NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
180. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 3, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Special Group Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62. Secret. Drafted by Davis. Attached to the source text were an agenda for the meeting of May 10, a memorandum on counterinsurgency terminology, and a transmittal memorandum from S/S. SUBJECT PRESENT 1. South Viet-Nam Status Report Mr. Cottrell stated that he has returned from his recent trip to South Viet-Nam with three general impressions: A. In the strategic hamlet concept, together with a quick military reaction, we have found the right formula. B. More confusion exists in the inter-relationship between U.S. advisers and Viet-Nam opposite numbers in military units than he had previously thought. This applies to the reporting of aircraft, as well as the linking of communications. C. The fiscal problem has again become serious. The South Viet-Nam budget exceeds the country's income plus U.S. aid. Mr. Cottrell summed up the situation by stating that in his opinion we have reached bottom in South Viet-Nam, and that he is not sure whether we have made the upturn yet. Evidence as to an upturn will include such things as the number of Viet Cong attacks, the number of Viet Cong personnel killed, and the South Viet-Nam military reaction time. General Taylor expressed the Group's interest in receiving the views of the Secretary of Defense following his return from South Viet-Nam. General Decker will disseminate to the Group a report prepared by General Rosson following the latter's recent trip to South Viet-Nam./2/ /2/Not further identified. [Here follow sections on subjects unrelated to Vietnam.]
181. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, May 3, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-016-69. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Mr. Cottrell advises me that the question of the desirability and extent of foreign military participation in the fight in South Viet-Nam has been carefully reviewed by State in the last few days. A decision has been made to pass on each case that comes up rather than attempt to organize any sort of multi-national contribution from the Washington end. 2. The first specific case is Korea. As you will see from the attached telegram,/2/ received during your absence, the Koreans have advised the United States officially of their plan to despatch a military mission to Saigon. This is the same project of which we had earlier word through intelligence channels. /2/Reference is to telegram 1135 from Seoul, April 28, not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5811/4-2862) 3. State has worked up a draft reply to the Ambassador in Seoul which, in effect, indicates the US has no objection to the Korean mission but expresses the desirability of coordinating the Group's work with General Harkins on arrival in Saigon. The decision is subject to concurrence of our Ambassadors in Seoul and Saigon and the outgoing telegram is so worded./3/ Though Saigon and CINCPAC both received the attached telegram, neither has indicated their views. /3/Document 180. You will note in paragraph 2 of the Seoul telegram that the mission includes experts in intelligence organization and operations; otherwise, the functional composition of the Korean group appears to be useful, can probably be absorbed without military complications, and will achieve the political objectives. 4. State is consulting with Defense this afternoon to gain their clearance on the draft telegram. Barring complications, an answer should be sent by Saturday. W.H.B.
182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, May 3, 1962, 6:03 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5811/4-2862. Secret. Drafted by Cottrell, and cleared with Loftus, Harriman, and Rice. Also sent to Seoul and repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1281. Task Force Viet-Nam. Seoul's 1135 to Department./2/ Unless Task Force/Saigon, CINCPAC or Embassy Seoul has other view we believe a quiet covert Korean military experts survey mission to Viet-Nam outlined reftel should not be discouraged. /2/See footnote 2, Document 181. Request Embassy Seoul inform Koreans we appreciate fact their experience may be useful in Viet-Nam and would like to have them work closely with MACV informing it fully of recommendations they may formulate as result their survey. ROK ideas on intelligence management materiel and anti-aircraft might conceivably cross lines with MACV thinking so full discussion and clarification between MACV and ROK would be desirable prior to ROK submission any report to GVN. Ball
183. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, May 5, 1962-4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5-562. Secret; Limit Distribution. 3509. For Harriman. Parthasarathi came in at my invitation for long and I think important talk about South Vietnam. He confirmed confidentially what we had heard from Canadians about the report, hopes to have it by first of June./2/ It will condemn Hanoi for subversion, cite us for exceeding ceilings. . . . /2/See Document 208. I pressed Parthasarathi at length on his discussions in Hanoi. He stressed what we have heard before, to-wit, that there is a difference between moderates who would like to forestall Chinese intervention and a radical pro-Chinese fraction. He doubts that there is any fear of American attack on North Vietnam but there is a widespread conviction that we aim to entrench ourselves militarily in the South. He states also that the Russians have told Hanoi that we are not very comfortable in our situation in the South, that we do not see how we can win with Diem but equally do not see any alternatives. Turning to the South, Parthasarathi believes Diem's political base is continuing to shrink, that the strategic villages plan, however plausible from a military point of view, is politically disastrous and based on false analogy by Thompson and others to Malayan situation. He does not, however, see any immediate alternative to Diem. Turning to the prospects for settlement he shares your doubts about a general conference. He does note that it would focus world attention on area which would be a restraining factor. However he strongly hopes that since both moderates in the North and Americans in the South find the situation unsatisfactory, the way will be kept open for negotiation. The right time he thinks is following the initial explosion which will accompany the submission of the report to the co-chairman. When the latter dies down he hopes the co-chairman will ask for bilateral talks on stabilization, compliance and peace. His suggestions are rather along the line of our recent discussions in Washington, to-wit, if North calls off the dogs for a stated period of months, we proclaim a standstill on military personnel and equipment with further understanding that if after say six months situation is stabilized we begin withdrawal./3/ He urges that while reunification is not possible there is a strong and genuine desire both North and South for increased contact. Politically reunification is attractive on both sides. /3/Next to this sentence the word "wrong" is written. I will repeat summary of conversation the first of the week to Saigon, London. etc./4/ /4/A sanitized copy of this telegram was sent as 3571 from New Delhi, May 10, and repeated to Saigon, London, Geneva, Paris, Ottawa, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for Polad. The sanitization involved deleting the last sentence of the second paragraph, all of the third paragraph, the first two sentences of the fourth paragraph, and the sixth sentence of the fourth paragraph. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5-1062) Galbraith
184. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, May 9, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Task Force meeting today was mainly devoted to a verbal report from Mr. Stoneman, the USOM representative, on his observations in a three week visit in Viet-Nam. 2. He was impressed with the operation of the intermediate level US country team committee chartered to support, on the US side, GVN province pacification operations. This has served to focus US attention to the details of implementing action in South Viet-Nam to an extent not previously attempted. For the first time the country team is evaluating detailed supporting action that in the past has been left to the GVN. As a result, the US is more actively prodding the various ministries in Saigon for information and status of planning. 3. The initial results of this new US procedure has been a clearer realization of GVN disorganization and ineffectiveness. There is no detailed GVN long-range planning for province pacification to include logistic requirements and personnel needs. The requirements deficiency is important because AID has only enough in-country resources to support two more province operations. In order to generate necessary activities in the pipeline to avoid future logistic delays, the US committee in Saigon is now trying to work up their own estimates of material requirements based on what is understood to be the proposed schedule for future operations. From this AID and MAP resources will be tapped. 4. Mr. Stoneman was amazed at the lack of firm planning in Saigon. Though he characterizes the US side as energetic and willing, he stresses the limits of US influence due to the lack of GVN organization and Diem's resistance to any suggested streamlining. USOM recently asked Diem for authority to bypass the Saigon ministries and deal directly with the province authorities to support rural operations. Diem said no. 5. Mr. Cottrell got the inference from this presentation. He observed it is now obvious we are reaching a crucial point at which it may be necessary to make a firm approach to Diem to insist on administrative procedures that will get the job done. If action along these lines is not undertaken, it is possible the large US investment will be of no avail. 6. Mr. Stoneman also had a lengthy discussion with the Minister of Civic Action. You will recall this Ministry is also responsible for propaganda. Stoneman says it is obvious the Minister considers the civic action part of his task as of the lowest priority. He has no rational conception of how his personnel are to be used or what type of support they may need in the months ahead. He does not understand the objectives of civic action and is approaching it on a very narrow basis. 7. The importance of continuing GVN ineffectiveness to the war in SVN is now being comprehended on a wider basis in Washington. You may wish to raise this issue at the Special Group (CI) meeting of 17 May./2/ /2/No record of the May 17 meeting has been found. W.H.B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
185. Editorial Note On May 8-9, 1962, the ANZUS Council met in Canberra for the first time since October 1959. United States representative Secretary of State Rusk was joined by Admiral Felt and several others. The Australian representative was Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister of External Affairs; New Zealand was represented by Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs K.J. Holyoake. According to a summary of the conversation, transmitted in airgram A-24 from Canberra, May 10, the Council undertook a discussion of Laos and South Vietnam on the morning of May 9. The discussion consisted of a briefing by Admiral Felt and exchanges between Barwick and Rusk on the viability of the Diem regime, the extent of the United States commitment in Vietnam, and me possibility of aid to South Vietnam from Australia and New Zealand. Regarding the latter Admiral Felt offered to smooth the way for aid from Australia and New Zealand when he visited Vietnam after the ANZUS meeting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 310 ANZUS) For text of the final communiqué issued at the conclusion of the conference, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 992-995.
186. Letter From the Ambassador in India (Galbraith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ New Delhi, May 10, 1962. /1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, EFGH. Confidential. Dear Averell: When I was back a few weeks ago,/2/ the President asked me if it would be a good idea for me to tell the representative of Hanoi here that if they ever had any communications to you or to him to use me as a channel. I told him I was a bit reluctant. The representative here is a very low-level figure and it isn't at all easy for me to communicate with him. Nor do I know of his reliability. We left the matter at that but since no action was involved I never thought to mention it to you. /2/See footnote 1, Document 141. The President, as you know, is anxious to have lines of communication open against possible need. Yesterday when thinking about Parthasarathi's forthcoming visit, it occurred to me that he would be a good channel of communication. Accordingly, without making much of a point of it, I told him that if he ever felt Hanoi had anything to communicate to you or the President they should feel free to do so and could do it through me. I doubt that anything ever comes of this, but I thought you should know. Yours faithfully, John
187. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: JCS Files. Top secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but declassification markings indicate that it was prepared in the Department of Defense. In addition to the summary of the trip to Vietnam, May 8-11, printed here, the report, which is 71 pages in length, includes an introduction stating that McNamara was accompanied by Lemnitzer and Sylvester, a summary of the Thailand portion of the trip, May 8-9, and 10 appendixes, including itineraries, maps, force strengths charts, descriptions of some ARVN operations, and a summary of Operation Sunrise. VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA BY THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, [Here follow sections I and II.] III. South Vietnam 1. As in Thailand, the period in South Vietnam was spent largely in visits to military activities in the field. It included visits to the Corps headquarters, to the scene of Operation Sunrise, to three strategic hamlets, to the SVN training center for Civil Guard units, as well as interviews with US unit advisors in their areas of operations, and with all three of the ARVN Corps commanders. The field visits covered generally the length of South Vietnam, from the 17th parallel to the Delta, and measured some 1400 miles. Included also was a conference with Chief, MAAG Laos, a meeting with President Diem, and a final meeting with Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Commander in Chief, Pacific and their staffs. The detailed itinerary is shown in Appendix 5 and a map representation of the area covered is shown in Appendix 6. 2. Impressions gained during the visit included the following: a. Strategic villages (townships) and strategic hamlets (communities).