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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
290. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 21, 1962, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/IAF Files: FRC 68 A 1415, Vietnam General and Personal. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Moore on September 25. The meeting was held at the U.S. Information Agency. A "Talking Points" memorandum for this conversation, dated September 20, is ibid., USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field Far East (IAF), 1962. PARTICIPANTS Secretary Thuan paid a brief courtesy call on Mr. Wilson in the course of his Washington visit. The tone of the discussions was set by the nature of the call, but Mr. Wilson did take the occasion to press several points about the situation in Viet-Nam of interest to the Agency. Foremost was the relationship of the GVN with the international press corps. Mr. Wilson emphasized the necessity of improved relations and the value of organized and regular press briefings to accomplish this. Thuan replied that he was fully aware of the problem as was President Diem, and that such press briefings would hopefully start next month. On the general subject, however, Thuan launched into a lengthy justification of the GVN's reactions to recent events arising out of the Sully case (although Sully was not mentioned by name)./2/ He quoted chapter and verse against the correspondents, citing each instance as proof of their irresponsibility, unreasonableness and immaturity (average age: 24). /2/Francois Sully, a correspondent with Newsweek, who was expelled from Vietnam on September 4. Mr. Wilson countered by again stressing the fact that the GVN had nevertheless to live with the international press which created a public image of the country, the situation and the country's leaders world wide. Positively, he made the suggestion that more use be made of press exploitation of Viet Cong defectors. Thuan replied that this was already being done, though only the local Vietnamese press was using these opportunities to best effect. (IAF will follow up on this.) Mr. Wilson introduced the subject of Thuan's general assessment of USIS operations in Viet-Nam. Thuan ducked discussions of this question by talking about U.S. support of mass communications in general. He praised the completion of the 50 kilowatt radio station, saying that with it the GVN hopes to reach Hanoi which had been impossible with previous equipment. Thuan made passing reference to difference in policy with the U.S. over jamming. The GVN had on its own (and particularly before the new 50 kilowatt capability) tried to jam Hanoi; for this, they used former French equipment. Hanoi's strong signal often previously drowned out the GVN's voice even on some community sets provided by the government, especially in remote and mountainous areas. Thuan referred to the importance of film production to support this effective visual medium, but went on to make a plea for U.S. support of television for Viet-Nam, which, he said, would bring national events (and Diem) immediately to the attention of the people without the delays necessitated by film processing. Mr. Wilson recalled his discussions with President Diem in Saigon on the subject of television and said that he would make further inquiries about support for television. After a further exchange of amenities, including Mr. Wilson's assurances of continuing USIS information support for the GVN effort, particularly that affecting the rural population, Secretary Thuan took his leave for another appointment.
291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, September 22, 1962, 10:45 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51KII/9-2262. Secret. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to CINCPAC. 355. Thuan visit thru September 20. During his calls on US officials thus far following points were stressed to Thuan: 1. Assurances of continuing US support and guarded optimism re progress in Viet-Nam. 2. Serious US concern on question GVN representation Laos. 3. Probable drastic Congressional cuts in aid bill repeatedly brought to Thuan's attention. However, no suggestion that Viet-Nam program will suffer. 4. Hopes that GVN would make every effort alleviate tensions with RKG with as first step visit of GVN Cabinet Minister or General to Phnom Penh. 5. Importance avoiding serious frictions between GVN and US press reps. 6. Agreement with Thuan that International Development Association be encouraged make funds available to SOFIDIV. 7. Awareness of financial sacrifices and reforms being made by GVN, assurance that US would keep close watch on GVN financial situation, but clear indication that a) AIK charges on GVN could not be reduced now and b) third country counterpart funds could not be made available to GVN without US legislation which not now feasible. 8. Importance finding all means using US agricultural surpluses. Among points emphasized by Thuan were: 1. Provided adequate US support continues DRV can probably not defeat GVN by increased military effort and hence likely apply more and more political pressure for conference on Viet-Nam. (In 1959 Ho hoped defeat GVN in one year, his estimates have now risen to 15-20 years and he has allegedly indicated to Indian Chairmen that DRV prepared negotiate with GVN.) 2. GVN successes in delta and importance of Montagnard swing to GVN. 3. Importance of crop destruction program. (He received scant encouragement and was questioned closely as to whether it would be possible destroy VC crops without hurting Montagnards.) 4. GVN compliance Staley recommendations, particularly currency reform, increased tax collections and deficit financing. This connection sharp fall in GVN foreign reserves stressed. Thuan has received sympathetic hearings on the Hill and from high level officials Executive Branch. He will see as much as possible of press during remainder his visit. Rusk
292. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency (Thuan)/1/ Washington, September 25, 1962, 10:10-10:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-2562. Secret. Drafted by Wood and approved by the White House on October 16. Copies were sent, inter alia, to S/S, S/P, FE, SEA, TF/SEA, WG/VN, DOD/OSD, and Saigon. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Saigon in telegrams 364 and 375, September 25 and 27. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) In a memorandum dated September 24, Forrestal stressed that the President should impress Thuan with the strong views that the United States had on Diem's breaking diplomatic relations with Laos. Copies of the memorandum and another dated September 22, which suggested topics that the President might raise with Thuan, are in Declassified Documents, 1977, 108E and 247A. SUBJECT Mr. Thuan opened by underscoring to the President the improvement which had occurred since General Taylor's first visit to VietNam,/2/ and urged that the momentum of the joint US-GVN effort be maintained. The President agreed that recent reports from Saigon were somewhat more encouraging. /2/For documentation on Taylor's visit to Vietnam, October 18-25, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 169 ff. Turning to Vietnamese representation in Vientiane the President said that when he learned that President Diem desired to break off relations with the Lao Government due to its recognition of the DRV he had sent him a message through Ambassador Nolting explaining that such an action would give him a good deal of concern./3/ The President emphasized that the abandonment of the Geneva Accords before they had been tried would allow the Soviets to take the position that they had been violated by the United States. This would be disastrous. While understanding the feelings of President Diem that he did not wish the Lao Government to recognize both the Government of Viet-Nam and the Hanoi regime, President Kennedy stated that to abandon the Lao Government in this way would play into the hands of the Communists, would endanger the situation and increase the chances of military action. Noting that the Vietnamese Ambassador had been called home the President expressed the hope that the Embassy would be left open in Vientiane. He pointed out that although the U.S. did not recognize Communist China, we had sat down with them at Geneva and that there were many other things which we had not liked about the Geneva Conference. /3/In telegram 331, September 15, Nolting was instructed to convey Kennedy's concern and disappointment about Diem's decision to break relations with Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/9-1562) Nolting had already met with Diem and Mau for 2 hours on the question on September 15 and met again with them on September 17 to present the President's views. (Telegrams 305 and 309, September 15 and 17; ibid.) By the end of September, North Vietnam had agreed to Chargé-level representation only in Laos and Diem did not break relations. Mr. Thuan replied that having discussed the question with Messrs. Johnson, Harriman and Forrestal/4/ he had sent a telegram to his government. Unfortunately the first consequences of the Geneva Accords had been the recognition by the Lao Government of the DRV which presented an internal problem for Viet-Nam. /4/See Documents 285 and 287. Forrestal reported briefly on a conversation along these lines, which he had with Thuan during a lunch at CIA on Saturday, September 22, in the memorandum to the President described in footnote 1 above. The President said that the Geneva Accords of 1954 had in a sense constituted recognition of the DRV. Mr. Thuan acknowledged this but said that the present case involved diplomatic recognition. Having sent a telegram to Saigon he had received an answer stating that President Diem agreed to keep a Charge in Vientiane provided that the arrival of the DRV Ambassador was delayed and that the DRV did not have the same rank as the Charge from Saigon. The President pointed out that the GVN must have expected Souvanna to recognize the DRV. He realized that the GVN did not like the Geneva Accords, but said that if they failed our common efforts and his own efforts for the last year would fail. A treaty had been signed with the Chinese Communists and it would be a great mistake to have the burden for the failure of the Geneva Accords fall on the Vietnamese Government. If these accords failed, it would then be very difficult to get the Communists to pull out their troops. There were three choices in Laos, to fight for the country, to withdraw from the country or to do what was being done. If we were to undertake the present solution, we should not stop 1/3 of the way down the road. The GVN could not ask that the Hanoi delegate be given a lesser position than that of the GVN. It would not work, and it would mean that the Lao Government would have relations with only Hanoi. The President concluded that while the present arrangement had not been satisfactory from the beginning, he strongly desired that breaches of the Geneva Accords, to which Khrushchev was publicly committed, should come from the Communist side and not from the Free World side. He hoped that Mr. Thuan would explain this to President Diem. Turning to Cambodia the President asked what both the Americans and the Vietnamese should do to ease the present situation. Mr. Thuan replied his government was ready to ease the tension, that it had said nothing even when Sihanouk had publicly called Diem an American valet, that the Vietnamese Government was ready to send a military mission which had been already chosen by President Diem, but that the "versatile" Sihanouk had changed his mind and now wanted a Cabinet Minister sent first. He also wanted the Vietnamese Government to pay the Cambodian Government 1 billion riels based on the 1954 Paris Accords. However, since the burden of the 1954 war had been borne by the Vietnamese they could not accept in addition to pay the Cambodian Government this money. On the other hand the Vietnamese were prepared to ask that the French unfreeze the Indochina franc account. This would mean that the Cambodians would get about 3 billion old francs and that Viet-Nam would get about the same amount. Viet-Nam would only agree to this unfreezing if it were done simultaneously for the three countries of Indochina. There was no doubt in Mr. Thuan's mind that Cambodian territory had been a safe haven for the Communists. In Zone D, for example, there had been found huge stocks of medicinal cotton. The packages showed that this cotton had transitted Cambodia. Captured Viet Cong maps showed that they used routes passing through Cambodia. No one knew the location of the border. When the Cambodians accused the Vietnamese of crossing the frontier, the Vietnamese replied that they are willing to set up a commission and pay damages. Mr. Thuan then raised the subject of crop destruction, saying that this was vital for Viet-Nam; that if they were to shorten the war by controlling their frontier, they would need both Montagnard intelligence units and the means of destroying Viet Cong food supplies. The manpower for the Montagnard intelligence units were forthcoming as the Montagnard deserted the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong in the mountains were already short of food. The President asked how it was possible to distinguish between Viet Cong and Montagnard fields. Mr. Thuan replied that the Viet Cong fields were in inaccessible areas not inhabited by innocent people or local tribes. These are areas which have been used by the Viet Cong for 15 years. Montagnards from the Kontum area have petitioned the GVN to start their crop killing program. The President again inquired how it was possible to differentiate between Viet Cong crops and Montagnard crops. Mr. Thuan replied that the Montagnards habitually build a hut in the middle of their rice fields. The Viet Cong did not. Also the province chiefs had intelligence which enabled them to pick out fields used by the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong food situation in the mountains was becoming serious. The President replied that the Viet Cong could easily build huts in their fields. The United States was concerned that the distinction between Viet Cong and Montagnard crops be clearly made and secondly that the U.S. was concerned lest it be accused of conducting food warfare. Mr. Thuan proposed that crop destruction be carried out by hand in a few provinces, pointing out that the October harvest was approaching. In reply to a question by the President, he named the provinces of Phuoc Long and Phu Yen, suggesting that after the crops had been destroyed in specific areas the results could be assessed. The President asked when the next harvest would occur. Mr. Thuan replied that it would be in May. The President indicated that he was willing to reconsider the matter both in terms of hand spraying and aerial spraying. Thuan suggested that the Vietnamese might also need some C-123s which they did not have. The President promised to get in touch with Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins and to let the Vietnamese Government know by the end of the week. The President inquired as to the status of the amnesty program, to which Mr. Thuan replied that this would be undertaken by the Vietnamese Government. He continued that there were more and more Viet Cong defectors, that the improved equipment and training made available by the U.S. was most helpful. He was particularly pleased with the improved intelligence now available to the GVN and with the aggressive and competitive attitude of the younger Vietnamese officers. He had explained political progress to Mr. Wiggins of the Washington Post and to the editors of the New York Times saying that a recent constitutional amendment required cabinet ministers to come to the National Assembly and answer questions of the deputies. He had also told them about elections in the strategic hamlets. They had not been aware of these developments. Economically Dr. Staley's recommendations had been carried out with successful results. The Shell Oil people were now able to reach areas where they had not been for two years and for the first time in 15 years the price of rice was dropping between harvest seasons. A swing in the pendulum was also shown by the fact that whereas there had been 700 volunteers for officers training in 1960, there had been 2,300 volunteers in 1962. The GVN hoped to make real progress by the end of the dry season (May 1963). As to North Viet-Nam he said that the carefully planned RVNAF air strikes were having such an effect that Ho Chi Minh had requested the Chairman of the ICC to ask Diem to stop them as a gesture of good will. Ho had taken the line that the U.S. was trying to make Diem a puppet by the use of air strikes since these were completely under U.S. control and their increasing use made Diem more dependent on the U.S. Thuan said Ho's own predictions for the future of the war were changing. Whereas in 1959 and 1960 Ho had undertaken to win the war within one year, his prediction for 1962 was 15 to 20 years. Also, the DRV, which had previously never agreed to negotiate with Diem, was now willing to do so. Thuan said that since the DRV was "losing the war" it was increasingly anxious for a political settlement. The President commented that this brought the conversation back to his original point on Laos. Although newspaper correspondents had predicted the worst in Viet-Nam, things were now better. Similarly in Laos it should not be forgotten that there were strong factors on our side, and it was for that reason that the U.S. wished to carry through on the present policy. Thuan then turned to the question of aid, saying that his government understood the reasons for the "Buy American" policy. He suggested that it might be possible to make counterpart Japanese Yen now in U.S. accounts available to the GVN. The President promised to look into this. Mr. Thuan said that the President's speech at the IMF meeting was a masterpiece./5/ /5/For text of President Kennedy's address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, September 20, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 691-694. The President concluded by expressing U.S. admiration for the progress being made in Viet-Nam against the Communists and urged the GVN not to be too concerned by press reports. He assured Mr. Thuan that the U.S. Government did not accept everything the correspondents wrote even if it appeared in the New York Times. He emphasized that if the Vietnamese Government was successful, the public image would take care of itself. In reply to Thuan's expression of concern at inaccurate press reporting, the President asked him not to worry. This occurred every day in Washington.
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, September 25, 1962, 3:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/9-2262. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cottrell and cleared with Harriman, Heavner, and USIA. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 363. To preclude GVN taking one more ill-advised action outlined Embtel 349/2/ which will further sour press relations and cause serious adverse reaction here in many quarters, you should make following points at highest levels. Suggest Counselor Nhu be included. /2/Telegram 349, September 25, transmitted a summary of a Vietnamese Information Directorate communiqué that criticized Newsweek and threatened to limit its future entry into Vietnam. (Ibid., 951K.6211/9-2562) 1. It would be great mistake for GVN to ban Newsweek giving clear impression GVN not strong enough to stand criticism and must resort to news blackout. 2. Impression in U.S. will be that GVN attempting to cover up. This will shake confidence in our present policy of strong support to Vietnam and bring into debate question whether U.S. policy is sound or unsound. As GVN knows, many are unconvinced and will seize this opportunity. 3. GVN can ill afford this reaction in U.S. and, on balance, it is perfectly clear from here that GVN best interests served by ignoring distasteful news stories and taking it in stride. 4. If GVN indulges its feelings of anger and bans Newsweek, they should clearly understand consequences described above. U.S. policy is firm in supporting the principle of a free press and we cannot overlook damage to this principle no matter how irritating or unfounded certain press reports frequently are. 5. Newsweek is sending Ken Crawford to Viet-Nam for approximately one month to survey situation. Crawford is former Washington Bureau Chief, is a senior seasoned reporter now a columnist, who can be expected do objective reporting. This may provide opportunity put GVN-Newsweek relations on better footings./3/ /3/On September 29, Nolting discussed the possible banning of Newsweek with Mau and "bore down on counter-productive and harmful effects" it would have. (Telegram 363 from Saigon, September 29; ibid., 951K.6211/9-2962) Ball
294. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, September 26, 1962, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-2662. Secret; Niact. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 352. Deptel 364./2/ After careful study over past months (Embtels 302, 233/3/ and previous) General Harkins and I have jointly recommended approval of limited crop destruction operation in Phu Yen Province by spraying from air and in Phuoc Long Province by hand in conjunction ground operations. We are not yet prepared to recommend broad-scale crop destruction program until trial operations give basis for evaluating conduct such operations and results vis-à-vis Montagnard population and VC. Under GVN plans, spraying would be directed only against specific target areas which best intelligence available pinpoint as VC-cultivated or VC-controlled area. We have recommended test program in Phu Yen primarily because of obvious advantages in support operation Hai Yen II and Phuoc Long because crop destruction program currently being carried out by physical means-cutting and uprooting (Embtel 233). Admittedly there may be indirect impact on Montagnards as total food supply reduced but believe impact will be much greater on VC and Montagnards affected can be taken care of through other programs. Moreover, Montagnard letters described Embtel 302 provide evidence that at least some Montagnard groups would welcome destruction their crops in order deny assistance to VC. General Harkins and I continue be convinced by mounting evidence of VC food shortages in highlands that crop destruction can be effective weapon against VC. Without carrying out test operation we will never be able fully confirm efficacy this weapon or ability GVN to utilize it with limited indirect US assistance. /2/See footnote 1, Document 292. /3/Dated September 15 and 1, respectively. The former described letters from Montagnard leaders asking for destruction of all crops in certain areas of their districts. (Ibid., 751K.00/9-1562) Regarding telegram 233, see footnote 6, Document 276. Regarding differentiation between VC and Montagnard crops, it possible pinpoint with considerable degree of accuracy highland areas under VC control. GVN in fact has provided us with maps showing specific target areas they wish to hit. These proposed targets would be checked out beforehand by MACV and we could restrict use chemical agents to verified VC targets. We have never envisaged using USAF aircraft and continue believe we should not concur use USAF 123's. If trial program approved and assessed as successful, we might consider providing VNAF with suitable spray equipped aircraft. Feel sure however that, if ARVN carried out operations with only such limited and indirect US assistance, any resultant VC propaganda would still be largely directed against US. We can provide ARVN with capability for hand-spraying operations if authorization given. Regarding psywar aspects: FBIS reports indicate Hanoi has sporadically been accusing US of conducting or aiding GVN in crop warfare in highlands usually lumping these charges in long list heinous crimes and without special emphasis. Thus, we already being accused to some extent. On other side of coin, we have detected no VC or DRV effort propagandize mangrove defoliation operations. We have seen no public or private VC or DRV references to this operation. At same fume, mangrove defoliation operations have shown that ARVN has adequate psywar capability. After somewhat erratic start, it has conducted ground and air leaflet program with credible themes. It is also able employ loudspeaker planes and demonstrate "sprayed ARVN soldiers" to show that chemicals do not harm humans or animals, for mangrove defoliation program, GVN has also instructed Province Chief forward any claims for crops deshroyed to Saigon for action and payment. In summary, General Harkins and I favor proceeding with the program along the following lines: A. GVN initially proposes targets for attack with no U.S. advice or assistance, and B. MACV reviews and approves, with Embassy coordination, only those which can definitely be verified as VC and have reasonable chance producing tangible results. C. MACV provides technical assistance and advice as to chemical agent to be used, time and method of attack and other purely operationa1 advice, and D. MACV assist GVN in preparation and implementation of concurrent psywar effort, and E. Chemicals to be released only as required for attack of specific targets, and F. Chemicals to be applied by hand by ARVN with equipment presently in country, but now held by U.S. Agency only, and G. Chemicals to be air delivered only by VNAF helicopters, and H. MACV-Embassy make joint evaluation of effects and provide appropriate recommendations to State and JCS as to whether program should be continued on an expanded basis or abandoned./4/ /4/On October 2, the President authorized the crop destruction program in South Vietnam under the conditions and terms set forth by the Embassy. (Memorandum for the Record, October 2; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. According to a memorandum from Forrestal to McGeorge Bundy, October 4, the President "did so over the mild objections of Averell, Roger Hilsman, and myself; but with the strong approval of Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, the field, and just about everybody else you could think of. I believe his main train of thinking was that you cannot say no to your military advisors all the time, and with this I agree." (Ibid., NSC Staff Memoranda. Michael Forrestal, 6/22-10/62) Nolting
295. Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, October 1, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Thuan Visit, September 62. Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Fritz: I think Thuan's visit was very successful--particularly in terms of the press. We have sent a round-up telegram and memos of his conversations with the President, the Secretary, the Attorney General and Fowler Hamilton./2/ He also had talks with the following: /2/For memoranda of Thuan's conversations with the President and Rusk, see Documents 285 and 292; regarding the conversations with the Attorney General and Fowler Hamilton. see Document 284 and footnote 2, Document 287. Walt Rostow--Dr. Rostow was sympathetic and perhaps the most understanding of Thuan's interlocutors. He urged adoption of the amnesty program, pointing out that the most critical part of such a program was getting the signal through to the VC. Dr. Rostow made three suggestions in order to improve and strengthen relations between the Government and the villagers: 1. The organization of Vietnamese students from the towns to do civic action work in the villages, not only to help the villagers but to increase the students' understanding of the war which their country faces (this idea sounded particularly good to me). 2. A conscious GVN policy to encourage industries to manufacture goods needed by the peasants. This would help industry since "a rapidly growing industry must be based on the whole country, not just on the city". It would also provide incentive goods for the peasants. Thuan agreed. He mentioned the problem of getting loans from the IDA and yen from U.S. Treasury accounts. 3. Train draftees whose terms of enlistment are ending so that they will have useful skills when they return to their villages. This has been done in Korea and some Korean experts might help in setting up such a program. On Laos he emphasized that the U.S. was working with Viet-Nam in a life and death struggle. At the same time we had responsibilities which, while they may be of second importance to Viet-Nam are important to world order and in the long run will be important to Viet-Nam. He asked that Viet-Nam help us in responsibilities which are important to the United States in its position of world leadership. Frank Valeo--As you know, Valeo is Senator Mansfield's closest adviser. After 15 minutes with Senator Mansfield we had lunch with Valeo and Thuan later had a talk with him in his hotel. I think Frank benefited from this lengthy contact with Thuan. He started with the theme that Viet-Nam must have as an ultimate objective a reunified and neutral Viet-Nam. The more we talked about the problems of reunifying Viet-Nam and having it defend itself as a neutral the more Frank agreed that the ultimate should probably be postponed to the infinite. Other Congressional Contact--included Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Mundt, Congressman