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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
142. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to the President/1/ Washington, April 4, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Bowles. Secret. The memorandum totals 54 pages and includes a table of contents at the beginning. Bowles transmitted the paper to the President under cover of a memorandum of April 4 in which he indicated that it was the second of two papers growing out of his recent trip, that he was limiting the number of copies due to the controversy sure to be generated by the conclusions, and that he would like to discuss the proposals with the President after he had read it. (Ibid., National Security File, Meetings & Memos, Staff Memos, Chester Bowles) He also sent copies to Bundy and Forrestal in the White House and Walt Rostow in the Department of State. The President had sent Bowles on a mission to the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East, February 8-March 19; while in the Far East, Bowles chaired the Baguio Chiefs of Mission Conference, March 10-11. U.S. POLICIES IN THE FAR EAST Review and Recommendations [Here follow a three-page introduction, a six-page section entitled "The Shape of East and Southeast Asia in 1962," a four-page section entitled "The U.S. Position in the Region," and the first three pages of a section entitled "U.S. Objectives Regarding Non-Communist Asia."] 3. A third U.S. objective in non-Communist Asia should be the maintenance of an effective but unprovocative military presence capable of deterring an overt attack by Communist forces./2/ /2/The first two objectives were: (1) "to help create independent states, free to make their own choices, capable of maintaining their own internal security, and ready to cooperate with us in case of overt aggression;" and (2) "the fostering of increased cooperation among the nations of the region." At present the Seventh Fleet and other U.S. forces provide such a deterrent. Even among the unaligned nations the importance of this military shield is increasingly recognized in private discussions, even though not always in public statements. However, the failure of the Lao and South Vietnamese governments, with almost unlimited U.S. support, to create viable societies which their people are prepared vigorously to defend has led to a direct U.S. confrontation with Communist forces in Southeast Asia. This in turn has raised far-reaching questions about the political framework in which our military forces can be most effectively employed. As I have noted in an earlier section, many vigorously anti-Communist Asians believe that Western-sponsored regional defense organizations, such as SEATO, do more damage than good to the cause of regional unity and security. Similar doubts as to SEATO's usefulness were expressed by several of our Mission Chiefs at the recent Regional Operations Conference at Baguio. Although our abrupt abandonment of this organization now might be interpreted as an act of weakness, I believe that on balance it has hindered rather than helped our efforts during the last few years. Moreover, it could be persuasively argued that a conspicuous American military presence in an area bordering directly on Communist China may, in certain circumstances, serve more as a magnet for Communist pressures than as an effective defense. When we contrast the ability of such unaligned nations as Cambodia and Burma to destroy indigenous Communist guerrillas and to contain Communist infiltration across their borders with the vulnerability of Vietnam and Laos, which are closely associated with us, it is difficult to escape such a conclusion. This is not to deny the importance of the U.S. military role in those unaligned nations that are not under direct Communist pressure. For instance, the Pentagon's training of Indonesian officers has created powerful pro-U.S. attitudes within the Indonesian armed forces which may be the key to Indonesia's political future. Similarly, American military missions can help train and arm indigenous forces, on the model of the new Cambodian army, that combine an effective counter-guerrilla capacity with skill in building bridges, roads, schools, and clinics. This provides a counter-subversion force that can also act as a powerful bridge between the people and their government. 4. A final objective for U.S. policy is the stabilization of the three outstanding politico-military situations which now endanger the region and in which our own military forces have become indirectly or directly involved. These are the impasse in Laos, the war in South Vietnam, and the precarious balance in the Taiwan Straits. [Here follows a brief section on the impasse in Laos.] B. South Vietnam. Here again the new Administration has taken courageous steps to save a situation that had been rapidly deteriorating. Yet the outcome remains unclear; the situation in Vietnam may develop in any one of three ways. 1) One possibility would be a clear-cut military victory by the South Vietnamese government, the destruction of the Vietminh guerrillas and a restabilization of the divided country along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. Much as we desire this outcome, it appears to me unlikely, given the present Vietnamese leadership. It is difficult to see how our weapons and training can compensate for the politically weak base on which Diem operates; his liabilities will tend to limit the effectiveness of the most carefully planned military tactics. 2) A second eventuality would be the drastic worsening of the existing situation and the threat of total collapse of South Vietnamese armed resistance. What should we do then? It may be argued persuasively that the Rubicon has already been crossed, that U.S. prestige is now irretrievably committed, that our failure to throw in whatever force may be required-regardless of the Chinese military reaction-will result in the collapse of all the independent nations of Southeast Asia and the total humiliation of the United States. In rebuttal, it may be said that a French army of 350,000 failed to defeat or contain Vietminh forces that were less well organized than those now operating within gunshot of Saigon; that this failure cost the French 90,000 casualties without active Chinese Communist participation; that under present circumstances the Chinese would quite probably react to a major American military effort near their borders by entering the war as they did in Korea; that if the Vietnam government should collapse under pressure, our embarrassment, although acute, would not be fatal; and that the independent nations of Southeast Asia, finally free of any illusions about the immediacy of the Communist danger, could then be rallied for effective defense. If the President should determine that deeper U.S. military involvement is not worth the likely consequences, some skillful balancing will be required. On the one hand, we will need to avoid public statements which may later compound our embarrassment if the situation in fact should turn against us. On the other, we should continue to leave the Vietminh, Communist Chinese, and Soviets with reason to fear a massive U.S. military movement against the heart of the Vietminh operations in Hanoi if such action should prove necessary to save the situation in South Vietnam. 3) A third possibility-and one which our skillful operations of the last few months make most likely-is that there will be neither total victory nor total defeat but rather the development of an uneasy fluid stalemate with the Viet Cong unable to crack the U.S.-supported government forces, yet still able to maintain an effective opposition. Although we Americans have never found it easy to accept such a situation, the prospect is not wholly discouraging. With the Viet Cong threat held in check, the South Vietnamese government would have another chance to build a solid foundation of popular support while at the same time we could explore the possibilities for a more permanent negotiated political settlement. [Here follow two more pages in the section "U.S. Objectives Regarding Non-Communist Asia," an eight-page section entitled "U.S. Objectives Regarding Communist Asia," and the first five pages of "Recommendations. "] C. Policy in Regard to Southeast Asia. Objectives: The development of viable, neutral, and independent nations on the Southeast Asian mainland, able to defend themselves against internal subversion or border pressures and increasingly willing to work together, thereby forcing the Chinese either to forgo aggression or to attack overtly in a manner which can be met by the U.S. with world-wide support. Lines of Action: 1. Clearly and publicly define our political objective of a neutral and independent Southeast Asian area as stated above. 2. With an absolute minimum of direct U.S. involvement and fanfare, strive to stabilize the military situation in Vietnam; our minimal aim should be a deadlock which will provide a basis for meaningful negotiation (i.e., a situation in which operations have become so costly to the Vietminh that continued fighting becomes unprofitable). 3. Without further committing U.S. military forces, keep the Vietminh, Communist Chinese and Soviets apprehensive that we may move vigorously against North Vietnam and even China in response to any increased effort on their part south of the 17th parallel. 4. Decide what specific political terms will be acceptable to us and to South Vietnam, as we have already done in Laos, and make known through a third party our willingness to negotiate with the Russians or others on that basis. 5. Continue our efforts in Laos to create a neutral and independent government under Souvanna. At the same time, prepare a contingency plan for the de facto partition of Laos, in the event of a breakdown in the present negotiations. 6. Keep unaligned nations such as India, Indonesia and Burma informed of our genuine desire for a Vietnam and Laos settlement that will assure a neutral and independent Southeast Asia and the ultimate withdrawal of an overt U.S. military presence. 7. On a step-by-step basis, move toward the dissolution of SEATO and the replacement of its guarantor functions by U.S. bilateral guarantees, on an interim basis, and ultimately, by great-power guarantees of Southeast Asia's security from external aggression. The following steps would be relevant: a) The termination of SEATO's non-military aspects and the transfer of its viable non-military program (e.g., the Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok) to other sponsorship; b) The granting of an interim bilateral guarantee to Thailand similar to our present guarantees to the Philippines and Pakistan, and a public reaffirmation of our commitment to defend the protocol states (Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam); at the same time, we should de-emphasize our military presence in Thailand, while vigorously supporting the Thai government in economic and political development and reform in the north and northeast, backed by civic action and counter-subversion units. c) An intensive, confidential information program within the region in the course of these steps, to explain this process of gradual dissolution and to reassure the relevant states. d) As the situations in Laos and Vietnam move toward stabilization, probe the Soviets and Chinese on their willingness to join in a guarantee for the region as a whole; in respect to the Chinese, this step relates to the possibility of grain shipments for local currencies under the carefully prescribed conditions to which I have already referred. e) Throughout this process, continue to make clear U.S. determination to oppose with whatever force may be required any and all overt aggression in Southeast Asia by either the Chinese Communists or the Vietminh.] [Here follow two additional pages of "Recommendations," and a nine-page section entitled "Political Implications of these Recommendations."]
143. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 4, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. SUBJECT /2/See Document 114. This memorandum makes two points of interest: a. Continued reluctance in Saigon to propose that Americans participate with, as opposed to coordination with, the GVN in any governmental task. b. Mr. Hilsman's misgivings on Operation Sunrise are shared by General Harkins. While Binh Duong is an exposed area, any area which starts the pacification campaign will suffer from some degree of isolation. My understanding of the concept is that regular troops will remain until the strategic hamlets are constructed and occupied and CG/SDC troops take over defense responsibilities. At that point we want the VC to attack on the premise the positron can hold until reserves can be moved in by hero. This is the classic Malagan concept, you may wish to discuss it with Mr. Thompson on Friday, 6 April./3/ /3/ No record of a meeting between Thompson and Taylor on April 6 has been found. A suggested draft note of reply to Mr. Hilsman is attached./4/ /4/Not found. W.H.B./5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, April 4, 1962, 2:01 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-462. Confidential, Priority Drafted by Wayne James (DOD/ISA) and cleared with Heinz, Cottrell, and Stoneman Also sent to CINCPAC for Polad and repeated to COMUSMACV and USOM in Saigon. 1171. Refs: (a) Saigon Toaid 647;/2/ (b) Deptel 1166;/3/ (c) CHMAAG to JCS MAGAR OT (PS)687, 3-05Z Jan 62./4/ Task Force Viet-Nam. Ref (a) received with much interest. Need urgent for complete integration of our civil and military civic-action and rural rehabilitation programs without regard for restrictions imposed by departmental or agency terms of reference and funding procedures. /2/Not found. /3/Telegram 1166 to Saigon, April 2, concerned improvement in medical care supplied to the rural population. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-262) /4/Not found. To this end, we need ASAP: a. Overall US-GVN time-phased civic action plan principally keyed to, but not restricted to geographic areas to be affected in near future by politico-military strategy of clear and hold. For ARVN role, consideration should be given to recommendations in Viet-Nam Civic Action MTT Report which was approved and recommended to GVN (Ref c). b. Estimate and schedule of personnel and materials assets required to support timing and thrust of plan. c. Your specific recommendation as to who will do what. Imperative that Civic Action proceed expeditiously. Because of lead time involved urge advance estimates be cabled on hard-core of any new funding procurement and personnel requirements so that we may arrange quickly to support field requirements. We will sort out required authority for dispensing services on cross-service basis and for requesting with GVN further third-country support. Aside from conviction that success in Viet-Nam depends much on successful civic action program, an unparalleled opportunity exists to demonstrate functioning inter-agency and international effort, which could serve as guidance in other free world struggles. Program for medical civic action sought in ref (b) could be a guidepost in this field. Rusk
145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, April 4, 1962--6:07 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-462. Secret; Priority. Also sent to CINCPAC for Polad. Drafted by Harriman and Cottrell, and cleared with Johnson. 1173. For Ambassador Nolting from Harriman. 1. Department increasingly concerned over constant implications in press generally of U.S. participation and direction, rather than purely support and training of Vietnamese against Viet Cong. Elements of international press and critics of our present policy continue to emphasize "growing U.S. involvement" the "moral responsibilities" and other similar concepts, implying Vietnamese situation is becoming more of a U.S. rather than a Vietnamese war. Even names of operations, such as Sunrise, Farmgate, suggest U.S. rather than GVN planning. 2. Part of this press picture is probably developed by observing support and advisory activities in which American presence is conspicuous, leading to conclusion U.S. is assuming leadership of operations, and noting public statements of partnership or joint relationship implying assumption U.S. responsibility. 3. An article in the New York Times Sunday Review Section April 1 by Homer Bigart reports a large group of American colonels and civilians inspected stockade in Operation Sunrise. Why do large groups of Americans inspect anything? It leads Bigart to report that "Americans were taking on a drastic program that was certain in the initial stages to be bitterly resented by the peasantry whose allegiance must be won." His references to a U.S. officer helping to plan Sunrise further involves U.S. responsibility. In the eyes of the world these reports lead to this becoming our war rather than their war. This should be prevented. 4. There are two dangers, first, adverse international reaction to assumed U.S. dominance, and secondly, Viet Cong using conspicuous US military role to gain popular support from nationalists and anticolonialists by portraying U.S. as assuming former French role. American teams with battalions must not give local impression that they in command of operations. 5. It cannot be overstressed that the conduct and utterances public and private of all U.S. personnel must reflect the basic policy of this government that we are in full support of Viet-Nam but we do not assume responsibility for Viet-Nam's war with the Viet-Cong. This responsibility remains with the GVN. 6. You should bring this telegram to the attention of all senior members of Task Force Saigon and request them to take appropriate action to impress this policy clearly upon all members of their respective organizations, and also in other ways get the cooperation of all concerned to devise means of minimizing U.S. presence and reducing public impression U.S. going beyond announced objectives. Rusk
146. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Director of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)/1/ Washington, April 5, 1962. /1/Source: Harriman Papers, Vietnam, 1962. Secret. A typed note at the bottom indicates that Harriman dictated but did not read the memorandum. I have given your memorandum of April 2,/2/ concerning Congressman Saund's suggestion on Viet-Nam, to Cottrell. It's an old story to me, going back to Korea. There is a lot of real reluctance on the part of the military. If anything is to be done about it, top-side pressure has to be brought. I personally agree with your thought, but I don't know if anybody else involved in the operation would want to do it. An exploration was made at the request of the President some months ago, and the seed didn't take. There are obviously logistic and command difficulties, but I still believe that as you say we are likely to be in Viet-Nam for a long period of time. Command difficulties could probably be worked out. We also might expect some trouble with the Vietnamese--but I don't know how serious that is. If anything is to be done on this whole subject, it will have to be on orders from on high. /2/Actually April 3, Document 140. W. Averell Harriman/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
147. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 5, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret. SUBJECT /2/Thompson was in Washington April 2-7 to brief U.S. officials on the situation in South Vietnam. He traveled from Saigon via CINCPAC Headquarters in Honolulu, where he arrived on March 30. Mr. Thompson replied to questions at the Viet-Nam Task Force today for an hour and a half. He fully covered his pacification strategy. Some of his opinions/conclusions are of interest. a. Setting up of strategic hamlets and defended villages should not be rushed, should be phased with availability of required resources, material and human. b. Next dry season will see first test of pacification strategy as VC must react to maintain contact with the population. Question is will GVN be able to resist VC attacks successfully. c. He is reluctant to estimate the time required to beat the VC, but is thinking in terms of 3-6 years. d. He stresses need for border ranger force. e. US should get the GVN machinery working properly (administration and supervision), but stay clear of the sharp end (village level). He thinks the village organization is the best element in SVN. f. SVN river forces do not yet control the Delta waterways. g. The SVN troops are tiring; some units must be rotated out of combat or security tasks. His talk carried unexpressed implications which I suggest you may wish to explore Friday morning:/3/ /3/April 6; no record of this meeting has been found. a. GVN organization and capability for control, planning, and public information, and intelligence remains ineffective. b. The numbers of Americans in SVN is growing too large; the VC can develop a case that the US is running the show and have in fact replaced the French with all its implications. I have attached suggested questions which can probe these issues further. W.H.B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
[Attachment] SUGGESTED QUESTIONS 1. Is the GVN capable now of waging a successful war against the VC? 2. To what extent will Diem respond to advice as to organization for, and implementation of, the province pacification strategy? 3. Is there a need for closer liaison with GVN ministries at the seat of government by selected and limited US (or UK) personnel with special qualifications? 4. Why is Diem resisting release of ranger companies for mobile operations along the border areas? 5. What deficiencies, prejudices, or capabilities are slowing GVN effectiveness in the public information and intelligence fields? 6. Are there too many non-Asian advisors now in Saigon? In the countryside?
148. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, April 6,1962, 4:55 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 1/62-5/62. Top Secret. Prepared by Forrestal. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President's log. (Ibid., President's Appointment Books) South Viet-Nam The President read the letter from Ambassador Galbraith dated April 5, 1962 with the enclosed memorandum./2/ Governor Harriman indicated that while he agreed with some of the conclusions in the memorandum, he had difficulty with others. He thought it was important that the overt association of the U.S. with military operations in Viet-Nam be reduced to absolute minimum. He showed the President a telegram to Ambassador Nolting on this subject./3/ The President agreed with the position expressed in the telegram. /2/See Document 141. /3/Presumably Document 145. Governor Harriman also said he supported the idea of using the forthcoming ICC report, if it adopted a strong enough position, as a means of investigating whether a common reduction of involvement by the Viet Minh and the U.S. could be achieved. The Governor said he was not in favor, however, of an attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference or to seek a neutral solution in Viet-Nam. The Governor said that while he thought that Diem was a losing horse in the long run, he did not think we should actively work against him, because there was nobody to replace him. Rather our policy should be to support the government and people of Viet-Nam, rather than Diem personally. The President asked that Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum be forwarded to Secretary McNamara for his comments. (I will do.) The President asked what instructions should be given to Galbraith with respect to an Indian approach to Hanoi with a view to exploring the possibility of getting them to withdraw from Viet-Nam in conjunction with us. Governor Harriman replied that we should await the ICC report before deciding our reaction to an Indian approach to Hanoi. If the report is strong, the approach might be worthwhile. The President agreed but said that instructions should nevertheless be sent to Galbraith, and that he would like to see such instructions./4/ (Harriman will do early next week; I will make sure the President clears.) The President observed generally that he wished us to be prepared to seize upon any favorable moment to reduce our involvement, recognizing that the moment might yet be some time away. /4/The instructions referred to here have not been found. The President thought it was very important and specifically requested that we prepare now a U.S. position on the anticipated report from the ICC. (I will pass this along to State.) The President asked why defoliation had not been tested elsewhere than Viet-Nam before being tried. He asked Forrestal to investigate. [Here follows a section on Laos.] MVF
149. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, April 6, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Poll 7. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text but it is signed "Cot." SUBJECT R.G.K. Thompson, formerly Permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya, now Chief of the British Advisory Mission in Saigon, during his visit in Washington between April 2 and 7, made the following points in various conversations held with Department, Defense and TF/VN meetings. 1) Diem. Generally unpopular in Saigon, particularly with the "intellectuals". Much more respected in rural areas. They seem to appreciate that Diem has always insisted that Viet-Nam is an agrarian country whose pattern of life is centered in the villages. His agroville program, his frequent visits to the villages and public statements have all emphasized this orientation. For instance, the last Presidential election, although opposing candidates were weak, did not reveal a rigged, forced vote for Diem. It was apparently held with a minimum of coercion. Chances of getting anything better than Diem is very "chancy". If there were an Army split struggle for power, upon an event of accident to Diem, you could have a chaotic situation wherein the Communists might be able to move in. Therefore, it seems the most prudent policy to go along with the Diem regime, attempting to urge improvements where possible. 2) Villages. This is the key to the Vietnamese situation. You must obtain support of the villages in order to win the war. You cannot win unless you get it. There is tremendous energy in the villages, and if a proper framework is established which will provide them security they will fight in their own behalf to preserve a traditional village system against the Viet Cong. Other considerations are important but peripheral. Diem is a strong village man and has in effect said "the hell with the intellectuals". It is a fact that the villages are anti-Communist, not necessarily pro-Diem. 3) Nationalism and Communism. It is most important to press the distinction. Many so-called Viet Cong are not fighting for Communism. They are with the Viet Cong because they still believe that the Viet Cong are fighting a nationalistic war against foreign domination. Psychological and informational activities should be directed to destroying the link between Nationalism and Communism which now exists. This means that foreign assistance to Viet-Nam must be played in the lowest possible key. Vietnamese should kill Vietnamese but never foreigners killing Vietnamese. The Viet Cong would love to get the Americans more committed to combat in Viet-Nam because they could then wrap themselves in the cloak of Nationalism and recruit more Vietnamese for the fight against the foreign devils. This is why the British believe we should play down U.S. participation. Conclusion: We should avoid putting a large number of foreigners "at the sharp end". Translated into operations this means that the U.S. presence in the field where they are visible to villagers and Viet Cong should be minimized. On the other hand, doctors, USOM people, or Civic Action people who are handing out services or goods cause no problem. 4) Strategic Hamlet Problem. Brother Nhu has taken a very active interest and for the first time has assumed an executive role as Administrator of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Much of his thinking is good although the program was kicked-off in exaggerated terms. He set up targets of 12,000 strategic hamlets to be completed in 18 months and this started a race between the Province Chiefs to frantically build these installations with attendant imposition on the villagers. Twelve of these new hamlets got hit badly in one Corps area because security infrastructure had not been set up concurrently. Nhu now has lowered his sights and is proceeding more slowly. Thompson has insisted that the hamlet program be carefully integrated into the Delta Plan with the necessary security measures keeping pace with the construction of the hamlets. They now seem to be on the right track. Experience in Malaya indicates that the Government must be firm in resettling villagers and that a certain amount of resentment can be expected at the outset. Later, however, when the benefits, both security and social, become apparent to villagers they generally get to like the system. 5) Communications. This is not yet working properly. Villages where communications have been installed, the results are excellent. The point behind communications is that Viet Cong bands on the move can keep twenty-four hours ahead of any news about them. However, if their presence is communicated from village to village they can be intercepted and cut up. If the network of communications is set up covering sector after sector in connecting links, it would drastically cut the mobility of the Viet Cong. Every effort should be made to hasten the construction of the communications network. Radio should not be put in every hamlet because this is too confusing. Hamlets can use gongs, flares, drums and other simple devices to alert the nearest village. 6) Navy. GVN control of the waterways in the Delta area is one of its major weaknesses. Time after time the Viet Cong attack and get away over the rivers in dugouts. This should never happen. The GVN must work out methods of controlling and denying the use to the Viet Cong. A program seems to be under way with U.S. help but it must be made effective at the earliest possible moment. 7) Civil Guard. Training seems to be going ahead as fast as it can. Civil Guard river patrols are most necessary and getting the civil guard into place to protect the new villages is essential. 8) Self Defense Corps. Beginning to function. Must be tied into the "dear and hold" operations. Self Defense Corps is the key in the village to lead the defense. 9) Sunrise. Plan by the Province Chief of Binh Duong and the Minister of Interior. Thompson is a bit worried about this plan because it involves one of the toughest provinces and the forces needed to keep it clean will be tied down to defense duties. He had urged unsuccessfully that the "clean and hold" operations start in easier areas and push forward against the stronger provinces. It does, however, show a good spirit on the part of the Vietnamese and indicates the right direction. 10) Air Power. Thompson was worried several months ago about the damage from any indiscriminate attacks. Says he thinks the situation is much improved through the installation of a JOC and TAC. However, the use of air in the form of the helicopters, 123, and attack planes has been remarkably effective. It has crippled Viet Cong freedom to attack in large formations and has had a telling effect on Viet Cong morale. He thought the overall effect of some villagers being killed accidentally in attacks on villages probably depended upon how other villagers reacted. He thought it might be minimum because it was his impression that the villages are fairly self-contained units psychologically and are relatively indifferent to the fate of the other villages. He said there probably would be certain bad reactions by mistakes which would make it more difficult to reclaim previous Viet Cong controlled villages which may have been attacked but thought in general the application of air power was being handled properly. 11) Delta Plan. The original concept paper/2/ has been approved by Diem but he does not know about the four implementing instructions. He said he hopes they do not publish them widely because it would assist the Viet Cong. However, instructions must be issued. Question in his mind is whether the GVN would modify them. /2/Document 113. 12) Chain of Command. Unfortunately, almost all of the province chiefs are Army officers. He has suggested that they all be put in civilian clothes to emphasize the civilian function of their work. Acting as they do, as military men, the Regimental Command of the ARVN is presently wasted. The Province Chief should rely on the Regimental Commander as his military arm. Now battalions are scattered all around the provinces under the Province Chief. He said if he had his way he would cut the telephone lines between Province Chiefs and Diem, in order to prevent the present crossing of wires. 13) Intelligence. Much should be done. Self Defense Corps should be basic intelligence unit "winkling out" the Viet Cong from the villages, collecting intelligence through the villagers and in sounding the alarm when attacked. 14) POWs. In Malaya they sorted them out into white, gray, and black. The whites were given relative freedom and attempts were made to reintegrate them quickly back into society. The gray took longer treatment and the blacks were hard-core Commies. The only occasional success they had with the blacks was to use an ex-Commie who was smarter than the black. They found that the blacks all had a certain fixed conviction which could not be shaken except by an ex Commie./3/ /3/At this point is the following notation in an unidentified hand: "As I heard it, 'which could be shaken by a smarter ex-commie, and which had to be replaced by something else. 15) Length of the War. The Malayan emergency lasted twelve years but after the first six years the battle had essentially been won. The last six was a mop-up operation. Some factors are more favorable in Viet-Nam but some less. Thompson said he would not like to have this go on record, but a rough guess would be not less than three years to win the main battle and it might be five or six. One of the main favorable factors is the remarkable vigor and strength of the Vietnamese villagers which has been true historically. One of the more unfavorable factors is that Viet-Nam is bordered by three sanctuaries, Cambodia, Laos and North Viet-Nam. 16) Crop Destruction. This should be left for the GVN. Foreigners should not be actively involved. At present there is no shortage of food for the Viet Cong so efforts at crop destruction would probably not be too effective. After provinces have been all cleared of Viet Cong then crop destruction would work more effectively. In Malaya they did very little by air. Most of it was done on the ground when they ran into patches in the jungle which were being used by the terrorists. 17) Montagnards. They have been badly treated to date because the Vietnamese have failed to appreciate the differences and make allowances for tribal customs and ways of life which were different from the rest of the Vietnamese. Important point is if the Montagnards are on the GVN side no Viet Cong could exist in the jungle. 18) Rangers. Most important that rangers be put back in their proper role. They should be trained to work in the jungle for up to six weeks at a stretch. At present they are unwilling to live in the jungle longer than a week or so. The secret is that ranger companies must deliberately get lost from the Viet Cong. At that point they become extremely dangerous because the Viet Cong movements are hampered by the very fact that they don't know where the ranger companies may be. 19) Casualties. After the security structures are in place and Viet-Cong casualties go up their recruiting afterward becomes very difficult. Morale sags fast among terrorists who are hit frequently and hard. One of the principal weaknesses of the guerrillas is that they must carry off their wounded. This has a bad effect on the remainder particularly if they are unable to leave them in villages for medical attention. 20) Civic Action. The Ministry is not so good and Corps has touch of the old Hitler youth. The idea of arming them is wrong because Civic Action people should not be soldiers or intelligence officers, otherwise they reinforce the distrust of the district and provincial officers. They should be used as manpower to join those under orders of the provincial and district officials. Most important, Civic Action Teams should not usurp the functions of other Departments. For instance, the Health Department and the Education Department should be relied upon for those services in Civic Action. 21) Multi-National Effort. This has certain political advantages in spreading the load and responsibilities but from the Vietnamese point of view we are all tarred with the same brush. Only the Vietnamese should shoot Vietnamese. This is a GVN war against Vietnamese terrorist intruders. We should help but not get out and fight or turn it into a multi-national war against the Viet Cong. 22) ARVN vs Viet Cong Dedication. Ideology doesn't play too strong a role since 70-80% of the Viet Cong are locals. They are fighting for reasons other than Communist ideology, Nationalism being one of the strongest. The ARVN chaps seem to be well motivated against the Communists but many of them have been fighting too long and need a rest./4/ /4/At this point is the following notation in an unidentified hand: "Hence, 1,000 desertions/month!" 23) Information. This is one of the weakest links and is not properly organized yet. Radio, newspapers, pamphlets, propaganda need coordinating so that the GVN is telling the same story through all media. The political and psychological barrier against the Viet Cong should be done through proper information. 24) Terminology. Although it seems rather inconsequential it is important to get the labels straight. For instance, the use of "psywar" is often misused in connection with friendly population instead of enemy. Another example is Viet Cong, dignifying them by labeling them as Vietnamese whereas in Malaya they deliberately called them "Communist terrorists". A number of these labels should be adjusted if possible. 25) Administration. The villages are the best administrative units in Viet-Nam and the central government probably has the poorest administration. In Malaya the Government still practices the way they were taught by the British, namely, that the decisions of the Cabinet were relayed to the various ministries in clear written form. The ministries then had the authority they needed to proceed. Thompson said he might be able to make an impression on the Vietnamese Government to follow the administrative line in a saner fashion. He said Thuan was very receptive to the idea and urged him to hammer on these points with Diem. For tactical reasons, Thompson said, he thought it was a mistake to press too many "reforms" at one time and up to this point he was concentrating on getting the village system set up with adequate security. When he goes back he will pursue some other ideas including this administrative one. He said he thought it was vital to get our priorities straight in Viet-Nam. The security system comes first and the rest later. He said he thought the next six months would be vital in determining whether the villages were going to be able to reorganize themselves in all fields to achieve ultimate success. In the meantime the foreigners should provide and assist and advise [as] unobtrusively as possible.
150. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 7, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/4-1762. Secret Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1277. For Assistant Secretary Harriman from Nolting. Deptel 1173./2/ Your message has been read by all principal officers Task Force Saigon and its importance stressed. We have all been striving for many weeks to prevent and correct the kind of reporting to which you refer, for the reasons given your tel. Will continue do everything possible to keep reporting in perspective, stressing, as we have been doing, fact that US role here is advisory and supporting, and does not involve US direction, control, leadership, or responsibility for Vietnamese struggle. Since receipt Deptel 1006,/3/ I think we have made headway in enlisting cooperation of majority US press corps here, but there are still certain exceptions. Davis has been working constantly and effectively on this and related problems. Given scope and magnitude US assistance, however, attainment our objectives will require self-discipline on part of press and interest in more accurate and balanced reporting. /2/Document 145. /3/Document 75. Vietnamese themselves invented code word "Binh Minh" (translate "Sunrise"). We taking steps to assure that shorthand names for other GVN operations have indigenous character. Bigart's reference to "large group Americans" inspecting stockade apparently confuses military operation with dedication ceremony of Cu Chi strategic village. No large group Americans involved in either, but about a dozen Americans, representatives of civilian agencies as well as military, attended dedication ceremony Cu Chi March 28 on invitation GVN. Numbers were deliberately held down below those invited. All members team Saigon will continue do their utmost on this problem. Nolting
151. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 9, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-030-69. Top Secret. At the top of the document, Taylor wrote: "See me." SUBJECT /2/See Document 141. The memorandum enclosure of a letter from Amb Galbraith to the President is attached; the views of the President and Gov Harriman on the letter, as expressed at the Friday meeting,/3/ are also appended. /3/See Document 148. A summary of the content of these papers follows. Ambassador Galbraith 1. Use the forthcoming ICC report/4/ on DRV and GVN/US violations of the Geneva Accords to seek withdrawal of DRV support of the Viet Cong. The US, in exchange, would reduce its assistance to SVN to normal levels. /4/See Document 208. 2. The Communist view on accommodation would be ascertained through approaches by India or the USSR. Any subsequent agreement would be sought on the basis of the Geneva Accords. 3. Corollary goals would be trade relations between north and south Viet-Nam and eventual reunification. The US would play down its support of Diem. 4. In any event, the US should resist further increases in US personnel in SVN and avoid direct US participation in the pacification strategy and other rural activities. The President 1. The US involvement in SVN should be reduced at the first favorable moment although it is recognized this may not be possible in the near future. 2. A US position should be prepared now on the anticipated report from the ICC including draft instructions to Amb Galbraith on a possible approach to India. Governor Harriman 1. The objective to play down US participation in the SVN conflict is a sound and previously agreed course of action. 2. US policy use of the forthcoming ICC report should be formulated after the substance of the report can be studied. 3. It is not advisable to reconvene a Geneva conference or to seek a neutral solution in Viet-Nam. 4. We should not actively work against Diem because there is nobody to replace him. It seems to me that the Galbraith proposals pose certain basic considerations which should be faced, at least informally, before we move too far toward accommodation: 1. What are the US objectives in SVN and Southeast Asia and what are the prospects of achieving those objectives? 2. Is the establishment of a neutral belt in Southeast Asia a practical concept and does it satisfy US objectives in the area? 3. The Geneva Accords of 1954 were formulated prior to Communist intrusions into Laos. Should we initiate action for accommodation in SVN before the particulars of a Laos settlement are known and tested? W.H.B.
152. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 10, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.S/4-1062. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1289. Our 1273./2/ Trueheart and Mendenhall had second talk with Lac April 9. Lac will be attached to Thuan in latter's capacity as Coordinating SecState for Security. Lac indicated he expects work as "chief of staff" to Thuan in coordinating pacification planning and operations in Delta. Expects maintain close liaison with other ministries including Civic Action and Interior in particular. Does not expect issue orders in his own name to other ministries or to regional delegates or military officers outside Saigon but rather to work through tact and persuasion and any orders issued will be in name of Thuan or President. /2/Telegram 1273 from Saigon, April 6, reported on a talk between Mendenhall and Lac on April 4 about provincial surveys. Lac, who impressed Mendenhall with his intelligence and straightforwardness, had not previously heard of the provincial surveys but was awaiting an appointment with Thuan to ascertain his responsibilities. (Ibid., 751K.5/4-662) Since we understand overall Delta Pacification Directive says Thuan will be responsible to President for execution of plan but SecState Interior still responsible for strategic hamlet program (despatch 355),/3/ we asked Lac how this would work. He anticipates no trouble since Thuan sits on strategic hamlets committee and SecState Interior comes under Thuan's overall coordinating authority in latter's capacity as Coordinating SecState for Security. /3/See Document 46. Lac told us President has not yet approved four "instructions" under overall Delta Pacification Directive on coordination. strategic hamlets, population control and civic action. Lac himself in process studying drafts of these instructions with view toward recommending to Thuan and President form they should take and any substantive changes he considers necessary. Specific problem on which he focusing is coordinating mechanism in corps tactical zones, specifically 5th, 7th and 21st Division areas in 3rd Corps tactical zone. Lac inclined recommend formula that Division commander should be head of coordinating committee because of his control of troops which may have to be used outside as well as within area encompassed in Delta Pacification Plan. Exception might be made in case of General Cao, whose pacification operations in 5th Division area already well advanced. Lac now beginning assemble his staff but evidently this is going to take time. He feels (and we agree) that it would be wiser use personnel who will be permanent members his staff to conduct studies in provinces as base for developing pacification planning rather than drawing in temporary personnel. He quite prepared that we work with him on these planning studies in provinces. As foreshadowed reftel province studies moving in different direction from earlier generalized provincial surveys. Can be expected new studies in conjunction Lac and his staff will be keyed closely to specific pacification planning needs. We are sure Dept will agree this is desirable shift in emphasis. Appears to us under these circumstances that Americans working with Lac and his staff on province studies should be those who will continue work with him and lower echelon Vietnamese officials in execution plans in order maintain continuity of familiarity with situation and what is being done about it. Will be desirable also associate USOM directly with these studies and believe in view Lac's present attitude this should be readily possible. In view length time which may still be involved before new type province study gets underway as well as desirability maintaining continuity American personnel working on pacification we reluctantly conclude that Heavner should probably return Washington. Regret it has not been possible induce GVN move faster on surveys while he was here but think it has nevertheless been useful to Task Force Vietnam for him to have had fresh first hand look at Vietnam. Heavner would like stay an additional ten days or two weeks in order visit several southern provinces on his own prior return. Request instructions re Heavner./4/ /4/Heavner was in Vietnam during March and April to assist with provincial surveys) see Document 173. Nolting
153. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Vietnam Affairs, Agency for International Development (Stoneman)/1/ Washington, April 10, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 8. GVN, 1962, Information & Civic Action. Confidential. Stoneman prepared the memorandum on April 18. SUBJECT The attendees are listed on the attached sheet./2/ /2/Not printed. Mr. Stoneman explained that he had asked Mr. Wood, Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force, to be co-chairman of this meeting, which had grown far beyond what had originally been intended, namely, an informal discussion between himself and a few DOD officials on the current status and problems of civic action in Vietnam. It was recognized at the outset that the questions being discussed at this meeting were dependent more on action by the GVN and U.S. Missions co-ordination in Saigon than on Washington action. It was also pointed out that recent cables such as Embtels 1166 and 1171/3/ were already sent to elicit information from the field which appears necessary to enable Washington to more effectively support field endeavors in civic action. /3/Document 144 and footnote 3 thereto. The meeting agenda consisted essentially of the following series of questions with an attempt to formulate lines of action for dealing with them: 1. What is the relationship among civic action (which by definition is performed by military forces), rural development (as supported by AID), and other programs supported by USIA . . . ? Mr. Stoneman proposed that the principal focus of action be on how to help the GVN to gain and hold the allegiance of the rural population throughout Vietnam without respect to bureaucratic considerations as to whether it is technically civic action being done by military types, or rural development being done by civilians being supported by AID, USIA or CIA. It was emphasized that the sweep of action which is necessary to make the pacification program a success in Vietnam requires that help to the villages be a continuum and not unduly segmented because of agency and funding categories. It was proposed that in all planning and staff work with respect to this problem, the focus be on continuous attention to the villages and that, to this end, the phrase "Civic Action (military)--Rural Development" be employed. It is hoped that this approach will help assure that there are not gaps between various agency functions, and that in Washington staff work attention will be focused on the total spectrum of what is being done for the rural population, rather than on individual agency's program. 2. What is the co-ordinating mechanism in being, and what new might be needed, with respect to military-civil activities (a) within the Vietnamese government, (b) within U.S. agencies in Vietnam, and (c) within U.S. agencies in Washington? Some discussion revolved around the fact that the Ministry of Civic Action of the Vietnamese Government is in fact concerned with civilian-type assistance to the villagers. It was also pointed out that by virtue of their superior organization and staffing, the Vietnamese military have more capability than the civil agencies for civic action-type work. With respect to co-ordination of U.S. agencies in Saigon, it was suggested by some that this was quite effective, but there remains an uneasy feeling that there seemed to be several unexplained gaps in information and the flow of work that might indicate that more effective co-ordination is yet to be desired. There was discussion as to whether a single director should be appointed to preside over all U.S. agencies' efforts within any particular field, such as medical services. With respect to co-ordination in Washington, Mr. Stoneman (with Mr. Wood's concurrence) suggested that closer and more regular interagency co-ordination might be fruitful, but that in lieu of any more standing committees, this need be met by adding a regular civic action agenda item to the weekly meetings of the Vietnam Task Force. Among other things, this would frequently bring civic action specialists into the TF/VN forum. Emphasis would be more on solving problems than on formal reports. 3. Considerable discussion revolved around whether a problem in fact remained with respect to the reported inability to use MAP funds for certain types of civilian aid such as medicines to be dispensed to civilians by VN military civic action teams, and as to whether there were AID procedural blocks to the fullest of AID support of military civic action activities. It was widely agreed that what is needed is a completely integrated approach to the basic problem of pacification in Vietnam, and that there needs to be complete flexibility with respect to cross-servicing between the U.S. military and civilian agencies with the primary criteria being (a) what is the need, (b) who can best meet it within the time-frame involved. Specific questions regarding such things as cross-servicing on medical supplies and on personnel are to be vigorously explored among various agency staff members present.
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 11, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-1162. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1296. Task Force VN. Following is interim reply Deptel 1171./2/ In recognition urgent need for complete integration civil and military civic action and rural rehabilitation programs, Task Force Saigon established late March inter-agency committee on province rehabilitation chaired by DCM. Committee's principal role is to coordinate all US programs to maximize our assistance to GVN rural rehabilitation activities. It is working closely with Secstate Thuan and with Col. Lac, newly appointed head of Delta Pacification Program, and expects meet this week with Nhu's interministerial committee for strategic hamlets. /2/Document 144. Considerable planning already done on US side and there was completed some time ago time phased "Outline Plan for Counterinsurgency Operations" (being pouched)/3/ which includes overall concept of operations, machinery for control and coordination (that is, who will do what on GVN side), detailed outline of military, political, economic, and psychological counterinsurgency operations; time-phasing and geographic phasing concepts. Plan approved by TF Saigon and is being used as guidelines for above committee. On GVN side, President Diem on March 16 promulgated much of Thompson Delta Pacification Plan in presidential decree no. 1/QP./4/ Text will be sent Dept for TF as soon as Col. Lac furnishes us Vietnamese copy to compare with informal English translation we now have. With this decree we have for first time an approved policy framework for provincial rehabilitation programs much as we visualize. Another breakthrough was March 28 issuance OCAG-developed Military Civic Action Program as JGS Directive./5/ /3/Document 11. Pouched in despatch 429 from Saigon, April 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-1662) /4/Document 113. /5/Not found. Re geographical phasing, decree establishes category of first priority provinces in third corps tactical zone compatible with MAAG priorities developed separately. Our next step will be to refine these priorities with GVN to launch across-the-board civil/military rehabilitation operations simultaneously, if possible, in 31st, 32nd, and 33rd Division tactical zones. At same time we proposing separate similar operation for Quang Ngai Province, or, if GVN should prefer, other area outside Delta. Until provincial priorities assigned and detailed planning for these operations begun, we shall not be in position develop meaningful estimates of material and personnel requirements. We shall have better idea of requirements and magnitude of problem as provincial rehabilitation activities get off ground in days ahead. Nolting
155. Circular Telegram From the Department of State/1/ Washington, April 11, 1962, 4:58 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-1162. Official Use Only. Sent to Embassies in 15 Asian countries and to Canberra, Wellington, Paris, London, and Ottawa. Drafted by Chapman; cleared with Cottrell, Manell, Usher, and Link; and approved by Rice. Circular 1730. 1. Department seriously concerned by impression created by some press reports that the war in Viet-Nam is a U.S. war, and which imply that it is war which U.S. is directing, in which U.S. is participating and for which U.S. is responsible. Critics of our present policy emphasize "growing U.S. involvement," "U.S. moral responsibilities," and similar concepts, as well as role of U.S. military personnel. This erroneous impression carries two dangers: a) adverse international reaction to assumed U.S. involvement and b) psychological support for Viet Cong who can gain popular backing from nationalists and anti-colonialists by pointing to conspicuous U.S. military role and portraying U.S. as assuming former French dominance. 2. This impression is factually wrong and lacking perspective. Purpose this message therefore is to enjoin on all posts in discussing Viet-Nam war to avoid above terms but rather to make following points: a. U.S. has given Viet-Nam military assistance since 1950 and at GVN request this assistance has been expanded in the past two years to help GVN defeat the Communist subversive aggression. b. Assistance consists of materiel and equipment for Vietnamese security forces; advisers to these forces; and air transport capabilities, cargo planes and helicopters, to supplement presently inadequate Vietnamese capabilities. c. U.S. military personnel are not participating directly in war nor are they directing war. Major U.S. effort is to train instructors rather than troops. However, given fluidity and ubiquity of guerrilla warfare, necessarily Americans suffer occasional casualties in carrying out their training and logistical functions--e.g., taking part in training patrol exercises. d. In view of the seriousness of the Viet Cong aggression U.S. effort consequently substantial. Quite naturally American correspondents find U.S. effort most newsworthy subject for American public. This emphasis however tends distort facts: it is Vietnamese war. They are fighting it and retain full responsibility for it. U.S. role is limited to assisting them in maintaining independence. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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