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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
108. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright)/1/ Washington, March 14,1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51K/2-2162. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a copy of a similar letter that was not sent is attached, listing Wood as the drafter with clearances by Aldrich and Vance (DOD) as well as Oakley, Chayes, Rice, Cottrell, and Sarris in the Department of State. The source text lists as attachments: (1) Questions and Answers on Vietnam; (2) Letter to [from] Senator Morse, (3) Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem; and (4) "The Economics of North and South Vietnam." Only the first two are attached and only the first is printed. The letter from Senator Morse, February 21, submitted additional questions to Harriman, which are included in the attached Questions and Answers. Dear Mr. Chairman: In Governor Harriman's absence, I am forwarding the Department's replies to the questions which were presented to him as a result of the executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee concerning Viet-Nam./2/ The questions were those put by Senator Morse at the meeting and then by letter subsequently. /2/The transcript of the Executive Session at which Harriman testified on February 20, is in National Archives, RG 46, SFRC Files. The enclosed material is provided with the understanding that those portions which are classified are for the sole information of the Committee. If I may be of further assistance, I will appreciate you letting me know. Respectfully, Frederick G. Dutton/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
[Enclosure] ANSWERS TO SENATOR WAYNE MORSE'S QUESTIONS OF Q. No. 1. (Unclassified) From what provisions of the Constitution or treaty or statute does President Kennedy derive the right to order United States military personnel to transport South Vietnamese troops into combat, to return the fire of North Vietnamese, to patrol the sea approaches to South Viet-Nam and to drop propaganda leaflets over areas held by the guerrillas opposing the Government of South Viet-Nam? Answer: (Unclassified) Article II of the Constitution makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and vests in him the executive power. Article II has also been interpreted as making the President the "sole organ of the nation" in the field of foreign affairs (United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 318 ff. (1936)). These constitutional powers give the President authority to deploy United States military personnel abroad. In addition to the President's constitutional powers, the Congress has enacted Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which authorizes the President to furnish military assistance abroad, inter alia, by ". . . assigning or detailing members of the armed forces of the United States . . . to perform duties of a noncombatant nature, including those related to training or advice."/4/ /4/P.L. 87-195, September 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424. These and subsequent ellipses are in the source text. Furthermore, the United States and Viet-Nam are parties to the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950 (TIAS 2447; 3 U.S.T. 2756) which was concluded pursuant to P.L. 329, 81st Congress (63 Stat. 714, 22 U.S.C. 1571-1604). This agreement provides for the furnishing by the United States to Viet-Nam, among others, of military assistance in the form of equipment, material and services. Article IV, paragraph 2, of the agreement states that "To facilitate operations under this agreement, each Government agrees . . . to receive within its territory such personnel of the United States of America as may be required for the purposes of this agreement . . . ." Under these provisions the United States has since 1950 provided military assistance to Viet-Nam in the form of training, equipment and logistic support. The activities mentioned in the question are an expansion of this training and logistic support role. The transportation or troops is logistic support. The sea patrols referred to are carefully limited to training operations and the exchange of intelligence with Vietnamese naval units. Our assistance to the Vietnamese in dropping leaflets over isolated parts of Viet-Nam has similarly been confined to training and logistic aspects of the operation. Given the activities in which they are engaged, and the character of guerrilla warfare, in which hostilities occur sporadically at scattered points throughout the country, we had to face the possibility that United States personnel would come under hostile fire. In these circumstances, it was obvious that they would have to be able to defend themselves, and the President has accordingly authorized them to fire, if fired upon, if necessary for self-defense. Q. No. 2. (Unclassified) Would you discuss the differences and similarities between the present use of United States forces in Viet-Nam and their use in Korea in 1950 and in Lebanon in 1958? Answer: (Unclassified) United States military personnel are presently in Viet-Nam pursuant to a request of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam of December 14, 1961 (attached)/5/ and to an Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950. These personnel are engaged in activities of a noncombatant nature, primarily in training, logistic and advisory capacities, designed to assist the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to counter the indirect aggression directed against it from the North. /5/Not attached to the source text, but presumably a reference to Kennedy's letter of December 14; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 322. United States forces were sent into direct combat operations in South Korea to repel the aggressive armed attack launched on June 25, 1950 by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. On the same day the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the situation. The Korean National Assembly, on June 26, appealed both to the United States and the United Nations for assistance. On June 27, 1950 the Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the attack. The Security Council, on July 7, established a United Nations Command under the United States. In these circumstances, the President on the basis of his constitutional authority sent United States forces to Korea. United States forces were deployed in Lebanon in 1958 pursuant to an urgent request from the Government of Lebanon which felt itself threatened by externally inspired civil strife. These troops were sent to Lebanon under the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. President Eisenhower stated that United States forces had been sent to Lebanon "to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." It will be recalled that pursuant to President Eisenhower's request the Congress had on March 9, 1957, passed a joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East which provided in part, "if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism:" (P.L. 85-7, 85th Congress). In sending United States troops to Lebanon, the President did not make use of this joint resolution since the Lebanon situation did not involve Communist armed aggression as contemplated by the resolution. In the Lebanon situation, United States forces neither engaged in combat operations as in the Korean conflict nor in training or advisory functions as is the case today in Viet-Nam. Their mere presence in Lebanon had the desired effect of helping to restore order and tranquility there. Q. No. 3. (Unclassified) Would it be appropriate under the Constitution for the President to submit to the Congress a resolution covering the situation in Viet-Nam which would be comparable to the Formosa Resolution of 1955/6/ and the Middle East Resolution of 1957? /6/See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, p. 