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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
266. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 16, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field--Far East (IAF). Secret. Drafted by Thomas C. Sorensen, Deputy Director of USIA. SUBJECT If we will win in Viet-Nam with defoliants, but lose without them, then we must use them. If we will probably win with defoliants and probably lose without them, then also we must use them. If we might win with defoliants, and might win without them, then we had better consider the implications before undertaking the project proposed by the Department of Defense for 2,500 acres in Phu Yen Province. We have a tradition in this country of not using food as a weapon of war. Chemical and biological warfare are subjects which arouse emotional reactions at least as intense as those aroused by nuclear warfare, as witnessed by the publicity surrounding the recent accidental death of the British scientist, our Korean and East German experiences, and the recent Indian incidents. A series by Rachel Carson currently running in the New Yorker and soon to be published in book form sets forth with devastating impact the consequences of insecticides on insect-plant life balance and human health. The Agriculture Department is concerned about the implications of this book for our foreign crop marketing; if we launch a defoliation program in Viet-Nam our enemies and many of our friends will use this book against us. Depriving the Viet Cong of their local food supplies and forcing them onto the open plain where they can more easily be dealt with is a legitimate and necessary military objective. But what are the alternative methods of achieving this objective? Have all been tried and have all failed? Given the relative predictability of the growing season, can not the Viet Cong be ambushed or otherwise prevented from harvesting these crops? No matter how reasonable our case may be. I am convinced that we cannot persuade the world--particularly that large part of it which does not get enough to eat--that defoliation "is good for you." Nonetheless, should the President decide to proceed with the project, it is important that we be given a brief period to explain to the world exactly what we are doing and why. This will reduce, to some extent, the impact of the inevitable Communist propaganda campaign. Edward R. Murrow/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to the Secretary of State/1/ Washington, August 16, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Special Correspondence, Bowles. Secret; Eyes Only. Before leaving for Maine I would like to make a few comments regarding the proposed mission to Southeast Asia which we first discussed a month or so ago./2/ /2/See Document 241. I gather from our talk last Friday/3/ that the Far East Bureau is strongly opposed to the proposal, and that under the circumstances you feel that the mission should be abandoned or postponed. /3/No record of Bowles' conversation with Rusk on Friday, August 10, has been found. Although I bow to any decision which you may wish to make I would like to offer a strong personal dissent from the reasoning that appears to have led the Bureau to oppose the core of my proposal: A speech by the President outlining U.S. political, economic and military objectives in the area. The arguments as stated in a memorandum to my office on July 31 (a copy of which I am enclosing)/4/ strike me as specious in the extreme. If these views prevail I believe we will have lost our opportunity to recapture the political initiative in that part of the world, and for this reason I am anxious to have my own views fully understood. Let us first consider the Bureau's objections. /4/Not found, but see Document 253. The memorandum argues that there is no point in the President asking the Southeast Asian nations to restate their opposition to the use of force since they are already on record through the U.N. Charter and because our Communist opponents cannot be expected to live up to whatever verbal commitments they might make for tactical purposes. If we adopted this view as national policy we would abandon the entire peace initiative to the Communists. The memorandum then discounts the value of any "paper guarantees" that we might obtain from the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, in regard to overt aggression in Southeast Asia, and ridicules the suggestion that broader international inspection machinery might be effective in curbing internal subversion. While experience may prove their pessimism to be correct, this view is contrary to the assumptions on which the Laotian negotiations and the Geneva agreements have been based, i.e., that the Soviets in Southeast Asia as in the case of Austria may carry out whatever agreements they believe to be in their interest; and that if their interests in this area should coincide with ours there is some hope of curbing the more overt forms of internal subversion. The memorandum also asserts that there is no hope now or in the foreseeable future that Southeast Asian nations may be willing to forego some degree of sovereignty in order to increase regional economic and political cooperation. This judgment appears particularly defeatist in light of the new Malaysian Federation, the recent proposals by Macapagal, ASA's tentative early steps toward closer economic cooperation, and the support already demonstrated by the four riparian countries for the development of the Mekong. Finally, the memorandum asserts that what the North Vietnamese really need is a good stiff military lesson and until we have given them that lesson we will be wasting our time in attempting to create a less negative U.S. posture in Southeast Asia. On the basis of such reasoning Wilson's Fourteen Points could be condemned as an empty gesture, Secretary Marshall's 1947 speech at Harvard viewed as a visionary bit of do-goodism, Truman's Point Four proposals as unrealistic, the Alliance for Progress as a blatant case of international day dreaming, and The Ten Commandments as the ultimate in utopianism. Let me again briefly state my position in regard to Southeast Asia: 1. My hat goes off to Averell Harriman for his brilliant performance in negotiating the Laos agreement. Had he been bound by the paralyzing inhibitions laid down in the attached memorandum, we would never have reached that agreement. If the Soviet Union should choose to live up to its agreements (and Averell would be the first to agree that this is a crucial "if") we may be able to work our way out of a miserable situation which we inherited from the previous administration and gradually to create a relatively stable Laos, neutral and independent. On the other hand if the Soviet Union fails to live up to its side of the bargain it will be clear to everyone in Southeast Asia and throughout the world as to who wants peace and who wants trouble, and the stage will be set for whatever may follow. 2. At present we are faced with a most difficult security situation in South Vietnam. Although our military authorities appear hopeful about the outcome, qualified outside observers place the odds for a clear cut victory at less than fifty-fifty. If, as many fear, the situation deteriorates we may be forced within the next year or so to choose between committing more and more American troops and material to what the President's political opponents will describe as "another Democratic War" or withdrawing in embarrassed frustration. For the U.S. Government to adopt the classic "let's wait and see" posture under such circumstances strikes me as not only sterile but foolhardy. 3. Since F.D.R.'s efforts to persuade the French to leave Indo China in 1945 and our efforts in 1948 on behalf of Indonesian independence, the U.S. has drifted into a singularly negative posture throughout Southeast Asia. This has been due in part to our involvement with Chinese Nationalist troops in North Burma, to our strong military support for the French prior to their defeat at Dien Bien Phu, to our alleged effort to upset the Sukarno government in 1958, to our close association with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan, and to our support of such right wing Southeast Asian leaders as Diem, Bao Dai, Sarit, and Phoumi. Thanks to our role in negotiating the Geneva agreements and the near settlement in West Irian, our prestige is starting to rise. However, it still has a long way to go. 4. In these circumstances the most effective course of American policy, in my opinion, should be along the following lines: a. Continue to make it clear that we will massively oppose any overt Communist effort to take over Southeast Asia. b. Continue our strong military support for the Diem government in its opposition to the Communists in South Vietnam, while pressing Diem more vigorously to broaden his political base and to institute essential administrative and economic reforms. c. Discreetly keep our eyes open for an alternative to Diem who would provide a broader political base from which to oppose the Communists. d. Insist on a firm but realistic enforcement of the Geneva agreements regarding Laos. e. Give generous encouragement to the Souvanna Phouma government, being careful not to embrace him so fondly that he will be dismissed as a new U.S. satellite. f. Encourage better relationships between the Souvanna Phouma government and its non-Communist neighbors. g. Improve our almost non-existent intelligence capability in regard to Ho Chi Minh's attitudes and objectives. 5. Against this background of political action it is urgently necessary for the U.S. Government to clarify its overall objectives in Southeast Asia. I believe that this can best be accomplished through a carefully conceived statement by the President of the United States, patterned on the concept of Wilson's Fourteen Points, in which he would outline the kind of Southeast Asia we are striving to build once the fighting in Vietnam has been halted. I believe that the proposed outline of such a speech which I attached to my June 13 memorandum to the President/5/ and the 15 points which were included in my July 18 memorandum/6/ to you are generally valid. They can be substantially improved, however, as a result of constructive discussions in the Department of State and White House. /5/Document 214. /6/See the Attachment to Document 241. In my opinion a visit by me to the area would be useful at some stage in this situation. However, it is in no sense essential to the speech or statement which I think the President should make on the earliest practicable occasion. A personal note: As you know, I have been deeply concerned about many phases of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and indeed in all of Asia between Tehran and Seoul. To an uncomfortable degree I believe we still remain captives of actions by the past administration and of right wing associations and commitments which we inherited twenty months ago. To base U.S. policy in Southeast Asia on the optimistic assumption that we are about to teach the Communists a hard lesson in Vietnam and that other matters can wait sounds perilously similar to the posture of the French in the early 1950's. At best it is putting our eggs in a basket of questionable durability. In a political sense an "American bastion" in Southeast Asia is a dead end street even if it were feasible militarily. Our best hope for stability in this area lies in the development of a buffer concept into which we can draw most elements of the non-Communist left and right with the neutral orientation which has effectively curbed Communism in India, Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia. (As Mike Mansfield recently suggested, the two Southeast Asian countries which have been least closely connected with us--Cambodia and Burma--have been the most free of Communist pressure.) The prospects for a successful Laotian operation are moderately encouraging. The U.S.S.R. is far away and the harried Chinese Communists are steadily losing their capacity either to frighten or to persuade the nations of this area. I believe that our national interests will best be served by disengaging ourselves from the SEATO concept and encouraging a buffer area approach--as a means of undercutting the position of the Viet Cong and as a basis for the regional development of the entire area when the fighting is over. Even if this effort fails I believe that our overall position in Southeast Asia will be strengthened, and our objectives clarified before world opinion. The several memoranda which I have written to you and the President on Asia in general and this area in particular are based on intimate study of and association with these countries and many of their leaders over the last decade. On the basis of this experience, I was outspokenly critical of the negativism of U.S. policy in Asia during the eight years of the last administration. As the President's Adviser on Asian policy I am troubled to see the same kind of thinking still deeply rooted at the operational levels of the Department as illustrated by this memorandum. The Geneva settlement provides the basis for something more affirmative. Let's build on it. A good place to start is with an affirmative statement by the President in which he boldly spells out U.S. political, military and economic objectives in Southeast Asia. This could give us the initiative in Asia for the first time since Mao Tse-tung conquered China.
268. Memorandum From the Former Political Counselor of Embassy in Vietnam (Mendenhall) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rice)/1/ Washington, August 16, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-1662. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Mendenhall. SUBJECT I have prepared this memorandum in accordance with your request that I set down my views on the Viet-Nam problem. It is confined to fundamentals, and makes no attempt to deal with other aspects of relative importance. 1. Situation 1959-1962. The Viet Cong have increased their armed regulars in South Viet-Nam from roughly 2,000 in late 1959 to about 20,000 today. The latter figure has remained fairly stationary during 1962, but in view of GVN claims of heavy Viet Cong casualties each month the Viet Cong obviously continue to be readily able to replace large losses. Infiltration from North Viet-Nam is not to be belittled as a source of this strength, but the majority of VC forces have been locally recruited and continue to be so. In late 1959 the GVN had effective control over almost all of South Viet-Nam (except for old Communist base areas like the Plaine des Joncs). One could travel, at least by day, almost anywhere in Viet-Nam without escort, and in Central Viet-Nam security was virtually absolute. Today the Viet Cong effectively control large areas of the countryside except when GVN security forces enter in adequate numbers, and much of the rest of the countryside oscillates between the two sides. Real government control is largely confined to the cities and towns. Current Trend. While the rapid deterioration of September-October, 1961, especially in anti-Communist morale, was stopped by increased U.S. military aid and improvements in GVN military capabilities, the present overall security trend continues gradually against us. In the Central Viet-Nam lowlands provinces security has seriously deteriorated during 1962. The Central Viet-Nam highlands provinces are, on the other hand, in better shape than at the end of 1961, but this seems attributable, in part at any rate, to Viet Cong shift in focus from that area to the lowlands where ethnic Vietnamese recruits and food are available. In southern Viet-Nam (the provinces south and immediately to the north of Saigon) the military situation is superficially a stand-off, but it is actually somewhat in our disfavor as Communist-initiated incidents continue at a high level and the populace is thus not getting effective government protection. Isolated areas (like Father Hoa's area at the southern tip of Viet-Nam) have improved, but they represent the exception rather than the rule. Prospect. The future trend is likely to continue to be gradual deterioration, with perhaps an occasional dramatic large-scale Communist incident carried out for psychological purposes. There is no immediate prospect of Communist conversion of their guerrillas into conventional forces, but they may feel this will not be necessary for their take-over of South Viet-Nam. They may instead decide to depend upon war fatigue in South Viet-Nam and/or the U.S. If the war drags on with gradual deterioration and no hope of victory, the danger will arise of a switch in political sentiment among the South Vietnamese educated class from strong anti-Communism to neutralism as the only way to stop the war. From the U.S. standpoint I believe this would be disastrous as neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone would shortly lead to Communist take-over from North Viet-Nam. 2. Why Are We Losing? Fundamental Factor. President Diem and his weaknesses represent the basic underlying reason for the trend against us in the war. Under present circumstances his excellent qualities of intelligence and courage are outweighed by two great weaknesses: a) the organizational inefficiency of his government resulting from his failure to take decisions, refusal to delegate, lack of chain-of-command, refusal to permit errors and distrust; and b) his inability to rally the masses to his support because of his defects as a politician. To win against the Communists, the Government of Viet-Nam should be either efficient or popular, but the Diem Government is neither. There is common agreement on the essentiality of support of the population if our side is to win the war. Since the GVN does not now have this support, it cannot get adequate intelligence from the people to rout the enemy, and the enemy continues to be able to maintain its strength through recruitment from the population. To break this vicious circle, the government must win the support of the villagers by providing adequate protection and helping them improve their lot. This the strategic hamlet program is designed in theory to do, but the Diem Government's organizational inefficiency and poor political approach give little promise that the program will be effectively implemented by that government. Despite frequent U.S. prodding over many months no real priorities for the establishment of strategic hamlets have been set up, and no systematic allocation of limited civilian and military resources has been made in support of the program. Instead prominent officials are pushing forth everywhere at once to complete the number which will satisfy the pressures from Saigon, even though in almost all essential respects many--probably the bulk--of these hamlets will be inadequate to achieve their purposes and the people will often have been forced to labor in vain. The political approach used under Nhu's tutelage in the strategic hamlets (establishment of mass organizations and reliance on "self-help", i.e., forced labor) is more likely to alienate than win the people, and the election of hamlet officials by secret ballot is likely in Viet-Nam's atmosphere to be a sham. The economic and social component of the program--vital to gaining active support of the people--has received virtually no GVN emphasis to date except in a few model hamlets and the two clear-and-hold areas where we have been operating closely with the Vietnamese. For all these reasons there is a serious risk of compromising the strategic hamlet program in the eyes of the people. There is no chance of changing Diem and Nhu's political ways or methods of organization and governing. Diem is too old and set in his mandarinal ways. Both he and Nhu are convinced they know Viet-Nam better than anyone else, and thus infrequently accept advice. Both likewise so basically distrust almost everyone outside the family that they are completely disinclined to change their "divide and rule" method of governing. 3. Conclusion and Recommendations Conclusion: That we cannot win the war with the Diem-Nhu methods, and we cannot change those methods no matter how much pressure we put on them. Recommendation: Get rid of Diem, Mr. and Mrs. Nhu and the rest of the Ngo family. Alternatives: a. Vice President Tho and General "Big" Minh as a duumvirate, with Tho succeeding constitutionally to the Presidency and Minh, the most popular general, in charge of the armed forces. This would be the preferred alternative. Tho's qualities as a politician and flexibility outweigh his weaknesses. Equally important, while a government by him and Minh might per se not be much more efficient than the Diem Government, they would permit U.S. advisors to operate closely on the civilian as well as the military side, and thus give us the chance largely refused by Diem and Nhu of infusing efficiency into the GVN's operations. b. General Le Van Kim and General "Big" Minh. If Vice President Tho refuses to cooperate in the overthrow of Diem (and no one can say whether he would until he is sounded), then a combination of Kim (the most intelligent of all the generals) and Minh would be the second alternative. At present Kim is Minh's deputy in the Field Command, and it would probably be acceptable to Minh for Kim to run the Government and Minh the armed forces. c. Tran Quoc Buu, President of the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers. Head of the only important organization in Viet-Nam not under government control, Buu has the qualities of a good politician, and knows how to influence the people. An early close colleague of Nhu's in organizing the Can Lao Party, he is no longer close to the Ngo family, but has not broken completely with it. What Buu's relations with the military would be are not known, nor could one be sure without sounding him of his willingness to head a coup effort. Comparative Risks: The risk involved in switching from Diem to an alternative would be substantial because of possible Communist military gains in the attendant confusion (especially if the crisis were prolonged). But this can be counteracted, at least in part, by temporary U.S. military intervention during the crisis to prevent Communist seizure of towns. There is also the risk of failure of a coup, with its adverse effects on our future relations with Diem. But Diem has no place else to turn except to the U.S. for support. And the overriding risk is the likelihood of the loss of Viet-Nam to the Communists if we stick with Diem. 4. How the Coup Might Be Carried Out/2/ /2/Next to this heading is written: "(Sounds like a very complicated job and hard to keep secret beforehand. ER)." (I have never carried out a coup, and am no expert in this field. I am suggesting a possible means of doing it--the best that has occurred to me--but there may be better ways.) It would be desirable to keep the U.S. hand in the coup concealed to the maximum extent feasible. We would want to avoid any public connotation that the new government was our puppet. However fear of exposure should not deter our discreet involvement. We shall always be accused by some of involvement (just as we were with respect to the November, 1960, coup attempt and the February, 1962, palace bombing)./3/ The cardinal rule would be not to admit involvement publicly. /3/Regarding the February bombing of the palace, see Documents 87-97; for documentation on the November 1960 coup attempt, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. I, pp. 631 ff. The appropriate U.S. officials would quietly sound out a few carefully selected Vietnamese (such as Tho and Minh) about a coup possibility, and would if indicated make known its readiness to support a coup at the proper time. With this encouragement these few Vietnamese would contact other Vietnamese about participation. U.S. contacts would be kept very limited to restrict knowledge of our role. We would advise behind the scenes on organization, and let the Vietnamese do all of the implementing. The aim would be immediate seizure of all of the Ngo brothers and Mme. Nhu and their immediate removal from Viet-Nam if they survived the process of seizure. The physical process of seizure would probably be easier when Diem and the Nhus are out of the palace traveling around the country. It would preferably be carried out when brothers Thuc (the Archbishop) and Luyen (Ambassador to the U.K.) are out of the country since they would be taken care of simply by preventing re-entry. Thuan (Secretary of State for the Presidency) and Tuyen (head of the secret police) would be detained to prevent counter-plotting, but could probably be released after the coup was over since it is doubtful they would pose any real danger to a new regime. Since the armed forces represent the only real power force in Viet-Nam, it would be necessary to line up in advance in support of the coup as many of their key elements as feasible. Discretion would dictate caution in too wide an approach, but since plans for seizure of the Ngo family could miscarry at first, discretion should be balanced against the possible need to use the armed forces extensively and the desirability of denying the Ngo family the possibility of rallying a significant segment of the armed forces. The U.S. should be prepared to introduce combat military forces into South Viet-Nam to prevent Communist seizure of provincial towns during the crisis. If necessary to execute this step, the U.S. should publicly announce its neutrality between the contending anti-Communist forces in Viet-Nam. We should not be deterred from the step by the absence of a request from the GVN. Timing of a coup would be extremely important. Preferably the coup should be carried out when there is publicly clear trend against the GVN in the war with the Communists since many more Vietnamese would be psychologically prepared to support a coup under these circumstances. It would be preferable also to keep the interval between widespread planning and execution short because of the danger of leaks. This does not mean, however, that the U.S. might not discreetly work with selected Vietnamese on the development of coup plans well in advance of widespread contacts and execution. American dependents should have been evacuated from Viet-Nam in advance of execution of the coup plans. Otherwise we might well find them hostages in the hands of the Diem Government which would not hesitate to use them to pressure us.
269. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to the Vice President/1/ Washington, August 17, 1962. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, Colonel Burris Reports. Secret. RE The program for South Vietnam which you delineated in your memorandum to the President in May of last year/2/ continues to be the basis for U.S. effort in that area. Your program was modified only slightly by General Taylor's mission/3/ in three specific military areas, as follows: (1) improve intelligence, (2) improve communications, (3) provide air logistics. The net result of General Taylor's recommendations was to provide information as soon as possible on Viet Cong activities and to offer a means of transport whereby Government troops could move swiftly to attack the Communists. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 59. /3/For documentation on Taylor's visit to Saigon, October 18-25, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 169 ff. In the economic field, your recommendations were augmented and amplified by the Staley Committee,/4/ with which recommendations you are familiar. The recommendations of Dr. Staley were generally accepted and the measures which have been implemented have been generally successful. /4/The Staley Report on South Vietnam is not printed, but see the letter transmitting the report, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 93. The specific measures in your program have therefore been proven to be sufficiently comprehensive. The goals which were set remain essentially unchanged, and constant surveillance is maintained in State and Defense on the degree of achievement or accomplishments in each specific point or area (see attached memorandum). On the practical side, there has been concern as to just what these measures have contributed toward winning the war, or at least toward reversing the trend sufficiently in favor of Government forces to permit victory in the foreseeable future. While the conditions described in the recent Newsweek article/5/ are rejected by State and Defense, it is virtually impossible to elicit specific replies from either of those Departments as to the degree of success or failure, particularly in the military field. While confidence in eventual victory is generally accepted, only General Harkins has said that "we are on the winning side". Mr. Wood in State assessed the situation by saying that the trend against the U.S. in South Vietnam was halted last November, but presently we are just about holding our own and an upward trend in our favor is not yet clearly in sight. /5/Presumably a reference to Francois Sully's article in the August 20, 1962, edition of Newsweek. Politically, Diem is, if anything, weaker than he was when you met him, but the U.S. is determined to work with him in the absence of a reasonable alternative. Economically, progress is being made through the excellent cooperation of the Vietnamese on the principles set down by the Staley Committee. Socially, much progress has been made in health measures, agriculture credits and improvements, education, and information. Great emphasis is being placed on these social activities because of the recognition that the real strength of Vietnam lies with the peasants and the Army and not with the central Government. Certain achievements here, however, are going to be more gradual. Militarily, such statistics as incidents, casualty rates, desertions, loss and capture of weapons, frequency and size of attacks, border infiltration, etc., do not reflect such a favorable picture. We are now in a period where the impact of U.S. training, supplies, assistance, doctrine and technique should soon be felt and yield results. Mr. McNamara has held six conferences in Hawaii with the Ambassadors and principal military people from the area. While the voluminous transcripts of those conferences reflect great attention to detail in providing for optimum success of American effort, there is also a repetition of Mr. McNamara's philosophy that the United States must make an effective showing in Vietnam as quickly as possible or be misunderstood by the American people, Congress and indeed by the world. There is also motivation to avoid the charge of "too little, too late". With the settlement in Laos, great attention has been paid to the transfer of Viet Cong forces, but such an increase has not yet been detected. However, the border crossing problem, as it has long existed, remains practically unsolved. There have also been rumors that the Communists would seek a Laos-type settlement in South Vietnam, but such a settlement is currently ruled out because the South Vietnamese people will not willingly accept the kind of settlement imposed in Laos. While Mr. McNamara has pursued the military effort with a great sense of urgency, he has, for planning purposes, established a time factor to carry out the President's decision last year to seek the settlement in Laos and to defend South Vietnam. In addition to the elements of urgency described above, he has also set forth the assumption that the present effort will be maintained for three years. This is not to say that the effort will be terminated or phased out in this period, but rather it is a realistic expression of a reasonable period during which success must be achieved or at least be in sight. Under present circumstances we appear to be just about turning the corner.
[Attachment] Memorandum Prepared in the Vietnam Working Group/6/ Washington, August 16, 1962. /6/Drafted by Wood and C. Richard Spurgin. SUBJECT The following points were discussed (some appeared in the Joint Communique of May 13, 1961/7/). Each is followed by a description of its present status: /7/For text of this communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1043-1045. 1. Agreed to infuse into our actions high sense of urgency and dedication. Achieved on both sides, as evidenced by the American military build-up, improved Vietnamese morale, exchanges of messages between President Kennedy and President Diem, and the momentum behind the strategic hamlet program in Viet-Nam. President Diem told Ambassador Nolting last month that US-Vietnamese cooperation was excellent. Both sides are agreed on the importance of helping the peasants quickly by means of the strategic hamlet program. 2. Diem pleased US has approved MAP support for 20,000 force increase but pointed to problem of paying local currency costs for this increase. The present regular armed forces level is now about 200,000, or 50,000 above the level in May 1961. The local currency problem has not been completely solved. However, GVN deficit financing, higher yields on US-financed imports, increased tax collections, combined with US assurances that we will provide resources needed to stem possible inflation, have been sufficient to move ahead with the buildup. 3. Agreed parallel political and economic action has equal importance with military measures but stated political and economic actions must be those appropriate to Viet-Nam as country which is underdeveloped and subject Communist subversion. There has been political and economic progress since May 1961, although Diem's popular support has probably declined. This is counterbalanced by momentum achieved m the strategic hamlet program already underway, which shows great promise to reverse the trend as villagers get security, more local self government, economic benefits and a greater stake in the outcome of the war. 4. Agreed to increase in MAAG personnel. A steady increase of U.S. training, advisory and logistic support personnel commenced in May 1961. The number has risen from 700 to 10,000, including those in operational units attached to the new Military Assistance Command/Viet-Nam (MAC/V), of which MAAG is now a component. MAAG advisers in each province are doing a terrific job. 5. Agreed to MAAG support and advice to Self-Defense Corps. The training and rearming of SDC units is proceeding rapidly and they are giving a good account of themselves. 6. Diem pleased with MAP support for entire Civil Guard force of 68,000. Training has been speeded up with a target of training and rearming all CG units by the end of calendar 1962. The strength target for FY 1964 is now 90,000. 7. Diem accepted offer of material support for the Junk Force. Construction is underway to develop a force of 28 Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four divisions are now operational and performing their mission to harass VC seaborne communications and stop infiltration from outside. 8. Noted that we are prepared to consider the case for further increase in the strength of GVN armed forces. We have established a force goal of 225,000 (an increase of 50% from May 1961) to be achieved by June 1964. 9. Agreed to further urgent joint study of border control techniques. Plans and concepts for border control are still under study by RVNAF and U.S. advisors. Intelligence on infiltration is improving, especially as patrols of mountaineers are being rapidly formed. US planes and helicopters and improved radio communication now make it possible to bring Vietnamese troops quickly to any threatened point. 10. Agreed to consider establishment in southeast Asia of research and development facilities. Combat test development centers have been established and are in operation in Viet-Nam and Thailand. Research has led to many improvements, e.g. better arms and armament for helicopters. 11. Agreed to use of US military specialists to assist Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities at village level. Stressed importance of tact of foreign officials in working in this field. US forces are working in all forty provinces to train the Vietnamese Armed Forces in civic action and civil affairs, as well as mounting their own civic action programs. 12. Agreed to renew border control negotiations with the Cambodian Government. In spite of repeated efforts by the US, joint Vietnamese-Cambodian control has not been effected and incidents are frequent, causing friction and helping the Viet Cong. Cambodia did, however, invite the GVN to send a military commission to visit border areas and determine the extent of Viet Cong activity on the Cambodian side. The GVN has accepted and will dispatch a team shortly. It might develop into a joint operation. 13. Agreed on desirability of using foreign non-American experts in counter-guerrilla field, but stressed it would be up to initiative GVN to request these experts and they would have to work under its control. The British have sent a highly qualified advisory mission. Many of its recommendations have been accepted. Australia has sent thirty trainers to augment US MAAG activities. Other countries have sent survey missions or are being approached to provide help. 14. Agreed to proposal for sending US economic and fiscal experts to work out financial plan as basis for joint efforts. A mission under Dr. Eugene Staley worked out a plan with the Vietnamese and completed its work in Viet-Nam in July 1961. The plan was adopted and embodied in National Security Action Memorandum 65, August 11, 1961./8/ As a result the Vietnamese have added import taxes so that aid dollars now generate more piasters. /8/Not printed, but see the editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 118. 15. Agreed we should work together on a longer range economic development program. The GVN has announced a formal 5-year plan, but it is more in the nature of a catalogue of projects than an integrated plan. The ongoing AID program is continuing to contribute to long range development, but conditions in Viet-Nam have required a shift in emphasis to programs with an early pay-off which can help win the war sooner. 16. Diem presented memo to Vice President on need for additional commodity aid and for relaxation of "Buy American" policy on aid to Viet-Nam./9/ /9/Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 519 from Saigon, May 16, 1961. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/5-1661) The amount of assistance which could be absorbed by Viet-Nam was a matter of dispute in May 1961. The Staley Mission subsequently established criteria which have proven workable for that portion of commodity aid channeled through the private sector. In addition, commodities and equipment procured directly for the public sector (e.g. materials for strategic hamlet construction), which are not affected by the absorptive capacity of the private sector, have been increased significantly.
270. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President/1/ Washington, August 23, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. According to another copy, this memorandum was drafted by Rice and Wood on August 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 851K.23/8-2362) SUBJECT /2/Document 262. Description About six Vietnamese operated helicopters with Vietnamese air support would spray herbicide on 8 areas of land totaling 2500 acres as a part of the successful Hai Yen II operation now taking place in Phu Yen province. These fields are in the mountains. On the basis of ARVN intelligence Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins believe that these crops will, unless destroyed, nourish local Viet Cong. However, there is no first-hand evidence to prove that this riceland is primarily for Viet Cong use (Tab A/3/). Because of this operation there are resources in the province to care for any Viet Cong or Montagnards who may flee the area. /3/Telegram 129 from Saigon, August 8; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/ 8-862. It is not feasible for ground troops to enter this area and destroy the crops. If the operation is to be carried out, it should, to be effective, be done in August. Disadvantages (a) Although conducted by Vietnamese, there would be Communist propaganda attacking the use of U.S. aircraft and techniques for the destruction of Asian people's food. (b) The way to win a guerrilla war, basically, is to win the people. Crop destruction runs counter to this basic rule. The problem of identifying fields on which the Viet Cong depend is hardly susceptible to solution so long as the Viet Cong and the people are co-mingled. The Government will gain the enmity of people whose crops are destroyed and whose wives and children will either have to stay in place and suffer hunger or become homeless refugees living on the uncertain bounty of a not-too-efficient government. Other people, who merely sympathize with them, will also hate the government for crop destruction. The use of strange chemical agents, to destroy crops, strikes at something basic implanted in human beings (even if the people do not--as many will--fear that the chemical agents are also directly harmful to people). (c) Use of United States aerial spraying techniques to destroy crops in Viet-Nam may give rise to Communist propaganda that the United States is embarking on chemical warfare in Asia. This could give rise to increased charges of use of poison gas and perhaps even of biological weapons against Asian population. Advantages and Other Considerations (a) We have already carefully limited our supporting role in Viet-Nam. We should not voluntarily deprive ourselves of the use of new techniques unless we are sure the Vietnamese can subdue the Viet Cong without them. (b) The most effective way to hurt the Viet Cong is to deprive them of food. Food is scarce in their mountain strongholds and food destruction there can be most effective. (c) Neither the method nor the concept are new. The British destroyed some crops from the air in Malaya. In Viet-Nam, both sides are destroying each other's food. The Vietnamese have been burning Viet Cong crops with air-dropped napalm for some months. Napalm damages the soil for several years; defoliants do not. (d) The GVN is very anxious to undertake this program and is looking into purchasing the chemicals in Hong Kong, Taiwan or Tokyo. If the GVN does this, it will be more difficult for us to control and delimit the operations. (e) We have already absorbed some Communist propaganda accusing us of destroying crops in connection with our earlier defoliant tests (Tab B)./4/ This propaganda did not arouse major international repercussions. The Communists may continue these charges even if we stop all defoliant and do not engage in crop destruction operations. Communist charges of germ warfare in Korea were not withdrawn consequent to the fact that, being untrue, they could not be proven. /4/Telegram 145 from Saigon, August 15; ibid., 751K.23/8-1562. (f) With available techniques and chemicals the crops can be killed (Tab C)./5/ /5/Tab C was a six-line extract from an operational program on vegetation control. (g) Earlier limited defoliation experiments in Viet-Nam are reported to have had the following effects: a. Viet Cong leaders issued orders which showed concern (Tab D)./6/ /6/Tab D was a three-paragraph extract from a review of the defoliation program in South Vietnam. b. According to Ngo Dinh Nhu, defoliation appeared to the Montagnards as a powerful weapon, suggesting that the GVN is the more powerful side which they should join; he has asserted it also made the Viet Cong put more pressure on the Montagnards to ensure adequate food supplies, and contributed to their leaving Viet Cong areas. c. In neighboring Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk did not show concern. Conclusions Destroying crops will inevitably have political repercussions. Intelligence is not yet reliable enough to assure that the crops destroyed are those controlled solely by the Viet Cong. Some innocent, or at least persuadable, peasants will be hurt and the Viet Cong will make the most of this in their propaganda and recruiting. Internationally, there will undoubtedly be greater reaction to a program of crop destruction than there was to defoliation. Since food in South Viet-Nam is plentiful, it is not likely that a program for destroying crops would be effective enough to produce starvation among the Viet Cong, but two realistic strategic goals do seem possible. First, an effective program might be able to cut down food supplies enough to prevent the Viet Cong from stockpiling, thus making it difficult for them to concentrate large forces and sustain them in combat. Second, an effective program would force the Viet Cong to spend an increasing proportion of their time on acquiring and transporting food, rather than fighting. It seems clear, however, that such results could be achieved only at a later stage in the counter-guerrilla campaign, after the Viet Cong have been isolated from the peasants and driven into well-defined areas of concentration. To be effective, the program would have to be extensive, and it is doubtful whether the government could carry out an extensive program while the Viet Cong are as widely dispersed as they are at present. An ineffective or premature program would only force the Viet Cong to intensify their efforts to penetrate or destroy nearby strategic hamlets, and the strategic hamlet program is in its present nascent state still extremely vulnerable. Recommendations I recommend that we make the foregoing conclusions known to Ambassador Nolting and ask that he seek to dissuade President Diem from now embarking independently on a crop-destruction program which would be at least premature. I further recommend that the program under immediate consideration be disapproved. Dean Rusk/7/ /7/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
271. Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting/1/ Washington, August 24, 1962, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 65 D 172. Top Secret. The source text bears a notation that it was a Department of State draft that was not cleared with the Department of Defense. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. [Here follows the beginning of the memorandum, which dealt with Laos.] Crop Destruction--Viet Nam General Lemnitzer said that the JCS were being urged by General Harkins, Ambassador Nolting and the SVN Government to agree to a program of crop destruction in the north. If this program is to be effective, it must be undertaken quickly before the crops ripen and are harvested by the VC. General Lemnitzer asked Mr. Johnson how State felt about the proposed program. Mr. Johnson said that State has not agreed to it and that State has received the views of Secretary McNamara and the JCS which support the program. Accordingly, in view of the importance of the matter and the differences in the positions taken by State and Defense, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will have to decide the issue. General Lemnitzer then asked Mr. Johnson to cover the basis for the State position. Mr. Johnson said that the State position is contained in a memorandum to the White House which had been approved the previous evening./2/ He noted that he had given a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Rowen of ISA (Rowen was present at this meeting). Mr. Rowen then passed his copy of the memorandum to General Lemnitzer. After reading the memorandum General Lemnitzer remarked that the matter will have to be decided at a higher level. However, he stated that he personally disagreed with the State memorandum. He said that he desired to proceed with the destruction of VC food stocks and this program was a good way to accomplish the objective. Mr. Johnson said it was doubtful that we could destroy VC crops without destroying Montagnard crops at the same time. The crops are in the same area and are not readily identifiable as belonging to one or the other of the two groups. General Lemnitzer said that this is not a problem because the VC have driven the Montagnards out of the area and thus all crops will be harvested and consumed by the VC. Mr. Johnson said that the crops were not planted and raised by the VC but by the Montagnards. Mr. Rowen said that the SVN program called for dose control and that the operation would be conducted on a careful basis right down to the village level. Mr. Johnson noted that the proposed program posed great psychological problems even though the chemicals to be used were obtainable at a hardware store. They were in fact similar to materials we use on our own lawns. The proposed destruction using aircraft had psychological drawbacks. General Lemnitzer remarked that the program would have great military advantages. Mr. Johnson said that there is no precedent for this type of action except in the case of British employment of a similar program in Malaya. General Lemnitzer said that it is strange that we can bomb, kill, and burn people but are not permitted to starve them. Mr. Johnson noted that food may be destroyed in storage dumps. /2/Document 270. [Here follows a section on Latin America.]
272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, August 24, 1962, 5:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-2462. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood and cleared by SOV. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 201. Department requests Embassy's views on line U.S. should take if Communist nations should launched concentrated campaign for conference on Viet-Nam at some future time. Our present objective in Viet-Nam is to help GVN to achieve the strength necessary to exercise predominant and continued sovereignty over that part of its territory which lies below the demarcation line. There is nothing to negotiate until this minimum objective is achieved. Having this policy objective the U.S. would, if there were a call for a conference, base itself on the position most recently set forth in President's letter of December 14/2/ and in Secretary's press conference statement of March 1./3/ (President Kennedy: "Our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in north Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary." Secretary Rusk: "the United States is always prepared to talk about situations which represent a threat to the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is the Communist aggression against Viet-Nam in disregard of the Geneva Accords.") /2/Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 322. /3/See Document 94. The following additional points could be made if necessary to meet a Communist campaign for a conference. However, the decision on whether and how to use them would depend on the circumstances since we will not voluntarily enter a lengthy public discussion on Viet-Nam. 1. It has been suggested Lao settlement provides model for Viet-Nam. International settlements, like forms of government, must be carefully tailored to situation of a particular country or they cannot be effective. The situations in Viet-Nam and Laos are certainly not the same. While the U.S. was willing to join in guaranteeing a policy of neutrality which was generally desired in Laos, it will not seek to impose neutrality on a nation which is fighting off aggression to keep its independence. The source of this aggression has been indicated in the most recent report of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam./4/ /4/See Document 208. 2. What can be gained by a conference on Viet-Nam now? Viet-Nam will not and cannot negotiate its freedom. Neither a man nor a nation can be asked to bargain for independence while facing an uplifted knife. Until aggression against Viet-Nam stops, all international actions should be designed to help this nation maintain its independence. Can other nations make peace for Viet-Nam? The United States is helping Viet-Nam fight for its freedom; we will not seek to persuade Viet-Nam to abandon its freedom at conference table. This is a Vietnamese war; there can be no lasting peace unless it is freely accepted by the Vietnamese./5/ /5/In telegram 202, August 27, the Embassy in Saigon concurred with the lines set forth in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-2762) Ball
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, August 25, 1962, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-2562. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 191. Reference: Department's telegram 181./2/ Both Embassy and MACV consider as encouraging those indications of VC hardships in highland areas reported MACV message mentioned reftel. While we have had many reports that VC are short of medical supplies and are having growing difficulties in obtaining food in highland areas, MACV report referred to records first real indication health conditions of VC may be sufficiently serious to affect operational effectiveness. Therefore, believe it premature attempt now assess significance this report. As follow-up reference telegram, MACV requesting Senior Adviser II Corps to follow matter closely and to report regularly on reliability and numbers prisoners giving this kind of information. (Since above written, we have received from Thuan translations of captured VC letters, et cetera, strongly reinforcing evidence. These being analyzed and summary will be sent separately.) /2/Telegram 181, August 22, reported that a MACV message to the JCS on August 20 had stated that the VC in II Corps area were suffering from shortages of medical and food supplies. (Ibid., 751K.00/8-2262) Existing evidence sufficiently impressive to conclude VC in highland areas having real difficulties obtaining food and medical supplies. This evidence shows that such operations as Haihyen, combining "clear-and-hold" and Strategic Hamlet Programs, plus the Montagnard flights, are beginning pay concrete dividends. All these indications reinforce our conviction that carefully conceived crop destruction programs in clearly VC areas (see Embtel 171/3/ and previous) can be important weapon against VC. These operations must be mounted quickly if to be effective. /3/Telegram 171, August 21, reported that General Harkins had received a letter from Thuan requesting the release of 5,000 gallons of defoliant for an operation against VC crops in Phu Yen province. (Ibid., 751K.00/8-2162) Nolting
274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 5, 1962, 11:33 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/8-362. Secret. Drafted by Barnard and cleared with SOA. 913. Reference: Embtel to Dept. 401, Saigon 2, Ottawa 2, London 63, Vientiane 5./2/ Under instructions from GOI Ambassador Nehru called on Harriman August 30 discuss Viet Nam. In addition, wide range other subjects covered in relaxed, cordial but exceptionally candid exchange: /2/Telegram 401, August 3, reported that Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia had asked the United States to go slow in its visible introduction of material into Vietnam lest it prejudice the utility of the ICC both there and in Laos. Galbraith suggested that Indian Ambassador Nehru call on Harriman for a full explanation of U.S. policy. (Ibid.) Viet Nam: Referring to Galbraith-Gundevia conversation (reftel) Amb raised question Viet Nam and said GOI uneasy about continuation and intensification US activities in SVN. GOI hoped after Laos conference/3/ there would be slowdown but there such obvious breaches of agreement by GVN, e.g., introduction US helicopters, that ICC will be forced issue citation and GOI cannot prevent it. Said M.J. Desai's view is "Indian cannot apply different standards to each ICC"; the Laos agreement must be enforced and this means the same ICC treatment for SVN. Ambassador continued that with escalation conflict SVN GOI worried that ChiComs will intervene. He asked if ChiComs assisting Viet Cong. /3/The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, which met intermittently May 15, 1961-July 23, 1962. Harriman replied we have no indications yet that ChiComs moving into Viet Nam since they preoccupied with own internal problems and Indian border dispute. We know ChiComs are building road near Phong Saly (Laos) and have combat troops this area, but there no way by which they can move easily into SVN. Said it was DRV rather than ChiComs who assisting Viet Cong in SVN. In Laos Soviet had supplied most equipment and transport, DRV the troops. Harriman said our position SVN as stated by President has not changed. We providing mil aid at Diem's request for self defense; if DRV aggression stops our additional mil aid would no longer be needed. Harriman had made three efforts with Pushkin in Geneva and also with DRV Foreign Minister to talk about DRV "calling off dogs" and had got nowhere./4/ Both had maintained that Viet Cong entirely local operation and Pushkin had contended that US backing unpopular tyrant. They seem believe Viet Cong can win in SVN with support of North by disrupting country. They would take over country but for our assistance. This much easier for ICC to see than is covert assistance given other side. Yet new Viet Cong offensive may come after end of wet season. ICC should look under the rug and not report only what is visible. /4/Regarding Harriman's conversation with Foreign Minister Mau see Document 246. Regarding Harriman's conversation with Pushkin on September 13, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 133, footnote 2. The other two efforts have not been identified. In answer questions from Amb if we satisfied with political/military progress SVN and how future looks, Harriman said we would like broader based government which would gain more support among intellectuals in Saigon; however we believe people in villages responding favorably to provision arms by GVN and ready to fight in defense. We believe villagers primary concern is security against Viet Cong. As to future we see guerrilla war might extend for years unless North decides it has had enough. Our objective is to help SVN get Viet Cong out of their country. In view very unhappy situation there we would welcome any constructive ideas which Indians can offer as friends. Amb replied he wished India could help; GOI had made approaches both sides without success. His reason for coming in see Harriman was to warn us there may be ICC reports which very displeasing to US. Harriman answered we have left it to our Embassy in Saigon to discuss this problem with ICC. Situation is different in Laos since under terms 1962 agreement/5/ ICC reports to co-chairman who have responsibility to see that agreement is carried out. Harriman said he did not wish to interfere with Saigon talks nor transfer them to Washington. /5/For text of the Declaration and Protocol on Neutral Laos, July 23, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083. Laos: Harriman noted that ICC not really enforcing agreement re withdrawal of troops in Laos although we very gratified at efforts Indian Chairman to make Commission effective. Problem is refusal of Pathet Lao permit ICC move about and inadequate number of ICC checkpoints. Souvanna helpful but Souphanouvong refuses admit Viet Minh presence in Laos though they have been observed by many reports. It ridiculous have only three check points; at least three required each zone. Our people are moving out of Laos on schedule in accordance with agreement that departure be checked by ICC; VM not doing same however. Harriman said we hope ICC will be vigorous and active in enforcing Laos agreement. Amb replied it will be. Cambodia: Harriman said our Amb now exploring with Sihanouk means assuring integrity, neutrality Cambodia and we now in process drafting Presidential reply Sihanouk letter./6/ Said we hoped Sihanouk would accept as substitute for conference of Geneva powers series letters in which each power would give bilateral assurances. Said US taking Sihanouk letter seriously since he man with many good qualities and laudable objectives despite his emotional approach to certain issues. Amb did not comment on Sihanouk letter except to say GOI also working on reply. /6/For text of Sihanouk's letter, August 20, and the President's reply, August 31, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1002-1004. ChiComs: Harriman mentioned having met Chen Yi socially in Geneva although nothing of substance discussed between them. Found Chen trying hard project himself as pleasant and reasonable but found no evidence ChiComs prepared yield any material points. Amb said Chen not quite so affable with Indians in Geneva. Said news of Krishna Menon and Chen dining together, and picture of Menon clinking glasses with Chen and Gromyko had caused strong public reaction in India. Noted Indian public very much worked up over border issue. Meeting concluded with agreement that Harriman and Amb should consult whenever problems of common interest arise./7/ /7/The following sentence at the end of this telegram was deleted before transmission: "General tone entire meeting leads us hope Ambassador's report will give accurate and sympathetic interpretation US position." Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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