram 1012 from Saigon, February 6, Nolting approved the proposed press announcement. (Ibid., 751K.58/2-662) Telegram 1018 from Saigon, February 7, indicated that the Vietnamese Government had also given its approval. (Ibid., 751K.58/2-762) Diem was in optimistic and rather philosophical frame of mind, saying he felt that our "closer partnership" was working well, having good effect on SVN popular opinion as well as on morale and aggressiveness of Vietnamese Armed Forces. He then said he hoped our fellows would be on their good behavior vis-à-vis Vietnamese girls, who are "en principe, tres morales". I did not pursue subject (not wishing to start a discussion on a Status of Forces Agreement). See no obstacle to Gen. Harkins' arrival here whenever desired, and we look forward to his coming. Dept please repeat to CINCPAC as desired. Nolting
46. Editorial Note The Government of Vietnam on February 3, 1962, issued Decree 11-TTP proclaiming that the Strategic Hamlets program was now national policy and establishing an "Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets," consisting of the Secretaries of Interior, Civic Action, and Rural Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, and the Chief of Staff of Vietnamese Armed Forces. The decree also established regional and provincial committees responsible for executing the program. An English translation was transmitted in despatch 355 from Saigon, February 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-2762)
47. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam (McGarr)/1/ Honolulu, February 3, 1962, 7:31 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Secret. Repeated to the JCS; Ft. Ritchie, Maryland; Hickam Air Force Base for PACAF; CINCPACFLT; and CINCUSARPAC. 040531Z. Use of offensive air power. 1. Undesirable reactions that grow out of the indiscriminate use of the air arm in counter guerrilla operations has been thoroughly belabored in all reports on the Greek anti-bandit war and the Indochina episode. At one time during earlier part of Indochina war there were two opposing views on exercising tight restraint on use of aircraft against ground targets. One view was usual one of not alienating friendly peoples by making them victims of unjustifiable air attacks. The other view (an extension of a common Foreign Legion attitude) was that anti-guerrilla forces should not hamper their operations by too much purposeful restraint, particularly considering there were certain advantages to be gained from bringing populace to realize that innocent and guilty alike would suffer when Vietminh were detected in their midst. Idea here of course being that all non-communist Indochinese would realize that very presence of Vietminh was a "plague on their houses" and therefore they should specifically direct anti guerrilla forces to the Vietminh unless they wanted to suffer along with communists. French officers in non-Foreign Legion outfits contended such policy was typical of the "boche" influence in the Foreign Legion. In the end, more temperate policies for using air power prevailed--although many tragic errors in target designation continued to be made until end of war. 2. In both Greece and Indochina it was found that normal problems of target location and identification were compounded by fact that friend and foe were intermingled. It was found that only positive system of enemy target location was by ground forces who enjoy facility of positive identification through factor of their being shot at. It was also found, however, that potential for making maximum employment of available air power was considerably curtailed by waiting for footsore troops to run down and fix, in substantial lumps, a will-o-the-wisp guerrilla enemy. Problem was finally handled in both wars by attempting to develop an effective air/ground communication capability for close air support; and as far as independent air attacks were concerned, being as careful as possible when shooting up things around friendly areas. 3. We have been impressed with the expressed concern of several GVN officers that innocent people might suffer from the use of defoliants, mines, etc. They seemed to be well oriented on the undesirable aspects of the indiscriminate use of weapons amongst the civilian populace. Recognizing RVNAF awareness in this direction, I feel we should be confident that all concerned in SVN are applying the element of good judgment in the use of air power. I believe we should also recognize that occasional mistakes will be made as they were many times in WW II and Korea, and they should not be justification for imposing unreasonable restrictions on the use of the VNAF. This may well be a subject for discussion at next SecDef mtg at my hdqtrs. 4. You and your chief of air section should take immediate steps to ensure that sound intelligence and reporting provides basis for launching strikes. Your sitreps should make it clear to me and WashDC readers that positive control is being exercised.
48. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 6, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/2-662. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad and to the Department of Defense. 1013. We are running into increasing difficulties here with US newsmen. They claim they not being given sufficient opportunity to cover US participation in operations against VC, alleging embassy responsible for "blackout". In effort head off some bad stories about "press censorship" and "clamming up by US officials Saigon", Anspacher and I had long session today with several correspondents. It developed that they were sore (a) about being excluded from helicopter missions (pursuant CINCPAC instructions to MAAG 050547Z/2/); (b) my disallowal their request to board USS Core tomorrow at Cap St. Jacques; (c) discrimination arising from treatment Souchurek. /2/Dated February 4, it rescinded earlier authorization allowing newsmen to accompany Vietnamese troops on helicopter combat missions. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 10793) I had thought we were making some progress with US correspondents here and am concerned at their present attitude. In talking frankly with them, we drew distinction between coverage of introduction of materiel and personnel into SVN not reported to ICC, and coverage of use of US assistance after arrival in country. To facilitate full reporting of former flouts ICC and makes more difficult ICC decisions favorable to our side. Coverage of US assistance in country, however, where no security risks appear involved, seems justified and desirable. Pending MAAG's reply to CINCPAC message above, request Washington's urgent consideration and advice re giving Task Force Saigon authority to decide on local correspondents' requests to cover field operations in which US participating, including arrival of equipment when deemed advisable Nolting
49. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, February 6, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-142-69. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a February 6 memorandum from Gilpatric to Taylor stating that the Department of Defense was submitting a draft of the events at Binh Hoa that differed from that submitted by Roger Hilsman in Document 42. On the transmittal memorandum was the penciled notation in Taylor's hand: "Report to HA 8 Feb '62." Another copy of the memorandum in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Sensitive 7-61, includes a covering memorandum from Lansdale to Gilpatric recommending that Gilpatric forward the paper to Taylor. SUBJECT The following information is provided in reference to the Binh Hoa operation of 21 January and in response to your memorandum of 30 January 1962./2/ It is based on the best information that the JCS was able to provide. /2/On January 30, General Taylor sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara stating that the President had expressed an interest in the Binh Hoa operation. (Ibid.) Brief Outline of the Operation Plan. The purpose of the two phase plan was to destroy the Viet Cong, their bases and installations in an area as shown on the inclosed map./3/ /3/Not printed. Phase I called for airstrikes on D-day, 21 January 1962, followed by a parachute assault by the 5th Airborne Battalion to seize objectives in the drop zone. During Phase 1, the 1st and 3rd Battalions (8th Regiment) and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions (11th Regiment) were to cross the Vaico River from east to west to attack and occupy IA and other objectives in the operations area. During Phase II, the 5th Airborne Battalion was to move from its previous objective in the drop zone to Cu Chi via Saigon for deception purposes and to establish blocking and ambush positions. In the meantime, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to move from their original objective and seize new objective IIA, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were to seize new objective IIB. In effect, the Viet Cong would then be caught between the 5th Airborne Battalion in the vicinity of Cu Chi, and four Battalions of the 8th and 11th Regiments closing in from the west on objectives IIA and IIB. Aerial observation by L-19 and fighter aircraft was to be continuous. The 57th (US) Transport Company was to provide an aerial Command Post, medical evacuation, parachute recovery and on call reserve lift. Composition of Friendly Forces. Ground Forces consisted of elements of the 8th Regiment, 5th Division; and the 11th Regiment, 7th Division. River forces consisted of eight special purpose craft. Air forces consisted of 11 Farm Gate aircraft, 10 aircraft of the VNAF and one U.S. light helicopter company. Composition of Enemy Forces. Enemy forces consisted of various enemy units with an approximate total strength of 750 men. After Action Report. The airstrikes were executed as planned on D-day (210 755H). During Phase I, the 5th Airborne Battalion jumped from VNAF C-47's and secured its objective. Four soldiers were killed and many documents captured. Patrolling continued throughout the day. Phase I Battalions of the 8th and 11th Regiments crossed the Vaico River as planned, attacked and seized their objectives. All units continued search operations through D+2. Phase II units continued the attack on 22 January and elements of the 8th and 11th Regiments seized their new objectives. During Phase II the 5th Airborne Battalion was re-deployed and used as blocking and ambush forces in the vicinity of Cu Chi. Operations concluded on D+4. No supply or maintenance problems were encountered. Evacuation of casualties was timely. Lack of external antenna for