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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
319. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)/1/ CM-117-62 Washington, November 17, 1962. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 380-385. Secret. The source text is stamped "See Def has seen Nov 26 1962." SUBJECT 1. Although the Government of Vietnam publicly announced support of the Strategic Hamlet Program in February 1962, a national plan was not formally approved by the Government until early August. In the interim, the strategic hamlet idea expanded rapidly throughout the country, as a form of inter-province competition, with little planning and less coordination. Numbers appeared to be the prime objective. Many hamlets were improperly constructed and inadequately defended, and little attention was given to the psychological, sociological and economic preparation of the populace, or to the proper qualification of administrative personnel, with the result that a basically sound idea got off to a weak start. 2. Now, the Government of Vietnam's Strategic Hamlet Priority Program, and the related implementing documents, include measures designed to overcome the deficiencies inherent in the initial poorly-coordinated program, and there is evidence of limited progress. 3. There are now 10,971 localities designated for development as strategic hamlets, of which 3353 are reported as completed. These vary widely in quality, as to the nature of their defenses, the composition of related security forces, and as to the efficiency, competence and dependability of administrative personnel. Of the entire number, probably not more than 600 can be viewed as fulfilling the desired characteristics in terms of equipment, defensive works, security forces and, possibly most important, government. The number of properly conceived hamlets is now growing at the rate of about 300 per month. There are some 1,897 strategic hamlet kits provided in the current MAP/AID programs; over 1,200 village radios are now installed, and installation of hamlet radios is now beginning at the rate of 1,000 per month. Kindred to this is the growth in quality of the Self Defense Corps, Civil Guard and Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, all of which contribute in some measure to hamlet security. Thus it will be seen that the real strength of the program is still more in prospect than in reality. It is only now beginning to be felt, and the statistics with which we have been working to date are not an accurate measure of the durability of the true strategic hamlet but, more accurately, are a reflection of operations of the Viet Cong against all rural localities. 4. The enclosures present the recent situation graphically. Tab A/2/ shows the number of attacks on strategic hamlets and other, less secure, localities in the past three months. "Attacks" are characterized as destruction of defenses, assassination of hamlet officials, kidnapping and theft of foodstuffs (Tab B). Strategic hamlets sustained an average of five attacks per week, while other localities were attacked nine times weekly. In the three month period covered about two per cent of hamlets of all types were attacked. Two strategic hamlets were overrun; nine of the less secure localities suffered that fate. The remainder varied from serious depredations in the hamlet, to outright defeat of the Viet Cong, to a stand-off, where both sides lost resources and interest. /2/None of the tabs is printed. In terms of size, six attacks against strategic hamlets exceeded platoon size while twenty-five attacks of platoon or larger composition were reported against the other localities. (Tab C) It is further of interest to note, in terms of VC tactics, that about eighty per cent (Tab D) of all attacks occurred during hours of darkness. This assumes considerable significance when contemplating reaction time and the use of vehicles or aircraft for reinforcement or support. In geographic terms, Tab E portrays the areas in which the attacks on strategic hamlets and other localities have occurred. They cover some 23 provinces. Of interest is the fact that during the period there were only 14 attacks against the hamlets in the current GVN/US approved clear and hold operations in Bin Duong, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai. 5. There would seem to be no reason for modifying the views expressed by General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting regarding the long-term virtues of the program. It is only now commencing to mature and the vigorous reactions against it--both reported and forecast--suggest that the Viet Cong also perceive its potential. Certainly the current Viet Cong actions with respect to hamlets, involving terrorism, theft, murder and kidnapping are direct attacks against the people. In this sense they are inconsistent with the avowed communist principle that the affection and confidence of the populace are essential to their program. Maxwell D. Taylor
320. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Saigon, November 19, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 3A, GVN 1962, RVNAF General. Secret; Official-Informal. According to another copy, the letter was drafted by Barbour and Manfull on November 17. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: 67 A 677, 350 GVN) Dear Governor Harriman: I thank you for your letter of October 12/2/ on the dangers of over-optimism here and on other matters basic to our operation. Your thoughts were most welcome, and, had we not had unfortunate difficulties relating to Laotian recognition, press problems and border incidents to try to deal with, I would have answered it earlier. /2/Document 300. I agree with you that over-optimism is dangerous. I find it difficult at times to be optimistic at all, in face of setbacks, non-activation or poor execution of plans, dissensions among the Vietnamese, and a general stickiness which pervades this place. But, as General Harkins put it the other day, we must "whistle while we work", for the sake of our own and everyone else's morale here. And we are making progress. Your inquiry whether the, villagers are being armed fast enough seems to imply that there might not be enough small arms in Viet-Nam to give out rapidly. That is not the case. Supplies of shotguns, carbines, Springfields, grenades and other weapons are more than ample. There are, however, two problems. First, the GVN and local authorities have been reluctant to issue arms to village youths or militia before they have been thoroughly screened and given some training. This slows up the process, though for reasons we cannot really challenge. Second, it is Ngo Dinh Nhu's fear that too many arms in a strategic hamlet will make them targets for VC supply operations. He advocates, therefore, that the number of arms in a hamlet be limited to about a dozen and that if the VC attack in numbers too large to be resisted by the hamlet's defenders, they hide their arms and disperse. We have not followed this concept, however, and in the plans we are now supporting there is provision for equipping two and in some cases three squads (of about 12 men each) of hamlet militia depending on size and location of the hamlet. The question about arming helicopters and using them on escort missions is being taken care of. As you know, there is now a squadron of HU-1A's here. Each carries a sizeable quantity of rockets and two machine guns, and they have been very busy and effective lately. I had previously talked on several occasions with General Harkins, along the lines of your misgivings about the "explosion" scheme. He assumes the VC will know in general what is up, but he does not expect them to be able to cope with it. He expects them in many cases to conceal themselves, a standard tactic, but to be unable to operate as effectively during and after the operation as before, because in the meantime the strategic hamlet and the clear-and-hold programs would go forward and forces would be developed to secure the area more permanently. Further, the "explosion" scheme is not conceived as a one-shot operation but rather as a series of measures designed to place RVNAF in a more aggressive posture throughout the country and to show the fence-sitters who has the power. I am not completely convinced of the soundness of the concept, nor of its feasibility. But I can frankly think of no better way to test this government's will to bring this struggle to a show-down, and this, I think, is becoming psychologically necessary, particularly as regards the GVN armed forces. I share your concern about the need to protect the innocent from injury during military operations insofar as possible, and I can assure you that General Harkins does also. Administrative support of former VC villages is a problem which grows in proportion to the GVN's success. Until our first province rehabilitation operations got started, there was little retaking and little rehabilitation. However, in Binh Duong, where Sunrise is going on, and in Phu Yen's operation Sea Swallow, villages have been retaken from the VC, and in these administrative support and institutions have been installed. This will continue as the comprehensive strategic hamlet programs we are beginning to support in the delta areas. All hamlets, even those formerly dominated by the VC, seem to get the same general treatment. The controls in the latter may be a little stronger and last longer, but the plan is that ultimately they, too, will have their own hamlet councils and defense forces. And, we will try very hard to insure that they, too, receive the dispensaries, wells, schools, etc. that are part of our support program and a necessary follow-up to military operations. There is of course a continuing lack of trained administrators and civic action specialists. Your comments on the GVN's image and the need for concrete accomplishments instead of empty claims are well taken. We are aware of this problem which, in fact, was discussed during the last Province Rehabilitation Committee meeting. USIS and MACV psychological warfare people are increasingly involved in advising on and supporting province operations. As you point out, the best propaganda by the GVN will be its concrete accomplishments in the countryside. I feel we have made considerable headway toward focusing on the social and economic betterment of the villagers, particularly on the organizational aspects. Joe Brent and Rufe Phillips are pushing ahead rapidly and the GVN appears to agree on the importance of these aspects. In connection with the review of next year's military budget we have been careful to retain on the civilian side a sizeable amount for direct counterinsurgency operations. In exploring this generally with Thuan earlier this week, he recognized the importance of this and of earmarking the necessary funds on the GVN side. As you are aware, concrete accomplishments in these areas are directly related to the degree of security in a given area. While we can assure, for example, that the necessary economic and civic action components are included in our province rehabilitation planning, they can only take hold and develop in those areas where GVN clearly exercises control. As the security situation improves we should expect an accelerated and cumulative effect from the economic and civic action measures. We will continue to concentrate on these important areas, which I agree, must go