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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
64. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, February 16, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 8. GVN 1962, Information & Civic Action. Secret. Drafted by Heavner, initialed by Cottrell, and sent to Johnson through S/S and Harriman, who also initialed it. REFERENCE /2/Document 56. SUBJECT The following is in reply to your memo of February 11: 1. Military Civic Action. In October of last year a DOD civic action team completed a study of ARVN's civic action program. We have informally seen the team's report,/3/ but understand that DOD has not yet accepted their recommendations. In any event, neither State nor AID has received a civic action plan from DOD or any request for action. /3/Not found. Embassy Saigon, however, reports that MAAG is trying to get the plan worked out by the DOD team accepted by the GVN and that the Embassy is working with MAAG in the effort to get GVN acceptance. There is currently no indication of funding requirements for this plan. It was suggested to Saigon January 20 in a State message/4/ that a DOD-AID civic action team should visit Saigon this month, but Saigon indicated that it saw no value in another team until the GVN has accepted the plan worked out by the first team./5/ /4/See Document 30. /5/See Document 38. On February 13 the Department sent out a circular airgram on the need to develop military civic action./6/ Saigon was one of the addresses. It is expected that the post will respond with specific projects, for AID and MAP funding. If not, an AID-DOD team may be despatched to Saigon to develop a program. /6/Reference is to Aidto 189, February 12, which noted the President's interest in the implementation of civic action programs by indigenous military force and provided guidelines for such programs. (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/ TAP Files: FRC 68 A 1415, C.I.-Civic Action) 2. Civilian Civic Action. Much of the USOM program, particularly the rural impact programs envisaged in the January 4 joint GVN-US communiqué,/7/ are civic action type programs. Progress on some of these projects is being held up pending AID approval of the FY 62 USOM program. One of the delayed projects affects the Montagnards. The Task Force has pressed AID for fast action on the FY 62 program, to the point of loaning one of our officers to them for a week. We are actively studying means for putting USOM Saigon on a war footing. /7/See Document 4. The GVN has a Ministry of Civic Action which includes responsibility for Youth, Information, and the old department of civic action. The functions of the Ministry are varied and its cadres are involved in propaganda and political organization and control of the population as well as true rural improvement work which we might regard as civic action. Nevertheless, it has an on-going civic action program which probably could be strengthened, and we will ask the field to consider ways of accomplishing this. 3. Provincial Surveys. You also inquired about the failure of the provincial survey teams to include civilian and political elements. The chief reason for this failure is that President Diem agreed to the provincial surveys with the proviso that they not be concerned with political factors, but would confine themselves to the military and intelligence side. The teams have now completed the pilot phase of the provincial survey, a survey of three provinces (Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, and Binh Long). The Embassy member of the pilot team has submitted despatches covering the political situation in two of the provinces (Tay Ninh and Binh Long)./8/ While the political and civilian elements in the provincial situation will not be jointly covered, they will continue to be reported to us insofar as they can be observed by the Embassy member of the team. /8/Not further identified. The Task Force also regards the failure to cover political factors as a serious shortcoming in the provincial survey, but sees no better solution, given Diem's attitude. The Task Force believes the provincial surveys are useful even within their truncated terms of reference.
65. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Rowan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, February 16, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field: Far East (IAF), 1962. Confidential. This memorandum is part of a package that included a memorandum of February 19 from Rowan to Rusk, Johnson, and Manning in the Department of State, Bundy and Salinger at the White House, and Wilson in USIA, enclosing a draft telegram that was to be considered at the Honolulu Conference of February 19; and that was dispatched with indicated changes as telegram 1006 to Saigon (Document 75); the memorandum of February 15 from Rowan to Johnson (Document 62); and a chit of February 15 from Rowan to Murrow transmitting the latter, with a handwritten note by Murrow to Wilson indicating that he agreed with Rowan. Attached is a proposed State-Defense-USIA message to Embassy Saigon (responding to their 1013 of Feb. 6)/2/ in which detailed guide lines are spelled out for handling newsmen there covering the military strife. /2/Document 48. It is the view of this Bureau, of USIA, of Mr. Sylvester in Defense and of Mr. Cottrell of Task Force Viet-Nam that press problems in Saigon are of the greatest importance, and that detailed instructions for dealing with correspondents are urgently needed. Mr. Sylvester makes the point that our major problem arises from the fact that military leaders in Viet-Nam are straining to get out from under Embassy control and deal with the press as they see fit. Significantly, Governor Harriman has pointed to this same problem. Thus I raise the question of whether the instructions to military commanders in paragraph four of the proposed telegram are worded too diplomatically. Mr. Sylvester, Mr. Cottrell and Mr. Manning each has made independently the observation that the military operation in Viet-Nam is large enough, and the press problems and implications important enough, to deserve the full-time attention of a top-flight information man. I recommend that prompt attention be given to the proposal that we get a savvy individual who is skilled at dealing with newsmen and assign him to this job. This in itself would go far to show our desire to co-operate with newsmen. Such an individual should have the confidence of Washington to the extent that he would receive the same information given to Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins. He would maintain frequent contact with Washington so as to ascertain any policy shifts, or to be apprised of any informational or propaganda problems growing out of the Viet-Nam operation.