--The program, in reality, is just beginning to gain momentum, and unqualified conclusions as to its efficiency cannot properly be drawn at this fume. It is plain, even at this early point, that in the resettlement process often involved in the strategic hamlet program, and in the attendant regimentation, the South Vietnamese authorities are obliged to use some of the same arbitrary techniques as the Communists themselves. It is to be hoped that the very real motivations of ultimate freedom from terror, a sense of national or local pride, and the prospect of a life of individual opportunity will be enough to make the regimented system work. There is good reason to believe that it will. There are about 14,000 hamlets (small communities) in South Vietnam. As of this fume, 1579 have been organized as strategic hamlets, with an additional 1230 planned for this calendar year. Most of these actions did not involve resettlement and were created on the original site of the hamlets, in areas where the GVN already exercised a strong measure of control. They are thus serving mainly to solidify or to enhance the degree of GVN control. A few, such as Ben Tuong, which was visited in the Sunrise Project, and one seen near Ca Mao in Delta, were actually created in areas which were liberated from VC control. The Sunrise undertaking--a most ambitious effort to clear the VC from an area 40 miles northwest of Saigon--has proceeded satisfactorily to date, with a great reduction of VC influence in the area and the creation of a completely new strategic hamlet, into which families from the area have been concentrated. The project is portrayed and described in detail in Appendix 7. The Strategic hamlet program undertaken near Ca Mao on the Delta presented an equally impressive picture but from an entirely different viewpoint. Here, the commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment had gone into an area 95% controlled by the VC, declared martial law, and resettled 11,000 people (some under duress) in 9 strategic hamlets, while fighting the VC wherever he found them. It is a bootstrap program, essentially without material aid from outside. Since inception of the program, none of his villages have been attacked, and the freedom from VC taxation (extortion) is proving most appealing to the people. It is the commander's hope (doubtless optimistic) that he will be able to turn the whole area over to the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps within 6 months. It would appear, at this early moment, that the strategic hamlet program promises solid benefits, and may well be the vital key to success of the pacification program. Plainly, it: (1) Provides physical security for the villagers from the Communists. (2) Precludes extortion of the people's limited means. (3) Offers promise of a tranquil existence, and a substantially improved economic condition. (4) Provides for better housing, more education and a higher order of health and sanitation. (5) Impedes greatly the VC capability for surviving off the land, both in terms of food and information. On the other hand, the program gives evidence of having weaknesses--all of which are probably susceptible of correction. They include: (1) A lack of adequate orientation for the people who must be resettled, to make plain all the reasons why they should be willing to leave their homes and fields and surrender some of their liberties. (2) A shortage of competent GVN administrators to make the communities operate properly. (3) Inefficient and unstandardized construction methods. (4) A lack of warning communications. (5) Insufficient training and equipment for local defense forces. The first three of the above problems are on the way to solution now, through a National Academy for Strategic Hamlets which opens on 17 May, with an initial class of 500. The last two problems are most serious, and each is deserving of separate treatment here, by virtue of their magnitude and complexity. b. The training of Vietnamese paramilitary forces.--The subversive technique adopted by the communists fixes the hamlet as the decisive battle ground. The hearts and minds of the villagers are the major objective of the Viet Cong. Thus the security, prosperity and tranquility of each hamlet needs, at all costs, to be preserved from terror, violence and extortion, and this can be done best by young people who (1) have a blood identity with the area and an interest in its welfare; (2) have adequate arms, equipment and training for the task; and (3) are properly organized and led. The program to accomplish these things is just beginning to gain momentum. It has three elements: (1) Training of the Civil Guard (provincial paramilitary forces).--A visit to the Song Mao Civil Guard Training Center disclosed an active and effective program, capable of handling 15 Civil Guard companies at a fume. During this calendar year it will give 12-week training courses to 188 of the existing 449 Civil Guard companies, or about 20,000 men. By the end of next year 372 companies will be trained. These units will be adequately armed and capable of small unit offensive action against the VC, in local security tasks. One problem in the program turns on what point in time the Civil Guard units should be given their US weapons. At present the companies are inspected at their home stations and, when found capable of handling them, are issued the weapons at that fume. On this basis, a total of 338 Civil Guard companies now have US weapons. (2) Training of the Village Self Defense Corps.--This is a paramilitary program, formalized and like the Civil Guard, involving paid, full-time participation. It is less sophisticated than the Civil Guards. The SDC is identified with the village (township) in the same sense as the Civil Guard is identified with the province. The program for the Self Defense Corps training is not as far developed as Civil Guard training. It comprises a six-weeks basic course at seven SVN training centers. The SDC man is issued a US weapon on the day his unit reports to the training center, and is held responsible for the weapon thenceforward. Under the present program 65,000 SDC will have received training by 1 April 1963. (3) Training of the Youth Corps.--This is an undertaking identified specifically with the hamlet, and completes the paramilitary spectrum from the province downward. The participants are unsaid volunteers, both male and female. Their training is not standard, being accomplished by various ARVN units, and their weapons are heterogeneous. Nevertheless, their importance is great, inasmuch as the volunteers are actually a part of the hamlet which they undertake to defend. One Youth Corps group observed at the strategic hamlet of Luong Son near Song Mau in the central part of the country, was obviously highly motivated, but its weapons--ranging from shotguns to 1892 Mausers--gave little cause for confidence. There is no crystalline program for Youth Corps training, no detailed plan for its uniform armament, nor has a plan been prepared to equate the Youth Corps requirement with the number of strategic hamlets which will ultimately be created. COMUSMACV was directed to have such a plan developed, as a matter of urgency. (4) The problem of warning communications.--The transmission of intelligence reports and the processing of urgent reports of VC activity in the hinterland parallels closely the paramilitary security force problem. Communications are planned, from the metropolitan level to the district, and from the district to the village (township), but the hamlet, where the issue of violent subversion is really joined, has not been firmly linked--even in planning--in the communications system. At the present time, 220 of 242 districts are linked with Saigon by radio At the next lower level, the plan contemplates 2400 village radios, of which 215 had been installed by 2 May, with a forecast of 2019 by October. In this connection, the need for completion of this project, expressed by US personnel interviewed the length of South Vietnam, is urgent. At the lowest level, the hamlet, little has been done. It is acknowledged locally that a communication system from hamlet to village is essential, and a pilot group of 1000 very simple radio sets win be tested. The Secretary of Defense, in view of the importance of this project, advised the Ambassador and COMUSMACV that DOD would support the hamlet communication project, and asked for an early and complete plan which relates the communication need to the number of strategic hamlets contemplated. c. Visits to the I and II Corps Areas.--Both Corps Areas are vast, comprising terrain of extreme military difficulty, minimal road communications, a sensitive Laotian border and a wide assortment of VC activity. In this regard, probably the most significant tactical impression gained was that the ARVN forces--doubtless because of dynamic guidance by US advisers--are pressing aggressively to keep the VC off balance, and to make his existence as unfruitful as possible. There seems little question but that this vigor is paying off. Small unit patrols, ambushes, attacks of company size, sweeps involving a battalion or more, imaginative employment of helicopters, air observation and heavier weapons--all must be having some effect on denying initiative to the VC Eight such recent operations are described, and critically analyzed, in Appendix 8. A point of possible significance, in connection with the increased scale of helicopter-borne operations is the fact that the pilot area of the aircraft is suffering hits with increasing frequency, leading to the possible conclusion that the VC are learning to concentrate on the pilot. This, in turn, raises once again the matter of whether there should not be some form of suppressive weapon integral with a fraction of the assault helicopters. Specific observations regarding visits to the Corps Areas include: (1) An imaginative utilization of education, civic action and psychological activity has resulted in the voluntary resettlement of 11,900 people in the Kontum area. It could well be done elsewhere, but success apparently demands the happy combination of a willing provincial authority, a vigorous ARVN commander and a dynamic US advisor. (2) The primitive country is an ideal setting for exploitation of our superior mobility in the helicopter and our superior radio communication capability. In both Corps Areas a desire was expressed for more of this support, particularly helicopters. At the present fume, there are scarcely enough helicopters for operational purposes, leaving the logistic problems involved in supply and evacuation for remote patrols to be solved by slower and less effective means. It is most likely that more helicopters are needed. (3) There is little infiltration by sea reported, attesting to the effectiveness of the maritime patrol. The same is hue with respect to the 17th parallel. Some increase in infiltration across the Laotian border was reported by the I Corps commander, following the growth of communist activity at Tchepone in Laos. (4) US advisers in both Corps commented upon the great need for more junior officers and NCOs in both ARVN and Civil Guard units. In some organizations the number is as low as 15 to 25% of the authorized strength. (5) Advisers in both Corps were enthusiastic about the value of civic action, and urge acceleration in training of Vietnamese administrators in community development. They express a need for medical supplies for civic action purposes. (6) In contemplating the sum of the operations in I and II Corps, it was not possible to overlook the reality that these activities actually do relatively little to impede movement across the long and rugged Laotian border, a practical fact which assumes even greater importance in light of current developments in Laos. d. Conference With Chief MAAG, Laos.--The Chief, MAAG Laos joined the party at Nha Trang during the visit to I and II Corps, and gave a late summary of events in Laos. His recital of the developing situation paralleled closely the official reports available in Washington from other sources. However, he added the following personal views, which are significant: (1) That he had earlier appealed to the Laotian military leadership to readjust their low-ground defenses at Nam Tha, without success. (2) That the Laotian private soldier involved in the Nam Tha fighting gave a reasonably good account of himself, but that the officer and NCO leadership was gravely deficient, and that the pusillanimous example was set at the very top. (3) That this weakness which, in his views, is widespread, gives rise to the conclusion that what is left of the Laotian Army cannot be expected to fight with any effectiveness. (4) That there are grave doubts, in his mind, as to the real violence of the fighting, following the initial blow at Nam Tha, inasmuch as the field commander took pains to prevent direct US observation of the operation, and inasmuch as few casualties were noted. (5) That there is a substantial logistic build-up along the whole of the former cease-fire line; that logistic activity in the Tchepone area is growing; and that an attack may well be expected in the general area e. Conference at MACV Headquarters.--A conference at MACV Headquarters, attended also by representatives of CINCPAC and the US Embassy, Saigon, treated the following matters: (1) A review of major VC military activities.--Since 14 April there have been no VC operations as large as battalion size, the largest involving about 50 men. Present VC organized strength is estimated at 16,500. While this is a reduced estimate, the reduction was described as being more a matter of accurate reporting than of lesser numbers. There are estimated to be at least 100,000 active communist guerrillas. With regard to these facts, it is likely that we shall be getting better information in the future, inasmuch as there are now intelligence advisers down to the section level. (2) Review of RVNAF operations.--Since 21 March there have been over 40 operations of battalion or larger size, along with 400 minor offensive efforts. The Air Force has flown over 400 sorties, of which 275 were in close support. COMUSMACV is now concerned about how to maintain the tempo of operations during the rainy season, and has a study in progress on this subject. (3) The status of Clear and Hold operations.--Activities in Operation Sunrise and at Ca Mao have been discussed earlier. Additionally, it was reported that, while there is no time schedule set for the approved Delta Plan, the Vietnamese seek to divide the clear-and-hold scheme into three phases, involving tasks of ascending difficulty, and each to be accomplished in three months. (4) Progress in gaining GVN acceptance of issue of weapons to CG and SDC.--This has been discussed earlier, except for the single significant point that, in the case of the SDC, the reluctance to issue weapons at home stations is wholly a GVN decision. It is their view that issue of the weapons at the training center is a powerful lever to procure the participation of the SDC in training. Actually, a far graver problem lies in the absence of a sound program for arming the Youth Corps. (To be taken under study by MALV.) (5) The relief of ARVN units by Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps in static tasks.--There has as yet been essentially no replacement of ARVN units by Civil Guard or SDC, nor is there likelihood of any until a greater number of these para-military units are properly trained. This is so because the trained CG and SDF units are now used to replace untrained similar units which, in turn, go to the training centers. At the same time it is significant to note that probably 85% of the ARVN forces, while technically addressed to "static" duties, are actually engaged in pure operational functions of defensive nature--protection of vital installations, airfields, supply depots, etc. (6) Establishment of the Intelligence Net.--At the present time 92% of the people and 98% of the equipment for the intelligence net are in place, and substantially operational. While there is stik some requirement for US personnel to depend on Vietnamese resources for information, the need is steadily decreasing. There is now a joint US/VN intelligence element existent from section through division, corps, and field command to general staff. There should be a visible improvement in intelligence quality and timeliness in the immediate future. (7) Communications in Provinces, Districts, Villages and Hamlets.--This has been discussed above. (8) Infiltration.--Infiltration, which has been at a low level for the past few months, is estimated to be on the increase, using routes through Laos. (9) Current Desertion Rate in RVNAF.--The Army rate has dropped from 6/1000/month to about 4/100/month. There is no desertion problem in the Air Force or Navy. (10) Defoliation.--A detailed and generally favorable report was submitted on defoliation, as a result of a comprehensive survey by chemical warfare, agricultural and botanical technicians. The defoliation technique was characterized as potentially most effective, and its operational resumption, under specialist technical advice, was recommended. Its usefulness, in terms of selective crop destruction, was also emphasized. MACV was directed by the Secretary of Defense to submit a specific recommendation covering both defoliation and selective crop destruction. (11) A progress report on whether we are winning or losing.--MACV offered one practical index for appraising the problem, acknowledging always the multitude of imponderables involved. It has to do with the control--geographic and by population--exercised over the country by the GVN and by the VC. The geographic picture is presented in Appendix 9, with a detailed rationalization. In essence, it says that: The GVN controls 14.7% of the country. The above population figures, moreover, are developed without considering the 1.7 million people in the cities, essentially, all of whom are under GVN control. Another interesting index to the trend of affairs is portrayed in Appendix 10, which shows, for a 5 month period, the trend of GVN combat losses in killed, wounded, deserted and defected, as well as weapons lost, contrasted to the same figures for the VC. The trend is plainly a favorable one. 3. Vietnam Summary a. US military forces in South Vietnam are acquitting themselves well, exhibiting much energy, great initiative and imagination in dealing with their Vietnamese counterparts. b. There are skill some material needs in S. Vietnam--helicopters, hamlet communications, and suitable arms for paramilitary forces. MACV is aware of each problem and has been directed to submit specific proposals. c. There remain urgent training and organizational problems related to hamlet security. These too, are recognized by MACV. d. Beyond this, and in a broader sense, there was an atmosphere of restrained optimism evident in every area visited, on the part of both US and GVN personnel. All the way from the intensely proud attitude of the administrator of a strategic hamlet to the military and civil leadership at the top, the Vietnamese exhibit confidence and resolution. The US participants in the battle are likewise solid in their determination that the future holds genuine promise. At the same time, there seems to be universal comprehension of the inevitable reality that for fifteen prior years the war in Vietnam was in the process of being lost--progressively and day by day--and that there is no alchemy or magic that can convert that sort of loss into a dramatic victory overnight. Put otherwise, there is evident a general conviction--first, that victory is clearly attainable through the mechanisms that are now in motion and, second, that hopefully, it will not take fifteen years fully to consummate it.
188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Hong Kong, May 11, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Official-Informal Letters, GVN 1962. Secret. Transmitted from Hong Kong under a letter from Wood to Cottrell, May 11. Signed for Wood by Marshall Green, the Consul General in Hong Kong, who appended a note stating that he agreed with the conclusions but would have phrased Wood's points differently. SUBJECT In making future assessments of the effect which our military/diplomatic role in Viet Nam has on the Communists I believe we should keep the following elements in mind. The list is not exhaustive. I have discussed the following with Consul General Green and key members of his staff in Hong Kong. They have made sound contributions and agree generally. 1. The ChiCom-Russian split. The Russians think Communism can make gains without local wars. They will back wars of "National Liberation" provided the risks are controllable. The ChiComs think local wars are the best way to spread Communism and will accept higher risks. (Moral: if we prove the Russians right, we are lost.) 2. For all their toughness the ChiComs are realists. Given their economic plight and because they will not have an effective way of delivering the bomb in the foreseeable future, they don't want a major war. Proviso: If they thought they were being attacked, they would stop at nothing. (We can communicate our limited intentions to the ChiComs by our acts.) 3. If the ChiComs took over all SEA, it would not solve their immediate rice problem. Later they would quadruple the rice production of SEA, but this would not permanently solve their rice problems. They probably know this and we can assume that they will not move into SEA because of their food problem. 4. The North Vietnamese have committed their prestige to the conquest of South Vietnam, but they will not voluntarily accept massive ChiCom assistance. They know that to gain South Viet Nam by this method would lead, in turn, to being swallowed by the ChiComs. They have an abiding, neighborly hatred dating back 1500 years. 5. The North Vietnamese react badly to internal, covert dangers. As orientals they do not naturally band together to face a common danger. This tendency to look out for themselves is accentuated by Communist training to act as separate cells and cadres and to spy on each other. There are already indications that the North Vietnamese are afraid of sabotage, that there is an atmosphere of distrust which can no longer be papered over by warring revolutionary zeal (these tensions should be discreetly exploited). 6. The South Vietnamese peasants fear the Communists more than their own Government. If convinced they have the means to resist the VC, they will. If convinced they don't have the means, they will, through fear, give the Viet Cong more than they will the GVN. 7. The GVN wants to win its own war. It now realizes the importance of Civic Action as a means of helping the peasant. The confusions in this program are not insuperable. The GVN has not yet fully faced the other side of the coin--to really root out the VC it will be necessary for ARVN units to stay out in the field longer and with less support than is now the case (experience will help them gain the confidence to do this, but we must also help through joint planning and by supplying the right kind of light equipment. We must not let them become so dependent on daily US provisions that they can't be weaned and hardened off into the jungles). 8. International Conference--At present the Communists (Russia, the ChiComs and North Viet Nam) would only come out for a conference if they felt they could gain two objectives: i. a neutralized SVN really ripe for the takeover (they were fooled on this one in 1954 and would want to be satisfied); ii. paint an "aggression" label clearly on the U.S. without any rubbing off on themselves (that is why we must work so hard to get the ICC to pin "subversion" on them). In the future when the war goes badly for the Communists, they will want a conference (this will test our nerve. We should remember the Communists understand our actions. If we agree to a conference, they will assume it to be an act of weakness. We must assume that a conference will not lead to an agreement which will bind them. By the thrust and parry of diplomatic and military action we can reach a de facto understanding, but we should only do so when the GVN has the ability to exercise sovereign control over South Viet Nam. Finally the publicity of a conference on Viet Nam is apt to make it a poor form of diplomacy, particularly since our friends and allies are apt to get into a greater degree of public disarray than the Communists). Conclusions 1. Maintain our present program in SVN.
189. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Laos, Top Secret. Drafted by Neubert (INR/RSB) and Coolidge (INR/RFE). SUBJECT In order to provide a command structure for the US forces being moved to Thailand and the Southeast Asian area in connection with the situation in Laos, the Joint Chiefs propose ordering the establishment of the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI). General Paul Harkins, who heads the US Military Command, Vietnam (USMACV) will additionally assume command of USMACTHAI. As head of USMACTHAI, General Harkins will command Joint Task Force 116 (headed by Lt. Gen. Richardson), MAAG Thailand, and such other US forces as may be in Thailand now or subsequently. There are undoubtedly sound military organizational reasons for establishing this command structure. This we do not question. However, from a somewhat less specialized point of view, we can see a number of undesirable implications in the action taken (or about to be taken). 1. Communist Reactions: The limited purpose of our military buildup in Southeast Asia may have been made abundantly clear publicly and in private approaches to the Soviets. Moscow is, in our view, likely to give credence to the limitations we assert. Peiping and Hanoi, however, are more directly concerned than Moscow, and we think they are apt to view our assertions with a jaundiced eye; they will be quick to draw conclusions from any of our actions which do not, in their view, square with our limited objective. Thus, we believe both Peiping and Hanoi likely at a minimum to regard the establishment of USMACTHAI under General Harkins (with all his other responsibilities) as an indicator of US intent to draw a line in a permanent fashion from Thailand through Laos to South Vietnam. They will believe this not only threatens their position in southern Laos, but their support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam as well. As long as we are not compelled to move US/Thai troops into Laos itself, this conception on their part is of no great significance. If we move into Laos, however, it is almost certain to make them more likely to initiate hostile action against US and Thai troops than we have previously estimated. They would have great difficulty, as we crossed the Mekong into southern Laos, in not concluding that this was the beginning of an effort to pinch off the whole southern panhandle. 2. In US Policy Terms: In South Vietnam we are assisting a national government in a divided country to check and beat back an insurgency. We are going to great pains to make clear that it is not our war but that of the GVN. With respect to Laos we are mounting a deterrent to further communist territorial encroachment so as to create the conditions in which a new government of national union can be formed and the area neutralized. Only if neutralization proves impossible would we consider armed intercession to effect a de facto partition. US policy is differentiated for the two areas. A central regional military command does not reflect this policy differentiation, and indeed it cuts across the concept. When the new command structure becomes public, the question will be not whether the policy and command problems are different, but whether the policy has changed. 3. In Terms of US Governmental Operations: In his memorandum of May 29, 1961/2/ the President made it clear that the Ambassador is to "oversee and coordinate all the activities of the US Government" in the country to which he is accredited. An exception was made in the case of "US forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a US area military commander." It is not clear whether General Harkins becomes a "US area military commander" responsible to another US area military commander (Admiral Felt). If so, some confusion arises as to the responsibility of the Ambassadors in Thailand and South Vietnam (and perhaps eventually in Laos); more importantly this could lead to a greater confusion in policy recommendations from the area, with the JCS claiming a direct line to the President. If not, General Harkins is put in a difficult position of being overseen and coordinated by two (or potentially three) US Ambassadors. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 271, footnote 5. 4. In Laos: Announcement of the command is likely to make it more difficult to persuade Phoumi that US military moves are directed toward making a political solution possible. Equally important, it would tend to reinforce his personal position within the RLG at a time when the US is preparing to reduce his political stature and even to seek his replacement. To Phoumi and others in the RLG the implied linking of US military operations in South Vietnam and Laos would bolster hopes of securing southern Laos. There is recent evidence that Phoumi has this thought the more in mind since the loss of northwestern Laos. It would also strengthen the force of his appeal ("we are fighting the same battle") for support from South Vietnam and South Korea. 5. In South Vietnam: Diem is not likely to feel overly sensitive to the broadening of General Harkins' authority beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and whatever deflation of Saigon's stature may be implied will be compensated by the vision it opens for Diem (as for Phoumi) of pinching off southern Laos. At the popular level, making the senior American military officer in South Vietnam the commander of Southeast Asia plays directly into Communist hands. The war in South Vietnam is a villagers' war. They are nationalistic and sensitive to the possible reimposition of a colonial regime--this time American. The Viet Cong works hard on this theme, and will now have additional rationale. 6. In Thailand: The Thais have little interest in the South Vietnamese situation but great interest in protecting their entire border with Laos. Phoumi may well seek to enlist their support in interesting the new USMACTHAI in pinching off southern Laos, but to the extent that they support this thought it will be without prejudice to their interest in protecting their northern borders. The end result could be an expansion of Thai expectations of US actions in their security interest. 7. In Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, Japan, India: At a minimum there is likely to be immediate and public questioning of US intentions. The bloc will do its best to manipulate the propaganda effects in these countries as adversely to US interest as possible. Sihanouk in particular is likely to be most upset by what to him will appear a hedging in of his country. Recommendation: In view of the non-military policy disadvantages we see to the present conception of a command structure in Southeast Asia, we suggest that a more appropriate structure (if military considerations are not overriding) might be based on the following principles: 1. There should be no connection apparent directly between USMACV and our command in Thailand or Joint Task Force 116. 2. The command in Thailand should not be a Military Assistance Command (which obviously parallels our set-up in a totally different situation in South Vietnam). 3. The deterrent buildup should be susceptible to ready dismantling once its purpose has been achieved. It will undoubtedly be difficult vis-à-vis the Thai Government, for example, to retrogress (as they will see it) from USMACTHAI to MAAG once the Southeast Asian buildup has served its hoped-for purpose with respect to Laos. If we really intend to create a long-term USMACTHAI, it should not be done by the back door. 4. Since there is no immediate threat to Thailand, the US forces sent to Southeast Asia in connection with Laos (even if introduced into Thailand) should be under command of (for example) JTF 116. This will tend to dramatize the temporary and limited purpose of their presence in the area.
190. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, May 12, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Laos. Top Secret. Transmitted to the Secretary of State through the Executive Secretariat. SUBJECT I believe the time has come to force a confrontation on the role of Hanoi in Southeast Asia and thus bring our Laos and South Vietnam policies clearly into line. The common stand has been, of course, that we are trying to force the return of North Vietnamese forces to their own borders; but this fact has been obscured in our diplomacy, our military posture towards Laos, and in the public consciousness. The fact is that the Nam Tha operation and the whole Communist operation in Laos has depended on North Vietnamese forces which are operating extra-legally. They evidently hope that we either fail to react now or react in such a way as to permit a de facto split which would have the effect of permitting North Vietnam (and probably Communist China) to take over Northern Laos, continue to chew away at a demoralized Southern Laos, and hold the corridor to South Vietnam. This is a bad and unstable outcome which, I would predict, will force us to put U.S. troops into Southeast Asia at a later and more disadvantageous time to protect vital U.S. interests. I would propose, therefore, that our next moves be designed to put the heat directly on Hanoi--in the context of both Laos and South Vietnam. Specifically-- 1. We should inform Moscow that we are counting on continued Soviet support for the Laos solution agreed between us at the highest level; i.e., a neutral, independent Laos. We have moved the politics of the RLG in this direction and are prepared to move them further. But the role of North Vietnam in Laos, in the context of the Nam Tha engagement, is unacceptable to us, as is the North Vietnam role in South Vietnam. 2. We should inform Hanoi by some reliable route that their role in both Northern Laos and South Vietnam is unacceptable to us; that we are prepared for a neutral and independent Laos and for a return to the Geneva Accords in South Vietnam; but that we shall have to take direct retaliatory action if they continue on their present path. 3. We should move carrier forces into the South China Sea south of the 17th parallel. 4. In addition to the possible movement of the U.S. battalion to the Laos border in Thailand and of naval forces into the Gulf of Siam, we should signal our seriousness of intent by: (i) a Jungle Jim attack on Tchepone: (ii) a small but overt Jungle Jim attack on a North Vietnamese rail line. (They have been systematically harassing the South Vietnamese railroads.) 5. We should ask the Australians to inform the Chinese Communists that if the situation in Laos deteriorates they will have to hold up their grain shipments. 6. This line of action is not only based on an assessment of vital U.S. interests but also on an estimate of Soviet, Chinese Communist, and North Vietnamese intentions and capabilities. Moscow. Soviet behavior suggests that they have agreed to let Hanoi and Peiping experiment with extended aggression in Laos; but there is no indication that they are prepared to let their prestige become involved or their freedom of action be determined by others in a U.S.-Hanoi or U.S.-Peiping military engagement. On the other hand, they have permitted to happen precisely what they promised they would not permit to happen; i.e., a Communist exploitation of our pressure on Phoumi. And this we should not take. Hanoi. Ho perceives that it may be possible that the U.S. will not react and thus permit a Communist takeover in Laos; but, in any case, he is clear a split would be better than a unified government involving North Vietnamese withdrawal and loss or degradation of the Tchepone corridor. He is persuaded by our actions thus far that he can pursue this game and the game in South Vietnam without endangering his North Vietnam base, since we have reacted to his extra-legal actions only inside Laos and inside the 17th parallel. But his domestic base is weak-weakened by another bad harvest. Peiping. By reason of its abiding ambitions in Southeast Asia and its desire to lead the Asian Communist movements, Peiping is backing Ho. Basically, however, the Chinese Communist domestic situation has never been so weak. By every indicator, popular morale is bad, people are hungry, industrial production is radically down, and they calculate that for the next years their dependence on Western grain will increase. We have, in fact, within the week two separate indications that we shall soon have a direct indication of Chinese Communist desire to buy U.S. wheat. It seems outlandish, but a first-class Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Hong Kong wrote a piece (which you should read) entitled "Peace for Food." It suggests that the Chinese Communists have encouraged Nam Tha in order to gain bargaining leverage with the U.S. for a Laos settlement versus a food deal. This is, of course, a long shot; but it is essential to look at the incredible state of the Chinese Communist domestic scene in making our assessment of the proper U.S. course of action. 7. The course I propose is based on the defense of vital U.S. interests, not on pious hopes. We should not undertake it unless we are prepared to back our play. But I believe that if we are bold enough, lucid enough in our communications, and make it clear that Hanoi cannot any longer safely be used as a Communist cats-paw without paying a direct price, we have a fair chance that we can foreshorten both the Laos and Vietnam crises. But down the line, quite conceivably, could be a China grain deal.
191. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, May 15, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 16-E.I, GVN 1962, Presidential Letters. Secret. Drafted by Heavner on May 14 and cleared with Cottrell, Manell, Rice, and Greenfield. Sent to Secretary Rusk through S/S and Under Secretary Johnson. On May 19, Walter Cutler of the Secretary's staff returned the package to Johnson with the following note: "Upon reviewing the attached memorandum the Secretary expressed strong doubt as to the advisability of sending the letter to Diem at this late date and having the President refer to it at a press conference. The Secretary would appreciate your reconsidering this matter in the light of his reservation." According to a notation at the bottom of Cutler's note, the memorandum was never sent to the President. SUBJECT /2/Document 137. At our suggestion, President Diem on March 31 addressed a letter to the Pope and to 92 heads of Free World states, including the United States, calling attention to the Communist attack on his country and requesting Free World moral support. This action is intended to reinforce the impact on world opinion of the Jorden report, "A Threat to the Peace",/3/ and the US-GVN Joint Communiqué of January 4./4/ /3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 315. /4/See Document 4. The effect of Diem's letter will be further strengthened if President Kennedy makes an appropriate response. (A good US response is also important for US-GVN relations because the Diem letter was sent at our suggestion.) It is recommended that the President send the attached suggested letter to President Diem (Tab B), and that he call attention to it at his next press conference. The President might also wish to take the opportunity to restate briefly at his press conference US determination to help the brave Vietnamese people defend themselves and our hope that other nations will do likewise. I recommend that you send the attached memorandum to the President. (Tab A)
[Attachment] Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President SUBJECT On March 31 President Diem, at our suggestion, sent a letter to the Pope and to 92 heads of Free World states calling attention to the Communist assault on his country and requesting Free World moral support. This action is intended to reinforce the impact on world opinion of our report and the U.S.-GVN Joint Communiqué of January 4. The effect of the letter would be strengthened by a public response from you. It is not intended to prompt a continuing dialogue between you and President Diem. We think it would be desirable for several replies from other heads of state to be received before yours. The United Kingdom and Cambodia have already replied. The Koreans have issued a formal statement of support. The Filipinos say they intend to reply soon, and we have urged the Thais to reply quickly. A suggested text for your reply to Diem is enclosed as a proposed telegram to Saigon. You may wish to call attention to Diem's letter and your response at your next press conference. You might also take this opportunity to observe that the Diem letter is a good statement of the threat not only to Viet-Nam, but to all Free Nations, that the U.S. remains determined to help the brave Vietnamese people defend themselves, and that we hope all Free World nations will contribute what they can to the defense of Viet-Nam. I recommend that you approve the enclosed telegram to Saigon and that you refer to the exchange of letters at your next press conference along the lines indicated above.
[Attachment] Draft Message From President Kennedy to President Diem/5/ /5/Drafted as a telegram to the Embassy in Vietnam. Your letter of March 31 places before the world the picture of a brave and determined people fighting to maintain their independence. You have again exposed Communist responsibility for the continued bloodshed and destruction in Viet-Nam by pointing to new and blatant evidence that it is directed from Hanoi. And you have asked that the nations of the Free World raise their voices in condemnation of this brutal attack. Your letter, addressed to chiefs of state and government, will serve the cause of freedom throughout the world by again alerting free men to the menace of Communist aggression. The world must mark well the daily heroism and sacrifices of your people--and the reasons for them. For our own part, we cannot express too strongly the indignation we feel when we consider the nature of the war against your people. Unable to compete in peace with your thriving nation, unable indeed even to feed adequately their own hungry people, yet determined to destroy what they cannot equal, the Communists in Hanoi have employed systematic terror against your whole population. The conscience of the world is deeply troubled by this savage and unnecessary war. The United States condemns in the strongest terms the authors of the violence in Viet-Nam. We hope that our voice, added to that of other Free Nations, may cause the Communists to pause. In the past we have repeatedly urged them to give up their designs for conquest in favor of peaceful plans for the betterment of all mankind. In particular, we have asked that they abandon their effort to conquer the Vietnamese nation. We again call upon them to cease their attacks on your people and on the Free World. But we cannot be content to appeal by words alone to the Communist authorities in Hanoi. Meanwhile, we have already increased our economic and military assistance to your nation, and we will continue that support in order that your courageous people may both build and protect what they are building. The Communists label as aggression the extraordinary efforts we are making to assist you and your own efforts of self-defense. If they want us to cease these extraordinary efforts they need only call off their own attacks upon you. The United States is not alone in its support, both moral and material, of your embattled country. Many other friendly countries are already contributing to your defense. It is our hope that additional Free World nations will also assist you in every way possible, realizing that to help another country preserve its independence is a way of protecting one's own independence--and the best way. We are confident of your ultimate success. The strength and the courage of your nation will prevail. Peace will be restored in Viet-Nam, and your people will again be free to build their own future in peace, in their own way and in their own great traditions. [Continue with the next documents]
Vietnam, 1962 Volume II Index | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |