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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
129. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva/1/ Washington, March 24, 1962, 5:33 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series 3/23/62-3/26/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Johnson, cleared with Pezzullo, and approved by Ball. Tosec 140. Eyes only for the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Secto 100./2/ There has been full agreement here with your view but problem has been locate and get to South Viet-Nam aircraft with capability locating and destroying supply planes operating at slow speeds and very low altitudes. Four F-102's night fighters were immediately sent Saigon and are now there but very doubtful they can be effective against this type target. We hope they can soon be withdrawn and replaced by more suitable propeller night fighters when Defense can locate and get some to area. We have recommended to the President approval for the use of these aircraft against hostile aircraft over SVN territory under rules of engagement which have been carefully worked out with DOD. /2/Document 128. Ball
130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, March 24, 1962, 7:23 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-2462. Secret. Drafted by Wood; cleared with Czyzak, Rice, Pezzullo, and Heinz (DOD) and approved by Johnson. Also sent to Ottawa and New Delhi and repeated to London, Moscow, and CINCPAC for Polad. 1137. Ref: Deptel 1119./2/ In view 1) difficulties we now facing with ICC/VN, 2) favorable action in ICC's legal committee on subversion and 3) fact that to get along with ICC we will have to play game partly their way i.e., a) limited ad hoc approach (case by case without involving large legal principles) and b) maintenance when possible decent veil hypocrisy, Department concludes and Defense concurs we should modify our approach to ICC and proposes following courses of action: /2/Document 119. 1. We have prepared comprehensive memo/3/ of our legal position which we shall discuss with Canadians in first instance and Indians later. We will not, initially, seek any agreements or undertakings on this paper. (Paper being pouched all addressees.) We shall state we agree on objectives that Geneva Agreement should be maintained (this depending on cessation of DRV aggression) and that ICC remain in being. We shall express understanding ICC problems and shall ask Canadians specifically what they have in mind . . . . /3/Not found. 2. While realizing that Saigon has the only satisfactory deep water terminal facilities for off-loading in SVN, the JCS will instruct CINCPAC, when practicable, to utilize to the maximum other ports for off-loading unconcealable equipment and materials which are undeclared to the ICC./4/ /4/For the original version of this paragraph, see Document 126. 3. We should seek further evidence Bloc importation men and matériel into North Viet-Nam. Realize this most difficult, but evidence need not be conclusive. In this connection ICC should be encouraged increase demands on DRV for access to North Viet-Nam points of entry. DRV refusals could be cited. Canadian Counselor Rettie said re Gia Lam airport ICC now restricted by its own "periodicity" ruling which only permits visits to airport one day a month (!) GVN might request reconsideration this ruling. We prepared help Canadians informally and if asked with legal problems they face in ICC. 4. We must further step up: a. efforts increase ICC patrols DMZ. b. public release all possible evidence VC infiltration into Viet-Nam (hopefully as ARVN patrols augmented there should be more evidence). Ball
131. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at Geneva/1/ Washington, March 26, 1962, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2059. Secret. Drafted by Johnson, cleared with Rice and Pezzullo, and approved by Ball. Tosec 150. Eyes only for the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Tosec 140./2/ President has now approved rules of engagement for US aircraft to intercept Communist aircraft over South Viet-Nam. Public posture is to be one of discreetness and we are asking field to work it out so that if US-marked plane actually destroys Communist plane, public handling will be simply that Communist plane crashed, thus attempting avoid problem of degree to which Americans engaged in active hostilities in SVN. We feel confident Communists will in any event receive message loud and clear. /2/Document 129. Ball
132. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)/1/ SACSA-M 63-62 Washington, March 26, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-131, Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1963. Secret. At the top of the first page is written: "Check idea of ops. deps. with Lansdale." SUBJECT 1. Responding to your request of yesterday for my comments on Brigadier General Lansdale's memorandum (attached)/2/ I have three reactions; two associated directly with the paper; one related to the paper indirectly. /2/Not attached to the source text; presumably a reference to Document 122. Gilpatric's request for Krulak's comments has not been found. 2. As a general proposition, I consider General Lansdale's appraisal of the Vietnamese civic action problem to be exactly on target. He has described the basic need accurately; and his direct action program, embracing the dispatch of a skilled and objective team, will achieve results. 3. Beyond this, I believe it well to reflect that even the most effective results-and I believe these will be achieved through the program suggested by Lansdale--will be far from dramatic. What we face is an urgent need to reverse a basic oriental conception--that the dignity of the common man is unimportant and that his basic rights are few. Heavy-handed conduct on the part of the soldiery is the normal thing in Asia. A lack of fiscal integrity on the part of officials is wide-spread, and generally accepted. Regrettably, these things are deeply ingrained in the fabric of the very people whom it is so important that we influence--the military, the police, and the minor officialdom. Thus, it is that the best we do will be none too good, inasmuch as it runs counter to the instincts of those with whom we must deal. Nevertheless, this is still the essence of civic action; and the best way to get on with it will be, as Lansdale says, to procure the total services of a few people who are enthusiastic, knowledgeable, and oriented directly toward the project. 