66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, February 16, 1962, 5:59 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2962. Secret. Drafted by Heavner, cleared with Wood and with B/FAC, FE, and AID, and approved by Cottrell. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 997. Reference: (A) Saigon 983 to Dept. (B) Aidto circ x 189./2/ Believe civilian civic action at least as important as military civic action in fight against Viet Cong. Present AID program for Viet-Nam has major element of civilian civic action, but Joint Communiqué/3/ as developed at TFSaigon initiative is clearest present statement of GVN objectives in civilian civic action field, i.e. impact activities by GVN to win prompt peasant support. Would like soonest, therefore, report from Task Force Saigon on status implementation Joint Communiqué together with TF's specific suggestions for further such activities, including especially activities by which civilian civic action can support military plans for cleaning out and securing provinces. /2/See Document 38; and footnote 6, Document 64. /3/See Document 4. Feeling here is that civilian civic action must give direct benefits to peasant population without demanding much effort or resources from them as they already soured and suspicious as result corvee-type civic action projects. Also believe it important carry out work wherever possible by means teams which will live in villages for some period of time. Assume Ministry Civic Action logical place to mount such a program, in cooperation with USOM. Believe you may wish consider ways strengthening Civic Action Ministry, including employment of US advisors within Ministry. Feeling here is that effective civic action cannot be combined, at least now, with intelligence or propaganda effort./4/ /4/This sentence was corrected by telegram 1003 to Saigon, February 19, to read: "Washington would not disapprove use propaganda early stages civic action provided it informational only." (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-1962) Understand Hieu is capable man who works well with Americans. Can he be approached directly for discussion civic action methods and suggestions how US aid could beef up civilian civic action? Understand Vietnamese Civic Action Teams have been operating on shoe string basis under General Cao with some success since August in area from Tay Ninh east to coast. Can they be supported? Also suggest future provincial survey teams may wish make particular effort study this problem. Discussion contained Ref B refers to use of local military forces engaged in civic action projects. Distinction should be made between military and civilian effort in civic action particularly in regard to funding. Ref B should provide CT with sufficient information to proceed in developing specific projects for FY1962-63 for military forces to implement an expanded program for civic action for Washington consideration. Re Ref A do not contemplate sending Joint State-AID-Defense civic action team to Saigon at this time. Team will be available to assist in program development at later time if CT determines such assistance useful. While we prepared accept your judgment that pilot civic action team not necessary now, team will be available in future to assist in FY1963 program development and implementation. Rusk
67. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, February 17, 1962. /1/ Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, Honolulu Meeting, July 23, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Silver. The source text lists four attachments: (1) Agenda items for the Honolulu Meeting (held on February 19); (2) the Hilsman paper "A Strategic Concept for South Viet-Nam" (Document 42); (3) A New York Times story of February 16 on a speech by Nolting; (4) a partial text of the Nolting speech, February 15. Only the first was found attached to the source text. SUBJECT A. The Agenda Attached are the Agenda items for the Honolulu meeting. As you know we are particularly interested in Item 5 "The Concept of Close-In Air Support", Item 8 "The Military Civic Action Program", and Item 9 "The Status of Provincial Surveys". The question of close-in air support is one which I discussed with the Air Force planners in the Pentagon Thursday morning,/2/ stressing repeatedly that they would make more enemies than friends unless they are very careful. Ben Wood also reminded them that the President had delimited the U.S. military role in Viet-Nam quite clearly in his last news conference,/3/ saying that U.S. troops were engaged in training and logistic support, that they are not engaged in what would generally be considered combat. If there were press stories to the effect that U.S. military are bombing and strafing Vietnamese villages, we would have serious political problems. I gather that General LeMay had talked to them on the same line, that they are willing to cooperate, but wanted a clear set of rules under which to operate. I suggest the following as a simple rule: U.S. planes should not attack ground targets in Viet-Nam unless 1) their assistance is requested by troops on the ground who are engaged, or are about to be engaged, with the Viet Cong, or 2) the targets to be attacked are specifically cleared by the Ambassador or his Deputy in the Embassy. The second provision would emphasize that the political implications of this war are at least as important as the military. I do not think that this would cause serious delay since they would still have a free hand to move in fast when there was an actual fight and I am sure that Ambassador Nolting could work out a system whereby permission or refusal could be given promptly. /2/February 15. No record of the meeting has been found. /3/See footnote 3, Document 68. As to Item 8, civic action, there has been a great deal of talk but not too many specific ideas. Herewith are three suggestions which you might wish to bring up: (1) that we support existing Vietnamese civic action teams which reportedly have been operating near Zone D since August under the direction of General Cao. We understand they are very short of supplies; (2) that the Vietnamese Government order its troops to automatically and promptly give rewards in rice, salt, or money to persons giving information on the Viet Cong (there is too much tendency to treat persons who give information as suspicious characters); (3) that in the present widespread state of the war in Viet-Nam it will probably be necessary to assign considerable number of American and possibly third country NCOs to work with the Vietnamese in organizing defense and civic action in the villages. This will be a difficult decision since good NCOs who could fit into the Vietnamese way of life are hard to find in large numbers and it will present the political problem of increasing American casualties. The Australians, Malayans, Filipinos, and even the Koreans and ChiNats might also be asked to supply some of their NCOs. The thinking behind this suggestion is set out most clearly in Hilsman's "A Strategic Concept for South Viet-Nam" which is attached. You might want to review this book on the way out since it is the best statement of how counterguerrilla actions should be conducted in Viet-Nem that I have seen. However, if you use these ideas I would not cite Hilsman or his book since the military are resentful of it. As to the status of the Provincial Surveys, Item 9, we understand that three provinces have now been surveyed (Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh and Binh Long). While the Embassy has submitted preliminary reports on Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces,/4/ we have not received the actual provincial surveys. /4/Not further identified. B. For Discussion with Ambassador Nolting 1. The Department intends to assign John Plakies (FSO-2) to Saigon as Economic Counselor. He has a thorough economic background and his French is very good. Messages about this assignment will reach Saigon soon. 2. The New York Times story on Ambassador Nolting's speech (attached) played it as a major policy statement and headlined the idea of reforms in the Government. However the article itself indicates that Nolting stressed the importance of supporting the GVN and of working with it to make it more effective rather than standing aside and criticizing. This is healthy advice for the Saigon intellectuals. We are hoping the text of the speech will be received on time to attach with this memorandum. 3. AID-State-Defense intend to send a three-man team to Saigon, arriving about Friday, February 23 and staying about a week. The team will work with Task Force Saigon (including the USMAG) on the FY 1962 and FY 1963 economic project programs to give priority to projects in support of the expanded counterinsurgency program. With the collaboration of Task Force Saigon the team will hold discussions with the U.S. technicians, military, and other personnel at all levels of the Task Force so as to get information not presently available here. Then the team will eliminate projects or parts or build them up in keeping with counterinsurgency requirements. The AID member of the team will have authority to approve some projects on the spot after such discussions. The job cannot be done in Washington without information, nor in Saigon without the background of Washington discussions. Saigon seems best because that is where the needed information and people are. (Cleared with AID-Mr. Janow.)
68. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, February 17, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files; Lot 66 D 307, 1.A-2 Briefing Papers, GVN, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Wood, Heavner, and Silver. SUBJECT /2/February 20. 1. Veil of Secrecy The President has said we have been as frank as we can be, consistent with the security needs of the situation. In his words, "We have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word"./3/ American military personnel are in Viet-Nam to help the Vietnamese with transport, communications, and various technical services. We are providing the logistic facilities and skills that they lack. But it is their war, and they are doing the fighting. We have not publicly gone into details on numbers and kinds of equipment because of military security and because of possible charges of violating the Geneva Accords. Although only five Americans have been killed by the Viet Cong since 1955 we recognize the dangers of this situation. Having helped Viet-Nam since it became independent we do not intend to withdraw our help when it is fighting to survive Communist guerilla attack. Further, the fall of South Viet-Nam would endanger the future of all Free Asian nations. (NB--We understand Senator Morse is particularly dubious about risking American lives in Viet-Nam.) /3/President Kennedy made this statement in response to questions asked at a February 14 news conference; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1101. 2. Geneva Accords The DRV has systematically violated the Accords almost from the day they were signed. Their present campaign against the GVN strikes at the basic raison d'etre of the Accords, which is the preservation of peace in SEA. While neither the Government of Viet-Nam nor the U.S. signed the Geneva Accords, we have respected them. At the time the Accords were concluded, the U.S. declared that while it would not use force or the threat of force to disturb the situation created by the Accords, it would "view any renewal of aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." The DRV attack on South Viet-Nam must be regarded as such a threat. Our increased military assistance to Viet-Nam is our response to this effort to conquer South Viet-Nam. In presenting our action to the world, we have stressed the DRV violations. We have publicly pledged that extraordinary American aid to Viet-Nam would be terminated when the Viet Cong cease their aggression. We have avoided specifics in describing our efforts in order not to accuse ourselves of violating the Accords. 