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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
III. Attack on the Presidential Palace
87. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 27, 1962, 7:35 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-2662. Secret; Flash; Critic. Also sent to the Director of NSA. Received at 8 p.m., February 26. 262335Z. Between 2 or 3 aircraft attacked Presidential Palace at 0715 local. Guards responded with anti-aircraft fire by 0730 local. Extent of damage unknown.
88. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, February 27, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-2762. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Paris, London, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, CINCPAC for Polad, Manila, Geneva for FECON, Hue, Ottawa, Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, Moscow, Singapore, Djakarta, Tokyo, Seoul, Hong Kong, Taipei and Rangoon. Received at 4:10 p.m. 1109. Embtel 1099./2/ /2/Received in the Department of State at 6:51 a.m., February 27, it provided essentially the same information, in sketchier form, as telegram 1109. (Ibid.) 1. As of late afternoon Feb. 27 calm continued prevail in Saigon, and morning's attack on Presidential palace appears have been unsuccessful attempt assassinate Diem and Nhus rather than element in coup d'etat. 2. Except for two aircraft involved in attack, GVN military establishment remained loyal to President and government. All services including air force, responded with alacrity and efficiency to attack. Before 35-minute assault had ended, armor and supporting units had arrived at palace, air force had pursuing AD-6's in air, and navy putting up heavy anti-aircraft barrage. 3. One attacking aircraft apparently forced down by ground fire and pilot captured. Second plane crash landed Phnom Penh. 4. President told Ambassador only palace casualty was injured maid. Small number troops on or around palace grounds were wounded. Madame Nhu also suffered slight wound on arm. No American casualties, though one American died as result fall through roof of building while watching attack. 5. Ambassador and members diplomatic corps saw President at end of morning. He said not discouraged and determined continue his fight for country. 6. Service of Thanksgiving in Saigon cathedral in afternoon was crowded. 7. No incidents reported in provinces, and government appears have situation firmly in control. Nolting
89. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, February 27, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, New Command Arrangements, 1962. Top Secret; Official-Informal. The source text was part of a package that included the original transmittal letter from McConaughy, October 20, 1961, and a copy of the contingency plan. In the margin is a handwritten note from Nolting to the DCM which reads: "(See Cont. Plan, if you have not done so already)". Dear Fritz: In the light of today's attack on the palace I have reviewed Walter McConaughy's letter to you of October 20, 1961 and the "Suggested Contingency Plan"/2/ of the same date which was enclosed with that letter. /2/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document181. It seems to me that the "Suggested Contingency Plan" is still valid. I regret that we did not have time to discuss it during your hurried visit to Washington. If you have any comments to make on it in view of the present situation I would be glad to read them. Knowing that you are very busy I will assume that if I do not hear from you this plan remains satisfactory to you. We are very pleased with your handling of and reporting on today's attack on the palace. With best personal regards, Yours very sincerely, Averell
90. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 27, 1962, 3:04 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/2-2762. Confidential. Drafted by Grant and Horgan. Approved in S on March 6. A note at the top of the first page indicates that this is the first of two parts. Part II is not attached to the source text, but another account of the meeting transmitted to McGeorge Bundy in the White House under a memorandum of February 28 for the President's perusal prior to his 11:30 meeting with Nehru contains a second section on Kashmir. (Ibid.) The text of the section on Vietnam is identical with that printed here except for the final sentence, which is missing in the version transmitted to the White House. The attachment is also missing from the White House version. No record of the President's meeting with Nehru has been found. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Nehru made what was essentially a courtesy call on the Secretary immediately prior to his return to India for a fortnight's consultation. After the usual pleasantries, the Secretary raised the subject of Vietnam. The Secretary reviewed briefly the United States position regarding Vietnam, emphasizing that the US did not wish the trouble in Vietnam to become a serious war. He said that if the ICC can find a way of stopping penetrations from the North, the US would work diligently to bring the situation back in line with the Geneva Accords. We recognize the problem posed to the ICC by our overt assistance to South Vietnam, but we cannot fail to take account of the reality of the covert violations of the Geneva Accords by the other side. The Ambassador indicated that both in New Delhi and in Vietnam itself the Indians had some difficulties because of the extreme visibility of our assistance. The Ambassador, however, repudiated the Secretary's suggestion that perhaps the Indian Chairman of the ICC would prefer to dose his eyes to violations on both sides. The Secretary then explored the Indian position with regard to the ICC's responsibilities toward investigating subversion. The Ambassador indicated his belief that India held the view that subversion as such was not the concern of the ICC; it became a matter for the ICC only when it could be shown that it came from the outside. The Ambassador asked whether there was anything specific the United States wished India to do in Vietnam. He would be glad to convey these desires to New Delhi. The Secretary said what we wished was for the ICC to get at the violations coming from the North if it can do so. Mr. Grant added it was our hope the ICC would not make charges against the GVN right now, at least until it answered complaints that have been made against the North. The Secretary wondered whether our side had been getting to the ICC all the information we can on these complaints. It was left for Mr. Grant to inform himself on this matter and to have specific information for the Ambassador regarding the type of ICC action the US felt should be taken now. (Mr. Grant talked further to the Ambassador on this subject the following day and left with him the attached paper.)
[Attachment] For an extended period of time the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has been providing the ICC with evidence that the North Vietnamese regime has been violating the Geneva Accord. Thus on October 24, 1961 the Government of the Republic of Vietnam made an elaborate presentation to the ICC of the data available at that time of North Vietnamese-directed subversion in South Vietnam. The presentation was accompanied by the request that the ICC investigate. Additional evidence was submitted on November 16, 1961, December 29, 1961 and, most recently, on January 27, 1962. Much of this information was used in the preparation of the "White Paper" prepared by the United States Government entitled "A Threat to the Peace"./2/ /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 315. By its letter of December 9, 1961, to the ICC,/3/ the Government of the Republic of Vietnam notified the ICC that it has requested extraordinary aid from the United States for as long as the North Vietnamese regime pursued its aggression. The United States considers the position of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam stated in that letter to be consonant with international law: non-observance of a treaty obligation by one party to that treaty justifies comparable non-observance by the other party until the first party is prepared to observe its obligations. /3/Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1056. The ICC has not yet taken definitive action on these complaints of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. This is despite the fact that on June 24, 1961 the ICC decided that it has the competence and the duty to investigate complaints under Articles 10,19, 24 and 27 of activities fomented by one party against the other in violation of the Geneva Accord. We recognize India's very difficult role as Chairman of an organization whose members have widely differing views and which has the responsibility of attempting to enforce a cease fire under most difficult circumstances. The actions of the North Vietnam regime are convert actions taken by a closed society. Counter-actions of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the support by the United States provided on request are those of open societies acting overtly. The United States hopes that before any citing of the Government of Vietnam the ICC would act on the complaints made by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam over the last two years of subversion by North Vietnam. If the ICC does cite the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for violating the Geneva Accord, we would expect the ICC at the very least to cite at the same time the North Vietnam regime, since it is the actions of North Vietnam which give rise to the counter-actions of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.
