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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
II. Consideration of a Civic Action Program for South Vietnam, February 9-26, 1962
54. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting/1/ Washington, February 9, 1962, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 65 D 172, February 1962. Top Secret. A notation on the cover sheet indicates that it was a Department of State draft that was not cleared with the Department of Defense. U. Alexis Johnson headed the Department of State delegation. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. [Here follows discussion of item I, the situation in the Congo.] II. Viet Nam Mr. Johnson opened the discussion of this item by stating that he had asked Mr. Hilsman to make an oral presentation on his report to the President on Viet Nam./2/ Mr. Johnson said that he felt such a presentation would allow a personalized approach which would not be reflected in the written report. /2/See Document 42. Mr. Hilsman stated that he was distressed over any concern of the JCS which might have arisen as a result of his oral presentation to the President./3/ He certainly had not intended any reflection on anyone and had not known of the matter until Mr. Johnson had brought it to his attention. General Lemnitzer accepted this explanation for the JCS and stated that the JCS were happy to have Mr. Hilsman present with them. /3/According to the President's log, Hilsman and Taylor met with the President from 7 until 8 p.m. on January 29. Mr. Hilsman said that he would like to stress and expand on a few key points contained in his report. First, we must get across to the liberal press the fact that it does not necessarily follow that the existence of guerrilla war in Viet Nam means that the government is unpopular and bad. The village people live an inward existence and are concerned largely with their own immediate problems. They have no regional or national feelings or loyalties, and while they are basically anti-communist, they are still very isolated. The people respect Diem, but they do not have any feeling of love or admiration for him. Second, the importance of the existence and availability of Viet Cong infiltration routes has been overplayed. The establishment of a completely effective wall across the border would not unduly affect the Viet Cong activities. While the Viet Cong does use these routes to bring new regular Army cadre personnel into South Viet Nam, they do not rely unduly on them for anything else. Third, the Viet Cong has ready access to the villages, and it does not employ any great degree of terror tactics against the villages. They buy their rice at premium prices from the villagers and do not take property or food by force. The Viet Cong does, however, obtain money and goods through actions against business people such as robbery, blackmail, and ransom. Most of their arms are obtained or manufactured locally and do not come in over infiltration routes. There is a great deal of Viet Cong small arms manufacture taking place in South Viet Nam. The true Viet Cong logistic lines stem out from the villages where they obtain rice, arms, and recruits. The Viet Cong have access to, and are using, about 2,000 such villages. Fourth, we must institute a program of civic action which will tie the villages to their districts and to the central government. These programs must be designed to assist the villages with their problems and by performance demonstrate to the villagers that they can expect help if they ask for it. The few hard-core Viet Cong supporters in the villages must be removed through aggressive police work. This will require the establishment of a system of ID cards, personnel checks, etc. The villages must be provided effective physical protection which in turn will permit the control of movements of supplies and personnel. The problem is a tactical one involving combat, and not strategic intelligence operations. We must get across to the villages the fact that we will provide them real and adequate protection against revenge if they provide us information and assistance. Fifth, the regular army is static and relatively immobile as a result of its role of defending strong points. We must free it to act as a mobile force. We must institute a full reorganization of all friendly forces at the working level along the lines of basic guerrilla principles and counter-insurgency tactics. Aggressive patrolling must be instituted. When these patrols make contact with the enemy, they should call in the Jungle Jim units and the paratroopers. We should not rely on helicopters for attacking. Sixth, Diem is in a difficult political situation. State has been pushing him too hard for reforms. Many of these reforms are not necessary and perhaps some are undesirable. More reforms should be pressed at the lower levels. Seventh, we need many more U.S. company grade officers and NCO's to assist on the spot. We also need effective police type training and assistance. The strategic village is not the key because it really is only a fort of sorts. The key element is the zone. We must establish zones and control them by civil guards with the Army ready to step in to assist. We have to put the Viet Cong in a meat grinder. By cutting off access to the villages, they will have to attack, and we should be in a position to react with superior force. Eighth, the purely military effort is going well, but we must complement it by equally effective civic action programs. Self-defense units must be established, and they do not require more than minimum training. This must be a rapid program, and it should be conducted simultaneously with a leadership program for selected people from the villages. General Lemnitzer noted that we had already faced the problem of a lack of native recruits for present programs. Mr. Hilsman said that we need about 1,000 company grade officers and NCO's (Special Forces type people) to train personnel and set examples. We must show the way at the bottom and ease the pressure on the top echelons. Mr. Hilsman said that there are no effective gimmicks to substitute for people. He noted that the results of the defoliation program have been marginal. The real solution is men who will go out into the jungle, live there, and close with the enemy. General Lemnitzer said that the U. S. military in Viet Nam had the same objective. Admiral Anderson asked Mr. Hilsman how much time he had spent in Viet Nam in preparing his report. Mr. Hilsman replied that he was in Saigon for five days./4/ General Lemnitzer asked how many police officer personnel would be required for training the Viet Namese. Mr. Hilsman estimated that about 200 would be required and noted that the British and the Malayans would be prepared to provide part of this number of people. General Lemnitzer remarked that we now have about 3,000 U.S. personnel in Viet Nam and that the present program called for a total of about 6,000. He then noted that General Taylor had recommended the institution of provincial civic action studies in Viet Nam./5/ However, the survey teams included only military and intelligence people. Mr. Johnson pointed out that Diem had vetoed the inclusion of political and economic people in these study groups. General Lemnitzer said satisfactory progress in civic action required the development of a comprehensive plan of action by the Viet Namese. Mr. Hilsman indicated that such a plan had been prepared by the British and was under study by Diem's people. General Lemnitzer said that our USOM people had not been forceful in their actions. Mr. Hilsman agreed that AID should do more and that its Public Safety Division should be improved. He said that AID is the weakest element in the civic action program. Mr. Johnson asked just what we should expect from AID. Mr. Hilsman said that we should not expect too much from AID and that we may have to move the MAAG into the field of police type action and training. /4/Hilsman traveled to Vietnam on January 15, following the Honolulu Secretary of Defense's Conference. He witnessed the Binh Hoa operation on January 21 and then returned to the United States. /5/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 210. Admiral Anderson asked if he was correct in assuming that Mr. Hilsman did not feel that the U.S. military in Viet Nam had been sufficiently effective, helpful, imaginative, and resourceful. Mr. Hilsman said that our decision to support rather than just advise the Viet Namese was a very recent one and that until that time our people in Viet Nam were merely advisors, as we all were. He said that probably no government ever had so much advice. Accordingly, we cannot blame our people on the spot for any lack of positive action since they were instructed to act as advisors. Admiral Anderson then asked if Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr agreed with Mr. Hilsman's views on the required actions in Viet Nam. Mr. Hilsman replied in the affirmative. General Lemnitzer remarked that we must now build up our resources in Viet Nam. Mr. Hilsman said that while Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr agreed with his general approach, he could not state positively that they agreed with all of the details of his report. General Decker asked if Mr. Hilsman had discussed his report with General McGarr. Mr. Hilsman said that he had not because he did not begin to write it until after he had left Saigon. He had not sent a copy of the report to General McGarr because Mr. Gilpatric had asked him not to make any distribution of the report outside certain Washington Agencies for the time being. General Lemnitzer noted that the JCS have a strong directive from the Secretary of Defense regarding provision of full support to our effort in Viet Nam. He asked if other Agencies of the U.S. Government have similar directives. Mr. Hilsman said that AID does not. [Here follows discussion of Items III and IV, the Punta del Este Conference and the Inter-American Defense Board.]
55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, February 9, 1962, 4:28 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2-162. Secret. Drafted on February 8 by Czyzak and Chapman, cleared with Cottrell, Rice, Chayes, Carlson, and Bamard, and approved by Harriman. Also sent to New Delhi and Ottawa. Repeated to Geneva (FECON), London, Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. 974. Saigon 999./2/ /2/Dated February 1, it recounted a conversation with Canadian ICC Commissioner Hooten in which he expressed the view that the ICC at best would cite both North and South Vietnam for violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords and offered several alternatives to the then-current U.S. practice of not notifying the ICC but overtly introducing men and equipment into South Vietnam. Nolting recommended continuing the current policy, but asked for the opinion of the Department of State. (Ibid.) 1. In connection with points made reftel, Department has examined question notification personnel and equipment in light of position taken by GVN in note sent ICC Dec. 9, 1961. (Saigon 769./3/) /3/Dated December 7, 1961, not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/12-761) As Department views Accords, two obligations are involved: (a) One involves the obligation to notify ICC of any arrivals or departures of personnel or equipment; (b) the other relates to the obligation not to introduce foreign troops, military personnel, arms and munitions, other than as authorized by the Accords. 2. Department now inclined to view that December 9 note from GVN to ICC may be considered as a notification within meaning Accords, since ICC thereby informed of intended USG increased support in men and material over and above that which authorized by Accords. We do not believe specific numbers, figures, amounts, and quantities need be notified as envisaged by Accords, since purpose Dec. 9 notification not to stay within limits provided for in Accords, but rather to place on record fact limits would be exceeded in view existing situation. 3. Second question is whether introduction fresh troops, military personnel, arms and munitions, beyond limits authorized by Accords, can be justified to ICC. On this point, under clearly recognized principle of international law, non-observance of a treaty obligation by one party to that treaty justifies an equivalent corresponding or related non-observance by the other party. This principle is subject to the limitation that aggrieved party may only continue non-observance of its treaty obligations until resumption of observance by other party. Therefore, in replying to ICC's letter of Jan. 6/4/regarding USG increased support in men and material, GVN might base its answer on foregoing principle. In fact, this point already made in GVN's December 9 note which stated, among other things, that "in view aggression being waged by so-called DRV against GVN in flagrant violation Geneva Accords, GVN has requested USG increase support in men and material which it has accorded in past. Right of self-defense being inherent and legitimate attribute of sovereignty, GVN obliged by NVN's contempt for life and property of free people of VN and by its breaches of GA to exercise this right and appeal for increased assistance." At same time December 9 note recognized limitation on this principle by stating that "As soon as authorities in NVN end their aggressive acts and begin observe Geneva Accords, these measures of support can be terminated." /4/Not found. 