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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, June 14, 1962, 8:42 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5-3062. Secret. Drafled by Heavner on June 11; cleared with Cottrell, Wood, Rice, Horgan, Hubbard, Chayes, and Czyzak; and approved for transmission by Harriman. Repeated to New Delhi, Ottawa London, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for Polad. 1447. Embtel 1536. New Delhi's 3795./2/ On balance after study pros and cons notification problem Dept concludes best continue present policy non-notification. Resumption notification would involve self-conviction, propaganda windfall for Commies, loss of advantage inherent in keeping Bloc in dark as to exact scope and direction our efforts, plus damage to military security. /2/Dated May 30 and 26, neither printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/5-3062 and 7516.00/ 5-2662, respectively) At same time believe we must seek means avoiding mounting ICC citations of GVN without corresponding citations DRV. After ICC report out and impact observed we intend confer with GVN and GOC on approach to Indians in effort persuade Indians (1) cease citations altogether and pass buck to Co-Chairmen as outlined Deptels 1326 and 1361,/3/ or (2) agree that future citations GVN must be balanced by roughly equal number citations DRV. /3/Neither printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/5-462 and 751G.00/5-1862, respectively) Line with Indians should be based on cause and effect nature VN situation and stress our desire restore force Geneva Accords and authority ICC. Might begin by pointing out continued citation GVN for violations which in fact caused by DRV aggression manifestly unfair. Such citations only likely encourage DRV continue its attack and may discredit ICC itself. After indicating our desire maintain force GA, suggest to Indians that two alternatives occur to us which we would like them consider. First possibility is for ICC to view subsequent GVN actions of the same character as violations of a continuing nature and for ICC to inform Co-Chairman periodically e.g. annually under Article 43 of the Agreement that parties failing put into effect ICC recommendations, and that violations previously reported continue. In this regard point out that there nothing in the Agreement that requires ICC to make citations re each separate incident that occurs. Thus under Agreement ICC is free to decide not to cite GVN for each incident if it considers above procedure most appropriate in particular circumstances. Second possibility is to balance citations GVN by citations DRV. If citations DRV infiltration and subversion too few ICC could insist on controls at times places its choosing in NVN and cite DRV for non-cooperation if refused. Do not agree we should attempt suggest to USSR that failure to call off DRV may result larger war. We have been careful to indicate we not threatening DRV and would not wish contradict this defensive stance at this time. Rusk
218. Memorandum From Senator Mansfield's Legislative Assistant (Valeo) to Senator Mansfield/1/ Washington, June 15, 1962. /1/Source: University of Montana Library, Mansfield Papers, Box 105, Folder 19. Unclassified. SUBJECT I met with the Vietnamese Ambassador, Tran Van Chuong, from 9:00 p.m. until 12:30 a.m. on June 14, 1962. The conversation covered a great range of matters; much of it was confused and disjointed. However, there emerged from it several principal ideas which he apparently wanted to communicate to Senator Mansfield without doing so directly himself. (1) That the Diem government is in very deep trouble and has little prospects for survival. The principal faults, as he saw it, are those which have been indicated in the press from time to time, such as the family control, Diem's obliviousness to the realities around him, his mandarin tendencies which discourage any but relatives and "secretaries" from working for him. He made no criticism of Diem as a man, of his patriotism and his dedication, but it was clear that he felt these were insufficient attributes to deal with the present situation. He did not say so in so many words, but there was implicit in his remarks, a belief that a coup was imminent. (2) He was trying, I believe, to find out through me what Senator Mansfield's position would be in the event of such a coup. He had a very clear recollection of what he believed to be a decisive statement at the time Diem first came to power. He made reference to the fact that Senator Mansfield had said at that time that it was either Diem or no foreign aid and he knew that this was what had persuaded both Bao Dai and the French to bow out. He was exploring to see what would happen at this time in the event that Diem was threatened with imminent overthrow. Would it mean that Senator Mansfield again would say, in effect, Diem or no foreign aid? I told him that I did not know what Senator Mansfield would say but that he would very likely support President Kennedy who had to make the critical decisions. (3) As regards the speech,/2/ he understood the factors which had given rise to it, both those at home and those in Viet Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. But he feared for its effect on foreign aid appropriations. I told him that Senator Mansfield was, as far as I could see, trying to deal only with the realities in the situation, recognizing the difficulties in Southeast Asia as well as our own limitations, but that Senator Mansfield had given and would undoubtedly continue to give full support to whatever the President decided. /2/Reference is presumably to the commencement speech that Mansfield presented at Michigan State University, June 10. See Document 214, footnote 4. (4) He apparently expects the coup to come from a combination of the military and the presently dispossessed intellectuals, including those whose political backgrounds, like his own, predate Diem. He does not expect this to be a democratic uprising. On the contrary, he was highly critical of the fact that Diem had established the forms of democracy in Viet Nam, forms which he felt were unsuited to the situation and which led to irresponsibility. In other words, what he anticipates and, I am quite certain that what he is inclined to support, is something on the Korean pattern in the hopes that such a regime can more effectively administer the nation and use aid more pointedly. He was, to some extent, also critical of the past administration of aid in Viet Nam. This he attributed both to the inadequacies of some of our people and to the type of Vietnamese administration which had evolved under Diem. The successor group which he anticipates, presumably, would be far more militant in its military policies than Diem. He spoke even of the possibilities of moving into Laos militarily if not into North Viet Nam by hit-and-run tactics. (5) He is afraid of the Laotian solution for a somewhat ironic reason. He is afraid that the Communists will make it work. He believes they may do so as a preliminary for what would be a diplomatic offensive to bring about neutralism in South Viet Nam. These steps he believes are part of a plan for the conquest of Southeast Asia by the Communists without force. He expressed fears at the present tendencies in American policy. While understanding the political limitations on actions, he raised questions about where this course would eventually lead, insisting that if we continued in the Laotian pattern we might in time have no alternative but a nuclear war. He dated the development of this approach from the time MacArthur was prevented from bombing behind the Yalu. He obviously would like to see a much more militant policy. He mentioned the possible use of Chiang Kai-shek against the mainland, the use of Thai forces as well as the previously noted references to Vietnamese forces in Laos. He expressed the hope at the end of the conversation, once again, as he had done several times during the talk, that Senator Mansfield would not despair of the situation in Viet Nam and that he would recognize that there are good and able people and a considerable amount of leadership ability not now being used. This, again, I took to be a reference to the imminent possibilities of a coup against Diem.
219. Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting/1/ Washington, June 15, 1962, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, State-JCS Minutes. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that this record was a Department of State draft, not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held in the Pentagon. A memorandum from Guthrie (S/SS) to Brubeck (S/S), June 15, indicates that the briefing material on U.S. policy in the event of loss of Diem's leadership was included only in Johnson's briefing book (not found) in view of its "sensitivity." (Ibid., State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328) [Here follows a list of participants including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. Alexis Johnson heading the Department of State delegation, Henry R. Rowen for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and General Carter representing the CIA.] I. Viet Nam Admiral Anderson indicated that the JCS would appreciate Mr. Johnson's thoughts on what course of action we would follow if Diem should pass from the scene. Mr. Johnson replied that last fall certain general guidance on the subject was passed to Ambassador Nolting./2/ The thrust of this guidance is the provision of a high degree of flexibility and authority to the Ambassador as the man on the spot. He has a wide measure of discretion in determining who the most likely successor will and should be. His guidance, which has just been reviewed with him indicates that the most likely candidates for the present are Tho and Thuan. We recognize that the military would probably constitute the base of power for any successor regime. However, we have indicated that if at all possible a new regime should be given a civilian complexion with emphasis on the constitutional aspects. Diem's departure from the scene would place a great strain on our entire mission in Saigon and one man (the Ambassador) must be free to call the shots as he sees them. /2/See the enclosure to the letter from McConaughy to Nolting in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 181. Admiral Anderson asked if Tho would be the constitutional successor in the event of the death of Diem, and Mr. Johnson replied in the affirmative indicating that Tho was acceptable to us. Mr. Wood said that Tho and Thuan were in jail together under the French and are very close personally. We would have a satisfactory situation with Tho as the civilian head of government supported by big Minh heading the military element. We would like to use people presently in the government and avoid the use of local people who are not now active in the government. We do not wish to have the government taken over by politicians who are presently in exile because they are out of touch with the local situation and would compound the problems involved in a change of leadership. We would have to move rapidly if we are to avoid a Communist takeover, and we do not need a quarterback in Washington. The Ambassador has proper guidance and full authority to carry it out. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, June 15, 1962, 8:29 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0051K/6-1462. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to CINCPAC for Polad. Drafted by Stoneman, and cleared with Peterson and with AID, DOD, Treasury, and BOB. 1454. Task Force/VN. (a) Embtel 1605; (b) Toaid 1192./2/ /2/Telegram 1605 is printed as Document 216. Toaid 1192 has not been found. 1. Following approvals of your requests are given herewith in view of political, psychological and security considerations outlined ref. (a), particularly urgency of security situation and undue GVN preoccupation with fiscal and foreign exchange problems to detriment Counter-Insurgency efforts: (a) Issuance of up to $10 million individually coded Counter-Insurgency procurement authorizations (PA/PRs) with elimination multi-code concept for FY 62. Multi-code concept permissible during FY 63. (b) Approval in principle of $10 million purchase of piasters at mean rate of $73.50 (see para 2 below). (c) Delegation to US AID Director of authority to waive limited worldwide procurement and certain AID Reg I requirements as they apply to up to $8 million Counter-Insurgency procurement authorizations. (d) Delegation to US AID Director authority to waive limited worldwide procurement for up to $12 million commercial imports industrial machinery. 2. Piasters purchased in FY 62 for deposit US account must be committed for specific purposes in FY 62 or they will not be available for use in FY 63 without reappropriation due Sec. 1415 Supplemental Approp. Act. of 1953./3/ Best course of action appears postponement actual obligation to FY 63. To extent a specific requirement exists for obligation of piasters in remainder FY 62, this amount can be purchased prior June 30. During negotiations you should make clear that above arrangements do not set precedent for any future cash grants to solve piaster budget problem. /3/P.L. 547, July 15, 1952 (66 Stat 637). 3. You should make clear that waiver of limited worldwide procurement under paras. (c) and (d) are only possible because of present emergency and should in no sense be considered as precedent for future. 4. Details of conditions of waivers and certain negotiating and programming instructions follow in separate cable./4/ Withhold negotiations until receipt. /4/Document 225. Rusk
221. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, June 18, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 350. Counterinsurgency Plan. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official-Informal. Dear Fitz: At Cot's suggestion I spoke June 16th to the Counterinsurgency Group on my trip to Viet-Nam./2/ The CIG is chaired by General Taylor and is usually attended at the Undersecretary level by the Departments concerned. /2/No record of the June 16 meeting has been found. I stressed: 1. That the question of deciding whether the GVN was moving too fast in creating Strategic Hamlets was one which depended on many local variables and that the decisions should be made in Saigon. However, we could help the GVN move faster by supplying more piasters for locally obtainable products and services. The members of the Group appeared to agree. 2. That we would ask you to consider whether it would be feasible to make more bulldozers and dredges available (from those already in Viet-Nam) to speed the work of'6uilding ditches and walls around Strategic Hamlets. 3. I mentioned various items of military equipment which American and Vietnamese officers at the province level had particularly requested, emphasizing that I was not qualified to pass any judgments. The items were more grenade launchers (to lob grenades over the walls of rice paddies), more armalite rifles, more helicopters (requested by the Vietnamese), and more Caribou aircraft. General Taylor said that he believed more Caribou are available in Thailand and asked that the matter be explored. . . . . . . . Today, Joe Alsop gave a lunch for Colonel Thao which Cot, Mike Forrestal and I attended. Thao stressed the following points to Alsop and so I suppose more will be heard of these suggestions in Washington: Thao is convinced that if the situation in Laos weakens further and the route through Attopeau into Kontum becomes more easily accessible to the Viet Cong, it must be expected that they will bring in increased numbers of mortars and recoilless artillery. Based on his own experiences in the Indochina War, he also felt that it was relatively easy for the Viet Cong to bring in a few hundred technicians to manufacture mortars, recoilless artillery, and projectiles in South Viet-Nam. Thao believes that the United States must therefore face the necessity of promptly making a further major increase in its efforts to assist the Vietnamese. He is convinced that this further effort should be concentrated on (a) artillery for the Vietnamese forces and more artillery training for Vietnamese officers in the United States; (b) a change in the employment of our helicopters, and an increase in their total numbers so that these would be available in larger numbers rather than used in small groups throughout the country; (c) a major increase in the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps without a corresponding increase in ARVN. After the lunch Thao told me that in his private opinion it would be very useful to invite Nhu to this country for a relatively quiet two weeks, primarily for informal, high-level consultations in Washington. He is concerned by Nhu's well-known anti-Americanism, by his thought processes which frequently parallel the Communists', and particularly by the fact that, in Thao's opinion, Nhu thinks in terms of the type of tactics which the Communists employed a decade ago. He commented that Communist tactics had improved since then, but Nhu's had not. Thao emphasized frequently how much he, Thao, was impressed by the differences between the American and Vietnamese governments. He believes firmly that such a visit would be most useful in changing Nhu's views./3/ /3/In the margin next to this paragraph Nolting wrote: "I think Nhu should not go now (even if he wanted to) during present stage S.H. [Strategic Hamlet] program. FEN". If you think it would be useful to pursue any of the above, let us know by whatever channels seem best and we will get to work. Yours very sincerely, Ben
222. Editorial Note On June 18, 1962, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hilsman transmitted RFE-27 to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Harriman. This was a progress report summarizing the major goals and accomplishments of the counter-insurgency program in South Vietnam. For text of this memorandum, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pages 469-480.
223. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President/1/ Washington, June 20, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. SUBJECT Background For the past month Ambassador Nolting, General Harkins, and the rest of the country team in South Vietnam have been pressing very hard for a rapid increase in the amount of local currency (piasters) available for counterinsurgency activities in South Vietnam. Diem's people have complained that, owing to a 4.8 billion piaster estimated budget deficit this year (U.S. estimate: 3 to 4 billion), decline in tax revenues, and the failure of the Vietnamese economy to absorb sufficient high cost American imports, there is a shortage of local currency. They also point out that their gold reserves have slipped from $200 million plus to $164 million. Due to this situation the Diem regime asked for a $25-million cash grant and an across-the-board waiver of all "Buy American" restrictions. The Defense Department and Secretary McNamara have argued strongly that local funds for counterinsurgency must be provided quickly, directly to the field and preferably under U.S. control. Secretary McNamara feels that this is of the highest importance, since it affects particularly those military programs which are vital at this time, i.e. aid to the Montagnards who defect from the Viet Cong and the strategic village and related programs. The Aid Agency on purely economic grounds questioned the advisability of providing cash grants to Diem at this time, pointing out that the better way to generate local currency was to have the Diem Government borrow from the central bank, i.e. print money. The State Department, while sympathetic to the Aid Agency position, came to the conclusion that the military urgency was so great and the political resistance of the Diem Government to deficit financing was so strong, that the following compromise on a one-shot basis offered the best solution 1. An offer to Diem of a cash grant of $10 million in return for which Diem will deposit piasters at a rate of approximately 73 to the dollar in an account which will be available to the United States for counterinsurgency purposes in Vietnam. (This, I gather, would be a direct charge on our balance of payments.) 2. The waiver of the "Buy American" restrictions with respect to $8 million of funds already obligated but not yet used to finance the importation of items useful in the counterinsurgency campaign (i.e. fertilizers, barbed wire, etc.) which would generate an equivalent amount of local currency, also to be used by the U.S. 3. The waiver of "Buy American" restrictions on $12 million of industrial imports to bolster the general economy of South Vietnam. This is new money and together with the funds referred to in (2) above would also constitute a charge against our balance of payments to the extent that imports were made from countries other than the United States. The maximum potential gold drain is thus on the order of $30 million. Action Taken So Far There has been an exchange of cables with Nolting which has resulted in Nolting's having been given authority generally to negotiate within the above three actions. Negotiations are not to start, however, until the State Department has sent further details on certain technical points. I have asked that these negotiations be held up pending your review. Comment This problem boils down essentially to a political decision. I am told that the Diem regime is adamant in their refusal to finance the local currency requirements of counterinsurgency operation by increasing their budgetary deficit. This appears to be the only other quick way of generating the piasters without the United States simply purchasing them for dollars. If we refuse a cash grant and refuse to waive the "Buy American" restrictions, I am told that Diem would not finance the counterinsurgency programs. This is blackmail, and I am personally convinced that our objective should be to force Diem to increase his economy's contribution to the war effort by increased taxes and deficit financing if that is necessary. Not only are cash grants from us a charge on our balance of payments, but, perhaps even more importantly, they may encourage socially undesirable activities in war time, such as the importation of some luxuries and possibly the flight of capital. Despite feeling this way, I did approve the sending of a telegram to Nolting authorizing him to begin negotiations on the above described program./2/ I was mainly moved by the need at this time for speed as expressed by the military. It seemed that this was perhaps not the best time to force the political issue. Since no steps have been taken, the decision can be modified or reversed; and even if you approve the currency proposal, you can and, I hope would direct the Departments and the country team to raise the whole issue of deficit financing with Diem in the strongest possible terms, so that the question of cash grants and waivers will not come up again. This should be done simultaneously with the current negotiations. /2/Presumably a reference to Document 212. Specifically, I would recommend that you first discuss the general political and financial problems of South Vietnam with Secretary McNamara in order to ascertain how strongly he feels about the necessity of swallowing this bitter pill now. If you are convinced of the military and immediate political necessity to go ahead, then you might approve the program described above with an injunction to the Departments concerned and to the field to tell Diem that we are simply not prepared to continue our support of their war unless he does his share. The United States has been forced into deficit financing and a drain on its gold reserves in order to meet its commitments throughout the free world. The least we can expect is for those Governments whom we help to take their fair share of the burden. One last point on the balance of payments and the waiver of "Buy American" restrictions. I have asked why it is not possible for the American commodities whose importation to South Vietnam we finance to be sold locally at lower prices, thus avoiding having to buy them from other countries. I have not got a satisfactory explanation of why this isn't possible, and would hope you would approve my telling State that this should be done unless Nolting can give a convincing explanation why not. This would save up to $12 million of the $30 million charge against the balance of payments. It would also be an additional cost to the U.S. internal budget.
224. Editorial Note According to a letter of June 21, 1962, from Ball to McNamara, Lemnitzer, Taylor, McCone, Murrow, and Hamilton, Secretary of State Rusk on that day issued an Action directive establishing a Task Force on Southeast Asia. This group, chaired by Assistant Secretary Harriman, supplanted the Vietnam Task Force, which now became the Vietnam Working Group under C. Ben Wood as Executive Director. It was one of two components of the Southeast Asia Task Force. The other was a Cambodia-Thailand-Laos-Burma Working Group under H.L.T. Koren as Executive Director. Besides Harriman, the Task Force included Sterling Cottrell as Deputy Chairman and representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency. (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field: Far East (IAF), 1962) According to a memorandum of June 21 from Brubeck to Harriman, the functions of the Southeast Asia Task Force were: 1. To plan programs for the area and for individual countries within the area; 2. To coordinate execution of the programs; 3. To develop policy recommendations for the area; 4. To keep the Special Group (CI) informed of all activities related to its sphere of jurisdiction. (Department of State, S/S Policy Briefing Books: Lot 66 D 219, Box 219)
225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, June 21, 1962, 4:46 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.0051K/6-1962. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Furst, Silver, and Cottrell, and cleared with Peterson (State), Pelikan (Treasury), Furst (AID), Heinz (DOD), and Forrestal (White House). Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1474. Embtel 1626./2/ /2/Dated June 19, it pointed out that a contradiction existed between the procurement policy waiver granted by telegram 1454 (Document 220) and a subsequent AID message that severely limited the waiver in practice and requested clarification before beginning negotiations with the Government of Vietnam. 1. Because blanket waivers of limited worldwide procurement policy represent serious departure from our basic policy to improve US balance of payments and because of internal political problems, now becomes necessary to withdraw authority to import on worldwide basis up to $12 million worth of industrial machinery (Deptel 1454)./3/ In addition waiver for industrial machinery would weaken our hand in arranging DAC countries assistance in program loans to Viet-Nam. Subject will be pressed by us in early meeting with participating countries. We hope to get European countries and Japan to finance many of these items. /3/Document 220. 2. We fully cognizant your efforts stimulate accelerated action counterinsurgency and assuage GVN preoccupation with dangers of deficit financing. 3. From US standpoint, our immediate objectives would be satisfied if agreement reached on (a) counterinsurgency PA procedure and (b) $10 million piastre purchase proposal. These two elements would take certain measure counterinsurgency funding out of competition other funding requirements and give it special status as to priority and normal procedures. It would also provide more effective mechanism. 4. GVN must face up to deficit problem; US not prepared grant waivers en bloc or make further cash grants in face pressing US and international considerations. $10 million piastre purchase plus US military purchases in VN will result in significant increase previously unanticipated free dollars. 5. Would not object proposals for shifting to commercial import program additional acceptable items. This would permit GVN financing of imports from Europe and Japan with GVN foreign exchange. 6. We prepared give sympathetic consideration other means you may deem useful in overcoming GVN concern its budgetary problem. Food for troops might offer possibility. 7. We are willing to maintain in force at reduced level the waiver granted for counterinsurgency imports on the understanding that the waiver will be utilized only in rare cases where the time factor does not allow timely delivery or when goods not available from an eligible source. Request prompt arrangements be made to plan requirements sufficiently in advance so that utilization this waiver authority will be extremely rare ($3 million maximum suggested). 8. If there is a priority requirement for commodities to be financed in commercial import program which cannot be obtained from a limited worldwide source, we would require more details concerning the type of commodities required and the extent to which alternate sources of financing have been explored to allow AID/W to consider waivers on a case by case basis. Note this connection that we have recently granted waiver for $4-1/2 million for spare parts but only for non-US machinery and for machinery which cannot be obtained in US. Ball
226. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 25, 1962, 7 p. m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/6-2562. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1659. Dr Gordon Smith, American medical missionary from Danang, visited me June 22. Dr. Smith has lived and worked in Viet Nam for some thirty years, mainly among the Montagnard population in central Viet Nam. In summary, main points which Dr Smith made were: 1. Military situation and aggressiveness of GVN military and paramilitary forces have greatly improved during past six months. He thought that without increased US assistance last winter, Viet Cong would by now have taken over SVN. He was especially complimentary of work of Special Forces Units. 2. Nevertheless, popular support for GVN continued to decrease alarmingly in central coastal provinces (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen) where Dr Smith has wide first-hand knowledge of conditions. He attributed this to belief by people of Communist allegations against Diem and his family and government; to lack of GVN contact with people; and to lack of efficiency in GVN's execution of plans for benefit of people. He said that most of his own converts. both Vietnamese and Montagnards, several now themselves Christian missionaries, were bitterly anti-government and thus inclined to believe promises of Viet Cong that liberation Front would be better than present government. 3. He then said that it was his strong impression that American military influence in central Viet Nam was pressing Vietnamese military in direction of a military coup d'etat against the GVN. I questioned him very closely on this. He said that many US military advisors of his own acquaintance, whose work in military field he greatly admired, had said repeatedly in presence Vietnamese officers that anti-guerrilla war was being waged in the teeth of a predominantly hostile population, made so by the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the GVN; and that on this basis military campaigns were bound to be unsuccessful or ineffective. He said that this was almost the universal theme of American military officers in his area. He said that Vietnamese military officers, who generally inclined to this view themselves, took the American officers' remarks to mean US military advocacy of an ARVN military coup d'etat. Dr Smith said that he himself thought that military rule would be more effective and more popular than that of the present regime. I told Dr Smith, that if his observations were correct, this was a most serious matter. I explained to him US policy of support to SVN through the constitutionally elected government, and the reasons therefore. I also mentioned certain plans, agreements, programs, and some progress in improving the performance of the GV~ on the civil side. (Comment: Dr Smith's observations, which were sincerely given and apparently without any ulterior motive, may indeed account for some of the hesitancy and suspicion on part of GVN, more noticeable in recent weeks.) Dr Smith also discussed at length the Montagnard problem. He believes that only through generous government measures to feed, house, clothe, and eventually resettle the mountain people who have come into GVN controlled territory, can others be induced to escape from Viet Cong control. He also expressed view that tribes people had very little, if any, political convictions and would go along with the side which seemed the stronger. On the whole, Dr Smith's views on the situation in central coastal provinces were discouraging. Since he intends to continue his work in Viet Nam, and is even now seeking a grant of land from GVN to establish a leper hospital near Danang, it is very important that his views as summarized above be closely protected. I have discussed para 3 above with Gen. Harkins who is planning a trip to area involved and will take appropriate measures. Nolting
227. Memorandum From the Special Consultant for Counterinsurgency, United States Operation Mission (Phillips) to the Acting Director of the Mission (Fippin)/1/ Saigon, June 25, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 350.Counterinsurgency Plan. Secret. Copies were sent to the Ambassador; the Deputy Chief of Mission; Chief, MAAG; Chief, MACV; and Chief, OSA. SUBJECT 1. Mr. Nhu said that although he had originated the strategic hamlet program, it was only an idea, a "pipe-dream", to him until the last four months. Since that time he has been making constant trips to the provinces, particularly to the south. During his more recent trips, all ceremonies were eliminated and he insisted on only single course meals. Most of his time was consumed by visits to hamlets and meetings with strategic hamlet teams, hamlet chiefs, province chiefs, district chiefs and committees. These discussions often lasted as long as five hours. He found the trips very tiring but at the same time exhilarating because he had been able to test out his theories about strategic hamlets through actual experience. 2. He viewed the strategic hamlets as a means to defeat communism while, at the same fume, overcoming the problems of an underdeveloped country. These problems, in addition to communism, were separatism among various groups of the population and inherited systems of privileges. He said the imposition of democracy at the top in an under-developed country brought anarchy which resulted in dictatorship. Democracy must be instituted at a level where the people can understand it and where it can be a revolution to eliminate the existing system of privileges and the defeatism and separatism which exists in the minds of the people. 3. In time of war people think you must suppress democracy to win. To the contrary, he said, we shall use the war against communism as a means to introduce democracy and we shall use democracy to win the war. This is the strategic concept. 4. Free elections of the hamlet chief and hamlet council are the key to success of the strategic hamlets. The first thing Nhu asks when he visits a hamlet and talks to the hamlet council is how were the elections conducted. He tells the district committees (for strategic hamlets) that hamlet governments elected by a show of hands are only provisional. If they are not sure of a hamlet, they may have an initial provisional electron through a show of hands. However, they must have an electron by secret ballot before the strategic hamlet (civic action) team goes on to another hamlet and before the hamlet can receive a charter (which Nhu describes as a social contract between the province and the hamlet). He tells the cadres working in the hamlet that they must not tell the people who to vote for; otherwise the election defeats its own purpose. If the cadres want a particular person to be elected, that person must prove himself to the people by working harder than the others. If he deserves to be elected, he will be elected. 5. In answer to a question whether he did not think the Government should attract the Viet Cong to surrender, he said that this was very necessary. He said he had indications that the strategic hamlets were demoralizing the Viet Cong. He felt that the Government should urge them to surrender and rejoin their families. Special fortified or combat hamlets might be established with these families as volunteers to fight the Viet Cong. 6. Mr. Nhu said he was not satisfied with the concept of the defended hamlet as it had been applied so far in Vietnam. He did not believe that uprooting people was the best answer--it resulted in too many problem and was too expensive. He had discussed a new idea with the strategic hamlet committee during its meeting Friday morning. He wants to induce young families to volunteer to establish defended hamlets; then attract people to these hamlets from the Viet Cong areas. These new hamlets would be similar to the Israeli Kibutzes. Each defended hamlet would have several commando groups similar to those in operation now on the high plateau, which would ensure security outside the fortified hamlet. 7. Mr. Nhu felt that the two major weapons which could be used to win the war were the strategic hamlets and the commandos. He wanted each hamlet or at least every village to have a commando team which would operate as guerrillas, in similar fashion to Viet Cong tactics. He was very impressed with the Montagnard teams he had seen on the high plateau recently. This, he felt, was the answer to carrying the offensive to the Communists. He believed that harassment by the commandos would force the Viet Cong to group for protection, and when this happened the Army could strike with its mobile forces carried by helicopters. 8. He said he had asked some of the men being trained by our Special Forces what they thought of the Americans and got back the reply that they weren't like the French at all but were their friends, ate their food and worked alongside them. Mr. Nhu felt there should be more Americans like this in the countryside. 9. Finally, he felt that placing the divisional commanders in charge of the strategic hamlet program in their tactical zones would be very helpful. The Army could thus give the additional support to the program to make it succeed. Comment From experience gained in other countries, particularly in the Philippines, the most urgent need in defeating a Communist guerrilla movement is a firm political base among the people. With most of the Vietnamese village people neutral in the present struggle, such a base does not yet exist in Vietnam. The strategic hamlet program, as Mr. Nhu conceives of it, presents an excellent chance to build a political base of popular support at the hamlet level. The danger is that the hamlet elections, which are the key to the success of the program, may not be genuine. The central problem is that many Vietnamese lack experience and confidence in democratic procedures. It is easier for them to tell their people what to do. And they are fearful of making a mistake, particularly of ever electing a Viet Cong. My superficial observation after inspection trips to Phu Yen and Tay Ninh provinces and considerable talk with local officials is that too many strategic hamlet teams are forcing these elections, even though they told me that all elections were now being held by secret ballot. Without offending the Vietnamese, we can do much to lend them moral as well as material support in the strategic hamlet effort. My impression is that they are in an experimental frame of mind. Most of them know that they must in the final analysis, win the enthusiastic support of the villagers if the Communists are to be defeated. However, they tend to become preoccupied with the control or repressive aspects of the program. We must help them learn how to generate and keep alive the enthusiasm of their own people, knowing that without strong popular support no amount of men or material will win this war.
228. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Counselor for Political Affairs in Vietnam (Mendenhall) and the Chinese Ambassador in Vietnam (Yuen Tse Kien)/1/ Saigon, June 26, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-016-69. Secret; Limited Distribution. This memorandum and Document 229 were transmitted to General Taylor in the White House by Rostow on July 31. Covering the two memoranda of conversation was an intra-office transmittal slip from Taylor's office with the following message: "These memoranda deserve special note. I have marked key parts, but suggest all are worth reading. Major point made is need to accelerate CI effort and more liberal social-economic actions are mandatory. Time is of essence because of growing sentiment for neutral solution. Perhaps latter point is means to press Diem?" Also sent to Nolting, Truehart, Richardson, Harkins, Weede, the Vietnam Working Group in Washington, INR, and the Embassy in Taipei. SUBJECT (Note: During a farewell call on the Chinese Ambassador he decided to engage in a very frank exchange on the situation in Viet-Nam. At the conclusion, he expressed the desire that his views not be repeated to others. Therefore, this memorandum should be regarded as containing very sensitive information and recipients are requested not to give it any further distribution.) In an exchange assessing the strategic hamlets program the Chinese Ambassador expressed serious concern that GVN Minister of Interior, Bui Van Luong, in his recent speech on the program before the Lions Club, placed economic and social development of the hamlets in the fourth phase of the program. The Ambassador repeatedly emphasized that economic and social works to improve the lot of the peasants should be in the very first phase because they are essential for winning the people to the support of the Government. He said the Vietnamese are a good people, but they have been buffeted and forced to work for both sides in conflicts for 17 years since 1945. Now that they are being asked once again by the GVN to provide work and make other sacrifices in connection with the strategic hamlets program, they must be given some compensation for what they are being asked to do. If it is not demonstrated to them that they are going to get something in the way of concrete benefits out of this program, the risk is great that the strategic hamlets program will drive them over to the enemy. The Ambassador then said that it did not actually take much to gain the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasants because they now have so little. He mentioned the usual type of benefit which we have been urging on the GVN, such as agricultural credits, schools, dispensaries and agricultural tools, and also mentioned that he thought a little cement to enable the peasants to pave the floors of their huts and thus keep them dry underneath would be an extremely useful means of attracting support. He indicated that it is up to us Americans to find the means of inducing the GVN to undertake an adequate economic and social program. He suggested the advisability of avoiding any approach based on politics or principles, since either would ruffle GVN feathers, and thought perhaps the best means might be simply to go to the GVN and state that we have the money for such a program and let's get started with one in specific places. The Ambassador stated that President Diem is a fine man but he thinks only in black and white without any shades or nuances. The Ambassador said he had talked with Vice President Tho about the reported number of around 25,000 Viet-Cong, and indicated that many of these are Hoa Hao and Cao Dai rather than Viet-Cong. He said the Vice President had agreed with this analysis as well as with the Ambassador's view that it would be desirable to win over by compromise the non-VC fighting against the Government and thus reduce the proportions of the guerrilla problem to those who are actually Communists. Since President Diem, however, sees things only in black and white he refuses to make the compromise necessary for this purpose. The Ambassador also indicated the, the President puts too much emphasis on the "moral side." The President is stressing constantly what he expects the people to do on behalf of the nation, but he should be outlining to the peasants what the Government is going to do to better their condition. The Ambassador concluded sorrowfully, however, that President Diem's nature cannot be changed and therefore effort must be made to find other means to meet these problems. He reverted to his suggestion about the need for U.S. efforts to sponsor economic and social development in the hamlets. He indicated that he himself cannot influence the GVN directly because he is obliged to talk very circuitously with most GVN officials. (This may have been an oblique reference by the Ambassador to the pressures which can be placed by the GVN on the Chinese community in Viet-Nam unless the Chinese Ambassador treads carefully.) The Chinese Ambassador emphasized that the war in Viet-Nam should not be permitted to drag on too long. Already, he said, some Vietnamese are beginning to think in terms of neutralization of Viet-Nam. They ask that if it can be done in Laos, why not in Viet-Nam? When I questioned him more closely on this, the Ambassador said he has heard this view particularly from representatives of the old scholar class and not thus far from those who are politically active. He indicated that in his view, however, these thoughts of neutralization would spread as people became weary of the continual killing. I asked the Ambassador whether those who are talking about neutralization are thinking just in terms of the South or all of Viet-Nam. He said that most of them are thinking of neutralization initially of the South with the thought that Viet-Nam might eventually be reunified over the longer term. A few are thinking in terms of early neutralization of both parts of Viet-Nam. Comment: I was struck that for the first time during my three years' service in Viet-Nam I had received serious indication that neutralization is beginning to be considered by some Vietnamese as a solution to the Vietnamese problem. It was even more striking that this indication came in two conversations, one immediately after the other on the same day, with Vice President Tho and the Chinese Ambassador.
229. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Counselor for Political Affairs in Vietnam (Mendenhall) and Vice President Tho/1/ Saigon, June 26, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-016-69. Secret; Limited Distribution. See footnote 1, Document 228, concerning routing of this memorandum. Also sent to Nolting, Trueheart, Richardson, Harkins, Weede, the Vietnam Working Group in Washington, and INR. SUBJECT (Note: During my farewell call on the Vice President he promptly suggested we drop our official capacities and frankly discuss the Vietnamese situation as man to man. It is therefore requested that the recipients of this memorandum regard it as containing very sensitive information and make no further distribution of it.) After discussing the morale and the military situation at the Vice President's request, I stated that I thought that the strategic hamlet concept represented a fine idea but I had rather deep reservations over the way in which it is being executed. The Vice President immediately expressed complete agreement and stressed the importance of executing this program in a manner which will not alienate the peasants. He stated several times that it is absolutely necessary that the peasants be paid for the work which they are doing on the strategic hamlets and took the position that this is indispensable if they are to be won over to the Government. He said they cannot be asked to make further sacrifices without payment. He noted that he is receiving many complaints, both oral and written, from people in the rural areas about the way the strategic hamlet program is being executed. He referred to the recent ambush attack on a military convoy 1-1/2 miles from Ben Cat in which two U.S. officer advisors were killed and pointed to this as an instance where the people in the area could have given the Government forces advance warning, but did not because they had not been won over. I said it is important to establish priorities for the construction of strategic hamlets and indicated that we are emphasizing this constantly at the various layers of the GVN. The Vice President agreed stating that there are insufficient military forces, civilian cadres, money, etc., to try to do too many strategic hamlets at once. It is far better to carry out the program slowly but surely than to try to push it to a hasty conclusion. In the end time would have been saved by the former method. I stated that establishing priorities requires a rational organization. on the part of the Government. Again, the Vice President agreed but added with emphasis and repeated it several times, a rational organization without interference. He referred to the fact that about a year ago he was offered the post of Coordinating Secretary of State for Security and said that he had refused it precisely because he knew he would not be permitted to do the job without interference by others in the GVN. We both agreed that we do not really know how to solve this organizational problem of the GVN. I referred to USOM's effort to provide resources directly to the province chiefs as a means of getting around the organizational problem. The Vice President said that this would work, however, only as long as there is approval in principle by the central government of a particular operation, since otherwise Saigon will frustrate this method of meeting the problem. The Vice President then said, however, that there is one extremely important way in which the United States can use money directly and effectively in the provinces--in the intelligence field. He said that if the proper rapport is established between U.S. advisors in the provinces with the province chiefs, they will find it possible to hand over money directly to the latter for the improvement of intelligence networks through adequate payment to informers. To establish the right kind of rapport the Vice President emphasized the importance of assigning Vietnamese language officers to these advisory positions. Recognizing the practical difficulty in obtaining enough such officers to meet all the requirements, he said it would be sufficient to assign one rotating language officer to three or four provinces for this purpose. The Vice President strongly stressed that at the present time the intelligence agencies of the GVN scarcely know the enemy at all. He asserted that information of a reliable kind can be obtained if sufficient funds are available to send agents into the enemy areas to collect it. The Vice President indicated that he could not overstress the importance of this and suggested that, if necessary, we divert to this intelligence purpose part of the funds that we are expanding in Viet-Nam for other things. He indicated he was not thinking of small amounts of money, but in terms of many millions of piasters. Since the Vice President had brought up the influence of money in connection with the success of both the strategic hamlets and the intelligence programs, I felt it was important to determine whether he considered this monetary factor of major importance in both central and southern Viet-Nam. His immediate response was that he was thinking particularly of the people in the southern area since they were the ones he knows from his long experience as a province chief. He added that if the southern area could be held against the Communists it would not be too hard to hold the center, since the south provides the bread basket of the country. The Vice President declared that it is important to act quickly in taking the proper measures to deal with the war. He warned that it should not be allowed to drag on too long because that would discourage the people, and at this point he warned with solemnity that the "Lao solution could be catching." He also indicated that it is important to bear in mind that during the resumed Geneva Conference on Laos/2/ the Viet-Cong may well try to pull off a sensational coup, such as, for example the capture of Pleiku. /2/The Geneva Conference on Laos resumed on July 2 and concluded on July 23. The Vice President indicated that he hoped that we do not believe the figures put out by the GVN on Viet-Cong casualties. He said many of these casualties were not VC at all but members of the population killed by the GVN forces. If all these casualties were VC, he said, the war would be over. (It is of interest that a reliable American source told me about two weeks ago that Vice President Tho had just said to him in a conversation that, if another coup attempt comes which appears likely to eliminate President Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu will see to it that the Vice President is eliminated through assassination during the attendant confusion. When the Vice President was asked why then he did not take measures to protect himself, he replied stoically that he preferred not to spend all of his time under guard, but to live as normally as possible. The Vice President said he would be prepared to die, but would have preferred to be killed by the Viet-Cong rather than by "one of our own.") Comment: The Vice President would, under normal constitutional processes, succeed to the Presidency if anything happened to the President. Elimination of the Vice President would leave the succession open to a man Nhu could control.
230. Status Report on Southeast Asia, Prepared by the Southeast Asia Task Force/1/ Washington, June 27, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 264, Followup. Secret. [Here follow sections on Thailand, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia.] VIET-NAM General Situation Evaluation The GVN is making progress against the VC, but it is still too early to predict assured success in the counterinsurgency effort. The strategic hamlet program and the two clear-and-hold operations now under way are moving forward well and seem to promise good results. With US assistance, the RVNAF has significantly reduced its reaction time in recent months and appears to have upset the VC timetable. Government efficiency is slowly improving. By patient pressure, the mission has been able to eliminate or shortcut some of the bureaucratic delays, to speed supplies and funds to the clear-and-hold operations and to the Montagnard refugees. The present mass movement of the Montagnards out of VC controlled areas may represent a major victory for the GVN if it can provide prompt relief measures and train the Montagnard irregulars. On the negative side, GVN control of the rural areas is probably still being eroded faster than it is being reinforced. The VC are attacking steadily and frequently and retain the capacity to strike in battalion strength at several points simultaneously. In spite of heavy losses, they seem not to have been seriously hurt. Perhaps most important, the VC apparently retain the aura of invincibility, while the GVN is making only very slow progress in gaining the sympathy of the rural population in some areas. A major unsolved problem is the generation of piasters for the local costs of the counterinsurgency programs. The GVN, and President Diem in particular, are fiscally very conservative and fear further deficit financing to the point of cutting back on essential war measures to avoid further deficits. If Ambassador Nolting is able to keep the momentum of the counterinsurgency effort going with the emergency measures we authorized last week, we must then engage in serious talks with the GVN on the long term financing of the program. The GVN scored an important psychological and political victory on the international scene with the June 25 publication of the long awaited ICC report on DRV subversion and aggression. Progress on Action Program 1. VC Activity. Viet Cong attacks continue to be concentrated in the III Corps area. Principal targets are still outposts, strategic hamlets, communication routes, and agrovilles. During the first five months of the year, armed attacks averaged 124 per week. In the period 5-11 June, armed attacks dropped to 101, 73 less than the previous all-time high of the preceding week. There were 91 armed attacks June 12-18. VC casualties for the year now stand at 11,925, including 8,100 killed. GVN losses for the year stand at 1,933 killed in action. 2. Clear and Hold Operations. Operations Hai Yen (in Central Viet Nam) and Binh Minh or Sunrise (northwest of Saigon in Binh Duong province) continue as planned. As of June 15, military operations in the Hai Yen area were 30 days ahead of schedule and 84 of the planned 270 strategic hamlets had been set up. Financial bottlenecks which had hampered the Hai Yen operation in earlier stages appear to be solved. The Province Chief now has Saigon's assurances of funds to carry the operation through June 30 and a local GVN-US committee has been set up on the ground to approve expenditures. Resettlement of 12,000-16,000 people will be underway before the end of the month. The VC are reacting by increased activities in the area. In Operation Binh Minh, a fourth strategic hamlet will probably be set up this month. The population in the first two hamlets to be established are now receiving simple basic self-defense training but have not been armed. Indemnities for relocation losses have been paid to all eligible families in these hamlets. 3. Australian Trainers. The GVN has agreed to integration of the Australian military training group into US programs. The Australians will bear all costs of their mission, which may be on the ground by the end of August. 4. Piaster Problem. In an effort to prevent delay in the counterinsurgency program Ambassador Nolting has been authorized to purchase 10 million dollars worth of piasters from the Viet Nam National Bank to be used in counterinsurgency programs and to set up a special counterinsurgency stockpile of about 10 million dollars worth of materiel. Waivers on counterinsurgency imports for this stockpile will be granted where the time factor is vital or where essential goods cannot be procured from an eligible source. This waiver authority is to be used only in rare instances, with a suggested ceiling of three million dollars. While we understand Diem's fear of further deficit financing, the consensus here is that the GVN can undertake a much larger measure of deficit spending without serious danger of inflation. The US position is that the GVN must face up to the problem and we intend to initiate talks with the GVN to this end. 5. Montagnard Program. On June 23 a joint GVN-US interagency team was despatched to several provinces to gather information on the Montagnard problem and lay the groundwork for fast joint action. USOM is studying the possibility of a 50 million piaster interim project agreement, with specific amounts to be released as information and plans are developed. 6. Communications Programs. As of June 15, 670 of the planned 2,500 village radios had been installed. On June 12 a contract was signed with Philco for the construction of the telecommunications system between Saigon and Bangkok. Paving on the new runway at the Saigon airport is expected to be complete by the end of the month. 7. Identity Cards. More than 2 million of the planned 7 million identity cards have been issued. The program has already resulted in the capture of a number of VC agents and ARVN deserters. 8. ICC Report. The ICC report charging the DRV with a deliberate campaign aimed at the violent overthrow of the GVN and citing the GVN for importing military equipment and personnel above the limits imposed by the Geneva Accords was made public June 25. The Department, the GVN and the Canadians made statements on the release of the report, pointing out its significance and the cause and effect nature of the DRV attack and the increased US assistance to Viet-Nam All of our diplomatic posts outside the Bloc have been issued discretionary authority to bring the report to the attention of their host government, and USIA is seeking to maximize the impact of the report through its programming.
231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, June 29, 1962, 3:04 p.m. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Confidential, Priority. Drafted by Cottrell, cleared with Fowler (AID), Peterson, Wood, Little (State), Diehl (Treasury), Bundy (DOD), Kaysen and Bundy (White House), and approved by Ball. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 1511. To Ambassador from Ball. The President desires that you be aware that he personally made decision against providing blanket authority to grant waivers from limited worldwide procurement policy for up to twelve million dollars of industrial machinery. Deptel 1474./2/ /2/Document 225. He also has made decision against direct purchase of twelve million dollars worth of piasters to fund items in GVN military budget proposed urtel 1663./3/ /3/Telegram 1663 from Saigon, June 27, proposed, in view of the withdrawal of $12 million waiver authority, that the U.S. Government buy $12 million worth of piasters to be used for military support of construction, facilities maintenance, and MAAG support. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.0051K/6-2762) He desires that you understand and inform the GVN that these decisions were made in the light of our present basic policy to improve the US balance of payments position. Further he is not persuaded that the above two proposals are necessary to accomplish your purposes. He believes that any delays or cutbacks on the part of the GVN in providing piasters for necessary efforts to defeat the Viet Cong are incomprehensible in the light of the present grave threat to the independence of Viet-Nam and in view of the enormous quantities of economic and military aid we are providing. FYI: Your discretion as how to inform Diem of substance this message. End FYI. Rusk
232. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Timmes) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Saigon, June 30, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, SGN (62) 19-GVN. Top Secret. Attached to the source text was a copy of a memorandum from Nolting to Timmes, June 30, thanking Timmes for his report. Reference cable number Embtel 1659 to Department, dated 25 June 1962,/2/ concerning conversation between you and Reverend Smith at Danang. /2/Document 226. On last Tuesday and Wednesday, I visited the Hue area and spoke with the Senior Advisors from the I Corps area. None of the officers to whom I have spoken, including Colonel Patten, were familiar with the fact that any officer has spoken in a derogatory manner concerning the present regime, and each officer expressed amazement and surprise. As you have been previously informed, since August 1961, I have made a particular point of personally orienting all the new personnel assigned to MAAG. A major part of this orientation is devoted to explaining the U.S. position concerning our unqualified support of the present government of Vietnam. It is particularly emphasized that President Diem and his associates have, since 1954, been faced with both the war against the sects and more recently with the Communist insurgency. It is further explained to the new MAAG personnel that, in my opinion, President Diem has proved himself to be the greatest anti-Communist fighter in the world today. Also, that no other country is so actively opposing Communism or making an effort of the same magnitude to remain a part of the Free World. I also explain that the reason for my orientation concerning the GVN is that certain of the critical articles appearing in the various news media fail to take into account the tremendous achievements of the government. Then I again discuss the position of the United States with respect to supporting the legally authorized government and explain that the consequences of failing to support the GVN can only result to the profit of the VC. As you know, I make frequent visits to the various MAAG detachments. On the occasions of each visit, I always assemble the officers and enlisted men for the purpose of discussing MAAG operations and on each of these occasions, I further stress the fact that MAAG is here only to advise in military matters and is not concerned in any way with local politics. Also, I again point out the position of the U.S. Government and our adherence to this position. I want to assure you that we in MAAG are doing everything possible to further your policy of supporting the GVN. Please be assured of my continuous effort in this matter. Charles J. Timmes [Continue with the next documents]
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