91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 1, 1962, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-162. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, New Delhi, London, Vientiane, Bangkok, Singapore, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, Paris, and Geneva. 1117. Department's 974./2/ In view reaction Canadians and Indians in Ottawa and Delhi and Canadians in Saigon to reftel argumentation we believe it inadvisable send note to ICC along lines proposed reftel. First, it is clear that ICC will not accept legal argumentation breach one party of Geneva Accords is justification breach by other party. Second, note proposed reftel would convict US officially out of our own mouths of violation Geneva Accords and put US at mercy Indian chairman. Third, Hooten has pointed out proposed reply would bring to head question of whether GVN Dec 9 letter/3/ was denunciation Articles 16 and 17, whereas Canadians and apparently Indians have been trying precisely to avoid that because it puts in question future existence ICC itself. For that reason ICC in reply GVN Dec 9 letter sent innocuous response (our A-208/4/) which Canadians and Indians hoped would not lead to any further reference by US and GVN to Dec 9 letter. /2/Document 55. /3/See footnote 3, Document 90. /4/Not printed. GVN has in meantime sent holding letter essentially along lines of draft prepared by Canadians in response ICC'S letter Jan 6 and follow-up of Feb 3./5/ We do not know how long holding letter can keep ICC satisfied but at least appears allow some breathing space for further consideration of US-GVN approach to Geneva Accords problem./6/ /5/Neither found. /6/In telegram 2340 from New Delhi, March 9, Ambassador Galbraith agreed with the argument presented in this telegram that a proposed note to the ICC would be unwise. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-962) Nolting
92. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 1, 1962, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and passed to the Department of Defense. 1118. Have just been informed of following GVN request, on which urgent reply requested: 1. In view grounding GVN Air Force fighter bombers AD-6 pending investigation incident Feb 27 (bombing of palace) GVN has officially requested through Deputy Chief of Staff Khanh that Farmgate aircraft, with combined US-GVN crew, be used on combat training operations in close support of ARVN operations planned to begin March 1 and continuing several days. General Harkins, Mr. Bundy/2/ and I believe it highly important that momentum of ARVN operations be continued despite setback of bombing incident and that Farmgate air support is justified and necessary under present circumstances. Since this operation does not fall closely within existing instructions, request immediate consideration and advice. Upon receipt Washington clearance, we would make clear to GVN that this is temporary measure pending completion investigation GVN Air Force and resumption usual procedures./3/ /2/William Bundy was in Vietnam for consultations. /3/Telegram 1118 was received at 4:54 a.m. in Washington. At 7:31 p.m. the Department of State approved the South Vietnamese request. (Telegram 1046 to Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-162) Nolting
93. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Saigon, March 1, 1962 /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 361.1, Chief Executive-Vietnam. Secret. Typed on MAAG stationery, suggesting that Eggleston was the drafter. SUBJECT ATTENDANCE After a warm exchange of greetings, the President told his guests of some of the incidents surrounding the bombing of Independence Palace on 27 February 1962. He said that throughout the attack, he had the impression that the explosions were taking place some 20 kilometers away. He described this as a curious phenomenon since, normally, his hearing is very acute--the presence of another person in his room--the striking of a match, usually being enough to awaken him. He cited several examples wherein he had called General Ty or Colonel Mao (who is charged with the security of Saigon) to ask the reason for distant artillery fire or the explosion of a grenade within the city. In many instances, neither of them had heard the noise. In response to a comment by Ambassador Nolting concerning the excellent maps which the President had had in his Independence Palace office, the President replied that they were now present in his room. A bomb had struck the verandah near his office, but had not exploded. If it had, the stairs leading to the bomb shelter would have been demolished and the President would not have been able to find refuge. The Nhu family had also been particularly fortunate in that a bomb which carried away a large section of the palace next to their apartment, had hit the side away from the staircase--thus permitting them to escape to the shelter. The children had already come down to play in the garden and were amongst the first to reach the shelter. The last to arrive was Madame Nhu, who took the time to dress. She was slightly injured on the face by flying glass, and, in womanly fashion, was worried about being scarred. The President's brother, the Archbishop of Hue, who was visiting the President after attending a meeting at the Vatican, went through the entire attack in a small chapel in the new wing of the palace and emerged uninjured. The President expressed the thought that his brother might have been killed if he had attempted to move, since the surrounding area was riddled, and the blast had been violent enough