3. Military Assistance Command The new U.S. military command set up in Viet-Nam February 8 was required because our effort there is no longer only advisory but now includes operational personnel such as helicopter and communications people. The old MAAG command structure did not meet the needs of this activity. The new command also recognizes the increased importance of our effort in Viet-Nam by assigning a higher-ranking man toward it. It does not mean that our people are to seek out and engage the enemy in combat situations. It is not a combat command. It does not mean that we are directing the war in Viet-Nam. This is not a joint command. The Vietnamese are running their own war. The head of our Mission in Viet-Nam is still a civilian, Ambassador Nolting. 4. American Casualties Five Americans have been killed and twelve wounded by the Viet-Cong since 1955. Fifteen of these seventeen casualties occurred before December 1961 when our increased military aid began. Three of the casualties were civilians, the rest were military. Table of U.S. Casualties and Accidental Deaths in Viet-Nam (since 1955) |
| Total | 39 (18 dead, 20 wounded, 1 missing) |
| Accidental deaths | 13 (all military) |
| Killed by Viet Cong | 5 (1 civilian, 4 military) |
| Accidentally wounded | 8 (2 civilian, 6 military) |
| Wounded by Viet Cong | 12 (2 civilian, 10 military) |
| Missing | 1 (military) |
|
5. Importance of Viet-Nam (a) The loss of Viet-Nam would convince many Asians now on the fence that Communism is indeed the wave of the future. We cannot afford to have American support devalued by the loss of a nation which is covered by the SEATO protocol and to which we are deeply committed in terms both of public statements of support and in terms of a large and long-standing aid program. (b) The loss of Viet-Nam would encourage the Bloc to use similar tactics of infiltration and subversion in other countries. Southeast Asia would be immediately threatened. (c) North Viet-Nam has been one of the most aggressive members of the Bloc. If it succeeds in conquering South Viet-Nam, it will solve what is perhaps its most pressing internal problem: food. Given its performance in Laos, it seems certain that any strengthening of the DRV will increase the dangers faced by free Asia. 6. The American Role The Vietnamese have the will to fight Communism. Total casualties on both sides of 3,000 per month, of which over half are Viet Cong, prove that the Communists are meeting strong opposition./4/ Even more illuminating is the fact that the clear majority of Vietnamese casualties does not belong to the Army but to the village defense units (Self-Defense Corps and Civil Guard). Our role is to give these people the technical and logistical assistance they cannot provide for themselves to enable them to win their own war. /4/During 1961 total casualties were: GVN--12,686; DRV--20,390. [Footnote in the source text.] The DRV can raise the ante. There are more than 350,000 men in their armed forces--many of them natives of South Viet-Nam as well as veterans of the long guerrilla war against the French. They can be infiltrated into Viet-Nam via Laos with little difficulty across the long and rugged border between the two countries. If the DRV chooses to take the risk, they can compel us to take further measures or lose Viet-Nam. We do not intend to lose Viet-Nam. 7. Why We Support Diem For thirty years Diem has recognized the Communist threat to Asia. He has done all he can to strengthen his country against it. He is a determined and courageous man. He has been right in emphasizing the importance of defense, education, communication and rural welfare. If Viet-Nam is not a democracy, neither is any other underdeveloped country. These countries must develop politically as well as economically. Viet-Nam has no democratic tradition. It is divided and at war. Yet Diem has held elections. Opposition candidates were given equal time on the radio. They were critical. They are not in jail. President Diem recently followed his Cabinet's recommendation that an unpopular bill proposed by his sister-in-law be returned to the National Assembly. Diem's strong leadership has been needed to prevent factionalism which is endemic in Vietnamese politics. He has been reluctant to delegate authority, but has recently agreed to our suggestions that he set up a National Internal Security Council (War Cabinet) which meets twice a week and that military chain of command and intelligence operations be reorganized. American advisers are playing a larger role. We support the Government of Viet-Nam and Diem as the head of that Government. The future is up to the Vietnamese. We do not intend to interfere. Since the war in Viet-Nam cannot be won without the closest cooperation between our two Governments, public American criticism of Diem only succeeds in hurting our own efforts in Viet-Nam. 8. Our Economic Aid Program The economic assistance program in Viet-Nam was developed (1) to provide those commodities the GVN cannot afford out of its own resources, but which are necessary--even on an austere basis in which consumer goods are minimized--to keep the economy primed and pumping; and (2) to provide projects for the development of Viet-Nam into a democratic self-sustaining economy. Right now, however, we are in the midst of a very urgent revamping to assure priority to projects in full support of the expanded counterinsurgency program. We want to speed up projects that are particularly useful in the short run because they support the war effort directly or by producing important social and economic benefits in a hurry. While we want to continue successful, long-range development projects, we are going to defer new starts for the time being, and we are reviewing other long-range development projects to modify them or terminate them. We especially want to work out civilian (and military) projects that will have the swiftest impact in winning the peasants to the government, i.e. civilian and military civic action progress.
69. Letter From Wesley R. Fishel of the Michigan State University Group in Vietnam to President John A. Hannah of Michigan State University/1/ Rangoon, February 17, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Personal and Confidential. A date stamp on the source text indicates that President Hannah received it on February 23. Hanna forwarded it under a covering letter to President Kennedy on February 26, noting that the contract with the MSU Group had been terminated by President Diem and expressing misgivings about ever having gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. Also attached to the source text was a copy of a letter from McGeorge Bundy to President Hannah of March 26 resuming the original, thanking him on President Kennedy's behalf, and informing him that copies of the Fishel letter had been distributed to members of the President's staff concerned with Vietnam. Dear President Hannah: I have recently left Saigon after spending four weeks there, and given the developments there during that time it occurred to me that you might be interested in my personal report on the situation which prevails there. Since I left Saigon I have had no word from the MSU people there, and can only assume that the President has not reversed his decision to terminate the University's contract program in Vietnam. (If he has, of course, you will read the following remarks with a different perspective than otherwise.) As you can easily imagine, the interview at which the President informed me that he had decided against renewing the MSU contract was a difficult one./2/ He was obviously ill at ease and made it plain that he hoped the program termination would not affect our personal relationship. At the same time it was clear that he held me at least partially responsible for the fact that MSU people had published what he called "untrue, unfair, and tendentious" criticisms of his government. He tried to depersonalize his decision by telling me that the members of his Cabinet had recommended against our continuation. But since I had already learned that he had consulted only two advisers: his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and the Secretary of State at the Presidency, Nguyen Dinh Thuan, I called him on this, whereupon he repeated earlier accusations that MSU personnel had been "disloyal." Both the President and his brother individually voiced implicit accusations in talking with me, to the effect that our professors had used their "privileged position", which gave them access to government offices, personnel, and files, to engage in intelligence activities in the guise of "research"; and had then used the information they had secured to the detriment of the Vietnamese Government. /2/The interview between Diem and Fishel took place on January 24. An account of it is in a memorandum of January 25 from Guy Fox of the MSU Group to James Hendry, Assistant Dean of the College of Business and Public Service. (Michigan State University, Hannah Papers, H, Vietnam, 1962) I tried to reason with Diem on this, though I recognized from his manner that argument was probably futile. The voice was that of the President, but the reasoning was that of his brother, Nhu. I am sorry to say that Mr. Nhu apparently actually believes his own arguments and persuaded Diem of them. It is also a fact, however, that other members of the government, headed by the Vice President, while sharply critical of the publications in question, were fully convinced of the value of MSU's work and wanted very much for our group to continue its programs. As much as I regret the termination at this time, when all of us should be making a maximum effort to keep the Vietnamese Government afloat, I am relieved that the issue was resolved enough in advance of the termination date to permit an orderly phasing out. And given also the situation which I shall outline in the following paragraphs, it is probably just as well that our work is being brought to a close, at least for the present time. For the first time in seven and one-half years I have become a pessimist about the fate of South Vietnam. In the two and one-half years since my last visit to that country there has been a most profound and distressing deterioration there, politically, socially, and psychologically. Economically, though some progress is still being made, the gains of the past few years are in many cases being reversed, by a combination of factors of which the major ones have been very serious floods along the Mekong last fall, and sharply intensified Viet Cong activity. As you may know, Vietnam is not exporting rice this year; it will in fact import some. Again, there has been just enough interference in normal business and investment activity on the part of the government-supporting political party of Mr. Nhu to have a monkey-wrench kind of effect on economic operations. Militarily, the recent influx of thousands of American officers and men, and dozens of helicopters, etc., is starting to make a distinct change in the situation already, turning what was a minus into a plus. I would hesitate to predict, however, that the plus will remain that for long, for I find it hard to believe that the Chinese and Viet Cong will allow this challenge to go unmet. Indeed, my travels to the high plateau, the center, and the Mekong delta last month have left me with the impression that a Viet Cong offensive is very likely in the next few weeks. By that I don't mean a major invasion out of the north, but rather a heavily intensified terrorization program that may spread even to the cities, with the intent of panicking the population and weakening the Diem government's hold still more. Politically and psychologically things are at a low ebb. The commendable programs which were begun a few years ago have been allowed in many instances to lose their momentum by reason largely of a failure on the part of the Central Government to follow through on initial decisions and acts. The hopes and aspirations of 1954 and 1955 have been allowed to die, and a miasma of apathy pervades the atmosphere. I talked more than casually with 118 people during my four weeks in Vietnam. Almost all are people I have known for many years. None of them is politically part of the "opposition." At least two thirds of them were still Diem's strong adherents in 1959. Yet today, only three or four of these men and women support the government with discernible enthusiasm. Then too, there is much popular fear: fear that "the Viet Cong are coming," and that the government is not going to be able to move to meet the Communist threat swiftly enough to save many people from being hurt or killed. Of course, this is the kind of fear which is surreptitiously encouraged by Communist agents, of whom there are many in Saigon. Diem himself is linked more and more often with those around him--the "evil influences," as some call them. After all, he is the Chief of State and must take responsibility for the acts of his entourage, whether he knows of them or not: if he knows of them, he is at fault because they are "evil"; if he doesn't know of them, he should by now. No one yet accuses him of wrongdoing, and in fact he could recoup his former stature and support easily with just a minimum of effort. But he does not see the necessity or desirability of such steps, and no one who does has the courage to tell him. This applies even to those few still with him who are basically courageous, men of integrity and ability who despise the craven flatterers who surround him and insulate him from the realities of his situation. They are reluctant to tell him unpleasant truths because he may dismiss them, and they know that in that case "the evil ones" would put their own men into the vacancies and then even this tiny opening to the outside would be closed off. Who are these "evil influences?" As always, Diem's brother, Nhu, heads the list, but shares his position with his wife. Nhu's policies have formed the philosophical basis of the regime's activity for the past six years, and they have failed miserably to win the people to the side of the government. But he doesn't realize this, and one cannot convince him (or Diem) of this. His wife is as brilliant, vivacious, bitchy, and brutal in her Borgia-like fashion as ever--and with (charitably) the purest of intentions she is succeeding in alienating substantial segments of the population from her brother-in-law's regime at a time when it needs the enthusiastic support of everyone. She is the sponsor, for example, of an asinine bill that passed the National Assembly by a questionably secured majority: the "Social Purification Law." This silly legislation, rammed through the Assembly in the name of "austerity" and "mobilizing the population", prohibits dancing or the teaching of dancing, even in private homes, bans dissemination of birth control information, devices, or medications, and would regulate all sorts of other activities and practices including public displays of affection, certain kinds of dress, etc./3/ Coming from a Catholic it is interpreted to mean that Catholic dogma is being forced on the people, which means that it is creating inter-religious frictions where few have existed previously. Then there is the Secretary of State at the Presidency, Nguyen Dinh Thuan, a shifty, ambitious, clever, and unscrupulous-but able-administrator, who has his eye on even higher position, and some American friends who think he would be easier to handle than Diem. Much as I do not wish to see the influence of the Nhus continue, the elevation of Thuan is not to me the answer either. For this man is as well hated as the Nhus (who put him into his job, incidentally) and a likely candidate for assassination, either by the Communists or by many others who detest him as a man who has tasted power and likes it too well, and who climbed to his present position on the backs of those who were his friends and benefactors. /3/In the margin next to this sentence is written in an unidentifiable hand: "Diem has returned this bill to the assembly for reworking." The US role in all this is, as ever, of mixed quality. The determined military effort we are now making is likely to help a good deal; our economic measures will also help. But these steps are helping only to warm the fingers and the toes; the body itself needs badly to be warmed too if it is to be kept alive. Unless Vietnam experiences a major and favorable psychological shock within the next few months, I doubt seriously whether it will survive, notwithstanding our efforts and our money and our men. The bright spots which were so clearly visible two and even one year ago are now fading into insignificance because the regime still has failed to mobilize the hearts and loyalties of the people. This is ironical, for this is a regime which has based its system of appointment to office on "loyalty." And ironical too is the fact that this regime, which has a philosophical base (synthetic and unloved) of "personalism," which teaches that every man has the right to the fullest development of his personality, has failed miserably to enable men to do just that. (I am not speaking of civil liberties here--they are still a side issue, by and large--I speak of the freedom of men to rise in their chosen professions to positions of responsibility, to improve their status by their own efforts, by demonstrating their capacities and their talents.) I think here of all the young men I have known and worked with in Vietnam (including Nguyen Thai, who is once more back at MSU, and Vu Van Thai, who reportedly is now at Harvard), who have the qualities of leadership which Vietnam will need in the years ahead, but who have been alienated and their development stifled and smothered by the heavy hand of their government. (But I must clarify one point here: the Vietnamese Government is not malicious or predatory or vicious or particularly oppressive, especially if it is compared with the regimes of neighboring countries. Rather it is a clumsy and bumbling government which has failed to take advantage of one opportunity after another, and which has not dared to take the risks involved in implementing its avowed ideas, and which has not carried successful programs to their successful conclusion.) Perhaps my rhetoric has left you with the impression that I have written my friend off. I have not. However, I am firmly of the opinion that unless what I have termed the "evil influences" are removed from the scene in one way or another, Ngo Dinh Diem's government is not going to make the grade. Support for the government is dwindling, and one finds evidences of a growing feeling of desperation among the able and hitherto loyal men and women who have supported it. Unless the situation can be changed for the better, we are in for a very bad period in Vietnam. Sincerely yours,