hand-in-hand with the military. I share your view that it is safer to lean in the direction of emphasizing our problems rather than our successes. After a hard winter, however, it is difficult to restrain feelings and expressions of exhilaration at the first signs of spring. There has been a rather dramatic change in outlook among GVN (and US) officials from the extreme pessimism of a year ago. This, I think, is a good thing and provides considerably more impetus toward uniting and getting the job done. The mood is nevertheless still one of cautious optimism and I do not believe that any of us underestimates the complexity of the task ahead. I should add that, in general, things seem to be going internally pretty well; the external problems less well (relations with Laos, the Cambodian problem, press relations, etc.). A part of our difficulty in dealing with the latter comes precisely from the increased confidence of the Government, which--they are frank enough to admit--we have helped to create! Sincerely yours, Fritz
321. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, November 21, 1962, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2162. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC, London, and Paris. 537. In talk with Thuan at his request November 19, following matters discussed: 1. Progress Against VC Insurgency. Thuan briefed me on contents VC documents recently captured in An Lac operation. (We have copies of these, now being translated.) According Thuan, these documents, mostly letters from VC officers in high plateau area, describe a situation of severe lack of food, medicines, recruits; generally low morale, desertions, and fear of ARVN attack. Asked whether this was local condition around An Lac, or typical of larger area, Thuan said he thought it applied generally to high plateau (roughly GVN Second Corps area), but this not entirely clear from captured letters. He said President Diem, greatly encouraged by these reports, had briefed his military commanders on them, stressing necessity to keep up military pressure everywhere in highlands; necessity to enforce strict controls over drugs and food distribution; and feasibility of attacking areas like An Lac where ARVN had previously feared to go. I asked Thuan whether this picture of VC demoralization did not offer just the opportunity we have been looking for to start large-scale defections and surrenders by a well-organized country-wide amnesty program. I suggested something like Magsaysay's "all-out friendship or all-out war" program, tailored to Vietnamese psychology. He said this had been again discussed and that a program of this kind would be launched at Tet (late January). 2. External Relations. From discussion of above, I led into dangers to Viet-Nam and to progress achieved here from too narrow and inflexible a policy vis-à-vis Viet-Nam's neutral neighbors, especially Cambodia. I told him again of our deep concern re RKG's threat to invite ChiComs into Cambodia if Sihanouk's fears of aggression from Viet-Nam and Thailand were not calmed. I said I did not know what USG's position on proposed neutrality statute would be (since we had not seen text), but that GVN ought to be as concerned to find a way out of dilemma made by this move as we are--even more so. I said I felt GVN's handling of the issues with Cambodia (border incidents, notes, debt settlement, etc.), regardless of the rights and wrongs on specific issues, had been slow, unimaginative, and inept. If in fact their aim was to calm Sihanouk down and prevent his pushing his demands and threats too far, they should be more skillful in dealing with him. I said we were counting on GVN, and specifically Thuan as Min. of Defense and Acting Min. of Foreign Affairs, to avoid anything which could be interpreted as hostile towards Cambodia on the one hand, and to promote some constructive moves on the other. Thuan said this subject was most difficult. Without contesting that GVN had not been forthcoming or adept in dealing with Sihanouk, he said this was inevitable when GVN's president was constantly being attacked personally by Sihanouk as a "bloody dictator," etc. Under these circumstances, he said, it was most difficult to achieve a flexible and realistic policy, even though such a policy would be "smart". I asked him point-blank whether there were any grounds whatsoever for Sihanouk's fear that GVN had designs to overthrow him or to take any aggressive moves against his country. Thuan answered that there were no grounds whatsoever. I said we continued to get from time to time reports that GVN agents were plotting with Cambodian dissidents, and that Sihanouk apparently believed this to be the case. Thuan denied that this was going on. I then stressed again necessity on the military side to avoid any actions which would exacerbate this situation and might lead to introduction of ChiCom forces on the flank of Viet-Nam. Thuan said he realized the importance of this and would do everything possible to minimize the chances. I told him that we would rely on that. Thuan said that GVN would not enter into an international agreement on the Laos pattern with Cambodia, because this would be tantamount to condemning themselves as aggressors, which they are not. He said the Thai Government felt the same way. Thuan then said that GVN, despite gratification over internal success, continued to be deeply concerned and alarmed over developments in Laos, where, he said, General Phoumi is bitter against the U.S. and left wing is continuing to make progress among the people. He said that any reduction of Phoumi's forces would simply mean transferring those soldiers to support Pathet Lao. He then said GVN was convinced that French Government has made deliberate policy decision to try to restore French influence throughout former Indo-China states through extension of neutralism, with "U.S. paying the bill". He said French are doing this through Souvanna Phouma in Laos and through "French lawyers" and men like Charles Mayer in Cambodia. He said while GVN fully trusted U.S. intentions in Vietnam, they were deeply worried by U.S. "trustfulness" of French policy. I said that we are not as naive as this statement seemed to imply, that perhaps we had better information on French policy than GVN, whose views on this matter were somewhat prejudiced. There are good reasons to believe that GVN is genuinely concerned over Cambodian developments and are doing their best to prevent border incidents. On the other hand, I do not expect any effective soothing salve to be applied by GVN, nor any real dexterity in dealing with this ticklish issue. Nolting
322. Memorandum From the Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)/1/ Saigon, November 27, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Hilsman Trip 12/62-1/63. Secret; Noforn. Moore sent a copy of this memorandum to Murrow on December 10 (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field--Far East (IAF)), which was circulated by Forrestal to the Special Group on Counterinsurgency on January 28, 1963. Press Relations Saigon once again is full of brave talk about imminent GVN inauguration of regular press briefings. Besides the assurances you received Monday from Thuan, Counselor Nhu told me last week that briefings and other facilities should be instituted. Colonel Smith reports that General Khanh has volunteered to do the briefings temporarily himself. Khanh has even asked Smith for advice on creation of a DOD public information office. Unhappily we have heard this tune before, always followed by endless delays. Already there is a taste of the same routine in the air. When I called Dang Due Khol today to ask what comes next, in view of Thuan's promises, he replied that immediate action is impossible because of "difficulties" in obtaining information from the field fast enough for the newsmen. He said he would speak to Khanh about it. This is exactly the stall we encountered on the last go-round, when we offered unsuccessfully to feed the GVN information collected through MACV channels. I hope I'm wrong, but it seems to me almost certain that adequate improvement, if any at all, in GVN relations with the foreign press is not about to materialize. In anticipation of this and in view of the fact that these relations have presently reached an abysmal low, there follows a reassessment of the situation, and recommendations for relatively drastic action. I hope you may see fit to send a copy (attached) to General Harkins and that the three of us and Colonel Smith may then meet to discuss it. Reason for a reassessment, in my judgment, is the fact that it has now become clear that the expulsions of Francois Sully last summer and of Jim Robinson a few weeks later were considerably more than isolated incidents. On the contrary, evidence accumulates that they signaled a major change in GVN press policy, and that this policy is being formulated and administered by Counselor Nhu, uncomfortably often at the whim of his wife. In my opinion, the policy is rooted in an emotional, almost irrational attitude which will prevail indefinitely, regardless of what comes of the current crop of promises. There is ground to doubt whether the newsmen of the US Mission can live with this. Subtly but undeniably, evidence is accumulating that Nhu's attitude toward the US press reflects his attitude in general toward the US Government and people. It is surely significant that during my talk with him on November 19, which included considerable discussion of the press, Nhu made at least a half dozen openly contemptuous remarks about Americans. Variously he accused us of failing to "understand" communism, underdeveloped countries, Asians, India and cold war realities. As reported elsewhere, he capped all this with the reckless (and psychotic?) remark that the US should now mount an atomic attack on Peking. If you relate this to the evidence that Nhu's personal power is critically increasing, I think it may be likely that press policy happens only to be one of the first of our forthcoming disagreements with him. It follows that the US Mission's reaction to this initial challenge quite possibly could set a pattern for future, much more difficult and important problems with him. The Nhus' influence almost certainly is the main reason why the GVN--despite repeated promises to you, the DCM and myself--has failed to date to institute a single one of the improved facilities we have suggested. There is even less doubt that the Nhus have been behind what amounts, contrarily, to a deliberate new campaign of harassment. It has been applied against all the newsmen, furthermore, friend and critic alike, and in a spirit of bitter contempt for their protests. There have been continued public and private recriminations against the correspondents by the Vietnamese press and leaders, e.g. Mme. Nhu's remark in a taped interview this morning with a Mutual Broadcasting System correspondent that the American correspondents here are "intoxicated by communism." (Copy attached)/2/ American newsmen in Saigon believe they are regularly tailed. They are threatened with reprisals if they fail to be properly "objective" (which means friendly by GVN definition), notably including recent publicized letter to the AP in New York personally attacking correspondent Mal Browne. The permanent ban on Newsweek continues, as well as intermittent bans of other American publications. /2/Not found. If there was any question whether all this was officially inspired, it was removed by General Ty's circular of October 13 (Embtel 536)/3/ requiring field unit commanders to talk to correspondents only through written questions and answers--which of course amounts to a ban on talking to journalists at all if literally enforced. We have not been able to confirm the origin of the Ty circular, but several newsmen claim to have information that it was suggested by the Palace; in any case Nhu endorsed the order when I asked him about it last week. The order has already resulted in several newsmen being kicked off American helicopters. /3/Telegram 536, November 21, reported that reporters were required to submit their questions to field commanders in writing. (Department of State, Central Files, 951K.6211/11-2162) Hard on top of this came last week's prohibition on newsmen covering the new operation in Zone D. This ruling also originated with the GVN. Some 30 or 40 American helicopters participated--which together with unit advisors meant perhaps as many as 150 Americans entering into combat conditions. The newsmen felt that the ban on reporting this to American readers was an outrage. Inevitably many of them found their own sources for information on the operation, notably including Neil Sheehan of UPI, whose story led to a MACV investigation, intensifying the newsmen's resentment. The Zone D order has tended to turn the newsmen bitterly against the US Mission--to a more serious degree, I think, than at any time since last winter. Sheehan and Halberstam of the New York Times have both sent messages to their New York offices urging formal complaints in Washington because of the Zone D operation. Halberstam says he told his office that the MACV explanation of the ban (that the operation's objectives are classified) was "an insult to the patriotism" of the newsmen. Attached is a hastily written letter to you/4/ which Halberstam composed in my office and then threw on my desk in disgust last Friday,/5/ remarking "you can do any damn thing you want with it." It is certainly true, as the letter notes, that Halberstam's initial effort to be detached and fair to the GVN, which indeed has been the tone of his copy, is fast disappearing. The process accelerated Sunday when Halberstam went on a trip with the junk forces, got what he called a first rate briefing from a US Navy officer only to be told later by the same officer that the GVN commander had rebuked him for giving the briefing and asked him to ask Halberstam not to use it. When he got back to Saigon, Halberstam was literally shaking with anger. /4/Not printed. /5/November 23. Our hope that the GVN would begin getting a better stateside press as it made progress with the war has been fulfilled. There has been a distinct, continuing improvement, a widening recognition that the GVN perhaps can win. But the GVN, instead of easing off its bitterness, is responding with blind vindictiveness for past criticism. I said earlier I'm not sure we can live with this. Apart from the tactical problem of how to deal with Nhu, I think we must consider action because the issue itself has changed. We reluctantly accepted the Sully and Robinson expulsions, without resorting to sanctions, on the principle that the GVN is a sovereign country and thus has a right to move against unfriendly reporters, even though this is not the way we would do it. The difference now is that this time the GVN is deliberately harassing all foreign newsmen, and, even more seriously, deliberately attempting to establish a blackout on news from Vietnam other than official communiques, which are notoriously unreliable, including news about activities of US personnel in Vietnam. The question of GVN sovereignty is less black and white in this case. This is not just another under-developed country, or banana republic or what have you, rocking along in the usual intrigue and petty chauvinism. This is 1) the scene of a confrontation between East and West which could be decisive to the fate of Asia, and 2) an area of massive US involvement. This is not in any way meant to invoke the weary argument that we're spending millions here and the US thus has a "right" to special treatment by the GVN, which in effect is to confirm the communist line that Diem is a puppet, etc. The point is rather that the GVN is infringing on a root American right: the right of the American people to be informed of the facts on which the policies of their government are based, and on the activities of US military personnel committed to combat. All this, furthermore, is apart from the fact that continued criticism of the GVN in the US press for trying to suppress newsmen inevitably weakens the Administration's political capability to maintain the present policy of support for the GVN. There is a certain parallel here with the problem of the American correspondents who covered the Eastern Front in World War II under innumerable restrictions, with one very big difference: in Vietnam, the USG has the means to correct the situation unilaterally, at least partially. It is, furthermore, conceivable that this could be done without a direct clash with the GVN, i.e., without forcing a face-losing showdown which could lead to serious damage to our relations in other areas. Accordingly some recommendations which I hope you and General Harkins will consider: 1) We should cease forthwith any further efforts to change the GVN policy toward the press by persuasion, especially in view of Thuan's categorical assurances to you yesterday, which were the most we can hope for anyway. Failure of the GVN to follow through this time will surely establish beyond doubt that persuasion on this highly emotional issue doesn't work, and that further agitation can only exacerbate our relations. 2) MACV should begin now to give regular daily briefings to Western newsmen on a non-attribution basis. These in general should be limited to news about activities involving US personnel (which means virtually every action initiated by the GVN), but news of major developments involving only GVN personnel should also be "leaked" at the discretion of MACV. It would be preferable not to advise the GVN formally that such briefings have been started, thus avoiding a direct question of "face." But if and when the GVN hears about them and inquires, we should simply say the pressure from the US press for adequate information became so intense that we could no longer resist it, and that of course the briefings will be discontinued once the GVN itself begins doing the job. 3) MACV should begin giving a limited amount of classified information to reputable Western newsmen to give them a true picture of what's going on, and then request them not to publish or otherwise circulate those portions which would be damaging to operational security. This could not be done to the extent that correspondents were briefed during World War II because there is no censorship nor juridical control over them in this situation. (Censorship might be desirable here, but GVN application of it would unquestionably be so chaotic and politically motivated that it's not a reasonable consideration, in my opinion.) But I am completely confident that enough information could be entrusted with the newsmen to win their cooperation. It would, of course, be relatively simple to enforce their respect for classified information by instantly barring a correspondent who violated a confidence not only from the briefings but even from all American installations in Vietnam. If this is feasible, I think we should call a meeting of the American newsmen here to discuss how to go at it. 4) American advisors throughout the country should be instructed to ignore any GVN efforts to prevent them from cooperating with newsmen, to urge their Vietnamese counterparts to cooperate, and to insist that space for newsmen be provided in the plans of any operation involving American personnel or equipment. In application, the sense of this would be: no correspondents, no choppers. Again if this were done at the regional level, I think a showdown with the GVN could be avoided because the local commanders would be less willing to jeopardize US support by balking than would be the case in Saigon. I think we should all accept the reality that the newsmen here will continue to find access to very much of the truth of what's going on, regardless of what we may do. I think it is futile to try to "control" them, or cut off their sources. Americans, even in the military, simply don't work that way. If Sheehan's source for the Zone D story were located, for example, he would find somebody else next time. Similarly it seems rather pointless to me to try to prevent newsmen from obtaining such classified figures as the number of helicopters in an operation. Most of them find out simply by checking friends who live near Tan Son Nhut and count them as they take off. There is hope of suppressing that kind of sensitive information, however, if we take the newsmen into our confidence as much as possible, i.e., honor their sense of patriotism as Halberstam puts it, and then ask them on the basis of their own good sense not to use certain specified items. This kind of drastic shift in our policy vis-a-vis the press admittedly risks an unpleasant time with the GVN. It would verge on application of sanctions--especially in insisting on the right correspondents to go along on all operations as a condition to providing the helicopters. In my opinion, however, the long-term damage, if we permit the GVN to continue its present policy of deliberate harassment, would be appreciably greater. There is a good possibility, furthermore, that if the US applied this new policy swiftly and decisively, yet quietly, so nobody loses face, the GVN would go along with it in recognition, however reluctant, of the greater need for our help. Subsequent (November 28) to typing of the foregoing, Colonel Smith advises that General Khanh's office had called to ask PIO/MACV to act temporarily as the outlet for ARVN military reports on a daily basis, pending inauguration of ARVN briefings. Khanh then delivered to the PIO a three-paragraph "bulletin" reporting on the resumption of the Zone D operation on November 27. Smith is releasing this to newsmen in writing. Khanh's office promised to deliver such bulletins daily around 5 or 6 p.m. Smith plans to follow the same procedure of release in writing, at least for the time being. This, of course, is encouraging in the sense that Khanh is showing real interest in the project. It must immediately be noted, however, that the first bulletin was a day late. If this continues, the newsmen can be expected to continue tapping their own sources to get the news faster, with resulting continued errors and possible security breaches. Also, the bulletin was vaguely worded, omitting any indication of the size of the operation and similar details that newsmen will be sure to want. The GVN will have to go vastly beyond this cautious first step if it hopes to bring about any appreciable change in the situation. My recommendation that MACV should begin its own briefings forthwith perhaps should now be amended to read that MACV should be prepared to do this if the present GVN experiment fizzles. But this does not change my opinion that MACV briefings will inevitably become necessary, nor affect my other recommendations. [Continue with the next documents]
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