to hurl a heavy brass incense burner the length of the corridor. He added that the Archbishop was the one who had caused the least trouble. The President next told of his visit to the Bien Hoa Airfield (on 28 February) during which he personally questioned the Base Commander, the Fighter-Group Commander and other responsible officers. The Base Commander, whom the President referred to as a "bureaucrat" claimed that his job was to provide security and to feed and perform other housekeeping duties for the men assigned there, and that he had no function of command, including the control of bombs and other armament. The President agreed that he was correct--in accordance with his terms of reference--but that his attitude was somewhat exaggerated and that he should have been aware of events taking place around him. The President then had a frank discussion with the commander of the Fighter-Group and a few of his officers. All expressed their grief over the incident which had dishonored them but disclaimed any knowledge of disaffection, subversive propaganda or other suspicious activities. They admitted that there had been some griping about the lack of conveniences, particularly by those who had spent some time in foreign countries, such as France and the United States and had seen the favored position held by the Air Forces of those countries. There had been complaints about the dangers involved in their operations, the hardship of being assigned away from their families in such areas as Pleiku and Danang, and the overwork produced by the fact that there were too few pilots and planes to meet all operational requirements. Ground crew personnel were particularly unhappy over the fact that, as in most other countries, they could not advance beyond the rank of Master Sergeant. Some pilots who had undergone intensive training were only too happy to receive desk jobs and to fly only the minimum number of hours required to maintain their flying status. One officer told the President that he (the President) was considered to be a "regular fellow" by the real pilots, because he put in almost as many hours in the air as they did. Only the best pilots were assigned to fly him because, unlike the scheduled airline pilots with their regular routes and replacement personnel, his pilots were asked to follow irregular, hazardous routes for long hours without relief. Ambassador Nolting then asked if the President considered the attack upon the palace as the act of two disgruntled, isolated cases, or whether others in the Air Force were implicated. The President replied that, although most of the airmen were young, worked hard and liked to dance and play hard, they were not generally men of ill-will. One of his aides, himself a pilot, had been surrounded by airmen while the President was questioning their leaders. The aide was bombarded with questions concerning the President's feelings concerning the Air Force in general and themselves as individuals. In a subsequent conversation with a senior Air Force officer, the President agreed that the pilots were young, excitable and immature. He further agreed that there should have been a more careful selection made prior to training and that family, education and background should be more meticulously examined. (The father of Lieutenant Cuu, one of the pilots in the attack, had a recorded history of antigovernment activity.) The President next said that General Khanh and other officers had held a meeting the preceding evening to examine the problem of whether the VNAF should be permitted to continue its mission of bombing and close air-support. He said that he personally considered the restrictions which had been imposed a hindrance and was prone to allow them to operate as before. General Khanh had insisted that he proceed slowly--and that he consider the possibility that there might be another fool like the two who had acted. General Khanh told him that the members of the Bien Hoa group were very unhappy and that they wished to make some sort of manifestation to ask the President's pardon. The incident lies heavily upon them. General Khanh had also proposed that the Americans be asked to fly bombing and support missions, accompanied in each case by a Vietnamese. He further proposed that the VNAF first resume its activities by carrying out strafing missions only. As a preliminary to a somewhat lengthy expose of the elements which might have precipitated the incident, the President said that the time selected for the bombing was determined largely by chance. Three days before the attack, the police at Thu Duc arrested a group of men caught in the act of robbing a man who had recently acquired a large sum of money. They claimed that they were not ordinary bandits but were collecting "political funds" and that they had been instructed to do this by a man named Luc (the father of Lieutenant Cuu, who had dropped the bombs). It is possible, said the President, that Cuu might have considered the entire plan compromised and that, believing himself on the verge of arrest, he decided to flee--attacking the palace on the way. A second incident, not so dear, but which might have had some influence on the act took place some eight days before in the High Plateau close to the Laotian border. In this region, the construction of a tie-road (which the President reminded Ambassador Nolting they had seen together) was badly behind schedule. Finally, the President had become impatient and had ordered the Public Works authorities to look into the real reasons for the delay. It was revealed that the Engineer in charge of road