ground radios created some communications problems. Planning was detailed and US advisors participated throughout. Intelligence during the planning phase was detailed, accurate and up to date. Study of CHMAAG's report of the entire operation indicates that the plan did not make adequate use of the element of surprise. Troop movements prior to the attack alarmed the VC and the heavy air activity caused a VC alert and evacuation. Had troop movements been carried out gradually over the period of a few days prior to the attack and with some deceptive moves included, VC suspicions may not have been aroused. Aerial reconnaissance and the airstrikes appear too prolonged and without an attempt at deceptive strikes in areas outside the actual objective zones. Results. While the execution of the ground operation was considered excellent, and the airstrike and airborne operation was carried out as planned, the results were disappointing. The VC in the area had evacuated prior to the attacks and the number killed and/or captured was negligible. Enemy casualties consisted of five killed, 15 captured, and 64 suspects held for interrogation. Attack on Cambodian Village. On 21 January 1962, an airstrike in nearby Cambodian territory due to faulty target identification was reported. The intended target area is shown on the attacked map, as well as the small village of Bathu on which the attack was actually made. Foreign correspondents, ICC representatives, the U.S. Army Attaché, Cambodia and SVN officials were flown to the scene on 22 January 1962. Ground reconnaissance showed undeniable evidence that Bathu had been attacked and essentially confirmed the Cambodian account. The U.S. Embassy, Saigon, reported on 24 January 1962 that it appeared that an error in navigation had occurred and that Bathu had been hit by Farm Gate aircraft participating in a GVN action against a suspected VC concentration west of Binh Hoa. On 25 January 1962 the GVN apologized to the Cambodian Government for the incident and agreed to make indemnification. Though the U.S. had offered to reimburse the GVN for damage payments, Secretary Thuan on 25 January 1962 dismissed the matter of funds as being of minor importance. On 26 January 1962, the Cambodian newspaper Depeche carried a front page editorial focused on the Vietnamese "gesture of good will" in offering regrets and expressed the hope that this gesture augurs a new era in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. Roswell Gilpatric
50. Editorial Note On February 6, 1962, Philip Bridgham of the Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, prepared a paper entitled "North Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations" for several officials, including the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. Covering the period 1949-1961, it made the point that North Vietnam in varying degrees had cast its lot ideologically with China more than with the Soviet Union, but had tried to mediate the growing dispute between the two in 1960 and 1961. It closed with the following paragraph: "In sum, North Vietnam in the years 1960-1961 achieved a new status of independence and influence within the Communist bloc. As a major beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the form of vastly augmented economic and military assistance from both Moscow and Peiping during this period, the North Vietnamese party leadership have every reason to persist in their chosen role of mediator and neutral in the deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 6214, Vietnam (North and South))
51. Draft Paper by the Head of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam (Thompson)/1/ [Saigon, undated.] /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Vietnam, 1/62-2/62. Secret. Sent to Hilsman under an undated memorandum for J.B. Denson of the British Embassy in Washington. At the top of Denson's transmittal memorandum is written in pencil: "For 6 p.m. appt 2/7/62." No record of a meeting between Hilsman and anybody at that time has been found. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Policy Directive No. . . ./2/ /2/Ellipsis in the source text. Delta Plan The aim of this Policy Directive is to outline the Plan and the measures to be taken for the clearance of the Vietcong from the whole Delta area Vung Chien Thust 3). Priority Areas 2. It will not be possible to carry out the full Plan and all the measures proposed in the whole area simultaneously. Where it is necessary to accord priorities, particularly with regard to the allocation of equipment or forces, the first priority area will be as follows (see map attached):/3/ /3/The map is not reproduced. Minh Long, Vinh Rinh, Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong (excluding the area north of the road Ben Tranh-Cai Lai to the ferry at My Thuan), Long An (excluding the area west of Thu Thuc thence north along the Vaico river), Gia Dinh Province, Southern tip of Tay Ninh Province, Rinh Duong Province south of Ben Gat, southem tip of Phuoc Thanh Province, Bien Hoa (excluding the area east of the Vung Tau road), southem tip of Phuoc Tuy Province. Further priorities will be laid down as the Plan progresses. Aims 3. The aims of the Plan are: (a) to control, protect and win the population with particular emphasis on the rural areas; (b) to obtain the intelligence necessary to break the Vietcong organisation within the population; (c) to isolate the armed Vietcong from the population and then to eliminate them; (d) to establish and maintain "white" dress which have been cleared of Vietcong. General Concept 4. This is a battle for the control of the villages and the protection of the population. If