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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 20, 1962, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/10-2062. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 443. To Harriman from Nolting. Deptel 459./2/ It will be a diplomatic defeat if Diem severs relations with Laos. It will be something considerably worse if he breaks relations with Laos after approach in terms your telegram. I am convinced he will do so unless approach is coupled with threat of severe sanctions, and even then outcome would be doubtful. I do not believe that such sanctions are in the interests of the United States and I gather this is also Washington's position. /2/Document 304. The further approach prescribed--which advances no arguments not previously put to GVN and to Diem personally, but which directly engages President Kennedy's prestige--would in my judgment undermine our future influence here, and, with it, the carrying forward of our program. Whatever success we have had to date rests in important sense on our ultimate respect for GVN sovereignty, including its right in final analysis to make decisions in field of foreign policy. Within limits indicated above (respect for country's sovereign rights and no threats of withdrawal of US aid), we are doing everything we can on this issue. To take the position set out in your telegram would, in my judgment, defeat our purposes here--on an issue which in itself cannot compare in importance to the United States with that of maintaining an independent, non-Communist Vietnam. Nolting
307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, October 22, 1962, 4:06 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-2262. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Harriman. 466. For Ambassador Nolting from Harriman. Your 443/2/ indicates that you and I are not on the same wavelength. The President's position is already doubly engaged, not only by his personal letter to Diem,/3/ but also by Laos settlement which must be made to achieve US objectives as far as possible. In making settlement we have made it plain to all concerned that we consider it not as ending all conflict, but transferring conflict from military to political area. In this conflict we have a right to expect full support and assistance from GVN as ally as well as a signatory. From your messages I gained the impression that you do not consider Diem's attitude towards Laos of prime importance. /2/Document 306. /3/See Document 238. What happens in Laos will have substantial influence on South Viet-Nam and therefore I have asked you to make Diem understand the importance we place upon it and the fact that we have a right to ask him as an ally to cooperate in matters which so vitally affect our efforts to keep South Viet-Nam free. This is also true of Cambodia where GVN is continuing to aggravate situation to our mutual disadvantage. I am relieved to learn from your 449 that Diem is beginning to recognize his obligations toward the President./4/ If, however, this does not occur, your are instructed to make another approach along lines of Deptel 459 or in whatever manner in your judgment you consider most appropriate. We have never suggested application sanctions, and you are not to give any implication that US has any idea of applying them. When you talk to Diem you should talk as an ally to another expecting support due us and may inform him you are speaking under instructions. /4/Telegram 449, October 20, reported that Thuan had indicated there was a chance that Diem would change his mind about breaking relations with Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/10-2062) Rusk
308. Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem/1/ Washington, October 24, 1962. /1/Source: Department of state, Presidential Correspondence Files: Lot 66 D 476. Limited Official Use. Transmitted to Saigon in telegram 472, October 24, for delivery to Diem. Dear Mr. President: As the Republic of Viet-Nam comes once again to celebrate its establishment and its independence, the United States of America sends greetings to the Vietnamese people and to their government. In writing to you on this same occasion last year,/2/ Mr. President, I paid tribute to your country's heroic struggle against the campaign of terrorism, destruction and suffering by which Communism had responded to the progress which your young republic had achieved. In those dark days the American people joined with your compatriots in looking forward to a future October twenty-sixth when Viet-Nam would again know peace, and its citizens would begin to enjoy the freedom and prosperity which Communist subversion would deny them. That day is approaching. The valiant struggle of the past year, the sacrifices and sorrows of countless heroes and the introduction of new institutions such as the strategic hamlet to bring lasting social and economic benefits to the people in the countryside earn for Viet-Nam the world's admiration. /2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 1049. As Viet-Nam gains its victory over adversity and aggression, it will be in a position increasingly to devote its energies to achieving closer cooperation among the community of free Southeast Asian states. Each of these nations has its unique character and philosophy. In common they are confronted not only by grasping Communism but also by the chance to develop together. By sharing the development of their individual capacities they can multiply their mutual strength. Thus can Southeast Asia become unassailable and contribute to the stability of the world community. This task is as difficult as it is necessary. It will require a mutual submergence of differences and bold leadership. It will call upon those of vision to see a future of Asian peoples working for their common benefit in a harmony and freedom bequeathed them by their forefathers. Mr. President, I again express my faith and that of the American people in Viet-Nam's future and I look forward with confidence to a year of increased momentum and progress leading to the restoration of peace, law and order, and a better life for the Vietnamese people. Sincerely, John
309. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 25, 1962, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/10-2562. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane. 456. For Secretary Harriman from Nolting. References: Department's telegram 466/2/ and previous. I used occasion of presenting President's message on Cuba/3/ to Diem to urge upon him again importance to GVN as well as us of his finding a way to continue diplomatic relations with Laos. I had previously worked again on Thuan and Nhu to this end. Thuan's previous cryptic word (Embassy's telegram 449)/4/ had been watered down by him in subsequent report to effect that GVN now seeking "middle position". This turned out to be leaving of Laotian Embassy in Saigon and cutting back to consular representation in Vientiane in event DRV Ambassador accredited. I told Diem that this would not satisfy requirements as we saw them, since consular representative in Laos would not be in position to help with diplomatic influence on RLG and RLG would doubtless not leave its embassy in Saigon under these circumstances. I used President Kennedy's great and heavy responsibilities involving world peace, as reflected in decision re Cuba, as yet another reason why Diem as ally should support US and our President on Laos. I put this to him as strongly as I could without indicating any thought of withdrawal of support or infringement GVN sovereign right of decision. I asked Diem not to come to a decision immediately but to think it over yet again in the light of what I had said on instructions. He did not seem as adamant as previously, but did say that he thought that he had gone quite far, and as far as he could go, to accommodate our views. He added that he had no desire to undermine the agreement on Laos, although he had little faith in its outcome; but he also was determined not to undermine the will and rationale of the Vietnamese people by seeming to ignore an action on part RLG weakening to SVN relative to DRV. I cannot say what final result will be./5/ /2/Document 307. /3/For text of President Kennedy's proclamation, October 23, interdicting delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 410-412. /4/See footnote 4, Document 307. /5/On November 8 the North Vietnamese Ambassador presented his credentials. The following day the Government of the Republic of Vietnam issued a communiqué stating that in view of the accreditation, its Embassy in Vientiane would "cease to function." (Telegram 499 from Saigon, November 9; Department of State, Central Files, 6511.51K/ 11-962) Nolting
310. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 29, 1962, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.50/10-2962. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 466. Embtel 464./2/ Trueheart and I spent hour and a half with President Diem this morning seeking persuade him change his position on expulsion of Robinson (NBC). Regret to report that Diem proved quite impervious to my arguments. He did agree, at my request, to allow Robinson to remain in Vietnam three more days but he gave us no reason to believe that he would use this period to reconsider the matter, still less to change his position. /2/Telegram 464, October 28, reported that Nolting had talked repeatedly to no avail with Thuan about the expulsion of James Robinson, NBC Southeast Asia correspondent. (Ibid., 951K.50/10-2862) Despite Nolting's appeal directly to Diem, Robinson was expelled on November 5. For another account of the expulsion, see Mecklin, Mission in Torment, pp. 136-138. In approach to Diem, I made it clear that I considered decision to expel Robinson was matter of utmost gravity which could only have highly adverse effects on our joint effort here--particularly coming after expulsion Sully and continued banning of Newsweek. Reminding him that what I was telling him was in large part repetition of what President and Secretary had told Thuan in Washington,/3/ I stressed that it was essential that American public, Congress and government not gain impression that GVN was seeking to conceal what was going on in Vietnam. I pointed out that press reporting on Vietnam had improved markedly in recent weeks and that this favorable development would be undermined by expulsion Robinson. I urged him to accept fact that press problem would cure itself, and could only be curbed, by manifest success in defeating Viet Cong. Finally, I told him calmly that his rationale for action against Robinson would not be understood or accepted by US Government or people. /3/For memoranda of Thuan's conversations with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk, see Documents 285 and 292. Trueheart and I repeated these and other arguments many times in course of meeting without apparent effect. Diem acknowledged that visa question was technicality and that action was directed against Robinson personally. He had with him a dossier of Robinson's past broadcasts and showed me one of about six months ago which was highly critical of President and his family. He characterized Robinson's attitude as "intolerable", lacking in elementary respect for chief of state, referring specifically to Robinson's alleged remark to GVN press officer, after long interview with Diem some months ago, that president had "taken a great deal of time saying nothing". He referred to sacrifices which he and his family have made for Vietnam over many years and said that for these past actions he and his family were widely respected in Vietnam. It was his duty not to permit this respect to be undermined by insulting press reporting. He said several times that it was also his duty to other chiefs of state not to tolerate attitude of reporters like Robinson. (It was made clear that American political leaders do not expect immunity from personal press attacks for themselves or their families.) This is essence of lengthy discussion in which I believe all available arguments were brought to bear with great earnestness and in which basic difference in points of view was clearly isolated. Fundamentally, this difference is that Diem is unwilling or unable to subordinate to other considerations, however important, his canons of correct behavior, and what he regards as his primordial obligations to his family. Accordingly, I frankly have little or no hope that Robinson's expulsion can be averted. Robinson has been advised of three-day reprieve and gist of above./4/ /4/At 7 p.m. on October 29, the Embassy in Saigon transmitted Robinson's message to NBC in Washington summarizing the events of October 28-29 and stating that American correspondents were alarmed that Diem might get away with the expulsion without a vigorous protest from Washington. (Telegram 467; Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/10-2962) Nolting
311. Telegram From the Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the United States Information Agency/1/ Saigon, November 5, 1962, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, USIS 1962. Drafted by Mecklin on November 1. Repeated by pouch to Bangkok and Manila and pouched to Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Tousi unnumbered (by pouch). Bunce from Mecklin, Hi-lites October 21-November 1. 1) Press Relations Feuding between GVN and American newsmen, for years one of unhappy facts of life in Saigon, this week appears to be expanding to unprecedented and undeniably dangerous proportions. In past Mission has been able to preserve at least semblance of order, e.g. last spring when Ambassador persuaded President Diem to rescind expulsion orders against Homer Bigart (NY Times) and Francois Sully (Newsweek). When Sully was again ordered to leave early September, however, Mission appeal was rejected. Since then, as though reassured by relatively harmless reaction, GVN has been getting increasingly tough with press--despite Thuan's promise to DCM after Sully affair that effort would now be made to improve facilities and otherwise repair relations. Newsweek has been wholly banned from SVN circulation since Sully affair, despite Mission representations to Thuan, Tao and other senior officials. Minister Hieu last week told PAO ban would remain in effect at least six months--though this may be softened if Kenneth Crawford of Newsweek's Washington bureau, visiting for month, maintains initial good impression. One-issue bans and delays of other American publications, notably Time, have become more frequent. GVN has also advised Associated Press correspondent Malcolm Browne that it intends to terminate AP contract as of end of calendar 1962 to save money ($600 monthly), rotating UPI and AP on yearly basis thereafter. Since GVN controls AP circulation through Vietnam Press, this will deny entry to Vietnam of AP news in any form. (We are attempting to find way to buy service for new AFRS station as possible means persuading GVN to reconsider.) For moment there's no hard evidence that cancellation is anything more than economy, but it's considerable coincidence in view of open GVN moves against US press. It also comes after several Browne dispatches that irritated GVN. These notably included report few weeks ago of trouble between ARVN and US personnel; GVN officials have repeatedly protested article to Mission officers. GVN's repeated promises to institute daily military press briefings have come to naught, and project now seems to be dropped, at least for moment. MACV PIO reports that the three DGI officers, whom he had been training in briefing techniques, have ceased coming around; PIO speculates that complexities of undertaking were too much for them. Two military officers who GVN had promised to provide for similar training have never materialized. Within past few days two new restrictions were imposed: 1) prohibition on newsmen riding in T-28 aircraft, and 2) prohibition on visits to Special Forces units without DCI permit. Letter, when newsmen discover it, is certain to stir considerable bitterness because most SP operations are run by Americans, who thus are made inaccessible without GVN okay. On top of all this, GVN chose October 25, eve of Independence Day celebration which was marked by public assertions of gratitude and friendship with US, to order James Robinson, veteran Far East correspondent for NBC, to leave country "within shortest delay". GVN publicly said expulsion was ordered because Robinson had entered SVN with transit visa and failed apply for regular visa within seven day limit (which was true). Ambassador called on Diem October 29 to protest and learned technicality was only ruse, that true reason was "insulting" broadcast by Robinson last May discussing family "clique" running SVN government. Diem also complained he had once given long interview to Robinson only to learn subsequently that Robinson not only had not used story but also had remarked that it's not much of a President who has that much time to "waste" on reporters. Diem flatly refused Ambassador's appeal to reconsider (see Embtel 466),/2/ conceding only three day extension of expulsion order. Robinson accordingly departed today for Hong Kong. /2/Document 310. Mission has considerable evidence that expulsion created unprecedented divisions inside GVN. DGI Director Phan Van Tao and his deputy Dang Duc Khoi called on PAO in unmistakable state of emotional agitation same night Robinson received order. They reported that order had originated with Ngo Dinh Nhu and that they had spent previous hour and half trying futilely to persuade him not to issue it. Tao and Khoi continued thereafter to try to persuade Nhu and Diem to reconsider, including strong memo from Khoi to Diem yesterday, all unavailingly. Khoi openly told newsmen he opposed expulsion, leaked considerable details on behind-scenes maneuvers (including Diem talk with Nolting), and even told PAO he was disgusted to point of resigning (most doubtful). Grotesquely Tao and Khoi gave dinner evening October 27 for foreign newsmen, including Robinson. Newsmen considered boycott but then decided to go and found guest of honor was Madame Nhu, who spent evening being charming, turning away newsmen's complaints with quiet response that they must understand conditions unusual here because SVN at war. Newsmen sent formal mildly-worded protest to Diem in Robinson's behalf October 31. Its main point was that this discrimination because other journalists had also violated visa regulations. (Mission has located three who are here now, though all applied after seven-day deadline.) So far GVN has not responded. NBC Vice President McAndrew cabled protest to Diem calling expulsion "incomprehensible" and asking explanation. McAndrew also asked how long ban would remain in effect. Mission has repeatedly asked us same question and received no clear answer, except that Robinson should not attempt return immediately. Robinson today said he would try for visa about month hence. Newsmen of course are uniformly bitter, predicting if GVN gets away with Robinson on top of Sully, still more expulsions are probable. Post is inclined to agree. Affair has made clear that Diem has decided he can override advice of US Mission on press policy. It also has indicated clearly that Nhu, and presumably wife, are becoming increasingly the moulders of this policy, and are doing so in bitter spirit of revenge. [Here follow sections on the other aspects of the public affairs program.] Mecklin
312. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood)/1/ Saigon, November 6, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.50/11-662. Personal; Secret. On the source text Wood had written "WAH[arriman]--a word here can sometimes help!" For Wood's reply, November 16, which was attached to the source text, see Document 318. Dear Ben: The enclosed is something I almost sent off last week--but held. The matter has since died down somewhat, and I would not recommend issuing any such statement at this time. However, I wanted you to know how I felt about the matter in principle, and I am also puzzled by the lack of any reaction from Washington. I suppose our little problem was completely snowed under by the Cuban crisis--right?--or was there a deadlock on whether to invoke sanctions? All the best, Sincerely, Fritz P.S. This is for YOU personally--not intended to stir up any action. F.
[Enclosure] Draft Telegram of November 1, 1962 CINCPAC for Polad. Embtel 466./2/ Re Robinson (NBC) case. In response to American newsmen, I have in mind making on-record statement along following lines, if Dept approves. /2/Document 310. "Embassy has done everything it can on this case (James Robinson, NBC), short of recommending changes of US policy, which I do not think desirable or justified. The Republic of Viet-Nam is a sovereign country and makes its own decisions. For our part, we have made quite clear to President Ngo Dinh Diem our view on this matter, which is that the encouragement of a free flow of information is the best way to vindicate the just cause of Free Viet-Nam and to maintain full support for it. Measures of suppression or control, either directly or through a technicality, are in the final analysis self-injurious. "I hold no brief for inaccurate reporting, nor for discourtesy in any form, but I believe that the best antidote to criticism is success and victory, rather than press control." I recognize such statement will in all probability bring heavy riposte from GVN-controlled sources here and may cause further decline my ability to influence Diem. On other hand, to let the matter go without comment (Robinson has departed this afternoon) will, in my judgment, increase tendency here to pursue policy of press control and intimidation at expense U.S. ability to continue support this effort. We have of course been waiting for some guidance from Dept on this matter, which I recognize may have been difficult under circumstances of past week. Would appreciate reaction re above ASAP, with discretion to use or not depending on circumstances--e.g., other pending issues, degree of press interest, etc. Nolting
313. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)/1/ Washington, November 9, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 370.64. Secret. Dear Ros: I have seen a copy of the proposed memorandum from Secretary McNamara to the President which recommends that henceforth defoliation operations in Viet-Nam be conducted under the supervision of the Ambassador and General Harkins./2/ I am agreeable to your indicating Department of State concurrence to the memorandum. /2/The proposed memorandum has not been found; for text as sent to the President on November 16, see Document 317. However, I suggest that we ask for regular reporting from Saigon on the effectiveness of the operation as weighed against the harm being done to United States interests by Communist propaganda on the subject. If the President approves the memorandum, I suggest Saigon be informed by a joint State-Defense message. Sincerely, Alex
314. Memorandum From the Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bagley) to the Chairman (Taylor)/1/ Washington, November 12, 1962. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-239-69. Secret. SUBJECT 1. There is considerable differences of opinion within the Executive Branch as to the progress being made in the strategic hamlet strategy. This is not unnatural during a period of transition, but resolution of opposing views is difficult because of a paucity of information. This problem is recognized in Saigon and effort is being made to get at the true facts by better administration and production of information on the GVN side. In the meantime, it would be wise to evaluate the incomplete information available cautiously. 2. The doubters exist in the Pentagon, as well as State and in the White House in the person of Mr. Forrestal. Last week, Governor Harriman called General Krulak over for a general talk on our military efforts in SVN with emphasis on the security aspects of the strategic hamlet strategy. General Krulak allayed Governor Harriman's uneasiness, using the basic information contained in the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary of Defense./2/ The provision of this information to the Secretary of Defense, and perhaps distributed in some form to other interested Departments, is probably intended by General Krulak to spread the gospel and offset opposing views in Washington. This will not be easy, however, because of information gaps and other factors, some of which are as follows: /2/Not found. For the memorandum that Taylor sent to the Secretary of Defense, see Document 319. a. The American Consul in Hue has reported Diem's brother, Bishop [sic] Can, is according priority to his Republican Youth Civic Action and Self-Defense Program rather than the strategic hamlet program being pushed from Saigon and, as a result, the strategic hamlet program ~s not effective in its present form./3/ /3/See Document 303. b. While current Viet Cong actions against hamlets (kidnapping, theft, murder) are direct attacks against the people, they serve the political purpose of showing that the GVN is not able to protect the populace using the strategic hamlet concept. This is important as the program gets underway. c. Neither the Fiscal Year 1964 MAP nor AID programs provide for strategic hamlet kits. This is not a serious matter at this point except to indicate that administration of the strategic hamlet program is not yet an efficient matter. In this particular case, there is also a dispute between AID and DOD as to division of funds for such kits. d. Information available from Saigon continues to indicate that the GVN strategic hamlet program is handicapped by poor implementation by province chiefs. e. In Malaya, the requirement for reinforcement to meet Communist attacks at night was met by the collection of good intelligence and by assuring that villages and posts had defenses sufficient to resist attack for the 6-8 hours until daylight when reinforcements could be deployed. It is not clear how this problem is being met in SVN. 3. The draft memorandum as prepared raises certain questions which follow: a. Is the additive of 300 strategic hamlets per month being applied in the area of the some 2700 poorly conceived hamlets which now exist or is it merely an add-on to the current total of 3353 strategic hamlets? If the latter is true, the program remains seriously weak; if the former is true, real efforts at improvement are in progress. b. How many strategic hamlet kits have already been delivered? How does this figure compare with the total of not more than 600 properly conceived hamlets? In other words, is the number of effective hamlets directly proportional to US provision of hamlet kits or does it, in fact, depend to a major degree on other action by the GVN? c. To be useful, figures showing attacks against strategic hamlets and other villages should indicate the total targets in each category. Further, there should be a breakdown of the numbers of strategic hamlets attacked into those which were properly conceived and those which are poorly defended. d. There should be a statement indicating just how the US/GVN is meeting the problem of "considerable significance" concerning Viet Cong attacks at night. 4. I recommend that answers to these basic questions be sought and that a specific reporting system be instituted to refine reports now made by ComUSMACV. At the same time, there is no reason why the proposed SACSA memorandum should not go forward to the Secretary of Defense as a current appraisal. I would suggest adding the following paragraph to assure the data is in proper perspective: "6. Continuing assessments of the effectiveness of the strategic hamlet concept requires better information than is now available. Action is being undertaken to develop a broader reporting system which will become the basis for future analyses of this program." 5. If you concur with the above, I will: a. Have the draft memorandum typed in final form, with the addition of paragraph 6 and, on signature, distributed to State and to Mr. Forrestal. b. Advise SACSA of the need to develop answers to the basic questions remaining, preferably through a refined, continuing reporting system levied on the field. W.H.B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
315. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ CM-104-62 Washington, November 12, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 380-385. Secret. SUBJECT 1. During your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 October,/2/ you requested information on the status of implementing plans or orders and the initiating dates for the "explosion" concept which was discussed by General Harkins at the 8 October conference./3/ As of 3 November, General Harkins reports that the operation is still in the planning stage as amplified below; that operations will be intensified in critical areas during December, January and February with nationwide intensification anticipated in mid-February. The exact time has not been determined. /2/No record of this meeting has been found. /3/Regarding the Honolulu meeting on October 8, see Document 298. 2. The purpose of the plan is to conduct a nation-wide offensive against the Viet Cong, bringing to bear the full military potential of the RVNAF, paramilitary and citizenry of South Vietnam in an integrated campaign. The plan is phased as follows: I. Planning Phase: Involves adjustments in the Vietnamese command structure to streamline channels of command as well as the development of a comprehensive RVNAF operation plan. II. Preparatory Phase: Includes preliminary operations with the preoperational preparations. This phase is not necessarily dependent upon Phase I planning but is a continuation of current operations and shall proceed concurrently with and beyond the planning phase. III. Execution Phase: Full scale coordinated operations, utilizing the talents and capabilities of every loyal citizen and every paramilitary organization with the regular military establishment. IV. Follow-up and Consolidation Phase: Restoration of full control by the Government of South Vietnam, banging into the plan all elements of the civil government. 3. Plans for reorganization of the military command structure are being finalized and have been submitted to President Diem for signature which is considered necessary as a legalizing procedure. President Diem informally approved the over-all concept in early October. 4. Highlights of the Vietnamese reorganization include a. Readjustment of the Joint General Staff and the creation of three service component commands. b. Creation of an Unconventional Warfare Directorate to coordinate and control the efforts of special forces and irregular fighting elements of the country. c. Elimination of the Field Command Headquarters from the command structure. d. Establishment of a fourth Corps for operations exclusively in the Delta region. e. Assignment of the necessary tactical and logistic support elements for each corps by attachment or in direct support. 5. General Harkins expects the reorganization to be completed by late December. Implementing plans by the RVNAF and operational planning by the Corps are proceeding concurrently. 6. As further developments materialize in the foregoing outline, I will keep you informed. Maxwell D. Taylor
316. Letter From President Diem to President Kennedy/1/ Saigon, November 15, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence Files: Lot 66 D 476. Dear Mr. President, I wish to thank you warmly for the message,/2/ so cordial and full of understanding, which you sent me for the people and Government of the Republic of Vietnam on the occasion of our National Day, Oct. 26. /2/Document 308. As we celebrate the seventh anniversary of our Republic this year, we note with great satisfaction that our determination has overcome the difficulties which the enemy has heaped in our way, and that our efforts in the economic and social fields already bear the most promising fruits, raising the hope, as you kindly pointed out, that the day is approaching when the Vietnamese people finally enjoy peace, security and happiness again. I deeply appreciate the fact that you made a special reference to our strategic hamlets and described them as an institution designed to help us rapidly attain the essential objectives of our policy, which are respect for the human person, social justice and the creation of true democracy. It is hardly necessary to add that the assistance of the United States, under your leadership, definitely contributed to the successes which we have scored, particularly during recent months. I bow with respect to the sacrifices of those American citizens who came and shared our trials and hardships and sealed with their blood the brotherhood of our two peoples. I want to renew here the expression of our gratefulness to these noble sons of America, to their families, and to the entire American people as well. Their sacrifices will not be in vain, as they show that the cause which the Vietnamese people are defending is just, one which deserves to be upheld by all peoples dedicated to freedom, and the more so by those directly interested in the maintenance of peace and stability in this part of the world. In reaffirming the friendship of the United States of American and its faith in our future, your message is not only particularly auspicious but also really heartening to us. Please accept, [etc.].
317. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President/1/ Washington, November 16, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. SUBJECT Defoliant operations have been completed in the areas in South Vietnam that you approved 9 August 1962. The technical team charged with evaluating the program considers the results of the spray operations as excellent. The effectiveness of herbicides against the types of vegetation sprayed in previous operations is evaluated by General Harkins as follows: Mangrove forest--90-95% effective The operation conducted in the Bien Hoa Air Base area during July has increased horizontal visibility from approximately 5 feet to 30-50 feet while improving vertical visibility by 80-90 percent. The susceptibility of the sprayed areas to ambush has been significantly reduced. United States advisors working in the vicinity of areas sprayed report that there has been no apparent reaction by the populace to the spray operations. Radio Hanoi commentaries to Asia and Europe, 13, 14, and 16 October, claimed that chemicals sprayed by the United States had injured hundreds of people. No neutral or friendly press coverage or comments have been reported. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC have reviewed the overall effects and operational value of defoliants in South Vietnam and have recommended that general authority be granted to General Harkins to plan and conduct future operations to achieve specific military objectives by use of herbicides, without reference of each detailed plan to Washington for approval. The authority proposed would not extend to crop destruction and would be limited to field decision concerning operations to clear grass, weeds, and brush around depots, airfields, and other fixed installations; to clear fields of fire to inhibit surprise attack by the Viet Cong; and, in conjunction with military field operations, to spray defoliants in areas wherein attainment of a military objective would be significantly eased. Plans and arrangements for each operation would be reviewed and approved both by the United States Ambassador to Vietnam and by the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also received field recommendations for extension of the defoliant operations which you approved in August to five additional specific areas. The five recommended areas, shown on the attached map, are examples of the type of operations that we propose be conducted in the future on the authority of Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins. They are segments of highways 1, 13, and 14, a rail line and a power line, each located in an area regularly harassed by the Viet Cong. The military objectives sought in defoliating these five areas are improved visibility and reduced susceptibility to Viet Cong ambush. Specific psychological warfare precautions taken in previous defoliant operations would be applied as appropriate for these and all future operations involving use of herbicides. These measures include loudspeaker warnings, dropping of leaflets, discrimination to avoid damage to cultivated and inhabited areas, and avoidance of areas near the Laotian or Cambodian borders. I recommend that employment of herbicides be authorized in the five specific areas shown on the attached map/2/ and that Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins be delegated authority to approve employment of herbicides in future operations not involving crop destruction to achieve specific military objectives in South Vietnam. The Department of State concurs. Your approval is requested./3/ /2/Not found. /3/On November 27, McGeorge Bundy informed McNamara that the recommendations had been approved along the lines indicated, adding that the President wanted to be consulted on any operation beyond these limits and desired to be informed of the results of future operations. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 370.64) This decision was transmitted to Saigon on November 30 in telegram 561. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) Robert S. McNamara/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
318. Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Washington, November 16, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 951K.50/11-662. Secret; Official-Informal. Attached to Document 312. Dear Fritz: Thank you for your letter of the 6th/2/ on the Robinson case. I can understand your puzzlement by the lack of reaction here which was occasioned more by the lack of manpower than lack of interest. I was in touch constantly with the head of the Washington NBC/3/ bureau and he understood the speed and firmness with which you acted vis-à-vis the GVN. He felt that the Embassy had done what it could and I gathered that he did not think Robinson's own actions merited all-out support from NBC. There was no suggestion here from the Governor or anyone else about invoking sanctions. /2/Document 312. /3/Deptel 474. [Footnote in the source text. Dated October 26, it reported on conversations with Bill Monroe, Washington News Director for NBC, on the Robinson case. (Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/10-2662)] On the other hand the Governor feels as strongly as ever that the GVN is making a serious mistake in its handling of the foreign press. The second and third sentences in the paragraph numbered 2 of Deptel 513/4/ are only pale reflections of the depth of his feelings. For the present I think the expulsion of Sully and Robinson have been at least partially swallowed by the journalistic profession on the grounds that they are not perhaps among the more outstanding members of the Fourth Estate. Although the enclosed editorial from the New York Times/5/ indicates a continuing journalistic thundering, the cases of Sully and Robinson are certainly not developing into cause celebre here. /4/Dated November 12. These two sentences read: "Embassy should impress on GVN that measures outlined in AP report [on limiting press activities] would jeopardize American public and Congressional support essential GVN operations. There must be reasonable opportunity for press to observe and report shortcomings as well as accomplishments." (Ibid., 751K.00/11-1062) /5/Not printed. It was The New York Times editorial for November 16. Perhaps the banning of Newsweek and the continued sporadic suppression of other American periodicals will have a more galling long-run effect and, I must say, seem inexcusable in American eyes. These are international publications which only very occasionally refer to Viet-Nam. Whereas an individual correspondent's behavior might provide some grounds for "handing him his passport", the suppression of one of the Free World's leading news periodicals seems a bit childish. Do you think anything might be done? Evidently the GVN think they have our number on this press question and can do as they wish. I can thus understand your temptation to make a public declaration. Should we perhaps have one or two plans up our sleeves in case they should try another fast one? 1. As you know, the Governor has very good relations with the upper brass of the journalistic world and has recently said that he is always prepared to have a word with them. By this he meant that if you see storm clouds gathering around a particular journalist or publication he might help m explaining the Vietnamese point of view here to the owner or Publisher concerned. He would, of course, only undertake this if the Vietnamese view could be presented as making sense in American eyes. 2. Might it be wise to let the GVN know now that if they intend to "fire" another correspondent, it may be necessary for you in Saigon or for the Department here to make a public statement, calmly but clearly setting forth our disagreement? 3. As to sanctions, while the Governor has said he did not wish to invoke them, we have not studied the question here. Would we be prepared to cut off any USIA or Psywar services to the GVN which would embarrass them without hurting the war effort? I imagine we should not cut off services to the provinces, but we might seriously consider whether we should reduce our support of cultural activities in Saigon if the GVN should take another swipe at the freedom of the U.S. press. Certainly the main point that the Vietnamese should understand is the one expressed so clearly by the President to Thuan, when the GVN begins to do better in the war, its public image will take care of itself. Good luck with your numerous visitors and may you have a quiet Christmas at home with your family. Yours very sincerely, /6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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