construction in the area had continuously protested that the weather was bad and that coolies were afraid to work because of the lack of security. Further, he had hired two members of his family and placed them in charge of depots where equipment and materials, including explosives were stored. These men had repeatedly told the workers that the Viet Cong was very strong in the area and that there were heavy concentrations of Communist troops immediately across the border. The Public Works investigators became suspicious and seized the records of the depots to check on the receipt and issue of explosives. Since the bombing of the palace, it has been discovered that there is a family connection between them and Lieutenant Quoc--through the wife of the Engineer--a woman named Phu. (Interpreters' Note: Lieutenant Quoc's full name is Phan Phu Quoc.) The President expressed the thought that, although there appears to be no direct connection between the investigation in the High Plateau and the bombing of the palace, the fact that this inquiry was being conducted might have frightened Quoc and helped to precipitate his action. Ambassador Nolting again asked the President if he felt that the information which had been obtained would seem to indicate that the action against him was an isolated, local incident not connected with the Armed Forces or specifically, with the Vietnamese Air Force. The President agreed that this was generally true, but that certain non-flying personnel of the Air Force also seemed to be implicated. The President next spoke of the existence of minor political parties headed by ambitious, unemployed men with little following who worked on the ignorance and the superstitious nature of the people. He talked at length about a man named Thieu (?) who first became active in 1941-1942 as head of the National Socialist Party at the time when it appeared that Hitler and his fascism were most successful. Through the years, Thieu had offered his support to the President, changing the name of his party to fit the situation, but always maintaining his basic theme that the head of state should be a firm fascist and that the superstition of the people should be played upon. At one time, working through an intermediary, he had claimed that he could control the Cao Dai Sect by providing them with more predictions and superstitions than they could invent themselves. President Diem had consistently refused to accept his support and had, on one occasion, attempted to remove him from the political scene by providing funds for him to establish an arts and crafts center in Thu Duc. The venture failed because Thieu was unsuited for it. To further illustrate the fact that there were people in Vietnam who felt that the President's actions against the Communists and other dissident factions were not severe enough, the President told the story of an officer on the staff of Colonel Cao (7th Division Commander) who, after making a thorough study on coups d'etat, had suggested to Cao that, if he seized the power and exercised it with a firm hand, the people would follow him and obey him. The President next told of an incident in Nha Trang in which a noncommissioned officer had been approached by a man who said that his name was Le Than (the name of a corrupt official of Bao Dai) and who told the soldier that he and people like him would be counted on in the forthcoming revolution. The description of the man fitted Luc, the father of Cuu. He was not taken into custody because of the approaching Tet holidays. Returning to the subject of the attack on the palace, the President said that Quoc appeared to be hesitant and influenced by Cuu. Both pilots had been assigned to a close support mission on the morning of the 27th of February. They were preceded by two L-19's which were to lead them into the target. Shortly after take-off, Cuu told them over their protest, that he was returning to Bien Hoa because of lack of visibility and then led Quoc in the attack on the palace. According to the President, it was fortunate that they were not able to discharge their entire load of bombs and rockets--or the palace might have been completely leveled. Quoc, who is now in custody, told an interrogating officer that he was stupid to have listened to Cuu. He had been told that the dropping of their bombs would be the signal for a general revolt and that "everyone" was in on it--including the Americans. As evidence of the complicity of the Vietnamese officers, Cuu had drawn his attention to the fact that the paratroop battalion guarding Bien Hoa had been replaced by another which he claimed to be in sympathy with the revolt. (The President explained that the battalions had been switched in connection with an operation to resettle the people in Binh Duong Province as part of a clearance program.) To substantiate his claim that the Americans were supporting the revolution, Cuu called Quoc's attention to derogatory articles in the press, particularly Newsweek Magazine. The President expressed the thought that Quoc might have become mentally unbalanced and excited by the mass of intrigue and subversive talk to which he had been subjected. Ambassador Nolting agreed, adding that his observations seemed to indicate that the act was that of two young men who had been led astray and that it did not go down into the roots of the Vietnamese Army or the Air Force. Then, (referring to the request for U.S. participation in air support) he asked the President how long he thought the investigation would continue. The President replied that, as an individual, he was ready to