2486. Answer: (Unclassified) As indicated in question 1 above the President has power under the Constitution to take the actions presently being carried on in Viet-Nam. It is obviously desirable that the Congress understand the basis for Presidential actions of this character and fully support them. Traditionally these objectives have been achieved by consultation between officers of the Executive Branch and members and Committees of Congress having responsibility in the premises, particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the present case the President has asked that the fullest and freest consultation with the Committee and the Congressional leadership be maintained. He has himself met with appropriate members of the Congress on several occasions to discuss the problems in Viet-Nam. The Secretary has frequently testified before this Committee on the same subject, and has discussed it informally on many occasions with the members of the Committee. The Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs with appropriate members of his staff are and have been available for the purpose of consultation. On two occasions in the past, where it seemed possible that the President would wish to commit United States forces to combat operations, President Eisenhower decided to invite Congress to associate itself with his exercise of his constitutional functions as Commander-in-Chief, primarily in order to provide a convincing demonstration of United States unity on the issues there involved. We have not thought that such action has been called for to this point. However, should circumstances develop in which a formal expression of Congressional support seems desirable, the President undoubtedly would not hesitate to seek an appropriate resolution. Q. No. 4. (Unclassified) To what extent are the actions by United States military personnel in South Viet-Nam considered to be combat actions? Answer: (Unclassified) As the President said in his Press Conference on February 14, "We have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word."/7/ The United States is assisting Vietnamese combat units with training, logistic, transportation and advisory personnel. /7/See footnote 3, Document 68. The nature of the activities in which United States military personnel are engaged in Viet-Nam is dictated by the very character of guerrilla war. Hostilities are not concentrated in any well-defined area; rather, fighting is likely to break out sporadically and without warning in any part of the country. The "front" is not fixed as in the classical situation; the front literally is everywhere. In these circumstances, as indicated in Question 1 above, the President has ordered our military personnel in Viet-Nam to fire back in self-defense if fired upon. As noted above, United States military personnel in Viet-Nam are noncombatants. In the seven years since 1955 violence in Viet-Nam has claimed about 26,000 casualties. Of these, fifteen have been American personnel (four killed, ten wounded, one missing). Despite our increased activities in Viet-Nam, we would hope that these casualties can continue to be kept at a minimum. Q. No. 5. (Unclassified) Is the action of the United States in Viet-Nam inconsistent with the agreement of July 1954 on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, having particular reference to Chapter III entitled "Ban on Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Arms and Munitions, Military Bases"? (End Unclassified) Answer: (Confidential) The United States did not sign the 1954 Geneva Accords and is not a party thereto. At the time of conclusion of the Accords, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the . . . agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We have maintained the view expressed in General Smith's statement, and our present actions in Viet-Nam are fully in accord with that policy. However, North Viet-Nam which is a party to the Accords has consistently violated the agreements by directing, assisting, supplying, and reinforcing guerrilla forces in South Viet-Nam and by illegal introduction into North Viet-Nam of military personnel and war materials. International law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations. Both the United States and Viet-Nam have made it clear that if North Viet-Nam would comply with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, increased United States assistance would no longer be necessary. Legally, the actions of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in requesting and receiving additional assistance from the United States are fully consistent with the above principle. Justification for the application of the principle of law outlined above gains force in the present context from the fact that actions being taken by the Government of Viet-Nam can be related to the requirements of legitimate self-defense necessitated by the breaches of the other party. (End Confidential) Q. No. 6. (Unclassified) Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to assist a friendly country by providing defense articles and by assigning military personnel "to perform duties of a noncombatant nature". To what extent are the operations of United States Forces in Viet-Nam being paid for out of appropriations made pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961? (End Unclassified) Answer: (Begin Confidential) As of March 1, 1962, fiscal year 1962 operations in Viet-Nam have been funded to the extent of $151.3 million from appropriations made pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and $49.6 million from Department of Defense appropriations. These figures are subject to adjustment by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in accordance with the following guideline issued by the Secretary of Defense: "Under MAP financing procedures, reimbursement is made to the Military Service for materiel and/or services delivered or furnished to a recipient country against an approved and funded Military Assistance Program. On the other hand, where a Military Service has been assigned a U.S. military mission in a foreign country by the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all costs involved will be charged to the Military Service Appropriation." Salaries of all military personnel are, of course, funded from their Service appropriations and are not included in the above estimates. (End Confidential) Q. No. 7. (Unclassified) What are the plans of this Administration, if any, to bring the South Viet-Nam issues before the United Nations? Answer: (Confidential) The Administration has no present plans to bring the Viet-Nam situation before the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly for debate or action. However, Viet-Nam's case has been officially brought to the attention of the United Nations and its members. The State Department paper on Viet-Nam entitled "A Threat to the Peace" was transmitted to the Secretary General and all members on December 8, 1961. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam's own presentation of the facts has been made known to the members. The Secretary General, at the request of the Australian Delegation, circulated to all United Nations members copies of Vietnamese Notes to the International Control Commission on January 10, 1962. (End Confidential) Q. No. 8. (Unclassified) What do we consider to be our obligation to SEATO in regard to supplying military aid and economic aid to South Viet-Nam? Answer: (Confidential) Under Article IV (1) of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty, the United States is committed, in the event of Communist aggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Viet-Nam, to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. In the case of a threat to Viet-Nam other than armed attack, the parties to the Treaty have agreed under Article IV (2) to consult in order to agree on measures which should be taken for the common defense. Under Article IV (3) of the Treaty, no action can be taken on the territory of Viet-Nam except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. There has been no request by Viet-Nam for SEATO action. There is, of course, nothing in the Treaty which prevents the United States from taking action bilaterally with the Republic of Viet-Nam outside the framework of the Treaty. Several years before the creation of SEATO, the United States began to supply military assistance (1950-TIAS 2447) and Economic Aid (1951-TIAS 2346). A good working relationship for dealing with the fast-moving complexities of a guerrilla war has been established. We have consulted regularly in the SEATO Council Representatives with our Treaty partners on the situation in Viet-Nam. We have informed them of our efforts there and have urged them to join in helping Viet-Nam. A majority of the members are doing so. (End Confidential) Q. No. 9. (Unclassified) What is the Administration's answer to the cumulating evidence that the Government of Viet-Nam is not an effective government, that it is a corrupt government, and that it is a government that will probably fall at some time in the absence of U.S. support? (End Unclassified) Answer: (Begin Secret) The effectiveness of the Vietnamese Government can only be judged against its circumstances. It is a new country emerging from fifteen years of war and eighty years of colonial control. During half its six years of existence it has fought off the threat of Communist conquest. Its political policy has been to lay the infrastructure of democracy" through education, transportation and communication. Despite the war the number of children in Vietnamese elementary schools has grown in five years to 1,100,000, an increase of 272%, and a far better record than that of Communist North Viet-Nam. The Government of Viet-Nam has also made a proud record in expanding transportation, communication and health services. Its per capita food production and per capita gross national product are growing and are both higher than in North Viet-Nam. This is a good indication that the Government of free Viet-Nam with U.S. help has made more effective progress than has North Viet-Nam under Communist control. Statistical evidence carefully compiled from the best sources available is enclosed./8/ /8/Not attached to the source text. On the other hand Government effectiveness in South Viet-Nam has been hampered by over-centralization, overlapping agencies and insufficient understanding between the governing and the governed. While this is partly due to the lack of competent administrators, it is also true that a greater number of competent administrators could have been developed if they had been given more responsibility and authority. Another fact which has hampered the effectiveness of the Government of Viet-Nam is that President Diem does not possess the magnetic qualities needed to rally his people enthusiastically to his Government's programs. There is evidence of corruption in the Government of Viet-Nam. There is no evidence of corruption on the part of President Diem and he has carried on an extensive and well-publicized campaign to punish corrupt officials. Several have been publicly tried and punished. Some official corruption is endemic in Southeast Asian countries. The amount of corruption in Viet-Nam does not appear to be greater than in neighboring countries. However, it has damaged the prestige of the Government of Viet-Nam because exaggerated stories of official corruption are widely believed. We have checked these stories carefully and find no evidence for many of them. However, the Government of Viet-Nam has not done an effective job setting the record straight with its own people. Two attempts have been made against President Diem. Both were military in origin and seem to have been motivated by the feeling that the government was not giving them the authority to press on vigorously with the anti-Communist struggle. The attempts failed. President Diem is clearly in control as the legitimate and elected head of the government. No other group has any appreciable degree of popular support. In the circumstances of war and tension existing in Viet-Nam, some discontent must be expected. Also the trouble lies partly with Diem's inability to project adequately his own many good qualities of leadership to his people. (End Secret) Q. No. 10. (Unclassified) What actions has President Diem taken in regard to the 9 points for reform which he and Ambassador Nolting agreed to in December?/9/ /9/The Joint Memorandum of Understanding, December 4, 1961, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 756 from Saigon, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-461) Answer: (Unclassified) Varying progress has been made on all the points on which President Diem and Ambassador Nolting reached agreement in early December. Since their understanding intimately affects the interests of both governments and the prosecution of Viet-Nam's defense effort, it cannot be spelled out in detail. However, the following has clearly emerged in the intervening three months: 1. There is a much closer and more effective working relationship between the United States Government and the Government of Viet-Nam. 2. American military advisers have been accepted and listened to in a variety of roles. 3. The Vietnamese National Internal Security Council (War Cabinet) has met more frequently and is playing a somewhat greater role. 4. There has been increased freedom of debate in the National Assembly. 5. The military command structure has been strengthened, but considerable improvement is still needed. 6. U.S. and Vietnamese officials have embarked on joint studies of local conditions. 7. Civic action and plans for village and hamlet defense are being made. Further coordination and better implementation are needed. 8. Provincial Councils are being created. It is too soon to judge their usefulness. 9. There have been increases in military salaries and benefits. 10. A wide range of sound measures have put the economy on a sounder basis. 11. A National Economic Council has been formed and has commenced examination of government development plans. Its activities will be slow and cautious. 12. The effectiveness of military intelligence has been greatly increased. 13. Flood relief and rehabilitation have been carried out with good effect. 14. The President has increased his travels to the provinces. 15. Public information has definitely improved. Q. No. 11. (Unclassified) Do the Attorney General's remarks/10/ at the Saigon Airport represent the policy of the Administration? Were they cleared by the President or the Department of State in advance? /10/During his tour of Asia, Attorney General Robert Kennedy stopped in Saigon for about an hour while his plane was refueled. In response to a question from a newsman, he made a statement to the effect that the United States was in South Vietnam to win. Answer: (Unclassified) The Attorney General received intensive briefings on the situation in Viet-Nam before his departure for the Far East. He made a stop in Viet-Nam at the Saigon Airport only for purposes of refueling his aircraft. His remarks there were informal and consisted largely of answers to questions from the press. In these circumstances there was no formal clearance of his statements. However, his remarks reflect the policy of the Administration toward Viet-Nam. Q. No. 12. (Unclassified) To what extent are our allies and other non-Communist states contributing to and supporting the combined U.S.-Vietnamese effort to preserve the independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam? Answer: (Unclassified) Since it became independent Japan, France, Germany and Australia have made available to Viet-Nam various forms of aid whose total value is about $100 million. In addition there have been other programs involving students, teachers, technicians, commodities and equipment from these countries as well as from Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, China, Malaya, India, FAO, WHO, ILO, ICAO, UNESCO and UNTAO. The United States is, moreover, presently trying to stimulate expanded Free World aid to Viet-Nam as evidence of financial and political solidarity with Viet-Nam in its struggle. Q. No. 13. (Unclassified) What precisely is the present attitude of the Indian Government toward the conflict in Viet-Nam? Heretofore, India has appeared to observe a strict and uncritically neutral role in its function as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam. I would like to know whether this continues to be the case. Answer: (Unclassified) India, as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam, has, according to its lights, sought to play an impartial role dealing with the problems of Viet-Nam as they relate to the Geneva Accords of 1954. (End Unclassified) Q. No. 14. (Unclassified) What is our intelligence estimate of the possibility that the Communist bloc will escalate the conflict in Viet-Nam above the level of subversion and guerrilla warfare? (End Unclassified) Answer: (Secret) The Communist objective remains that of eliminating United States influence and presence from Viet-Nam and of replacing it by Communism. They have so far maintained coordination within the Communist bloc in their attempts to attain this objective. While the tempo of Viet Cong activity is likely to increase in Viet-Nam, there seems little prospect at present that the pattern of this activity will change quickly and drastically. In looking further it must be remembered that Hanoi and Peking are more militantly revolutionary than Russia and consider their interests to be more directly involved in Viet-Nam than Russia's. If Viet-Nam's efforts to defend itself are more successful, Hanoi, with military forces of 300,000 available, will be strongly tempted to increase the strength of its attacks. To Hanoi the struggle is at least as much a struggle for national reunification as an ideological struggle. It has largely committed its prestige to this struggle. However, the following factors are likely to deter an overt escalation by North Viet-Nam in a situation where South Viet-Nam is defending itself with increasing success: 1. Hanoi would not welcome the presence of a large number of Chinese Communist troops in North Viet-Nam. China is the traditional enemy. North Viet-Nam does not want to become another Chinese sphere of influence. 2. North Viet-Nam fears Free World retaliation. 3. Hanoi desires to retain some latitude of action by playing off Moscow and Peking. 4. Moscow might increase its military aid to Hanoi, but would probably prefer to see a conference on Viet-Nam rather than a full scale war m Viet-Nam, an area which Russia probably does not consider vital to its interests. 5. There appears to be some Communist belief, particularly in Moscow, that even if South Viet-Nam is able to resist temporarily, it will, in the long run, fall to Communism. If Viet Cong success increases, the present guerrilla struggle will be likely to move up the scale, in the pattern of Communist wars of "national liberation", towards open war involving increasingly large troop formations. A "liberated" area and "liberation government" would probably be established. However, the formation of a "liberation government" would not be an automatic signal for Communist military escalation. It appears more likely that the present pattern, a long, wearing struggle, will continue. The South Vietnamese effort, with U.S. support is designed to meet this challenge. Time is not necessarily on the side of the guerrilla, as shown in Greece, the Philippines and Malaya. The Viet Cong probably must escalate their guerrilla war to open war in order to conquer the country. If they should decide to escalate to larger, open formations, it will be a particularly dangerous time for them. On the other hand continuation of present guerrilla destruction risks angering the peasant without winning the war. Since Communist propaganda carries limited conviction in Viet-Nam, where so many have already lived under their domination, the Viet Cong guerrillas must operate through fear and coercion as well as through propaganda and persuasion to obtain men and food. The South Vietnamese counter-guerrilla strategy seeks to save the peasant, conserve his property and deprive the Viet Cong of their needs so that they will have to take increasingly cruel measures to obtain food, arms and men. (End Secret) Q. No. 15. (Unclassified) I find myself unclear as to the Soviet Union's attitude toward and role in the Viet-Nam conflict. I would like an assessment of that question. More specifically, I would like to know whether Russian and Czech arms are being made available to the Viet Cong-if so, whether the levels of such assistance are appreciable or token. Answer: (Begin Secret) As indicated above the Soviet Union for the present probably desires to avoid an enlargement of the struggle in Viet-Nam to the point which would increase the likelihood of a major war. If, however, South Viet-Nam's defensive efforts become more successful, the USSR might feel constrained to redress the balance by increased aid to North Viet-Nam in order to reduce the likelihood of a large scale Chinese Communist intervention. Moscow cannot appear to oppose Communist expansion in underdeveloped areas. While the Soviet attitude towards Viet-Nam will be largely influenced by developments in Laos, as well as by its own relations with Communist China and by developments on disarmament and in Berlin, it seems probable that at present Moscow does not want any major escalation in Viet-Nam. This attitude will not prevent the continuation of Russian and Communist bloc military aid to North Viet-Nam. Communist bloc military aid to North Viet-Nam has been large and effective. However, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid the use of Communist manufactured arms in South Viet-Nam. (End Secret) Q. No. 16. (Unclassified) If President Diem should depart the political scene--either as a result of a military coup such as was attempted in November 1960, or otherwise--are there elements, military or civilian, which could cope effectively with the situation, in our judgment? Answer: (Unclassified) We believe there are. We are following this most sensitive subject very closely. (End Unclassified)
109. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, March 15, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-1562. Top Secret. Dear Alexis: The Department of Defense has completed a review of the required force structure and strengths for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC) through 1964. Our analysis included consideration of the following factors: 1. The build-up of Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. 2. The expansion of Communist control in Laos. 3. The progress of the GVN in planning for and conducting security operations. 4. The capability of the GVN to train, maintain and effectively utilize their forces. 5. The need for the GVN to husband its manpower resources carefully. 6. The force structure best reconciling the requirements of coordinated and phased counter-insurgency operations with available leadership; and 7. The requirement for long range planning for South Vietnam. From our analysis we conclude that MAP support should be authorized for the FY 62 and FY 63 GVN force levels shown below; and that the FY 64 GVN force levels shown below should be approved for MAP planning purposes: |
| Currently Authorized | FY 62 | FY 63 | FY 64 | |
| RVNAF | 205,000 | 206,600 | 215,000 | 225,000 |
| CG | 68,000 | 72,000 | 81,000 | 90,000 |
| SDC | 49,200 | 65,000 | 80,000 | 80,000 |
| Totals | 322,200 | 343,600 | 376,000 | 395,000 |
|
The estimated additional MAP costs of the above increases,
from presently approved force levels to the levels proposed for
end FY 63, are prorated as $11.6 million for FY 1962 and $21.7
million for FY 1963.
It is anticipated that some MAP support may also be required later for selected paramilitary local defense groups. Modest support may be required to prepare selected paramilitary forces for use in support of the plans developed for the campaign in South Vietnam. Our estimates of the extent and duration of required MAP support for forces of this nature are not yet firm. It will depend on the role that these groups accept in support of refined counter-insurgency plans. We now envision that as clearing actions are initiated in the areas where these groups operate, they might be integrated into the CG or SDC for support of holding operations. The Department of Defense recommends prompt approval of support of the above force levels, to insure most timely availability of trained and effective operational forces considered essential for attainment of U. S. objectives in South Vietnam. As you know, Ambassador Nolting and the Country Team concur in support of these force levels. Sincerely yours, Bill
110. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 15, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-1562. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad and Manila for Ambassador Nolting. A memorandum recording the conversation with President Diem is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 361.1, Chief Executive--Vietnam. 1180. General Harkins and I called on President Diem afternoon March 12 at his request. In course of two hour meeting, primarily devoted to Diem's views re military situation in central highlands and central coastal plain, General Harkins asked when limitations on armament of VNAF planes would be lifted (as of that time our information was that they were still limited to 20-mm cannon, except in I corps area). Diem indicated that he was not prepared to permit planes to carry bombs until system of "control" had been devised which would ensure that pilots hit targets they were supposed to. He did not specify what sort of control might accomplish this. Although not willing to permit planes to carry bombs which could "destroy buildings", Diem indicated that he might be prepared to permit them to carry rockets and napalm. In pointing out dangers of permitting planes to carry bombs, Diem remarked that even if an irresponsible pilot were shot down, plane with bombs aboard might crash anywhere in Saigon "even on foreign Embassy". General Harkins and I expressed concern over continuation of restrictions, emphasizing not only military handicaps but awkward position in which United States Government was placed. US role in Viet Nam was to assist GVN to win its war; it was not a US war, undeclared as some press releases indicate or otherwise. Restrictions on VNAF tended to undercut this position. Diem did not reply directly. Following day, March 13, I raised matter with Thuan and Harkins with Generals Ty and Khanh of joint general staff, along same lines we had taken with Diem. Thuan said that restrictions were being lifted immediately except on 250 pound and 500 pound bombs. Planes would, however, be allowed to carry rockets, napalm and anti-personnel bombs, which Thuan said was only type of bomb needed in "war of this kind". (He telephoned March 14 to say that he had just signed order to this effect.) General Harkins was informed by Ty and Khanh that background investigation of pilots was continuing but was expected to be completed by about April 1. They also said that "controls" envisaged were radar and definitive flight plans. Harkins informed by Khanh today that Thuan's order had been received and put into effect, i.e., VNAF planes now authorized carry 20-mm., rockets, napalm and anti-personnel bombs. Trueheart
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 16, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-1662. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1185. Deptel 1085; Embtel 1155./2/ I discussed provincial surveys with Thuan March 13 stressing importance getting further surveys under way. As it was my understanding that GVN desires proceed next with remaining seven provinces covered by Delta (Thompson) plan,/3/ suggested desirability survey teams using that plan as framework for their investigations, seeking develop information which would be useful in its implementation. I thought that in order to accomplish this, it might be necessary to extend period devoted to surveys to about one week per province. Thuan agreed with these suggestions but was not at that time prepared to set date for start-up of next surveys or to name GVN representatives. It was clear from his remarks that he expects to have trouble finding qualified people who can be spared full time for this work. He did say that he had already discussed recommendations of first surveys with President Diem and planned to have further discussion next day with him with view to getting recommendations implemented. /2/Documents 101 and 100, respectively. /3/See Document 51. We will continue to press GVN to get further surveys under way. It is our hope that Thuan's informal agreement to key surveys to Delta Plan will permit expansion into political, economic and social areas, without risks of rejection or at least delay which would be involved in proposing explicitly that terms of reference of surveys be changed with reference points raised Deptel 1085: (1) Every effort will be made to gear surveys to needs Delta Plan. MACV has developed new checklist and we will seek to have surveys concentrate on those provinces slated for early clearing and holding operations. Results of surveys will also be combined with large slides specific information being developed through MAAG and CAS channels. (2) Effort will be made to reach village level in surveys. Do not believe practicable, however, have surveys proceed on village-by-village basis. This would not only involve proposing change in terms of reference (with risks indicated above) but would, we estimate, require extension of time spent in each province to two or three weeks, with resulting heavy drain scarce GVN manpower, maximum disruption normal provincial administration, and increased security risks. Moreover, much detailed information for planning purposes can be and is being developed in other ways, for example, through CAS/CIO surveys of provincial NPSS units already in progress (3) Believe important value first set surveys was catalogue intelligence and military shortcomings that could be immediately corrected, plus on-the-spot remedial action by officials concerned. Wish continue stress this approach, while at same time using surveys to generate information for implementation outline plan for counterinsurgency. Believe surveys should fill out and provide check on information obtained from GVN for planning purposes, but do not believe we should make them sole instrument for developing such information. Trueheart
112. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to the Vice President (Johnson)/1/ Washington, March 16, 1962. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, Memos from Colonel Burris. Secret. SUBJECT The Communist rebels continue their attacks with company and battalion-sized units, in contrast to much smaller groups of men formerly employed. Attacks are made against lines of communication and isolated guard posts. The brunt of the attack therefore is directed against the civil defense forces rather than against the principal units of the regular armed forces. The propaganda barrage against United States assistance to South Viet Nam continues to increase and the rebels are receiving increased logistic support from North Viet Nam. Propaganda broadcasts to South Viet Nam have reached an all time high and emanate from many sources both within and without South Viet Nam. . . . . . . . The U.S. program in South Viet Nam still has not reversed the level nor intensity of Viet Cong operations. While I have not talked with Mr. McNamara personally on the subject, I am familiar with the substance of his meetings with the commanders in the Pacific. Further, discussions with General Taylor's office and with representatives from the Joint Chiefs' staff have all so far failed to produce an estimate as to when the trend might be reversed. One discussion on March 14 produced a rather interesting thesis that a decisive victory could never be achieved in South Viet Nam and that a Korea-style truce within that country would be the most that could be expected./2/ One basis for this thesis is the policy of dealing, in effect, with each nation in Southeast Asia separately and in differing contexts. The Communists therefore take advantage of our truce efforts in Laos to supply Viet Cong forces in South Viet Nam, even utilizing the sanctuary of Cambodia. Soviet aircraft continue to operate with impunity in this effort. Suggestions have been made that actions be taken against these operations, but State rejects them as "aggressive" and "provocative". The situation is analogous to that in Korea where Communist forces were supplied from bases just across the Yalu. Under these circumstances and restrictions our efforts in South east Asia will at most be no more conclusive than those in Korea. The costs will probably be comparable, and the President's estimate of a ten-year effort is realistic. /2/No record of any meeting on March 14 has been found.
113. Decree by the President of the Republic of Vietnam/1/ No. 1/QP Saigon, March 16, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-1662. Secret. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to despatch 431 from Saigon, April 16, which described some of the changes made in the Delta Plan from the time Thompson originally submitted it until its final approval by Diem. For original plan, see Document 51. Also enclosed with the despatch was a decree of March 23 that appointed Hoang Van Lac as Special Commissioner responsible for carrying out the Delta Plan. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PLAN TO RESTORE
SECURITY Article 1. Within the framework of national pacification, a priority plan is herewith established to restore security in the Third Tactical Zone. The purpose of this Special Instruction is to determine the basic principles and necessary procedures to carry out the plan. This Instruction is divided into two parts:
PART 1 General Article 2. Over-all Concepts. The Viet Cong have chosen rural areas for their important activities. They have oppressed the spirit of the people in order to destroy the lower echelons of government authority, exploited news, sources of supply, manpower, and resources in order to build up their strength in their destructive war. The reliance of the Viet Cong on rural people is obvious. Cut each connecting link between the Viet Cong and the people, and the Viet Cong will naturally be isolated and easily crushed. As for the people, once they are able to escape the coercion of the Viet Cong, their protection will become more effective. Security and the National Law will be guaranteed, and the Government's authority will be strengthened in every village and hamlet. Order will be restored, the people will believe firmly in the government, and will honestly cooperate with the authorities to eradicate Communism. The Plan to Restore Security in the Third Tactical Zone aims at the vital objective of eliminating Viet Cong influence among rural people. Article 3. Objectives of the Plan. In order to achieve this vital purpose, the Plan aims at the realization of the following objectives: (a) Control, protect, and fight for the people, most of all rural people; (b) Gather all information essential to destroy the organs the Viet Cong have placed among the people; (c) Isolate armed Viet Cong elements to force them away from the people's side; (d) Establish and maintain "White" zones, i.e., zones where Viet Cong influence has been completely eliminated. Article 4. Priority Areas. The national resources at present are not sufficient to carry out the plan at once in all areas of the country, or to provide all the means. For this reason, in the initial period the following areas have been chosen as first priority because they are densely populated, have centralized administrative organs, a prosperous economy, and are relatively secure: a) All of Vinh Long province; b) Vinh Binh province (except the southeastern portion: Tra Cu, Cau Ngang, and Long Toan districts); c) Kien Hoa province (except the southeastern portion: Thanh Phu, Ba Tri, Binh Dai districts); d) Dinh Tuong province (except for the portion north of the road from the My Thuan ferry to Cai Lay, along the Thuong Mai canal to Thu Thua); e) Long An province (except for the portion west of Thu Thua, along the Vam Co river north of Duc Hoa to the Part between the Vam Co river and the road from Duc Hoa to Tay Ninh); f) Tay Ninh province (the part south of Go Dau Ha and east of the Vam Co river); g) Binh Duong Province (except the part north of Ben Cat); h) Phuoc Thanh province (that part west of Interprovincial Route 15 from Phu Giao to Tan Uyen); i) Bien Hoa province (that part south from Ho Nai to Long Thanh along National Route 15, except for Quang Xuyen and Cao Gio districts); j) Phuoc Tuy province (that part west of National Route 15 from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Le, then along Interprovincial Route 23 to Xuyen Moc). Priorities for remaining areas in the provinces of the Southern Region of Viet-Nam will be determined later, according to the progress of the plan. PART 2 Execution of the Plan Article 5. Establishment of a Security System. In the area granted priority, the Plan will establish a firm security system, composed of strategic hamlets and fighting hamlets. Strategic hamlets will be built in places where popular security is adequate. Fighting hamlets will be built in areas that still suffer Viet Cong pressure and control, or in areas permanently threatened by important Viet Cong troops. The security system must be built on a stable foundation and in depth, in order that the strategic and fighting hamlets support one another. For this reason, isolated hamlets or groups of hamlets which the enemy could exploit or which would be unprotected close to the frontier will not be established. On the provincial level, the Province Chief must put forth a plan for building a system of strategic and fighting hamlets. Only in this situation may isolated hamlets be built during the brief wading period unh1 intermediate hamlets are constructed to complete the connected system. On the interprovincial level, the Province Chiefs must coordinate the plan for building a security system in their own provinces with that of neighboring provinces, in order that the interprovincial security system is not left uncovered in border areas Article 6. Defense of the Security System. During the period in which the security system is being built, the Army shall carry out operations to prevent Viet Cong units from being free to interfere in the execution of the Plan. Intelligence and information agencies shall make every effort to assure that the Plan obtains satisfactory results. In the defense of the hamlets the large part of the work will be given to the Self Defense Corps, with the Republican Youth contributing strength within the framework of the SDC organization. The Civil Guard will have responsibility for providing close mobile support. However, during the period when fighting hamlets are being built in areas heavily infiltrated by the Viet Cong, the Civil Guard may be temporarily used to replace the SDC in the direct defense of hamlets, unti1 such time as reliable and capable SDC units can be raised. The Army shall be ready to intervene when the hamlets are heavily attacked by the Viet Cong. Article 7. Control of the Security System. Control of the population in the security system must be complete, to cut off any source of contact with the Viet Cong. Therefore, a number of control measures must be taken, to wit: 1) Urgent distribution of plastic identity cards to the entire population in the area where the security system is being established. The inhabitants of each house will be recorded and photographed' a copy going to each house along with the identity card number. Copies will also go to the district and province headquarters. 