Zablocki, Congressman Bloomfield (RIll.), Congresswoman Church, Assistants Carl Marcy and John Newhouse. Congressman Zablocki was the only one of the last who even indirectly raised the question of whether Diem's leadership was adequate. As to the press, he was invited to lunch with several editors from the New York Times, met Mr. Wiggins a senior editor of the Washington Post who has connections with Newsweek (Wiggins asked that if either publication made factual errors in reporting, Thuan get in touch with Wiggins by cable or through his Ambassador), Joe Alsop, Ted Weinthal of Newsweek, and Carl Meyer, a Washington Post editorial writer. I also had two-hour discussion with Meyer. Thuan also held an open press conference on the afternoon of September 25. Mike Forrestal and Carl Kaysen of the White House Staff--Forrestal spoke strongly on Laos representation. He pointed out that East and West Germany both send Ambassadors to Moscow although they do not recognize each other. Thuan raised Japanese yen in U.S. accounts. This would take legislation, possibly next January; AID thinks it impossible but Forrestal has told Thuan that something might be worked out The Vice President was only able to see Thuan for five minutes due to the crisis on the aid bill. He expressed admiration for the progress in Viet-Nam, said he hoped to make another visit, and assured Thuan of our continued prayers and support. On the military side Thuan saw Secretary McNamara who bucked up Thuan's morale and impressed him strongly. He also saw General Lemnitzer whom Thuan asked for more H-34s. Other events included a formal State Department luncheon given by Governor Harriman and a dinner by Roger Hilsman. Thuan had two or three visits to Bethesda Naval Hospital. I gather the tests revealed nothing abnormal. I must say he looked better than when I saw him in May. We have pouched Thuan's speech at the Bank and Fund Meeting./3/ /3/Not printed. Looking forward to seeing you on the 8th. Very sincerely, Chalmers B. Wood/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
296. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 4, 1962, 11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/10-462. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Vientiane, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC, Bangkok, London, and Paris. 385. Refs: Deptel 387, Vientiane 136 to Saigon, Embtel 377, Phnom Penh 194 to Saigon, Deptel 395, Deptel 390 Embtel 379./2/ /2/None printed. These telegrams, dated October 1-4, dealt with various aspects of the deteriorating relations between South Vietnam and Laos or Cambodia. (Ibid., 651H.51K/10-162 through 10-362, and 651J.51K/10-162 through 10-462) Had long talk today with Mau on relations with Laos and GVN-Cambodian problems. Made most persuasive pitch I could on need for GVN to take a fresh look at its relations and positions vis-à-vis its neighbors, and to take bold and imaginative diplomatic initiatives for the sake of stability in SEA and to prevent its own diplomatic isolation. Keyed this approach to improved situation in SVN, pointing out that under present conditions GVN initiatives would be reflection of strength and confidence rather than of weakness. Specifically, I strongly urged reconsideration GVN position on relations with Laos, reviewing President's talk with them,/3/ and stressing advantage to GVN in position as outlined in Deptel 387. /3/See Document 292. On Cambodian problems, discussed also at length, I urged immediate dispatch of conciliatory note on Koh Rokar incident,/4/ to forestall possible damaging ICC report, suggested that note should state intention to send GVN military mission to Phnom Penh, the head of which could negotiate its terms of reference, and which could be immediately used to help investigate Koh Rokar incident. On debt question, I urged that GVN break impasse by offering to join on condition that Cambodian will agree specifically to debt settlement conference. (Mau, in his mild-mannered way, hit the ceiling on this. He said, "If we gave Sihanouk his money first, we would be chasing him for the rest of our lives trying to get ours. I said I did not think so--that a magnanimous gesture might be exactly what this situation requires.") /4/On September 10, South Vietnamese troops and planes had attacked the village of Koh Rokar on the Mekong River in Cambodia. Mau was noncommittal. He said, regarding Laos, that he wanted us to know that GVN position had been very carefully weighed by President and Cabinet and it would be hard, if not impossible, to reverse. His only concrete commitment was to try to pry loose a note on Koh Rokar of type we discussed by "early next week". I warned him that this might be too late; that GVN might miss opportunity after so long a delay. I proposed to Mau that I see President Diem again on these questions before departure Honolulu,/5/ and suggested that I first send through Mau, an aide-mémoire giving our precise suggestions and recommendations on matters we had discussed. (Mau agreed and I am sending Diem an aide-mémoire, which will be pouched to Dept./6/) /5/Nolting discussed the question with Diem on October 6 along these same lines. A report on the conversation was transmitted in telegram 395 from Saigon, October 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/10-662) Regarding the meeting at Honolulu on October 8, see Document 298. /6/Not found. Mau mentioned that according his information DRV Ambassador expected to arrive Vientiane October 7 and would be immediately accredited. He seemed resigned to fact this would mean rupture diplomatic relations unless Laotian King intervenes. I told him that we had certain recent information to effect that center and right-wing elements in RLG drawing closer together to counteract left wing, and re-emphasized this no time to abandon the fray. Nolting
297. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Confidential. Drafted by Heavner and Wood on October 5. The source text was attached to a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, dated October 8, which stated that it had been prepared in response to a request by the President. SUBJECT Then and Now The Viet Cong were winning the war in October of last year. From January to October, 1961, VC regular forces grew from less than 10,000 to about 16,500. From July to October, their strength accelerated dramatically, jumping up by more than 1,000 per month. In September, the guerrillas struck several times in battalion strength. Less than 50 miles north of Saigon they attacked the capital of Phuoc Long province with a force of 1,500 and held it overnight. They seemed to have the capability of "liberating" an area on the high plateau. They choked off the flow of food to Saigon, and the GVN was forced to import rice and restrict the sale of pork. Most important, morale had ebbed away much more rapidly than real GVN strength was eroded. There was an air of near panic in Saigon. Now a year later, the Viet Cong are not winning the war. As in 1862 and 1942, no one clearly has the initiative. However, VC are clearly further from their objective than they were in October, 1961. The most dramatic change is in morale. The GVN and its military forces are confident and anxious to get on with the job. There are signs that the people as a whole now believe the GVN will win: the army is getting more and better intelligence from villagers, volunteers for officer training are at an all-time high, rice is coming to market normally and for the first time in 15 years the price is dropping between harvests-a sign of confidence that security is returning because it means Ace hoards are being sold. The political climate has changed. The GVN is gaining more popular support for the war effort, particularly where it counts the most--in the rural areas. By means of its strategic hamlet program, the GVN is making a major effort to provide the peasant with more social services and to introduce democracy at the hamlet level. Hamlet councils are being elected by secret ballot. Schools and medical facilities are going to the provinces. The military design calls for the defense of all of the people, not just military posts, communication arteries, and the towns and cities. And the people are being successfully involved in their own hamlets. With a stake in the local status quo, they have been giving a good account of themselves. The implementation of GVN rural programs is uneven; it suffers greatly from a chronic shortage of skilled personnel. The GVN remains basically paternalistic; a nation at war, divided, underdeveloped and with 2,000 years of authoritarian traditions does not quickly or easily become a modern democracy. But real political progress has been registered in one short year. Military progress is also encouraging. The basic need and wish of the Vietnamese people is security. They are beginning to get it through the application of a strategy based on defense of the whole population, by the whole population. U.S. logistic, technical and advisory assistance has resulted in sharply increased mobility, better communications, better intelligence, and better performance generally by both the regular and the paramilitary forces. VC strength is now set at 20,000 regulars. But casualties are high, nearly 600 a week and going up. The guerrillas are troubled by shortages of food and medicine. Morale among replacements is reported low. Most importantly the VC have not been able to escalate through regiment- and division-sized operations towards a new Dien Bien Phu. Their largest attack was in September, 1961, when they used 1,500 men. They have not "liberated" any area on which they could establish a government. In short, the momentum of the VC attack has been lost. Or, to put it in Vietnamese context, they no longer have the "mandate of heaven." Last Year's Problems To arrest the Viet Cong advance and turn the tide, a two-fold problem had to be solved. First, an effective strategy had to be devised. The body of anti-guerrilla doctrine was meager, and much of what we knew was not applicable to Viet-Nam. We had to learn how to apply our strength and how to hold an area once the military had cleared it. We had to discover how to involve the people in their own defense, and we had to find ways to separate the guerrillas from the people. Second, we had to overcome obvious weaknesses in the Vietnamese military and civil establishments. We had to provide the military with better intelligence, a much greater degree of mobility, and we had to wean them away from static defense. We had to train and arm the paramilitary who take the brunt of the attack and who can relieve the regulars from static defense missions. The military and the civilian government had to work together as a team at all levels. The government had to streamline its operations and really put top priority on the war effort. Some means had to be found to cause the people to identify their interests with the defeat of the Viet Cong. And we had to achieve more effective cooperation between the Vietnamese and ourselves. The Viet Cong strategy was simple to describe, hard to combat. They sought to isolate the government, both from its friends abroad and from its own people at home, and then to destroy it. The VC tried to paralyze the government at the rice roots by assassinating and threatening village and provincial officials. They sought to win the people's support, or at least their passive tolerance, through a combination of propaganda and threats. They threatened the families of potential draftees, trying to force the young men into their own ranks instead of into the government forces. They told the peasant that under the VC he need not pay rent to the landlord, they told the squatter that the land was his. They exploited grievances and floated rumors of government corruption. They kidnapped or killed the recalcitrant. Teachers and village health workers were special targets because they linked the people to the government and presented a benevolent image of the national authorities. More than 250 school teachers had been kidnapped; of these 100 are still missing and 30 are known dead. In the first eight months of this year 3,300 persons have been kidnapped; some return, many do not. A Year's Progress Toward a Solution A. Devising and Implementing a Strategy. The VC aim to isolate the government from the people. We aim to tie government and people together, and to isolate the VC from the people. Applying the lessons learned in Malaya and in the GVN's own agroville program, the "strategic hamlet" program has been devised. This program seeks to give the people both the means and the will to defend themselves. The means: local inhabitants are armed and trained, a perimeter is set up around the hamlet, and communications with reserves forces are provided. If necessary--and usually it is not--the houses are regrouped from scattered homesteads into more defensible clusters. The will: the government provides the hamlet people with a stake in their own status quo, i.e., the hamlet gets a school, a maternity clinic, cheap agricultural credit. And the people elect their own hamlet officials by secret ballot. The strategic hamlet concept is the child of the British Advisory Mission, our own military advisors, and the Vietnamese government. It is still being refined and defined, in practice. There are more than 3,000 strategic hamlets which have been constructed during 1962, and more than 2,600 under construction. Some are well defended and the people well motivated. Some are poorly done, and only half-heartedly defended. We have devised a "hamlet kit", including such items as barbed wire, weapons, and medicines, and we are planning to supply nearly 4,000 of these kits by the end of FY 63. But the majority of the hamlets are providing most of their own resources. Our military advisory machine has a special section working on the strategic hamlets. The GVN has an Inter-Ministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee chaired by the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The GVN has also set up a Strategic Hamlet regional committee under each of the Division Commanders. The GVN is well aware that the strategic hamlet program cannot succeed unless most of the people are willing to go along with it. Presidential advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu stresses the political aspects of the program, bills it as a democratic revolution in the countryside, insists on election of hamlet officials by secret ballot and high calibre training for high calibre cadre charged with carrying out the program. As in all underdeveloped countries, there is an acute shortage of trained people, and the program is unevenly implemented. The GVN has recognized this by publicly calling for complaints