permit the Air Force to resume its role but that he was obliged to permit the military to carry out its responsibility of getting to the bottom of the story. Ambassador Nolting agreed that the military should be granted authority corresponding to its responsibility and added that morale and psychological factors should be considered. He concluded by saying that the United States was prepared to advance with the President "all the way." The President next spoke of his visit to the area of Zone D in Binh Duong Province on the day following the bombing, saying that he had become impatient with the slowness of the program for regrouping the people of that area into fortified hamlets. It had become obvious that the program had to be carried out simultaneously throughout the province because the Viet Cong were reacting violently to it--forcing women and children to go to "unregrouped" isolated villages, thus putting pressure on the men to go along with them. Without regrouping, pacification could not be realized and military and paramilitary forces were constantly subject to ambush--platoons and even companies had been lost in the area. General Eggleston asked if this program was related to General Cao's program of "Civic Action" teams. The President replied that it was and that, realizing that the job was difficult and unpleasant, he had issued firm orders to permit General Cao to go ahead and to use severe methods, where necessary. As an example he said that, after several warnings, villages had been burned in order to force people to remain in the regroupment areas. General Eggleston then asked the President if he thought fortifications such as fences, ditches and barbed wire to be very important elements of the plan. The President replied that they were basic and added that the Communists had done the same thing against the French and that it had taken an entire battalion a half of a day to penetrate them. He then commented that the Viet Cong were doing the same thing again--aerial photographs had been taken of VC strongholds ringed by concrete lined trenches. Ambassador Nolting next asked the President if he had signed the Overall Plan. The President answered that he had not, that he had discussed it with Secretary Thuan and that it had been decided that it should be coordinated with the Minister of the Interior since it had civilian as well as military aspects. Meanwhile, implementation was going on in the provinces. Reverting once more to the bombing of the palace, the President stated that the Air Force appeared to be "clean" but he was concerned that their exaggerated interest in comfort and conveniences. He compared their situation with that of the ground troops and civilian officials who lived in constant danger to their lives. He suggested that the Americans might attempt to point out to his airmen that their role was not only one of glamour and grandeur, but also of service. The President next spoke to the Ambassador about General McGarr's illness. He said that it was regrettable and paid tribute to the many things that the General had accomplished since his arrival in Vietnam. Ambassador Nolting then told the President that he had noticed the pleasure of the people on hearing his voice. It could be seen on their faces. He suggested that when the President felt that the Air Force was ready to resume its role, he might address the people by radio to express his confidence. The President said that it was planned to have a demonstration which would be eloquent enough. The Ambassador repeated his suggestion that an address by radio would be worthwhile, pointing out that this would reach the entire nation. He added that the people wanted to hear the President's voice and that there might be an advantage in making a film which would be seen by the 3,000 people who see the newsreels each week. Turning to Mr. Bundy, the President expressed his pleasure over his visit and asked if there was anything that he would like to discuss. Mr. Bundy replied that he had no special points to raise. He reminded the President that he had some responsibility for the United States Military Assistance Program. He had spoken with the Ambassador and U.S. military authorities as well as Mr. Thuan and General Khanh and felt that his visit had been profitable. He added that the United States public were becoming more and more understanding of the problems of Vietnam. The President commented that some journalists saw the bombing of the palace as a warning to him. He felt, rather, that it should be a warning to them--an indication of the danger of their irresponsibility. He hoped that the incident would soon be cleared--but expressed his concern over some of the political factions which played on superstition./2/ /2/In the margin next to this paragraph Mendenhall wrote: "Never learns. JAM" The meeting closed with Ambassador Nolting's remark that there might be an answer to his cable./3/ /3/See footnote 3, Document 92.
94. Editorial Note On March 1, 1962, Secretary Rusk gave a press conference that included a prefatory statement on Vietnam. He made the case that North Vietnam violated the Geneva Accords of 1954 by perpetrating aggression against the South, that the United States was assisting the people of the South to maintain independence by supplying military and economic assistance and technical advice, that the United States had no intention of sending combat troops to South Vietnam, and that the United States would end assistance to South Vietnam as soon as the threat from the north was removed. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 1101.
95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, March 1, 1962, 8:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-162. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. Drafted by Cottrell; cleared with L, FE/P, P, Heinz (ISA), and Sylvester (DOD); and approved by Harriman. 1050. International and local U.S. press reporting of events in Viet-Nam as well as news commentators and even some public and private statements by U.S. government officials and military personnel are stressing or implying incorrectly the following themes: 1. That U.S. effort is in support of the Diem regime rather than the people of Viet-Nam. 2. That we are in partnership in a common effort rather than in support of a GVN effort. 3. That the situation is rapidly turning into a U.S. war rather than a war controlled and directed by the GVN. 4. That U.S. military personnel are in combat status on offensive operations rather than in training, logistics, transportation, support and advisory capacity, defending themselves when attacked. 5. That the U.S. is violating the Geneva Accords rather than our assistance is in response to North Vietnamese aggression. This aggression is what constitutes a violation of the Accords, and our assistance will no longer be necessary if the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Secretary's press statement of March 1/2/ transmitted separately to you was designed to set the record straight. It and this message constitute guidance which you should transmit to appropriate U.S. personnel. /2/See Document 94. Rusk
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 2, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-262. Confidential, Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, Paris, London, Manila, New Delhi, Moscow, Hong Kong, Taipei, Hue, Kuala Lumpur., Singapore, Djakarta, Tokyo, Seoul, Rangoon, and Ottawa. 1126. Embtels 1099. 1109./2/ /2/See Document 88 and footnote 2 thereto. GVN announced evening Feb 27 casualties in morning aerial assassination attempt on President were four dead and approximately 30 wounded. Embassy info puts wounded at between 30 and 40, many of whom injured in Cholon by falling anti-aircraft fire. 2. Security measures have gradually been relaxed in past 48 hours and job of repairing palace already begun. Particularly strategic buildings such as Treasury and Gia Long Palace, where President now living, remain under heavy guard. Tanks and armored cars have disappeared from streets, however, and municipal police and gendarmerie have taken over security controls originally performed by army. 3. Information gleaned from interrogation captured pilot, Quoc, continues indicate very small number of people involved. Father of pilot Cuu who escaped to Cambodia and several others with VNQDD (VN Anti-Communist Nationalist Party) implicated, and Suox [?], Captain Quoc's brother, also VNAF pilot, party to plot. However, still no indications other units were prepared to support this, shocked reaction other pilots in AD-6 squadron, GVN'S rapid and effective response to attack all point to limited scope effort. 4. Pilots' motivations not clear. Quoc one of VNAF'S most outstanding and experienced pilots, though only 1st Lieutenant. Married, he had been at Bien Hoa for six years and under almost continuous combat conditions for past two years. He recently selected for jet training in U.S. and had been told had excellent chance for promotion and more responsible job on return. Like Cuu, his family had VNQDD history. Cuu's father arrested some two years but, according Dr. Tuyen, head Presidential security service, released at instance Col. Vinh, AF commander. Cuu, also married, in squadron only since December, prior to which had flown l-19's. Considered be good pilot and known to have invited Quoc to his house several times. What little have in motivation info thus points to political rather than personal grievance compulsion. 5. Numerous mass meetings, religious ceremonies, petitions of support, etc., which being publicized indicate GVN may be trying use attack as vehicle for renewed popular support of President and government. Official treatment continues depict incident as isolated act two deranged pilots. No doubt, however, that suspicions of President and family toward Saigon political dissidents and intellectuals will be even stronger in future than in past. Also likely his reluctance trust GVN officials and his unwillingness delegate authority will be strengthened, too. . . . In talk with U.S. journalist Tuyen hinted all non-GVN political circles under suspicion. Thus appears be some possibility GVN may use attack as basis for further restrictions on opposition. Possible augury of such line is motion adopted by Bureau of National Assembly Feb 27 calling for "end of tolerance" and severe repression of "irresponsible elements". According . . . info some 60 people taken into custody for questioning; number actually detained not known. Tuyen told several journalists no one had been arrested. Among those questioned was reported to be Nguyen Thi Truyen, unsuccessful vice presidential candidate in last April's elections. Cuu's father reportedly still being sought. 6. Despite mass meetings, etc., there appears be no pattern of public reaction, which probably due Vietnamese temperament as well as caution. There has been little display of emotion, and most of Saigon appears studiously to have gone about business. We thus unable evaluate at this moment what effect Tuesday's/3/ event will have on Diem's popular position. We understand most correspondents here describing attack as manifestation GVN's basic unpopularity. /3/February 27. 7. Grounding of VNAF lifted evening March 1. However, AD-6 armament to be limited for moment to 20mm cannon. President has twice assured AD-6 squadron that he did not hold it responsible for acts of two of its pilots and that he continued have confidence in air force. 8. So far as we now know, VC did not attempt exploit confusion surrounding attack on palace, either in Saigon or outside. Seems reasonable believe, however, Commie conviction "enemy divided at home" will be strengthened, and bolder ventures may ensue. 9. Effect on GVN-RKG relations will probably be bad. FonMin Mau told EmbOff March 1 GVN had requested extradition of Cuu, but Sihanouk in speech Feb 27 implied he would be granted political asylum. Also noteworthy but not surprising that while messages of sympathy and support being addressed to Diem from many nearby countries, Cambodia not one of senders. 10. As all of foregoing indicates, it still too early provide final answers as to scope of plot, attackers' motivations, effect on GVN and Diem and on their status in country and abroad. No reason at this time change earlier appraisal of limited-scope, anti-Communist assassination attempt. We are inclined believe that with some luck GVN may succeed in minimizing adverse effects, though we somewhat disquieted by possibility it may react against political opposition in general. Nolting
97. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 2, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-262. Secret. Drafted by Hubbard on March 6. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS While waiting for his appointment with the Under Secretary on March 2, 1962 regarding another subject, Ambassador Heeney took the occasion to make some observations to Mr. Rice about the question of the ICC in Vietnam. The Canadian Ambassador said he thought it had been fruitless to instruct the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa to attempt to persuade the Department of External Affairs of the validity of the legal principle that a breach of an accord by one party automatically allowed the other party to break the agreement also./2/ The Department of External Affairs had reported rather fully to Ambassador Heeney on this approach by the Embassy at Ottawa and had noted that the Embassy had been instructed to make the point that such a legal thesis was based on well recognized principles of international law. The Ambassador added that the legal staff of the Department of External Affairs could not accept such a thesis and could find no legal justification for such an assertion. In any event, he continued, it was not really worthwhile to push this point. He believed that the legal aspects of the ICC had already become so Byzantine that to add to the complexity of legal assertions would not be productive. /2/See Document 55. Ambassador Heeney went on to say it was not for him to say what the United States should or should not do. He understood only too well U.S. anxieties about Vietnam and he shared them. He believed that, if the United States thought the only way to save Vietnam was to bring personnel and materiel above the limits set by the Geneva Accord, then he would be willing to accept this judgement. He would bless any attempt to save Vietnam, but nevertheless saw no point in stressing legalisms. Ambassador Heeney thought a double citation was probably the best solution available at this time, and, in this connection, noted that he had received word from the Canadian Commission in Saigon (Hooton) that it believed it would be possible to bring the subversion issue out of the Legal Committee by mid-March. On another aspect of the same subject, Ambassador Heeney discussed the manner in which U.S. materiel had been brought into Saigon. He understood that the reason for delivery being made in the principal downtown area of Saigon had been to buttress Vietnamese morale and faith in its government being properly equipped to defend itself. Nevertheless, this quite open way of doing things did make matters rather more difficult for the ICC and he imagined that the effectiveness of this materiel in coping with insurgency would probably do as much for moral as anything. Mr. Rice said he was insufficiently informed about the legal problems involved but said he would speak to Mr. Chayes about it--which he did shortly thereafter. [Continue with the next documents]
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