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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
IV. Further U.S. Efforts To Strengthen the Government of South Vietnam, March-April 1962
98. Paper Prepared for the Special Group (Counterinsurgency)/1/ Washington, March 7, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 75 D 378, SV 23613, Civic Action. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The date is penciled in at the top. In the margin is written: "This was tabled and revised." At the March 1 meeting of the Special Group, General Taylor under agenda item 3 asked about the status of economic programs. The minutes of that meeting reported that: "Mr. Coffin was asked to prepare a special report on this for next week's meeting, which would outline specific programs and show the emphasis being placed on support of counterinsurgency." (Ibid., Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62) Presumably the paper printed here is that report. No specific reference was made to this paper in the minutes of the March 8 meeting, although they indicate that General Taylor "made the general observation that it was very difficult to get hold of civic action programs which were contemplated for South Vietnam." U. Alexis Johnson promised to have the Vietnam Task Force examine civic action programs and report its findings. (Ibid.) SUBJECT /2/There was no agenda item 3d in either the March 1 or 8 meeting, although there was an "agenda item 3" on Vietnam for the March I meeting and "agenda items 3a, 3b, and 3c" on Vietnam for the March 8 meeting. "Agenda item 3b" at the latter was entitled "Civic Action. South Vietnam." 3d. Planning for immediate civilian and military civic action and subsequent detailed civic action programs which will be required to support the province pacification strategy. I. Status Enclosure number one is a review of the status of civic action programs in Vietnam. The salient facts to be considered are the following: 1. Neither US nor GVN planning for civic action in Vietnam can proceed on a sound basis until the overall strategy for the campaign in Vietnam is developed and agreed. The civic action effort must be planned to support the time-phased geographic plan for clearing and holding the country-side. The general concept of a campaign plan is emerging, but the plan has not. 2. The Vietnamese are currently conducting several unsystematic civic action activities, varying by area and means and not guided by a strategic plan. Their primary source of advice and guidance in the civic action field does not appear to be our Country Team. 3. Country Team recognition of the need for civic action is recent. Civic action has not been persistently pressed on the GVN. What has been accomplished appears to be mainly on GVN initiative. 4. A clear concept on the U.S. side of the manner in which to unite the divided responsibilities of U.S. agencies in a successful field program in Vietnam has not been demonstrated. A joint State-AID-Defense message of 12 Feb 62/3/ provides very broad guidance calling for MAP funding of requirements to provide indigenous military forces for which MAP is responsible, with increased capability to take on civic action and calling for AID funding of project costs additional to those funded by local governments and of requirements to enhance the civic action capability of the paramilitary forces for which AID is responsible. This broad guidance, generally confirming previous understanding, does not solve the problem of how to develop and administer one integrated program, agreed to by the GVN, in Vietnam. /3/See footnote 6, Document 64. II. Required Actions by the Country Team Each of the required actions listed below presumes that our Country Team will have completely determined what the GVN is doing in the civic action field and will, through early consideration of GVN views and local circumstances and united persuasion that the U.S. has a sound program to offer in this field, achieve agreement with the GVN as to requirements, methods, and programs to be implemented. 1. Attention to the necessity for a time-phased, geographically based strategy and campaign plan for all of Vietnam that envisions clearing and consolidating areas contiguous to the starting area. 2. Development of one integrated comprehensive civic action program phased to support the strategy of the campaign plan. This must be a program of specifics; the generally accepted broad principles thus far announced in various programs do not provide an adequate basis for action in the current stage. 3. Division of tasks between the U.S. agencies only on the basis of their capability and willingness to perform the function in the current circumstances in Vietnam. 4. Assignment of resources to U.S. agencies on the basis of the division of tasks rather than such a basis as MAP support or precedent. Enclosure 1/4/ /4/Secret. REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF CIVIC ACTION IN VIETNAM I. Status a. U.S. Military Civic Action Efforts On 12 July 1961, a Department of Army Civil Action Mobile Training Team (CAMTT) arrived in SVN. Its dispatch was one of the approved "Gilpatric Task Force" recommendations./5/ From 12 July to 12 December, the CAMTT conducted surveys of civic action needs, held seminars in Saigon and in each military region for top military and civilian officials, organized a group of ARVN officers to conduct a civic action program, provided the P.O.I. for individual training, and submitted to CHMAAG a complete Civil Affairs/Civic Action Program for approval./6/ /5/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 42. /6/Not further identified. On 30 January 1962, this program was submitted to CINCPAC. CINCPAC approved the program 7 February 62. It now awaits adoption by the GVN. Only after query from the JCS/7/ did the Country Team during February present to the GVN the proposals for civic action drawn up by the DA CAMTT during 1961. /7/The JCS query has not been found. b. U.S. Civilian Civic Action Efforts As reported under Agenda Item 3a, a proposed civilian rural medical plan was proposed to Ambassador Nolting by State/AID message dated 26 Feb 62./8/ The basic feature of the plan would be mobile civilian medical teams performing a "sick call" operation in villages and available for emergency call. Foreign doctors would replace in the cities the VN doctors moved out to rural areas under this plan. Field comments have not been received. /8/Transmitted in CA-1198. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) On 16 Feb 62 State suggested to Ambassador Nolting that he consider means to strengthen the GVN Civic Action Ministry, including employment of U.S. advisors within the Ministry, and requested a report from T.F. Saigon on the status of civilian civic action and specific suggestions for expansion of the program, including especially activities by which civilian civic action can support military plans for cleaning out and securing provinces./9/ These are each very recent indications of interest in civilian civic action; results--or even clear specific plans--have not been realized. /9/See Document 66. c. NV Civic Action (1) Background The Government of Viet Nam (GVN) has established a number of organizations and carries out a variety of programs which are designed either to materially aid the people of Viet Nam or to convince them of the desirability of supporting the present regime. The Information Service, the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), the Republican Youth Organization (RYO), the Ministry of Health, and the Vietnamese Solidarity Movements are examples of such organizations. Frequently it has occurred that the programs of these organizations combine both material and moral help for the people with a propaganda program, and the lines between the GVN purpose of "help" and the regime's purpose of "sell" are difficult to differentiate. (2) Organization and Cadres In at least part of the provinces a provincial-level CA organization exists. Below the provincial headquarters there is often, but not always, a chief cadre for each district who may have a number of cadres under him, depending upon the size of the population. These cadres, through the chief cadre, usually coordinate their activities closely with the district chief although the latter in most cases exercises no direct authority over the CA program. Generally the number of cadres is not fixed in a district and may vary from time to time according to the schedule of the CA program. One cadre, however, may be assigned to cover two to four villages on a more or less permanent basis. CA cadres often participate in "teams" composed of Information Service cadres, Surete representatives, RYO cadres, and Self Defense Corps members. The teams move about in a district, spending perhaps two or three weeks in a village organizing defenses, explaining GVN policy lines, and exhorting the population to carry out self-help projects. The CA cadres (25-35) are young, aggressive, and dedicated. They are paid 2,800 piastres a month (the provincial CA chief receives 5,500 piastres), a fair wage were it not for their added expenses accruing from their responsibilities of having to live away from home virtually all of the time. One district chief stated the CA cadres are generally educated through the third or fourth year of high school. In addition, they received two months of training with the Ministry. (3) Civic Action Activities Civic Action activities can be grouped into two categories1) propaganda and 2) organization of projects generally relating to either defense or community welfare. CA cadres frequently organize "study courses" which are used to "educate" the people about GVN programs and policies and to convince them of the advantages of supporting the present regime. CA objectives in poorer areas are, of necessity, changed from encouragement and organization of community projects to simple propaganda, as the people of such areas are too poor to devote much if any time or money to projects not immediately essential to the providing of the daily necessities of life. The principal job of CA, however, is to aid villagers in the organization and execution of projects designed to benefit the community as a whole. Varying according to the needs and capabilities of the village, such projects include road repair, dam building, canal excavation, construction of tactical defenses, crop protection, and establishment of health programs. They may investigate any "suspicious elements" in a village for VC activities or connections, and investigate the background of candidates for the village council or any charges of abuse of power leveled against a member of a council. In an emergency involving the safety of the village or the crops, CA cadres may concentrate their efforts on a given area. However, CA itself has no funds to invest in projects and it is always necessary for the villagers to foot the bill themselves on any costs of a project. CA cadres can only explain the utility of the project to the villagers and help them organize the effort. Another activity sometimes engaged in is to coordinate with SDC and other defense groups in conducting security patrols. CA cadres also frequently urge the people to pay their taxes. These activities and programs have a basic limitation in that they do not have funds to assist with the developments that they urge. They are essentially "do-it-yourself" advisors. Their programs call for diversion of local effort and resources to programs not developed at local initiative. This would be more acceptable if some funds were available to the teams to help with local projects. There is recent information that a special responsibility for civic action has been assigned to . . . . The portion of the total program which he supervises and the resources available to him are not yet clearly reported. He is at least responsible for the Binh Duong and Bien Hoa areas. However, fragmentary