70. Memorandum From the Chief Adviser, Michigan State University Group in Vietnam (Fox), to James B. Hendry of Michigan State University/1/ Saigon, February 19, 1962. /1/Source: Michigan State University, Hannah Papers, H, Viet. fr., 1962. None of the attachments is included with the source text. SUBJECT This is to review the events of the past few days. We are now notified officially and definitely there will not be a renewal of MSU's contract with GVN. Meetings between the President and Secretary Thuan with Dean Seelye and myself have made it clear that GVN does not want MSU to continue here. Dean Seelye himself intended to write both you and President Hannah this morning but he was called suddenly and unexpectedly to see President Diem. It was necessary for Dean Seelye to go directly from the interview to the airport. Therefore, he has requested me to report on developments here and to send a copy of my memorandum to President Hannah. On Thursday, February 15, Dean Seelye and I met with Secretary of State at the Presidency Nguyen Dinh Thuan. The attached memorandum for the record/2/ gives an account of that meeting. Though Thuan was cordial he made it clear that the President considered the articles by Taylor and Child/3/ to be so harmful and such a breach of ethics that he believes it inadvisable for MSU to continue here. Thuan said the President realizes MSU cannot exercise control over project returnees and therefore believes it better that the government directly hire advisors who can be prevented from writing "irresponsibly" and "unfairly" on political matters. /2/A record of this meeting by Fox, February 16, is ibid. /3/Presumably a reference to Milton C. Taylor and Adrian Jaffe, "Crumbling Bastion," New Republic, 644:17-20, June 14, 1961; and Frank C. Child, "Vietnam," ibid., 645:14-16, December 4, 1961. President Diem, who was quite friendly during the meeting this morning, revoiced much of what Thuan had said. The President said he was grateful for the assistance and achievements of MSU and praised the good work of the overwhelming majority of our personnel. But he said he was deeply hurt and shocked by articles written by MSUG professors after their return to the United States. The Child and Taylor articles--especially that of Child--urged the forceful overthrow of the government, he said. If Child and Taylor had written the articles while they were in Vietnam the President said they would have been tried before a tribunal for fomenting an insurrection. Diem did not appear bitter, but, rather, shocked and disappointed that "those in whom he had placed confidence and trust" had fumed against him. The President expressed the view that the interest of the government would be served best by having foreign advisors hired by the NIA. This arrangement, he believed, would insure control by the government over the advisors' publications. Of course, Dean Seelye outlined the University's position, with which you are familiar. He said in effect that whereas he did not agree with much of the material from the Taylor-Child articles the University must recognize the right of returnees to write freely so long as they do not disclose genuinely secret information--he believed GVN would have to weigh the total good of our efforts against the relatively small number of objectionable articles. The President became sentimental toward the end of the meeting, reviewing the years of warm, harmonious relations with MSUG, again expressing his appreciation for our work here and asking Dean Seelye to convey his best wishes to President Hannah. There is one other development of which I should apprise you: On February 15 just before our meeting with Thuan, Malcolm Browne, of the Associated Press, called for an interview with Dean Seelye. He said he had heard the MSU contract was not to be renewed because of the writings of our returnees. We haven't the least idea where he received the information, but the news now seems to be all over Saigon. Because he was tied up with various meetings--including one with American Ambassador Nolting-Dean Seelye delayed having a meeting with Browne until the next day. In the meanwhile he took up with Nolting the question of dealing with the press. Nolting said he supposed there was little we could do but tell the truth that the Government of Vietnam did not want a contract because of objectionable articles by former MSUG members. Nolting seemed quite concerned that the President might make a big issue of the government's position vis-à-vis MSU. On the sixteenth Dean Seelye met with Browne. Browne said he thought he had a real story here because fundamental principles of freedom of press were involved. He recounted his own difficulties with Vietnamese censorship, which has prevented him, he said, from telling the American people of the actual conditions here. At one point during the interview both Dean Seelye and I emphasized was that GVN has never on any occasion asked MSU to muzzle returning scholars nor indicated it would want a contract renewal in the event we agreed to throttle returnees. The government, he said, simply objected to the writings of our former members and as a result did not believe it advisable to have us continue beyond the expiration of the present contract. Browne asked if we believed the government would have agreed to a renewal if we had agreed to curb freedom of expression of returnees. We said quite candidly we did not know, because the matter had never arisen. The government had never made such a request and we certainly have not and would not make such an offer. I mention this point specifically because in Browne's release he has said that Seelye said "the government had asked his university to order returning MSU professors not to write articles criticizing the national administration."/4/ There are other inaccuracies in the release. For example, Browne says that Seelye, who has always been on cordial terms with the President, has been unable to confer with the President this time. As I have already mentioned, Dean Seelye did meet with the President. In another place Browne said that Seelye would return to the United States "without the contract renewal he had sought." As a matter of fact we told Browne that Seelye was here to present the conditions under which the University would accept a new contract and to precipitate a decision from GVN. I am sending you a copy of Browne's release, which contains several other minor misrepresentations. /4/Malcolm Browne's despatch, February 17, appeared in the Washington Post, February 13. 1962. Dean Seelye left today at 2:30. While in Saigon he talked not only with Diem and Thuan but with various other governmental officials, such as the Secretary of State for National Economy, Thanh; Dean Thuc, Director of the Law School; and the President of the Bank of Vietnam. He also had discussions with officials and faculty at the NIA and saw a number of persons in private business such as the President of the Bank of China, President of the Chamber of Commerce. At USOM several times with Gardiner; Knox and Rome of PAD; Fippin, the Deputy Director. At the American Embassy he met with the Ambassador, with Bogardus of the Economic Section, and others./5/ /5/ No records of meetings with anyone except Thuan and Diem have been found. I believe his visit was interesting and profitable in the sense that he precipitated a decision from GVN.
