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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
156. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ I-16294/62 Washington, April 14, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files. FRC 65 A 3501, Vietnam 1962,-2. Secret. At the bottom of the page is the following handwritten note: "For record-SecDef has talked to Amb Galbraith and feels no reply needed. Mr. Forrestal informed this date none would be sent. April 17." The memorandum, but not the attachment, is also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, p. 466. A less detailed memorandum from Lemnitzer to McNamara, April 13, which makes some of the same points as the attachment, is ibid., pp. 464-465. Problem: To respond to the President's request for your comments concerning Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum on Vietnam./2/ /2/Document 141. Discussion: The President's request for comments did not specify that only military aspects should be treated. In view of the nature of Ambassador Galbraith's memo, meaningful comment necessarily ranges beyond the narrow military implications. However, the proposed comments conform with Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 10-62, dated 21 Feb 62./3/ /3/Document 78. Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State advises that Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum has not been referred to State for formal staffing and comment. Mr. Harriman regards it as a private communication to the President from Ambassador Galbraith. However, an initial draft of the attached memorandum to the President was reviewed by Mr. Cottrell and his comments have been considered. Recommendation: That you sign the enclosed memorandum. Concurrences: None required.
[Attachment] Memorandum for the President/4/ /4/Drafted by Colonel Kent on April 14. SUBJECT Comments concerning Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum of 4 April 1962 on the subject of Vietnam are submitted in response to your request. The burden of Mr. Galbraith's proposals appears to be that present US policy toward Vietnam should be revised in order to seek a political solution to the problem of Communist penetration in the area. The effect of these proposals is to put the United States in a position of initiating negotiations with the Communists to seek disengagement from what is by now a well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism in Southeast Asia. The various measures approved for implementation by the United States in support of our objectives in South Vietnam have not yet been underway long enough to demonstrate their full effectiveness. Any reversal of US policy could have disastrous effects, not only upon our relationship with South Vietnam, but with the rest of our Asian and other allies as well. We accept the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community expressed in SNIE 10-62 (21 February 1962) as follows: "The long-range Communist Bloc objectives in Southeast Asia are to eliminate U.S. influence and presence and to establish Communist regimes throughout the area. Although the Communist powers have some differences of view as to tactics and priorities and the risks to be run in pursuing their objectives, they have thus far maintained a basic unity of ultimate objectives and a high degree of policy coordination with respect to Southeast Asia." Ambassador Galbraith may not be aware that although our military assistance and support of South Vietnam has grown, our military commitment has continued as stated in your letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diem: "Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown--that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. . . ./5/ In response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort. . . . If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary." /5/These and following ellipses are in the source text. Our present policy in South Vietnam does contain some risk of military escalation. The alternative is U.S. withdrawal, which is tantamount to abandoning South Vietnam to the Communists. The Department of Defense considers this unacceptable. To prevent the fall of South Vietnam to Communist aggression and subsequent loss of the remainder of the Southeast Asian mainland must remain our unalterable objective. The military considerations involved are clear. Also of major importance is the psychological impact that a firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the world--both free and Communist. South Vietnam is a testing ground of U.S. resolution in Asia. More important than these immediate losses are the eventualities which could follow for the remainder of non-Communist Asia. The problems raised by Mr. Galbraith with regard to our present policy have been considered in the coordinated development of that policy. There follows discussion of several points in Ambassador Galbraith's memorandum which are seriously questioned by the Department of Defense. There is general recognition of the deficiencies of the present Government of Vietnam. At the same time it should be recognized that the Government also has notable strengths and has recently taken measures to increase its popular support and to mobilize the entire country in support of the war effort. The present policy of supporting the Diem regime, while applying continued pressure for improvement, appears to be the only practicable alternative at this time The parallel between the present U.S. and past French roles in Vietnam is unjustified. The following statement in your State of the Union Address bears on this point: "The systematic aggression now bleeding that country is not a 'war of liberation'--for Vietnam is already free. It is a war of attempted subjugation and it will be resisted." French forces participated directly in the prior struggle; U.S. personnel have only an indirect role and are not subject to "bleeding" in the sense implied. We are mindful of the probability that the Communists will attempt to identify the U.S. with initially unpopular measures associated with pacification. Accordingly, the activities of our advisors are being regulated to avoid conspicuous participation in these measures. We concur that the door must be kept open for a political solution, but the policy advanced by Ambassador Galbraith does not address the basic problem. His proposal contains the essential elements sought by the Communists for their takeover by providing a set of rules which the free world would be forced to obey, while the Communists secretly break the rules to gain their objective. The Department of Defense concurs with Secretary Rusk in his statement of 1 March 1962: "In reference to the demand by the Communists that the co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference and other countries concerned consult regarding Vietnam, the U.S. is always willing to talk about situations which represent a threat to the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is the Communist aggression in Vietnam in disregard of the Geneva Accords. . . . There can be peace overnight in Vietnam if those responsible for the aggression wish peace. The situation is just as simple as that."/6/ /6/See Document 94. It must be recognized that a suspension of Viet Cong activity would be readily terminable by the Communists and is not a concession equivalent to a "standstill on an introduction of men and material" and "phased American withdrawal." Such withdrawal would leave South Vietnam incapable of continuing development of a permanent basis for resisting Communist subversion and would be, in fact, a surrender of Vietnam. Because of the foregoing, the Department of Defense cannot concur in the policy advanced by Ambassador Galbraith, but believes strongly that present policy toward South Vietnam should be pursued vigorously to a successful conclusion.
157. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/ Honolulu, April 15, 1962, 7:23 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Repeated to COMUSMACV and four other military commands. 160523Z. SVN op for pacification. A. Your 4030 DTG 13144 3Z. B. Saigon 1296 to State DTD 11 Apr. C. Saigon airgram A-257 to State DTD 23 Mar. D. COMUSMACV 40313Z Cite MAC J5 364 (PASEP)./2/ /2/Telegrams 4030 DTG 131443Z and COMUS MACV 40313Z Cite MAC J 5 364 (pasep) have not been found. Telegram 1296 and airgram A-257 are printed as Documents 154 and 127. 1. Ref A requested info on Diem's plans to initiate pacification ops in three of the northern provinces, on status of Outline Plan for Counter-Insurgency ops, and on status of border control concept and ops. 2. Ref B will give you much of info desired. Outline plan desired has been pouched./3/ Diem 16 Mar decree/4/ adopted much of Thompson Delta Plan and establishes certain provinces in central part of 3rd corps area as first priority. This is compatible with plans prepared here and by CHMAAG. GVN has accepted our concept that concurrent with ops in Delta region, additional ops will be conducted in 1st and 2nd Corps areas to keep enemy off balance and prevent fractioning of the country. VC build up in Quang Ngai area prompts selection this and adjacent provinces for early attention. In other words, Diem is responding favorably to American military strategic advice. It would appear also that headway is being made in areas other than military as, for instance, issuance of Civic Action Program on 28 Mar by Jt General Staff. However, there are reasons not to be starry-eyed. /3/Document 11. /4/Document 113. 3. Ref C prepared by Embassy Saigon is an assessment of political and economic factors in Vietnamese war. After reading the report, I requested COMUSMACV view as he sees situation through military eyes. Ref D is his reply in which you will note his comment that a master plan has not reached a final stage. The outstanding ingredient still lacking is efficient administration and coordination of the several programs. Further reforms are still necessary to success. 4. The above applies to paras 1 and 2 of your request (Ref A). In regard to border control, latest concept was discussed at SecDef Conf here on 21 Mar. CHMAAG ltr of 8 Nov 61/5/ is somewhat [garble]. It was merely a collection of ideas--some good and others proven to be not so. COMUSMACV will keep us advised as border ops get underway. /5/See Document 125; the letter has not been found.
158. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 16, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-1662. Secret; Priority. Repeated Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for Polad, London, Paris, Bangkok, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, Taipei, Hong Kong, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, and Moscow. In a memorandum of April 17, Bagley informed Taylor that President Kennedy was interested in the view of the Department of State on this telegram and that Harriman's initial reaction was not to make the public repudiation suggested by Nolting, but rather to inform Sihanouk privately that the United States opposed a conference. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69) 1309. Sihanouk's reiterated public urgings of international conference on Vietnam cause us growing concern. We believe that, unless prompt action is taken to put forth United States position of opposition to such conference, our political position vis-à-vis GVN will be impaired and, even more importantly, confidence of Vietnamese people and armed forces in United States support in war with Viet Cong may begin to waver. Carefully nurtured efforts over past year by President Kennedy's statements and letters to Diem, Vice President Johnson's visit to Vietnam and Taylor-Rostow mission to maintain confidence of Vietnamese in United States may well be brought to naught unless this move toward international conference on Vietnam is spiked as far as United States is concerned. Sihanouk's frequent headway to draw analogy between conference on Laos and conference he pushing on Vietnam is very thing most likely to raise serious doubts in Vietnamese minds about future United States intentions. We believe therefore as a minimum United States should (a) make clear to Sihanouk its opposition to international conference on Vietnam (realizing that position conveyed to Sihanouk will almost certainly be made public by him) and (b) inform Diem what we are telling Sihanouk. We believe for sake our position among Vietnamese people and armed forces as well as to show international opinion clearly our stand on this issue it would be preferable for United States to make its own position public immediately after informing Diem and Sihanouk. We recommend substance United States position be as follows: 1. Only issue for current discussion re Vietnam is cessation of aggression by Communist regime of North Vietnam against people and legally constituted government of South Vietnam. United States is quite prepared discussion this issue bilaterally through diplomatic channels with appropriate countries (meaning UK and USSR but without saying so publicly) in order make clear that its extraordinary military assistance measures to Republic of Vietnam will cease once guerrilla war in South Vietnam directed and supported by Communist regime in Hanoi has come to halt. 2. Since this is only issue for discussion and United States message on this score can be conveyed through bilateral channels to those whom it concerns, there is no reason at all in United States view to consider calling international conference on Vietnam and United States does not intend to consider matter further. 3. International conference already held on Vietnam at Geneva in 1954 agreed on cease-fire in Vietnam. United States and GVN have consistently respected this provision for sake of maintenance of peace. It is however Communist regime of North Vietnam which by its guerrilla war against Republic of Vietnam has upset the peace and stability established in Vietnam by the international conference held in 1954. There is no point whatsoever in convening a new international conference on Vietnam involving Communist regime in North Vietnam since it is violating basic purpose of Geneva Conference of 1954--re-establishment of peace in Vietnam. 4. As for idea neutralizing of South Vietnam sometimes bruited about, it is evident that peace of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia would be much better assured if it were North Vietnam that were neutralized since it is present Communist regime in that area that has upset the peace. Nolting
159. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to the Vice President/1/ Washington, April 16, 1962. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, Memos from Colonel Burris, Jan. 61-June 62. Secret. RE Following the many rumors of a coup and possible assassination of Diem the two South Vietnamese pilots bombed the palace and Diem escaped./2/ This action set off full-scale plotting against Diem to the extent that there are now three principal groups which have been organized to take over the country at the slightest provocation or opportunity. /2/See Documents 87 and 88. The first group is composed mostly of political leaders and Diem's brother has even expressed his support of this particular element. A second group is a mixture of lesser political and lesser military personalities and is considered less likely than the other two to achieve success. The third group is potentially the most powerful since it controls the Armed Forces and can easily assume control of the Government. The leading figure is the Commanding General of the Army Field Command. While no disaffection has yet appeared, it nevertheless seems certain that Diem will be overthrown. This would resolve one of the comparative minor problems of his conduct of government along lines suggested by the United States. However, precipitant action by one of these groups could well reverse the trend toward liberalism which Diem has begun to observe.
160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 17, 1962, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security File; Vietnam Country Series. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Bagley to Smith, April 25, noting that Cottrell was preparing a reply to be recommended to the White House. 1311. Task Force Viet Nam. President Diem called me in April 16 to discuss question of crop defoliation. He made clear that he is as much in favor of this program as ever and indeed regards its implementation as "one-third of the battle" in the VC controlled areas where he wants to use it. In this conversation, he also showed much greater awareness of the need to employ crop defoliants with discrimination, i.e., in such a way as to avoid destruction of non-VC crops. Diem also emphasized that a prompt decision is necessary if another growing season is not to be missed. I recalled to Diem that I had previously told him that at the last SecDef meeting in Honolulu/2/ it had been agreed that Washington would be asked to give us authority here in Saigon to authorize crop defoliation missions on a case by case basis. We had not yet received such authorization but he would appreciate that this was a difficult problem for the US Government. /2/See Document 124. Diem said that Colonel Trach (Vietnamese head of CDTC) had charge of this matter on Vietnamese side and was making careful study of suitable targets. He proposed that representatives of Colonel Trach and US representatives jointly overfly possible targets, map them and reach joint assessment of their suitability for defoliation. I agreed to put this proposal to my government. General Harkins and I recommend that we be authorized to participate in joint target assessment with Vietnamese and again request authority to authorize Vietnamese crop defoliation missions on case by case basis. Nolting
161. Letter From the Commander in Chief, Pacific's Political Adviser (Martin) to the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell)/1/ Honolulu, April 17, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 20.1 GVN 1962. Secret. Dear Cot: In certain CINCPAC contingency plans the question arises of what our aims would be if military operations should ever develop against North Viet-Nam. That is, would we include the reunification of Viet-Nam by military means as one of our aims?/2/ /2/Next to this sentence the word "No" was written. As far as I can determine our position on the reunification of Viet-Nam remains that set forth in the Bedell Smith declaration of July 21, 1954 at Geneva/3/ which included the following: /3/For Smith's declaration, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, p. 1500. "In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954 as follows: "'In the case of nations, now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.'" I have seen no new policy pronouncements on this subject./4/ Therefore, I assume that reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means continues to be our objective. I also assume, however, that reunification of Viet-Nam by military means would not be an aim of any military operations which might develop against North Viet-Nam short of a general war situation. I should be interested in any information you may have as to whether or not these assumptions are correct. /4/Next to this sentence were written the words: "I believe this is correct." Sincerely yours, Ed
162. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 18, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-030-69. Secret. SUBJECT Recent assessments of the situation in SVN stress that future success depends on the GVN ability to correlate diverse administrative requirements to implement the pacification strategy. Doubts are expressed that the GVN can achieve this task. Diem has created a number of committees and councils in the past 3-4 months ostensibly designed to decentralize administrative control. No observer feels confident that these actions will be, or are, effective; the same deficiencies noted during the period of your mission prevail. At the same time, Diem continues to resist basic improvements recommended by the US. Thompson has met a similar response when he engages in discussion of details. The Ambassador, General Harkins, and Mr. Thompson, from contact on the ground, caution slowness in pressing Diem along these lines. The US, however, has executed in full measure its commitments to Diem, which stemmed from your mission, and assumed thereby a degree of responsibility for success. A vital part of the US-GVN contract was recognition that the GVN should seek improvement in administration and public image. Few think the victory can be won if Diem does not take steps toward limited liberalization of his regime. To assist him, the US offered, on GVN concurrence, to provide selected advisers on a mutually acceptable basis; Diem has not chosen to take up this proposal. The question now is whether the US should continue to exert such influence it can on Diem and hope the GVN can do the job, or should it insist on certain minimum actions which will increase the odds that the GVN will do the job. This issue was a difficult one last November and a source of US-GVN disagreement. Nevertheless, it is important we develop some sort of rationale on the problem. I suggest that this is the time for State to study the prospects in SVN. Recommendations should be made as to whether we should expect Diem to respond more positively in accordance with our jointly undertaken agreement or, alternatively, if a projection of present levels of progress represents a risk of future increased US involvement. W.H.B.
163. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 18, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret. SUBJECT Items of interest of Task Force meeting today were: a. State is in receipt of a telegram from Saigon (we do not yet have) requesting authority to allow Viet-Nam to use US chemicals to spray Viet Cong crops./2/ Saigon suggests the US join with the Vietnamese in identifying targets and recommends that the Ambassador be given authority to approve such Vietnamese operations on a case by case basis. This telegram formalizes the oral request made by Ambassador Nolting in Honolulu 22 March, which has not been acted on by State. In Cottrell's absence, Mr. Wood gave the usual State discourse on the adverse effects of using defoliants regardless of selective targetting. /2/Document 160. b. Mr. Wood suggested to AID that action should be taken to obtain foreign doctors for use in Viet-Nam without waiting further for answers to outstanding telegrams on this subject which have been sent to Saigon. Wood mentioned the Presidential interest in creating an atmosphere of international support for the SVN Government. There were some differences of opinion on whether this should be acted on immediately or whether Saigon should be pushed for an answer. The issue was left dangling. c. There was a very interesting and concise briefing by an AID Communications Specialist, Dr. Winfield, who had just resumed from a short survey trip to South Viet-Nam. He indicated progress was being made in the installation of community listening equipment in the villages; the recently commenced rural newspaper was off to an excellent start; and bids had been received from US and Japanese sources for transistor radio receivers for distribution throughout South Viet-Nam. The tentative decision on the receivers is to use US sources entirely, some of which will be delivered as assembled sets while others will be shipped in units for assembly in Saigon. The estimate is 4 to 6 months before the first of these receivers is ready for distribution by sale or, as an alternative, by buying through the US economic assistance program and distributing without cost to the populace. In the meantime, Dr. Winfield felt the normal sales of transistor receivers in Saigon was resulting in some of the distribution that we desired. d. He also reported on the status of transmitters which the US is installing in South Viet-Nam. The 5 main transmitters should be on the air by June (2 or 3 of these are operating now). Tests indicate coverage of all South Viet-Nam except an area in the Kontum-Pleiku Plateau; possible installation of a 1 KW transmitter at Pleiku to cover this section is under study. A directional antenna for the HVE transmitter is being installed and, when operational, will permit radio coverage of all of North Viet-Nam, except the northern and western border areas. Dr. Winfield emphasized that we are rapidly approaching the point when South Viet-Nam will have a very modem and extensive system to promulgate information throughout the country. The content of such information, as now produced by South Viet-Nam, is ineffective. There is an urgent need that US advice and experience in this field be utilized by the GVN. So far all such approaches have been unsuccessful. Dr. Winfield recommends a firm approach at a high level. W.H.B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
164. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, April 19, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-1962. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3313. For Harriman. Reference: Saigon's 140 to New Delhi, sent Department 109./2/ While I have no desire to extend my range of concern I continue think that South Vietnam is our most dangerous problem and I would take strong exception to reference telegram. While respecting your judgment as to the timing of any conference, the latter could be extremely useful in moving this from a military to a diplomatic solution and search for diplomatic solutions is after all the business of diplomacy./3/ In different ways offensively and defensively the Geneva accords are being violated on both sides of the line. It could well be the business of the conference to consider ways of getting full observance/4/ and the effect of course would be to focus world public opinion on the issue and as the Laos cease-fire has shown this can have a restraining influence. /2/Document 158. /3/Next to this sentence were written the words "Not entirely." /4/Next to this sentence were written the words "DRV pull-out." I also take strong exception to the cliché which is so persistently damaging in our diplomacy that we must subordinate our policy to whatever will maintain the confidence of the regime to which we are accredited. This leads us to the absurdity that any action, however sensible, may undermine confidence if it doesn't fit the particular preferences of the government we are supporting. Nolting suggests that confidence of Vietnam people and war with Viet Cong may begin to waver if we show disposition to diplomatic discussion. In fact they should never be in any doubt about our preference for diplomatic settlement. Finally I confess to some concern over the attitudes exemplified in the first paragraph of reference telegram. If we must fear losing our position vis-à-vis a government as utterly dependent on our military and charitable support as that of Diem our diplomacy is in a sorry condition. And if we can only inspire confidence by emphasizing willingness to fight war we are in even worse shape and ought to get Dulles back to take charge. I would also note typical tendency in telegram to identify the people with Diem and vice versa, an identification which no close observer of the South Vietnam scene can take seriously. Galbraith
165. Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of the Army (Stahr)/1/ /1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Departments and Agencies, Army, 1961-1962. Secret. The source text provides no indication of the date of preparation. SYNOPSIS OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S FAR EAST
TRIP, The following summarizes principal impressions of my recent trip to the Far East. I am aware of the dangers of reaching conclusions on the basis of hit-and-run visits, but since I had had fifteen months of daily concern with one aspect or another of our problems in the Far East, and my sources of information were themselves very much attuned to the situations in their own countries, I was able to get quickly to the point in most cases. And, because it was known that I served in Asia with Asian troops two years in World War II, I was received with genuine trust. [Here follow accounts of Stahr's visits to Hawaii, Kwajalein, Korea, Okinawa, and Taiwan.] Saigon--32 hours Principal persons with whom discussions were held: US Vietnamese Briefed by USMACV; commanders and staffs of I and II Corps, Vietnamese Army; Commanding Officers of Army helicopter and light aviation companies recently deployed to Vietnam. Principal sites and activities visited: extensive flight from Saigon over a major portion of Vietnam, with stops at Da Nang and Nah Trang. Comments--I found the President bright and serious and talkative. As is well known, he is unwilling to delegate authority sufficiently and appears adamant about maintaining a dual chain of command for military operations, but he still seems to be far and away the best man for us to rely upon. In this regard I found the feeling among the U.S. on Saigon that those South Vietnamese intellectuals who oppose and criticize Diem seem unable to convert their criticism into any form of constructive assistance. He himself appears to have a very clear grasp of his military problem. He has studied in great detail the causes of the failures of the French and is determined not to repeat them. My own eyes convinced me that the difficulty of terrain of which I had heard so much for so long is not a myth but very real. It seems to me important that key U.S. decision makers find the time to look for themselves at this country. The Vietnamese are greatly encouraged by our policy toward them and by our strong support. Slowly but surely they are working out the techniques of counter-insurgency and of civic action. They seem fully aware of the importance of associating the ideas of military and civic actions in the minds of the villagers. They also realize the importance of training villagers to perform civil guard and self-defense roles and are facing up to the tough problem of having to keep the villages protected while simultaneously conducting the training for the civil guard and self-defense units. Gradually they are learning to use the new techniques which we are making possible, such as the use of helicopters and direction finding equipment. In this regard our buildup in their country is very fast by their standards; we must be a little patient as they try to assimilate the new resources and absorb the related operational techniques. The Armed Forces of South Vietnam are committed to a larger degree than I had realized to the village defense and counter-insurgency roles. They are so spread-eagled by these deployments that a conventional attack by major units of the North Vietnam Armed Forces would present them with a hard choice between concentrating to meet the conventional threat (knowing full well that the rear areas would immediately erupt with increased Vietcong activities), or alternatively, pitting small regular Army forces against greatly superior conventional forces of North Vietnam. As I see it, this clearly adds up to a requirement for us to prepare to come quickly to their assistance if they are jumped by conventional forces from North Vietnam. Ground combat troops could be supplied by, e.g., the GRC and ROK, but our Naval and Air Forces could play very important roles. With respect to Laos, their "open back door," they were too polite to complain openly about our policy but referred over and over to the extreme difficulty of cleaning up their country while the Vietcong have such an opportune means of access. One of the South Vietnamese pointed out the analogy of Greece, making the point that only when Tito closed his border and denied the guerrillas both access and sanctuary were the Greeks able to eradicate them from their country. The Army of South Vietnam impressed me as one which, though certainly not up to the standards of the Korean much less the Chinese Nationalist, is nonetheless very promising. It has some good young officers and mostly needs continued good training and experienced leadership. Within the Army there is a recognition that the struggle will be long and difficult, but, possibly for the first time, they believe there is reason to be quietly optimistic about the long pull. General Harkins has taken hold well. He spends much time in the field and is at once firm and friendly in his dealings with the Vietnamese. He and Ambassador Nolting work well together. There were a few random impressions worth noting. The feeling was expressed by Minister Thuan that the mainland Chinese (and other Asians) have not been so brainwashed as to have lost a basic good will toward the United States. They are practical people who have duly noted our according independence to the Philippines and who remember such things. He further expressed the opinion that now is the time for the ChiNats to hit the ChiComs, a feeling which he says he distinctly did not have at the time of Quemoy and Matsu. He bases this estimate on his assessment of the bad conditions in China and also North Vietnam. He added that the ChiComs are putting the squeeze on North Vietnam in the same way the Russians are squeezing the ChiComs. He said that the full impact of our decision to keep South Vietnam free is greater than we may realize. He believes it has actually recreated an opportunity to free Southeast Asia from communism. He indicated quite spontaneously that his country is very happy with Ambassador Nolting and that the Thais like Ambassador Young. A high-ranking and apparently able and astute Vietnamese officer expressed his concern that we seem content to remain strategically, strictly on the defensive in the field of guerrilla warfare. He pointed out that there is always a great disparity in numbers between those who fight as guerrillas and those who play the role of counter-guerrillas (ratios of counter-guerrillas to guerrillas normally range from 10 to 1 to 20 or more to 1). He reasoned from this basic fact that we must necessarily ourselves become the guerrillas and place the onus on the communists to provide the much larger numbers of counter-guerrillas. [Here follow accounts of Stahr's visits to Japan and Alaska.]
166. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 20, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4-2062. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi, Ottawa, London, CINCPAC for Polad, and Moscow. 1331. Reference: A. Deptel 1213; B. Embtel 1297./2/ Number of French military training personnel and cadres in Viet Nam in 1954 documented in Embassy despatch 420 of May 27, 1960./3/ As indicated therein source is French Military Attaché who obtained the information for us from Paris. /2/Telegram 1213 to Saigon, April 16, asked whether the Embassy envisaged making the case to the ICC that the United States was entitled to replace French combat troops in Indochina in 1954 under Article 16 of the Geneva Accords. (Ibid., 751G.00/4-1262) Telegram 1297 from Saigon, April 12, recommended that the Department of State make the case with the Canadian and Indian representatives on the ICC that the United States was complying with the Geneva Accords by only replacing French troops that were present in Indochina in 1954. (Ibid., 751G.5/4-1262) /3/Not printed. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/5-2760) Agree 3,500 figure not now particularly helpful in view present number US military personnel. Therefore would envisage arguing US right to introduction additional military personnel on ground that total number French military personnel in Viet Nam in 1954 far in excess of what we have and that, as Canadians stated in memorandum given Department March 15, 1962,/4/ basic purpose of Geneva accords was to "freeze" balance of military power in Viet Nam. From technical point of view justifying presence US military personnel under wording article 16, would not appear necessary relate US military personnel to either nationality or function foreign military forces in Viet Nam in 1954. Article 16 prohibits introduction of "any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel" except for rotations of units and groups of personnel, etc. without making distinction as to nationality or function of troops. Thus article 16 solely concerned with preserving military status quo in terms numbers of foreign military personnel. Would endeavor to avoid being drawn into discussion as to whether we seeking replace French "combat" troops by simply pointing out US military personnel in Viet Nam are training, advisory and support personnel, and not combat forces. /4/Not printed. Believe we can best ascertain whether ICC prepared accept new figure as basis justification for US military personnel in Viet Nam by informal discussion with Canadians and subsequently with Indians along lines suggested reference B Trueheart
167. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 20, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret. SUBJECT John Anspacher, just resumed from Head of USIS in Saigon, gave a debriefing on 19 April. He covered a wide range of subjects, but in his own field of information he made the following points of interest: a. There are only 2 or 3 Vietnamese who are professionally qualified to administer the information service, but they are not utilized. Diem continues to provide guidance personally and it is ineffective. b. US advice is given, but not followed except in technical areas. At the same time, the US is providing most of the physical and technical means for the SVN information program. c. There are 25 SVN newspapers m Saigon; none elsewhere. Deliveries to the provinces are infrequent and in small quantity. d. Sometime in the next 6-18 months the US will be faced with the decision as to whether to use our resources unilaterally to project the required GVN public image or to insist on Diem (and Nhu) accepting our counsel. e. If the impact of the psychological assets are not altered to appeal to the people, the growing GVN military superiority will be of no avail. Anspacher has indicated to me he has some concrete ideas on how to gain improvement in this area. I will see him Thursday after his return from a trip to New York./2/ /2/See Document 171. W.H.B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
168. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, April 20, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-2062. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Phnom Penh, London, Paris, CINCPAC for Polad, Moscow, Vientiane Bangkok, Geneva for FECON, New Delhi, Taipei, Manila, and Ottawa. 1330. Our 1309./2/ Contains verbatim text. Following statements have come out of Hanoi past two days on international consultations or conference on Vietnam: /2/Document 158. 1) On April 18 at close long report to current session DRV National Assembly on US "Colonial War" in South Vietnam and the "just fight" of the South Vietnamese people, Deputy Nguyen Van Vinh stated: "Of late world opinion has paid attention to seeking measures to check war and maintain peace in Indo-China--the proposal for reconvening the Geneva conference, for instance. US have had to talk of international conference on SVN question. But they want to take advantage of this conference to slander Vietnamese people and give fig leaf to their acts of aggression in South Vietnam. "Since Geneva agreements have been sabotaged more and more seriously by US and Ngo Dinh Diem, it is very necessary to reconvene Geneva conference to discuss Vietnamese question. But this must aim at checking US intervention and fully achieving sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Vietnamese people in keeping with spirit of 1954 Geneva agreements on Indo-China". Vinh report also welcomes initiatives of bloc, Sihanouk and "certain political circles in Britain, India, France and elsewhere, aiming to maintain peace in Vietnam and Indo-China". Vinh is also chairman of National Reunification Commission, post of Ministerial rank in DRV Council of Ministers, HC [as?] well as Major General and Vice Minister of National Defense. He regularly reports to DRV National Assembly on reunification question. While he apparently spoke in capacity as Deputy, executive position he holds would make it appear international conference proposal on verge becoming official DRV policy. 2) Hanoi "Voice of Vietnam Radio" April 19 broadcast commentary welcoming recent suggestion of Sihanouk for international conference on Vietnam and stating it deserves serious consideration. Commentary also refers to DRV FonMin note March 15 to Geneva cochairman calling for consultations (our 1197/3/). /3/Dated March 20, it reported that, although the DRV had not actually called for a new international conference on Vietnam, it had come close to doing so on several occasions, among them the March 15 note to the 1954 Conference co-chairmen. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3-2062) 3) DRV Foreign Office spokesman in statement April 19 criticizing British note of April 16 to USSR on Vietnam situation reiterated passage in DRV Foreign Minister's March 15 note to co-chairmen requesting international conference. Comment: DRV seems quite evidently to be moving close to call for international conference. Believe this further points up urgency putting forth US position vis-à-vis conference as proposed reference telegram. Trueheart
169. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 26, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret. SUBJECT Meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. Cottrell on his recent 2-day visit to Saigon with General LeMay./2/ /2/LeMay visited Vietnam April 16-21. It is unclear from his report of April 24 which of these days he spent in Saigon. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 320 thru 370.05) The main points made were: a. There is confusion on both the GVN and US side in Saigon, apparently due to organizational uncertainties. The Ambassador and DCM have had long recent conversations with Nhu and Thuan and are hopeful of some progress in clearing lines of command. Cottrell is mulling over the idea of using lower administrative levels as the point of contact for advice. . . . Mr. Trueheart (DCM) thought this would be difficult to do in other ministries. Cottrell asked Thuan why the GVN had not asked for US advisors per the joint December Memorandum of Understanding./3/ Thuan implied concern with past experiences with advisors from Michigan State, and preferred to continue profitable contacts with institutions such as Brookings, who were giving them useful studies. The obvious impression was that there were enough US advisors in SVN without formalizing specific positions. /3/See the enclosure to Nolting's letter to Diem, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 307. (There is a renewed State interest in the whole matter of US advice; the extent to which it is needed and the probable results if it is not accepted by the GVN.) b. Cottrell is impressed with the execution of air support in SVN, both US and GVN. (This is a complete switch based on his look on the ground and talks with Gen. LeMay.) c. Cottrell backs selective defoliation, including against VC crops, and thinks the chemicals will do the job against food crops. (This is also a 180 degree turn resulting from talks with Diem and Trueheart; the reason for his confidence in the chemicals is not clear.) He recognizes some political hazards, but considers them acceptable for the gains involved. d. He talked with Mr. Walton, the USOM police advisor. You will recall Walton was very critical last fall of the situation in SVN. He now thinks there is real improvement; the police link with the Surete is good, and equipment and training facilities are improved. e. US advisors to Province Chiefs are in place in 11 provinces. Diem is pushing for helos and vehicles for provinces so the chiefs can get around; some have not visited the greater majority of their villages because of the security situation. f. Implementation of Staley reforms has produced GVN budget shortages. AID and State are studying this matter to see what can be done. A prime factor is a general let-down in business activity. g. In a talk with Gen. LeMay, Diem produced a long shopping list of items desired. Included were jet T-33 aircraft, radars, ULA helicopters for province use, photo processing facility, air photo capability./4/ /4/A summary account of this meeting is in LeMay's final report; see footnote 2 above. As a separate but related matter, I understand at the JCS meeting 25 April,/5/ Gen. LeMay said the Army was not employing air support in SVN often enough in routine and set-piece operations though for reaction type missions it is well used. He noted there is significant unused air capacity. He complained that his people could not get by the Chief of Staff (Marine Gen. Weede) to talk this over with Gen. Harkins. (Gen. LeMay talked with Gen. Harkins in Saigon so presumably this matter is resolved.) Reportedly, Gen. Shoup said if the senior Air Force officers in Saigon were not man enough to insist on seeing the Commander on a vital issue we were in greater difficulty there than he had thought. /5/No record of this meeting has been found. W.H.B./6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
170. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 26, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret. SUBJECT 1. I talked with Mr. Forrestal on the several factors involved in the question of employing chemicals for crop destruction. 2. The essential element in his view is a desire for assurances that the potential gain will be worth the possible adverse propaganda and political results. He sees particular sensitivity in US association with action that decreases food supply in a generally food-short continent such as Asia. He is not convinced the intelligence that is available will provide more than a few clear-cut cases in which crop destruction might serve its purpose. He feels these limited gains would not offset the other disadvantages. On the other hand, if the target survey indicated a significant potential gain against the VC he would tend to give the political disadvantages less weight. He distinguishes between Communist propaganda on recent defoliation and that which would follow crop destruction. 3. On this basis, I sense he would not object to telling Saigon to go ahead with a joint study of possible targets, but will resist any suggestion that the Embassy be authorized to give a go ahead for crop destruction on the basis of such a survey without Washington once again considering the issue. 4. Since writing the above, I understand the new State/Defense draft calls for a review in Saigon of crop destruction tests previously conducted in SVN;/2/ if on review, the Amb and Gen Harkins are convinced these tests indicate effectiveness, a combined target survey with SVN is authorized; on completion of the survey, Washington will then consider any recommendations for crop destruction operations and advise Saigon accordingly. This looks like the best action we can get and, in my mind, is sound if undertaken expeditiously. /2/See Document 174. W.H.B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. [Continue with the next documents]
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