reports indicate some activity in these areas and elsewhere. For example, in January 62 President Diem ordered a crash civic action program for the newly formed province of Chuong Thieu. By the end of January an initial complement of 100 civic action personnel, of whom 70 had been newly trained and armed with carbines and LSMG's, were organized into ten teams of ten men each. To meet the estimated 250 additional team members required for this province, 150 were to be assigned from the class of 200 graduating from their training program at Danang in late February. (4) Relation to the Overall Strategy Future GVN civic action programs will certainly be geared to the strategic hamlet concept and the overall strategy for clearing and holding areas. This, too, is not yet completely developed. No time-phased priority of clearing the provinces has been announced. However, the scheme for clearing and holding individual provinces appears to be generally understood as depending on a three-phase operation (I--preparatory, II--military, and III--civic action and rehabilitation) to establish strategic hamlets. Civic action plans and requirements will consequently be tied to the strategic plan finally agreed. The costs of this scheme may run high. For example, the relocation costs for only 6,500 people being moved in Binh Duong to five new sites is estimated at $75,000. President Diem only recently (3 Feb) signed the decree establishing an Inter-Ministry Committee for Strategic Hamlets./10/ The mission of this body is to develop a national plan for securing the villages. However, in the meantime, the work is proceeding. There are 16,000 hamlets and 2,500 villages in Vietnam. 784 strategic hamlets have already been constructed and 453 are under construction. It is reported that 6,066 are to be completed in 1962. /10/See Document 46. The intent of the GVN as to an overall strategy is also somewhat clouded by recent actions with regard to the recommendations of British Advisor, Mr. R.G.K. Thompson. Mr. Thompson has submitted to the GVN a draft directive for the pacification of the Delta area, which outlines in the form of a National Security Council Directive the concepts to which he proposes./11/ [sic] He has also prepared three draft policy instructions for implementation of the directive. One concerns the general concept, another the coordination and command of the operation, and another specific control measures to break the links between the VC and the population./12/ It is reported that President Diem approved at least the basic directive at a meeting from which he excluded Minister of Civic Action Hieu. /11/Document 51. /12/The draft instructions were enclosed with a letter of February 10 to Trueheart. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814,350. GNV-Task Force (Thompson Mission)) This plan now considers only the Delta area. How the program there will tie into a national plan is not clear because the GVN has also been recently discussing clearing provinces in the Binh Duong area with MAAG. However, it is reported that Thompson coordinated his plan and draft directions with MAAG.
99. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 9, 1962, noon. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and Manila. A note by Bundy on a copy in the Kennedy Library instructed the Communications Center to forward the telegram to Salinger in Miami. 1149. From Ambassador Nolting. Manila for Harriman./2/ Following relates to US statements to press concerning US military activities in Viet Nam. We have previously disseminated and stressed to all units of mission press guidance given to date, including distribution of Secretary Rusk's statement March 6th./3/ /2/Harriman was in Manila en route to a Chiefs of Mission Conference for U.S. representatives in the Far East scheduled for Baguio, March 10-11. /3/Presumably a reference to Rusk's March 1 statement; see Document 94. Late evening March 7 two reporters (Hudson of NBC and Rose of Time) came by my house to discuss what they termed very important information received by them which was in conflict with their understanding of official US statements. I thanked them for following suggestions made at earlier press briefing that US press corps check doubtful or important information with General Harkins or me, or designated representatives, prior to broadcast or filing. Reporters then said they had received from a US military source, and had verified through GVN military source, the following: (1) that Farmgate operation was in many cases spearhead of ground support and bombing missions against Viet Cong, including recent operation in Tay Ninh province, results of which had been seen by several reporters: (2) that there are now two air forces in Viet Nam operating against the Viet Cong--the GVN Air Force and secondly American units (Farmgate) controlled and operated by US Air Force, comprising T-28's and RB-26's: (3) that during recent grounding of GVN AD-6 squadrons, US had been requested to supply US pilots for the AD-6's for combat missions and had done so; (4) that this report was inconsistent with what had been said in Washington and in Saigon officially as to US military role in Viet Nam. These two reporters added that above information was widely known to foreign reporters now in Viet Nam. I told them following: (1) US role in Viet Nam is, as officially stated, a training and supporting role in air force as well as in all other branches of GVN Armed Forces. (2) It is incorrect to say US is "spearheading" ground support and bombing operations against Viet Cong. (3) In training GVN Air Force in operation T-28's, a new plane to them, we are giving on-the-spot training which often involves training under combat conditions, but that in no case do US pilots operate alone, purpose and objective being training of GVN pilots for combat operations. (4) Information that we had been requested to fly AD-6's in combat during short period of grounding of GVN Air Force was false, as was statement that there are two distinct air forces operating now in Viet Nam. These reporters said they accepted this explanation and would file their stories accordingly, remarking that this made stories considerably less sensational. I have no doubt, however, that they will continue to probe this matter on basis of leads they already have, and try define more precisely role of Farmgate. (This code name was used by them throughout.) As illustrated by above, I feel most US reporters here are trying to play ball with us, but I also have strong feeling that, given number of participants, both US and GVN, in these air operations, it is inevitable that the degree of US control of mechanics of Farmgate operation, and the degree of US participation in air combat operations, will become increasingly known and stressed in press. (Lt. Cuu, one of renegade pilots now in Cambodia, is undoubtedly familiar with details of Farmgate operation.) Such questions as when will GVN pilots be trained and ready to take over complete control of T-28's and RB-26's now at Bien Hoa will inevitably arise. Believe we should give further thought to adequacy our present line with press in light these insistent inquiries. While official statements correct in general terms, they may become object of criticism or attack when specifics of operation become further known, which is likely. Mission may have further suggestions. General Harkins concurs. Trueheart
100. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 9, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-962. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1155. Deptel 1017./2/ Embassy has carefully considered suggestions reftel and feels scope of provincial surveys can be broadened on informal basis to include fuller consideration of effectiveness village administration, local development plans, civil-military relationships, economic conditions, and provincial information programs. However, believe we would encounter strong resistance from Diem to explicit broadening of terms of reference of Joint Vietnamese-American Commission beyond military and intelligence matters. Believe American team members--particularly Embassy representative--can in most cases informally cover at least portion additional matters listed above. Believe decision on what additional points to cover in each province beyond military and intelligence matters should be left to American members of commission, who in best position to judge what is feasible under circumstances. Our comments on other specific suggestions in reftel as follows: /2/Dated February 23, it noted that the Department of State considered previous provincial surveys very useful and offered suggestions, as outlined in telegram 1155, for improving the surveys. (Ibid., 751K.5/2-2362) 1) Agreement already reached with GVN to form additional teams. Will attempt to increase length of observation time in each province to approximately one week. However, believe possibility of GVN opposition or VC harassment may make it necessary to limit survey to shorter period. Rate at which surveys made and written up has been limited by heavy commitments of Vietnamese Team members to other duties. Problem here has been to find qualified Vietnamese team members with knowledge at least French (and English if possible), who have enough authority to command cooperation from local officials but are not too occupied with other duties. This is tall order. 2) Future surveys will contain summary. 3) Surveys of individual provinces will probably not be suitable vehicle for specific recommendations to be used in making overall policy and for planning and assessing purposes, as perspective from one province only is too limited. However, information accrued through surveys will be used in formulating overall policy and planning for Vietnam and in assessing Vietnam's major needs. Further details by airgram. Heavner has arrived and has helped draft revised concept survey program which following by airgram. Trueheart
101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, March 9, 1962, 6:37 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Magathan and Cottrell, cleared with Heinz, and approved by Cottrell. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad and to Baguio for Harriman. Harriman, Nolting, and the other U.S. Ambassadors in the Far East were in Baguio, March 10-11, for the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference. A complete record of that conference is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2056. 1085. Embtel 1159./2/ Initial reports provincial surveys received with interest here at all levels. Obvious program very worthwhile and general consensus opinion here is they should be pushed with all possible speed consistent with requirement for thorough coverage. Consensus also they should include economic and political data and surveys should be focussed on information of direct use to military and coordinated plans. Following questions raised here: /2/Telegram 1159, March 9, reported that all agencies represented on the Country Team concurred in the Delta Plan presented to Diem by the British Advisory Mission. (Ibid., Central Files, 751K.5/-962) 1. Since Diem has now accepted Thompson approach should not surveys be realigned explicitly to supply requisite planning data on schedule coordinated with Thompson Plan? You may wish discuss this matter with Gen. Harkins and with Thompson and consider compiling data in some standard format for ready accessibility and comparability. 2. Questions Emb Despatch 189/3/ appear fairly comprehensive. In view strategic hamlet approach, however, more specific information may be needed on situation and applicable assets each village, nature communications thereto, and degree VC control or influence. Also in view crucial civic action phase, reliable information on political, economic, and social matters such as the effectiveness of the GVN administration and the attitude and livelihood of the populace on village by village basis and availability of local resources for establishment of defended areas. This appears vital to realistic planning for successful outcome. /3/Not printed. 3. Despite Diem's express limitation to military and intelligence matters reflected Embtel 756,/4/ hope you can rely heavily on opening afforded by Thuan mentioned last paragraph Embtel 754./5/ /4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 305, footnote 4. /5/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 305. Rusk
102. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 10, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-1062. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, Baguio for Ambassador Nolting, Clark Air Force Base, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Manila, Paris, Singapore, New Delhi, Taipei, London, Hue, Hong Kong, and Fuchu. It also requested that the Department of State pass the cable to the Department of Defense for various military units. to CIA. and to AID. 1163. Following is mission Interagency Intelligence Committee assessment of current Viet Cong position and tactics: We expect continuation for next few months at least of pattern of generally small-scale VC attacks, accompanied by intensive politico-military organization of back country, which has characterized Communist struggle in South Vietnam. Until two weeks ago, this campaign concentrated primarily on isolated CG and SDC posts but since then there several attacks on ARVN forces using somewhat larger, more aggressive, and better armed units. This could represent beginnings of trend in some areas toward larger-scale warfare of type associated with Phase II General Giap's doctrine. We believe VC not yet capable, however, of full transition Phase II all areas. Furthermore, continued reliance on slower but less provocative process eating away at government administrative structure and presence at district and village level offers Communists several advantages at this stage their revolution. For one thing, it is kind of program which strikes Diem regime at weakest points while avoiding to large extent damaging contact between limited VC offensive force and much more numerous ARVN. It also tactic least likely attract major American intervention Vietnam or arouse more active concern of Western allies of US. Viet Cong are likely, however, to punctuate this campaign with occasional larger-scale attacks, employing up to 1,000 men or so, against selected targets which appear to them relatively vulnerable. In each case Communist decision undertake such attack would probably be made only after carefully balancing advantages, in terms heightening VC morale and perhaps inducing panic in GVN, against risks of inviting effective ARVN counteraction and inspiring escalation American commitments. On organizational side, Communists will continue efforts elaborate controlling political superstructure for VC, giving first priority to development of newly established Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party as Communists inner core in National Liberation Front. At same time, Communists will continue attempt attract non-Communists various walks life to Front's banner, and representatives of Front likely appear in increasing numbers at Communist-supported international conclaves. Although at national level, Front's efforts enlist non-Communist support not notably successful, there considerable evidence that at local level numerous front committees established. Parallel political efforts, Communists continuing emphasize progressive development military forces. After dramatic expansion their forces in 1959 and 1960, it reasonable assume substantial consolidation of VC forces has been necessary. There some evidence enemy engaged this process past few months, regrouping smaller guerrilla elements to form district companies and provincial battalions. This effort enhanced by utilization trained cadres infiltrated North Vietnam, for which DRV has substantial manpower reservoir in form more than 80,000 troops evacuated from south after Geneva Armistice. Some of these regrouped southerners demobilized and assigned "production" elements, but 50,000 were used form four PAVN infantry divisions. DRV deployment in Laos intimately connected with support of VC in addition, of course, to backing up PL, by insuring safe transit supplies and cadre to South Vietnam. There is in fact evidence DRV units assisting in preparing logistical system (roads and supply points) for support VC effort. Possibly offsetting this advantage, at least for short term, is continued delay in reaching settlement in Laos leading coalition government under Souvanna Phouma. So long as this question unresolved, DRV probably feels it must be ready participate resumed hostilities which now seem only alternative to a Souvanna coalition. This may detract somewhat from attention it pays to South Vietnam. Due to nature of war here, it difficult draw up balance sheet for past few months. RVNAF, with American assistance, undoubtedly improved, among other things, its ability cope with large enemy concentration and exploit sudden encounters with VC by calling for air strikes. On other hand, incident rate has remained extremely high, and Viet Cong, while sustaining substantial casualties themselves, able inflict rather heavy casualties government forces, particularly over extended and under-trained CG and SDC. Perhaps best estimate is that there more or less military standoff with both sides gradually improving respective capabilities. Fact VC has in general concentrated on small-scale activity recent months, eschewing more sensational attacks mounted Sept, should provide no grounds complacency. Enemy is determined, resourceful and controls substantial areas in countryside. Government cannot hope begin long, slow road to victory until it better able contest with enemy for control vital countryside through buildup CG, SDC and various irregular