security and Government control are restored, then, with the assistance of the people themselves, the elimination of the Vietcong will automatically follow. The Vietcong cannot exist unless they can intimidate and gain the support of elements in the population. They depend on these elements for supplies, food, intelligence and recruits. This is a continual traffic and represents the weakest link in the Vietcong organisation. In order to isolate the armed units of the Vietcong from the population it will be necessary to break this link and to eliminate. Vietcong supporters within the population. In order to achieve this it is essential to establish a solid security framework in the populated areas. Security Framework 5. The foundation of the security framework will be strategic hamlets and defended hamlets: (a) the conception of strategic hamlets is well understood and many have already been established. This policy will be extended as rapidly as possible in all areas where strategic hamlets are sufficient to provide effective protection for the population. (b) In all areas where villages and hamlets have been under Vietcong control or which are continually threatened by major Vietcong units, particularly on the perimeter of the populated areas (i.e. along the Cambodian frontier and on the fringes of swamp areas which have been lone established communist bases), houses wiI1 be regrouped and defended hamlets will be established. 6. It will be essential to establish the frame work solidly and in depth so that strategic and defended hamlets are mutually supporting. There must be no gaps. Under no circumstances will strategic and defended hamlets be established in isolated groups unless such groups can be rapidly linked together by the establishment of further such hamlets in between. It will normally be desirable to establish strategic hamlets in the more secure areas of each province expanding steadily outwards to the less secure areas where defended hamlets may be required. Chefs de Province will also pay particular attention to the need to coordinate the establishment of the framework with neighbouring provinces in order to ensure that there are no loopholes along provincial boundaries. Defence of the Framework 7. The framework will depend for close defence mainly on the Self-Defence Corps supported by the Republican youth as part-time members of the Self-Defence Corps. Immediate dose support in a mobile role will be provided by the Civil Guard. Where defended hamlets are established in areas which have been heavily penetrated by the Vietcong it may be necessary to employ Civil Guard in their close defence until such time as reliable Self-Defence Corps units can be called. During the establishment of the framework it will be the task of the Army to keep the regular units of the Vietcong harassed and off balance so that the security framework can be consolidated. The efforts of both the intelligence organisation and of the information services will be directed in support of the Plan Control Measures 8. In order to establish control over the population and to assist in cutting the supply line to the armed units of the Vietcong, the following control measures will be introduced: (a) Priority will be given to the issue of new plastic identity cards to the whole population in the Delta area. The inhabitants of each house will be recorded and a photograph of the complete household, together with identity card numbers, will be placed inside the house, and duplicate photographs will be available at district and province headquarters. (b) Permanent check points will be established at selected static posts, on all roads and waterways. There will also be surprise checks at other points. (c) Curfews will be introduced on certain roads and waterways and in areas surrounding defended hamlets, and any such other areas as may be required, from 7.00 p.m. until 6.00 a.m. The necessary authority will be given for the security forces to shoot on sight at anyone breaking the curfew. (d) In certain areas of jungle, mangrove swamps and marshland, prohibited areas will be declared and the population will be totally excluded until further notice and all security forces will be given complete freedom to shoot on sight in such areas. (e) In certain areas, particularly on the perimeter of the populated areas, measures will be introduced to control the movement of rice and other supplies. Where necessary food convoys on certain roads and waterways will be introduced. In certain villages and hamlets rice stocks will be purchased and removed from the area immediately after harvesting and a rice ration will be issued to the inhabitants. Protection 9. As already stated under the General Concept in paragraph 4, the protection of the population will be based on strategic and defended hamlets with the Self-Defence Corps (now being rapidly expanded, re-equipped and trained) providing the close defence, supported by the Republican Youth, and with the Civil Guard providing mobile support. The Army will at all times be prepared to rescue any post which is under attack by the Vietcong. Winning the Population 10. There are three main requirements: (a) Great attention will be paid at all times to the behaviour of all government personnel both civil and military in their dealings with the population. Under no circumstances wiI1 punitive measures be taken against any village or hamlet without the prior approval of the National Security Council. Great care will also be exercised when ground attack aircraft or artillery are used in populated areas to ensure that innocent persons are not wounded or killed. (b) The population should be kept well informed with regard