71. Editorial Note On February 19, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Admiral Felt, Ambassador Nolting, General Harkins, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman, and numerous other officials met at CINCPAC Headquarters in Honolulu for the third Secretary of Defense's Conference. A full record of the meeting is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 5159, SGN (62) 19GVN-DEFSEC-CINCPAC. For a summary record, see Document 77. Regarding the second Honolulu Conference, January 15, see Document 22.
72. Editorial Note On February 19, 1962, President Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum 132, a four-paragraph memorandum on the support of local police forces for internal security and counterinsurgency purposes. For text of this memorandum, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pages 455-456.
73. Memorandum From the Naval Aide of the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, February 19, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Confidential. As a follow-up to the recent poor press in Saigon and the moratorium on U.S. newsmen riding in U.S. aircraft,/2/ State approached the President Saturday, 17 February, to pin down a future policy. /2/See Document 48. The State proposal gives Ambassador Nolting authority to decide on press participation in U.S. air operations on a case-by-case basis. He will be governed by the policy to emphasize the U.S. support function and the SVN primacy in winning the war. Military and other advice will be rendered through the Country Team. The State position was developed with the positive interest of Secretary Ball and Secretary Johnson, but was not concurred in by Governor Harriman./3/ It was presented to the President by Mr. Rowan. /3/See footnote 1, Document 59. The President agreed, though apparently grudgingly. It was decided that the approved directive, cleared by Defense, would be discussed in Honolulu with Ambassador Nolting by Secretary McNamara and Governor Harriman. If the Ambassador concurs, the more liberal policy would be confirmed by subsequent State telegram./4/ /4/Document 75. W.H.B.
74. Memorandum From the Naval Aide of the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, February 23, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Secret. Drafted by Bagley. SUBJECT 1. Items of interest developed at the Task Force Meeting of 21 February are indicated below. a. The organization of the State-Defense-AID economic group to proceed to Saigon for review of FY-62 and FY-63 economic aid programs, decided upon at the 15 February meeting,/2/ was discussed. The project is bogged down by AID delay in naming a representative chartered to make on-the-spot decisions; AID has asked Saigon USOM director Gardiner for his views on the trip, which will result in additional delay and possible haggling on whether the trip is needed at all. The reason for the trip is basic--to modify the AID programs so that project characteristics are compatible with the C.I. strategy and will support it in proper order of priority. /2/See footnote 2, Document 63. b. Defense indicated dissatisfaction with the progress and results of the provincial surveys. The military and intelligence objectives now being undertaken are not being met because team membership is too small and not enough time is devoted to each province. For example, there is need of data on numbers and location of CG and SDC. Defense feels there should be economic representation so that later civic action in the province pacification strategy can be properly planned. There should be more teams and a priority approach to parallel the 10 provinces selected for military pacification; the whole project should be speeded up. At Honolulu, Ambassador Nolting was moderately receptive to these criticisms; he was reluctant to push Diem. Governor Harriman indicated State support for any needs the Ambassador indicated. In the Task Force, Cottrell said the Honolulu discussion seemed to focus on the shortcomings and he would assume Ambassador Nolting will get with it; further, he asked the economic group to look into the matter when in Saigon. [This response was not very strong to say the least; I talked to Admiral Heinz and suggested he buck this to the Special Group (C.I.) next week through Secretary Gilpatric.]/3/ /3/At the March 1 Special Group (CI) meeting, it was agreed that the Group would investigate the question of "whether economic programs are being pushed as vigorously as others" and urged that "economic personnel should be included in survey groups for key provinces " (Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (C.I.) 1/1/62-7/31/62) Brackets in this and following paragraphs are in the source text. c. The recent RDF intelligence indicating a VC radio station inside the Cambodian border (about 10 miles) was discussed. . . . [The Honolulu meeting discussed the question of improving DF capability and accuracy in detail; the VC are now using a onetime tape that will be unbreakable so there is a need for pinpoint locating information to destroy rather than monitor military communication facilities.] d. State asked Defense for suggestions to soften the impact of 900 MAAG personnel scheduled to arrive in SVN in March. [The heavy input is due in part to the Bragg schooling; the first course completes in late March.] e. The proposed arrangement to handle the U.S. news representatives in SVN was agreed in Honolulu (the Ambassador will make final decision on newsmen going on U.S. helos and aircraft with Country Team advice; in any case where General Harkins says they are not to go, they won't). W.H.B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. [Continue with the next documents]
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