4. In view of foregoing, it would appear that question of notification has already been dealt with by December 9 note, and that further notifications are unnecessary, since, as noted above, purpose of notification is to permit ICC verify that amounts not exceeded and December 9 notification clearly indicated intention to break ceiling for reasons stated therein. Only question left for ICC to consider is whether action taken can be justified on grounds noted above. This point raises issue of subversion. Subversion then will clearly become issue with which ICC will have to deal and which it cannot ignore. 5. Believe that case on subversion can persuasively be made to Canadians and Indians by using above legal argument and by also setting problem in its broader context as follows: (a) What is at stake in Viet-Nam is question of world-wide concern: how can community of nations identify nature of subversive warfare as a violation of world peace just as flagrant, just as violent and just as dangerous as overt war of Korean style? DRV has trained troops on its own territory and infiltrated them over period time into South Viet-Nam instead of using them in overt and massive attack. Its agents have directed the present insurgency in South Viet-Nam, using newly infiltrated troops, personnel left in place when country was divided and local recruits. Its own General Giap has described the type of war it is waging, placing the world on notice. It cannot be dismissed as not being aggression because the pattern of aggression it presents is new and novel. (b) The ICC has so far avoided central issue and, months after GVN's complaints of DRV subversion, matter is still being sifted through legal committee. US considers ICC must lift its sights to face this issue which is at heart of insecurity in SEA. US believes ICC can fulfill important role in beginning to formulate body of legal doctrine to control subversion. (c) US policy toward Viet-Nam is clear: US does not menace NVN nor seek its reconquest. US does intend to provide GVN, with all means necessary to preserve its independence. US will cease its exceptional aid once DRV ceases its attempts to destroy GVN. (d) US appreciates difficulties of Indians and Canadians but considers it would be damaging if ICC cited GVN and US in violation Geneva Agreements without citing DRV for its responsibility for situation in SVN. Record is clear that increased US aid has been answer to increased subversion, regardless of present attempts of DRV to obscure facts. We would hope therefore that ICC would first consider GVN complaints on subversion before considering those of DRV. If this absolutely not feasible we would nevertheless consider two issues linked since GVN in responding to ICC citation would be expected inject issue of subversion by way of defense. 6. For Saigon: Unless you have objections suggest GVN answer ICC letter January 6 in accordance para 3./5/ You should also present our views as set forth above to Indians and Canadians. /5/See Document 91. For New Delhi and Ottawa: Unless Saigon expresses objections you should similarly discuss matter with appropriate officials at high level. Rusk
56. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/ Washington, February 11, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 8, GVN, Information and Civic Action. Confidential. Drafled by Johnson. Copies were sent to Harriman, Janow, and Magathan. SUBJECT At our meeting with the JCS on Friday,/2/ General Lemnitzer informally indicated to me that he did not feel that State and AID were moving energetically enough on civil aspects of organizing and training civic action teams. As I was not clear on the question of the responsibilities for and the status of these teams, I was not able to discuss the subject. However, I suggest that you will want to look into it with a view to undertaking any corrective action that may be necessary and seeing that Governor Harriman is briefed on the subject prior to the February 19 Honolulu meeting. /2/See Document 54. There was also some discussion of the failure of the provincial survey teams to include civilian and political elements. Should we be doing anything about this?
57. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam (Trueheart) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/ Saigon, February 12, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1-C.1. Secret Official-Informal. A handwritten note on the letter by Trueheart asked Cottrell to pass to Hilsman copies of the draft instructions on Co-ordination and Control Measures, noting that he already had copies of the draft Directive and draft instruction on Strategic Hamlets. Dear Cot: As you may know, the British Advisory Mission under Mr. R.G.K. Thompson has already submitted to the GVN a draft directive for pacification of the Delta area, which sets out in the form of a NISC directive the concepts outlined in Thompson's earlier papers (Embdes 205 of 11/20/61)./2/ /2/Despatch 205 transmitted Thompson's earlier papers (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2062), including a letter from Thompson to Diem, November 11, 1961, and attached memorandum of November 13, 1961, conveying Thompson's impressions of how to clear the Delta area of Communist insurgents. For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 345-355. The draft NISC directive is not printed. (Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Vietnam, 1/62-2/62) The Mission has also prepared three draft Policy Instructions for the implementation of the Directive, one Instruction on Coordination, one on Control Measures, and a third on Strategic and Defended Hamlets. Thompson has given these draft Instructions to Secretary Thuan, who told him that he agreed completely with the ideas therein and that the whole plan (presumably both the Policy Directive and the Instructions) would be put up to the National Internal Security Council this week. The three Instructions have already been cleared with MAAG. I might add that Thompson has been in constant touch with us on this and has meticulously coordinated his efforts with MAAG and the Embassy. His recommendations closely parallel those we have been or would be making to the GVN, and if accepted, they certainly would be a major step forward for all concerned. Copies of the draft directive and two of the three draft instructions are enclosed in 5 copies, the one on Strategic and Defended Hamlets in single copy; we will forward additional copies of the latter when they are available later this week./3/ Also enclosed is a copy of Thompson's letter of February 10 transmitting to Secretary Thuan the latest of the three Instructions; you may find Thompson's comments of interest. /3/A letter of February 19 from Trueheart to Cottrell transmitted additional copies of the draft instruction on "Strategic and Defended Hamlets." It also reported that Thuan had told Nolting on February 17 that Diem had approved the draft instructions and policy directive and was submitting them to the National Internal Security Council. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2048) Best personal regards. Sincerely, Bill
58. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam (Trueheart) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/ Saigon, February 12, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/2-2262. Top Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Cot: Fritz has asked me to make an interim response to your letter of January 26 regarding Farmgate bombing operations./2/ /2/Not found. The best evidence I can give you that the points which are troubling you have not escaped our notice here is the enclosed draft telegram. The latter is addressed in terms to the question of crop defoliation, but the arguments are of course applicable to area bombing and this is well understood. (This, incidentally, is the draft Task Force message referred to in MAAG's MAGPO 779,/3/ which you may have seen.) /3/ Document 43. As of now, Fritz is reserving judgement on the conclusions arrived at in this message. He takes a more pragmatic approach and, before reaching a position, would want to see the results of a review such as that suggested in the second paragraph of your letter. Given the fairly desperate position we find ourselves in in Viet-Nam, he wants to be very sure of his ground before rejecting any weapon which might help to win the war, and he is understandably reluctant to draw conclusions on vital questions on the basis of a priori reasoning--which is about all we have to go on at this point. Moreover, he is particularly anxious not to be recorded in Washington as for or against the operation in question until there has been an opportunity for further, objective study. In other words, he is very keen that this not become at this stage--or, hopefully, ever--an inter-departmental issue between State and Defense. Best personal regards. Sincerely, [Enclosure] Draft Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/4/ /4/Drafted by Trueheart. There is no indication that this message was ever sent. JCS 041835Z Dec./5/ TF/VN. Official GVN request has been received by MAAG from Defense SecState Thuan for commencement crop warfare program. In request Thuan stated instructions being given RVNAF to avoid damage to crops belonging government supporters and to take such preventive measures as may be required avoid adverse political or psychological reaction. Efforts now being made determine if plans have been developed which meet requirements ref msg for resettlement displaced persons and alternate food supply system. Vietnamese chairman Joint Planning Committee for defoliation and crop warfare aware US position stated in ref msg and is currently trying to ensure that instructions from VN DOD include appropriate provisions to meet this requirement. Vietnamese have been generally cool to idea of specific plans for resettlement and alternate food supply. They insist chemicals will only be employed in areas not under GVN control and where population either VC or sympathetic thereto. They also feel that chemicals just another weapon in arsenal to be employed against the VC. Since chemicals to be dispensed by Vietnamese in VNAF helicopters, they apparently feel it their show and are ready to go. /5/ Not found. Despite this understandable GVN impatience, Task Force has reluctantly concluded GVN concept of use defoliants against crops is ill conceived and, if implemented, would have effect increasing VC strength rather than decreasing it. As indicated above, GVN proceeds from premise inhabitants areas controlled by VC consist entirely VC troops and "sympathizers", thus any means may be used against them. Task Force does not accept this premise. On contrary, we believe that even in VC controlled areas populace still susceptible being won by GVN if proper tactics used. Problem in military/political warfare taking place here is to separate guerrillas physically and psychologically from people and to win latter's allegiance to government. Admittedly this is lengthy and tortuous process, but it is only means achieving meaningful victory in type of warfare such as that confronting Viet-Nam. Widespread food denial program, like area bombing recommended by Diem from time to time, is completely at odds with this approach. It might well inconvenience VC units and supporters in areas affected but it would also insure ill will of whole of population these areas, thereby increasing overall VC strength there. Various ways of mitigating this effect have been suggested, notably resettlement and food distribution programs in areas where crop warfare conducted, but for several reasons we inclined to doubt value such measures. GVN reps have argued VC will simply resettle with afflicted population and will be in forefront those demanding replacement food. These points well taken, we believe, and illustrate difficulties administering such a program. Furthermore, because GVN doubts wisdom resettlement and food replacement, such programs would probably not be effectively implemented, even if accepted on paper. We therefore now see no alternative but to conclude that type of crop warfare program envisaged by GVN would not contribute to GVN victory and might in fact make such victory even more difficult obtain. This conclusion based purely local factors and is without regard international aspects. We recognize that Diem may be highly displeased this opinion. However, only alternatives are: a) to permit GVN to proceed with defoliant operations in its own way--which we believe would be counter-productive for reasons stated above; or b) to insist on detailed case-by-case review by U.S. of proposed operations. Because of lack of independent intelligence, we have no sound basis for making such review and particularly for deciding with assurance that given operation would affect only hard-core VC. This procedure if conscientiously implemented would therefore be source continuing invitation in GVN-US relations. Task Force therefore recommends Diem be informed we prepared continue road clearance program, if trials demonstrate its effectiveness but that we will not support defoliant food denial operations at this fume. Nolting
59. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Rowan)/1/ Washington, February 13, 1962. /1/Source: Harriman Papers, Vietnam 1962. Confidential. The memorandum was sent to Rowan through Harriman. Typed at the top was: "Harriman said burn this." In Harriman's handwriting in the border was the following: "I disagree with this memo, but you should read it. I believe our press will build this assistance to Vietnam as our participation in this war--a new war under President Kennedy--the Democratic War [?] Party, so skillfully avoided by the Republican President Eisenhower. The Press do not belong on these aircraft but can be kept fully informed by briefings in Saigon by our military or Embassy. WAH" SUBJECT /2/Document 48. Problem 1. Ambassador Nolting reports that he is in trouble with the press because of a) press exclusion from helicopter missions, b) exclusion from boarding USS Core at Cap St. Jacques and c) discrimination arising from special treatment of Soucherek of Life Magazine. 2. Nolting requests authority "be given Task Force Saigon to decide on local correspondents' requests to cover field operations in which U.S. participating, including arrival of equipment when deemed advisable." Discussion 1. A large number of experienced, responsible American journalists are now in Viet-Nam covering a newsworthy development--the participation of U.S. military men in South Viet-Nam's war. 2. Until recently, our press coverage from Viet-Nam has been on the critical side--a search for a culprit responsible for the downward trend in the war against the Viet Cong. Critics point to President Diem and his tightly controlled government and military services as the impediment to success. 3. In my opinion, the only way this unfavorable publicity--originating mostly from malcontents in Saigon--can be reversed is through registering successes in the security effort. The criticism will then abate and the reporting will be directed to the factual progress in the war. 4. I believe we have almost reached the bottom of the downward curve. The results of our imminent adoption of a coordinated strategic plan (McNamara-Thompson-Hilsman-Diem ideas appear to be converging) plus the men, materials, and training should bring about a gradual upward curve favoring the GVN. 5. Consequently I believe it important that our press representatives in Saigon be treated effectively in order to achieve the best constructive coverage. The attached article from U.S. News and World Report,/3/ with a "box" entitled "Curtain of Secrecy" saying that this "looks like a U.S. Embassy effort to confuse and disguise the situation" is a sample of the kind of coverage we do not want. /3/Not found attached. 6. Since Ambassador Nolting is on the scene and in constant touch with the newsmen, I believe he should be charged with the responsibility of press relations and coverage, with appropriate advice from Washington. He should be allowed to permit coverage of certain operations, taking into account the military commander's opinion, and he should provide the newsmen with appropriate guidance. Recommendation 1. That we concur in Ambassador Nolting's request for authority (1013) 2. That we provide him guidance, i.e.: a) That he should emphasize to newsmen in backgrounders that we are not taking over the direction of the war; that we are "in support of" the Vietnamese; that therefore they should not over-emphasize the U.S. role. b) That we do not deal in numbers because we do not want to telegraph our punches in detail to the Viet Cong or provide numbers for DRV complaints to the ICC. c) That we are in firm support of the GVN and are not looking for a replacement for Diem, and that we believe we can win with Diem by gradual change in the tight controls he previously exercised. d) We do not want coverage of civilian casualties as a result of government military operations. e) Any other guidance Washington deems appropriate.
60. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, February 14,1962, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2-1462. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon, London, Bangkok, Paris, Ottawa, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Vientiane. 2474. Department's telegram 2692./2/ /2/Printed as telegram 974, Document 55. 1. As instructed last paragraph reference telegram, I presented views set forth reference telegram in some detail to Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia February 13. He listened attentively and then commented as follows: large-scale influx US aid clearly transgresses Geneva accords. GOI position as made clear informally to USG was that if US assistance could be covered under GA, this was "all right with GOI up to a point". However, USG has made no effort whatsoever do this. Thus, way things are going, impossible situation being created for ICC. 2. Gundevia went on to ask what USG thought would happen if ICC/VN were to abdicate? He thought open war would result. Added that Parthasarathy sending "frantic" telegrams saying he has already had protest from DRV and USS Core deliveries and matter will be brought up with him by Poles. On issue subversion, Gundevia said ICC bound hand and foot by GA and cannot change rules. If USG wishes see a conference convened and rules rewritten this another matter, but experience at Laos Conference in this respect is anything but encouraging precedent. Gundevia referred to policy statement on subversion agreed by ICC/VN in 1961 after months of wrangling and Polish opposition. Said ICC cannot investigate subversion, as this outside GA, but can investigate breaches of specific GA provisions. (Gundevia, who has been away from MEA for 4 months, did not refer to work apparently currently being done on subversion issue by ICC legal committee--third paragraph Saigon's 999 to Department/3/--and he may not be abreast of it. Could Department or Saigon summarize substantive status for our background, since Saigon's 999 seems indicate some possibility DRV being cited for subversion, which seems contrary to thrust of Gundevia's comments.) /3/See footnote 2,Document 55. 3. Gundevia said acting Canadian Hicom Campbell came in few days ago with proposal that ICC investigate a specific GVN charge each time it takes up a DRV complaint, in order obtain simultaneous citation GVN and DRV. Gundevia admitted DRV concealing violations but said US committing "daylight robbery" and that this not GOI's fault. ICC cannot juggle words or ignore what is openly taking place. Thus he saw little chance that simultaneous citation could be achieved or that repeated citations of GVN could be avoided. 4. According Gundevia, Parthasarathy feels that US assistance to GVN outside GA has gone so far that situation heading for crisis and real danger hostilities. Gundevia said he not so pessimistic over immediate situation as Parthasarathy but thinks future black. Parthasarathy holds that "moderates" in DRV weakening and extremists gaining on issue of letting ChiComs in. 5. Gundevia reverted to favorite thesis by asking whether US wants another Korea. In event shooting war, said ChiComs would take over "whole area". Asked whether US had attempted talk seriously to Soviets on Viet-Nam. 6. Comment: Foregoing summarizes Gundevia's lengthy and often rambling and emotional comments. Gundevia did not contest US view that subversion is at heart of insecurity in SEA, which I pressed hard, but fell back on restrictive ICC terms of reference. He did not address himself to US legal argument regarding increased support. Gundevia clearly worried and uncomfortable, and protested several times that GOI caught in middle of thankless task, which many people wished India were out of, since India being blamed for events over which she has no control. Gundevia concluded by saying he thought matter had been carried as far as possible in this session but he wished have another talk with me in few days. I asked Gundevia what was tenor of MEA's recent instructions to Parthasarathy and he said latter had been told to press for early decisions on Nam case and other pending issues. 7. Would welcome Department's observations and further guidance. Department will appreciate there is virtual vacuum in MEA at this time, with PM away electioneering and Desai ill. Gundevia, who far from well himself, therefore likely be calling shots on GOI policy toward ICC and Viet-Nam for at least some weeks, which is unfortunate. Timmons
61. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 15, 1962, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-1562. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Action was assigned to U. Alexis Johnson, who wrote at the top of the first page: "No reply required." 1047. I am sorry to have to raise again the matter of US organizational arrangements in Vietnam. However, an issue of principle and a question of my personal good faith vis-à-vis the government of Vietnam are involved. On the basis your letter of January 20,/2/ and in response to specific questioning on this point from President Diem, I gave him written assurance on February 2/3/ that "the US Ambassador will continue to be the senior US representative in Vietnam, responsible for coordination and supervision of US official activities here, including, of course, relations with your government." Diem stressed to me that it was on the basis of this assurance that he concurred in the establishment of the new Command. /2/See Document 40. /3/Not further identified. (In response to persistent questions, I also made substantially the same reply to the press on a background basis.) In the light of your statement that there is now "No piece of paper", I was surprised and disappointed to see CINPAC's 081600Z,/4/ which has just been passed to me. This message, repeated apparently to all military establishments subordinate to CINCPAC as well as to JCS, sets out the terms of reference for the commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, in precisely the same terms as those to which I had made clear to you and Secretary McNamara my objections and which I had understood from your letter were to be dropped. /4/Document 53. In the circumstances, I should appreciate a clarification. In view of the personal commitments I have made to President Diem and in view of my belief that the chances of success here depend on clear US organizational arrangements, as explained more fully in my proposed letter to President Kennedy sent you from Honolulu on January 17,/5/ I cannot, as I explained to you earlier in Washington, accept the responsibility attaching to this assignment on the basis set out in the CINCPAC message cited above. I am not prepared to carry forward on a task of this magnitude and importance under conditions which have unfortunately now developed, where ambiguous or conflicting instructions to US military establishment, on the one hand, and to me via your personal letter, on the other, jeopardize the essential unity of US effort and action here. /5/Document 25. I hardly need add that none of this reflects in any way on General Harkins. I am sure that we could work harmoniously and effectively together on the basis of a clear definition of relationships and responsibilities. Last month in Washington the President requested me to let him know if I thought organizational arrangements here were not clear or satisfactory. I therefore request that this matter be brought to his attention, and that my previous messages on this subject January 17 message . . . from Honolulu, Embtels 801, December 13, 819, December 19, 963, January 24, 980, January 27, 1004, February 2, and 1008, February 3/6/) be made available to him. /6/None printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2462, 1-2762 and 2-262) Nolting
62. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Rowan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, February 15, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, PR 11. Confidential. Drafted by Rowan. Copies sent to Murrow, Harriman, Manning, and Cottrell. SUBJECT Problem We seem headed for a major domestic furor over the "undeclared war" in South Viet-Nam and of US imposed "secrecy regulations" that prevent American newsmen from telling our people the truth about US involvement in that war. Discussion Our Embassy in Saigon has called to our attention the fact that it is having considerable difficulty with American newsmen who deplore what these newsmen believe are regulations that make it impossible for them to do their jobs. These newsmen specifically want the right to function much like war correspondents and accompany US personnel on various operations against the Viet-Cong Communist guerrillas. In the hope of easing relations with the press, our Embassy and military commanders in Saigon have requested the right to make on-the-spot, case-by-case judgments as to when newsmen might be permitted to observe military operations. Our present policy is that a flat rule prevails against newsmen going on helicopter and other military missions, or being permitted into areas where they might report in detail on what US military men are doing. It has been explained that this rule has been applied in the interest of national security--that we do not want to telegraph our punches for the enemy, and that we do not want news reports to build up a detailed record that might be cited as evidence of our violation of the Geneva accords. While in complete agreement with this objective, I do believe that our policy is too broadly restrictive, and that it was adopted without consideration of some press factors that must be considered. The current article in the US News and World Report (Tab A),/2/ the James Reston column (Tab B) and editorial in yesterday's New York Times (Tab C), the charges in the publication of the Republican National Committee (Tab D--article by Jack Raymond, also from yesterday's New York Times), and as yet unpublished reports submitted to Time-Life (I shall have them at the meeting this evening/3/) are all indications that we run the risk of serious domestic political consequences if we fail to give proper attention to our information policies with regard to South Viet-Nam. /2/None of the tabs referred to in the source text is printed here. /3/No record of this meeting has been found. I am setting forth my views on four points that I think we ought to bear in mind in reviewing the appropriateness of our present embargo on newsmen in Saigon: 1. This policy almost certainly will not continue for long to deprive the newsmen of the information we want most to keep out of public print. Covering the Viet-Nam situation are people like Homer Bigart, Keyes Beach, Howard Sochurek, etc. These fellows have spent a good part of their lives covering wars of one kind or another; they have substantial reputations to protect and, if possible, enhance; they aren't going to sit on their hands just because of our embargo. They will pump our returning soldiers, use Viet-Namese sources, and generally get the information they want. Less enterprising reporters there will seize upon rumors and resort to so-called interpretive pieces that the boys in the trade call "thumb suckers"--a kind of story that often can cause more woe than the facts. Their colleagues in Washington will pounce on letters written to Congressmen by relatives of GI's injured or killed in Viet-Nam. Furthermore, a look at the material Sochurek has submitted to Life is proof enough that the press boys already have enough detailed information about troops and material to paint a disturbing picture of US involvement. 