to all control measures and of their purpose. These measures will be relaxed when an area is cleared of Vietcong and declared "white". Where hamlets have to be regrouped the population should be given every assistance and should be kept well informed of the advantages which will follow from such regrouping. (c) As the framework is established and an area is cleared of communists, social and economic improvements will immediately be undertaken. Civil Authorities 11. The main tasks of the Civil Authorities will be: (a) the establishment of strategic and defended hamlets; (b) the administrative organisation of the villages; (c) the introduction of control measures; (d) the provision of social and economic improvements with emphasis on agricultural improvements, health measures, education and minor public works; (e) publicity for all government measures and propaganda directed at both the population and the terrorists. Self-Defence Corps 12. The main tasks of the Self-Defence Corps will be: (a) close defence of strategic and defended hamlets; (b) active patrolling in the immediate neighbourhood of strategic and defended hamlets; (c) collection of intelligence, particularly on communist supporters within the populated areas, and on communist supply lines; (d) elimination of armed communist cadres within the population and arrest of communist supporters; (e) distribution of information and propaganda leaflets. 13. The training and equipment of the Self-Defence Corps will proceed as rapidly as possible and which will be established in all strategic and defended hamlets. Great care, however, will be taken to ensure that such units can be adequately and rapidly supported by Civil Guard units in the event of a Vietcong attack developing and if necessary by the Army, which will be responsible for dealing with any large Vietcong concentration which may develop against Self-Defence Corps units in such hamlets. Civil Guard 14. The main tasks of the Civil Guard will be: (a) to provide mobile and offensive patrols outside strategic and defended hamlets, particularly on the perimeter of populated areas, including patrols on inland waterways; (b) to rescue Self-Defence Corps posts when attacked; (c) to provide the close defence of defended hamlets where the Self-Defence Corps is either inadequate or not yet raised; (d) to enforce the control measures in paragraph 8. 15. The Civil Guard will be organised to provide for the permanent defence of the security framework within each province. The battalion headquarters will become the provincial headquarters of the Civil Guard, and a company headquarters will be established as the district headquarters of the Civil Guard. Additional companies will be allocated to each province as required for operations. As the security situation improves, these additional companies will be transferred elsewhere. A company headquarters will; however, always remain at district level, though the number of men in that company may be reduced. The total strength, therefore, of the Civil Guard in each province will vary considerably, but the headquarters framework at province and district level will always remain. The retraining of the Civil Guard companies will continue as rapidly as possible, and river patrol units will be trained and established Military Units (Including Rangers) 16. The initial aim of military units will be to keep the main Vietcong forces off balance and harassed while the framework of strategic and defended hamlets is being established and consolidated. Their main tasks will therefore be: (a) active patrolling and engagement of Vietcong units outside the populated areas; (b) prevention, by planned operations, of Vietcong concentration; (c) support of hamlets in bad areas and rescue of them if attacked; (d) enforcement of control measures, especially curfews and prohibited areas. 17. As the framework is established, military units will gradually be relieved of all static duties (other than defence of their own establishments) and, where any static duties remain, a mobile reserve will always be available. Ranger companies will be withdrawn from the populated areas as soon as they can be replaced (if required) by retrained Civil Guard companies. Those that remain in the Delta area will be retrained for deep-jungle operations in Tactical Zone 31. Air Force 18. The main tasks of the Air Force will be: (a) to increase the mobility of the military and Civil Guard units in areas where other communications are lacking, particularly for offensive operations; (b) to provide reconnaissance and communications; (c) to attack targets of opportunity; (d) to evacuate all wounded (including civilians) from isolated areas; (e) to drop information and propaganda leaflets. Navy 19. The tasks of the Navy will be: (a) to prevent entry into the Delta area of Vietcong supplies, reinforcements, agents and weapons by sea; (b) to prevent all Vietcong movement by water along the coasts and in the river estuaries in close liaison with the Civil Guard river patrol units; (c) to transport troops and supplies rapidly in the coastal areas; (d) to support operations in the coastal areas and in the major channels of the Mekong. Important Points 20. In establishing the framework great attention will be paid to the following points: (a) The complete co-ordination of all civil and military action; (b) A clear chain of command (c) The direction and co-ordination of the intelligence effort, particularly at District level; (d) The direction and co-ordination of the information services and pay-war units and all information and propaganda directed at both the population and the Vietcong; (e) The establishment of wireless communications down to the village level and to defended hamlets and other key posts; (f) The domination of inland waterways to deny their use to the Vietcon~2; (g) The exploitation of the Government's superior means of communication to achieve mobility, flexibility and economy of force; (h) The relief of the Army from static defence duties; (i) The tactical siting of Self-Defence Corps and Civil Guard posts to achieve several objects simultaneously e.g. to defend a hamlet and a bride and to provide check points on a road or river; (j) The integration of all establishments, installations and training centres of a military nature within the framework (k) The protection of major food convoys by both road and water; (1) Supporting action by the Republican Youth Corps and Civic Action teams at the village and hamlet level; (m) Prompt medical attention for all persons (including civilians) wounded by Vietcong action (n) Prompt payment of compensation (where authorised) for damage to property or loss of life; (o) All matters affecting the morale both of the population and Government forces. Communist Reaction 21. The communists will not be slow to react to the establishment of the framework and will make a determined and violent effort to prevent it being established and to break it. This requires that there should be careful judgement and timing in each Province in the establishment of the framework and that all forces should be ready to counter communist attempts either to break it or to encourage the population to resist certain of the measures. As the framework is consolidated, the communists will be forced to attack it and, at this stage, the Army particularly must be alert to deal with communist concentrations and attacks on defended hamlets. Responsibility 22. The Secretary of State at the Presidency and Assistant for Defence will be responsible to the National Security Council for the execution of the Plan and will issue such instructions as are necessary for implementing it. These instructions will cover: (a) the points in paragraph 20; (b) the establishment of strategic and defended hamlets; (c) control measures; (d) such other matters as may be necessary. Approval/4/ /4/In telegram 1073 to Saigon, March 7, the Department of State asked whether the Task Force in Vietnam agreed with the Delta Plan. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2-2462) In telegram 1159 from Saigon, March 9, Trueheart replied that all agencies represented on the Task Force did agree with the Plan. (Ibid., 751K.5/3-962) 23. This plan approved by His Excellency the President and the National Security Council on and will come into force on ____. Signed:
52. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)/1/ Washington, February 7, 1962, 7:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1962, Folder 24. Secret; Priority. 080057Z. Secret for Felt and Harkins from Lemnitzer. 1. Now that we are about to get the new command in Vietnam under way after all the road blocks which have been encountered to delay its establishment, I would like to bring you up to date on the situation here. 2. In drafting the JCS message which you received today/2/ I attempted to make it clear that insofar as DOD and the JCS are concerned, your terms of reference are those which were agreed to by Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and which were approved by the President when Sec Def, JCS and Harkins visited Palm Beach in early January. As you know Nolting was not too happy with them and for that reason it is desirable that they be handled most discreetly, particularly in your contacts with him. I discussed the importance of doing so with Harkins during our last visit to Honolulu and I am sure he understands the situation in this regard. The importance of holding these terms of reference closely is obvious. /2/See Document 53. 3. As you are aware the necessary arrangements for the establishment of the command and announcement thereof have been made with President Diem. He has given his complete concurrence to the entire project and is looking forward with much pleasure to working with Harkins. 4. It now appears that our next visit to Honolulu will be on 19 Feb. While you are in the best position to judge when Harkins should leave for Saigon and whether he will be able to return for that conference, I believe that it would be most advantageous if he could leave Honolulu fairly promptly and return with McGarr for the conference on the 19th. 5. With respect to Harkins' promotion, he presently holds a recess appointment as general. The President signed the necessary papers during our Palm Beach visit on 3 Jan. Accordingly, the promotion papers to be forwarded by DA will confirm that fact. They have been closely held since Jan 3 for security reasons. Therefore Harkins should wear his fourth star as of 081600Z, the time of the public release. The papers which will send his promotion to the Senate for confirmation are now in the White House and will be forwarded to the Senate by the President at 1100 AM Washington time Thursday, 8 Feb. when the command announcement is made. Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester will make an appropriate announcement of the promotion at that time. 6. For Harkins. Again my heartiest congratulations to you on this well-earned and justly deserved promotion. In undertaking your new and challenging assignment you can count on the wholehearted support of the President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, the JCS and their respective staffs here. I know that Felt, O'Donnell, Collins and Aides and their commands and staffs will also give you all possible support and assistance.
53. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr)/1/ Honolulu, February 8, 1962, 6 a.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 334, MAC/V Files: FRC 69 A 702, Organization and Planning Files (1963). Secret. Also sent to DEPCINCUSARPAC and repeated to all commands and representatives under CINCPAC. It repeats a message to all concerned parties sent by JCS to CINCPAC. 081600Z. Establishment of United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 1. In accordance with a decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a subordinate unified command of Pacific Command, designated as United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), will be established as of 1600 hours GMT 8 February 1962. General Paul D. Harkins, USA, will assume command of United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam short title COMUSMACV, with Headquarters in Saigon, South Vietnam, APO 143, San Francisco, California. 2. Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, will: a. Have direct responsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations and assistance in that country, and the authority to discuss both the U.S. and Vietnamese military operations directly with the President of Vietnam and the leaders of the GVN. b. Furnish advice to the GVN on all matters relative to security and maintaining internal security in South Vietnam, to the organization and employment of the RVNAF and of counter-insurgency or other paramilitary forces. c. Have direct access to CINCPAC and through him to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. d. Consult the U.S. Ambassador on U.S. political and basic policy matters. In case of differences of view, both representatives will be free to communicate such differences to Washington for decision in accordance with already existing procedures. e. Keep the Ambassador fully informed, especially on all high level contacts with the South Vietnamese, and including major military plans and pending operations. f. Provide broad requirement guidance to CHMAAG VN as it may affect planning, programming and administration of the Military Assistance Program. In areas wherein responsibilities and interests of COMUSMACV and CHMAAG VN appear to overlap, divergent views which cannot be resolved locally will be referred to CINCPAC./2/ /2/For comparison of these terms of reference with earlier drafts, see Documents 9 and 17. 3. COMUSMACV will execute the following Mission and Tasks as directed by CINCPAC. a. Mission The mission of COMUSMACV is to assist and support the Government of Vietnam in its efforts to provide for its internal security, defeat communist insurgency, and resist overt aggression. b. Tasks (1) Exercise operational command of all U.S. forces and military agencies assigned or attached, including CHMAAG VN. (2) Plan for and be prepared to conduct military operations as directed by CINCPAC. (3) Discharge U.S. military responsibility to the GVN in accordance with CINCPAC policies and directives. (4) Assist the GVN and RVNAF in planning for military operations. (5) Develop coordinated U.S.-GVN plans as directed by CINCPAC. (6) Administer and supervise joint frequency coordination in SVN in accordance with PACOM CEI. (7) Continue development of GVN capabilities to provide such support for U.S. forces as may be required under existing agreements. (8) Coordinate joint U.S. military intelligence activities in South Vietnam. (9) Function as CINCPAC's single U.S. spokesman in South Vietnam for U.S. military policy, planning and contemplated force employment. 4. COMUSMACV is authorized a joint staff of minimum size in accordance with approved Joint Table of Distribution. 5. Support for Headquarters, COMUSMACV, will be provided in accordance with arrangements made by CINCPAC. 6. CINCPAC inst 003020.2B of 16 August 1961/3/ will be amended to reflect the above and further delineate command relationships with regard to US and SEATO contingency planning. /3/Not found. [Continue with the next documents]
Vietnam, 1962 Volume II Index | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |