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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
IX. Press Relations, Defoliation, Strategic
Hamlets, and South Vietnam's Relations With Laos
298. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, October 11, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307. Secret. Drafted by Wood on October 10; initialed by Rice and Wood; next to Johnson's name on the source text is the word "Saw." SUBJECT /2/No other report on the Honolulu meeting has been found. This is an unofficial résumé of decisions and discussions on Viet-Nam at the Honolulu Meeting, October 8, 1962. This paper is written for the information of Messrs. Johnson and Rice and for the record. I. Decisions 1. Get a B-26 unit flown by RVNAF into action as soon as possible. 2. Expand VNAF as fast as possible. II. Discussions General Harkins Briefing and Secretary McNamara's Comments and Decisions (At the Meeting) General Harkins showed that VC battalion-sized operations had declined steadily. There were 8 in May, 1 each in June and July, and none in August or September. On the other hand, ARVN battalion-sized operations had increased from 156 to a high of 454 in August, down to 378 in September. VNAF sorties had increased from 150 in January to 628 in September. Ambassador Nolting commented that evidence from the VC showed that these operations were hurting them and that there was no evidence from the VC that they considered they were getting any propaganda advantages from them. General Harkins and General Anthis pointed out that American pilots are flying 100 hours a month which could not be maintained and that more planes and personnel were needed now. Secretary McNamara stated that the initial objective was for US not to carry the burden of the combat. The following objectives were agreed upon: a) To get a B-26 unit flown by Vietnamese pilots into action as soon as possible. In this connection to explore the use of VN C-47 pilots for B-26s, and the possible use of Chinese pilots in C-47s. b) To expand the VNAF as fast as possible, having in mind Thuan's estimate that it could be expanded to 10,000. c) Secretary McNamara said "If you really want more US pilots, make recommendations, but they will be received coolly". The Secretary emphasized that our objectives are to help the Vietnamese fight their war and to reduce, not increase, our own combat role. General Anthis showed that Farmgate operations had been successful in convoying trucks. An average of 32 convoys a month had been escorted by planes from January through June and this had increased to 178 in September. None of the convoys had so far been ambushed. General Harkins continued that generally Vietnamese troops were staying out longer. One battalion had stayed out for 3 weeks. However, there were cases where Vietnamese soldiers were not as fit nor as well-led as they should be. Recently one group had eaten up all their food too soon and gotten their feet wet, etc., to the point where they had to be pulled back prematurely. The Ninth Division was now operational, the 26th Division (which would be Viet-Nam's 10th) was due in January. Two additional VN airborne battalions and 2 VN Marine battalions are now ready. (General Timmes commented before the meeting that there are now 4 Vietnamese paratroop battalions, but that they were not much used; this was partly because it was easier to get troops in and out by helicopters.) The men and organizations needed to handle the last large arrivals of M113s and M114 personnel carriers are now ready. (The Secretary commented that although these vehicles are in short supply, more could be made available for Viet-Nam if needed.) Staff planning had improved but was still weak. Logistic support was better. CO and DOC training would be finished as scheduled by the end of the year. Mobile training teams for these outfits had not worked out well, but some of it was being continued. There was a new airfield at Pleiku. Helicopter training was now being carried out in Viet-Nam. Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDG) had made good progress. The Strategic Hamlet program was OK. Intelligence had shown great improvement and was being better used. Defoliation operations in the Delta were very successful. Six target areas would soon be finished. 100,000 leaflets were dropped each time one of these operations was carried out. (Secretary McNamara asked for further recommendations on defoliation. As to crop destruction, he told General Harkins to assume that he could get rapid Washington approval for substitution of test sites providing the same high standard of choosing these sites was maintained. It was agreed that General Delmore/3/ who was then in Honolulu would be sent back to Saigon to supervise crop destruction.) /3/Brigadier General Fred J. Delmore, U.S. Army. 54 junks had been delivered and although there was squabbling amongst the contractors, another 143 were to be delivered during October. There had been no sabotage recently in this program. The tropo-scatter was working. General Harkins then presented his ideas for an explosive type operation. The concept had been approved by Secretary Thuan and President Diem. Even if there are 30,000 hard-core VC as estimated by the GVN (the US estimate is 20,000) their forces were far inferior to the Vietnamese who have the equivalent of 51 trained divisions. The objective, therefore, is to conduct a nation-wide offensive to exert sudden and continuing pressure on known areas of VC concentration. This required a planning phase, a preparatory phase, which would include saturation bombing against VC installations, especially in Zone D. Theoretically the explosive phase would consist of full-scale coordinated operations exploding at every level from the rice roots to the national level and finally follow-up operations. In replying to a question from General Taylor, General Harkins said that such an operation might have to be repeated several times. He emphasized the preparations which would be made, particularly in the chain of command which would eliminate the field command and bring it to General Ty's Joint Command Staff. (This had been accepted in principle by President Diem.) Improvement would also be made in the disposition of Vietnamese troops, prepositioning of equipment, intelligence training, planning, etc. General Harkins did not have time to present his plan for phasing out US personnel in Viet-Nam within 3 years. It is understood that this would involve large increases in the US MAP for the next 3 years and for the Vietnamese Defense budget. It would also involve very large increases in the number of Vietnamese under arms. For example, an increase of the SDC to about 140.000. Armed Helicopters (Corridor Discussion) Several officers were asked about the July recommendation that helicopters be armed. The answers were generally unclear and somewhat discouraging. General Anthis pointed out that it was difficult to fire accurately from an armed helicopter due to vibration and that it presented a relatively stationary target to VC on the ground. He recognizes the political importance of improving protection for US helicopter crews and agreed that the helicopters should be armed, at least to see what could be done to improve the situation. Major General Rowny who has participated in the field tests leading to the Howza (?)/4/ report, and who is going to Viet-Nam to supervise research and development, was more optimistic. He was also anxious to conduct experiments in mounting 2.75 inch recoilless artillery in helicopters. This would permit the helicopters to remain at a greater distance and still inflict damage on the VC. Both he and General Anthis agreed that the best helicopter operation was to use fixed-wing aircraft to soften up an area with bombs, napalm, and strafing, then bring in the helicopters as quickly as possible. /4/The question mark appears on the source text. . . . the reason for the delay in arming helicopters was the Air Force reluctance to have the Army demonstrate that its helicopters could be effectively armed. This was certainly reflected in remarks by Anthis to the effect that the helicopters were not designed as armed vehicles. USIA (Corridor Discussion) John Mecklin is asking for projectors and generators for all MAAG advisers. USIA is replying to the effect that he should look for all available in-country equipment and that USIA will then see what more can be added. It is believed that there is a great deal of in-country equipment. The total cost of Mecklin's request even if no in-country equipment is used would be about $200,000. . . . . . . . AID (Corridor Discussion) Mr. Brent had no problems which required help from the Washington end. However, AID is concerned about reaching an understanding with DOD (Bill Bundy) about who will pay for the Strategic Hamlet kits in late FY 63 and thereafter. It is hoped that this will be worked out in Honolulu on October 9. AID is also stirring up some new ideas about how to get more done for the Vietnamese peasants. We will hear about this shortly. . . . . . . .
299. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 12, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1262. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 423. Had talk with Thuan today in his Office at Presidency. After we had covered wide range of subjects, I said I had inferred from his remarks that there was nothing to the rumors that he had resigned from any or all of his jobs because of President's displeasure concerning the alleged lottery scandal./2/ Thuan directly confirmed that he had neither resigned nor been asked to resign. He said when he returned from America and Europe on October 5, he had immediately heard stories that he was in disgrace because of involvement in a lottery scandal. He recalled he had called me the next day and in response to my questioning as to how he was, he had said, "I am trying to find my way around". He said he meant that he had not at that time seen President Diem and didn't know what this was all about. He said Ngo Dinh Nhu had told him that apparently his enemies were out to get him. I asked who these enemies were, and he said a number of non-Communist Vietnamese who thought he had become too powerful and, of course, the Viet Cong. He mentioned in the former category a number of businessmen and professional men who, he said, for reasons of their own, opposed the 57th tax, the stricter enforcement of income declarations and collections, the draft of officers and doctors, and other measures which he had advocated. /2/In mid-September it was discovered that the Vietnamese National Treasury was missing 44 million piasters owned by the distributor of the national lottery tickets. Thuan said he went to the President directly as soon as he could get to see him and asked him bluntly whether there was any basis to the rumors that the President was embarrassed or irate because of any actions of his or his wife's; if so, he offered his resignation. Thuan said President Diem said there was no basis to the rumors that Thuan was in disgrace, that he had had the matter personally investigated and was convinced that Thuan had nothing to do with it, and that he wished him to continue in his present duties. Since then, as was evident from Thuan's previous discussion with me on matters recently discussed with Diem, he has been active in all phases of his previous work. I told Thuan I was delighted to hear this and asked whether this applied to other members of the Cabinet, about whom there were similar rumors. He said that to his knowledge it applied to Vu Van Mau, Nguyen Luong (Minister of Finance), and Nguyen Van Luong (Minister of Justice). I asked about Dr. Tuyen and Minister Ngo Trong Hieu. He said he did not know about Dr. Tuyen, since he was not a Cabinet minister and was always involved in "secret undertakings about which I know little". He also said he had not heard anything about the present status of Hieu. While Thuan did not state specifically that there was no irregularity or scandal concerning the national lottery (nor did I ask him this directly), he did state that the rumors that his wife had been involved and arrested were absolutely false and the rumor that Madam Duc Loi was an aunt of his was absolutely false. He said that he did not know her. Thuan added that it seemed that every time he went away there was a concerted attempt to cut him down, mentioning his trip to Formosa in February and the fact that before he could get back after the bombing there were rumors afloat that he was responsible. He also remarked that all of those who were allegedly implicated in this affair were northerners, who, he implied, were special targets of other Saigonnaise factions. One other point stated by Thuan: he said an important telegram he sent to President Diem after his talk with President Kennedy on Laos recognition problem and crop defoliation had never been received by Diem or by Nhu. The telegram had been received by Vu Van Mau, who had sent it in two copies, as is customary, to President Diem and to Counselor Nhu, but neither had received it. This indicated to his mind that someone in the palace was either negligent or untrustworthy. Nolting
300. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, October 12, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, Vietnam Correspondence. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Wood. Dear Fritz: As you know I remain concerned about the dangers of over-optimism in Viet-Nam. I am well aware that things are much improved since last year and I want you to know again how much credit you and the other members of the Saigon Task Force deserve. Although the tide may be turning in Viet-Nam, there is a danger that certain very serious problems may not be receiving the attention and action which they deserve here in Washington. I think we are by far safer in carrying out the President's directive to save Viet-Nam if we lean in the direction of emphasizing our problems rather than our successes. In this connection I would appreciate your full and unvarnished views on the following matters which have come to my attention during and after the Honolulu Meeting./2/ /2/See Document 298. 1) Are the villagers being armed fast enough? I take it that their priority comes after the Army, the Civil Guard, and the Self Defense Corps, and yet they are the ones who must usually resist the first attack until the Army, Civil Guard or Self Defense Corps can come to their assistance. It is my understanding that in the average village of about 2,000 inhabitants there are approximately 50 Republican Youth who are natives in the village who must resist the first attack and that there are not usually more than 10 rifles of ancient vintage available to them. Secretary McNamara has made it clear that we have plenty of rifles, carbines, etc. I would like to know if we can do more now to arm villagers who have received a reasonable degree of training from Civic Action teams or from the Popular Forces. 2) I gather that there have been delays in the arming of helicopters despite the fact that at the July Honolulu Meeting/3/ Secretary McNamara said that helicopters should be armed as rapidly as possible. From what I understand, the Air Force prefers the strategy of bombing and strafing an area with fixed-wing aircraft before bringing in helicopters. I also understand that they prefer this method because it would give them a larger role than arming helicopters which do not belong to the Air Force. While bombing and strafing an area before bringing in helicopters may provide greater safety it also runs the risk of killing more innocent Vietnamese. I hope that Major General Rowny, who I understand has recently arrived in Viet-Nam to be in charge of Combat Development and Testing, will push ahead with the arming of helicopters as rapidly as possible. Since the whole doctrine of using helicopters in counter-guerrilla war is now under development, I think that the helicopters should be armed urgently so that we can at least find out whether they won't give adequate protection to American armed forces personnel without the necessity of saturation bombing and strafing. /3/See Document 248. 3) I was frankly concerned by General Harkins' presentation of the "Explosion" operation which he is considering. I believe that the VC would be tipped off before such an operation could possibly take place and that it would give them time to make themselves scarce. I am concerned that given the very large numbers and different types of armed forces now operating in Viet-Nam the attempt to carry out such an operation simultaneously throughout Viet-Nam would lead to chaos and the loss of many innocent lives. I fear that after it had occurred the Vietnamese armed forces would be in a weakened condition and that the VC could slip back into their old positions relatively easily. In sum, I am dubious about such an operation and I think that its political implications are so important that it should not be approved without full consultation with the Department of State. 4) I would like your views on whether we are doing everything possible to put in administrative support in villages which have been recently liberated. I realize that in areas like Zone B it is necessary to soften up the Viet Cong by jabbing attacks and serial action and that you can't put a team of civil administrators in the middle of a Viet Cong area where they could not survive. However, I hope that every feasible effort is being made to maintain the Vietnamese Government's presence after the military have swept a village. 5) While I realize that progress is being made in improving the GVN's image, for example President Diem's speech at the opening of the National Assembly,/4/ I am still concerned that the Viet Cong propaganda machine is more effective. In general I think that the question will be solved through concrete steps taken to help the villagers, while unfounded public claims by the GVN will only hurt their cause. I approve of the many steps being made to get information to the villagers through radios, newspapers, etc., but I think we should make a constant effort to dissuade the GVN from over-optimism and from overstating its case. /4/Nolting commented that Diem's speech on October 1 and its reception were the "high-water marks" in an increasingly successful attempt to rally Vietnam to a national mobilization. (Telegram 367 from Saigon, October 1; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-162) In general I feel that we are doing better militarily but that more must be done to help the villagers themselves, not only by arming them more rapidly but also socially and economically. I am aware that AID has revolutionized its procedures, greatly expanded its recruiting, and that it is fortunate in having Rufus Phillips to work under USOM Director Brent in pushing this part of their program vigorously. Nevertheless, the risks are so great that I am still concerned on this question. I want to assure you that the purpose of this letter is to determine more accurately how I can carry out my job of meeting the President's requirements in Viet-Nam and of supporting you on questions where I may be of help in order to carry out his directives. It was a pleasure to have seen you in Honolulu and I am only sorry that Thai matters prevented us from being able to discuss the situation in Viet-Nam more fully. Very sincerely yours, W. Averell Harriman/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
301. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Vietnamese President's Political Counselor (Nhu)/1/ Saigon, October 13, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, 301 Laos-GVN. Confidential. Drafted by Nolting. Dear Mr. Counselor: I have already taken much time of your Government's officials, including the President, on the subject of relations with the Laotian Government, and I hope you will pardon my sending you this note on the subject to express once again my Government's strong hope that the Government of Viet-Nam will find a way to continue diplomatic relations with the Laotian Government. As undoubtedly reported to you by Minister Thuan, and as stressed by me to the President, President Kennedy personally has requested a reconsideration of your Government's position, in view of the stakes involved in this matter, not only of direct concern to the Government of Viet-Nam but also in the wider sense involving the position of the free-world countries in the Laotian affair. President Kennedy has made it plain to Minister Thuan and to me that, while he can guarantee nothing respecting the final outcome in Laos, the Free World Signatories of the Geneva Accords have chosen a course there best calculated, in his judgment, to benefit stability in Southeast Asia and eventually to protect the frontiers of Viet-Nam against Viet Cong infiltration. The success of this endeavor depends in great measure on the solidarity of the free countries signatory to the Geneva Accords in pressing by diplomatic means for the fulfillment of those Accords by the Communist Bloc countries and by the Government of Laos. President Kennedy feels that the United States has the right to ask for the continued cooperation of the Government of Viet-Nam in this matter. He also recognizes and appreciates the fact that your Government has gone along thus far even despite grave misgivings. He feels that it would be a great mistake to break diplomatic relations at this point, regardless of what the Laotian Government may do in recognizing the Hanoi regime. I would ask your consideration, therefore, of a similar case with which Chancellor Adenauer was confronted, of which I am sure you are aware. As you know, the Federal Republic of Germany has for years taken a stand similar to yours--namely, that it will not accept two German ambassadors representing the two parts of divided Germany. The United States has fully supported this position. Nevertheless, there has been one single exception to this policy, namely in Moscow. This exception was made by the Federal Republic of Germany for overriding practical reasons and as an isolated exception to a general policy. This exception has not only been maintained as an isolated case, not creating a precedent, but has also had practical, beneficial results for the Federal Republic of Germany. I hope it has been reported to you that the United States has offered to do everything it can to support your Government in confining a similar exception to your rule to the single instance of Laos. It appears that the presentation of credentials of the representative from Hanoi is imminent and I therefore take the liberty of requesting a prompt reconsideration of this question in the light of the factors above, and in view of the repeated requests from my authorities in Washington on this matter. I am sending this letter to you inasmuch as I have not had the opportunity to discuss the matter with you personally, although I have done so with the President and other members of the Government. With best wishes and regards, Sincerely yours, Frederick E. Nolting, Jr./2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
302. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Cottrell)/1/ Saigon, October 15, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1562. Confidential; Official-Informal. According to another copy, this letter was drafted by Barbour and Robert T Burke of the Political Section on October 4 and cleared by Manfull and Trueheart. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: ERC 67 A 677, 350 GVN) Dear Cot: I have received your letter of September 11/2/ which listed eleven questions asked by Ed Rice about Viet-Nam. /2/Document 282. These are, as you know, some (but not all) of the complex and broad questions to which we are constantly seeking the answers and which we are attempting to cover as completely as possible in our reporting. The replies below are therefore but brief treatments of subjects which our reporting deals with in more detail. They are numbered to correspond with the numbers of your questions. 1. Because of the nature of a guerrilla warfare in which the enemy not only mingles with the friendly or uncommitted population but is frequently indistinguishable from such population in dress or manner, aerial bombing and strafing present recognized problems. The Operations Control Center uses the utmost care in selecting and cross-checking its targets against all available intelligence and we are constantly trying to refine these procedures. They are, in fact, as rigid and restrictive as any enforced in any combat area. Furthermore, there is no doubt in my mind that President Diem, the Vietnamese Air Force Commander and all others concerned are fully aware of the harmful effects, political, psychological, and military, of misdirected or inaccurate bombing. They are trying as hard as we to keep these to the absolute minimum. As to the effect of an air stake on the people in a VC-occupied village, we can assume it is not good. But so long as the VC conceal themselves among non-combatants, some of these will suffer, too. On the other hand, all available intelligence shows that the VC are being hurt by air operations and that the populace is not being driven into the communists' arms by them. So far, then, aerial bombing has done considerably more good than harm and the continued improvement in intelligence will further reduce the margin for error. Vietnamese tactical air support of army operations and its role in the relief of beleaguered hamlets have increased greatly during the past year, and in such operations the danger to a non-VC populace is greatly reduced. There are no indications that napalm is resented more than the rockets, bombs, or machine guns used by the Vietnamese air force in tactical operations. On the general subject of VC versus civil casualties see our telegram 376./3/ For an account of the care exercised in bombing see also Bill Trueheart's letter of September 7. . . . /3/Dated October 3. It stated that incident and casualty figures were only two of many factors taken in assessing the progress of the war. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-362) 2. In some cases the arming of hamlet militia has been delayed on the grounds that the local authorities were still in the process of determining the reliability of those they propose to arm, a position difficult to quarrel with. The usual pattern in the case of completed strategic hamlets seems to be to give the hamlet militia a small arsenal consisting of shotguns and old French weapons and to improve these gradually as better arms become available and the hamlet organization develops. It thus happens that strategic hamlets are sometimes attacked while they still have inadequate arms with which to defend themselves. Two points should be noted in this connection, however: a. An attempt is frequently made to protect insufficiently armed hamlets through the assignment of civil guard or SDC personnel. b. One of the primary VC sources of arms in the past has been weapons captured from friendly Vietnamese forces. The chances of such losses occurring are, of course, increased when the Personnel in question are inadequately trained or their loyalty has been inadequately checked. But we know of no case where a hamlet had to show its willingness to withstand a VC attack in order to become eligible for weapons. This, obviously, would be nonsensical. 3. Many of Ed Rice's questions are phrased in terms of villages and villagers when I believe that hamlets and their inhabitants are meant. To clarify, Vietnamese provinces are divided into districts, which are in turn divided into villages. (In some of the larger, more sparsely populated provinces there is an intermediate unit called the canton.) Villages are primarily administrative subdivisions of a district. Their councils are appointed, usually by the district chief. Several hamlets are usually found within the village area, one of which may also be the village headquarters. Most of the people therefore are grouped in the hamlets, which are the smallest and most numerous unit of habitation-not in the villages. There has as yet been no attempt to arrange for the free election of village councils, but it is the avowed goal of the strategic hamlet program to provide that each hamlet council be so elected. Elections have not yet been held in all of the strategic hamlets on the grounds that many are not yet ready for them. As to whether they are really "free," I can only report that balloting is secret and there is a choice of candidates. Instructions to hamlet cadres insist on these two elements but point out that if the cadre has done his job well, the proper candidates will be elected. Despite this paradox, there appears no doubt that a real thrust toward free elections at the hamlet level is being felt and that perhaps as much progress in this direction is currently being made as could be hoped for. 4. It is true that the poorest inhabitants are bearing the brunt of unpaid work on strategic hamlet defenses. Those who are better off are also called on to make their contribution but can do so by giving cash or hiring someone else to do the necessary work. In defense of the procedure it might be noted: a. That most of the strategic hamlets established to date have been financed without direct U.S. support and with limited means; b. That the construction labor is a temporary contribution which does result in increased protection for the inhabitant and thereby directly benefits those working on the project; c. In the case of current clear-and-hold operations and those which are expected to be initiated with increasing frequency in the future, we are hoping the GVN will provide minimal remuneration for work accomplished, perhaps compensation in kind with PL 480/4/ commodities. /4/Formally entitled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted July 10, 1954, P.L. 480 provided for the donation of U.S. agricultural surpluses to friendly governments; for text see 68 Stat. 454. 5. The government does have an inspection service for dealing with corruption, among officials in the provinces. There also exists a President's "letter box" to which complaints alleging misconduct may be addressed. While this machinery may not be adequate, there is evidence that efforts are being made to eliminate lower and middle level abuses. In the press there is a constant campaign devoted to exposing misdeeds, and editorial comment calling on the people to denounce, and on the government to punish, all cases of official corruption. 6. Most strategic hamlets do not involve relocation. The most common practice is simply to build fences around the existing settlement. In some cases those outside the perimeter are moved within, but they continue to work their own land and remain within easy walking distance of it. On the other hand, some combat hamlets, such as those in Operation Sunrise, involve relocation. Our experience so far has been that it was both wise and necessary to move the villagers into combat hamlets in the Sunrise operation, which was carried out in an area which had been held by the VC. By relocating these people they were brought back under GVN control, the logistic support they provided the VC was reduced, and they were offered a better and more secure life. On the basis of this experience and similar situations in other provinces we support the combat hamlet regroupment concept. 7. ARVN and civil guard misbehavior is a chronic problem, but here again the trend is an encouraging one. Military civic action is still just getting off the ground, but the concept of the good soldier as a friend of the people is being accepted. Foraging in VC areas will undoubtedly continue, and there is probably little that can be done about it at this time. On the other hand, outright crimes are usually punished when an officer hears about them. Additional fundamental progress is primarily an educational matter, and this is a slow procedure. The SDC, being the least disciplined organization, most removed from regular units and most in contact with the people in the hamlets, is, as you pointed out, the worst offender. I personally believe their low pay is a contributing element in this problem. Their 900 piasters per month salary was originally set up when the SDC was considered to be a part-time organization. It has since clearly become an onerous, dangerous full-time job. While squad and platoon leaders have recently been given small increases, the SDC continues to bear the brunt of VC pressure, continues to receive the lowest pay, and continues to have the fewest fringe benefits. A problem arises in finding the necessary piasters to raise SDC pay, however. As in the case of hamlet labor, we are considering augmenting their compensation by PL 480 commodities. 8. The answer to question number 8 is contained in a number of recent economic reports, particularly airgrams 134 and 140./5/ As the question suggests, some basic reforms are needed. Plans are currently underway to distribute large quantities of fertilizer to Vietnamese farmers. The details, including the question of whether or not free distribution should be made, are currently under discussion. /5/Airgram 134, September 13, transmitted a paper on Vietnam's economic problems and suggested possible remedies. (Department of State, Central Files, 851K.00/9-1362) Airgram 140, September 17, transmitted a political and economic assessment of the situation in Vietnam at that time. (Ibid., 751K.00/9-1762) 9. I do not consider that a serious problem arises from any impression that we are replacing the French in their colonial rule. This is, of course, a theme on which communist propaganda has relied heavily, but it may be expected that such propaganda will continue despite any action on our part. It is also true that as Westerners in an Asiatic land we have a physical resemblance to the French and other European colonizers. There is, however, general recognition of our fundamental differences from the former French administration, namely, that we have not infringed on the sovereignty of the Vietnamese government or people, that our actions are directed toward assisting them, and our programs are largely carried out by the Vietnamese themselves. Many of these same considerations are true with respect to the question of whether the American presence here has reached a counter-productive level. I believe that it is generally recognized that we are here to assist. In light of the difficult conditions under which both the Americans and Vietnamese are operating, the evidences of faction have been remarkably slight. 10. The role of northerners in the GVN is less a source of criticism than it was several years ago. While regionalism is still very much present in the Vietnamese mentality, and a native of one area is quick to make slighting generalizations about those from another, the past years have had an homogenizing effect. Thus, I do not think Diem's administration is handicapped by the use of northerners. Diem's alleged favoritism of Catholics is more of a problem, for many actions take place which are unjustified and are attributed to his own favoritism of Catholics. A current source of concern in this area is a report that the Phu Yen province chief, with whom we have worked exceptionally well, is to be relieved because of his failure to get along with a very active Catholic priest in the province./6/ There are reports that many officials in the government and officers in the army believe the only way to get ahead is to be or become a Catholic. It may well be that the alleged favoring of Catholics is based less on what the policy actually is, however, than on what those involved believe it to be. /6/I have just been told that Maj. Dong (Phu Yen Prov. Chief) is to remain with Diem's full support. FEN. [Footnote in the source text.] There remains the presence and insidious influence of the Can Lao in the government. The Can Lao, however, seems to have lost momentum during the past year or two. It is no longer the feared machinery for intrigue and inquisition, for individual success or failure, that it used to be. The factions within it are more divided today than they have been previously. Ngo Dinh Can's Central Viet-Nam wing is probably even more estranged from Ngo Dinh Nhu's Southern branch than it was in the past and various favored groups outside the Can Lao have come into being. The party still maintains its military groupings and economic interests, however, and these undoubtedly are a source of insecurity and irritation on the part of businessmen and army officers. 11. The answer to question 11 may be found in the portion of our weekly progress report cable number 313 which deals with a breakdown of VC and GVN control of areas here./7/ /7/Dated September 18. This Task Force Saigon weekly progress report stated that the Government controlled 49% of the population; the Viet Cong 9%, and the rest remained in dispute. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-1862) With personal best wishes to Ed & you. Sincerely,
303. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)/1/ Washington, October 16, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Vietnam 1962. Secret. Drafted by Johnson. A copy was also sent to Henry D. Owen and Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Staff. SUBJECT On Friday, October 12, I had an interesting talk with John Heble, the U.S. Consul in Hue, about the situation in Central Vietnam. The Consul in Hue has always gotten around the countryside much more than any other US diplomatic official in Vietnam. When I prepared my paper on the "Central Government and the Countryside"/2/ I found the reports of Mr. Heble and his predecessor among the most useful sources of information on the situation. Since his return to Washington, Mr. Heble's relatively pessimistic reports on the present situation in Central Vietnam have provoked a good deal of interest; Governor Harriman and Ed Rice have taken a personal interest in them. Following are the principal points made by Mr. Heble in his talk with me: /2/ See footnote 3, Document 249. 1. The situation in Central Vietnam can be characterized in general as one in which the rate of deterioration of the Central Government's position has been reduced but deterioration itself has not stopped. 2. In Central Vietnam the strategic hamlet program is mostly pure facade. Often creation of a so-called strategic hamlet involves nothing but a very inadequate fence around one-quarter of the hamlet. This in itself might not be so significant since, while the hamlet fences have become the symbol of the strategic hamlet program, other elements are of equal or greater importance. However, in Central Vietnam the "strategic hamlet" begins and ends with such a fence. There is no other effort to improve the defenses of the hamlet and nothing at all to improve the internal situation in the village in connection with the strategic hamlet program. In part this failure may be the result of differences between brothers Can and Nhu. Can is unconvinced as to the value of the strategic hamlet program. More generally, however, it reflects customary defects of Vietnamese administration-its basic inability to handle such a program, particularly with the speed that is presently being demanded. The result is failure combined with an effort to cover up failure through superficial compliance which can be reported to the Central Government as full compliance. 3. The villagers in Central Vietnam can see no advantage in the strategic hamlet program and they complain because work on the hamlets takes them away from their fields. Province and district chiefs with whom Heble has talked admit that the strategic hamlet program has had no effect whatsoever on the number of VC attacks, etc. 4. Can's Popular Force is in Heble's view a much more promising approach to the problem of security in the hamlet and village. This program is based upon the realization that the VC are much more deeply rooted in the village than the Government has been willing to admit. Experience in Central Vietnam suggests that about 1/3 of the males in any village are likely to be active VC collaborators. You can build all the hamlet defenses you wish, but if you leave the VC cadres in the village untouched you will not increase the villagers' sense of security and his willingness to collaborate with the Government. 5. Can recruits his Popular Force on a volunteer basis. Its members are given training which is comparable to US Marine boot camp training in its rigor. Members of the force are required to work all day and much of the night. After a few weeks of training members are given the option of leaving, of taking a somewhat easier administrative job in the Popular Force, or of staying on in the military units of the force. The Popular Force has a good deal of esprit and has something of the same appeal to the youth possessed by the VC. It offers adventure and dedication to a cause. 6. After training, a Popular Force unit of 150 men is put in a village. The members live with the villagers and help them in the fields, in the construction of public works, etc. over a period of six months. The members are strongly disciplined and behave in a proper manner toward the villagers. After working all day members of the force spend much of the night on military patrols and forays against the VC. They use VC tactics, hitting the VC when they outnumber them or can achieve surprise and retreating from the village when attacked by a stronger VC force. Their activities create a sense of gratitude on the part of villagers--a feeling that the Government is interested in the village and its welfare. The Popular Force builds up an intelligence net and gradually begins to get the cooperation of the villagers. Even more significant, VC cadres in the village begin to defect. (Although interrogations have provided some information on the reasons for such defection, a more intensive effort is going to be made by Can to determine the reasons.) After six months or so, when the Popular Force feels it has rooted out the VC organization, has developed the village defenses and has created an intelligence net it moves on to another village. In Heble's view the strategic hamlet program can make sense only if it is made an adjunct to such an effort as this. At the same time he cautioned that if the Popular Force concept is introduced generally in Vietnam--and there is some present trend in this direction--it may not be effective in areas where Can does not control it. 7. There has been a struggle between Can and Nhu over the Popular Force. Until recently Nhu and Thuan tightly controlled the Central Government's support for the Popular Force and it was largely dependent upon local resources in Central Vietnam. Recently, however, Diem has been convinced of the desirability of increasing support for the Popular Force and has reduced Nhu's and Thuan's control over its finances. . . . 8. In Central Vietnam about the only welfare program of the Central Government that reaches the villager or hamlet dweller is the program for elimination of crop pests. This program, for which we supply much of the support, has done an effective and important job of significantly increasing crop yields. When I asked Heble what sort of welfare programs he would recommend he mentioned small public works--especially roads and small irrigation works. 9. A general exception to Heble's statements about the ineffectiveness of Government programs was his view of the Montagnard program. The Government has in recent months been doing a much more effective job with the Montagnards. Nonetheless he is a little afraid that there may be a gap in planning between the kind of immediate relief activity in which the Government is presently engaged and its longer term resettlement programs. I mentioned to him that I had had a similar concern as reflected in my paper but had been assured by Bill Trueheart and others that, in fact, the Government was moving beyond the immediate welfare stage. 10. Mr. Heble confirmed what I have heard before with respect to intelligence; namely, that while intelligence on the VC has improved as a result of improved organization and efficiency of military intelligence collecting system, cooperation of the villagers in providing intelligence has not significantly improved. This failure is, of course, a significant indicator of the inability so far of the Central Government to obtain the loyalty and cooperation of the rural populace. The Popular Force program has, in the limited areas where it has been developed, resulted in improved intelligence from the rural population. 11. Heble emphasized the need for better training of officials, particularly those in immediate contact with the rural population. The rural populace rarely saw officials above the level of district chief. Heble thought that a training program directed in the first instance at the district chiefs would be of considerable utility. This is, of course, the suggestion I made in my paper. Heble also agreed that there could be real value in using visits to districts and provinces where an effective job is being done as part of a training program for district chiefs and others. It provided one means by which one could hope to change the attitudes of district officials. 12. Heble also agreed with my conclusion that the election of hamlet councils under present circumstances had little, if any, value in providing a channel of communication between the Government and the countryside. As long as the councils were fundamentally the instrument of the central Government for the imposition of certain programs in the countryside, truly free elections would be difficult to achieve and even if achieved would not produce a body that could serve as a channel of communication. Heble believes that the establishment of such channels of communication is of considerable importance. Comment: I did not attempt to check all of the proposals in my paper with Mr. Heble. However, his account of the situation in Central Vietnam confirms the validity of the recommendations to which his remarks had a bearing. At Ed Rice's invitation I chatted with him (Ed) Monday about what further actions we might take in Vietnam and I am contemplating following up that conversation with a memo./3/ /3/A copy of this 2-page memorandum, dated October 18, is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, R. Johnson Chron.
304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, October 18, 1962, 8:24 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/10-1862. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rice, cleared with S/S, and initialed by Harriman. 459. To Nolting from Harriman. Deptel 331, Embtel 438 and Vientiane's 620 repeated Saigon 173./2/ I must tell you frankly that it will be diplomatic defeat if Diem severs relations with Laos. /2/Telegram 620, October 18, reported that the North Vietnamese Ambassador would arrive soon and present his credentials. (Ibid.) Telegram 438, October 17, stated that South Vietnam would break relations with Laos if the North Vietnamese Ambassador presented his credentials. (Ibid., 651J.51K/10-1762) Regarding telegram 331, see footnote 3, Document 292. Diem cannot expect us to accept his refusal, in affronting disregard of request from the President, to stay in the fight to preserve Laos, Laos being on his own doorstep. This is a fight which he should be helping us wage with all vigor. Diem's stubbornness and personal feelings are understood, but there comes a time when being a good ally requires laying them aside and cooperating to make joint policies work. This is such a time, and you should now put the matter to Diem in such terms. Rusk
305. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Saigon, October 21, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was prepared from the interpreter's notes and should not be considered a stenographic record of the meeting. A note attached to the source text states that it had not been reviewed or cleared by any of the participants. SUBJECT ATTENDANCE Mr. Nhu met his visitors at the door to his office and, after everyone was seated, asked Admiral Felt how the SEATO meeting had progressed./2/ Admiral Felt answered that he thought that the meetings had been successful and had been concerned principally with the refinement of the latest plan. He commented that, of the four plans which had been prepared up to now, three of them concerned South Vietnam. /2/Since there was no formal SEMO Council meeting in 1962, Nhu is probably referring to the informal SEATO Council meeting in New York on September 29. Mr. Nhu then asked the Admiral what he thought of the situation in Laos. Admiral Felt held up his crossed fingers and said that we must hope for the best. Ambassador Nolting explained that crossed fingers meant, in Vietnam, "nothing doing". The Ambassador then said that the Phoumi charges concerning the locations of North Vietnamese Communist units had been delivered to the International Control Commission. He added that the forces which were working in Laos appeared to be driving Phouma more to the right. Admiral Felt agreed, and said, in confidence, that that very morning the Pathet Lao had launched attacks in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements. He could not, he said, understand what their interest could be in doing this. Ambassador Nolting agreed that it was difficult to understand what they could gain by such violations. Mr. Nhu stated that these actions could be the result of the fact that there were many factions, many "tendances" within the Communist element. The Ambassador commented that there was not much coordination between the factions. Mr. Nhu then volunteered his personal opinion that the two North Vietnamese regiments which were in Laos did not want to return to Hanoi. They wanted to come to South Vietnam--which was contrary to the desires of their leaders in the North. He then said that last year, there had been a meeting in Hanoi which had been presided over by the Chinese. At the meeting zones had been assigned within South East Asia--including Vietnam, Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia in connection with the settlement of the Laotian question. North Vietnam's task was to provide two regiments which would operate in the South. Since that time, authorities in Hanoi had decided to replace the two regiments in South Vietnam by two regiments which were more reliable and the two units originally assigned to South Vietnam were ordered to the area surrounding Saravane. This action created doubts within the two regiments which had been reassigned and their morale was affected by the knowledge that they were not trusted. They had sent emissaries to Mr. Nhu with the request that he take a strong position against neutralism in Laos--since the realization of this state would result in their forced return to North Vietnam--which they did not want. Admiral Felt then asked what the monthly rate of defection was. Mr. Nhu said that he did not know but that it was increasing because of the growth in the number of strategic hamlets. He went on to say that the defection of officers remained a question of the individual and that the surrender of entire units still remained in the contact-negotiation phase. He then told the story of how, in Khien Phong Province, a leader--Colonel--of the Viet Cong had been seriously wounded during an offensive operation carried out by government forces. A check of the serial numbers of this officer's pistol (which Mr. Nhu produced and showed to his visitors) revealed that the wounded man was a person who had been favorable to the government. Generally, said Mr. Nhu, the dissatisfied Viet Cong troops wanted no part of neutrality in Laos. One of their leaders, a General, had attended a number of meetings held by the Communist chiefs and had reported that one must not believe that the Communists really wanted a neutral Laos. He had added that the creation of the present government in Laos had served to demoralize the factions in the North who were opposed to the Communist regime. Ambassador Nolting then asked Mr. Nhu if he thought that there were many malcontents in the North. Mr. Nhu replied that, although the number of people who were opposed to the Communist government was important, they were not properly organized. Reverting to his discussion of the two regiments he said that some of the troops were willing to return to North Vietnam, but most of them would rather return to the South. He added that a peculiar problem had been raised by the possibility of the Russians' refusal to supply the Communist regiments in Laos. If this occurred Hanoi would be forced to take care of them. Meanwhile, the effect of this problem was felt in Zone "D". It had been planned that this area would be stocked in a manner to provide for the needs of a division. Recently, however, the plan had been upset. Operations carried out by forces of the Government of South Vietnam had resulted in the loss of one-third of these supplies. Another third had been stolen to meet the needs of the two regiments in Laos. This was why it was necessary, concluded Mr. Nhu, for the government to launch an operation which would result in the seizure of the remaining stocks, leaving the projected VC division hungry. In reply to Ambassador Nolting's question, he said that he did not believe that the effective of a complete division were actually in Zone "D". Mr. Nhu then said that he believed that the doctrine of Mao Tse Tung contained a basic fallacy. According to Mao there was a natural progression from guerrilla activity--through irregular forces to conventional warfare. The fallacy became evident when the Viet Cong tried to progress to the stage of irregular forces and found that they did not have popular support. This was the reason for their many recent failures, to which mobility of regular government forces and improved counter-guerrilla tactics had contributed a great deal. He ended this part of his statement by saying that there was a direct connection between the events in Laos and the Viet Cong plans for Zone "D", adding that the Geneva solution of the Laotian problem had caused much hesitancy among the Viet Cong forces which had been sent to Saravane. Ambassador Nolting then asked Mr. Nhu for a clarification of what he had said. Did he mean, asked the Ambassador, that the continuation of Pathet Lao control on the borders of South Vietnam was an encouragement for the defection of Viet Cong troops and an advantage for the side of the Government of South Vietnam. Mr. Nhu answered that he thought that it could be--if we could inspire confidence in the defectors. He said that he had met with their spokesmen twice, only, but that they had spoken at length with their old friends now in the South. Many of them, he felt, were serious minded men. Eight or nine months ago they were worried about the results of the Geneva Conferences. From the standpoint of basic doctrine, as well as that of strategy, they were opposed to neutrality--recognizing it as merely a step toward communism. When Ambassador Nolting pointed out that these people continued to fight on the side of the Communists, Mr. Nhu said that their approach to him was with the objective of finding out what the government had to offer. They saw the American approval of neutralism in Laos and an aberration--and asked--"if they fought for real freedom, who could they count on to fight along side them?" When Ambassador Nolting insisted that, in Vietnam, there was no question of neutralism, Mr. Nhu answered that he believed this, but that others asked, in view of Laos, where the United States policy would stop. He then went on to say that there was a decalage--an echelonment in time between the psychology of the United States and that of the under-developed countries of Southeast Asia and the captive nations of Europe. This, he said, was the greatest worry of those who were hesitant about which cause they should support. The second reason, he added, was himself. The concept of the strategic hamlets had been accepted as a stroke of genius. But, people said, you, Mr. Nhu are an intellectual and you have tended to surround yourself with intellectuals who are incapable of realistic action. This is a cause for their hesitancy now--and later. Mr. Nhu then made reference to the Dulles policy--which he said was still being applied to Southeast Asia. He said that the Dulles concept, which he described as a concept of a personal universe, was better understood outside America--particularly in the under-developed countries of Southeast Asia and the captive countries of Europe. Ambassador Nolting then protested that the world picture of the Dulles policy was wrong--an illusion. He said that Dulles was a firm man--that he was credited with having said that "there was no morality in neutralism" but. insisted the Ambassador, the basic policy expounded by Mr. Dulles was the same as that of the present administration. He added that Mr. Rusk, as well as Mr. Dulles and before him Mr. Acheson and he, himself, saw things alike. Mr. Nhu replied that, perhaps there was an illusion--an optical illusion--but he felt that dealing with neutralism was dealing from a position of guilt. He said that he had the impression that the government in Washington was above prejudice. When it dealt with under-developed countries or the captive countries of Europe it was, in a sense, like the dealings of Russia with Albania. Once again he used the word "decalage", (an echelonment in time) to explain that the continuation of the Dulles policy vis-à-vis the nations of Southeast Asia was similar to the Russian, or Khrushchev, policy vis-à-vis Communist China--still considered to be operating under the policies outlined by Stalin. This, Mr. Nhu went on to explain, was one of the reasons for the misunderstanding over the settlement in Laos. It has caused hesitancy on the part of the anti-Communists in the North. Vietnam, he reminded his guests, has been at war for twenty three years. It cannot afford to settle for an intellectual ideal. To be objective equals folly. For the past six months, he emphasized, the war has been intense. The people have been convinced that they have been fighting for a just cause--one worth dying for. Now they are told that they must die for half this cause. Ambassador Nolting asked, at this point, what we could do. Given the fact, he said, that there is an agreement which we are committed to uphold, what could be done to reaffirm our resolution? Mr. Nhu replied that Washington should realize that they must not let go of the prey to grasp the shadow. South Vietnam is at war, he said, she must not be sacrificed for the shadow of Laos and Cambodia. When the Ambassador said that the United States had no intention of doing this, Mr. Nhu insisted that the position of South Vietnam had been weakened in favor of an overall policy for Southeast Asia--which exists, he added, only because of the solid spiritual and political strength of Vietnam. He then said that the policy of the Communists should be emulated. They had worked toward the consolidation of the North--and the spread of revolution in the South. We should reverse this by consolidating the South and spreading revolution to the North. Ambassador Nolting suggested that the word "magnetize" be substituted for the word revolution. Mr. Nhu agreed, with the proviso that the effort be a solid one. The thinking in Washington, he thought, was somewhat abstract--adding that he could ask for nothing better than to be mistaken. He went on to say that Vietnam certainly did not want to precipitate clashes. He then referred to Mr. Harriman's written account of the Yalta Agreements pointing out that these agreements rested on the signature and the word of Stalin./3/ He quoted Harriman's question in which he asked Stalin why he had not lived up to the agreements--and Stalin's answer that the conditions which had made the agreements necessary no longer prevailed. Mr. Nhu then said that the events in Laos were the direct consequence of the Vienna discussions between Khrushchev and Kennedy./4/ Ambassador Nolting reminded him that at the time of the Vienna meeting, some twenty months ago, the Communists were doing very well in Laos and conditions there were in their favor. Also, he added, the tension which existed in Laos was not the same as that which prevailed at Yalta. In Laos, the Communists had created the tension themselves and were free to lift it whenever they chose to do so. He then asked Mr. Nhu if he thought that Khrushchev wanted real neutrality in Laos. Mr. Nhu replied that the actions of the countries of the Free World were such that the initiative was always left with the Communists. The "agreements" in Laos were entirely dependent upon the will of Khrushchev. Why, he said, can't we provoke an anti-Communist movement through our own initiative? When Ambassador Nolting referred to the present policy of the United States, Mr. Nhu retorted that Americans, ideologically, think that governments really govern. Passing over Ambassador Nolting's remark that this was true in the United States, Mr. Nhu said that, in under-developed countries control of the people had to be established at hamlet level. How, he asked, could Phouma or Phoumi hope to do this? In Vietnam, he added, the government in Saigon could be changed 36 times and the people would never know it. We must think seriously, he said, of organizing the villages in Laos--and in Thailand. If the villages are not held, there is no hope of stopping Communist progress. Ambassador Nolting then said that Phouma had expressed his intention to travel extensively throughout the country. Mr. Nhu retorted that President Diem had been traveling throughout Vietnam for eight years. He was adored by the population, but there still remained the question of organizing the masses. For this, he added, there must be a revolution. In Thailand and Cambodia this was equally true. In Thailand the great difficulty lay in the fact that two revolutions would be necessary. There, the Army and the police constitute two separate forces. Reorganization of the villages would involve paramilitary forces--the police--and consequently the Ministry of the Interior. The Army, of course, would not approve and there would consequently have to be two revolutions--one at the summit--and the other in the villages. In Laos too, added Mr. Nhu, there would have to be a revolution and if this revolution is not better than the one which the Pathet Lao have to offer, the country will be lost. Ambassador Nolting at this point commented that, when Phouma visited Washington/5/ he was asked his views on social and economic reform. The general impression gathered from his answers was that he had a good fundamental program. Mr. Nhu interjected the facetious remark that Phouma had promised such things as hospitals and schools. The Ambassador insisted that Washington was convinced that Phouma had ideas which went deeper and that he was genuinely interested in reform. Mr. Nhu commented that reform was not enough--there had to be a real revolution. /3/Presumably Nhu is referring to Harriman's account of his discussion with Stalin in Peace with Russia? (New York, 1959), pp. 163-164. /4/Reference is to the Vienna meeting, June 3-4, 1961. /5/Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma visited the United States, July 27-30. Mr. Nhu next said that he had discussed some of his theories with an American journalist. This man had told him that if he really carried them out he was working toward his own destruction. Nhu's answer to him was that "unless the seed die, there can be no new harvest". He then, once again, spoke of the "decalage" or time gap in Washington thinking. Ambassador Nolting admitted that there was a tendency on the part of Americans to think of governments doing what they say they will do vis-a-vis the people. Still, he added, responsible people in the United States Government were beginning to understand more and more what Mr. Nhu had said about the need to win over the people at the basic hamlet level. Mr. Nhu agreed that this was good but insisted that the need for social revolution in under-developed countries should be appreciated. Cambodia, he said, was a country in which this was not realized. Sihanouk wanted no part of agricultural reform or of any other revolutionary move. He was content to hide behind the "alibi" of nationalism. Ambassador Nolting commented that this was somewhat like the Sukarno government in Indonesia. Mr. Nhu then went on to say that in 1945, the need for revolution was not appreciated. When he had said to the French Commander, during the period of Japanese occupation, that it was time to do something about reform and independence, the Admiral had said, "Yes--after we have achieved victory". It was useless to tell him that, without reforms, there would be no victory. The need in all the Southeast Asian countries was for an economic and social revolution. Governments could not prevail unless they themselves carried out this revolution. Ambassador Nolting then reminded Mr. Nhu that he had continuously expressed the hope that South Vietnam would keep its representation in Laos. Mr. Nhu said that there would still be a South Vietnam presence in Laos, though, he added in response to Admiral Felt's question, there would be no Embassy. Perhaps, he said, there would be Consulates--and by his manner implied that there would be other forms of presence. He then said, somewhat lightly, that the Laotian Embassy would remain in Saigon--though the only time they had anything to say was when they wanted money or something else. He once again mentioned the differential in the thinking in Washington and in Vietnam. He said that he was not against the basic Washington policy but that his objection to it was one of degree and form. Ambassador Nolting suggested that there might be some difference of perspective--to which Mr. Nhu replied that South Vietnam, not having the means of the United States, could not afford this basic policy. Ambassador Nolting then said that if there was any doubt in the minds of the people of Vietnam, or amongst the Viet Cong who wanted to return to the side of the government, a way must be found to clarify the fact that the Americans are in Vietnam at the invitation of the government and that they intend to continue to help until victory has been won. They would then leave. Any doubt about the United States shifting its policy toward neutrality must be dispelled. Mr. Nhu said that there was no fear that the Americans would remain too long--the fear was that they would leave too soon--and that they would slip out through the door of neutrality. Ambassador Nolting then said that Admiral Felt, who had frequent and recent contact with Washington, could attest to the fact that, in Washington, there was no thought of neutrality for Vietnam. Admiral Felt said that he had never heard the faintest whisper of such an idea. Mr. Nhu then said that he, personally, was convinced that the United States had no idea of abandoning Vietnam, but that others could not understand the reason for what had taken place in Laos. Those who had the desire to confront the Communists thought that Laos offered the perfect terrain for their struggle. Admiral Felt made the point that there was a big difference between Vietnam and Laos. In South Vietnam people were willing to fight, and to die if necessary for their freedom. This had not been true in Laos. Mr. Nhu repeated that the guerrilla-minded people thought that, if ever they had to fight the Chinese Communists, the ideal terrain would be Laos. Here, they said, was the place to open a gigantic hemorrhage in the belly of Communist China. Admiral Felt, at this point, asked Mr. Nhu what the status of the amnesty program was. Mr. Nhu said that it was now too early to announce this program and that it should be proclaimed at the time of the general offensive proposed by General Harkins./6/ He said that the Viet Cong were preparing plans for their fall and winter campaigns--but that the initiative would be taken away from them by the government. He said that the recently increased government activity was preparatory to the general offensive. In reply to Admiral Felt's question as to when this campaign would be launched, Mr. Nhu replied that this was a military matter to be decided by the military, but that he felt that it was closely linked to the Strategic Hamlet Plan which, at the first of the year, would have three-quarters of the population under government control. Admiral Felt commented that, at that time, the second of the two new divisions would have completed its training. Mr. Nhu again pointed out what he believed to be the great fallacy in the Mao doctrine and said that his concept of the Strategic Hamlet Program had grown out of this. /6/Regarding the general offensive, see Document 277. Admiral Felt then said that he was much encouraged by the attitude of the government authorities he had talked to during this visit. He added that a great change for the better had taken place since he first visited Vietnam some four years before. Mr. Nhu agreed that much progress had been made and said that, in three months the problem of desertion would be solved. Admiral Felt said that he had examined the desertion reports carefully and had been quite worried about them. Mr. Nhu explained that one of the principal causes of desertion had been the feeling of injustice which had spread amongst conscripts who, ostensibly had been drafted for eighteen months service but who had subsequently been extended indefinitely. The major problem, he said, had been that if the conscripts were released after. eighteen months service they would return to their native villages where they would be impressed by the Viet Cong. This, in effect, amounted to the government training troops for the enemy. As of the first of the year, all draftees who had completed thirty-six months service would automatically be released. When Mr. Nhu repeated that there had been a terrible sense of injustice amongst those who were kept beyond the originally specified period, Admiral Felt assured him that there was no difference between their feelings and those of Americans. Mr. Nhu then said that an impending problem would be that of taking care of the defectors who would come over to the side of the government in ever-increasing numbers. Smilingly he said that this was really a post-war problem. Ambassador Nolting added the comment that it was an optimistic problem. Admiral Felt said that he kept statistics on the number of people killed in action, wounded in action and captured. To this, he said, he would add a column showing the number who defect to the side of the government. This, he said, would become the most significant figure. Admiral Felt then asked Mr. Nhu what actions were being taken to solve the problem of dependent housing. Mr. Nhu replied that the problem had been placed high on the priority list of things to be accomplished through the strategic hamlet plan. He said that first priority in the hamlets was given to families of combatants--not only for housing but in such matters as agricultural credits. Their children were granted scholarships to attend schools. In reply to Admiral Felt's question as to what had been done for the families of conscripts, Mr. Nhu said that these people could be divided into two categories. The first of these, in the tradition of the French expeditionary forces, were the camp followers. Eventually this problem would be solved by the completion of the Strategic Hamlet Program which would assure the security of the families and protect them from the threats and reprisals of the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, a special policy was required to take care of them. Not only was there need for housing for them, but an organization had to be set up to train them in "mobile" skills such as nursing, midwifery, hairdressing, teaching and sports. With these skills, which they could take with them as they followed displaced troop units, they could supplement the family budget instead of whiling away their time uselessly while their men were away. The presence of these families would also constitute a cordon sanitaire around troop installations. The establishment of strategic hamlets would provide for the second category of families. Freed of the menace of Viet Cong reprisals they could remain on the family land and devote themselves to productive tasks. Mr. Nhu insisted that he should not normally be concerned with these problems which, in essence, were military, but, as Admiral Felt agreed, the strategic hamlet program touched on all basic problems--including that of morale. Ambassador Nolting who, earlier, had said that he would have to leave in a relatively short time in order to say farewell to Ambassador Hooten, the Canadian member of the ICC, told Mr. Nhu that it was long past the time when he should have left, and the meeting came to a close [Continue with the next documents]
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