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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
VIII. General Taylor's Visit to Vietnam, September 10-13, and Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency Thuan's Trip to the United States, September 11-25, 1962
280. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 22, 1962, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1590/9-2262. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 337. Reference: Department's telegram 327./2/ Below is summary General Taylor's conversation with President Diem September 11. Memo of conversation being pouched./3/ /2/Dated September 15. It asked the Embassies visited by General Taylor to transmit summary cables on the substantive discussions at each capital. (Ibid., 120.1590/9-1562) /3/The meeting took place at 5 p.m. at the Gia Long Palace. A copy of the 11-page memorandum for the record of this conversation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Sgn(62)42 Taylor Visit. In his opening remarks President Diem said that inability to form a valid estimate and pessimism prevalent in some circles, particularly the press, was result of failure to keep entire picture in mind at all times. Ambassador Nolting called his attention to recent objective New Yorker article by Shaplen. President next told General Taylor that VC had been forced revise their plans to overrun SVN and that present VC general plan is, in order of priority: Disrupt Strategic Hamlet Program, intensify propaganda vis-à-vis military, and give all out support to neutralist movement. In response query from General Taylor, President said he recognized value of helicopter support but stressed importance of artillery, pointing out role of his road building program to permit its deployment. The President next spoke of his recent directive to strike at heart of enemy, keep him on move and to plot and destroy all remote areas where VC could grow food or find safe havens. General Taylor agreed enemy must be pressed constantly. President mentioned long-range--to 1966--air support plan, saying that perspective of additional air power raised morale of people, gave impression of governmental stability and carried implication that program could be stepped up in emergency. President then mentioned VC buildup in Tchepone and Attopeu and said that possibility of Hitler type "folly" could not be discounted. As evidence that Strategic Hamlet Program was beginning to dry up VC's revenue within Vietnam he said that his Consul in Hong Kong had uncovered evidence that large amounts of piasters were being purchased there by Communists. Some of this money was to buy betrayal of SDC and CG members. In answer to General Taylor's question, President said that all 16,000 strategic hamlets would be needed, in addition to a certain number for protection of Montagnards. He said he considered that support of Montagnards trained and equipped to go back to their native haunts would constitute permanent advantage to government. He expressed doubt that, by themselves, they could be entrusted with defense of borders and spoke at length of their child-like nature and lack of initiative and leadership qualities. General Taylor emphasized that if Montagnards could be made into border guards, this would help considerably in solution of border problem. General Taylor asked if President was happy with progress made since earlier Taylor visit./4/ President replied in affirmative, stating Vietnamese were geared to idea of rational progress toward ultimate victory. He added that two of most important gains since General Taylor's last visit had been acquisition of thorough knowledge of terrain and emergence of competent military leaders. In economic field, President said, loss last year of 300,000 tons of rice, exportable part of harvest, had been low, but of course, it had not been publicized in order not give comfort to enemy. He produced charts showing good progress in production other crops, particularly in production of textiles, cotton, sugar and kenaf. He emphasized that his aim was to develop an industry which could be supplied from locally produced raw materials and that he had no interest in "prestige" assembly plants constructed by foreign capital in return for long term contracts for purchase of raw materials. /4/For documentation on Taylor's visit to Vietnam in October 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 169 ff.. At end of meeting, President Diem said that he asked British Embassy to confirm arrangements with Phnom Penh for expedition of military mission to Cambodia./5/ /5/Next to this paragraph in the source text was the handwritten note "Oh Lord". Nolting
281. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Cottrell)/1/ Washington, September 11, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Vietnam 1962. Secret. Copies were also sent to Trueheart, Rostow, Wood, INR, CIA, and DOD/ISA. SUBJECT This follows up on our conversation of somewhat over a week ago in which I discussed with you Mr. Rostow's and my ideas with respect to devising an objective means of measuring the trend of events in the countryside in Viet Nam. We are particularly interested in measures of the state of the relationship between the central government and the rural population. Our interest is stimulated by several factors. Perhaps because the population's sense of who is winning can be such an important factor in determining its attitude toward the struggle, once the tide begins to turn, there tends to be a multiplier effect. If this is the case, it is particularly important to obtain some measure of the way the tide is moving as a basis for pacing our own effort. Even more important, we need such information, of course, as the basis for adjusting U.S. and GVN activities to the changing situation. We have also been impressed by the great disparities in impressions of observers as to the state of progress on attitudes and the state of government progress in the countryside. Probably much of this variation is caused by the fact that different observers see different parts of the country or different aspects of what is going on. It would be desirable, if at all possible, to establish a system which would regularize observations. Our thoughts on the subject seem to me to complement and carry forward the suggestion that you and Ben Wood have been developing for improving political reporting from the provinces./2/ Our suggestions are as follows: /2/I have had the benefit, since talking with you, of suggestions by Ted Heavner. Although this memo has benefited from his comments, he was not asked to comment formally on it. [Footnote in the source text.] 1. Mr. Rostow has suggested that we adopt sampling techniques as the basis for a reporting system. We might carefully select a number of hamlets which are reasonably representative of the area in which they are located, develop regular contacts within them and attempt to report regularly on a series of indicators relating to them. Over a period of time we could build up a body of comparable data that would give us some idea as to trends. There are some obvious difficulties with sampling under present circumstances in Viet Nam. For example, there would be difficulty in obtaining access to hamlets which are under even partial VC control and probably even greater difficulty in obtaining accurate information on such hamlets. Moreover, if the central government (or district and province chiefs) became aware of the fact that certain hamlets were being made the subject of regular observation, they would probably devote particular effort to improving the situation in those hamlets and might also see that the reporting officer was given the "right" answers to his questions. It should be possible to get around at least this last difficulty, however. For example, it might be possible to select a group of, say, three hamlets which were generally representative of an area and report on them alternately. 2. It would be desirable to devise indicators which could be made reasonably objective. Where possible they should be quantifiable or measurable against some kind of rating scale with descriptive statements identifying each point along the scale. Such rating scales are, of course, familiar devices and have been developed, for example, by intelligence officers to measure extent of VC control of villages. The following are some suggested possible indicators of the scale and the effectiveness of the US-GVN effort: A. Does hamlet have an elected council? Was it elected by secret ballot? In attempting to get at answer to the question of whether the council election reflected true sentiments in the hamlet it would be desirable to analyze background of members elected. Are they from traditional local oligarchy? (The fact that they are or are not would probably have different significance in different areas of the country.) To what extent are they different from previous appointed councils in composition? How old are members? Were they at the time of their election, or had they previously been, government officials? Is membership on the hamlet or village councils actively sought or is it viewed primarily as an undesirable political and economic burden? B. Are people in the hamlet (or village) clear as to where real authority rests within the hamlet (village)? Are there perceptible differences in attitude toward Council members and other village leadership groups between the older and the younger generations of the rural population? C. How many hamlet council members (or other local officials) have received training in the past year? (If we can identify particular training programs that we consider particularly useful, this indicator would obviously be much more significant if it could be related to such programs.) D. How many times has the district chief visited the hamlet during the past month (or other time period)? Similarly for other provincial and district officials. How long did they stay? Did they talk to anyone but village or hamlet officials? E. How do officials learn of popular grievances? Is their any regular channel through which such grievances can be transmitted without significant risk of retaliation? How effective? How are grievances dealt with? Is there any machinery for this purpose? F. Has the local military commander issued instructions on dealing fairly and sensitively with the local population? What are civilian attitudes toward local military and para-military forces and vice versa? G. If this is an area in which the Cao Dai or the Hoa Hao are a significant factor it would be useful to know answers to such questions as: (a) Are there members of the sects on the hamlet council? Are they district chiefs? Province or district level officials? (b) Were (specified) sect religious celebrations held during the past year? (c) Does there appear to be discrimination against the members of the sects in the administration of government welfare programs? H. What is the lot of the poorer farmers? What evidence, if any, of improvement or retrogression in his condition? (Perhaps specific indicators could be devised to measure progress and retrogression.) I. What is the relationship between the farmer's costs and market prices for his product? Is this relationship a source of discontent? Has production increased or declined? For what reason? Does supply and cost of credit seem satisfactory? J. Is there an active civilian and/or military civic action program in the hamlet? Does the hamlet council formulate the hamlet's social-economic developments plans? If not, where is plan formulated? If so, what changes were made as a result of higher level reviews? Do such programs bring economic benefits to the hamlet from outside, or are their benefits all self-generated? (In other words, do they appear to rural populace to be simply another form of corvee labor?) Do they reach the poorer farmers? More directly, do hamlet-dwellers view civic action programs as improving their welfare and do they relate any improvement to government (district, province or central) activities? Are taxes collected? How? K. How many actions were taken in the last six months (year) by officials to enforce land reform legislation? (Would obviously need to be related to relevance of land reform in a particular area.) L. How many defections from the hamlet to the VC and how many re-defections? From what age, occupational, and economic groups did the defectors come? It would be desirable to attempt to correlate figures on defection with such other indicators as status of village guard, SDC and CG forces in the area, hamlet council electrons, etc. M. How many acts of terrorism by the VC against hamlet or village officials during the reporting period? Against other parts of the rural population? Was terrorism, where it occurred, selective? What was the basis of selection (e.g., economic class; unpopularity of officials; interference with government welfare program)? N. Has the hamlet been under pressure from the VC to supply food? What success has such pressure had? Has there been any change in this regard and, if so, to what factors is this change related (e.g., state of hamlet defenses)? O. What is the capability of the civil guard, local self-defense corps, and village or hamlet guard forces? (A rating scale for capabilities would be desirable.) How many weapons (by type) have been lost to the VC in the area in the reporting period? What is the status of defensive works (fences, moats, etc.)? P. Has a radio been installed in the hamlet? Has it been used to call for help? With what effectiveness? The above list is very long. It would probably be desirable to develop a reporting list in which items were ranged in order of priority, selecting for the highest priority those which are considered most representative and critical. As you will note, I have attempted to make the answers to as many questions as possible quantifiable. It is obviously much easier to outline a series of questions or indicators of this type than to get continuing, reasonably reliable, information on them. I realize, of course, that an outsider will have difficulty establishing the kind of relationship to hamlet-dwellers that is necessary to obtain this information although a skilled interviewer could obtain much information by indirect questions as well as by observation. It might also be useful in this connection to devise several general lines of questioning that could lead into these more specific questions. Ted Heavner pointed out, for example, that beginning a discussion with talk about crops and prices was often the best way to draw out villagers on their feelings about their economic situation, government programs, etc. Similarly, inquiries which begin with a question about how U.S. aid could help the hamlet better deal with its most pressing problems may lead to an exposition of unmet hamlet needs and the effectiveness of government programs. The above list does not adequately deal with one critical problem area--the attitudes of military and civilian officials in dealing with the rural population. For example, it would be desirable to devise a question which would provide meaningful reliable information on the subject of GVN treatment of persons suspected of VC sympathies. It is obviously difficult to develop questions which can be meaningfully reported upon in this area. 3. As a final suggestion, we ought to encourage the GVN to set up regular reporting procedures which would cover as many of these matters as can be made the subject of reasonably objective reporting procedures. What I have in mind is not strengthening of the intelligence services, but rather the establishment in a government department or departments which provide services at the hamlet and village level of reporting systems that would provide regular reports on such matters. Alternatively, a central statistical and reports office might be desirable. In particular, those questions that can be answered in a quantifiable way might be made the subject of regular reporting. This reporting would, for a number of obvious reasons, be imperfect. But, over fume, it could provide some indication of trends just as present figures on casualties can provide a kind of index number indicating trends even though the absolute figures on casualties are highly unreliable.
282. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Cottrell) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, September 11, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, Vietnam Correspondence. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. Dear Fritz: Ed Rice, having a very inquiring mind and conceiving it part of his job to question all operations in the area, has listed a number of questions which he says bother him. He asked me the other day what the answers were and I told him based on reports we have from the field. I do not have complete answers for all of them so I told him I would fire them out to you for complete answers. I hate to add to the burdens of your staff but if someone could dig out the replies it would serve the useful purpose. The following are the questions asked by Ed: 1. What has been the effect on the Government's base of support of aerial bombing and strafing of Viet Cong-occupied villages, and most especially of the use of napalm? (I have seen reports that the French are skill hated in areas of Laos where they used napalm bombs.) 2. How closely is the arming of villagers being timed with their assumption of responsibility for their own local defense, as symbolized by the building of village defenses? (We have heard of cases in which they do not get guns until they have beaten off an attack without them--a test no sensible man would want to be put to.) 3. In what per cent of cases are village electrons really free? We hear conflicting reports on this, and doubt that the villagers will really support men they do not choose themselves. 4. Is it true that the poorest villagers, who must live primarily by wages, are bearing the brunt of unpaid work on village defenses? 5. Does the Government have an inspection service adequate for identifying and dealing with official corruption in the Provinces? 6. Is it wise or necessary forcibly to move villagers into new strategic hamlets to the extent that is being done? 7. What more should be done to minimize extortion, stealing, rare, indiscriminate violence and other misbehavior by the ARVN and Civil Guards? (TDCS-3/520/576)/2/ Should the SDC, which is considered the worst of all, receive the same pay as the Civil Guards, in order to reduce its exactions on the people? /2/Not found. 8. To what extent do high crop rents skill create conditions favorable to the Viet Cong (TDCS 3/520/576) and inhibit full production? Would free distribution of fertilizer to the respective tenant farmers be an appropriate remedy? Are more basic reforms not needed? 9. How can we best minimize the extent to which we give the impression we are replacing the French in their colonial role? Has the American presence reached a counter-productive level? 10. To what extent is the GVN handicapped by Diem's use of northerners, Catholics and the Can Lao? 11. Where is the trend of support for the GVN upward, where downward, and why? Sincerely, Sterling J. Cottrell/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
283. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President/1/ Washington, September 18,1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. Drafted by Forrestal. SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM A recent cable (Saigon's 283 to the Department, attached)/2/ contains a somewhat bullish review of the political and military situation in that country. /2/Not found attached. Dated September 11, it transmitted Task Force Saigon's weekly progress report that featured an account of a conversation with Thuan on September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-1162) Several indicators of progress are given in the cable which, taken together, give us some hope that the various measures we have undertaken are beginning to prove effective. A. The month of August saw the highest enemy casualty totals since September 1961: 3,297 total casualties, of which 2,284 killed in action, 379 wounded and 634 captured. Total Viet Cong losses for the first 8 months of 1962 are reported to be 19,404, of which 12,791 were killed in action. GVN losses for the same period totaled 8,634 of which 2,984 were killed in action. I do not believe that one can rely entirely on these figures, although I am assured by State Department that there has been considerable improvement both in the accuracy of casualty reports and the degree of checking done by our own people. These figures suggest a 2-to-1 ratio in over-all casualties and almost a 4-to-1 ratio in the number of troops killed in action in favor of the GVN. If these ratios are sustained they will inevitably have an important adverse psychological effect on the enemy. I have asked the State Department to re-check these figures with the field in an attempt to get their most pessimistic estimate. B. Minister Thuan also reports that for the first time in 15 years the price of rice is dropping between two crop harvests--a time when it usually rises. He accounts for this phenomenon by referring to increased deliveries from the Delta where clearing operations have recently been more successful. C. The British, who have historically been most bearish on the success of our efforts in South Vietnam, have recently expressed "cautious optimism" for the future, and have spoken favorably about the progress we have been making; D. Although the evidence is still somewhat spotty, the results of an improved civic program are beginning to show up in terms of an uplift in village morale in some areas. The same is also true of the strategic hamlet program, which is now being conducted more nationally and in such a way as to minimize the unfavorable reaction which the villagers originally had to being forcibly removed to new locations. The attached cable gives somewhat more detailed information on the above, and you may wish to peruse it yourself. While we cannot yet sit back in the confidence that the job is well in hand, nevertheless it does appear that we have finally developed a series of techniques which, if properly applied, do seem to produce results. Furthermore we seem to have developed a group of Americans both in the field and in Washington who are capable of carrying these techniques forward with increasing effectiveness. Lastly there is evidence that the GVN is gradually coming to understand and agree with us on the importance of winning over the villagers to their side. There is reason to be concerned about domestic reaction to our policies in South Vietnam. There has been a considerable amount of bad publicity emanating from Saigon in recent months. Part of this is due to the fact that the newspapers and news magazines have not sent top drawer people to the area, and partly due to the attitude of the GVN toward the press in general. I think an effort should be made both here and in Saigon to correct both of these faults, and I am pressing the Department to give more attention to the problem. Should you have the occasion to discuss Southeast Asia with the editors or publishers of any of our larger news media, you might refer to this problem in general terms. Perhaps Ed Murrow could also give a hand.
284. Editorial Note At the end of August 1962, Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency Thuan informed the Embassy in Saigon that he would be in Washington for the meeting of the International Monetary Fund, beginning September 17. By August 27, the Department of State realized that Thuan was coming to the United States chiefly to discuss Vietnam with United States officials. (Memorandum from Heavner to Harriman, August 27; Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Thuan Visit) Subsequent exchanges of telegrams between Washington and Saigon revealed that Thuan would be accompanied by Buu Hoan, Head of the Research Department of the National Bank of Vietnam; Yu Quoc Thuc, Dean of the Saigon University Law School; and William Trueheart. Following a meeting with Admiral Felt at Honolulu, Thuan arrived in Washington on September 16, attended the Fund opening session on the following day, and met with various Senators and Representatives on September 18. On September 19, he discussed the Vietnam situation with Dean Rusk and U. Alexis Johnson at noon and then went to the White House for conversations with Michael V Forrestal and Carl Kaysen. The following day, he spent the morning at the Central Intelligence Agency, then met Averell Harriman at noon, before completing his talks with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lemnitzer and Secretary of Defense McNamara. On September 21, he talked with Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, before discussing the press situation in Saigon with Don Wilson, Deputy Director of the United States Information Service. Thuan spent September 22-24 in New York before returning to Washington on September 25 for meetings with the President and Attorney General. Documentation on the scheduling for the trip is ibid., Central File 033.51K11; and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Memoranda of Thuan's conversations with Rusk, Harriman, Wilson, and President Kennedy are printed here. A report on the conversation with Admiral Felt, largely devoted to the Vietnamese war effort, was transmitted in telegram 190056Z from Honolulu, September 19. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) A brief memorandum of Thuan's conversation with the Attorney General is in Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-2562. For a brief summary of several of the other meetings, see Document 295.
285. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 19, 1962, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-1962. Secret. Drafted by Wood, approved in S on October 4, and initialed by Harriman. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS In opening the conversation the Secretary referred to the prospective serious cut in the AID program emphasizing that this was an annual battle which was not always understood overseas. As to Viet-Nam he said that we were moderately encouraged and pleased by the initiative shown by the Vietnamese Government and its troops. Mr. Thuan replied that the progress was much greater than reported by the press. Whereas morale was very low a year ago there had been tremendous progress in the last six months. The Vietnamese plan to break up large VC units was successful even in Camau which had been under Viet Cong control for fifteen years. Priority was assigned to this area and to the delta since it was heavily populated and supplied so much food. The situation in Zone D was more difficult due to the jungle terrain and the fact that one division had to cover nine provinces. Vietnamese commanders feel good progress will be made right through until the end of the dry season in May. As in the previous two years the VC had attempted to take the offensive and knock the Vietnamese out during the rainy season. In 1960 and 1961 they had made big attacks in August and September. This year they were unable to do so since their main formations were broken. The migration of the Montagnards away from the VC has been most important as it deprives them of food and labor. The VC are not pushing them away because they need them as porters and to cultivate the land. The VC have strongly emphasized the cultivation of food by the Montagnards and that is why the GVN believes it is so important to kill crops in these areas. If the VC can't get food they can't live there. The Secretary inquired what effect crop destruction would have on the Montagnards. Mr. Thuan replied that the GVN had set up a large program to care for all Montagnards who may come over even if this cost more than the 50 million piasters in counterpart which had been originally set aside. A nationwide campaign to help the Montagnards is being carried out. Crop destruction will not hurt the Montagnards since they are leaving their villages. The food situation for the VC is difficult. The province chief of Phuoc Thunh province told Mr. Thuan recently that they are limited to seven cups of corn daily. He explained that crop destruction would speed up GVN success and assured Mr. Thuan that he could distinguish between VC rice fields and those of innocent people. The VC put a small hut in the middle of their rice fields. The number of Montagnards in each province is known and new rice fields are easy to spot. The Secretary turned to the question of relations with the American press stressing the importance of not giving the impression that Americans were being prevented from reporting. Adverse press reports would be less harmful than news that reporters were not being allowed to report. A hostile feeling should not be allowed to grow between the press and the Vietnamese Government. Sometimes the Americans can help quietly. Mr. Thuan replied that the GVN fully understood the importance of this matter and that he was trying to see as many members of the press as possible on his visit to Washington. In Saigon the Vietnamese Government simply could not understand occasions on which the press deliberately twisted the facts in a manner unfriendly to the Vietnamese Government. He cited the report by Bigart/2/ to the effect that President Diem was limiting the distribution of radio receivers to Vietnamese who were friendly to him, pointing out that distribution had actually been limited temporarily in the Ban Me Thuout area in certain places where only Radio Hanoi could be received. Governor Harriman said we face the practical problem that Sully would write a series of very bitter articles and said that it would have been much better if our Ambassador had been asked to have officials in Washington discuss this problem with Mr. Graham, the publisher of Newsweek, who is a very reasonable man. Mr. Harriman understood that certain French citizens in Viet-Nam (of course not the French Government) feel bitter about success of the American help to Viet-Nam because of French failure. Men such as Fall/3/ were using U.S. press. The fact remained that it was unfortunate to have Sully write these articles at a time when there was such a difficult struggle to obtain foreign aid. /2/Homer Bigart, The New York Times reporter. /3/Bernard Fall, author of Street Without Joy, who had just visited Saigon and was quoted as saying that the Vietnamese lacked adequate leadership. The Secretary turned to Vietnamese relations with its neighbors, pointing out that hostility between Southeast Asian nations was a barrier to achieving international support. He inquired about the military mission to Phnom Penh. Mr. Thuan replied that the GVN was prepared to send such a mission, that the question had been delayed due to a new government in Phnom Penh and that Prince Sihanouk had asked that a cabinet member and a general be sent to Phnom Penh preliminarily to discuss the question. The GVN was prepared to do this. Although it had few illusions about the success of such a mission it considered it the first step. The GVN did not wish to worsen its relations with the Cambodians since it had enough problems at home. The Secretary spoke of rumors in Phnom Penh to the effect that the Vietnamese Government was planning to overthrow Prince Sihanouk and said that these rumors did not make it easier to steady an emotional leader. He asked what could be done. Mr. Thuan replied that the GVN was doing absolutely nothing and reiterated three times that the rumors were completely untrue. Mr. Thuan pointed out that the reports of frontier incidents were usually very vague, that the French maps did not delimit the border dearly, that when incidents would occur the GVN apologized and offered to pay reparations. The Secretary inquired about a joint boundary commission. Mr. Thuan said a joint mission had been proposed for some time. But that the Cambodians would never accept. Mr. Harriman in reply to the Secretary's question as to whether the U.S. might suggest a joint boundary commission suggested that the most important step at this time was to get military representatives of the two countries together so that each could see how the situation looked from the other side. Mr. Thuan said the Cambodians were principally interested in settling the complex financial problem. He hoped to discuss this and the sending of a military mission to Cambodia further with Governor Harriman. The Secretary summed up by saying that it was of the very greatest importance to world peace that the battle be won as quickly as possible, that the U.S. had demonstrated its very strong support and the American government wished to emphasize its hope that the time would soon come when the Vietnamese could return to more peaceful ways. Mr. Thuan concluded his remarks saying that there had been two trends in Viet-Nam, those who believed in the French static method of defense (judging by early remarks to the reporting officer Thuan was probably referring to Vice President Tho), and those who support a war of mobility. The latter view was now dominant. The Vietnamese Government thanked the American Government for its assistance which was most useful and was one of the reasons why the Vietnamese were winning. He emphasized that America had made a good investment in money and men in Viet-Nam. It should not be thought that the war was over, the Communists would try to win either by big massive attacks--which would not be successful--or they would use political methods to seek to neutralize Viet-Nam. The Secretary commented that we did not believe that any effort from the Communist side to follow the pattern of Laos should be allowed to succeed. For example, the Lao had been allowed to commence an airlift. The time to stop an airlift was when the first plane came over. The Secretary was then called away. Afterwards Mr. Thuan commented to the reporting officer that he felt there had been very clear mutual understanding throughout the conversation.
286. Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Southeast Asia Task Force/1/ Washington, September 19, 1962, 2:30-4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 219. No drafting information is given on the source text. MEMBERS PRESENT William Trueheart, Minister at Saigon, and William Fippin, Deputy Director of USOM, Saigon, reported to the Task Force on the situation in South Viet Nam. Following are summaries of their comments: Comments by Mr. Trueheart Mr. Trueheart said he was tremendously encouraged by developments in South Viet Nam. The military progress had been little short of sensational and the intelligence capability had been greatly improved. Training for the Civil Guard units had begun to pay off, but more training was needed for the Self-Defense Corps. Mr. Trueheart noted that the Viet Cong have not yet made any large scale attacks even though the rainy season has begun and that this is evidence of the improved military situation. He said the Strategic Hamlet program has transformed the countryside and that he did not think the Viet Cong could now destroy the program. South Viet Nam's government organization to implement the program has improved and the plan is now better understood both in Saigon and locally. He said the biggest political move by the government was to convince the people that Montagnards were equals. He said the exodus of these people will hurt the Viet Cong and that the Montagnards have demonstrated they will fight to defend themselves. He noted that the way to destroy infiltration is to make it impossible for the infiltrators to support and maintain themselves on the plateau. Mr. Trueheart said that all these developments have taken place since last Christmas. Commenting on U.S.-Viet Nam relations, he said the government was now more willing to accept our advice. He thought that interagency relations in the U.S. mission at Saigon were excellent. In response to a question about the border situation in Cambodia, Mr. Trueheart said that, since there is no question that the Viet Cong are down along the border, there are bound to be incidents. He thought the two governments should try to develop some kind of informal cooperation between their respective military establishments. The one gloomy spot in the picture, he noted, was the mission's relations with the U.S. press corps. He asked for suggestions as to how to deal with this problem. The press, he said, believes that the situation in Viet Nam is going to pieces and that we have been unable to convince them otherwise. This matter was discussed briefly by the working group and Mr. Cottrell suggested that it be brought to USIA, Ed Murrow's, attention. Comments by Mr. William Fippin Mr. Fippin said he had been in South Viet Nam for five and one-half years. He stressed the cooperation among the U.S. agencies in Saigon. He noted that counterinsurgency was a new field of U.S. effort and that funds had first been shifted to this work in fiscal year 1962. It was only possible to begin funding properly in fiscal year 1963. He estimated that 25% of the mission's 62 budget had gone to this purpose and 2/3 or 3/4 of it would be used this year. He said that the GVN was beginning to shift its emphasis from creating an urban infra-structure to matters of rural concern. The mission is now able to work at the local level, instead of only through the central government. About 1,200 radio sets had been installed and the program was proceeding well. He thought the supply situation was steadily improving. Mr. Fippin noted that the Strategic Hamlet program was directed primarily by the government of Viet Nam and that our support was limited. Mr. Fippin wanted to show some films on the Strategic Hamlet program next week, which had been produced by the Viet-Namese government. Next Meeting The next meeting will be held on Wednesday, September 26./2/ /2/The minutes of this meeting are not printed.
287. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) and the Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency (Thuan)/1/ Department of State, Washington, September 20, 1962, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51K11/9-2062. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Harriman on September 21. Copies were sent to FE, INR, EUR, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. SUBJECT I saw Thuan alone. He told me of his talk with Fowler Hamilton./2/ He said he wanted to use the piastres which are normally used to repay our old MSP loans for a local development bank. He hopes Viet-Nam will be able to use our local currencies in Japan and elsewhere. This will be considered by Hamilton, but he thinks it will require legislation. He hopes we will help in getting a loan from the IDA. He feels this is very important because of our "Buy American" policy. This would give him some money to buy things that are essential in other markets. /2/No further record of Thuan's talk with AID Administrator Hamilton has been found. He pointed out that we had given 160 million dollars in aid last year of which they could only absorb 140 million on account of the lack of availability of American products. He spoke of a triangular arrangement whereby the French would purchase rubber from our stockpile and release francs to Viet-Nam for aid purchases from France. He was sorry that Spain was off the prescribed list as they had been buying iron, steel and medical supplies from Spain. The addition of Hong Kong did not help very much, particularly on account of the certificate of origin problem. Thuan said that he felt sure we would agree that the main measures recommended in the Staley Report/3/ had been carried out. He pointed out, for example, that the construction of schools in Saigon were of barracks-type construction, rather than permanent, and that the savings thereon would be used in the countryside. He said the village political situation had improved. The election of local officials had helped create better feeling. The Viet Cong were having difficulty in recruitment, more so than at any time in the past. He said that he thought the villagers were generally fed up with the Viet Cong. /3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 93. He gave me some complicated figures about the officers training school. He said that this year they had the largest number they had ever had. There were two thousand spaces but 2300 had volunteered. He pointed to the fact that for the first time in 15 years the price of rice had gone down at this time in the rainy season. I asked him about the amnesty plan. He said they would try to get it through shortly, perhaps the latter part of October or November. He recognized it would have to be done carefully, at a time of success, rather than of setback. Thuan thought the direction of their psychological warfare was working out better in agreement with the U.S. advisers. He was generally more optimistic now than he had been for some time. We discussed the question of the press. I asked him what they were doing to get a better atmosphere. He said that the information setup was being reorganized for the press and they were having group trips for the foreign press to see what was going on in the country. He expressed suspicion of the reports of the visit in Hanoi of the Indian Ambassador, Head of the ICC./4/ /4/On September 6 the Embassy in Saigon reported that the ICC had returned on September 4 from a 4-day trip to Hanoi during which the Indian Chairman, Goburdhan had been received by Ho Chi Minh. (Telegram 252; Department of State, Central Files 751G.00/9-662) I spoke to him about Laos in vigorous terms. "We are trying our best to help you--now it's up to you to cooperate with us." I said we couldn't give him any guarantees, but their pulling down their flag in Laos set us back. We did not expect them to retain their Ambassador; they could leave their Charge. I said that if they had been realistic in the beginning, they could have found some way of having a representative from the North, rather than an Ambassador in Laos. He appeared to agree and said he would telegraph strong recommendations to Diem. We talked about Cambodia at lunch. Thuan said it was pretty hard to take the insults which Sihanouk was piling on Diem--that he was a stooge for the Americans. I said that if President Kennedy could take it, I didn't see why Diem couldn't. The important thing was to come to an understanding on the border problems in connection with the Viet Cong. I could not guarantee anything, except I believe if they sent an intelligent military officer to Phnom Penh he would get more cooperation on the Viet Cong border problems. Sihanouk had promised us that the Vietnam Mission could go "anywhere at any time." If that promise were not carried out, we would certainly go to bat. Sihanouk believed that both Vietnam and Thailand were conspiring against him. Thuan denied it. I replied that right or wrong, Sihanouk believed it, and that was part but not all of the reason for Sihanouk's explosions. Sihanouk had no intention of putting himself in the hands of the communists. I said Thuan could not neglect the fact that Sihanouk had only French and American military advisers. Thuan told me when I spoke to him privately that General Harkins and the Viet-Nam military were getting along extremely well and so were their relations with Nolting. He thought the differences of judgment and opinion had been worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. I had a word to say about improved political action, and he countered by saying that support of the peasants would come with security and the program for village improvement. He said it was impossible to buy much U.S. fertilizer because it was too expensive and the peasants could not afford it. I told him I thought the political and economic program for the villagers should keep pace with the military and hoped that would be kept in mind. He said that Diem was not afraid of plots against him at the present time. There was no group behind the two Air Force officers who had bombed the palace./5/ There had only been 13 people questioned. They were satisfied that the bombing involved only the pilots. He thought that with the changes in the constitution which were contemplated that some of the intellectuals would feel a bit better about the government. /5/Regarding the bombing of the palace on February 27, see Documents 87 ff.
288. Paper Prepared by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/ Washington, September 20, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-22-69. Top Secret. A 4page draft of this paper, September 14, is ibid. IMPRESSIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM 1. General Impression Much progress has been accomplished since my visit in October 1961. The most notable perhaps is the snowballing of the strategic hamlet program which has resulted in some 5,000 hamlets being fortified or in process of fortification. Improved training of the Army, the Civil Guard, and the Self-Defense Corps has resulted in freeing many more Army battalions for mobile, offensive operations. The clarifying of the channel of command between Saigon and Army units in the field has been improved, but is still spotty. In some cases, the Province Chief can not intervene in the command channel, but in others he still retains prerogatives, depending upon his personal relations with Diem. The refusal of the Montagnards to accept Communist domination and their preference to give up their homes and move out of the mountains is another encouraging indication of growing popular support for the Diem Government. Finally, the statistics--for what they are worth--indicate improvement in comparative casualties, in the reduced loss of weapons to the enemy, and in the freeing of a larger segment of the population and of the national territory from VC domination. 2. The Infiltration Problem Unresolved remains the problem of closing the frontiers to infiltration through Laos and Cambodia. The exact amount of infiltration is still unverified but there is no doubt that important reinforcements in men and matériel reach the VC across these frontiers. On the other hand, the improved patrolling of the coastal waters leads us to believe that very little is coming in by water. The only current plan to meet the overland infiltration problem is the proposed organization of tribesmen in the border areas to watch the trails and to report infiltration to reserve units in rear. It will be sometime before this program is established to any significant degree. Eventual effectiveness is uncertain. 3. National Plan for Eradicating the VC There is still no coordinated national plan establishing priorities for operations against the VC. General Harkins has proposed the concept of a national levee en masse of loyalist forces to attack simultaneously the VC strongholds throughout the country. He has offered this concept to President Diem who has apparently accepted it. It remains to be seen whether a feasible plan can be produced to execute the concept. If it proves feasible, presumably it will be incorporated in the 3-year plan which General Harkins is drawing up at Secretary McNamara's direction. 4. Proliferation of Para-military Forces At the present time, or in the foreseeable future, there will be the following para-military forces in SVN, in addition to the Civil Guard of 72,000 and the Self-Defense Corps of 65,000, supported wholly or in part, directly or indirectly by the U.S. Force Populaire Program--8,000 Montagnard Commando Program: Civilian Irregular Defense Program: TOTAL--43,850/2/ /2/These figures do not include personnel devoted to training forces which involve, U.S., SVN and Australian Nationals. [Footnote in the source text.] While each of these organizations has considerable justification for existence, their number raises a real question as to whether they should not be amalgamated and their direction centralized. 5. Press Attitude The local Saigon press, particularly the American component, remains uninformed and often belligerently adverse to the programs of the U.S. and SVN Governments. Both Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins need help at home to improve the press coverage of SVN events, and to obtain the support of publishers in obtaining responsible reporting. The GVN must play a major role in improving the Saigon environment for the press in order to gain such support. 6. Improvement of Intelligence A great deal has been done in the last ten months to improve the quality of intelligence emanating from SVN.... The current impression is, however, that much remains to be done. On the encouraging side is the improved efficiency of direction finding techniques to locate VC radio sets. 7. R&R Requirements General Harkins reports concern over his inability to send his personnel on R&R leave to such places as Hong Kong and Manila. JCS authority limits him to providing transportation for such purposes on a space available basis. He points out that he has no legitimate reason for sending his available aircraft to Hong Kong or Manila; hence in point of fact, there are no R&R possibilities. 8. The U.S. Command Set Up in Southeast Asia We seem to be establishing a deeply layered command structure in Southeast Asia. My initial impression is that for both SVN and Thailand we intend to have a typical unified command structure with General Harkins at the top of each. This matter must be investigated further, to include the stated requirement for a 3-star Air Force Deputy for General Harkins. . . . . . . . 10. How Are We Doing? I was encouraged to find that there is a more methodical reporting system to check than I had realized, utilizing American personnel in the field to report indicators of progress in the campaign against the VC. This system consists of a listing of pertinent questions, which are revised periodically, and sent to the MAAG advisors in the field on a monthly basis. A comparison of the most current set of answers with those which have preceded it leads to a judgment within each Province as to the change in control of the areas concerned. From this information it is possible to analyze the relative progress of the GVN in extending its influence throughout the country. The accuracy of the system depends on the framing of the questions and on the perceptivity of the advisor observers. The question listing which is now in use is to be passed to other members of the Country Team so that in the next revision its content will reflect "in put" of all interested agencies. Up to this time this has been a MACV project exclusively. 11. Outstanding Questions a. How best to organize the U.S. military command in Southeast
Asia?
289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, September 21, 1962, 12:50 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/9-2062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cottrell and cleared in substance with Harriman. Repeated to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, London, and Paris. 349. After receipt Embtel 326/2/ Cottrell called on Thuan and made following points: /2/Telegram 326, September 20, transmitted the text of a statement issued by the Government of Vietnam on that day deploring the Laotian Government's decision to exchange ambassadors with North Vietnam. The last paragraph stated that because of this the Government of Vietnam was "obliged to revise its whole diplomatic position and all its international commitments regarding Laos." (Ibid.) 1. He was sure that Thuan must have received clear impression in his talks in Washington that USG officials were solidly in support of Viet-Nam and our commitments to GVN. Thuan confirmed this. 2. It is a fact that USG is just as firmly determined to have commitments to Laos fulfilled. 3. This is why GVN statement it obliged revise its whole diplomatic position and international commitments to Laos is received here as a shock. It means that a western power is threatening to pull the support props out from under the international structure so painfully erected. It is imperative that western powers fulfill their obligations to the letter and that any breakdown in Laos not be caused by western powers. 4. While understanding GVN frustration and anger over an RLG action which touches a sensitive fundamental GVN national issue at the same time we understand GVN has a commitment not only to Laos but to 12 other signatories including the USG. 5. The British have undertaken to see that the accords are observed by the western powers and the Russians have assumed a similar responsibility for the Bloc. Therefore the GVN contemplated action would constitute a blow against the British as well as to the other western signatories. 6. Cottrell reviewed the possible subsidiary effects outlined Deptel 348/3/ but emphasized that the central point was that GVN action to carry out revision of its commitments to Laos would produce a head on collision with a firm determined US policy on Laos. /3/Dated September 20. These effects dealt largely with Communist and Soviet undertakings to support the Laotian settlement which might cease if Saigon appeared to have broken the agreements. (Ibid.) 7. Cottrell requested Thuan convey above to his government. Thuan agreed. Said he himself did not understand last para Embtel 326 and had no firm ideas how to solve this impasse but would transmit immediately US views expressed above./4/ /4/Nolting saw Foreign Minister Mau on September 21 and 22 to reiterate Washington's concern about Diem breaking relations with Laos. At the latter meeting Mau agreed to try to convince Diem that if the Laotian Government did not accept the credentials of the North Vietnamese Ambassador, the Republic of Vietnam would leave its mission in Vientiane. (Telegrams 336 and 338 from Saigon, September 22; ibid., 751J.51K/9-2262) Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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