village defense forces, and through adoption wide variety political, social and economic measures aimed at giving peasant stake in defense his village against VC. In discussing contrast between large-scale Sept attacks and subsequent pattern smaller-scale activity, two main bodies opinion developed in committee. . . . These attacks and in fact general VC posture last summer indicated enemy actually in process moving into Phase II Giap's doctrine but later decided regress Phase I for number reasons. Other view, advocated by political section and evaluation center, was that these attacks represented specific use of tactic associated with Phase II to secure infiltration routes, redress morale balance and regain initiative following the GVN's temporary successes in Delta. Whatever the case, committee agreed they presently operating generally context Phase I but working intensively prepare themselves for transition Phase II. Trueheart
103. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, March 10, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Secret. SUBJECT The attached plan/2/provides for the pacification of Binh Duong province (southern edge of which is 12 miles north of Saigon). /2/Not found. Essentials of plan are as follows: Enemy: 1800 regular and provincial troops plus sympathizers; in strong control of northern half of province. Friendly: In addition to unspecified number of SDC/CG in the province now, allocate five ARVN infantry battalions to clear northern part of province; two civil guard battalions for local security; four ranger companies; one river forces group; VNAF and US Army helo company. There are nine civic action teams (16 men per team) operating now in southern part of Binh Duong province; five additional teams (32 men per team) will be added for the operation. Mission: The Government of the Republic of South Vietnam conducts combined civil-military operations in the province of Binh Duong to eliminate Viet Cong control over the people; provide for the selective relocation and physical security of the population; enforce law and order; assist in rehabilitating village administration, economy and security; and assist in consolidating national control within the area of operations by enhancing popular support for the counterinsurgency effort. Concept: Three phases of operations are planned: I. Preparatory (prior to D-Day). Reconnaissance and planning; determine requirements for village relocation and civic action; determine requirements for additional para-military personnel; train paramilitary and civic action personnel; command and logistic planning in detail; psywar and civic action planning; military planning. II. Military (D-Day to D+30). Regular forces gain control of northern areas in which population resettlement is to be undertaken; psywar campaign to explain to population the reasons for movement of their homes; Army engs and civic action teams move to new village sites (population of 15 villages will be moved to 5 new defended villages) for clearing ground and constructing defenses; CG provide village security; regular forces maintain secure LOC's; villagers moved to new sites (priority to 3 villages because of limited resources; complete other 2 villages when forces are released) and given funds/ material/help in reconstructing their homes; concurrently, clear western part of province and resettle on more limited basis. III. Consolidation (D+30 to D+120 approximately). Phase out of regular forces as SDC/CG are able to provide security; defensive village system and population controls continued and refined; village alarm system established; security patrols instituted; civic action pursued on urgent basis to regain normal living conditions; information program and facilities established; civic action teams (after 2-4 months) train local replacements and prepare to move to a new location. Command: The Province Chief is responsible for Phases I and III; the Commander. ARVN 5th Inf Div for Phase II. Specific parts of this plan which you may wish to scan are clipped as follows: VC organization Some questions which the Plan raises: 1. Date Phase II will commence (will rainy season delay until Oct/Nov)? 2. Extent of population indoctrination prior to Phase II. 3. What the US is doing now to expedite Phase I (which is in progress to some unknown extent)? 4. What the US is doing to provide resources for Phase III. 5. What role US advisors will have at command levels during Phase II to assure effective direction as the operation unfolds. 6. Possibility of success in view of strong VC position in north part of province and zone D to the east (it is of interest that in past 10 days, VC have increased scope of operations in Tay Ninh Province to the west). 7. Nature of follow-on operations in other provinces and extent of concurrent planning. 8. Supporting operations planned to divert VC reinforcements from Binh Duong as the operation gets underway. 9. Extent of reserves to be earmarked for the operation. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV are working with the GVN on details of this plan; detailed information on status is almost nonexistent. While not expressed, I think this operation will not be ready until the fall of this year. This is why it is vital there be more intensive attention to preparatory and supplemental actions (country-wide civic action; border patrols) to prevent further deterioration of the security situation while we prepare for offensive operations./3/ /3/Phase I of Operation "Sunrise" got underway on March 22. According to the minutes of the meeting of the Committee on Province Rehabilitation for April 20, Phase 1I began on April 17. (Department of State, Vietnam Task Force Files: Lot 66 D 193, 6.1-C, GVN 1962, Agrovilles & Land Devmt) W.H.B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
104. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 11, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-1162. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, Baguio for Harriman and Nolting, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Vientiane. 1165. Re Embtel 1164 info Baguio unn./2/ Mme. Nhu's address at Trung sisters ceremony made in her capacity as President-Founder of Vietnamese Women's Solidarity Movement. Diplomatic Corps and GVN ministers present. Her remarks, which subsequently broadcast, are not surprising as reflection views of her and her husband vis-à-vis West, including US, since both Nhus have privately expressed opinions generally along these lines in past. Even President Diem has in private conversation attributed lack of security in countryside to alleged failure US to support Civil Guard at earlier stage. /2/Telegram 1164, March 11, transmitted a translation of Madame Nhu's speech. The speech dealt mainly with the provision of security in the countryside, complaining that training and equipping a paramilitary force to provide such security has been difficult for Vietnam, "especially when its allies refused to recognize the need for such forces." (Ibid.) What is new, however, is public expression these sentiments by leading personality of regime. Their vehemence indicates depth of feeling probably intensified by narrow escape of Nhus in recent palace bombing episode. While we have not seen complete range Western press reaction (including Time and Newsweek) to bombing, we believe that if stress is on unpopularity Diem government and/or Nhus, Ngo family feelings will be even further stirred up, and recurrence last November's anti-American press campaign could be cranked up. Believe therefore that I should promptly make oral protest to GVN. I would put protest in context that public statements of this sort make task of Western, and particularly American friends of Vietnam inordinately difficult. I would point out that Madame Nhu's public speech presents gravely unbalanced view of what Western democracies, particularly US, are doing with their immense assistance to help Vietnam in its mortal struggle against Communists. American public which is wholeheartedly supporting this struggle can only be discouraged by statements of this sort. Raking over past is not key to future cooperation. Even past has two sides, however, and further public presentation by GVN of one side only may compel US press present other side, with resultant public dispute which can only please Communists. Finally, I would protest implication of foreign incitement to murder, and stress that public figure, whether American or Vietnamese, must expect receive criticism as well as praise. I would propose make protest to Secretary of State for Presidency, Thuan. I recognize that démarche along these lines unlikely have any effect on attitude of Nhus and could well increase their anti-American sentiments. By privately indicating our concern, however, we may forestall anti-US press campaign which otherwise likely be stimulated by expected US press reaction to speech. Whether or not démarche has this result, my personal view is that United States on prestige grounds should not ignore public statement of this kind by figure as closely associated with GVN as Madame Nhu. Ambassador Nolting may wish to comment. Please instruct urgently./3/ /3/In telegrams 19 and 20, March 12, Harriman and Nolting responded in favor of a démarche by Trueheart. Upon receipt of these responses, the Department of State authorized Trueheart to make the proposed démarche in telegram 1091 to Saigon, March 12. (Ibid., 751K.00/3-1262) Trueheart
105. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, March 12, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Secret. SUBJECT The following future MAP-supported force levels have been approved by the JCS for South Viet-Nam: |
| Present FY 62 | Proposed FY 62 | Proposed FY 63 | Proposed FY 64 | |
| RVNAF (Army-Navy-AF) | 205,000 | 206,662 | 215,000 | 225,000 |
| CG | 68,000 | 72,000 | 81,000 | 90,000 |
| SDC | 49,200 | 65,000 | 80,000 | 80,000 |
| TOTAL | 322,200 | 343,622 | 376,000 | 395,000 |
|
These figures have been recommended by CINCPAC with the
concurrence of the Country Team. Approval at this time was
suggested in order that GVN planning could go forward; the force
levels indicated do not reflect a number of factors which will
take form in the next few months. There is unofficial agreement
on the US side that changes in levels will be made if later
information and events dictate the need.
The review which follows is intended to set forth the essentials of the force structure determination. Current Force Levels The US approved a force level of 200,000 for the RVNAF in the fall of 1961; it was agreed then that the need for further increases would be reviewed after 1 January 1962. As an interim measure, CHMAAG was authorized by State and Defense to consider the calendar 1962 goal as 205,000 to permit flexibility in billet determinations. It is estimated at present rates of build-up that the 200,000 level will be reached in late 1962. Approximate present strengths are: RVNAF: Army: 163,000 Navy: 5,000 Airforce: 5,000 TOTAL: 173,000 On the para-military side the situation is as follows: Security Forces: |
| GVN Authorized Strength | MAP-support Level | Present Strength | |
| Civil Guard | 68,000 | 67,000 | |
| Self-Defense Corps | 67,751 | 49,200 | 57,000 |
|
The USOM-approved strength for the National Police is 7,020.
Proposed Increases Based on these strengths and the approved levels for the period FY 62-64, the net increases through June 1963 will be: |
| Present Strength | Present Goal | MAP June 1963 Global | Difference between present strength and June 1963 Goal | |
| RVNAF | 173,000 | 205,000 | 215,000 | 42,000 |
| CG | 67,000 | 68,000 | 81,000 | 14,000 |
| SDC | 57,000 | 67,751 | 80,000 | 23,000 |
|
Mr. Hilsman's recommended approach to a SVN strategy calls for
an increase of 58,000 in the Civil Guard and, in a part-time
Self-Defense Corps, an increase of 100,000./2/
Mr. Thompson similarly lays stress on the role of the CG and SDC.
The latter as the close-in defender of the strategic hamlet and
defender village; the former as the wider-ranging provincial
patrol force and mobile reserve. Thompson originally suggested
use of the National Police for provincial security, but later
agreed with the US view that existing para-military assets in the
CG/SDC should be used.
/2/See Document 42. Essential Considerations There are certain essential considerations in reaching a decision as to the force levels the US reasonably could support in SVN. Some of these have been cited by Defense or State; none are sufficiently developed to permit governing conclusions. Each should be the subject of further analysis or discussion with the GVN. a. Economic employment of existing armed resources. CINCPAC stresses the need to assure the GVN organizes and employs existing military and para-military resources properly before moving too rapidly toward increases in strength. There are insufficient indications now as to what the GVN is actually capable of doing and what military strength is required. The best data available suggests the RVNAF has not decreased static tasks despite US provision of transport aircraft and helicopters. Rangers still are not committed to jungle/border functions. At the same time, recent increases in the means for air and water mobility, the need to strengthen force capability in the Plateau area, and expanded training facilities have resulted in the need for RVNAF personnel increases (reflected in the FY 62 figure of 206,662). b. Requirement for security forces for follow-on control in province pacification strategy. There is a need for CG/SDC forces (and, later, National Police) to hold province areas swept by the ARVN and in which population resettlement has been accomplished. Numbers of para-military forces required for this purpose are not yet known; there is some uncertainty, in US circles, as to numbers now in each province. Tentative estimates for CG/SDC needed for the Binh Duong operation are 1644/1000 respectively, over the normal manning level in that area. A prime factor in any build-up is the present saturated training organization for the CG and SDC; personnel now in those categories will not all complete the training course until the end of 1962. Further, the GVN is reluctant to move CG and SDC forces away from their village and province assignments to fight elsewhere. To the degree that this is done, the local intelligence capability, area familiarity, and morale of these troops would be compromised. But at the same time, this reduces the flexible use of security forces to concentrate at points of immediate need. c. Influence of social and economic factors on the force structure. USOM, Saigon has emphasized the non-military determinants of an expanded force structure in the context of the concurrent need for progress and efficiency in governmental administration and services. The key factors, which USOM concludes indicate increases in Security Force levels rather than in the RVNAF, are: (1) Better use of available manpower; skilled personnel will be drawn off in lesser numbers. (2) Puts "people" into the fight to a larger degree. (3) Less cost in personnel and support. (4) Will require less stringent economic measures though USOM feels a build-up of the RVNAF to 279,000 can be financed by the GVN if proper procedures are followed. Conclusions From the background developed above, I conclude that the best courses of action are: a. View the JCS-approved force levels as tentative pending further analysis of capabilities and requirements. b. Continue to emphasize acceleration and expansion of CG/SDC training. c. Determine areas in which the ARVN can be released from static functions and made strategically mobile; press the GVN for early action to so refine their force employment. d. Assess the need for additional US air transport to force-feed ARVN mobility and reduce reliance on land lines of communication. e. Complete development of an overall military strategy for SVN so that force structures may be viewed in some sort of accepted framework. Currently, a and b above are in process; c, d, and e require improved U.S. direction. W.H.B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
106. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 13, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-1362. Confidential, Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, Baguio for Harriman and Nolting, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and Vientiane. 1173. Deptel 1091./2/ I saw Thuan at 4:30 today and spoke to him regarding Madame Nhu's speech, following more or less exactly third paragraph Embtel 1165./3/ Thuan could not have taken protest better, and I had distinct impression that he was personally pleased that it had been made. He said that he himself had been "shocked" by speech and appreciated difficulties it caused for US. He recognized tremendous effort US making in Viet Nam and, referring to my remarks re problems posed for friends of Viet Nam, said that he thought US-Vietnamese relations had never been better. He attributed this in large part to attitude displayed by Ambassador Nolting, General Harkins, General McGarr, and myself. /2/See footnote 3, Document 104. /3/Document 104. Requesting that I treat his remarks with utmost confidence, he asked that we understand extreme delicacy of his position, insofar as doing anything about Madame Nhu is concerned. It was a family matter in which it was awkward to intrude. Thuan concluded by saying that he would convey my remarks promptly to President Diem pointing out that they had been made on instructions. I thanked him and said that the fundamental purpose of the approach had been to facilitate American-Vietnamese cooperation. Comment: I believe that it is of the utmost importance that fact that this protest has been made, and especially Thuan's reaction to it, be kept confidential. Trueheart
107. Editorial Note On March 13, 1962, McGeorge Bundy transmitted National Security Action Memorandum 131 to various Executive Agency Directors. It detailed a series of training objectives for counterinsurgency. For text of this memorandum, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pages 467-469. [Continue with the next documents]
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