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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
VI. Final Report of the Vietnam Task Force
and the Establishment of the Vietnam Working Group
233. Final Report of the Vietnam Task Force/1/ Washington, July 1,1962. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 219. Secret. Also printed in Declassified Documents, 1981, 591A. A copy of the report was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on July 11 with a note that the programs and momentum generated by the Task Force would be continued by a new Working Group on Vietnam under the newly created Task Force on Southeast Asia. A. Presidential Program (Initiated May 23, 1962) 1. Seek to increase GVN confidence in US by Vice-Presidential visit. Achieved. 2. Attempt strengthen Diem's popular support by reappraisal and negotiation. Continues: Our attempts continue, but Diem's popular support has decreased. The January 4, 1962, GVN-US Joint Communiqué/2/ spelled out a program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with a stake in the outcome of the war. The communiqué resulted from negotiations which began with Vice President Johnson's visit and the Staley Mission./3/ Negotiations aimed at producing action which will increase popular support continue. /2/Document 4. /3/For documentation on the Johnson mission and the Staley mission, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 53 ff. and 72 ff. The December 4, 1961 Memorandum of Understanding/4/ between Diem and Nolting specifically recognized the importance of developing democratic institutions. The GVN has taken a number of actions following from and related to this understanding which are calculated to increase popular support. These include the establishment of Provincial Councils, a National Economic Council, a Constitutional Court, a national flood relief organization (which included oppositionists), a continuing purge of officials charged with various abuses, an organization within the Presidency charged with the responsibility for collecting and acting on popular complaints, the continued toleration of at least a minimum of opposition activity (example: the opposition candidates in the 1961 Presidential elections are at-large and have organized /4/See the enclosure to Nolting's December 5, 1961, letter to Diem, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 307. a Democratic Bloc; another oppositionist group has been permitted to set up the Front for National Unity which has publicly demanded a forum and legal status for opposition groups). A more vigorous civilian civic action program has been set in motion, combining the personnel of the former Youth, Information and Civic Action Ministries. US officials have influenced this program through constant contact and assistance to the information program and to the civic action aspects of counterinsurgency plans. 3. Begin negotiations looking toward bilateral arrangement with VN. Suspended: The December 4 Memorandum of Understanding, plus our ongoing joint programs constitute an adequate bilateral "arrangement" for realizing our objectives in VN. A bilateral treaty would probably bring us into conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, commit us irrevocably, and Diem has shown little interest in such a treaty since General Taylor's visit,/5/ and the increased American assistance which resulted. /5/For documentation on Taylor's visit to Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 169 ff. 4. Negotiation to improve VN's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, and its standing in world opinion. Continues: Vietnamese-Cambodian relations continue to be bad. In spite of many US efforts to bring the two parties together, little progress has been registered. VN's standing in world opinion has probably improved as a result of clearer international understanding of the nature of the hostilities there. In contacts with other governments, the US has consistently sought to present the facts of the Viet-Nam situation. In December 1961, the US published the evidence linking the DRV with the VC and documenting DRV aggression against SVN in our report A Threat to the Peace./6/ At our suggestion' President Diem on March 31, 1962, sent a letter to all Heads of Government and Chiefs of State outlining the facts of the DRV attack on his country./7/ The June 2 ICC Report charging the DRV with a deliberate campaign aimed at the violent overthrow of the GVN has been used by our diplomatic Missions to focus world attention on the DRV attack./8/ /6/See the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 315. /7/Document 137. /8/Reference is to the Special Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, see Document 208. 5. Strengthen border control arrangements with Cambodia. Continues: In spite of repeated efforts by the US, joint VN-Cambodian control has not been effected and incidents are frequent. This continuing friction and the absence of effective joint border controls has helped the VC. 6. Cooperate with GVN in planning effective use of assistance from other governments. Continues: The British have sent a special advisory mission to Viet-Nam under R.G.K. Thompson. In cooperation with the Thompson Mission, the US and the GVN have worked out the Delta Plan. The Australians have agreed to send a military training mission which will be integrated into MAAG activities. The Koreans have sent a military survey mission, the Thais are being approached to send observers. We intend to approach New Zealand. Malaya has trained several hundred Vietnamese in counter-guerrilla operations. The US is currently seeking to coordinate economic assistance to Viet-Nam by means of a special coordination group of donor nations. We are urging other countries to increase their assistance to VN, particularly in the form of commodity imports formerly financed by the US aid program. Over the past few years economic aid from countries other than the US has amounted to more than $108 million, including both grants and loans. Donor countries include Japan, France, Germany, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, China, and the Philippines. 7. Examine diplomatic setting for commitment of US forces to VN. Suspended: Accomplished by the Taylor Mission. The present level of U.S. assistance, i.e., training and logistic support plus some limited operational forces, appears to be the most effective "mix" at this time. 8. Assess political implications of increasing GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000. Achieved: The current strength level is over 197,000. 9. Request recommendations from Nolting to accomplish actions 1 and 2. Achieved. 10. Install radar to obtain warning of Communist overflights for intelligence or air supply. Achieved: Temporary installations were set up and operational at Danang in October 1961. Permanent installations are under construction with a target date of early Spring 1963. 11. Military Assistance Program for 20,000-man increase in ARVN is approved. Achieved. 12. Increase MAAG as necessary for 20,000-man ARVN increase. Achieved. 13. Consider case for increase ARVN strength above 170,000. Achieved: Current ARVN strength is 197,000. Target for the end of Fiscal Year 1964 is 225.000. 14. Provide MAP support for Civil Guard Force of 68,000. Achieved: 15. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include support and advice to Self-Defense Corps. Achieved. 16. Provide MAP support for Vietnamese Junk Force, including training of junk crews. Continues: See Action 54. 17. Accelerated Special Forces Training. Continues: Eleven Special Forces teams are engaged in training programs in Viet-Nam. 18. Collaborate with GVN in use of military, health, welfare and public works specialists for activities in villages. Continues: With US assistance, ARVN's Civic Action Program has improved steadily. However, this program still requires a great deal of effort to realize its full potential. 19. Study jointly with GVN border control techniques. Continues: The use of defoliants, dogs, portable radar, invisible chemical markings and other devices and techniques are undergoing study and tests at the combat development test center in VN. See also Action 65. 20. Consider establishment in SEA of testing facilities for new techniques against Communist aggression. Achieved: Combat test development centers have been established and are in operation in VN and Thailand. 21. Full examination of size and composition forces required in case of commitment US forces VN. Continues: Contingency planning is under continual review. 22. Dispatch to VN economic and fiscal experts to work out with GVN a joint financial plan. Achieved: The Staley Mission completed its work in June of 1961. Its plan was adopted as the Joint Action Plan (see Actions 34 through 44). 23. ICA (AID) is authorized to undertake rural development-civic action programs. Continues: The January 4, 1962 Joint Communiqué outlined these programs. USOM/Saigon has mounted an impact crop protection program, including rat destruction and eradication of rice destroying insects which will directly benefit 50,000 families. A program for Montagnard relief and resettlement is under way. The International Voluntary Service under contract to AID has been expanded to 69 people. Civic action in connection with the two clear-and hold operations, plus the country-wide strategic hamlet program, is being planned and supported jointly. This civic action effort includes agricultural credit and extension, schools, and rural medical programs from village dispensaries to provincial surgical facilities. 24. Undertake long-range economic development program as a means of demonstrating US confidence in the future of VN. Continues: The GVN has announced a formal 5-year plan. The on-going US AID program has contributed and will continue to contribute significantly to the long-range development of the economic infrastructure, including both agricultural development and industrialization. US aid continues to make important contributions to education, medicine, and other social services. 25. Assess economic implications of an ARVN force increase of 170,000 to 200,000. Achieved. 26. Assist GVN public information programs to build public understanding of actions required to combat VC and increase public confidence in GVN. Continues: USIS has worked closely with the GVN to develop its information program. Accomplishments include the establishment of a radio net serving the entire nation, production and distribution of films, and the development of rural newspapers. We are currently negotiating for the establishment of joint branch USIS-VIS posts throughout the country. 27. Country Team in coordination with GVN should compile documented facts of Communist infiltration and terrorism for dissemination in VN and throughout the world. Continues: The US publication A Threat to the Peace and Under Secretary Ball's speech on Viet-Nam,/9/ published by the Department in June, brought the evidence of Communist aggression to the attention of an international audience. USIS in Saigon works with the Vietnamese authorities on a continuing basis to collect and cross-file such information for use in media throughout the world. /9/Presumably a reference to Ball's speech before the Northwestern Law Alumni Association on May 9; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 28, 1962, pp. 872-877. 28. In coordination with . . . USIS will publicize unfavorable conditions in NVN. Continues: Information which can be declassified is not plentiful, but USIS continues to cross-file stories on unfavorable conditions whenever available. 29. Development agricultural pilot projects throughout the country. Suspended: Security conditions make this type of project difficult. A US-financed center near My Tho is in operation, however, with IVS personnel (who have been fired on by the VC). Ten pilot agricultural stations are conducting tests and demonstration work in crop and livestock development. 30. Exploit rehabilitation of VC prisoners and broadcast their stories to Communist areas. Continues: The GVN does not have a well-defined rehabilitation program for VC prisoners. (See Action 68). It has been reluctant to make prisoners available for interviews. Interviews with refugees from Communist NVN have been made and broadcast, however. 31. Provide funds for US participation in Saigon trade fair. Cancelled: The fair was called off. 32. Covert action to be carried forward and coordinated at appropriate levels. Continues. 33. President reserves judgment on levels of funding proposed. No Task Force action required. B. Joint Action Program (Staley Report) 34. Provide equipment and assistance in training for an increase in armed forces from 170,000 to 200,000. To increase effectiveness of increase, mutually agreed geographically phased plan, understanding on training and use of 30,000 additional men, and regulation of rate of increase for most efficient absorption should be accomplished. Continues: The force level now stands at 197,000. We have encountered difficulties in setting up and implementing a geographically phased plan. The Delta plan meets this requirement, but we are not sure that it will be completely implemented. 35. Decision regarding increase above 200,000 will be postponed until next year (1962). Meanwhile, training and equipment for Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps should be expedited. Achieved: Force levels now stand at 197,000. The ultimate target is 225,000 by the end of FY 64. On the Self-Defense Corps and the Civil Guard see Action 55. 36. Within limits of available funds US will provide resources required to implement action program, including commodity imports. Continues: The commodity import target for FY 62 was set at $135 million. The Vietnamese economy has been able to absorb only $110 million. Other external resources, i.e. equipment for economic and military projects, have been provided as needed. 37. VN should be strongly urged to undertake generation of piasters by the means spelled out in Joint Action Program. Continues: The GVN instituted fiscal reforms, including what amounted to a devaluation, in January 1962. These reforms are a direct result of US urgings. Internal tax receipts have increased over 1961. Piaster revenue remains inadequate, however, to cover counterinsurgency needs. The GVN has been unwilling to use deficit financing to meet this shortfall and has requested a cash grant from US. The problem is under negotiation. 38. Strongly urge GVN undertake tax reform and adopt principle of single and realistic rate of exchange. Continues: Although the January 1962 fiscal reforms represent considerable progress, the GVN still has a multiple exchange rate which is set too high. Tax collections should also be improved. 39. Ambassador should make clear to Diem that we attach great importance to agreed criteria governing imports, we consider raising effective piaster rate indispensable, and increased piaster realization per dollar will not be used as reason for reducing US aid. Continues: GVN has abided by the agreed criteria for imports in spite of shortfalls in the commodity import program. The January reforms raised the effective piaster rate but at the appropriate time it should be raised further. 40. President directed ICA to conduct thorough review of new proposals for emergency social action and of programs already under way. Achieved: Review continues. 41. Encourage long-range planning and urge Vietnamese create more effective planning machinery to develop a long-range plan. Continues: The GVN has recently announced a five-year plan, but this plan is more in the nature of a catalogue of projects than an integrated economic plan. Manpower planning is still very haphazard. One step forward: doctors are subject to the draft and medical talent will presumably be allocated to the most urgent needs. 42. Make clear to Diem that we hope one consequence new joint efforts will be effective projection our confidence in future of Viet-Nam. Continues: Our joint effort has markedly improved Vietnamese morale. Diem has been understandably concerned that the extent of US assistance may make the GVN appear to be the creature of the US. 43. Parallel committees should be given maximum delegation of authority. Suspended: Parallel committees have been discarded in favor of direct contact and negotiation between the action people on both sides at each level 44. President shall be informed of matters arising in implementation of joint program requiring his attention. Continues: TF/VN provided the White House with regular Status Reports, the NSC has provided an observer on TF/VN, and the Director of the Task Force appears bi-weekly at meetings of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). C. Actions under NSAM 104/10/ /10/NSAM 104, October 13, 1961, is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 328. 45. Make preparations for publication white paper on DRV aggression against SVN. Achieved: "A Threat to the Peace" was published in December 1961. 46. Develop plans for action in ICC based on white paper. Achieved: The ICC report of June 2, 1962 confirms the US position, i.e. the hostilities in VN are caused, directed, planned and led by the DRV. 47. Develop plans for presentation of VN case in UN. Suspended: After studying matter several times it was concluded that in present circumstances presentation to UN would result in more complications than gains. 48. Introduce Jungle Jim squadron into VN for training purposes. Achieved: See Action 53. 49. Initiate guerrilla ground action against Communist aerial supply missions in Tchepone area. Suspended: Due to possible effects on Lao negotiations. 50. General Taylor should undertake mission to Saigon. Achieved: General Taylor went to Viet-Nam in October 1961. 51. President agrees that certain other actions developed by TF/VN which do not require specific presidential approval should be undertaken on an urgent basis. Continues. D. Actions under NSAM 111/11/ /11/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 272. 52. Provide increased airlift to GVN forces. Continues: The US-provided airlift has sharply increased ARVN mobility and reduced reaction time. Perhaps more than other factors, it has enabled the GVN to take the offensive and upset the VC timetable. There are now 80 US-manned helicopters, 20 other (U-1A), and 21 C-123's in Viet-Nam. In addition, 32 C-123's based at Clark are available for operations in Viet-Nam. 53. Provide equipment and personnel for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence. Continues: Operation Farmgate (including 8 T-28's, four C-47's and four B-26's) now provides instruction in and execution of air-around support. Results have been good, with evidence that many VC attacks and bases have been disrupted by air action. Equipment and personnel have also been provided for air reconnaissance and photography and for special intelligence. 54. Provide small craft, including advisers and operating personnel, for control of coastal waters and inland waterways. Continues: A joint Junk Patrol has been organized with the Vietnamese Navy and elements of the Seventh Fleet to cut infiltration from North Viet-Nam. Construction is underway to develop a Junk Force of 28 Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four Junk Divisions are now operational. Three Junk Force training centers are operating, and recruitment of Vietnamese fishermen is satisfactory. The US has provided the GVN with 713 craft in all. These include 693 boats for inland waterway patrol and to increase ARVN mobility in the Delta, 9 harbor support and logistics type vessels, and 11 vessels with off-shore and major river capability. 55. Train and equip CG and SDC with objective relieving ARVN of static missions. Continues: Training of the Civil Guard by MAAG began January 1961 at a single training center. At MAAG's urging, the training was speeded up by establishing four other centers and reducing the training period from 24 to 12 weeks. By mid-June, 128 companies were trained, 51 were in training at the centers, and 21 additional were in training on-the-spot under MAAG contact training teams. The target for FY 62 is 372 trained companies. By the end of FY 64, total strength will be 90,000. Current strength, trained and untrained, is 75,000. FY 63 strength is set for 78,950 and FY 64, 80.000. 56. Provide personnel and equipment to improve intelligence system from provincial level upward. Continues: 194 U.S. military intelligence personnel are in Viet-Nam working at all levels to improve the GVN intelligence capability. . . . 57. Provide new terms reference, reorganization and additional personnel as required by increased responsibilities of US military. Continues: A military assistance command under General Harkins was established in February 1962 to direct our increased operational and training activities in Viet-Nam. US military personnel in Viet-Nam have been increased to 9,069 to carry out our increased responsibilities. 58. Provide increased economic aid for flood relief and to support the counterinsurgency program. Continues: Emergency food relief assistance from the US included medicaments and PL 480/12/ foodstuffs. Major items in our increased economic aid in support of counterinsurgency to date include: funds and equipment for two clear-and-hold operations now in progress (Hai Yen and Binh Minh or Sunrise), funds and equipment for Montagnard refugee relief and resettlement; the establishment of a special stockpile of supplies and equipment for fast servicing of rural counterinsurgency programs (particularly the strategic hamlet program); funds and equipment for 25 new surgical suites (which will treat battle casualties) to be set up in provincial hospitals; new strategic road construction and repair of bridges and roads sabotaged by the VC; and the rapid development of communications systems, in particular a broadcasting net and the village radio program which now has installed 670 of a projected 2,500 two-way radios. /12/Entitled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted July 10, 1954, P.L. 480 provided for the donation of U.S. agricultural surpluses to friendly governments; for text, see 68 Stat. 454. 59. Encourage GVN to request international or multilateral assistance for flood relief. Suspended: Assistance was received from Malaya and Australia. 60. Provide administrators and advisors for the GVN as agreed by two governments. Continues: The GVN has not yet formally requested advisers. MAAG advisors are/operating in all provinces. 61. Provide personnel for joint provincial surveys. Continues: Three joint provincial surveys were completed by a formal joint US-GVN team . . . . Formal joint surveys have been abandoned, since it is found that the information can best be obtained by continuing local contacts. All agencies continue to collect the required information in cooperation with the GVN. 62. GVN action to place nation on war footing, including measures to tap full potential all non-Communist elements. Continues: See Action 2. In addition to the measures noted under Action 2, the GVN has reactivated its National Internal Security Council, which Diem promised he would use as a war cabinet, created an Inter-Ministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee under Ngo Dinh Nhu, provided military training for civil servants and women, and in Central Viet-Nam organized a promising political-military irregular force to operate in the hamlets. Little or no genuine effort has been made to get the support of opposition cliques or to realize the potential of the religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. A great deal of effort has gone into programs designed to give the rural population a stake in the war. The war will be won or lost in the provinces. 63. Vitalization of appropriate governmental wartime agencies. Continues: An acute shortage of skilled administrators plus the temperamental reluctance of Diem to delegate authority (a reluctance understandably reinforced by the real dangers of subversion or another coup attempt) have made progress on this action slow. The National Internal Security Council has apparently met only five times since its inception in January and the Strategic Hamlet Committee is little more than an extension of Nhu. Progress has been registered in cutting red tape and increasing efficiency. Best results will probably be achieved by ad hoc arrangements and continued steady but patient pressure from the US rather than by insistence on dramatic structural changes in the GVN. 64. Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure. Continues: Considerable progress registered on this item. With U.S. assistance, ARVN has cut its reaction time and markedly improved its mobility. A Field Command, a Joint US-GVN Operations Center, a Joint General Staff and a Tactical Air Command, have been organized and are operating. US advisors have been accepted and are operating effectively with all units, with the Province Chiefs, and in the intelligence organizations. The GVN has increased Pay and benefits for the Civil Guard and the lower ranks of ARVN. The weakest link in the GVN military is still its citizen defense forces, the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, but as noted in Action 55, this problem is being rapidly solved. E. December 4 Diem-Nolting Memorandum of Agreement. In addition to the Actions above, the following specific actions should be added from the Diem-Nolting agreement. 65. Border Ranger Force. Continues: Ten companies of ARVN Rangers and 14 companies of Montagnard Rangers were made available for the Border Ranger Force on March 20. However, the old MAAG border control plan has not been implemented because high ARVN officers feel it is unrealistic. Plans and concepts for border control are under study by both RVNAF and their US advisors. The forces presently engaged in border control total about 7,000 in 88 posts. 66. Develop more contacts between GVN officials and people. Continues: Increased activity by Civic Action cadre plus frequent trips to rural areas by the President, National Assembly Deputies, and Cabinet Ministers have helped. The President has been unwilling to undertake regular "fireside chats." The basic problem is a change in attitude by District and Provincial officials. This is well understood at the top, but changing attitudes is slow work. 67. Bring non-Communist prisoners promptly to trial. Continues: No non-Communist prisoners of note have been brought to trial. The principal civilian leaders of the November 1960 coup are still being held without trial in spite of reports that Diem intends to release them. 68. Develop and announce an amnesty policy for VC defectors. Continues: The GVN has developed a nationwide plan approved by Thuan and General Ty, but it has not yet been coordinated with all Ministries. Surrender leaflets and rewards have been used locally in a number of areas with varying success. Although it seems to have great promise, the GVN has not yet really given this tactic a trial.
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 6, 1962, 3:02 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-562. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Heavner on July 5; cleared with Cottrell, Cleveland, Wood, and S/S. Also sent to Geneva and repeated to London, Paris, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. 20. Saigon's 14./2/ Contains verbatim text. As per last sentence reftel Department is considering proposing for highest level signature following message to Diem to overcome fears US will move toward neutralization policy for Viet-Nam and gain GVN cooperation at Geneva. Request comments following text priority. /2/Telegram 14 from Saigon, July 5, reported that Nolting had discussed with Diem the dangers that would ensue if South Vietnam failed to sign the agreements being negotiated in Geneva on Laos. In the last sentence Nolting recommended sending a high-level message to Diem explaining the U.S. position on Laos and reiterating support for Diem. (Ibid.) "Ambassador Nolting has told me of your concern over our Laos policy. It is a concern which I have long shared; the Laos situation is difficult, and the negotiations we are now seeking to complete at Geneva have not been easy. Perhaps it would be useful if I indicated to you in brief the basis of our thinking about Laos and our Southeast Asia policy as a whole. We have sought to counter the Communist drive in Southeast Asia by programs and tactics which recognize both the regional nature of the Communist threat and the peculiar circumstances of each country in the region. We vary our strategies but at the same time we maintain our overall policy objective, which is to do everything in our power to help the nations of Southeast Asia preserve their independence. In Laos, the United States believes that a neutral government, committed to neither the West nor the East, is most likely to succeed in providing the Lao people with peace and freedom. We are supported in this belief by most Free World Governments. In negotiating with the Communists to achieve a free and neutral Laos, we have not been unmindful of the relationship between Laos and the security of its neighbors. We have sought to build adequate safeguards into the Laos settlement. We are aware of the danger that the Communists will not honor their pledges. But the only alternative to a neutral Laos appears to be making an international battleground of Laos. This would not help the Lao people and it would not contribute to the security of Laos' neighbors. In the case of your own country, the strategy best calculated to preserve Vietnamese independence and enable your brave people to build a better future is clearly very different from the strategy required for Laos. I can assure you without reservation that this administration is not seeking a neutral solution for Viet-Nam. There is no change in the policy towards Viet-Nam which this administration has pursued since it took office. We have helped and shall continue to help the Vietnamese defend themselves. We believe our cooperation has been effective and will continue to improve. We believe the Vietnamese will defeat Communist aggression and subversion In pursuing our efforts to insure peace and freedom for the people of Southeast Asia the United States must, of course depend heavily on its friends. Most of all, we must have the cooperation of the Governments and the peoples of Southeast Asia itself. Your Government has been most closely associated with mine in this effort, and together we have achieved a great deal to defeat the Communist threat to Southeast Asia. It is my earnest hope that you will instruct your representatives at Geneva to continue this fruitful cooperation there by helping us to establish a truly neutral Laos. The Geneva conference cannot fully succeed without your help. I am convinced that failure at Geneva would have grave consequences for all the people of Southeast Asia." Rusk
235. Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, July 6, 1962. /1/ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51K/7-662. Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Fritz: In line with the recent changes in organization here and our new look on Southeast Asia, Cot/2/ has set all hands to developing "action programs" for each country in the area. This gives us an opportunity to reorganize and pull together our own somewhat ad hoc action plans into one package. After doing a final report on Task Force Viet-Nam keyed to the President's Program, the Joint Action Program (Staley Report), NSAM 104, NSAM 111, and your December 4 Memorandum of Agreement with Diem,/3/ we pulled out the actions which seem to us to be continuing and used them as the basis for our new draft action program. /2/Sterling J. Cottrell. /3/The Task Force Report is printed as Document 233. Regarding the Staley Report, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 93. NSAM 111 is printed ibid., Document 272. The December 4 Memorandum of Understanding is printed as an enclosure to Nolting's letter of December 5, 1961, ibid., p. 713. Regarding NSAM 104, see footnote 10, Document 233. This draft action program, which I enclose, will be subject to revisions and additions at the next Task Force Meeting July 11. However, since we are anxious to get your views at the Honolulu meeting I am sending our unrefined version to you now. Cot would like to have Task Force Saigon's revisions, additions, etc., when we get together at Honolulu. The final report on Task Force Viet-Nam which I mentioned above is still in draft. I will forward a copy to you as soon as we get it into final form. With best wishes, I am looking forward to seeing you at Honolulu, Sincerely, Ben
[Enclosure] Draft Action Plan Vietnam/4/ /4/Secret. Drafted by Heavner and Cottrell on July 3. This plan is a reorganization and restatement of the continuing actions contained in the Presidential Program for Viet-Nam, the Joint Action Program (Staley Report), NSAM 104, NSAM 111, and the December 4 Diem-Nolting Memorandum of Understanding. Completed actions in those plans have not been included. New actions or modifications of old actions which flow naturally from previous plans and experience have also been included. Political I. GVN Actions: This portion lists actions we should urge the GVN to take in accordance with the necessity of working through the administrative machinery of that government. 1. Increase governmental efficiency and put the GVN on a war footing. The GVN will take prompt legislative and administrative action to cut red tape and carry out counterinsurgency programs with maximum efficiency. This will include the vitalization of wartime agencies, adequate delegation of authority at all levels, and allocation of personnel resources in accord with the war emergency. 2. Strengthen popular support. The GVN will take appropriate measures to build popular support for the war effort, increase confidence in the government, and mobilize all of its manpower resources. These measures will include the following: (a) Appropriate training and indoctrination of provincial, district, village and hamlet officials. {b) Develop more contacts between GVN officials and the people' including institutionalized means of communication up and down between the national government and the rural population. (c) Efforts to mobilize all non-Communist elements willing to contribute to the struggle. This might include exploring the possible use of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects m the war effort as well as permitting the greatest amount of non-Communist opposition activity consonant with national security. A particular effort should be directed at those intellectuals and professionals now on the sidelines. (d) Bring non-Communist prisoners to trial promptly. (e) The GVN will take all practical and feasible steps to develop its democratic institutions at all levels. This means developing a governmental system responsive to the needs and desires of the Vietnamese people and does not imply an obligation to adopt western political forms. 3. Amnesty policy for VC defectors. The GVN will develop and announce an amnesty policy for Viet Cong defectors. This will be a comprehensive plan to include rehabilitation, resettlement if necessary, and full psychological exploitation of defectors. 4. Seek international support and cooperation against the VC. The GVN will take appropriate diplomatic and domestic measures to gain maximum international support. These measures will include: (a) Improved relations with Cambodia. Undertake negotiations aimed at settlement of outstanding differences and the establishment of joint border controls. Negotiate and maintain a press truce. (b) In cooperation with the U.S., seek third country economic, and where appropriate, third country military aid. Take appropriate measures to coordinate and maximize the effect of this aid. II. U.S. Actions 5. Make clear our confidence and support. The U.S. will continue to take periodic actions and make public statements to make clear its continued support of the Vietnamese people and their government. Our support and confidence must also be made evident to the Free World, and the Bloc for maximum effect. 6. Seek international support for Viet-Nam and our policy. The U.S. will take measures to gain international support for Viet-Nam and our Viet-Nam policy. The U.S. will actively seek third country economic and military aid as well as international political support for Viet-Nam. The U.S. will cooperate with the GVN in planning the most effective use of assistance offered by other governments. The U.S. will continue in its information programs to bring developments in Viet-Nam to the attention of the Free World. 7. Provide administrators and advisers. The U.S. will continue as opportunity offers to informally place U.S. adviser-operators with the Vietnamese governmental machinery. The U.S. will continue to develop and strengthen close working relationships with the GVN at all levels, placing particular emphasis on winning and maintaining *e confidence of both individual administrators and the GVN as a whole. 8. Cooperate with GVN in development of province CI requirements. The U.S. will continue to cooperate with the GVN in the collection of the detailed social, political, economic, intelligence and military information required to carry out province counterinsurgency programs. Military 9. Overhaul the military establishment and command structure. The GVN will reorganize its military establishment and command structure as necessary to prosecute the war more vigorously and to assure mobile offensive capability. This will include adequate delegation of authority to field commanders and clear and rational definition of the role of Province Chiefs. 10. Carry out a program of military civic action. The GVN, with U.S. provision of advisory personnel and equipment, will plan and carry out program of military civic action aimed at winning popular support and cooperation for the armed forces and the GVN. The plan will be coordinated with counterinsurgency programs and will include medical assistance for areas not serviced adequately by civilian medical facilities. 11. Seek effective border control. In addition to diplomatic measures aimed at closing Viet-Nam's borders to VC infiltration, the GVN will continue to study and implement military measures designed to achieve effective border control. In cooperation with the U.S., modem military technology will be applied to the problem. The GVN will also make available a Ranger Border Force and work out with the U.S. plans for its use. 12. Develop and implement a mutually agreed geographically phased plan. The GVN will in cooperation with the U.S. develop and implement a mutually agreed upon geographically phased strategic plan for bringing Viet Cong subversion under control. Geographic and strategic priorities will be established in order to utilize U.S. assistance most effectively. 13. Reorganize and strengthen the military-political-intelligence system. In cooperation with U.S. advisory personnel and equipment the GVN will take appropriate measures to strengthen its military-political intelligence system, beginning at the province level and extending upward through the government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization. 14. Accelerate the training of Special Forces. The RVNAF, with U;S. assistance in training and equipment will continue accelerated training of Special Forces. 15. Provide increased training, logistical, technical and advisory assistance to the GVN forces. This will include: (a) Increased air lift for the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by U.S. uniformed personnel and under U.S. operational control. (b) Provide such additional equipment and U.S. uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence. (c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways. 16. The U.S. will assist in training and equipping the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. Provide expedited training and equipping of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps with the objectives of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations. 17. The U.S. will provide advisory personnel and equipment required for mutually agreed force levels. The ARVN strength target now is 225,000 men by the end of FY64. Future increases in strength will be subject to review and agreement between the two governments. 18. Review advisability of further increases in the Civil Guard, Self Defense Corps and other local forces. Economic 19. The GVN should take appropriate economic and fiscal measures to mobilize the full resources of the nation in the struggle with the Viet Cong. These measures should include (a) Generation of additional piaster resources adequate for the requirements of counterinsurgency operations. These additional piaster resources should be generated by tax reform, possibly exchange reform, possibly a savings and victory bond campaign, and by borrowing from the national bank. 20. Integrate economic measures and planning with counter-insurgency planning actions. 21. Study how further use can be made of US. surplus agricultural commodities (particularly wheat and corn). 22. Undertake long range economic planning. To the degree possible in the present emergency' long range economic planning and long range economic programs should be continued. Planning machinery and personnel should be provided by the GVN for this purpose. 23. Provide additional resources to the GVN. Within the limits of available funds, the U.S. will provide the external resources required by the GVN, to include implementation of mutually agreed counterinsurgency and development plans. Commodity imports will be justified and absorbed under the seven criteria of the Staley Report. Psychological 24. Strengthen the information program. The GVN will accelerate its public information program to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions required to combat the Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the GVN's determination and ability to deal with the Communist threat. 25. Publicize within Viet-Nam and internationally the facts of DRV aggression and the unfavorable conditions in North Viet-Nam. Documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorist activities and the measures being taken by the GVN to counter such attacks will be compiled and publicized both domestically and internationally. The flow of information about unfavorable conditions in North Viet-Nam will be increased. 26. Exploit Viet Cong defectors. The GVN will exploit as part of a planned psychological campaign the rehabilitation of Viet Cong prisoners, stressing the errors of Communism, and broadcast this material to Communist-held areas, including North Viet-Nam, to induce defections. 27. Utilize USIA and diplomatic channels to focus world attention on DRV aggression and win international support for the GVN in its struggle against the Viet Cong. 28. Establish a network of sub-branch posts manned by one USIS local employee. These posts, which are primarily distribution points, are to be established in 12 to 18 major Provincial cities throughout the country. They will be housed in the VIS establishment in each city and function as a close support and advisory mechanism behind a VIS front. 29. Continue to press the GVN to establish adequate facilities for dealing with foreign correspondents. This would include a press lounge, a 24-hour duty officer in the Ministry of Information, and a senior official spokesman who is available at all times to answer questions on policy 30. Expand the already successful Kien Quoc, village newspaper designed in support of Operation Sunrise, into a network of village and provincial newspapers. 31. Arrange a sister-city relationship between Saigon and a major American city. . . . . . . . Presidential Action The President shall be informed of matters arising in the implementation of this action program requiring his attention that they may receive his immediate consideration.
236. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 7, 1962, noon. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. 21. Reference: Department telegram 1266./2/ Joint Embassy-MACV message. On basis several extensive briefings (including one June 25 with President Diem) and our own staff evaluation of technical factors and GVN preparations, Ambassador and COMUSMACV satisfied (1) crop destruction program could produce substantial military advantage; (2) satisfactory destruction of crop targets could result, as evidenced by Delmore Report;/3/ and (3) no further technical experimentation necessary. /2/Document 174. /3/Not further identified. Further convinced that GVN methods of determining targets, based on best available ground and air intelligence, take into account all necessary factors. MACV staff is in position to render adequate technical advice. Only factor not entirely determined is RVNAF capability launch and sustain on its own a crop destruction program on operational basis. RVNAF plans deploy helicopters for spraying, providing both air and ground cover during operations. Latter will involve considerable number troops in areas of substantial VC strength and control. Best way determine GVN capability is to concur with trial operation on limited basis, with dear understanding results thereof will be used decide whether further operations feasible. Propose, therefore, work out with GVN trial operation Phu Yen Province. Target zone encompasses area BQ750650 to BQ955650 to BQ750490 to BQ955490. Would involve destruction of eight target plots within defined area, totaling 2500 acres of rice, corn, sweet potatoes and manioc. Determination this target based upon best intelligence available from both military and political channels and would be re-confirmed by joint US/GVN assessment prior to attack. Proposed anti-crop operation to be initiated and conducted solely by GVN with US participation being limited to sub-rosa technical advice and assistance. GVN will carry out using helicopters as primary means of dispensing chemicals, and employ ground and air cover as necessary. Target in general area Hai Yen II and could contribute to overall success that operation. Incursion of GVN forces into VC controlled and occupied territory may result in bonus effect of engagement of sizable VC forces by VN troops. Equally important, considerable GVN civic action resources and US support already deployed this area, thereby providing better opportunity follow up quickly re social, economic, political aspects crop destruction operation. Request Washington approve above program and authorize release sufficient chemicals to GVN to undertake this operation. Based on results operation, we would then consider jointly with GVN further target areas which they have already developed on priority basis within a suggested overall crop destruction program./4/ /4/Telegram 21 was subsequently sent to the U.S. Delegation at the Laos Conference as telegram 56. On July 9, Harriman reported that he "trusted" the request for crop destruction would be denied since the good name of the United States would be at stake. (Telegram 25 from Geneva; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/7-962) On July 13, the Department of State informed both Geneva and Saigon that the proposal in telegram 21 would be held in abeyance pending Harriman's return from Geneva. (Ibid.) Nolting
237. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ Washington, July 7, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 66 A 3542 Vietnam 1962, 000.1-091. Also sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Signed "Ed". On the source text McNamara wrote: "7/15 To Gen Lansdale. An excellent set of questions Ed--it is this kind of info I need & am not receiving--please discuss with Joe Carroll." At the bottom of the source text Lansdale noted: "Discussed with Gen. Carroll. He said he would include this in further steps he is taking. He notes that some adding of intelligence & operations is needed." SUBJECT Here is a way of getting a sharper picture of how we're doing in Vietnam. The "way" uses the largest U.S. resources in Vietnam. Defense resources under your control. Attached are a list of questions. Most of them concern the "x-factors" of the real war in Vietnam. Some are vital to true measurements, others are significant as collateral. They are in addition to basic needs on enemy order-of-battle, casualties, lost weapons, etc. Inexpert use of these questions in Vietnam can be harmful to our cause. If they become widely known among Vietnamese, as being of real official concern to the U.S. military, the Vietnamese could take this as a U.S. loss of faith in the Vietnamese armed forces, government, or people; they could open a bad, political Pandora's box among Vietnamese or in our relations with them. Thus, it is recommended that the questions be used in the following way: a. The use of the questions should be a staff function of MAC-V; General Harkins could have a small team (2 or 3 U.S. military) to handle this; they should be good listeners, good writers, who know Vietnam. b. The questions should be asked only of Americans who have been out in the field, who have had first-hand experience, and who are judged to have gotten close to the Vietnamese; out of thousands of Americans, 50 or 100 might be selected; this should be repeated periodically. c. The questions should be asked at a time and place where these "field Americans" can reflect upon them amply; if our best Americans in the field are given brief R&R leaves in Saigon, Dalat, Hongkong, Clark, or Baguio, it would be wise to add extra time and then question them there. d. The questioners should do the work, not those questioned; verbal give and take can get better results than making field men write down what they know. e. Since conditions vary from locality to locality, it is important to get a geographic fix on each locality reported upon; results could be translated on charts or maps, after analysis; every significant locality should be reported on. In Vietnam, we are up against an enemy who uses Mao Tse-tung's tactics. The text-book rule of imposing our will on enemy forces needs further interpretation. The real contest is to win over the people on the land, which includes protecting them. My questions are to this point.
[Attachment] VIETNAM QUESTIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY Villagers (Think of people you have seen, talked to in specific villages and hamlets, usually away from military camps.) 1. Where was the village? About how many houses and people? What type of houses? How do people earn a living? Were the market places (or shops) busy or vacant? 2. What was the villagers' attitude towards the Vietnamese troops? Friendly, indifferent, sullen, afraid, hostile? Where were the children, outdoors or kept hidden indoors? Where were the young women? 3. What does it cost the villagers to give information to the troops? Are they taken in custody to be questioned for several days? If so, who takes care of their families in their absence? What happens to these villagers afterwards? Are they protected? Do the VC exact reprisal? Are there any rewards for giving information? What? Do the children give information? 4. Was there a village defense organization? How do you size it up? What was the attitude of the troops towards it? It towards the troops? 5. If troops stopped in the town, what happened? Were the troops quartered in homes? If so, were families removed? Remunerated? How? Was food obtained from the people? For the unit or individual military? Was there fair compensation? Was it given willingly or unwillingly? Were people happy to have the troops there, uneasy, or indifferent? 6. What measures did the Vietnamese troops take to get along with the villagers? Do you think these were effective? What do you think they should do? What was the attitude of officers and troops towards the villagers? 7. How many caches of VC arms, equipment, propaganda were found in the village? VC personnel? Did villagers help uncover? Why? 8. How was the village governed? A mayor? A council of elders? What say did the people have in who would govern them? How was this done? 9. If you saw a village several times, did you notice any changes in the attitude of the villagers? If so, what changed? What caused this? 10. How do the VC treat these same villagers? How effective is this? Civilians (Think of these as people in terms of Mao's "water" in which the military "fish" live.) 1. What happens to civilian casualties in military actions? Are they ignored by the troops? Left for village care? Given first aid by troops, then left in village? Taken to military hospital or civilian hospital? If military hospital, are they given equal treatment to military? If civilian hospital, who pays for their care? 2. What is attitude of Vietnamese troops towards civilians at check points on the highway? Are the troops alert, polite but firm? How do they check on bus passengers? On trucks? On farm carts? Are the civilians manhandled? Are there other abuses (collection of tolls, etc.)? If so, what remedies have been taken? Effective? How does attitude differ among units known to you? 3. What happens to civilians who come to a Vietnamese military unit with complaints, problems, or questions? Does the commander talk to them? A special officer on the staff? Are they turned away by the guards? If there are wrongs complained about, what redress is given? How? Do the local people hear about this? How? 4. When a Vietnamese troop unit is transferred to a new area, what indoctrination is given to the troops about local customs, tabus, etc.? How is this done? How effective is it? 5. What civilian organizations help the Vietnamese military the most? The least? In what way? How do you think this help could be best assisted to become more effective? 6. What happens on the highways (waterways) at night? Do the VC control? Do passenger vehicles run? If so, how do the VC treat the passengers? 7. What are the fundamental things which the people feel are worth defending? Their lives? Their property? Their village? Their way of living (as opposed to the Communist way)? Their form of government? What? Which of these are the Vietnamese troops helping the people to defend? Civil Officials (Include military acting as province chiefs or in other civilian capacities.) 1. When the military secure an area, how good is the follow-through by civilian officials? Who are they? Do they follow right up on the heels of the troops? Delay? Are they effective in dealing with the people? Do they have good team-work with the military? What improvements can you suggest? 2. In localities known to you personally, describe the activities of civilian officials. Do they get out among the people? Daily? Or remain in their offices/homes? Do they have bodyguards? Is this necessary? Why? What is the attitude of the people towards them? Are they invited into peoples' homes? Only the biggest or poor farmers/shopkeepers as well? 3. In these localities, what were the last 3 visits by officials from Saigon? What did they come to do? Do you think they were successful? Why? Were their contacts on mandarin terms or on the peoples' terms (talking down to the people, or with amicable equality)? Do you think they really found out about the local situation? What promises were made? What promises fulfilled? Propaganda (Think of this in terms of what troops and people talk about, as well as radio, leaflets, etc.) 1. What are the main VC propaganda themes? In wooing popular support? Against the Vietnamese government? Against Americans? How much of this do people believe? What is being done to prove this propaganda false? 2. How are the Vietnamese hitting back psychologically at the source of enemy strength? To stop popular support? To induce surrender? Do you believe this is effective? How would you improve it? Prisoners (Identify facts known to you first-hand, and stories you have heard from others.) 1. What happens to VC taken by a combat unit? Are they questioned promptly for combat intelligence? By whom? Are any of them liquidated on the spot? Without interrogation for combat intelligence? Why? What corrective measures are being taken? What happens to female prisoners? 2. What happens next, after capture and initial interrogation by the combat unit? Are they held in a compound by a military unit known to you? Turned over to another authority? Are they questioned further by military? How is this done? What use is made of the information? 3. What do you know about prisoner rehabilitation? First-hand? Hearsay? What methods are used? Do the prisoners learn a vocation? How do they earn their freedom? Do they denounce Communism publicly? Help the troops as scouts? Try to induce VC surrenders? Are freed rehabilitated prisoners turned loose on the community or sent to a separate community of their own? Do you think this system is effective? Why? 4. How do the VC treat prisoners? Vietnamese military? Vietnamese civilians? Foreigners? Troop Morale (Candid opinions are desired.) 1. What is the attitude of the troops on patrol? Aggressive? Need the eye of an officer on them? Have self-reliance if alone or with small group? Do they do night patrols? In storms? Do they really push into the jungle? Into swamps and grasslands? Into mountains? 2. Do the troops have any strong convictions about why they are fighting? What are they? Is there any troop I&E? Who does it? Do you think it is effective? Any ideas on how to improve it? What? 3. What are the feelings of troops about being in military service? Proud to be in uniform? Indifferent? Proud of unit? Indifferent? Homesick? Worn out? How much longer do they think the fighting will continue? What do they think will end the fighting? 4. Which weapons do the troops like best? Why? Which do they like least? Why? How effective are they with these weapons? 5. What are the major gripes of the troops? Which are justified and correctible? How? What do you know of Can Lao membership in units you have been with? About other political membership? How does this effect morale, promotions, preferential treatment, attitude towards top Vietnamese government officials? 6. What are the main superstitions of the troops? What are the main customs which are different from the military of other countries? How widely held are these? How do they help or impair the effectiveness of the troops? 7. How do you think the Vietnamese troops stack up in comparison to the VC? What are the main differences? Your ideas on why? Your ideas on how the Vietnamese troops think they stack up against the VC? Why? 8. What are the most important points you believe your replacement should know, for getting along with the Vietnamese?
238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Saigon, July 9, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 350 International Pol Rels--350 Laos Conf. In telegram 24, July 8, the Embassy in Saigon reported that Nolting and Harkins thought the draft letter transmitted in Document 234 was excellent. (Telegram 24; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) But the following day Harriman cabled a new text from Geneva and stated that the old one was too general to be effective. (Confe 1196 and 1197; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-962) The source text is the same as that suggested by Harriman except for minor changes. 28. Re: Confe's 1196 and 1197./2/ You are authorized to deliver the following letter from President Kennedy to President Diem urgently. /2/See footnote 1 above. "I have been told of your concern over the agreements on Laos now being negotiated at Geneva. Since these long and difficult negotiations are reaching a conclusion, I thought it would be helpful to Your Excellency for me to review with you our thinking about Laos and Southeast Asia generally. We have sought to counter the communist drive in Southeast Asia by programs and tactics which recognize both the regional nature of communist threat and the particular circumstances of each country in the region. In the case of your own country, the strategy best calculated to preserve Vietnamese independence and enable your brave people to build a better future is clearly very different from the strategy required for Laos. Such a strategy is based upon the fierce desire of your people to maintain their independence and their willingness to engage in an arduous struggle for it. Based as it is on these facts, our policy toward Viet-Nam must and will continue as it has since my administration took office. We have helped and shall continue to help your country to defend itself. We believe your efforts have been and will continue to be increasingly effective. We believe the Vietnamese will defeat communist aggression and subversion. In Laos, the circumstances are quite different. Because of that country's location and because of the conditions in which its people find themselves, the United States believes that a neutral government, committed to neither the west nor the east, is most likely to succeed in providing the Lao people with peace and freedom. We are supported in this belief by most of the free world governments. In negotiating with the communists to achieve a free and neutral Laos, we have not been unmindful of the relationship between Laos and the security of its neighbors. We have sought to build adequate safeguards into the Laos settlement, including assurance Lao territory will not be used for military or subversive interference in the affairs of other countries. We are aware of the danger that the communists will not honor their pledges. But the only alternative to a neutral Laos appears to be making an international battleground of Laos. This would not help the Lao people and it would not contribute to the security of Laos' neighbors. I am informed that the Geneva negotiations have reached the point where the agreements which have been hammered out over the past thirteen months are nearly ready for signature. In considering the position of our government at this juncture I think it is important for us to keep firmly in mind the real political foundation upon which these agreements rest. When Mr. Khrushchev and I met in Vienna last year,/3/ we were able to agree on only one of the many issues which divide us. This was our mutual desire to work for a free, independent and neutral Laos. The result has been that the Soviets, as one of the co-chairmen, have undertaken an international responsibility under the Geneva Accords to assure the compliance of the communist signatories with the terms of those accords. This responsibility will be tested soon as the agreements are signed. /3/Kennedy and Khrushchev met at Vienna, June 3-4, 1961. In return for these undertakings by the Soviets, both your delegation and mine have made some concessions in the course of the thirteen months of negotiations. These concessions are the result of the almost complete ineffectiveness of the Royal Laotian Army, as demonstrated again in the recent action at Nam Tha. It is only the threat of American intervention that has enabled us to come as far as we have in Laos. But I hope you agree with me that considering this deteriorating situation the safeguards built into the Laos settlement give us the best hope of future improvement against continuing communist military encroachment through that country. It is in this lilt [light] that I hope you will reconsider the wisdom of insisting upon a solution of the problem of diplomatic recognition by Laos as a condition for your signature of the Geneva Accords. I recognize the importance of the question and particularly the problem it may create in other countries. On the other hand, I believe that when it is compared with the change of achieving a viable settlement of the Laos problem, the question of the type of representation in Vientiane should not be allowed to determine your country's attitude toward our mutual effort at Geneva. I hope you will instruct your delegation not to raise issues on which general agreement had been reached last December, nor to bring up new issues. It is unrealistic to expect that other countries will undertake obligations to your nation unless your government, through its signature of these accords, assumes reciprocal obligations. That is why I urge you most earnestly to continue your help in making it possible for the Geneva Accords to be signed promptly by all the participants. In working to ensure peace and freedom for the people of Southeast Asia, the United States must, of course, depend heavily on its friends. Most of all, we must have the cooperation of the governments and the peoples of Southeast Asia itself. Your government has been most closely associated with mine in this effort, and together we have achieved a great deal to defeat the communist threat to Southeast Asia. It is my earnest hope that we may continue this fruitful cooperation by working together to establish a truly neutral Laos." In presenting letter you should stress in strongest terms the importance we attach to Vietnamese help in reaching Laos settlement, safeguards we have in Russian promises and which we building into settlement itself and our determination continue help Viet-Nam defend itself. We plan no publicity on this note and believe you should request GVN handle as classified communication Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
Vietnam, 1962 Volume II Index | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |