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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
245. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 20, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/7-2062. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 84. For Viet Nam Working Group. Deptel 61./2/ Although Task Force Saigon fully appreciates importance establishment geographical priorities for Strategic Hamlet Program, we favor somewhat different approach from that suggested reftel. As Dept aware, Task Force some time ago agreed on geographically phased counterinsurgency program including priorities (Emb despatch 429)./3/ This program has served as basis US advice to GVN on Strategic Hamlet Program and in deciding allocation of US resources to specific clear and hold operations. Believe we now have more effective means of applying these priorities de facto to ongoing Strategic Hamlet Program. With establishment US owned piaster fund and PA/PR for dollar procurement, we should have carrot with which to induce GVN to come up with coordinated clear and hold operations in those areas which we regard as having highest priority. If this approach works, effect will be to apply bulk of resources and effort in highest priority areas. Through experience we should also be able to develop more accurate programming justifications. /1/Document 242. /2/See footnote 1, Document 11. This approach will not result in slowing down or stopping Strategic Hamlet Program in non-priority areas. GVN is firmly and publicly committed to pushing program on nation-wide basis. While this is bound to result in some failures, we do not think that there is any substantial risk that these will be "fatal to GVN". Our impression is that even where program appears to be spread quite "thin", it is causing VC trouble. Moreover, GVN, specifically Nhu and MinInterior, are aware of risks and are now insisting that hamlets be established in most secure areas first. In sum, Task Force Saigon believes should welcome undeniable momentum behind Strategic Hamlet Program, seek to impose priorities on it by device of concentrating resources under US control on areas considered most important, and accept as divided any benefits which flow from operations of program in other areas. We are in regular touch with Thompson and believe above is in accord with his own thinking. Will discuss further with him prior Honolulu meeting if possible. Re earth moving equipment, there are indications President Diem is prepared to cut back on Presidential Road Program and this may release some equipment for hamlet construction. We are also studying other possibilities. Comment: In discussion with Pres Diem July 19, he raised question priorities in Strategic Hamlet Program, saying he understood our desire to gear our aid programs to the Strategic Hamlet Program, and need for priorities. He said that general priorities are: (a) in white areas extending into blue and eventually red; (b) in the richest and most heavily populated parts of the Delta, roughly the ten provinces of the Delta Plan; (c) in areas, especially coastal plains of central provinces, where Viet Cong pressure greatest and danger of cutting the country greatest. He said that the establishment of fixed priorities in building strategic hamlets is not simple. In some areas, the districts, villages and hamlets themselves are sufficiently rich and enthusiastic to carry out program largely under their own steam. In poorer areas, or in areas where the people are less ready to take sides, govt resources would be concentrated. Thus there would continue to develop Strategic Hamlets beyond the first priority areas indicated above, but govt help would be applied on a priority basis as indicated in (a), (b), and (c) above. In short the substance of this conversation, I believe, reinforces the rationale of this telegram. Nolting
246. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ USMC/8 Geneva, July 22, 1962, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, July 1962. Secret. Drafted by Sullivan on July 23, approved in S on July 24. Copies were sent to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Geneva. Secretary Rusk was in Geneva for the final sessions of the Laos Conference. The meeting was held in the U.S. Delegation building. PARTICIPANTS United States Viet-Nam SUBJECT Foreign Minister Mau called on the Secretary by appointment. The Secretary opened the conversation by asking for the Foreign Minister's assessment of the progress being made in Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister replied that real military progress was being made, especially as a result of the mobility provided to the Viet-Nam forces by United States military assistance. He thought the next need was for rapid telecommunications which would make this mobility more effective. The Secretary said that in his view there were two essential elements to success in Viet-Nam. The first was to be sure of full popular support for the Viet-Nam forces in their struggle against the guerrillas, and to pursue that struggle to a successful conclusion. The United States did not look upon Viet-Nam as a problem similar to Laos. In the first place the Vietnamese people are fighting against infiltration and in the second place the geography of Viet-Nam makes our assistance more feasible. We therefore do not anticipate any negotiations looking toward a Lao-type settlement in Viet-Nam. We have told the other side that if they will stop the attacks peace will result in Viet-Nam. But we do not intend to permit the other side any foothold in Viet-Nam, particularly one which might be assisted by an airlift. Therefore the orders are to shoot down any strange aircraft that appears over Viet-Nam. The second element of success for Viet-Nam will depend upon good relations with its neighbors. This would apply both to Laos and to Cambodia. The Foreign Minister said he agreed that good relations were essential but dilated for some time upon the difficulties in establishing good relations with Cambodia. He mentioned the Viet-Nam desire to have mixed military commissions to secure the Cambodia-Viet-Nam border. He said that Sihanouk had turned this down but had proposed the establishment of a Viet-Nam military mission in Phnom Penh, a proposal which the Vietnamese Government had accepted as a satisfactory first step. The Secretary observed that unsatisfactory relations with neighboring countries in Southeast Asia seemed to arise partly from undue publicity accorded to statements by personalities. There followed a certain discussion about the problems of calming mutual press attacks, from which the Foreign Minister drew the conclusion that external assistance to this end would be of very little use. The Foreign Minister said there was a point which he wished to raise concerning the representation of the Viet Minh in Vientiane. He had discussed this with Couve/2/ and twice with Souvanna. Couve will discuss it again with Souvanna in Paris on July 25. He realized the Lao could not cut off all contact with the Viet Minh but perhaps they would be willing to maintain the current status in which South Viet-Nam has an Embassy and the Viet Minh merely a trade and cultural mission. He asked U.S. support for this position. The Secretary said that the problem does not concern Viet-Nam alone but also China, Germany and probably Korea. He said that the U.S. will be alive to the interests of Saigon in this matter. /2/Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister said that the next important problem concerned the routes and points of control for withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos. Governor Harriman pointed out that this matter should best be discussed in Vientiane. The Foreign Minister said he agreed but wished to stress his Government's interest to the Secretary. The Secretary said that this was a matter of special interest because of the difficulty in identifying Viet Minh troops and suggested we should not rely entirely upon the ICC. We should for example attempt to control infiltration into Viet-Nam from the Vietnamese side of the border and we should also exploit other means of assuring ourselves that the Viet Minh will withdraw from Laos back into North Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister asked whether the Secretary felt that the Russians will really exercise control over the Chinese and the North Vietnamese to observe the agreement on Laos. The Secretary felt that the Russians did not want a war in Southeast Asia and that they would therefore presumably exercise control over the North Vietnamese to a point. The Foreign Minister asked whether the Chinese Communists had proposed a conference on Viet-Nam. The Secretary replied that he had seen this only in statements which the Chinese Communists had made but that no direct proposals had been made to the U.S. The Foreign Minister pointed out that Souvanna Phouma has made a similar proposal. Governor Harriman said that Souvanna Phouma has a tremendous problem in making neutrality a success in Laos. He felt that the Vietnamese should not lay too heavy demands upon him. In the Conference Saturday/3/ the North Vietnamese had disgusted everyone by their intervention and Harriman thought the South Vietnamese had made a tactical error by answering that intervention by a parallel statement of accusations, some of which were directed against Souvanna Phouma. He said that Souvanna had been annoyed and told us afterwards that he had been tempted to reply to Foreign Minister Mau's speech. Harriman thought that it would be wise for the Vietnamese to establish good relations with Souvanna because they must work with him in the future. The Foreign Minister agreed that they must work with Souvanna but that they should not shield him from the problems he must face. No accusation had been intended directly against Souvanna in the Foreign Minister's speech. Governor Harriman said that Souvanna had interpreted it in that way and hoped that the Vietnamese in the future would work with us helpfully to bolster Souvanna Phouma rather than making his work more difficult. /3/A summary report of the North and South Vietnamese speeches at the final plenary session of the Laos Conference, July 21, was transmitted in Secto 8 from Geneva, July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-2162)
247. Memorandum of a Conversation/1/ Geneva, July 22, 1962, 2:30 p.m. /1/Source: Columbia University, Harriman Papers, Vietnam. Drafted by Sullivan and authorized by Harriman. The meeting was held in Barrington's suite at the Hotel Suisse. PARTICIPANTS United States North Vietnam Burma During the course of a reception given by the Burmese on Saturday, July 21, Mr. Barrington asked Governor Harriman whether the latter would appreciate an opportunity to talk privately with the North Vietnamese. When the Governor indicated his willingness to do so, Barrington arranged a meeting for the following day in his room at the Hotel Suisse. Governor Harriman opened the conversation by recalling that the wartime policies of President Roosevelt had envisaged independence for Vietnam through the mechanism of some sort of international machinery. President Roosevelt had not anticipated that the French would return to Indochina. He asked the Foreign Minister what would have happened in his country if President Roosevelt's policies had been carried out. The Foreign Minister replied that he and his government were well aware of President Roosevelt's policies, and had been very surprised when the Americans acquiesced in the attempt of the French to reestablish their colonial control in Indochina. He felt that the following years were a great tragedy and had caused much suffering to the people of Vietnam. [Here follow eight paragraphs on the situation in Laos.] The Foreign Minister said he wished to turn from Laos to the question of Vietnam. He said that the Vietnamese people strongly resented American intervention in Vietnam. He said that the 1954 Agreements on Indochina had provided for the reunification of Vietnam through elections. If it had not been for the intervention of the US in 1956, that reunification would have been achieved, either by federation or by elections, which would have placed all of Vietnam under a single regime. US intervention had in recent years grown worse until it was now a fact that American forces were mercilessly killing Vietnamese citizens. While Governor Harriman spoke of President Kennedy's policy which respects neutrality, and the fact that it has produced an agreement on Laos, the Foreign Minister could not understand how President Kennedy could continue the policy of military intervention in Vietnam. Governor Harriman said that he wished to reply very frankly to the statement which the Foreign Minister had just made. President Kennedy, before making a decision to send increased military assistance to South Vietnam in response to President Diem's request, had directed that a very careful study be made of the situation. From that study he was convinced, as the recent ICC report/2/ has later borne out, that the guerrilla activity and the killing in South Vietnam were directed from the North, and that the guerrillas were led, trained and supplied by the North. When President Kennedy sent the additional forces into South Vietnam, he made clear that they were there for the purposes of helping the Vietnamese to defend themselves against this aggression from the North. He also made clear that if that aggression stopped, there would be no need for continued presence of those American forces. Therefore, the way that peace could be brought to Vietnam would be for the North Vietnamese to cease their aggression against South Vietnam, and to stop the guerrilla activity. Then the status envisaged by the 1954 Agreements could be reestablished and the possibilities of dealing with other difficulties could be explored. /2/See Document 208. The Foreign Minister replied that the Americans did not seem to understand the situation in Vietnam. The history of South Vietnam has always been one of struggle. The forces who are fighting against the Diem regime are people from the South who take their weapons from those supplied by the Americans. There are no North Vietnamese airplanes, ships or motor vehicles which can bring guerrilla forces or weapons into Vietnam. This is a popular revolt against the Diem regime and American intervention is trying to suppress it. Governor Harriman, noting an impending appointment he had with Secretary Rusk, said that he did not believe it would be useful to argue the issue. He was thoroughly convinced, as were other objective observers, that the cause of the trouble in South Vietnam came from the North. The US military assistance to South Vietnam would continue so long as that aggression persisted. He wanted the Foreign Minister to understand that and to understand that the way to bring peace to Vietnam was for the North to cease its aggression. Before departing, however, he wished to return to the first part of the conversation which he and the Foreign Minister had had concerning Laos. He felt that clear undertakings on the part of the US Government and on the part of the North Vietnamese to carry out scrupulously all the provisions of the Geneva Agreements on Laos would result in peace in Laos. He trusted that that would be done and that this sort of cooperation between the US and North Vietnam could make a great contribution toward the peace of Southeast Asia. The Foreign Minister agreed with this statement and said he would remember the first part of the conversation that he and Governor Harriman had had this afternoon. He hoped, however, that Governor Harriman would not forget the second part of the conversation, and particularly what the Foreign Minister had had to say about American military intervention in Vietnam. On that note, the meeting broke up with mutual thanks to Mr. Barrington for providing an opportunity for these talks to have taken place.
248. Record of the Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference/1/ Camp Smith, Hawaii, July 23, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, Honolulu Meeting, July 23, 1962. Top Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. A 10-page summary of the discussions is ibid. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet, a memorandum of distribution, and a memorandum of transmittal from Felt to McNamara, dated July 26. VIETNAM Item #1--Review of GVN and RVNAF actions and progress since 1 May to include estimate of situation now and forecast for next six months. Summary of Discussion 1. Gen Harkins opened the discussion by summarizing progress to date. He indicated there is no doubt that we are on the winning side. If our programs continue, we can expect VC actions to decline. The following subjects were summarized: a. Strategic Hamlet Program With regard to the Strategic Hamlet program, 2400 have been constructed and a total of 6000 should be completed by the end of the year. Some of the hamlets are not particularly good. There has been no national plan for their establishment. However, Pres Diem has recently formed a committee to coordinate the program and ARVN division commanders will now be included in implementing actions. COMUSMACV has initiated a program to insure that equipment is phased into the Hamlet project in an orderly manner. It was pointed out that in certain areas the reception of the Hamlet program has been very good. Approximately 115,000 Montagnard tribesmen have come out of the hills, asking for help by the government. Pres Diem has visited some of the tribes and has spoken to the people about the Hamlet program. b. Communications Thus far, 14 provinces have been equipped. The Backbone system will be completed by 1 September 1962. Reaction time has been improved considerably. c. Training Intelligence is improving and training programs are generally ahead of schedule, including programs for the Army, the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps. In this connection, it is planned that a retraining program for the Self Defense Corps will be initiated next year. d. Operations Contact is being made with the VC every day. During April 434 ground operations were mounted. This was increased to 441 in May. Over 1000 air sorties were flown in June. The GVN still needs to work on their organization but progress is being made. Pres Diem has indicated that he plans that his troops will get out in the field more often and stay out longer. e. River Boat Program With regard to the boat program for inland waterways, Gen Harkins stated that the program is going well and that additional boats are not needed at present. f. Armed Helicopters Gen Harkins stated that some helicopters should be armed for suppressive fire. Adm Felt outlined a request he had made to the JCS for new USA flexible gun kits, the XM 153. He recommended the kits and tech reps to assist in installation be sent to SVN. Sec McNamara directed VAdm Riley, Director of the Joint Staff, to start a project on this item so that a report could be made next week. SecDef asked if helicopters were equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks and/or armor. He was given a negative reply. SecDef then indicated he would speak with Army personnel further on the question during a forthcoming visit to Fort Bragg. g. Defoliant Operations/Crop Destruction Gen Harkins next outlined requests that have been made for further defoliation operations. The single approved operation at Bien Hoa started the week of 15 July and is in progress. A requirement exists for crop spraying in areas vacated by the Montagnards when they move to the Strategic Hamlets. The VC will use these crops unless they are destroyed. Amb Nolting pointed out that real progress is being made with movement of the Montagnards and that greater results could be expected if crop destruction is undertaken. A critical point on the side of the VC is how to keep the infiltrators fed. Adm Felt pointed out that two recommendations were pending in JCS with respect to defoliant operations (Delta area) and crop destruction. He stated he has not forwarded a COMUSMACV recommendation on defoliating communication routes and an elephant grass area in Northern SVN. With regard to crop destruction, SecDef inquired if the GVN could procure required chemicals on the world market, outside of the US. Mr Bundy stated that they could probably purchase chemicals from Dow Chemical Corp. SecDef asked Amb Nolting if he felt that crop destruction would create adverse propaganda in SVN. Amb Nolting replied that destruction of vacated Montagnard crops should not create a problem and that the GVN have used napalm to burn these crops. Food is a limiting factor in the VC campaign. The harvesting season is approaching and we will need to act fast if we are going to get results. Sec McNamara next pointed out the political problem involved. The US has just agreed to a settlement in Laos. This is a critical time with regard to international relations. It will be necessary to discuss this further in Washington. [Here follow sections h. Jet Aircraft, i. Armored Personnel Carriers, and decisions made and actions to be taken.] Item #2--Training and Equipment Status of RVNAF, CG and SDC. Summary of Discussion. 1. Gen Harkins summarized progress of RVNAF, CG and SDC. The programs are coming along well and in most cases are ahead of schedule. Equipment is being provided as fast as the troops are capable of absorbing it. The limiting factor is the shortage of ARVN officers and NCO's which should improve within the next 6 months. The VNN and VNMC are in good shape and there is no shortage of equipment. 2. SecDef noted that 6 months ago we had practically nothing and we have made tremendous progress to date. However, we have been concentrating on short term crash-type actions and now we must look ahead to a carefully conceived long-range program for training and equipping RVNAF and phase out of major US combat, advisory and logistics support activities. He asked how long a period before the VC could be eliminated as a disturbing force. Gen Harkins estimated about one year from the time that we are able to get RVNAF, CG and SDC fully operational and really pressing the VC in all areas. 3. SecDef directed that a long-range program be laid out to include training requirements, equipment requirements, US advisory requirements, and US units assuming that it is going to require approximately 3 years to bring the VC in SVN under control. SecDef pointed out that we will have a big replacement job next year for US personnel; about 8,000 will have to be replaced. We must get moving now on language training, guerrilla training and other related items in order to keep the pipeline full. Adm Felt noted that in the materiel field, availability of helicopters for VNAF would be a problem. SecDef stated that production of helicopters could be speeded up and directed that optimum requirements be submitted in order that FY 64 procurement can be expedited. 4. The subject of availability of VNAF pilots was discussed and BGen Anthis pointed out the major problem of obtaining GVN clearances for personnel to be sent to CONUS for pilot training. 5. SecDef then stated that we are behind schedule in our Defended Hamlet-Strategic Village program and the key to the problem is wresting areas from VC control and protecting the population. We must take a conservative view and assume it will take 3 years instead of one year. We must line up our long range program as it may become difficult to retain public support for our operations in Vietnam. The political pressure will build up as US losses continue to occur. In other words we must assume the worst and make our plans accordingly. 6. Gen Harkins pointed out that some areas are better than others and described successes in the Delta area where the GVN has increased its control in one area from 40% to 70% in the past year. He also pointed out that all actions are not VC actions but some are conducted by "bandits" which have been operating in SVN for thousands of years. 7. SecDef announced that training of Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) would be assumed by DOD. The details for this takeover will be worked out by . . . COMUSMACV-CINCPAC and requirements reported to DOD. 8. Mr Johnson asked about the morale of the CG and SDC. Gen Harkins stated that this was a problem in view of the large numbers of casualties, infiltration of SDC and CG by the VC, separation from families, no rotational policy for relieving troops in the field, and other matters. Amb Nolting stated that a request had been made to State Dept to provide PL 480 foodstuffs to help in this area. 9. Adm Felt passed out CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Digest of 20 July/2/ and called attention to articles on Vietnam. /2/Not found. Decisions Made and Actions To Be Taken 1. Prepare plans for gradual scaling down of COMUSMACV during next 3-year period. (COMUSMACV) a. Prepare a long-range training program with view to establishing Officer Corps to manage GVN military operations. b. Objective is to give SVN an adequate military capability without the need for special US military assistance. c. Lay down long-range program and requirements to place material in country designed for turnover to RVNAF 3 years from now. 2. Prepare optimum helicopter requirements for procurement in FY 64. (COMUSMACV) 3. Prepare plan for replacing US personnel to be rotated out of SVN. Place personnel in training now and get into pipeline in time for replacement, e.g. language and intelligence training, etc. (COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, Service Depts) 4. Update figures on CG/SDC training. (COMUSMACV/ CINCPAC) 5. Develop plan for DOD assumption of training responsibility for CIDG. (MGen Krulak . . . COMUSMACV/CINCPAC) 6. Reexamine numbers of M-113's and M-114's required for SVN and advise SecDef. (COMUSMACV, CINCPAC) 7. Speed up delivery of presently scheduled M-113's and M-114's from 1 June 1963 to 1 November 1962. UCS, DA). Item #3--Strategic Hamlet Program. Summary of Discussion 1. Gen Harkins gave a brief description of the GVN strategic hamlet program. There is no overall government program for building strategic hamlets: Country Team is working with GVN committee, appointed last week, to develop this program. CT plan is to introduce materials as soon as possible for 1500 additional hamlets. Amb Nolting stated Country Team was pushing on all fronts with GVN to get orderly priorities. Situation still not clear. Basic problem is that GVN is building sporadically all over the country where it is safe to do so. CT agrees following priorities are paramount; First--Delta Region, Second--Coastal Region, Central SVN. 2. Gen Harkins cited definite progress evidenced by Presidential Decree issued two weeks ago placing division commanders in charge of implementation of the strategic hamlet program in their respective division tactical zones. 3. Amb Nolting indicated that the Country Team is working in closer relationship with GVN and can influence priority location of strategic hamlets by placing US assistance in areas we deem important 4. Sec McNamara asked what types and quantities of materials were needed for strategic hamlet construction, and what items came under MAP. Col Buchanan, COMUSMACV, indicated that 397 villages had been programmed in FY 62 and FY 63 MAP for completion by the end of FY 63. MAP would support only such ordnance items as carbines, shotguns, Very pistols, flares and so forth. AID furnishes construction items such as barbed wire, steel posts, etc., plus communications equipment. Request is being completed to develop an add-on for FY 63 MAP budget of $4,000,000 for 1,500 additional villages. He cited the following planning figures: a. Each village averages four hamlets. There are roughly 2,500 villages and 17,000 hamlets in SVN. b. Village package consists of following organization: Four squads of 12 men each, armed with carbines, shotguns, Very pistols, and flares. c. Village periphery calculated at an average of 6 kilometers. Sec McNamara asked if the AID Budget carried complementary items for the number of villages mentioned under MAP. Mr Fippin, AID SVN, stated that AID program had been planned complementary to the number of villages planned for MAP. He made the following points: (1) AID SVN has authority for 67 villages in FY 62. (2) AID SVN has $3,000,000 for 330 villages, the same numbers planned by COMUSMACV for FY 63. (3) AID SVN and MAP are preparing a request for FY 63 for 1,500 more villages. AID SVN will request $13,000,000 as part of a $22,000,000 add-on package for the FY 63 SVN AID Budget. 5. Sec McNamara asked Mr. Janow, Assistant Administrator AID Washington, if AID could make available funds to cover the $13,000,000 item. Mr. Janow stated he had $15,000,000 initially earmarked for SVN. Sec McNamara emphasized the vital nature of the strategic hamlet program and asked that the AID/MAP hamlet programs be organized, balanced, and a report returned to Washington. 6. Adm Felt brought up the fact that many critics hold the hamlet program as being of no value and equate it to the old French program. He stated that the two were not the same and we need to do something to emphasize the effectiveness of the hamlet program. The SecDef called for a series of articles to educate the populace. Adm Felt stated we have been putting emphasis on the CG/SDC in defending the villages, thus freeing ARVN units for pursuit of Viet Cong. Sec McNamara mentioned a pessimistic report of the Washington teams on the hamlet program and indicated perhaps Washington was uninformed with respect to the progress mentioned by Gen Harkins. Sec McNamara asked Assistant SecDef Sylvester (PA) to look into the situation with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV representatives in order to get good material into the press. Decisions Made and Actions To Be Taken 1. Insure MAP and AID, SVN programs for Strategic Hamlets are balanced and equated to each other. (COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, AID) [Here follow items 4. Communications Capabilities, 5. Intelligence, and 6. Clandestine Radio Stations.] . . . . . . . 4. Adm Felt said that we do not necessarily need Special Forces personnel for all these tasks, but that other qualified people could do the job. CINCPAC has been of this opinion for a long time. Adm Anderson/3/ stated that Gen Hamlett/4/ shares this opinion. /3/Vice Admiral George W. Anderson Jr., Chief of Staff to Admiral Felt. /4/Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army. Decisions Made and Actions To Be Taken 1. Sec McNamara made the decision that DOD will assume responsibility for the training of Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups, subject to agreement as to details. (DOD, . . . CINCPAC, COMUSMACV) 2. Teams will be introduced on schedule without waiting for details to be worked out. (DOD, . . . CINCPAC, COMUSMACV) 3. Draw up schedule of output of trained irregulars (COMUSMACV- . . . ) 4. Organize assets according to schedule of trainee output. (COMUSMACV- . . . ) Item #8--Appraise the political and economic progress of GVN. Summary of Discussion 1. Amb Nolting stated that there is a fear on part of GVN that the United States may change its policy toward SVN. We have to nip this in the bud and convince the GVN that they don't have to fear a Laos-type neutrality. 2. Amb Nolting mentioned the piaster problem and fact that US aid must be backed up by sufficient VN-generated funds. SecDef said that the piaster problem should be discussed in plenary session later in the day (see Item #10). 3. SecDef then addressed the gold problem by saying that we are not going to solve it by reducing our job in SVN. SVN has No. 1 priority in foreign exchange when supported by valid military requirements. He said that he assumed State and AID would act accordingly. 4. Amb Nolting said that he looks upon the Strategic Hamlet Program as a principal arm of the general pacification program. He pointed out that, in addition to strengthening the village physical defenses, it was necessary to develop the will of the village people to resist. Mr Phillips added that hamlets which demonstrate the will to resist are targets of the VC. SecDef asked what arms the villagers possessed. Mr Phillips said shotguns, grenades, and some French rifles. SecDef then said not to let shortage of arms keep us from arming the villagers properly. Requisition carbines if they can do the job better. We should indicate the number of people in the villages that should be armed with the carbine. 5. Amb Nolting said GVN is hurting for trained manpower, not only in military but in all branches of government. GVN is doing better and quality of Province Chiefs is improving. Developments in education were highlighted and Mr Phillips, in answering question by SecDef, said that the school capacity has increased. 6. Amb Nolting pointed out that organizational arrangements on American side their linking with GVN side was greatly improved. Amb Nolting said members of hamlet councils must have a living wage. GVN wants to pay 300 piasters per month. This is not enough. SecDef said he wished the Sub-Committee on piasters to think about PL 480; that there is no limit on the amount of goods that the United States will supply. Amb Nolting is encouraged by the GVN planning not to stop improvements in the education of leaders at hamlet and village level but to go on up to higher levels of government. SecDef pointed out that we should get to the US press the fact that village officials will be elected. 7. Amb Nolting said that economic progress also depends on the success of the pacification program. He said that there is better economic planning. Now there is a more realistic point of view displayed by GVN on deficit financing--hopes that we can make good on this. Agreed with Gen Harkins that we have signs for encouragement. 8. Mr Fippin said that some hamlets will be overrun, that it was not intended that they stand fast against all odds. In regard to local administrators, the National Institute of Administration has trained 500 people. Each province has a training leader conducting formal training programs. Decisions Made and Actions To Be Taken 1. Use carbines for arming villagers. Indicate how many villagers should be armed with the carbine and forward requirements. (COMUSMACV) Item #9--Progress of MAP for SVN with emphasis on FY63. Summary of Discussion 1. Capt Byrnside J5 CINCPAC) charted MAP Program for FY63 and projected deliveries FY63-68. 2. Amb Nolting requested guidance on what to say to the press on amount of money being spent in SVN per year. Sec McNamara stated US policy in this respect is not to make public the specific dollar amount. 3. During Capt Byrnside's discussion of ARVN deliveries for FY63 and projected deliveries for FY63-68 Sec McNamara stated he needed a more detailed break-down of the force maintenance figure of 47.1 million for ARVN plus 20 or 30 million for the Navy and Air Force for a total of approximately 70 million. Sec McNamara directed Adm Heinz to give him details on the 70 million force maintenance request prior to approval. Adm Felt added that experience factors and better training of the RVNAF in maintenance of equipment would decrease the force maintenance total. 4. During the discussion of the Air Force items Capt Byrnside pointed out that additional 18 HUS-1's in the 63 program would provide for a second squadron of helicopters. Sec McNamara asked when the VNAF pilots would be trained and ready for these helicopters. Gen Anthis stated this would occur in 1964. 5. Amb Nolting then pointed out that entry of additional US equipment into SVN could raise an ICC contention that we are violating Article 17 of the Geneva Accords. In response to a SecDef question regarding the Article 17 limitation Amb Nolting stated it was hard to sort out, but gave helicopters as an example. Sec McNamara stated, as a basic principle, that equipment would be taken in and that the US would proceed on the basis that the equipment is owned and operated by SVN. In this process, if the US is cited by the ICC, this is a risk we have to take. Sec McNamara asked Adm Heinz to work with the military departments to package and deliver items in an inconspicuous manner. SecDef stated he was willing to absorb the extra expense involved. 6. Capt Byrnside pointed out that the force maintenance budget for SVN included attrition, replacement, follow-on spares, POL and MAAG administration, as well as training. 7. Sec McNamara asked if there is a shortage of medical supplies in SVN. Gen Timmes stated there is no shortage of medical supplies; that he has inspected many medical warehouses and there are adequate stocks. Amb Nolting stated that the GVN has imposed rigorous controls on the issue of medical supplies to prevent their falling into the hands of the VC. Sec McNamara then stated that the shortage was reported in connection with the SDC/CG. Gen Timmes answered that we are only responsible for taking care of treating wounded personnel from the CG. Adm Felt asked about Filipino help in alleviating the shortage of medical personnel. Amb Nolting replied that Pres Diem is not sold on the Philippine offer (Operation Brotherhood). Sec McNamara then asked if the CG has radio equipment and was informed by Gen Timmes that they have one radio per platoon. Decisions Made And Actions To Be Taken 1. Reference information to be given to the press. US policy is not to divulge the specific dollar amount per year spent in SVN. (COMUSMACV, CINCPAC) 2. Sec McNamara requests details of 70 million force maintenance item for SVN prior his approval. (RAdm Heinz, DOD/ISA) 3. Sec McNamara requests he be informed on problems involved in effecting inconspicuous deliveries of major items of equipment in order that DOD can work out solutions. (DOD, MGen Krulak, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV) Item #10--Progress of AID for SVN with emphasis on FY63, to include progress in training village and provincial administrators. Summary of Discussion 1. This item was mentioned briefly under item #8 but deferred until item #10 discussion. 2. Amb Nolting stated that a sub-committee earlier in the day had studied the problem as to what to do about the piaster shortage. Amb Nolting pointed out that it was necessary to keep momentum on GVN side of the picture. Application of economic and social measures at village level is essential to success in SVN. In order to accomplish this, radical changes should be made in the AID Program as follows: a. Shift emphasis from long-range AID projects to short-range village and Montagnard aid. b. AID can be made effective only by breaking away from some of the existing restrictive procedures, thereby achieving flexibility in funding. c. Project aid should be increased from $27 million for FY62 to $83 million for FY63. d. Scale down commercial aid allocated for FY62 to generate piasters. GVN has agreed to deficit financing of 3-1/2 billion piasters. Import program of $120 million commercial aid will prevent inflation and get SVN through this calendar year. GVN will have to use deficit financing of at least $120 million to get through next year (their FY63). To back up military expenses and efforts, some new paths in AID program must be cut; i.e., stand behind GVN on the import program. e. With regard to problem of off-shore procurement and gold outflow, Amb would request waiver of US supply requirement on a case-by-case basis. 3. Sec McNamara agreed with Amb Nolting and mentioned that he should continue to request waivers. We should further be willing to accept the price penalty. 4. Sec McNamara stated he was willing and anxious to take over financing of certain AID programs that have military application. However, to do this the MAP-AID programs for FY63 must be reviewed. Sec McNamara directed Mr Bundy to look into this. 5. Amb Nolting stated the foregoing discussion should cure the piaster problem but that if abuses against people by GVN, i.e., attempts to save on expenditures with "free labor", continue we may have to impose restrictions or changes on US AID program. Decisions Made and Actions To Be Taken 1. Amb will continue to request waivers on a case-by-case basis of AID items (Amb Saigon). 2. Review FY63 MAP-AID projects with view to MAP taking over financing of certain AID projects that have military application. (DOD, AID, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, AID-Saigon) [Here follow sections on Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, and general subjects.].
249. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the President's Military Representative (Bagley) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, July 24, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-238-69. Secret. SUBJECT 1. You will recall in November and December 1961 that Diem was reluctant to accept U.S. advice or specific political actions incident to increased U.S. military and economic assistance. At the time, the U.S. decided to accept Diem's reservations and move forward with the positive military aspects of your mission, with the hope that Diem could be encouraged later to carry out parallel political reforms. Subsequently the military position has improved, but progress on the political side has been slow. The final report of the Vietnamese Task Force/2/ concluded that Diem's popularity has, in fact, decreased in the past year. During this period there has been continuing public criticism of Diem's regime. If the possible Communist proposal for an international conference on South Viet-Nam materializes, South Vietnam will be without a favorable political base from which to bargain. At the same time, our strengthened military capabilities may be facing their severest test by increased Communist infiltration of personnel and improved equipment via Laos which occurred just prior to signing of the Accords. /2/Document 233. 2. You have broached the subject of political progress within the Special Group (CI) on several occasions during the past six months. Both within that forum and the Viet-Nam Task Force, State has emphasized the need for patience in encouraging Diem to make necessary reforms. The acceptable procedures are stated to be selected approaches to Diem by the Ambassador, a hoped-for evolution of Diem's own comprehension of the needs, and limited placement of U.S. advisors in the countryside to effect improvement at the lower end of the administrative chain without recourse to the Saigon hierarchy. Though State adhered to this strategy, there has been conviction on the Defense side that action is urgently required to make the political gains essential to further improvement of the military situation. 3. In the past month or so Mr. Rostow has apparently decided to grab this ball. He told Bob Johnson to study the political relationships in South Viet-Nam and determine steps that might be taken to improve the political environment. He also asked for suggestions as to how to implement such actions. Johnson completed his paper/3/ last week, and it is to be discussed at the NSC Standing Group luncheon today. Copies were taken by Mr. Cottrell to Honolulu to be passed to Ambassador Nolting for his comment. /3/Reference is to a 55-page draft paper entitled "South Viet-Nam: The Political Relationship Between the Central Government and the Countryside", July 17. Divided into seven sections, it traced the relationship from the colonial period to post-war Vietnam and analyzed the sources of disaffection in the countryside. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Vietnam 1962) The final text of the paper, dated July 27, was 78 pages including a summary and recommendations along the lines, summarized here. (Ibid.) 4. The basis from which the paper was formulated does not depart from the policy established some months ago. The following extract from the introduction will illustrate this: " . . . We have approached this problem, at least in recent months, with certain basic assumptions:/4/ /4/Ellipsis in the source text. "a. That re-establishment of security in the countryside was the sine qua non; that it is difficult or impossible to establish a relationship of cooperation and mutual confidence when the countryside is under heavy coercive pressure. "b. That we should not seek to impose our concepts of government on a society which is not ready for them and which is, in any event, not presently in a position where it can realistically adopt many of them. "c. That we must work with the Diem Government. "The analysis in this paper accepts these assumptions. The argument that security must come first, however, also recognizes that improved intelligence on VC activities is a precondition to successful military action and that improved intelligence depends upon improved cooperation of the rural population. If the present vicious circle is to be broken non-military measures to improve identification of the government with the population are important to military success. Democracy per se is clearly not the answer in Viet Nam, but our analysis will suggest that improved channels of upward communication are important and that one way to improve channels may be to provide new means of participation. We must work with the Diem government, but we must also be prepared to make a sustained effort to press for essential non-military reforms. Sustained failure could raise questions about the assumption." 5. A revealing conclusion of this study is the major lack of information available on the nature of political actions taken by the Diem government. This includes many programs viewed by the Country Team as positive accomplishments, i.e., land reform, training of civic action cadres for the strategic hamlets and province pacification, and administration of the strategic hamlet program. Some of the recommendations made in the study are conditioned on the subsequent provision of such information. Bob Johnson specifically deplores the GVN failure to implement the province surveys which emanated from your report./5/ (He does not cite the fact that this survey was agreed to in the joint U.S.-GVN Memorandum of Understanding of 4 December 1961./6/) /5/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 210. /6/See the enclosure to Nolting's December 5 letter to Diem, Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 307. 6. In general the paper implies that difficulties in government relationships with the populace are due in part to lack of action, but beyond that is due to poor implementation. There is a flow of administrative authority downward, but no provision for a flow upward from which subsequent decisions can be predicated on actions, recommendations, and situations existing at the village level. Rural officials are accorded responsibilities without parallel authority. 7. The recommendations which stem from this study are summarized on dipped pages 3 through 8 which you may wish to scan. In brief form, these recommendations call for: a. Closer collaboration between the U.S. and the GVN. b. Proper training of province and district chiefs aimed, by positive demonstration, to achieve a change in attitude. c. Training of village and hamlet chiefs similar to that for the higher officials in b above, with the participation of AID advisors. d. Refinement of the training of civic action cadres for strategic hamlets. e. The inclusion of a simple training program covering the elements of procedural protection in judicial proceedings against individuals. f. Supplement appointed village and hamlet councils by elected advisory councils and establish procedures whereby an entire village and/or hamlet population can contribute regularly to local administration. g. Reduce the number of mass organizations at the hamlet level to the one or two organizations which can be useful. h. Obtain GVN approval for the placement of an AID advisor in each of the provinces. i. Seek GVN action to complete implementation of the land reform program. j. Press the GVN for a decision on the Montagnard program proposed by the Country Team. k. Seek a means of reducing the price of fertilizer to the farmer through subsidy or otherwise. l. Develop a feasible public works program to improve the lot of the poor farmer by keeping him employed at work during off seasons. m. Establish fair salaries for village and hamlet chiefs. n. Press the GVN for action on U.S. proposals for military civic action. o. Study the possibilities of having the sects throw their political weight behind the GVN. p. Establish a defector interrogation program under U.S. leadership designed to get at the reasons why individuals join the Viet Cong. q. Improve our information on the sources of dissidence, status of GVN programs, quality of local officials, and other essential information, using U.S. personnel now in the countryside. 8. On implementation, the paper suggests that these recommendations be reviewed carefully and, as a starter, two or three items be selected as a subject of a serious high level démarche to Diem, using as a pretext prospective economic discussions. The requirement for a Presidential communication is recognized. 9. This paper is important because it recognizes our actions on the non-military side are moving behind, and hazarding, the military effort. If this premise gains acceptance, it raises basic issues: a. Can improvements be achieved through Diem or is a change necessary? b. Can the military handle prospective increased VC actions within the environment of the current rate of political progress or are accelerated political reforms required? c. Is the current political atmosphere in SEA conducive to a direct confrontation with Diem on this issue? d. If the risks outweigh the prospective gains of pressing Diem for reforms, what alternatives will gain time for the current evolution of political reform to take effect in the countryside? There will be an early need to assess these questions here and in Saigon. You may wish to raise the subject again in the Special Group (CI), subject to the reaction in the NSC Standing Group today. W.H.B./7/ /7/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. [Continue with the next documents]
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