2. By imposing unrealistic regulations we will create a completely hostile press and insure that the newsmen will write just the things we hope to prevent. Even our friends will do pieces that will grieve us. The Reston column and the Times editorial are examples of this. In a situation like this a government has two possible fundamental approaches: to impose a system of rigid wartime censorship, or to cooperate with the press enough to maintain rapport and a mood of mutual trust so as to use the leverage of personal contact to influence, if not control, what information the newsmen put out. 3. We presently are inviting a barrage of attacks on President Diem and on our policies and past actions in South Viet-Nam. Newsmen who feel unjustly deprived of the right to cover military operations will do more interpretives such as the Keyes Beech piece in yesterday's Washington Post. Sochurek's file to Life is loaded with rugged criticism of Diem, of Nolting and our Embassy people and of our military personnel. 4. We must not expect the impossible from the press. There is bound to be major emphasis on the activities of US personnel. This is the nature of news. People in Austin, Texas, care a lot more about what US GI's are doing in Viet-Nam than about the dirty work of the Viet Cong. Only through good relations with American newsmen can we "infiltrate" their dispatches with some of the information that we want to get to the public. Nor can we ever muffle all criticism of Diem. Doubts as to our ability to win with him are too widespread among newsmen who have spent months on the scene. With good relations, we can get a wide measure of silence by astutely invoking the national interest--but not otherwise. Recommendations 1. That we adopt a more flexible policy with regard to the handling of newsmen in Saigon. 2. That the Ambassador be given authority to determine what military operations, if any, newsmen might witness. 3. That we provide the Ambassador with guidance as to the things we hope the press will avoid, and suggest that he brief them confidentially as to our problems and our need for their understanding and cooperation.
63. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Council to the Director of the Council (Rostow)/1/ Washington, February 15,1962. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Vietnam, 1962. Confidential. SUBJECT Attached is a paper prepared by Warren Silver of the Vietnam Task Force staff on the FY 1962 and FY 1963 Project AID Programs for Vietnam. This paper illustrates in a very graphic way the fact--known to many of us for some time--that our economic AID program is not in very good shape in Vietnam and has not been well related to our other efforts. Even where new programs are being added that appear to be more closely related to the counter insurgency effort, as in the case of the "rural development" program on the 4th page of the tabular material, we know so little about the intended content of the program in Washington that approval is being given more or less on the basis of "blind faith." The paper was discussed at a Task Force meeting which I attended today./2/ As a result of that meeting, the following seemed to be tentatively agreed: /2/A record of the meeting is in Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, State Dept. 1961-63. a. That it would be desirable if at all possible, to send a team, including military as well as AID members to Vietnam within the next two weeks to review both the FY 1962 and FY 1963 programs in order to bring them into closer alignment with our counter insurgency effort. These programs contain a large element of conventional AID activities. Ideally, this team should have the power to make decisions in the b. There seemed to be general agreement that it would not be desirable to adopt the proposal put forth by Silver that the new USOM Director be a military officer who would be a Deputy to General Harkins. It seemed agreed the problem was one primarily of communication between the military and the USOM in Saigon and between the USOM and Washington. It was agreed that this problem could be better attacked in other ways including possibly meetings between Mr. Hamilton and the USOM Director in Honolulu on the order of the regular military meetings there. In the course of the discussion, I suggested that one approach to the problem of the FY 1962 program would be to provide funds for civic action in support of the sort of program that had been recommended by the U.S. military civic action team that went to Vietnam. It was pointed out that that team's proposals still awaited approval by the GVN. It was also indicated that once a program was established there would be no problem of getting AID funds to support it. A message to Saigon on civic action is presently being cleared./3/ It would propose that any civic action undertaken be in the form of "packages" involving little or no local effort. /3/See Document 66. It was pointed out that our more conventional view of civic action assumed a degree of community spirit and recognition of the social values of community effort which simply did not exist in a country like Vietnam. Vietnamese farmers, when pushed, can be forced to admit that an irrigation project to which they have been required to contribute labor provided them with identifiable benefits. However, their principal reaction to such projects will be to complain bitterly about the personal effort involved. They would like the work done by "American machines". The proposed telegram on civic action would, inter alia, propose the creation of travelling medical teams. Vietnamese doctors might be induced to undertake such duties through promising them scholarships for study abroad after completion of a two or three year tour of duty./4/ /4/At the end of this memorandum was written by hand the following: "Walt--I don't know whether you find this kind of informational report useful in your new role--I have tried to limit them to more important items."
[Attachment] Paper Prepared by Warren A. Silver of the Vietnam Task Force/5/ Washington, February 12, 1962. /5/Covering this report was a transmittal memorandum by Cottrell indicating that it would be discussed by the Vietnam Task Force on February 15. Attached were a list of projects then under way in Vietnam, a summary of the projects recommended by the Staley-Thuc Report (see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 93), and a list of the economic priorities contained in the Taylor report (ibid., Document 210). SUBJECT Recommendations: 1. The Taylor Mission priorities should be adopted for the projects in the FY 1963 economic program; 2. All FY 1962 projects in the CEP (Country Economic Program),/6/ both continuing and new, should be approved; /6/Not printed. 3. The CEP should be reviewed at once in Saigon by Task Force Saigon (including the MAAG) with the collaboration of an officer from AID and from DOD, and in consultation with the GVN, to bring the FY 1963 program into line with the Taylor Mission priorities; 4. Consideration should be given to whether or not, in FY 1963, the economic program in Viet-Nam thus revised and co-ordinated with the military effort, should be directed by a military officer who will be a deputy to the Chief, USMAC Viet-Nam. Discussion: 1. The Taylor report says that the economic program for Viet-Nam should: a. Expedite projects that are particularly useful in the short run; b. Continue successful long-range projects but defer new starts for the time being; and c. Review long-range projects for possible modification or termination. The Vietnamese Special Financial Group in July, 1961, said that Viet-Nam then had eighteen months to win its survival and in that period should concentrate on those activities designed to achieve it. This view is consonant with the recommendations of the Taylor report, and a similar view was expressed by President Diem to President Kennedy. The Country Economic Program (CEP) for FY 1963, which includes the program for FY 1962, states valid objectives (page 2): (1) successful counter-insurgency, (2) engage the loyalty of the people, (3) increase economic growth, (4) reach the less privileged groups. To achieve these objectives, however, the CEP proposes a program that does not use the Taylor priorities (page 37). The CEP says (page 29) that long-range (development) activities and short-range (impact) activities are usually inseparable because no really significant or complete benefits can be conferred in a short time. This point of view rejects the significance of results obtained say, during the period between now and the end of FY 1963 (e.g. mobile medical and evacuation teams, population regroupments) and those results obtained later. The CEP says, indeed, that long-range projects with no immediate benefits demonstrate to the people the value of their country and their government for the future. This approach offers a future promise to people in present need; it overlooks, as they do not, that they may not be here to enjoy the fruits of the promise. The CEP says, further, that insecurity does not make long-range activities more difficult than short-range activities; but this overlooks the main point that insecurity makes long-range activity less important than short-range activity. Perhaps if there were no lack of skilled people, technicians and administrators, both the long and short-range activities could be carried out; and the CEP says the existence of this lack is not critical. But the existence of this lack dictates a choice of projects to which to apply the human resources there are in Viet-Nam, and the Taylor priorities give a sound basis for choice. In this context of prompt effectiveness, the measure of "usefulness" under the first Taylor priority would be support of the war directly (e.g. medical, communications, transportation) or by speedy realization of economic and social benefits. 2. The FY 1962 program: It is too late to apply these priorities to the FY 1962 project program. (Note that the commodity portion of the aid program, which is the major part, is proceeding independently of the problems discussed in this paper.) The CEP indicates (page 39) that the program has not been worked over with the MAAG, nor (page 40) with the GVN. Washington does not have the information, the documents, or access to the people in Task Force Saigon and the GVN, that would permit review of the FY 1962 projects in time to bring them into line with the Taylor priorities, and there is not enough information presently in the CEP to support such a review. Nor should Saigon alone be asked to do the job in expectation of early results unaided. For FY 1962 it would be more productive to rely on the field and approve the continuing projects and new projects recommended by the field. This keeps the program going and starts new projects that, on their face, seem acceptable. 3. The FY 1963 program: Approval of the FY 1962 program then leaves the remaining few months of FY 1962 to work out the FY 1963 program on the basis of the Taylor priorities, and in full consultation with the American military and the GVN. When FY 1963 begins, continuing projects can proceed under the usual continuing authority, and any further new projects can be readied for the FY 1963 laws. This process should be started now. An AID officer and a DOD officer should go from Washington to take part in the process. They should go through the CEP FY 1963 projects with Task Force Saigon on the basis of the Taylor priorities, securing additional explanations where not now in the CEP, and taking part in the addition of projects, building up of existing projects or parts of projects, abatement or discontinuance of other projects, and the consultations with the GVN. They should bring back the FY 1963 program for approval, ready to start with FY 1963 itself. 4. Since the FY 1963 program would best be geared to a military operation, whereas the normal AID program is now geared, in substance and in administering, to long-range economic development, it would be inefficient to ask for a special administrative arrangement in AID for the war in Viet Nam. Present operating personnel in USAID would be continued in their work, but the program as a whole would be run by a military officer answering directly to the military commander who, in turn, answers for all operations in Viet Nam to the Ambassador. Additional personnel as required would come from civilian or military sources. The source of financing of the economic program would depend on the decision of the Administrator. Such treatment of the program would distinguish it before the Congress from those programs more capable of treatment under the prevailing legislation. [Continue with the next documents]
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