from its citizens about corrupt or abusive behavior on the part of officials carrying out the program. Built around the strategic hamlet program, which is nation-wide, are area clear-and-hold operations. These are coordinated military, economic and social drives designed to permanently clear given areas of VC strength and influence. Four are now in progress: Binh Minh or Sunrise in Binh Duong Province, Hai Yen or Sea Swallow in Phu Yen Province, and two just getting under way in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. These operations are supported in depth by U.S. economic, psychological, and military aid and advice. Plans are approved by our Inter-Agency Province Rehabilitation Committee and money disbursed through project agreements with Province Chiefs and local committees on which U.S. officials sit. While the strategic hamlets are being built everywhere and available resources are concentrated on clearing specific key areas, we must still prevent the VC from consolidating their strength and expanding their control. Hence the GVN armed forces must not only seek to protect the new strategic hamlets and expand GVN control by supporting clear-and-hold operations, they must mount constant spoiling attacks against VC strongholds. The recent, highly successful operations in the Ca Mau peninsula are examples of this kind of spoiling attack. B. Strengthening the Military Machine. The GVN forces have been increased numerically, the regular army to 200,000 and the paramilitary to about 154,000. More important, their performance has been greatly improved by the application of U.S. technical and advisory assistance. Our helicopters and our M-113 personnel carriers have given the GVN forces much greater mobility, forcing the VC out of many areas simply because they know the GVN's reaction time is now too fast for them. The helicopters have added the vital element of surprise, frequently allowing the GVN to catch the guerrillas unaware at their bases. Although much remains to be done, both the regulars and the paramilitary are better trained to deal with guerrillas. They patrol more at night, stay in the field longer, lay more ambushes of their own. Perhaps most important, morale is up. They believe they are going to win. As the strategic hamlet program and the clear-and-hold operations have progressed, military and civilian cooperation has greatly improved. The problem of Province Chief and military chain-of-command is still with us, but so eased by the meshing of military and civilian programs, changes in personnel, and government structural adjustments to the war effort that it is no longer a serious obstacle. American advisors at all levels, particularly in the provinces, have played a vital role in overcoming this problem. U.S. military personnel in Viet Nam now number over 10,700. The great majority are directly engaged in advising Vietnamese officers and units. They are doing an excellent job, both in technically improving the effectiveness of the RVNAF and in building close bonds of real understanding at all levels of the Vietnamese military and government. The VC have made them a special target. From January, 1961 to September 1, 1962, the VC killed 11 and wounded 32 American military personnel. The increase in U.S. military assistance is across the board, including such diverse items as radar to detect Communist overflights for intelligence or air supply of guerrilla forces, sentry dogs, defoliants to clear dense underbrush on road shoulders in order to reduce ambushes, helicopters and basic communications equipment. U.S. military equipment and personnel have given the ARVN forces a far greater measure of mobility. About 150 U.S. manned helicopters are now engaged in moving ARVN forces rapidly to whatever point they are needed. A joint Junk Patrol has been organized with the Vietnamese Navy and elements of the Seventh Fleet to cut infiltration from north Viet Nam by sea. Construction is underway to develop a Junk Force of 28 Divisions (20 junks per Division) for this task and for inland waterway patrols. Four Junk Force Divisions are operational and three Junk Force training centers are in operation. For inland waterway and coastal patrols, and to provide greater mobility in delta areas, the U.S. has provided the GVN with a total of 351 craft, including 125 river boats and 177 LCVP (landing craft vehicle personnel). Intelligence assistance includes the assignment of intelligence advisors throughout the country at the province level, over 200 in all. Eleven Special Forces teams are training Vietnamese special forces. Advice and assistance on civic action has included medical and sanitary training as well as help on troop education and psychological warfare. A Joint combat test and development center has been set up to bring modern military technology to bear on the special problems of the war in Viet Nam. Particularly important is the training program for the paramilitary which are bearing the brunt of the Viet Cong attack. Since January, the number of trained Civil Guard companies has increased from 33 to 255, companies in training from 13 to 64, and training centers from 4 to 5. In the same period the number of trained Self-Defense Corps platoons has increased from zero to 966, platoons in training from 53 to 220, and training centers from 15 to 31. C. Strengthening the Government and Gearing It for War. The GVN has made some important structural changes, notably the creation of the Inter-Ministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee, which is in reality a war cabinet, and the division level Strategic Hamlet Committees on which the Province Chiefs sit under the chairmanship of the Division Commanders. But the most important alteration is in attitude. The war effort is now clearly top priority. Signs of this changed governmental attitude are Nhu's almost fanatic devotion to the strategic hamlet program, the GVN's willingness to undertake whatever deficit financing is required, general willingness to allow American advisors to work at all levels, and a new energy and drive that has significantly reduced red tape and bureaucratic delays. Perhaps most significant is the clear recognition that the people must be won over at the rice roots. Although still not adequate, the GVN intelligence machine has been overhauled and improved on our advice. A Central Intelligence Organization has been set up, . . . training programs are now in progress, and a national interrogation center recently began operations. Military and civilian intelligence operations are effectively linked. Similarly, the psychological effort has been stepped up. The country is covered with a radio net; emphasis is on programming for the rural areas, and our advisors are working to improve quality. Nearly all provinces have a daily or weekly newssheet. The clear-and-hold operations have special newspapers produced with our help and advice. A general amnesty plan is being hammered out, and Nhu believes that by the first of the year the trend toward a GVN victory will make the launching of such a plan a sign of strength rather than of weakness. Training programs for provincial officials are under way. Every province now has a training plan, a training officer at the Deputy Province Chief level, and a training center. In Saigon a special program is operating to train strategic hamlet cadres. The emphasis in the training is on winning the support of the people against the VC. In January, as a result of the Staley recommendations, the GVN undertook fiscal reforms which included a successful devaluation (which means that the aid dollar now generates 25% more piasters), and an overhaul of the tax system. Tax collection is better this year than last, but more can and should be done in this area. D. Improved Cooperation with the U.S. The Taylor recommendation that de facto administrative changes be accomplished by persuasion at high levels, by cooperation with Diem's aides who want improved administration, and by a U.S. operating presence, has been largely effected. The job is not done, but it is being done rather well. Our people have shown remarkable ability to deal with the Vietnamese, to advise and assist effectively at every level from the hamlet to the Presidency, to meet and defeat the Viet Cong on their own ground and on their own terms. Specifically, the GVN is cooperating effectively with us on counterinsurgency planning: our Committee for Province Rehabilitation and the GVN Inter-Ministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee are working together closely. They jointly review and approve (or send back to the drawing boards) plans for clear-and-hold operations. Counterinsurgency project agreements are signed directly with Province Chiefs, and disbursement of funds is approved by joint committees on the ground. Priorities on the strategic hamlet program have been worked out jointly--a major objective of recent U.S. negotiating efforts. We have military advisers working with every province chief now; Diem has expressed great satisfaction with their relationship with his people and with the results. Our military participate in the planning of virtually all operations, and we have set up a joint U.S.-GVN operations center in Saigon. On the fiscal side, we have the GVN's agreement to take part in the vital and sensitive business of drawing up their national budget for 1963. This is a concession we have long sought. On the information front, the GVN has agreed to the establishment of USIS field support posts in the provinces. Eleven have been set up and a total of 18 are planned. E. Some Specific Results. Perhaps the most dramatic recent success in Viet-Nam is the mass exodus of nearly one-sixth of the Montagnard tribal population out of VC controlled areas. The Montagnards are seeking protection from VC exactions in some cases, simply fleeing a battlefield in others. But a significant proportion are willing and anxious to be trained, armed, and sent back into the hills. These trained and armed Montagnards are increasingly valuable in supplying intelligence on VC movements on Viet Nam's long and exposed frontier. The VC tried to increase their attacks under cover of the waning rainy season, but did not succeed. The dry season, which lasts until the end of May, will increase the effectiveness of the air monopoly which we enjoy in Viet-Nam. Since July, GVN control over the rural population has increased by an estimated 2 per cent. The GVN now controls 49 per cent of the rural population, the VC about 9 per cent. Communications arteries have been reopened. Roads which formerly required an armed escort are now traveled freely. Night train service has been resumed. As a result of US-supported rat and insect eradication programs, a bumper harvest was anticipated in the Central Provinces. Unfortunately, a typhoon wiped out much of the crop. But unlike last year, Viet-Nam now has adequate reserves of rice to meet this emergency. The program for rural health is moving ahead significantly. Twenty-five provincial surgical suites will be completed by the end of the year. One American surgical team is already in Can Tho, three others will soon be provided. New Zealand will send a team, Australia and the U.K. may also contribute. We have placed 1,300 radios in the villages and others are being rapidly provided for the remaining villages and hamlets; they have already proved very effective in summoning help when the Communists attack. Third country support is substantial. Eleven other countries have contributed about 108 million dollars in aid. An international coordination group has been set up in Saigon to stimulate more third country aid and coordinate it. The Australians have sent military trainers, the U.K. an advisory mission. The June 2 report of the ICC on DRV aggression and subversion in SVN had an important effect on international opinion. The Present Problem Viet Cong armed attacks are down, but they still average 110 per week for this year. Government forces have suffered over 3,000 dead since January. Betrayals of strategic hamlets and paramilitary posts are still frequent. VC intelligence is probably still better than GVN intelligence. The VC have probably made progress in convincing some of the Vietnamese people and some of the uncommitted nations that Viet-Nam should be neutralized on the Laos pattern. Pressures for a conference on Viet-Nam, while not yet serious, may be expected to increase, particularly if the Viet-Cong continue to suffer military reverses. The possibility remains that the DRV will decide to escalate the war by a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of infiltration. The ICC presence discourages this, but does not obviate the possibility. Perhaps the greatest deterrent is the knowledge that escalation to the kind of near conventional war the Viet Minh fought against the French in the later stages of that struggle would make the VC forces more vulnerable to reactions from our conventional arms. Probably the most important problem is simply keeping up the momentum of our joint efforts. This promises to be a long struggle. A shortage of piaster resources coupled with the U.S. gold problem is already troublesome. Continued sacrifice by the Vietnamese people and armed forces may produce war weariness. American casualties can be expected to increase. Our aid input must go on for a long time. We shall intensify pressures for increased contributions from the Vietnamese and from other countries. But the best way to save American money will be the achievement of peace in Viet-Nam. We do not intend to achieve this by surrendering Viet-Nam's independence at a Conference. The war in Viet-Nam is costing us about one per cent of our military budget. By next spring we may be able to predict whether the peak of these expenditures has been passed. The Viet-Nam war is important. For Americans it has proved among other things that our people can live in the provinces and villages with Asian peasants and help them hold off the Communists and improve their lot. On a larger scale, a Communist victory would have a strong impact on all of our allies by tending to devalue our commitments to them. It would provide the DRV with the rice surplus it so badly needs, add 14 million vigorous people to the Communist Bloc, and give the Bloc a strategic salient into the heart of Free Asia. A victory for us would prove that our people can live in the villages with Asians and help them, that underdeveloped nations can defeat "wars of liberation" with our help, strike a telling blow to the mystique of the "wave of the future", and save the tough and hard fighting Vietnamese people from the Communist regime they manifestly do not want. [Continue with the next documents]
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