4. Such a proposal as General Lansdale makes brings to my mind the multitude of similar good ideas which can well up through the Special Group--or could do so, were we properly organized for the task. In this regard, I am mindful of Mr. McNamara's expression of concern as to whether or not we are properly organized for counterinsurgency, Model 1962. I would like to address the problem here. 5. To begin with, and in the face of speeches to the contrary, the counterinsurgency issue that faces us today is different, is not compatible with existing organizational concepts, does need a fresh look. 6. This is true because our insurgency misery is a Communist creation, one designed on a pattern that does not fit neatly into the organization geometry of the system which has been so successful, heretofore, in meeting our country's troubles. 7. The conception that the shooting begins when all else ends was fine for Metternich and safe for Disraeli, but it has no identification whatever with today, when the traditional lines of authority, the traditional compartments of responsibility, and the traditional mechanisms of coordination have been discarded by the aggressor, and he having discarded them, our countervailing arrangements must be correspondingly altered. 8. Here is where we run into trouble. The State Department says, "Stabilization of our allies, inducing them to our persuasion, is pure diplomatic business--our business. It has been so for years." The military community says, "Insurgents? Guerrillas? Terrorism? That is certainly no mystery to us. We have thousands of skilled fighters to handle it. Just let us at them." The MAP or AID people say, "Stability? Yes, it is primarily a product of elevated standards; and dollars, well dispensed, are the real elevator. Whatever else is involved, the provision of financial help is still first, and that, of course, is our affair." And the information people; they feel much the same. "Enlightenment is the answer, the real enduring answer, and we have that in hand." 9. And on it goes. The fact is, they are all wrong; and they are all right, too. If we are to succeed in beating the Reds at their own game, our problem-solving mechanism somehow has to synthesize the strengths of all of these fine activities, somehow has to blot out the organizational lines and function as a single matrix of power. The time is past when we can hope to meet the Communists with a system in which diplomacy, guns, propaganda, and dollars all seek to function alone, each immured in its own well-defined proprietary area. The Communists are organized for aggression on a homogeneous basis. Regrettably as they are on the offensive, they call much of the tune, and we simply have to organize to meet them. 10. That brings me to the Special Group (CI). This, to me, forms the beginning of our answer, since it draws together, at a decisive level, the same resources that the Communists employ habitually against us as a unified entity. In other words, this Special Group idea gives us the mechanism to face consolidated aggressive power with consolidated quick-reacting power. I believe the Special Group scheme is the counterinsurgency answer--at the Washington level: a. If all of the participants can identify themselves with the executive function and avoid identification as institutional representatives b. If they are confronted with only problems of major magnitude (there are certainly enough of these); and c. If they are supported adequately and dynamically by a working group which seeks to unite, at a lower level, these same functions which go to make up our counterinsurgency strength. This latter arrangement, we do not now have, or we have on only the most informal and uncertain basis. 11. Therefore, it would be my idea that each member of the Special Group (CI) should designate a working deputy; these deputies to meet regularly on matters placed on the CI Group agenda by the Group; that the working deputies should dispose, by accord, of the counterinsurgency matters of lesser concern and present to the Group, staffed and in condition for decision (hard though it sometimes may be), the matters of prime concern. 12. It may be said that this contemplates more work; probably it does, but it will be worth it in the speed-up of counterinsurgency decisions. It may also be said that this whole CI Group idea is wrong, inasmuch as it transgresses organizational lines; but, as I implied before, this is the view that conveys real comfort to Mr. Khrushchev. V.H. Krulak
133. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, March 27, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/3-2762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad and to Tokyo for Harriman. 1231. Deptel 1131 and Embtel 1222./2/ Gen. Harkins and I together saw President Diem this morning. After reviewing results Honolulu meeting/3/ and general discussion situation here, during which Diem was relaxed and in rather optimistic mood, I raised subject of two correspondents of US publications threatened by expulsion. I said I had been happy to learn through Thuan that expulsion order for Bigart had been countermanded by President, and that I hoped very much that, upon reflection, President Diem had decided also to countermand the expulsion order against Sully. I made it clear that I was not defending Sully as a person, and that I did not always agree with the line taken by Newsweek regarding Viet-Nam; but that I felt very strongly, and had been explicitly so instructed by US Government, that the expulsion of the correspondent of an influential US publication would have a most damaging effect on public and Congressional opinion at home, and would greatly complicate our relations. Pointing out that it seemed to me that public approval in the US for our policy of support to the GVN was steadily increasing, I asked President Diem not to jeopardize this by action to expel Newsweek's correspondent. General Harkins supported this, pointing out that he too felt encouraged by the increased recognition by US correspondents here of the success of efforts being made by the GVN with our assistance. /2/Neither printed. /3/See Document 124. Diem said that this whole matter was painful to him. He wished to make it clear, for his part, that Sully had for many years been both derogatory and insulting in what he had written and said about the GVN and specifically about the President, members of his government, and members of his family. Diem said that he realized his government was not perfect, that one could truthfully point out weak spots, errors, and failures but there were good things to be said also, and these should not be neglected. But most especially, he said, he objected to those journalists who went out of their way to malign the personal integrity of the chief of state, his ministers, or his family. He said this was particularly true of Sully. He asked whether President Kennedy would permit a foreign correspondent who publicly questioned his personal integrity to remain in the US and enjoy its facilities. He again mentioned his conviction that stories emanating from certain US correspondents here published in the US press contributed to the political unrest in Viet-Nam, and specifically to the recent near assassination of himself and his family. I again said that I hoped he did not misinterpret my démarche (and I am sure he did not); that I was not defending a person or a publication, but was insisting, for the sake of our common cause, that he not make a "cause celebre" which would create real political difficulties between us. After considerable discussion, it came out that he had decided to allow both Bigart and Sully to remain until the expiration of their visas, and then not to renew their visas. He said that he understood Bigart's visa expires toward the end of April and Sully's in June or July. I said that I had understood from Thuan that there was no further sanction hanging over Bigart, that I was disappointed now to hear that Bigart's visa would not be renewed if requested. This would cause grave difficulties. The President replied that this was a normal prerogative of government and was a simple and unspectacular way to handle both men. I said that I did not question his prerogative, but that from point of view of our common endeavor such a course would be most unwise. We left it for the present that no positive action would be taken against either Bigart or Sully. (Diem said that the lifting of the ban against Sully was "tres penible" to him.) As to the future, I said that I would want to talk with him again on the question when the renewal of the visas came up, and I hoped very much that in the meantime he could think the matter over in the light of our conversation. Diem gave no indication of willingness to change his mind further, but I am hopeful this may be a face-saving device. I drew rather heavily on credits at the bank on this one, but detected no personal animosity. The press corps here is naturally very much interested in this affair. I am telling Newsweek, through Robert Elegant, the following: (1) that the expulsion order against Sully will be rescinded; (2) that if and when the question of renewal of his visa comes up, I do not know what the GVN decision will be; (3) that I expect both Newsweek and the US press generally to refrain from publicizing this matter as official US pressure on the GVN on behalf of US correspondents. I believe it is best not to reopen the question with Bigart, who apparently now understands there is no hindrance to his remaining here. If and when the renewal of his visa is requested, and if difficulties then arise, we can take the matter up again. Elegant said to me yesterday that he feels that Sully has "been here too long", and is therefore too emotionally involved for balanced judgment. This lead might be worth following up in Washington. Nolting
134. Memorandum From the Naval Aide of the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, March 29, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Items of particular interest which were developed at the Task Force meeting today are listed below. Mr. Cottrell reported on the Saigon request at Honolulu/2/ that Washington delegate authority to the Embassy and General Harkins to approve local Vietnamese defoliant operations. Such operations would be on specific targets restricted to Viet Cong crops, laid by Vietnamese helicopters, using chemicals made available by the US. Since these chemicals are commercially available and the Vietnamese have been carrying out crop destruction by burning on the ground, one course of action is for the US to remain aloof and let the Vietnamese carry out operations as they desire. Ambassador Nolting, however, sees some advantage in our issuing chemicals on the spot and thereby retaining a "foot in the door" so we know what operations the GVN are planning and executing. Cottrell asked for opinions within the Task Force. Military . . . were in favor; State and USIA were doubtful or in opposition. Cottrell will discuss this with Alexis Johnson, coordinate with Defense, and probably come forward to the White House with a proposal for delegating authority under carefully defined parameters. /2/See Document 124. The concept for the border patrol as outlined by General Harkins in Honolulu was discussed and questioned as to its relevance to your recommendation since it involves 88 posts over a frontier area of approximately 250 miles. Admiral Heinz was requested to send a message to ComUSMACV to get a fuller expression of the approved concept. There was a short discussion on the need for broader-based, more effective planning in South Viet-Nam for civic action. This proposition is understood and supported by Defense and AID; Mr. Cottrell resisted early action. AID and Defense representatives, however, are preparing a draft message for Cottrell outlining the overall strategic requirement for civic action and requesting information from Saigon as to existing plans and specific recommendations for US support. Defense also has been able to crash through with a draft telegram prodding Saigon to outline a plan to use both military and civilian assets for the deployment of medical teams in the rural areas. The military side, which is already in pilot stage, will be expanded around the ARPA project. AID bought the ARPA idea 100 percent and acted as if they had never seen it before. This is the same project we tried to push through Mr. Cottrell almost two months ago and which you brought up at the Special Group meeting two weeks ago. As a related matter, you should know that the new AID representative at the Task Force, Mr. Stoneman, who is also the AID Viet-Nam Desk Officer, is aggressive and far-seeing and already getting results. You may wish to comment on this to Mr. Hamilton. W.H.B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
135. Memorandum From the President's Military Aide (Clifton) to the National Security Adviser (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 29, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda-Chester Clifton, 3/61-6/62. Secret. Also sent to Bromley Smith. During the March 1st meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary McNamara with the President,/2/ the President stated a requirement for a contingency plan for South Vietnam in the event our present efforts fail. I believe that about April 1st you should ask Secretary McNamara how this project is coming. /2/No record of this meeting has been found. Secretary McNamara indicated that we need a plan for the induction of U.S. forces before the loss of the total interior of South Vietnam, if such a catastrophe were about to overtake us. An important item in this planning, according to the President, is the timing of a decision for U.S. action and the factors that go into such a decision. [Here follows a paragraph on another matter.] The President has placed a requirement on us to bring him a report of the political and economic operations in South Vietnam. Two items especially concern him: ten provincial surveys were approved but only two or three teams so far are in action; second is the civic action teams that follow the military activities. It was reported that civic action teams were not going out into the country, that the South Vietnamese had no stomach for this operation, and that we would have to do something about it. Is the JCS going to send the Caribou aircraft out to South Vietnam in June or are they going to send helicopters? [Here follows a paragraph on another matter.] C.V. Clifton/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
136. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 30, 1962./2/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, Memos from Colonel Burris, Jan. 1961-June 1962. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "VP has seen." /2/The date on the source text is March 20, which is incorrect. Telegram 1243 from Saigon, March 29, substantiates the information regarding the attacks referred to in the second paragraph. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-2962) Presumably the correct date is March 30. RE Viet Cong activity is being intensified on an increasingly broader spectrum. Attacks against reserve forces have been enlarged to supply lines, communications, transportation, and even to units of South Viet Nam's regular forces. On March 27 Viet Cong attacked and derailed four trains and tore up the tracks. On the same day the VC for the first time attacked two vehicles of the International Control Commission and wounded two individuals. The vehicles were plainly painted and marked with insignia of the Commission. In the face of this increased activity, South Viet Nam statistics, in one area in particular, are somewhat alarming. Desertions from the regular forces have increased to 1,000 a month. Even this does not include the figures among the pare-military forces. When the battle casualties are added the total losses are expected to increase to the point where an overall increase in the effectiveness of the South Viet Nam armed forces is doubtful. The significance of the high desertion rate is indicative of military and national leadership. More fundamentally, it reflects the willingness of the South Vietnamese to free himself from the Communist menace. The Chief of the British Advisory Commission, Mr. Thompson, feels that the philosophy of the present effort in South Viet Nam is wrong. Based on his experience in Malaya, he feels that the conflict is between the Communists and South Viet Nam citizens instead of between Diem's government and the Viet Cong guerrilla forces. The village is the foundation of the social structure of Viet Nam. The villages also constitute the base of Viet Cong organization and support. Thompson concludes that present government action will never be too successful unless this fact is dealt with and the role of the civil defense forces increased. Therefore, he recommends that the villagers be encouraged or even rewarded to resist the VC. He would also concentrate training of the villagers even at the expense of units of the regular forces to disrupt the base of VC efforts.
137. Letter From President Diem to President Kennedy/1/ Saigon, March 31, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3-3162. Official use Only. This letter was also sent to the Pope and 92 heads of state in non-communist countries. The Australian Mission to the United Nations had agreed to circulate the letter to all member delegations, but on April 26 Madame Chuang, the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations, undertook the distribution herself. Mr. President: I believe the facts of Communist aggression against the Vietnamese people are now well known to you. Despite Communist lies, the evidence on record cannot be hidden. However, I would like to draw your particular attention to the January 18 Hanoi announcement of the founding of the so-called people's revolutionary party. This announcement is virtual admission of Hanoi's direction and control of the Viet Cong rebels who are brutally attacking our people. On January 18, the Hanoi radio broadcast the declaration of the new Communist creation, the so-called Vietnamese people's revolutionary party. This declaration states that in the last days of 1961 "Marxist-Leninists" in South Vietnam established a new party, with its "immediate tasks" being to unite the people and "to overthrow" the Government of Viet-Nam. It also declared that the party "calls on the people in the North to build an ever more prosperous and strong North Vietnam, making it a solid basis for the struggle for peaceful reunification of the country, to give active support to their compatriots in South Vietnam in their revolutionary struggle." Here at last is a public admission of what has always been clear-that the Viet Cong campaign against my people is led by Communists. The North Vietnamese admission that the Viet Cong attacks on the free people of Viet-Nam--attacks which now average more than 400 per week and claim total casualties of nearly 800 per week--are henceforth to be openly Communist directed must be a matter of concern for all nations. The Communists have now themselves made it clear that they are making another brutal attempt in their effort to achieve world domination. This attempt is not new. For more than seven years the Communists have most cynically violated the Geneva Accords of 1954. The central purpose of these Accords, which established a cease-fire, is to maintain the peace in Viet-Nam. The Communist regime in Hanoi is violating this basic purpose by its direction and support of the expanding guerrilla war which it is carrying on in South Vietnam. The Hanoi regime made clear its objective when the Communist (Lao Dong) Party in North Vietnam stated at its 1960 congress that a strategic task of "the Vietnamese revolution" is "to liberate South Vietnam"--the Communist jargon for conquering a country already free. Evidence based on captured documents and prisoners shows that, in order to carry out this task, the Hanoi regime is infiltrating armed personnel by the thousands into South Vietnam to mount over increasing guerrilla war activities. In view of this guerrilla campaign, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has been compelled to appeal for increased military assistance and support from free world countries to help prevent it from being overwhelmed by massive subversion from Communist North Vietnam, backed by heavily increased support from the Communist bloc. Even the regime in Hanoi has recognized that the free world's increased assistance is needed and being used in South Vietnam for defensive purposes. In an interview broadcast over Hanoi Radio January 1, 1962, Major General Nguyen Van Vinh, chairman of the so-called "National Reunification Commission", stated that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam supported by the United States is not now preparing for a "march to the North." On the other hand, the Communist bloc has conducted an extensive airlift of military supplies into North Vietnam for aggressive purposes for well over a year. Part of this military material has been sent on to Laos to support the rebels and Viet Cong fighting the legitimate Government there, but much of it has been turned over to the Communist regime in North Vietnam to build up its war potential against South Vietnam. A grave threat to peace thus exists and can be removed only if the Communist regime in Hanoi is forced to desist in its guerrilla war against the legal Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, of which I have the honor to be President. World opinion is likely to serve as an important factor in the future decisions of the Communist authorities about this guerrilla war. I am, therefore, writing to you, Excellency, to bring the facts about the serious situation in Viet-Nam to your attention and to request that you raise your voice in defense of freedom and peace in this area of the world by condemning the Communist aggression against the duly constituted Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Yours sincerely
138. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, April 3, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-362. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text, but it is signed "Cot." SUBJECT The Diem-Nolting understanding of December 4,/2/ upon which we based our expanded support, contained the following undertakings: /2/See the enclosure to Nolting's December 5 letter in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 307. 1. Basic immediate objective is to enable the GVN to take and maintain the offensive against the VC. Results: Achieved. General Harkins reports good morale, offensive spirit, and operations. 2. Increased GVN effort will be mounted. Fundamental responsibility of GVN for conduct of the war will not be impaired. A closer relationship will be established with the U.S. Results: Increased effort has been mounted. By too much publicity and military zeal we may be impairing GVN responsibility. Closer relationship has been established. 3. U.S. will increase forms of aid previously furnished, and new steps will be (a) participation of U.S. personnel in operational missions with GVN forces and (b) closer consultation with U.S. advisors. Results: Achieved. 4. GVN will take measures to increase its efficiency, and to increase its public support at home and abroad. It will: (a) Reactivate its National Internal Security Council. Results: Achieved. (b) Consult with U.S. on reorganization of the Military Command structure. Results: GVN has consulted, has set up a Joint General Staff, a Joint Operations Center and a Tactical Air Control, but has moved slowly on any other basic changes. (c) GVN has set up a Central Intelligence Organization and is prepared to accept U.S. Intelligence personnel in the military headquarters from the Joint General Staff down through divisions. Results: U.S. personnel are in JGS, and each level from JGS to province headquarters and battalion level. 49 of 196 were installed as of February. (d) GVN agrees to joint provincial surveys, it being understood they will be directed principally to military and intelligence matters. Results: 3 provinces surveyed. More to be surveyed. (e) Border Ranger Forces will be provided against infiltrators. Results: 10 companies of ARVN rangers and 14 companies of Montagnard rangers released for Border Ranger Force on March 20, 1962. (f) GVN agrees to closest coordination of GVN and U.S. military commanders. Results: Achieved. (g) U.S. advisers will be accepted in certain GVN administrative organs, subject to the request of the GVN, on a case by case basis. Results: GVN has not yet requested any advisers. (It also may not be in the best U.S. interest to get into such a close relationship and be held responsible for GVN decisions.) (h) Legislation has been enacted giving the President broad emergency powers during the next two years, adequate to carry out this agreement. 5. GVN has taken a variety of actions to win public support at home and abroad. These include creation of a National Flood Relief and Rehabilitation Organization, creation of Provincial Councils, institution of military training for women, investigation of speculators, proposals to reduce official salaries and entertainment, plans for improved military allowances and survivor benefits, and the creation of a National Economic Council. 6. The GVN will take prompt measures of its own to (a) Give a broader sense of participation in the war effort to the people of Viet-Nam. Results: Fair to poor. (b) Develop more contacts between officials of the GVN and the people. Results: Good. Over 600 civic action cadres in all provinces are now in the field representing the GVN. (c) Develop a more effective public information service. Results: Not satisfactory. They have new a press spokesman which helps some. Minor progress such as village newspaper, film production and press trips. Radio poor. (d) Bring non-Communist prisoners promptly to trial. Results: Poor. No political prisoners of note have been brought to trial. (e) Develop and announce an amnesty policy for Viet Cong defectors. Results: GVN has developed a plan approved by Thuan and General Ty. Embassy likes it, but it has not yet been coordinated between ministries. 7. GVN recognizes the importance of developing at all levels its democratic institutions and will take all practical and feasible steps to this end. Results: Poor. Provincial councils, proposed village elective councils, and some additional freedom for National Assembly are among small steps taken. War footing and Diem suspicions inhibit dramatic progress.
[Attachment] STEPS TAKEN BY THE GVN SINCE DECEMBER 4, 1961 Political 1. National Assembly enjoying greatest period of activity since its creation, including criticism of GVN administration. 2. National Internal Security Council re-activated. 3. National Economic Council convened and consulted. 4. Constitutional Court established. 5. A Ministry of Civic Action re-organized and operating actively. 6. An Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets has also been created. 7. The Republican Youth Movement subsidized by the GVN is displaying an ever expanding Civic Action and Self Defense capability. 8. Provincial councils created, with the privilege of direct appeal to President. 9. Unpopular "Social Pacification Bill" resumed to Assembly for amendment by President. 10. Opposition leaders not being actively harassed. Psychological 1. Greater press freedom-appointment of effective Presidential press officer. Quality and credibility of Vietnamese press coverage has improved. 2. President making increased visits remote areas of country. 3. A number of officials guilty of graft being punished, speculators curbed. 4. People's Letter Box established by GVN. Receiving and replying to 3,000 letters per month. Economic 1. De facto devaluation of the piaster undertaken in 1961, thus generating more piasters. 2. Collection of taxes and excises is being intensified. 3. The decision was made to borrow internally-deficit financing. 4. Maintenance of stable rice prices and control of inflationary tendencies. 5. Measures taken to provide increased safety for delivery of rice to market. 6. Public works projects being undertaken; steps being taken to reduce unemployment. Military 1. The Delta Plan approved March 19, 1962./3/ /3/The Delta Plan was actually approved on March 16; see Document 113. 2. Operation Sunrise initiated March 22, 1962./4/ /4/See Document 103. 3. Better organization. a) Central Intelligence Organization making good progress; . . . . 4. Joint provincial surveys are being undertaken. Three are completed with more to follow. 5. The base of the military effort is being broadened: a) Women's military training programs carried out. 6. Some austerity measures have been taken with respect to civil population and civil servants. 7. Measures taken to improve the morale of the military: a) Increased pay and allowances for the lower ranks and Civil
Guard.
139. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, April 3, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries, Vietnam. Secret; Noforn. SUBJECT Herewith, the summary I promised you of recent progress in implementing the strategic concept for South Vietnam in recent months. A systematic counterinsurgency operation has been launched very recently in an effort to eliminate Viet Cong guerrilla-subversive forces and rehabilitate the countryside on an area-by-area basis. The most notable progress, however, has been in the civilian rather than in the military sector. The strategic village concept, for example, has taken hold within both the Vietnam Government (GVN) and the US Mission; this concept is now a matter of national, high-priority policy for the GVN. Also, the GVN's Civic Action program has been reoriented and is being revitalized and expanded. Indeed, strategic village and Civic Action concepts now are integrated and vital in the GVN's general effort against the Viet Cong. Specific examples of this progress are noted below. A. A Systematic Counterinsurgency Plan 1. President Diem approved the implementation of the Delta Pacification Plan on March 19, 1962./2/ This plan calls for a systematic military-civilian counterinsurgency operation to clear the Viet Cong from the Mekong River delta and re-establish government control on an area-by-area basis by giving protection to the villagers and cutting off Viet Cong access to the villages. (See Embassy Telegram 1191, March 20, 1962, Secret.)/3/ /2/Diem actually approved the Delta Plan on March 16; see Document 113. /3/Document 117. 2. The first part of such a plan has been initiated in the form of "Operation Sunrise." The operation is confined to Binh Duong province but once its objectives have been achieved, a similar plan (as modified on the basis of experience) will be applied in other delta provinces and ultimately throughout most of the country. (See COMUSMACV MACV 127, March 19, 1962, Secret, and Embassy Telegram Toaid 647, March 13, 1962, Secret.)/4/ /4/Unless otherwise indicated in footnotes, the remaining documents cited in this memorandum are not printed. 3. "Operation Sunrise" consists of three phases. The first phase, initiated a month or two ago, involves essentially the necessary planning. The second phase involves military operations, the relocation of hamlets into compact and fortified strategic villages, and Civic Action activities within these villages (since this phase began on March 22, 1962, it is too early to make an assessment of it). The third phase is the period of consolidation emphasizing stepped-up Civic Action activities. The objectives during this phase are to strengthen security, build a socio-political base at the village level, and tie the villages into the national governmental system and the national fabric. The success of "Operation Sunrise" is overridingly keyed to strategic village and Civic Action concepts, thus reflecting the essentially political nature of the problem in South Vietnam. (See CINCPAC 3010, February 24, 1962, Secret.) 4. The US Mission in Vietnam, when asked by the Vietnam Task Force whether all Saigon agencies concurred in the validity of the Thompson approach to counterinsurgency, replied that the Delta Plan "accords in essence" with counterinsurgency planning as worked out and approved by the Mission. (See Embassy Telegram 1159, March 9, 1962, Secret.)/5/ /5/See footnote 2, Document 101. B. Strategic Hamlets or Villages 1. President Ngo Dinh Diem signed a decree on February 3, 1962, creating a special "Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets" which will coordinate the strategic hamlet or village program on a country-wide basis. (See Embassy Despatch 355, February 27, 1962, Unclassified.)/6/ /6/See Document 46. 2. Although precise information is not available, it is estimated that 150-200 strategic hamlets or villages have been established throughout more than half of Vietnam's 39 provinces. In one province, Vinh Long, the province chief claimed the completion of 60 strategic hamlets by January 1962. (See Embassy Despatch 334, February 12, 1962, Official Use Only.) 3. The village of Tam An and the hamlet of Tan Phu in Bien Hoa province are examples of the effectiveness of the strategic hamlet or village approach for re-establishing government control in the countryside and promoting self-reliance among the peasantry. (See Embassy Despatch 375, March 16, 1962, Confidential.) a. The Tam An administration, virtually eliminated by the Viet Cong, was re-constituted in October 1961, following an army sweep of the area. A well-built defense post was constructed on a strategic site, equipped by a radio and defended by small locally recruited Self Defense Corps and Civil Guard units. A new village council was created, gifts of medicine, clothing, and rice were given by the province chief, and no reprisals were taken against villagers who once were suspected of cooperating with the Viet Cong. This village has since remained free of the Viet Cong. b. Tan Phu had been for years prior to July 1961 under almost complete Viet Cong control. Following a security sweep of the area in November 1961, the province chief began to transform Tan Phu into a typical strategic hamlet (surrounding ditch, barbed-wire embankment, defense post, watch tower, etc.) and defended by a small locally recruited Self Defense Corps unit. The administrative system was strengthened and improved by the addition of vigorous and interested officials. Tan Phu continues to remain free of the Viet Cong. C. Civic Action 1. On January 19, 1962, the Vietnamese Department of Civic Action was reorganized, creating (i) a central Civic Action Service in Saigon by combining related and heretofore separate services within the Department and (ii) an integrated Civic Action office in each province and district. (See Embassy Despatch 380, March 15, 1962, Confidential.) 2. As of January 24, 1962, a chief and deputy chief for Civic Action reportedly had been appointed in every province in South Vietnam. (See CS-3, 502,549, Saigon, February 27, 1962, Confidential, Noforn, Continued Control.) 3. Civilian Civic Action teams have been operating generally in the Mekong River delta and primarily in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Tuy provinces. (See Embassy Telegram Toaid 647, March 13, 1962; Embassy Telegram 1196, March 20, 1962, Confidential; and COMUSMACV MACV 127, March 19, 1962, Secret.) a. The teams consist of up to 20 specialists in health, agriculture police, education, information, public administration, public works and communications b. Recently, the mission of these teams has been increasingly focused on the strategic hamlet or village program. c. Civilian Civic Action activities are coordinated by the Department of Civic Action, assisted in men and material by the other departments and operationally directed at the local level by the district and provincial administrative authorities. d. In instances where they are employed in a systematic counterinsurgency operation, as in "Operation Sunrise," Civic Action teams are temporarily under direct military control but will subsequently revert to district and provincial civilian control. e. USOM has established a committee to provide on a priority basis direct US assistance (and to coordinate such assistance) to Civic Action operations through the relevant Vietnamese Government agencies. 4. The Vietnamese Defense Department is now planning its own Civic Action program. (See Embassy Telegram 1196, March 20, 1962, Confidential.) D. Security and Police 1. The importance now attached to the counterinsurgency role of the rural security services is reflected in the US Mission's recommendation that the strength of the Self Defense Corps be increased to 80,000 by fiscal year 1963 and that of the Civil Guard to 90,000 by fiscal year 1964. (See Embassy Telegram 1135, March 5, 1962, Secret.) 2. Planning in USOM and in AID is proceeding with respect to the development of a rural police force. USOM has drawn up the guidelines for this force, has asked for 20 rural police advisers, and has recommended that 4.8 million dollars in US aid be allocated to the Vietnam police advisory program for fiscal year 1962. (See Department Telegram 1010, February 21, 1962, Secret; and Embassy Telegram Toaid 579, February 24, 1962, Secret.) E. Village Communication System 1. Of the 133 village radios shipped to Vietnam to date, 44 have been installed in Gia Dinh province, 48 are to be installed in An Xuyen province during April 6-25, and most of the remainder are to be installed concurrently in Binh Duong province where "Operation Sunrise" is now in progress. Priorities have also been established for four other delta provinces. (See Embassy Telegram Toaid 739, March 27, 1962, Confidential.) 2. The public safety role of village radios was demonstrated on March 20, 1962, when a joint USOM-Vietnamese radio installation team was attacked by Viet Cong guerrillas. The security escort engaged the Viet Cong while the team proceeded to install the village radio and then notified district headquarters and other village radio stations. Assistance was despatched and resulted in an ambush of the Viet Cong as they were fleeing toward another village which had been alerted. (See Embassy Telegram Toaid 716, March 22, 1962, Confidential.) F. US AID Project Priorities The US Government's ability to render non-military assistance to Vietnam on an increasingly effective basis was decidedly strengthened by AID's action in March 1962 establishing priorities, first, second, and third, for projects within its Vietnam program. The categorization of these projects was based on their immediate impact on the "counterinsurgency and short-range security objectives in accordance with current US policy." (See Department Telegram Aidto 556, March 7, 1962. Official Use Only.) G. Military Tactics A military operation in late February or early March of this year reflects the effective utilization of security forces and artillery in counter-guerrilla warfare. A combined Vietnamese Army ranger, Civil Guard, and Self Defense Corps force, supported by an Army artillery unit, engaged a Viet Cong guerrilla company in a pre-planned operation in Kien Hoa province. The Viet Cong initially stood and fought but then broke and attempted to withdraw. At that point, artillery fire was requested on the retreating Viet Cong and inflicted severe casualties. In large measure, this operation succeeded, first, because artillery was not employed at the outset (which would have alerted the Viet Cong and permitted them to escape) and, second, because the use of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps forces (which are essentially defensive forces) in an offensive mission was supported by a participating regular army unit. (See CHMAAG Vietnam Magpo 1441, March 4, 1962, Secret.)
140. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, April 3, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 2-B.4 GVN. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Cot--Please consider. I agree with the principle. WAH" Congressman Saund of California, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, made an informal suggestion recently that in Viet-Nam more use should be made of nationals of countries nearby and thus reduce the number of U.S. servicemen required. Having been born in the area, the Congressman was especially convincing in presenting this point of view. Since then we have given considerable attention to the question and I brought it up for discussion in a meeting with the officers of the Joint Staff of the JCS. I believe that it meats current consideration. The U.S. servicemen or their replacements may be in Viet-Nam for many years; the 5,200 there now evidently will be increased to 8,000 or 10,000 with arrivals reported frequently in the press. The nationals most likely to be available and acceptable in Viet-Nam are those of the Philippines but others of the area might be usable. Filipino civilian technicians of the Eastern Construction Company are said to be working effectively in Laos. Psychologically, it would be of obvious benefit to us in the Far East and in our international relations generally, if other nations of the area were cooperating with us militarily in Viet-Nam as a visible demonstration of solidarity against Communist attack. There would also be psychological advantages in the United States. You are aware of the President's desire for us to induce other nations to work with us to the extent feasible in Viet-Nam, as evidenced in point 6 of the May 1961 Program:/2/ /2/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 42. "Cooperate with the GVN in planning the most effective use of assistance offered by other governments to assist Viet-Nam in its actions against the Viet Cong, including the provision of certain expert personnel with long experience, e.g., in Malaya." In view of the above considerations, I suggest that the Cottrell Task Force be asked to take a new hard look, and endeavor to come up with positive recommendations for action now or later in line with the idea advanced by Congressman Saund.
141. Memorandum From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to the President/1/ Washington, April 4, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-131, Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1962. Secret. Also printed in Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, pp. 297-299. Transmitted to President Kennedy under cover of a letter of April 5 from Galbraith (ibid., pp. 296-297) that dealt, for the most part, with subjects other than Vietnam. Galbraith was in the United States, March 27-April 8, to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on India. Forrestal sent this memorandum 131 to McNamara for DOD's comments on April 7. SUBJECT The following considerations influence our thinking on Viet-Nam: 1. We have a growing military commitment. This could expand step by step into a major, long-drawn out indecisive military involvement. 2. We are backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual government and a leader who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return. 3. There is consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did. 4. The political effects of some of the measures which pacification requires or ~s believed to require, including the concentration of population, relocation of villages, and the burning of old villages, may be damaging to those and especially to Westerners associated with it. 5. We fear that at some point in the involvement there will be a major political outburst about the new Korea and the new war into which the Democrats as so often before have precipitated us. 6. It seems at least possible that the Soviets are not particularly desirous of trouble in this part of the world and that our military reaction with the need to fall back on Chinese protection may be causing concern in Hanoi. In the light of the foregoing we urge the following: 1. That it be our policy to keep open the door for political solution. We should welcome as a solution any broadly based non-Communist government that is free from external interference. It should have the requisites for internal law and order. We should not require that it be militarily identified with the United States. 2. We shall find it useful in achieving this result if we seize any good opportunity to involve other countries and world opinion in settlement and its guarantee. This is a useful exposure and pressure on the Communist bloc countries and a useful antidote for the argument that this is a private American military adventure. 3. We should measurably reduce our commitment to the particular present leadership of the Government of South Viet-Nam. To accomplish the foregoing, we recommend the following specific steps: 1. In the next fortnight or so the ICC will Present a report which we are confidentially advised will accuse North Viet-Nam of subversion and the Government of Viet-Nam in conjunction with the United States of not notifying the introduction of men and materiel as prescribed by the Geneva accords. We should respond by asking the cochairman to initiate steps to re-establish compliance with the Geneva accords. Pending specific recommendations, which might at some stage include a conference of signatories, we should demand a suspension of Viet Cong activity and agree to a standstill on an introduction of men and matériel. 2. Additionally, Governor Harriman should be instructed to approach the Russians to express our concern about the increasingly dangerous situation that the Viet Cong is forcing in Southeast Asia. They should be told of our determination not to let the Viet Cong overthrow the present government while at the same time to look without relish on the dangers that this military build-up is causing in the area. The Soviets should be asked to ascertain whether Hanoi can and will call off the Viet Cong activity in return for phased American withdrawal, liberalization in the trade relations between the two parts of the country and general and non-specific agreement to talk about reunification after some period of tranquillity. 3. Alternatively, the Indians should be asked to make such an approach to Hanoi under the same terms of reference. 4. It must be recognized that our long-run position cannot involve an unconditional commitment to Diem. Our support is to non-Communist and progressively democratic government not to individuals. We cannot ourselves replace Diem. But w. e should be clear in, our mind that almost any non-Communist change would probably be beneficial and this should be the guiding rule for our diplomatic representation in the area. In the meantime policy should continue to be guided by the following: 1. We should resist all steps which commit American troops to combat action and impress upon all concerned the importance of keeping American forces out of actual combat commitment. 2. We should disassociate ourselves from action, however necessary, which seems to be directed at the villagers, such as the new concentration program. If the action is one that is peculiarly identified with Americans, such as defoliation, it should not be undertaken in the absence of most compelling reasons. Americans in their various roles should be as invisible as the situation permits. [Continue with the next documents]
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