2) Establishment of regular control points along inland waterways, and conduct of surprise patrols in neighboring areas. 3) Enforcement of curfew orders on a few waterways in the area of fighting hamlets and other areas, if necessary. Defense forces may fire at sight on anyone breaking the curfew. 4) Establish forbidden zones in dense, jungle, and marshy regions, etc. . . . /2/ Permit defense forces to fire at sight on any element penetrating this area. /2/Ellipsis in the source text. 5) Control of the transportation of paddy, foodstuffs, and articles of a military nature. If it is deemed necessary, transportation by convoy will be enforced, and after the harvest rice will be bought by the Government and collected in a secure place, and will be rationed to consumers. Article 8. The Fight for the People in the Security System. In order to fight for the support of the people, the following concrete policy must be carried out: 1) Military and Government cadres must have correct behavior when communicating daily with the people and in every situation. Punitive measures against a village or hamlet will never be taken without the approval of the National Security Council, even if they are legitimate. Great care must be exercised when using bombers or artillery in populated areas, to avoid injuring or killing law-abiding citizens. 2) The people must be kept thoroughly informed about the details and purpose of the control measures which they must follow. Once order and security in the area have been re-established, control measures must immediately be eased. In the event that people must be moved to regrouped hamlets, they must also be given every assistance, and at the same time should be informed of the benefits they will receive as a result of the Plan. 3) According to the progress made, when a security system has been firmly consolidated and Viet Cong influence has been eliminated in a part of the area, activities on the social and economic side must be begun immediately to improve the life of the people. Article 9. Distribution of Duties. The tasks of the civil and military authorities in the execution of the Plan are distributed as follows: 1. Civilian a) Administrative --build strategic and fighting hamlets; --organize administration in the villages and hamlets; --provide control measures; --effect social and economic reforms. Emphasize especially agricultural, health, and education, and public facilities. b) Self Defense Corps --direct protection of strategic and fighting hamlets; --patrol in neighboring areas; --gather information leading to Viet Cong organs, communications, or supplies; --eliminate armed Viet Cong cadres or arrest elements working -distribute leaflets, information, and propaganda documents. c) Civil Guard --mobile patrolling outside the hamlet, particularly along the perimeter of populated areas and along rivers and canals; --rescue SDC forts that are attacked --take over the defense of fighting hamlets in places where SDC are lacking or not adequate; --enforce the control regulations stated above. 2) Military a) Army --in the initial period, carry out sweeping and probing actions and attacks on bases and assembly areas of main Viet Cong forces; --patrol outside populated areas, and prevent coordinated attacks and concentrations of the enemy; --assist fighting hamlets in areas controlled by the Viet Cong, intervene it these hamlets are surrounded; --apply control measures, particularly the curfew and forbidden zones. As the security system is gradually stabilized, regular army units will be relieved of their static duties. Ranger units will be withdrawn on a priority basis from populated areas when Civil Guard units arrive to replace them. Army units that must remain will be reorganized for long operations outside of populated areas, primarily in the enemy zone in the Thirty-First Tactical Zone. b) Air Force --reinforce the mobile attack capability of regular Army and Civil Guard units, by airlift in areas where communications are difficult or nonexistent; --perform reconnaissance and communications; --seek targets to attack; --evacuate wounded, military and civilian. c) Navy --prevent the Viet Cong from infiltrating equipment, food, arms, and personnel by sea; --coordinate closely with Civil Guard river patrol units to prevent Viet Cong movement by water along the sea coast and river estuaries; --supply the means of rapid transportation of personnel and equipment in coastal areas; --support operations in coastal areas and along the major channels of the Mekong. Article 10. Responsibility for Executing the Plan. The Secretary of State at the Presidency, Assistant for National Defense, Charged with Security, shall accept responsibility before the President for the general execution of the Plan. As for the Strategic Hamlet Program, the Secretary of State for the Interior is the Secretary General of the Central Committee, still responsible for the over-all plan. Article 11. Special Stipulations. The Viet Cong will naturally react strongly to prevent the execution of the Plan, and will concentrate all their force to seek to destroy the Government's efforts, despite some failure at the beginning. Thus, when establishing the security system, the provincial authorities must examine the situation carefully and select the proper time to execute the Plan, i.e., when there are sufficient troops to halt every destructive Communist plot, or encourage the population to oppose the enemy. The more the security system is strengthened, the more will the Viet Cong seek to attack in strength, and at that time the Army will be ready to exterminate the enemy when he concentrates or attacks fighting hamlets. Finally, the determination of priority zones for establishing a security system does not mean that the Viet Cong are free to control other areas. such as the First or Second Tactical Zone. On the contrary, in these Zones civil and military authorities as well as popular anti-Communist organizations must be warned to face the enemy reaction in timely fashion. Ngo Dinh Diem/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
114. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, March 31, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 75 D 378, SV-236, 12 Delta Plan. Secret. SUBJECT /2/"Higher Authority" refers to President Kennedy. As directed by higher authority, I met with General Harkins in Saigon on 17 March 1962. After about an hour's conversation, we were joined by Ambassador Nolting. General Harkins gave me a rundown on the inspection tours that he has been conducting since arriving in Saigon. On the whole he feels encouraged. He finds the troops are well-trained, energetic, and vigorous fighters. He reported particularly on some newly organized strategic villages in central South Viet-Nam./3/ The Viet Cong had attacked one of these villages just the night before, and the Self-Defense Corps had successfully repelled them. The next morning reinforcements were brought up and the Viet Cong suffered heavy casualties. /3/The value of the strategic village approach is also illustrated by two recent cables. The first is an intelligence report indicating that the arming of a very few villages in the Montagnard District along the infiltration routes has forced the infiltrating Viet Cong to change their routes drastically. The second illustrates the particular importance of village radios. A team distributing radios bumped into a Viet Cong unit, which withdrew towards a village equipped with a radio just 24 hours earlier. Alerted by their newly acquired radio, the village Self Defense Corps intercepted the Viet Cong in a highly successful ambush. [Footnote in the source text.] In discussing our general approach in South Viet-Nam, I stressed to both General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting that the paper entitled A Strategic Concept for South Viet-Nam/4/ was written hastily after only a very short time on the ground; that no one felt that it was the last word on the subject; and that any comments, criticisms, or suggestions that they would have would be most welcome. General Harkins said that for his part he felt that the general approach was sound and that his impression was that the South Vietnamese Government and the people in the American Missions were in substantial agreement with this approach. On the specific recommendations for assigning U.S. personnel to civic action teams and other tasks at the village level, Ambassador Nolting with General Harkins' concurrence suggested that we should not approach President Diem with a formal proposal. Rather, we should recommend the assignment of individual Americans to civic action teams and other tasks at the village level only as specific needs arose. For my part I said that I thought that this was by far the best approach. Both Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins went on to say, though, the assignment of American personnel to civic action teams and village level tasks was necessary and desirable and that the numbers needed were very close to those estimated in the report. /4/Document 42. At the time of our meeting, President Diem had not yet signed the strategic village plan prepared by Mr. Thompson./5/ The delay was apparently occasioned not by any reluctance concerning the plan itself but by doubts as to who among the Vietnamese would be in charge of it. /5/President Diem signed the plan (Document 113) on March 16, although U.S. representatives did not learn of the signing until March 19. The Deputy Chief of Mission was concerned that Brother Nhu, who is enthusiastic about the strategic village approach, might attempt to apply it simultaneously all over the country rather than systematically by phases. Ambassador Nolting, however, has talked with Brother Nhu about this specific question and has gotten some assurances that Nhu is aware of the danger of a blanket approach. Ambassador Nolting feels that it would be most unwise to raise with President Diem any question about Brother Nhu at this time. Operation Sunrise I asked about Operation Sunrise, which calls for building a belt of strategic villages in Binh Duong Province along the road through Ben Cat./6/ This province is flanked by areas of very heavy concentrations of regular Viet Cong units, in Zone D on the one side and Tay Ninh on the other, and is a major route for Viet Cong supplies and troop movements. I said that the strategic village concept called for building zones of such villages beginning with the less dangerous areas and then fanning outwards, and that my fear was that the Viet Cong would try to make an example of these villages and so discredit the Strategic Village concept throughout South Viet-Nam. /6/See Document 103. General Harkins said that he, too, was very disturbed about Operation Sunrise. He feared that the troops guarding these very exposed villages would be called away to meet some other threat, giving the Viet Cong precisely the opportunity they seek. Both General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting were pressing Diem to cancel this operation, but they were handicapped by the fact that it was the MAAG that originally urged it and especially since the MAAG had previously urged the Zone D operation and then abandoned it. General Harkins said he could only hope that these villages could in fact be protected until the phased plan had begun to work. Roger Hilsman/7/ /7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
115. Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)/1/ Saigon?, March 19, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries: Vietnam, 3/1/62-7/28/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Allan Evans, Thomas L. Hughes, and Joseph W. Scott, all of INR. I find that I am a little uneasy about the way things are going in South Viet-Nam . . . . . . . Secondly, I'm uneasy about the tendency in Washington to attempt to keep the farm gate operations secret. I think it is an impossibility; there are just too many Americans and Vietnamese involved in this particular operation in South Viet-Nam and I think that the solution lies not in trying to keep it hidden but in to using farm gate correctly. On this latter point, it is perfectly clear that farm gate is still being used on what they call "Interdiction" roles; that is, striking at targets revealed by South Vietnamese intelligence in places where the GVN does not have access. A General Jabloski (whom I used to know at West Point) related the following to Fritz Nolting: On several occasions the Viet Cong, after an air strike, have removed their own dead and then laid out in the middle of the street the women and children killed by our air strikes, so that the villagers on resuming would find only women and children dead rather than Viet Cong. Among the Americans in South Viet-Nam, according to Nolting, however, there are growing doubts about the utility of farm gate used in this "interdiction" role as opposed to close ground support of units actually in contact with the Viet Cong. However, Diem and the South Vietnamese think it is great stuff and are continually calling for strikes on the basis of the flimsiest kind of intelligence. Our joint air control center has been screening these very carefully but there is still a very large amount of what cannot help but be indiscriminate bombing. The whole business could blow up in any number of horrendous ways. I would like all of you to give some thought to this and how we might intervene either at the White House with Bobby Kennedy or in some other way. Roger Hilsman/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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