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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
116. Letter From the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs (Heavner) to the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood)/1/ Saigon, March 19, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.S/3-1962. Secret; Official-Informal. Heavner was in Vietnam to assist with provincial surveys. Two handwritten notations were on the source text, one requesting that a copy be sent to Stoneman, the other indicating that it had been done. Stoneman was the AID officer responsible for Vietnam. Dear Ben: You will no doubt get a copy of the Hickey-Donnell report/2/ in due time. I think, however, that you may be interested now in some of the things they said Friday/3/ in a debriefing session at MAAG. Their work is not finished, so some of the ideas may be changed by future observations as well as by being filtered through Heavner. /2/Not found. /3/March 16. The outstanding conclusion seemed to be that strategic hamlets do make for better security, that relocation of the people in strategic hamlets is feasible in general, but that the GVN is still making many of the errors which characterized the agroville program, i.e. implementing the plan with no regard for the hardships imposed on the local population. Another conclusion was that the people very much need and hope for more agricultural extension assistance from the GVN. Both Hickey and Donnell seemed to feel that increased agricultural assistance in the form of credit, fertilizer, improved seeds, stock and expert advice are essential to winning over the peasantry. They reported that at Cu Chi in Binh Duong province they found the people openly resentful over the labor and material demands made on them to construct the strategic hamlets there. They learned that although the laborers were supposed to get nominal pay (10 piasters a day), none actually received any money or food, that some had worked as long as 49 consecutive days on the project, that many laborers will not live in the hamlet and so derive no personal benefit from the project, that building the hamlet cut deeply into the second crop (tobacco) because they did not have time to plant and water it, and that many were facing genuine economic distress as a result. Hickey and Donnell felt these gripes were quite legitimate. A simple solution here of course is to pay the workers. But this requires piaster resources. Another solution to the Cu Chi problem is suggested by the fact that one area visited is hiring a bulldozer from a nearby plantation to construct the earthworks around the village. In part at least, this could be done with dollars./4/ /4/At this point in the source text, a note in an unidentified hand reads: "How about using some of the SDP bulldozers sitting in Saigon?" Still another idea is suggested by the fact that Hickey and Donnell saw several variants on the strategic hamlet, some of which are much easier and much less expensive than the Cu Chi model (which is apparently pretty much on the lines of the Hilsman prototype). In Vinh Long they found strategic hamlets with no encircling fortifications but a "defensive bloc" at or near the center of the hamlet. This bloc was fortified by spike boards and mines made from hand grenades. These could be taken up in the day time. In Kien Hoa, no fortifications are built by the famous Colonel Thao, who thinks they are generally unnecessary. He builds a hamlet office, information post, and guard post and calls it done. He concedes, however, that in some areas earthworks may be required. His approach is in general much slower than that used at Cu Chi; he is not paying the peasants either, but neither is he applying great pressure. While the rather unhappy picture at Cu Chi is almost certainly quite accurate, I should say I think much of the discontent will wear off if security really improves. (Donnell tentatively agrees.) The Vietnamese are wonderful gripers, and let off steam in the same way our GI's do whenever they catch a sympathetic ear. Also Hickey and Donnell found that in Vinh Long the people generally seemed to like the idea of strategic hamlets, particularly because the better security made it possible for relatives to visit during Tet. And in the Hoa Hao area around Sadec, people seemed almost enthusiastic about the strategic hamlets. This was the only area visited where the people were quite vocal about the hamlets being useful in keeping the VC out. (This suggests to me that there may be more validity than I had supposed in the idea that the Hoa Hao are still an untapped source of GVN support.) And even in Cu Chi people liked the fact that the strategic hamlets keep the "agitators" out. Among other interesting observations that emerged is the fact that the NRM and other mass organizations have virtually disappeared in the countryside. The only active GVN organization at the rice roots seems to be the Republican Youth and various auto-defense groups. This is perhaps not altogether bad. The five-family system is not working well because the heads of the family groups often refuse any responsibility (which is not surprising, given the security situation and the rewards of heading the group). A point stressed by the team is the immediate importance of agricultural assistance at hamlet level. In this connection, it is worth repeating Hickey's observation that the peasants do not think in terms of future benefits. Saving is rare in the villages; a good crop simply means larger feasts on the suitable occasions. This means, as Warren has been saying, that plans for long-range economic development, however well conceived, are far less important in this struggle than rural impact programs./5/ (It is difficult to convince people of this. The fact that a mobile medical team in a hamlet will be talked about for months even though it helps fewer people less efficiently than building up provincial hospitals is difficult to sell. Medical teams in the villages would have impact. And they would reach people who will never venture near the provincial hospitals for political or financial reasons.) /5/At this point in the source text, a note reads: "Hear, hear." Few peasants actually stated they want increased security and one peasant engaged in constructing a strategic hamlet told the team that she was carrying bamboo to build a fence around "Mr. Communist." This seems to point up a failure on the information side. Hickey and Donnell said in response to a question that the population got a week of advance information in Cu Chi before construction started. Colonel Thao generally works them over for three or four weeks, by his own account at least, before setting up a strategic hamlet. This could make quite a difference. Among the team's tentative recommendations is better training and organization for hamlet and village level defense forces and increased salaries (paid on time) for the SDC and for village and hamlet chiefs. (Although they did not mention the need for more training of hamlet and village officials, the team did note that no training programs were in evidence except in Kien Hoa, where the wonderful Colonel Thao runs a continuous course for his people which lasts for three and a half months.) They stressed agricultural extension, as noted above, and also approved Colonel Thao's idea of using the old Council of Notables to backstop the village administrative councils in terms of advice, some control, and by lending their prestige to council actions. (Thao is also using the Cult Committees in some way not entirely clear to me.) One idea, also Thao's, that does not seem very convincing is the suggestion that we are overstressing the hamlet at the expense of the village, and that we must decide whether we are going to focus on strengthening the hamlets or the village administrative structure. Thao thinks we are now tending to overstress the hamlet. The team also reported that they never encountered any anti-American feeling. The role of the U.S. is not well understood, however, and the Commie line that we have replaced the French is perhaps making some headway. I am champing at the bit somewhat here in Saigon. While Hickey and Donnell sound very right to me now, I would like to check it out, and hope that Thuan will soon name the GVN team members so we can get on with the surveys. My best to all there, Sincerely, Ted
117. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 20, 1962, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-2062. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1191. Thuan informed DCM and me yesterday that President Diem had signed decree on "Delta Planning"./2/ I gather that this is overall directive for clearance and rehabilitation of ten provinces around Saigon and that Diem may not yet have signed detailed directives for implementation various aspects. At any rate, it was clear that he has not signed specific order assigning responsibility for execution of plan. Thuan nevertheless seemed confident that this would be done shortly and that officer designated would be Lieutenant Colonel Hoang Van Lac./3/ /2/Document 113. /3/Diem signed the decree bestowing responsibility for the plan on Colonel Lac on March 23. Lac is at present Chief of Kienh Province and is highly regarded by Thuan. Thuan assured us that when Lac is designated he will build on plans already developed by Gen Cao for operations in Bien Duong (Operation Sunrise) rather than starting afresh, and that Lac will maintain close liaison with mission as Cao has done to enable us to advise and assist promptly and effectively. This could be important breakthrough on commencement systematic counterinsurgency operation. Diem had been holding back on signing of Delta Plan directive for about a month, and there was reason to fear that major snag had arisen, possibly in form of some basic disagreement between ministries about fundamentals of plan or who was to carry it out. In particular, there was considerable ground for doubts that Operation Sunrise under General Cao had full support of GVN military. Thuan's more or less jubilant report on signing of Delta Plan indicates that this problem, if it existed, is resolved. Thuan is not only Minister of Defense and therefore in a position to give plan necessary military support. He also indicated that he was quite conscious that more forces than presently allotted two battalions are required for Bien Duong operation. He said that he was urging on President desirability of taking regiment from 1st division in north for this operation and substituting for it as military presence on DMZ newly-created 9th division which would carry out its training there. (I have not yet had opportunity to discuss military implications of this with General Harkins.) At any rate, decision to move forward on Delta Plan is encouraging development. We should make and are making maximum effort to support it. It is plan with which Task Force Saigon is generally in accord and there will be ample opportunity to support modifications of detail, if required, as operations proceed. Nolting
118. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 20, 1962, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-2062. Secret; Limit Distribution. 1192. Embtel 1173./2/ In conversation with Thuan yesterday, I brought up question of Madame Nhu's speech, following same substantive line as protest made by Trueheart March 13 but indicating also my personal disappointment and concern over statements and stressing problems created for my government in its efforts to help Viet Nam. /2/Document 106. Thuan indicated, as he had to Trueheart, that he personally deplored speech and understood our position. He said that he had discussed protest with Nhu who had suggested he reply to the general effect that Madame Nhu was not speaking for GVN but as head of Women's Solidarity Movement. We should also be aware that in interrogation of Lieutenant Quoc (one of pilots who bombed Palace February 27) it had been brought out that Quoc had stated that he was persuaded to undertake bombing by reading specific paragraphs of Time and Newsweek articles which were represented to him as showing that U.S. favored overthrow of regime. (I remarked that this showed Quoc was naive, but asked for specific citations of paragraphs in question.) With regard to references in speech to U.S. failure to support Civil Guard, Nhu had said, according to Thuan, that there might be two sides to question but GVN was being blamed for insecurity in countryside, and this was blame which must be shared. I replied in effect that question should be discussed privately, not in public speeches. Turning to what could be done to prevent a recurrence, Thuan seemed to think only solution was some procedure for prior clearance of Mme Nhu's speeches. As matters stood, President Diem's speeches were reviewed by Ministers, Mme Nhu's were not. He suggested that I might speak to Diem about this. I followed up on this with President Diem today. He took it in good part, seemed somewhat embarrassed, said that when he had read the speech after Mme Nhu made it he felt that, "while emotionally and perhaps intellectually understandable, it was politically stupid". I said that I hoped very much, for the sake of our common objectives, there would be no repetition. Mme Nhu has already told AP reporter Brown that her speech was aimed at U.S. press and not at U.S. Government. (According to Brown, she seemed in this interview to be genuinely upset at reaction to speech.) Moreover, as she is about to embark on extensive foreign tour which will reportedly keep her out of country for three or four months, I believe we should now let matter rest. Nolting
119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, March 20, 1962, 2:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-162. Secret. Drafted on March 16 by Wood; cleared by Hubbard, Morgan, Salans (State), and Heinz (DOD); and approved by Cottrell. Also sent for action to Ottawa and New Delhi and for information to London, Moscow, and CINCPAC for Polad. 1119. Saigon's 1117./2/ On March 8 Department officer had long talk with Canadian Counselor Rettie, who has now studied ICC/Viet-Nam so long and carefully that he understands much of it and therefore may be considered one of small number experts this esoteric subject. His views carry weight with Ambassador Heeney and probably in Ottawa. /2/Document 91. Following emerged from conversation: 1. ICC/Viet-Nam should continue. 2. As an awkward "early model Troika" ICC/Viet-Nam must not be expected deal successfully with large concepts, legal or otherwise. It responds best to limited stimuli. Thus we should not openly make sweeping statements to effect: a. We will give no more notification. b. Breach by one side justify non-observance by the other. Difficulty here compounded by fact we had used DRV breach cease-fire (articles 19, 24, etc.) as justification bringing in men and material (articles 16 and 17). Rettie unable find clear precedents in international law to effect breach one part a treaty by a party justified non-observance other parts treaty by other party. 3. Rettie also made plea that our actions should not be too sweeping, e.g., avoid upsetting ICC equanimity by spectacle scores US helicopters on dock opposite Majestic Hotel (Department officer commented ICC eyesight seemed far more acute Saigon than in Hanoi where after 15 months airlift apparently still not visible). 4. Rettie again confirmed that Canadian strategy on ICC would continue to be one of attempting persuade Indians rather than taking obdurate position to counterbalance Poles. Rettie then gave advance indication favorable ICC action re subversion (Saigon's 1157)./3/ /3/Dated March 9, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-962) Comment: We believe Rettie's theory international law incorrect, but we shall send subsequent instruction on whole ICC question which at present under study. Ball
120. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 21, 1962, 5p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-2162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 6:07 a.m. on March 21. Repeated to Bangkok for Harriman; CINCPAC for Polad, Nolting, and Harkins; and Clark Air Force Base. Nolting and Harkins were in Honolulu for the March Secretary of Defense's Conference. The message also requested that the Department of State pass it to the Department of Defense. 1200. COM USMACV 210531Z./2/ Reference message reports joint US-GVN radar sightings unidentified aircraft in numbers Pleiku area night of 19-20 March. /2/Not found. Similar reports for night 20-21 March being checked. If confirmed, and evidence strong for night 19-20 March, these sightings almost certainly involve aircraft dropping supplies and/or reinforce meets to VC. Defense Minister Thuan telephoned me this morning indicating grave concern and stressing need to take "precautionary measures". Thuan subsequently relayed to General Weede request from Diem that US interceptors be introduced SVN. I strongly recommend that aircraft with night-fighter capability be dispatched Saigon immediately with mission of confirming any future radar contacts and shooting down any unfriendly aircraft detected over SVN. This seems to me correct response from US standpoint to Communist effort reinforce VC by air. It is minimum response expected by GVN. If aircraft are sent, I recommend they remain at least through present full moon period and that they be represented publicly as "in transit". General Weede is commenting separately to General Harkins. Trueheart
121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, March 21, 1962, 1:09 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-2162. Secret. Drafted and approved by Johnson. 1121. Embtel 1200./2/ Agree that prompt action should be taken to investigate and if necessary destroy any NVN aircraft operating over SVN territory. Will of course be important avoid any possible incident over Cambodian territory. Also believe any such operation should be handled on very sensitive basis and if necessary introduce additional aircraft they be based outside Saigon area. CINCPAC and USMACV plan in foregoing sense will be given promptest consideration here. /2/Document 120. Ball
122. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)/1/ Washington, March 22, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam 7. Secret. SUBJECT The current plans and programs for Civic Action in Vietnam, which Sterling Cottrell is bringing back from his visit to CINCPAC, will need evaluation by the Special Group (CI)./2/ The following is a suggested yardstick for measuring Civic Action in Vietnam, based upon my experience in developing the initial Civic Action programs in the Philippines and Vietnam, and helping initiate Civic Action in Laos and Burma. /2/See Document 123. The essentials needed in Vietnam's Civic Action program now, I believe, are: 1. To provide the means for the VN military to earn the friendship of the people. These can be simple actions which show that the troops really care for the people they are protecting. The U.S. military program should be mostly one of promoting me proper attitude in the VN soldier. Troop brotherliness towards the people speaks louder than planned propaganda or big projects with bulldozers and gimmicks. These actions are such things as willing care for wounded and injured civilians, sharing rice with the hungry, repairing destroyed public structures, and starting public services such as schools, pure water supply, sanitation, etc. These are quick, natural actions which the soldier does when he has a moment from his primary security mission. Its effectiveness is measured in the increase of combat intelligence voluntarily given by the villagers helped. 2. To make the village a dynamic, willing part of free Vietnam. We need the whole countryside with us, not just a few fortified areas and cities. The people need something demonstrably worth defending. When the VN government shows up in a village, it shouldn't just teach village defense and collect taxes. The villagers need a sense of participation in something greater than their own local spot, and a sharing in both the benefits and responsibilities of free citizenship, as well as their action's future. The civilian Civic Action teams must set the example by being public servants in the best sense--including getting their hands calloused by helping people. I believe the Civic Action teams should develop national spirit at the village level, by fundamental democracy in the villages, including electing most village officials by secret ballot, establish primary education, and start linking up the village spiritually as well as mentally (information programs) and physically (roads, landing strips) with the provincial and national centers. The Civic Action teams will earn their influence with the villagers to accomplish the above by really helping initiate public services (which is where health, communications, etc., assistance comes in). 3. To establish a permanent governmental structure. Civic Action should be seen as a contingency means towards creating a going concern, where Civic Action teams are no longer needed. Thus, the Civic Action teams need to be fielded by all service-type national Ministries (Health, Agriculture, etc.) and work to build a modest permanent organization under each Province Chief so that the national government has roots throughout the country, responsive to the people. This requires a Civic Action chief at the national level able to levy requirements on a number of Ministries (as did Vietnam's first Civic Action chief), to increase the executive assets of Province Chiefs, and to inspire dedicated public service in his teams with a minimum of bureaucracy. The teams should be able to get a village on its feet as a good member of the national community, and then move on. Team members themselves used recognition, in terms of preferred civil service in Ministries or provincial governments at the end of their field duty. 4. To help the people help themselves. This must not be simple dogoodism. The real value of Civic Action is in helping the people to help themselves. Villagers will proudly maintain the road they helped to build themselves, where they are indifferent to maintaining a similar road built by the Army or other government organization. As the people create a better life, with government encouragement and help, they both find a closer bond with that government and build something worth risking life to defend. Further, as this progresses, people start providing true security in an area, and troops can be removed from static defense into mobile striking forces. Recommendation. The best way for the Special Group (CI) to get a meaningful Civic Action program under way fast in Vietnam would be to approve Defense and AID selecting one experienced officer each to be responsible for U.S. participation in Civic Action in Vietnam, team them up in Washington, and then send them soonest to Vietnam to get a practical organization and program started. There are several U.S. military officers who have proven themselves in Civic Action in Southeast Asia. AID was planning to use Bert Fraley in USOM counter-insurgency. Two "right" people, supported properly, could get more done with what is already available in Vietnam in one day on the spot than could days of further study by others. The two could quickly plan a really practical program, a realistic organization, and do more than that--get some willing cooperation from the Vietnamese government.
123. Briefing Paper for a Presentation by the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) Before the Special Group (Counterinsurgency)/1/ Washington, March 22, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 65 D 172, March 23, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Cottrell on March 22. The briefing memorandum was part of a package delivered to Under Secretary of State Johnson in preparation for a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 23 (see Document 126). A typewritten notation indicates that Cottrell presented the information orally to the Counterinsurgency Group meeting on March 22. The minutes of that meeting read in part: "Mr. Cottrell stated that, although he is encouraged by progress in the civic action programs, it is necessary to remember that we are engaged in an eight to ten year struggle. The MAAG is giving emphasis to the Strategic Hamlet concept in its civic action programs, as is USOM and the Government of South Vietnam. CIA's program is more in the field of security than civic action, with emphasis on paramilitary training for youths and villagers." (Department of State, Special Group (C.I.): Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/ 62-7/31/62) CIVIC ACTION IN VIET-NAM Introduction: Civic Action in Viet-Nam is undertaken by the military, CIA, USOM and the GVN. Military: The Department of Army Civil Affairs Team surveyed the situation in 1961 and presented their report with recommendations on December 12. After review by MAAG it was submitted to Secretary Thuan in February 1962./2/ He accepted the report but no formal approval by the GVN has been made. The principal recommendations of this report are: /2/Not found. 1. The RVNAF should be inculcated with the belief that the war cannot be won in Viet-Nam if the villagers are antagonized by RVNAF hostile attitudes and treatment. 2. Villagers should be assisted on Civic Action projects by ARVN teams. 3. Civic Action teams should be trained to conduct resettlement of villagers into strategic villages. 4. Teams should be trained to assume civil government functions in areas recovered from the VC until turned back to civilian control. Action Taken: 1. Psywar indoctrination of all RVNAF trainees has been introduced by MAAG to achieve objectives in No. 1 above. 2. Vietnamese leaders such as "Big Minh" have publicly stated and have issued orders to ARVN troops that their conduct vis-à-vis the villagers must be changed. 3. General Timmes reported in Honolulu on March 21 that a marked improvement has been noted in troop behavior towards the villagers since the initiation of this Psywar effort in the ARVN. 4. Five 20-man Civic Action teams are now in the field working on resettlement in connection with the construction of strategic hamlets and villages. 5. Five more teams are ready for assignment. 6. Five teams are now in training. 7. CINCPAC is providing guidance on a continuing basis to MAAG on the program described above. 8. The above Civic Action program is being applied in the Sunrise operation. . . . . . . . USOM: USOM Civic Action is geared primarily to rural rehabilitation and specifically pointed now at the strategic hamlet program in the Sunrise and Delta Plan concepts./3/ The resources offered are to assist in Civic Action cadre training, making known USOM resources so that these may be drawn upon. These resources include the provision of village communication facilities, restoration of medical clinics, provision of medical stocks and staff, issuance of identification cards, vaccinations, conduct of malarial programs, basic sanitation, provision of elementary schools, teaching aids, teachers, pest control programs, agricultural credit, fertilizer supplies, seeds, advice on crop patterns, fish farming and irrigation assistance, farm extension programs, introduction of rammed earth brick equipment for housing, farm equipment, temporary housing, well digging, improvement of roads, electrical generation, village radio receivers, motion pictures, and printed materials. /3/See Documents 103 and 113. GVN: The Civic Action of the GVN is centered in the Ministry of Civic Action which was created in 1961. Since a number of other ministries of the government provide assets in Civic Action, a coordination of the effort was vested by Diem in an Interministerial Committee for Secure Hamlets on February 3. This Committee is charged with coordinating the Civic Action program throughout the country and has among its objectives the setting up of 8000 strategic hamlets in the next two years, strengthening them with socio-economic services and facilities. President Diem has given the highest priority to the construction of these strategic hamlets which will constitute the hub of the GVN Civic Action effort. Minister Hieu now has over 600 cadre operating singly and in teams in every province of Viet-Nam. Conclusion: MAAG and USOM have organized standing committees to work directly with the GVN in providing required U.S. military and economic resources to assist the GVN effort. It is expected that the present multiplicity of effort and programs will gradually be consolidated and coordinated. The encouraging element is that the GVN is moving forward with energy, having recognized the necessity for reaching the villagers with tangible government benefits. . . . . . . .
124. Editorial Note On March 22, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Admiral Felt, Ambassador Nolting, General Harkins, and numerous other officials met at CINCPAC Headquarters in Honolulu for the fourth Secretary of Defense's Conference. A full record of the meeting is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SecDef Conf., Mar. 1962. For a summary record, see Document 125. Regarding the third Honolulu Conference, February 19, see Document 71.
125. Memorandum From the Naval Aide of the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, March 27, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Top Secret. SUBJECT The following items developed at the Honolulu conference are of special interest. a. President Diem has asked General Harkins to continue with the crop defoliation program and to provide helicopters to his province chiefs. In the first instance, General Harkins recommends using defoliants on a selected basis for crop denial. SecDef said he would try to obtain Washington concurrence in delegating some authority to Saigon for defoliation operations of this type. On the second matter, General Harkins suggested that H-19's now being declared surplus by the Vietnamese could be turned over to the province chiefs. SecDef concurred. b. General Harkins said Diem has approved a border patrol. Discussion indicated this referred to 20 base camps along the Lao border and 68 along the Cambodian border, many of which are already established. They will be manned by 10 ARVN and 13 Montagnard ranger companies. (An earlier report indicated that 5,000 personnel would be assigned to this type of border patrol. There has been no mention of means of mobility nor of organization for command and control. This project should be investigated further to determine if it really supports the purpose of your recommendation and does not, in fact, tie down additional troops in static positions. I am checking it out through the TF.) c. There was discussion as to the advantages and disadvantages of arming helicopters. Admiral Felt was opposed; General Decker was in favor. Although the matter was brought up in only general terms SecDef suggested the disagreements indicated there was a problem. He asked General Decker to determine what was required and to make recommendations to him. d. Ambassador Nolting said that Nhu had directed that strategic hamlets, being built in all provinces now, are to be completed as soon as possible. The Ambassador commented that this objective may be optimistic in terms of the projected availability of troops to provide required protection. e. General Harkins stated that the training of civil guard and self-defense corps personnel not yet trained will be completed by the end of 1962. Efforts are continuing to increase the capacity of existing training sites. f. SecDef asked what percent of the SDC was armed. No one present knew. Ambassador Nolting commented that GVN reluctance to issue weapons to the SDC reflected some doubt as to the loyalty of those troops. SecDef said we cannot let 50,000 to 60,000 SDC remain unarmed or ineffective (with old French arms) and asked General Harkins to look into this matter. (This is related to carbine issue to SDC.) g. Capability to resist subversion in Thailand was discussed. There was agreement that military capabilities are improving. The question of providing a Thai airborne unit was discussed at some length. There was some difference of opinion whether to convert existing non-airborne units or to form an entirely new unit. In view of the under strength status of the Thai Army, Admiral Felt recommended conversion although the Thais desire a new unit. Admiral Felt did not consider this an urgent problem but, based on a counter-argument by General Lemnitzer, agreed to review the entire problem including supporting airlift. Admiral Felt reported that he had directed Chief JUSMAAG to move ahead on a Central Intelligence Organization for Thailand. He had just received a message from Ambassador Young indicating nonconcurrence on the basis that this was premature and not yet required in Thailand. Admiral Felt said that . . . is resisting the idea and is influencing the Ambassador. h. There was a broad discussion of both military and AID communications systems in Thailand. Proposed systems would connect Udorn and Okinawa by 31 March 62, and Ubon with Pleiku, Bangkok, and Saigon by 1 Sep 62. These systems would require about 450 additional US personnel to operate the several links envisaged. Ambassador Young has not agreed to these personnel increases; SecDef said he would authorize the introduction of a radio relay company (350 men) for a period of one year to fill personnel needs until the Thais develop a requisite capability. He asked Mr. Bundy to follow up with State to gain Ambassador Young's concurrence. SecDef further requested a list of AID communication projects in Thailand so that he could consult with State and avoid long-term delays which have occurred in Viet-Nam. He indicated AID could subcontract to Defense in order to get the job done. i. SecDef asked General Anthis how important it is for US pilots to continue to fly Jungle Jim aircraft after Viet-Nam pilots have been trained. General Anthis said it was very important in order to continue learning about counter-insurgency operations and to monitor Vietnamese proficiency. SecDef pointed out the need to plan for the increased close air support capability which will exist in June as a result of present training and provision of additional aircraft; Ambassador Nolting cautioned that we should be sure of the political effect before stepping up air operations beyond the current level. j. General Harkins reported there is unanimous opinion that the five-man US advisory team for each ARVN battalion is too large. There should be one Captain and two Sergeants per battalion and four Lieutenants per regiment for observers. SecDef concurred. k. Ambassador Nolting indicated the AID program was being modified to emphasize short-range impact programs. He said the big problem was getting things done through the GVN. l. SecDef said this would be the last conference but that he expected to be in Saigon in May. W.H.B./2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
126. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting/1/ Washington, March 23, 1962, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, State-JCS Minutes. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. A note on the source text reads: "Department of State draft, not cleared with DOD." U. Alexis Johnson led the Department of State delegation; Mr. Amory represented the CIA; Messrs. Nitze and Bundy, DOD; and Bromley Smith the NSC. [Here follow a list of participants and discussion of items I-IV.] V. ICC Implications of U.S. Force Buildup in Vietnam Mr. Johnson said that State had placed this item on the agenda in order to cite the concern of Indian and Canadian ICC representatives over the open introduction of unconcealed military equipment into Saigon. They have asked that we reduce this activity insofar as practicable. They have stated that they know what we are doing and desire to be helpful. However, it would be advantageous to all if we could avoid flaunting our deliveries to Saigon. Mr. Johnson said that we realize Saigon is the only good port and that we must continue to use it. He asked if it would be possible to fly in the Marine helicopter squadron which is due to be delivered by April 15. This would be far less conspicuous than ship delivery to Saigon. General LeMay said that we can take some actions, but not a whole lot, to avoid the problem. He added that people appear to be much more sensitive to our actions than they do to those of the Soviet side. Mr. Johnson said that the President had taken a positive decision on our position on the ICC. This matter was discussed thoroughly and he had decided that we would recognize the ICC and we would not renounce the accords. We would just act in the face of them and this causes problems like the present one. . . . Mr. Johnson then said that he would like to have JCS agreement to the following paragraph in a proposed message to Ottawa, New Delhi and Saigon. "We will henceforth avoid open and flagrant introduction of personnel and equipment such as unloading unconcealable military equipment in Saigon which have not been notified to ICC so as to avoid charges of violations of Agreement. In this regard we understand fourth helicopter squadron can fly into Vietnam and need not be unloaded in Saigon."/2/ Admiral Ricketts said that this was a good objective and the JCS would do their best to meet it. However, no specific commitments could be made. He added that the only dock in Saigon was situated just in front of the Imperial Hotel. /2/The original draft of telegram 1137 to Saigon (Document 130) included this statement as paragraph 2. (Briefing material for Under Secretary Johnson, March 22, Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 65 D 172) Mr. Cottrell indicated that most of the objectionable heavy equipment had already been delivered and that the remaining immediate project which could cause trouble was the Marine helicopter squadron. General Shoup said that this squadron was in the Philippines and that if it is the one to go to Vietnam it can be flown in from as far out at sea as fuel capacity will permit. Admiral Riley said that the language of the proposed cable must be altered since it would tie the hands of the military. General Decker said that the JCS would ask Admiral Felt to act to meet our objectives in the delivery program to Vietnam. Mr. Johnson agreed with General Decker's observation that the ICC was spending too much time in Saigon and not enough time in Hanoi. Mr. Nitze asked if the group would like to spend a moment discussing rules of engagement/3/ for the four F-102 aircraft being deployed to Vietnam for possible employment against intruder aircraft. General LeMay said that the proposed rules were such that if any intruders were shot down it would be a sheer accident. He pointed out that the identification procedures were impossible to comply with at night. General Decker said that the rules were drafted by CINCPAC and the JCS would have to work out the problem with that Hq. Mr. Johnson asked if the F-102 could actually shoot down the slow-moving, low-flying intruders and General LeMay said that they could. Mr. Johnson said that we must not attack commercial aircraft. Mr. Nitze said that the F-102s could not be employed against the intruders without reference back to the President. /3/Not found. [Here follows a short paragraph on another matter.]
127. Airgram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ A-257 Saigon, March 23,1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-2362. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall and cleared with Gardiner, Fippin, and Bogardus. Repeated to all Asian posts, and CINCPAC, London, Paris, and Ottawa. SUBJECT Following is assessment of political and economic factors in Vietnamese war, prepared for use at current SecDefense meeting in Honolulu:/2/ /2/See Document 124. 1. Political Factors The main political factors bearing on the question of who is winning the war in Viet-Nam, the GVN or the Viet Cong, relate to organization and working methods of the Government, establishment of non-Communist unity against the VC, and winning the positive support of the mass of the people in the countryside. These are the political factors which were stressed by the U.S. Government at the highest levels following the visit to Viet-Nam by the Taylor Mission in October 1961. 2. Organization Organization and working methods constitute one of the essential keys to success against the VC. There is no question but that the DRV has established an extremely efficient organization for the conduct of the war on the Communist side, and is carrying on the war most successfully despite the difficult self-imposed handicap of clandestinity. To counter this ruthless efficiency requires a properly functioning administration on the GVN side involving delegation of authority and the use of working methods which encourage subordinates to do the job properly. Ineffectiveness in administration at the national level, in carrying out the central functions of the government and in extending services to the countryside represent one of the GVN's main weaknesses. Some progress had been made prior to the February 27 bombing of the Palace in improving the organization and operations of the GVN, but the renewed mistrust flowing from that incident will very likely slow down progress again. The GVN revived the National Internal Security Council in December 1961, and has made limited use of it since that time. Intelligence has probably reflected most progress administratively, with the delegation of some real authority starting about November 1961 to the Director of the CIO and the concurrent naming of him as Chief of the NPSS. In the military field, naval and air force representation has been added to the Joint General Staff, but there has been little in the way of effective improvement in the authority delegated to the Field Command for the conduct of military counterinsurgency operations. On the question of systematic area pacification, Diem, after more than a month's delay, has signed the General Directive for the Delta Pacification Plan,/3/ but has not yet signed the various Instruction on Coordination, Population Controls, Strategic Hamlets, etc., designed to implement the General Directive. There has also been confusion as to who is actually to be in charge of this operation--General Cao (who has been handling it to date) or Colonel Y (the Director of CIO) and an assistant (whom the President may be intending to name as officials in charge of pacification). It is likewise not clear whether the military have been directed to give adequate support to the pacification of the first province in which the Plan is being put into execution. /3/Document 113. Because of GVN reticence U.S.-GVN cooperation on the civilian side has not developed extensively in the sense of direct assignment of U.S. advisors to GVN agencies, except in the intelligence field. The cooperative effort represented by the joint provincial surveys has had success in carrying out the survey of three provinces, but this project has not been pushed on the GVN side (perhaps because of personnel shortages) as rapidly as we would like, nor has the GVN (because of Diem's opposition) permitted the coverage in the political and economic fields which we had hoped for. 3. National Unity Over recent months the GVN has taken a series of mobilization measures to increase popular participation in the war effort and improve the morale of the armed forces. Specific measures have included the drafting of educated persons for officer training, the institution of women's military training (the thrust of which is, however, open to considerable question), limited military training for civil servants in Saigon and other cities, similar training for the members of the youth organizations in various areas, increased pay or allowances to the lowest two ranks in the armed forces and the Civil Guard, reduction of the period in which a drafting stays in conscript status before attaining the status of a regular soldier, the creation of NCO ranks in the Self Defense Corps, legislation establishing employment preference for veterans both in the Government and in private business, the establishment of a program for the training and employment of disabled veterans, and proposed measures to help war widows and orphans. Steps have also been taken over recent months to establish the National Economic Council, the Constitutional Court, and provincial councils. The National Economic Council has served as a sounding board for the opinion of both trade unions and employers, and in a step in the right direction of freer expression and greater sense of participation. The Constitutional Court has had no noticeable effect. Since the provincial councils are just in the process of establishment, it is too early to determine whether they will have any political impact. The educated classes continue to present an unresolved political problem which is of importance for several reasons: (1) The Government needs all available talent to fight the war against the VC, and Ambassador Nolting has urged the members of this class to offer their services to the Government in this emergency. However, because of their political dissatisfaction with the Diem Government and their belief that their services are not wanted, there is a tendency among many of them to sit on their hands (just as many Vietnamese did during the Indochina war when they did not like either political alternative--the Communists or the French). (2) The dissatisfaction among the educated classes tends to influence the masses at least toward apathy in the present struggle. This influence is attributable to the special position which the intellectual or scholar occupies among the larger masses of the people in a Confucian society like that in Viet-Nam. (3) Perhaps most important of all, the educated class exerts a strong, probably predominant influence on international opinion because of the tendency of the foreign press to accept this class's judgment of the GVN rather than the official views which we and the GVN put forth. Therefore, what the educated class thinks about the GVN is an important factor influencing the degree of international support which the GVN will get in its fight against the VC. Various possible measures might be taken by the GVN to develop a more favorable attitude on the part of the educated class. For example, liberation of non-Communist political prisoners, greater freedom of the press and assembly, allowing the National Assembly to become more of a real parliamentary body rather than a puppet organization, and the authorization of opposition parties to operate. None of these measures has been taken to date by the GVN. There are no indications that the VC have made any material political headway themselves among this class by the use of the "national liberation front" tactic. 4. Winning the Support of the Villagers The first essentia1 for this purpose is to provide the villagers with a minimum of effective protection against VC terror and pressures. Only with this can the Government hope to obtain the cooperation and intelligence of the villagers. Systematic planning and execution of the strategic hamlet program, coupled with the development of paramilitary forces in adequate numbers and kinds, should restore a sense of security among the villagers. It is not certain, however, that these programs will be developed systematically since Nhu's pushing could well lead to overhasty, ill-advised development by officials at all levels in a manner which would alienate rather than gain the support of the people. In addition, there is the danger that Nhu's attempted use of the strategic hamlet program for a "revolutionary change of society" at the hamlet level could lead to further division among the population at the time when the aim should be to establish unity. (In control Viet-Nam Ngo Dinh Can's pragmatic approach (as opposed to Nhu's theoretical approach) may enable the hamlet defense program to be carried out without giving rise to the risks described above.) The SEC training and equipment program now being carried out is vitally related to this matter of giving the villagers protection, but it appears a considerably greater pare-military force will be required in order to provide each hamlet with a defense force capable of dealing with small VC groups and of trying to hold off larger groups until help can arrive from the Civil Guard and the RVNAF. Economic and social development of the villages is also essential in order to gain the positive support of the villagers as opposed to apathy on their part. The specific goals of such a program were outlined in the Joint U.S.-GVN Communiqué of January 4, 1962./4/ Much has already been accomplished in the fields of agricultural credit, education, health, etc., and what is now aimed for is extension of most of these programs to cover every village. USOM has established an organizaniona1 set-up designed to facilitate implementation of this program by backing up civic action cadres with training, advice and supplies, and the question now is whether the GVN can also be organized for rapid, prompt implementation. General Cao has been training and using rural rehabilitation teams since July 1961, for the development of strategic hamlets in the provinces just north of Saigon, and is expanding these teams in connection with the Delta Pacification Plan. These teams have some socio-economic flavor, though probably not sufficient at present. USOM expects to be able to work directly with General Cao's organization in the socio-economic field, but Cao will still need the cooperation and resources of the various Ministries of the Government in this field. No effective coordinating organization exists as yet for the village socio-economic program in other areas, including those which are relatively white. An interministerial committee on strategic hamlets was established at the beginning of February, and it may turn out to be the coordinating mechanism in the economic and social fields as well, but this is not yet clear. /4/See Document 4. On the political and psychological side, various actions are also desirable to counter the effect of VC propaganda. Payment of the salaries of village officials, now often enough not met because of the inability of the village to collect taxes, is necessary. The Minister of Interior is now understood to be making Central Government resources available for this purpose, and to be checking to see whether the funds furnished are actually being used to pay the salaries of village officials. This requires further checking (perhaps during province surveys) to determine actual status. The Government also needs an effective information program at the rural level, but it is doubtful that this can be mounted as long as the ineffectual Mr. Tho remains Director General of Information. The Government also faces the major obstacle of the skepticism and disbelief of the populace in what the Government says. Therefore, the only information program likely to succeed is one based on concrete accomplishments by the Government in the security, economic and social fields, thus restoring credibility in the Government's word. Aside from that, the information program should explain the record for population control measures, as well as continuing to paint the VC in their real colors. Perhaps most important of all in the political sense for generating mass support are inspired leadership from the top in the Government and the creation of a politically attractive public image. The President continues to travel in rural areas, but the security shield necessary during these trips vitiates much of the favorable impact. Efforts have been made for years to induce the President to make frequent use of radio for popular talks, since this would reach a much vaster audience in the rural areas than his trips, but thus far there has been no real success. Continuing effort is also required to induce the President to switch his theme in rural areas from sacrifice and discipline to that of improvement in security and living standards with the help of the Government. In other words, the theme needs to be what the Government can do to help the people (together with their own efforts) and not what the people should do for the Government. The GVN has also seriously weakened its domestic position by publicly airing imaginary or historical differences with the U.S., its principal source of military and economic aid and international support. 5. Economic Aside from the economic and social programs at the village level discussed above, other economic factors are also important in the war against the VC. At the end of 1961 the Government took measures that resulted in de facto devaluation of the currency, thus imposing a more severe financial burden which primarily rests on the well-to-do, who are, by and large, the heaviest consumers of imports. This step was designed to enable the Government to expand the piastre resources available for both security and socio-economic programs. The amount of piastres which will be generated for this purpose will be determined by the level of imports, which in turn depends upon the demand of a free market. VC activities in the countryside have tended to cause this demand to contract somewhat over the past year or more. There will probably be no permanent change in this trend until security begins to be restored systematically in the countryside. The markets in Saigon and in the provincial centers, and in many villages, are well stocked with both domestic and imported goods; prices on the whole are stable; and deficiency of imports in no way inhibits the current snuggle. The GVN's efforts to collect internal taxes on land, on incomes, and from various excise measures are being intensified, and the realities of their financial situation are bound to require internal borrowing as well, a course on which the Government has decided. For the first time the GVN is launching an appreciable deficit financing; in the past two months it has borrowed VN$1 billion from the National Bank, borrowing of some VN$800 million by the Industrial Development Center from the National Bank (to help finance the 5/7 tax or capital/equipment) is expected during 1962, and the 1962 budget is expected to result in a deficit of VN$2.5 to 3.0 billion out of total expenditures of VN$23.4 billion. Most recent proposals imply an additional deficit of VN$700 million by June 30, 1962, from a further increase in the military budget. Thus, a minimum deficit of VN$3.0 billion seems indicated for 1962. As against the VN$37.2 billion total money and credit outstanding on December 30, 1961, this means an increase of some $75. Also, an expected decrease in minimum bank reserve requirements with the National Bank may permit expansion of bank credit by as much as VN$3 billion. Indeed, the new effective exchange rate requires a considerable increase in bank credit-which, however, should be largely siphoned off as taxes. Yet most expert observers believe that the economy can stand this increase without serious inflation. In the first place, all evidence of the past several years points to a very low velocity of money circulation, and hence a low multiplier effect./5/ Despite uncertainties caused by VC and floods in 1961,/6/ money supply remained stable and there were indications of hoarding money. Secondly, the exchange black market is affected more by security conditions than economic conditions, and there has been virtually no forward speculation in exchange or conditions in anticipation of devaluation. Third, the modest price increases of imported goods were caused by tax increases, not speculative demand or inflationary pressure. Food staple prices, which were sensitive to VC disturbances and the Mekong flood in the final quarter of 1961, and which mean more than imported goods to the masses, are continuing their normal downward seasonal trend. And the GVN for the first time is building reserve rice stocks as a result of better organized commercial paddy collection price guarantees, and imports from America. Fourth, there are sound implications that the GVN is continuing to grow, as well as population (thus offsetting the expected increase in money supply). Finally, the economy is becoming increasingly monetized. /5/Next to this sentence were written the words "Not related." /6/Regarding the floods of 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 153 ff. The GVN and the VC are engaged in a battle for rice, the main crop of South Viet-Nam. VC control of extensive rural areas, their ability to blackmail peasants everywhere in the Delta, and their harassment of communication lines, cut down rice shipments to Saigon over the past two years, with the result that Viet-Nam, which is normally a rice exporting country, is this year now importing rice. The GVN has been having a fair success, however, in the battle over the past three or four months for the rice harvest in the Mekong Delta area, with the result that rice deliveries to Saigon have improved. Unless these deliveries can be maintained at a more satisfactory level, the GVN will be loath to export rice, and it may face a shortage next summer in Saigon and Central Viet-Nam. The VC have the capability of bringing about major disruption in rubber production and exports, but up to date have refrained from exercising this capability. Since rubber is Viet-Nam's major foreign exchange earner, and a fall in exports would seriously embarrass the GVN, it must be assumed that the VC are not interfering with rubber because of funds which they collect from rubber plantations or because of their belief in ultimate victory and the desire to avoid destruction of the asset which the rubber trees represent. VC activities have totally disrupted the trade in cinnamon, which was once a significant export. The other side of the economic coin is the ability of the VC to obtain necessary supplies from the people and their levying of taxes on the people. There is not question that the VC live off the land, and the greatest hope of gradually squeezing them in this respect is through the strategic hamlets program. Denial of food to the VC through this program ought eventually be relatively successful in Central Viet-Nam and the provinces north of Saigon, but the prospects are considerably less bright in the food-rich Mekong Delta provinces. 6. Conclusions a. One of the main weaknesses of the GVN in its ineffectiveness in administration at the National level, is carrying out the control functions of government and in extending services to the countryside. b. GVN programs in rural areas--the strategic hamlet program and village-level economic and social developments-aim in the right direction, but depend upon effective implementation for success in restoring security to the villages and winning the support of the villagers. c. The present GVN theme in rural areas "sacrifice and discipline" is not winning the support of the people and should be changed to "improvement in security and living standards with the help of the government." Any rural information program to be successful must be based on concrete security and socio-economic achievements. d. GVN is short of trained personnel to carry out its political, economic and psychological programs in the countryside at all levels. However, because of GVN reticence U.S.-GVN cooperation on the civilian side has not developed extensively in the sense of direct assignment of U.S. advisers to GVN civilian agencies at all levels. e. The GVN is doing little to develop a favorable attitude on the part of the educated class, who have some influence on the masses of the people and considerable influence on the international opinion of the GVN. f. Confronted with the efficient military, political and propaganda attack of the VC, the GVN has not yet organized an effective set-up to deal with the insurgency, nor has it taken the actions necessary to establish unity and win the support of the people in this fight. Unless the GVN develops a coordinated system of government among all fields (security, political, economic and psychological) at all levels from top to bottom, prompt to act and aimed at winning the people, it will not be able to turn the insurgency tide which has run against it for over two years./7/ /7/At the end of the airgram, Cottrell wrote the following: "I think: a) This paper reverses the priorities. The villagers are the key, gov't efficiency next, and non-commie unity third. b) The focus of our effort and appraisal should be: How are the VN doing in efforts to provide security and benefits to the villages? The answer is coming out thru the strategic village effort. If successful, we are on our way to victory over the Viet Cong. Cot". Trueheart
128. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Geneva, March 24, 1962, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam, Country Series 3/1/62-3/12/62. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution. Secto 100. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference your recent report strange aircraft over South Vietnam/2/ I believe it of utmost importance that we not permit other side to establish precedent of air supply, reconnaissance or other chores on behalf of Vietcong. We must not let them repeat Xieng Khouang maneuver in South Vietnam. Hope arrangements are being made to see that hostile aircraft over South Vietnam are shot down. /2/See Document 120. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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