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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963, Volume II Vietnam, 1962
Department of State |
329. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 15, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1562. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 598. Ref. Deptel 588./2/ Dept's assumption first para reftel correct as far as US Farmgate aircraft concerned. As reported Embtel 567,/3/ Gen. Harkins refused permit use of US aircraft to deliver napalm in Zone D operation because of absence hard evidence of VC concentrations sufficiently large to promise military benefits outweighing political and psywar risks involved. On other hand, GVN has in its possession quantity of napalm provided under MAP, and uses it on basis its own judgment of requirements and effects. Thus US does not have direct control of RVNAF's use of napalm on SVN territory any more than it controls use of any other weapon in RVNAF arsenal provided under MAP. At same time, however, RVNAF does not have air delivery capability for large quantities napalm and, as in case of Zone D operation, had to call on us for additional delivery capability. Thus, in terms use large amounts napalm, US in fact has control and is exercising it. /2/Document 326. /3/See Document 326, footnote 2. Zone D operation constitutes first time RVNAF has proposed employ large quantities of napalm. Question has not arisen in past and is unlikely arise often in future. Regarding effects of using napalm on GVN's ability gain support of populace, we aware reports that during Indochina War napalm considered here as white colonialists' weapon against yellow "natives". However, we have no evidence of any kind suggesting this attitude has been transferred to GVN's use of napalm. Nor do we have any reason believe local people single out napalm or any other particular weapon used by GVN as reason for supporting VC or at least being anti-GVN. While it true that Hanoi from time to time accuses "US-Diem" of widespread and inhumane use of napalm, and other weapons no evidence this line we have has had effect in SVN or that it has been exploited outside SVN. In Embassy's view, adverse political and psychological impact of napalm on attitudes of population would differ from impact of other weapons only to degree napalm more deadly as destroyer than rockets, bombs or large or small arms. Believe question is therefore not so much use of napalm as against use rockets or any other deadly weapon, but rather degree discrimination and care applied in use of all weapons. As indicated above, we are exercising discrimination and care in question use of US aircraft for delivery large quantities napalm. As for GVN use of stocks napalm and other weapons of destruction, we must depend upon discrimination and care with which GVN prosecutes this war in accordance agreed objectives. Overall agreed policy objective is, of course, to win the support of the people. The expeditious prosecution of the war is a "sine qua non" of this. The overall objective, constantly reiterated and discussed between GVN and US officials in many contexts, is, we think, becoming more and more understood and adopted by GVN forces. This includes greater care and discrimination in target selection and in the use of weapons. Since any lethal weapon is disliked and feared by any enemy in direct proportion to its effectiveness, the use of napalm, crop destroyers, high explosive bombs, claymore mines, and others will predictably provoke protests from hostile propaganda forces. With respect to last para reftel, COMUS MACV feels restraints already imposed are making it difficult enough to carry the war to the heart of the enemy and tend to set up inviolable sanctuaries where the VC can take a breather. In light of the above explanations, and taking into consideration the need for quick response and action in planning and execution of military operations, I agree with General Harkins that requirement of last para reftel is not necessary, and I request reconsideration. In any event, the instruction is so imprecise (e.g., what is definition of large amounts) that we feel discretion in this important matter should be left with Task Force Saigon./4/ /4/On December 21, the Embassy in Saigon was granted the discretion requested in this telegram, but was asked to seek advance approval from the Departments of State and Defense for any operations that were likely to have significant political repercussions. (Telegram 617 to Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5614/12-2162) Nolting
330. Report by the Senate Majority Leader (Mansfield)/1/ Washington, December 18, 1962. /1/Source: Senate Document 93-11. Printed in U.S. Senate 93d Congress, 1st session, Two Reports on Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the President of the United States by Senator Mike Mansfield (Washington, April 1973), pp. 7-14. For Mansfield's report to the Foreign Relations Committee, see U.S. Senate, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Report of Senator Mike Mansfield . . . to the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, 1963). SOUTHEAST ASIA--VIETNAM We have problems of varying complexity with all of the nations in Southeast Asia. Clearly, however, the critical focus is south Viet Nam. Developments there in the next two or three years may well influence greatly the trends in the whole region for the following ten or twenty. And at this point it is far from certain what will develop in Viet Nam. One thing is reasonably clear: From somewhere about 1956 or '57, the unusual combination of factors which had resulted in the establishment of the Republic under Ngo Dinh Diem began to lose its impulse. A drift set in at about that time, responsibility for which is only partially ascribable to the shortcomings of the Vietnamese government. Our aid programs, military and non-military, after all, were one of the principal sources of the origin and the continuance of that government's power and these were properly open to charges of being ill-conceived and badly administered. They did little with the time which was bought at Geneva in the sense of stimulating the growth of indigenous roots for the political structure in Saigon. That structure is, today, far more dependent on us for its existence than it was five years ago. If Vietnam is the cork in the Southeast Asian bottle then American aid is more than ever the cork in the Vietnamese bottle. We have now had for some months new concepts and a new American approach in Viet Nam. But the purpose of both remains, in essentials, what the purpose of other approaches have been from the outset. Indeed, it was distressing on this visit to hear the situation described in much the same terms as on my last visit although it is seven years and billions of dollars later. Viet Nam, outside the cities, is still an insecure place which is run at least at night largely by the Vietcong. The government in Saigon is still seeking acceptance by the ordinary people in large areas of the countryside. Out of fear or indifference or hostility the peasants still withhold acquiescence, let alone approval of that government. In short, it would be well to face the fact that we are once again at the beginning of the beginning. But as noted there are now new concepts and a new American approach. The new concepts, as undoubtedly you are aware, center on the strategic hamlets. The new approach involves the re-oriented and expanded economic aid program and the use of many thousands of supporting American military personnel as well as the special forces which are concentrating their efforts on the tribal people, the Montagnards. Although the first results have scarcely been registered, the evaluations of the new approach--Vietnamese and American--in Saigon are extremely optimistic. Those bearing responsibility--Vietnamese and American--speak of success in the solution of the problem in terms of a year or two. Having heard optimistic predictions of this kind, with the introduction of other "new concepts," beginning with French General Navarre in Hanoi in 1953, certain reservations seem to me to be in order. It is true that Vietminh casualty counts have been rising but the accuracy of these counts is open to question. Moreover, it should be noted that the estimates of Vietcong core strength have also been rising. The total of 20,000 which is now calculated at CINCPAC is the highest which I have ever encountered since the Geneva accords of 1954. Responsible Americans in Saigon believe that exceptional progress has been made in winning over the Montagnards by the special forces. This is an important achievement because the location of these tribal people has considerable strategic significance in terms of north-south supply trails. But it should also be recognized that in terms of the major struggle the Montagnards are peripheral. In the last analysis, the Saigon government will stand or fall on the basis not of the several hundred thousand primitive Montagnards, but the millions of Vietnamese in the villages, towns and cities. Apart from these two tangibles--higher Vietminh casualties and progress in winning over the Montagnards--there are also reports of improvements in the security of road travel and in the movement of rice and other commodities out of the countryside into the cities. These are excellent indicators of progress but the reports are not yet conclusive as to trends. At this point, therefore, the optimistic predictions of success must be regarded as deriving primarily from the development of the theory of the strategic hamlets by Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu and by the injection of new energy which has been provided by additional American aid and personnel. The real tests are yet to come. Reservations are in order because in the first place, the rapid success of the concept of the strategic hamlet would seem to depend on the assumption that the Vietminh will remain wedded to their present tactics and will be unable to devise significant and effective revisions to meet the new concepts and the new highly mobile firepower of the American-trained forces. That may be the case but it would be unwise to underestimate the resourcefulness of any group which has managed to survive years of the most rugged kind of warfare. In the second place, rapid success of the new concepts depends upon the assumption that the great bulk of the people in the countryside sustain the Vietminh merely out of fear or, at best, indifference. There is really no effective measure of the accuracy of this assumption. It may indeed contain a good deal of truth but the critical question is how much truth. The temptation to extrapolate our own reactions on to the Vietnamese peasant in this kind of a situation is as obvious as it is dangerous. The fact is that only experience and the most acute observation and objective reporting will throw real light on the accuracy of this assumption. To date we have not had enough of any of those essential ingredients of sound judgment. If experience should prove that there is less rather than more truth in the assumption that fear or indifference are the keystones of the Vietcong hold over the countryside, the target date for success will be delayed indefinitely beyond the year or two of the present predictions. This is not to say that even a serious error in this assumption renders success impossible. If we were prepared to increase the commitment of men and military aid to compensate for the error it is not impossible that the concept of the strategic hamlet could still be brought into existence, in time, despite widespread support of the peasants for the Vietcong. And if the Vietnamese government, with more aid, could then turn the secured hamlets into a significantly more satisfactory way of life than the peasants have known, then it is conceivable that a deep disaffection towards the Vietcong could be induced. But it would be well to recognize that any such reorientation involves an immense job of social engineering, dependent on great outlays of aid on our part for many years and a most responsive, alert and enlightened leadership in the government of Vietnam. Even assuming that aid over a prolonged period would be available, the question still remains as to the capacity of the present Saigon government to carry out the task of social engineering. Ngo Dinh Diem remains a dedicated, sincere, hardworking, incorruptible and patriotic leader. But he is older and the problems which confront him are more complex than those which he faced when he pitted his genuine nationalism against, first, the French and Bao Dai and then against the sects with such effectiveness. The energizing role which he played in the past appears to be passing to other members of his family, particularly to Ngo Dinh Nhu. The latter is a person of great energy and intellect who is fascinated by the operations of political power and has consummate eagerness and ability in organizing and manipulating it. But it is Ngo Dinh Diem, not Ngo Dinh Nhu, who has such popular mandate to exercise power as there is in south Vietnam. In a situation of this kind there is a great danger of the corruption of unbridled power. This has implications far beyond the persistent reports and rumors of fiscal and similar irregularities which are, in any event, undocumented. More important is its effect on the organization of the machinery for carrying out the new concepts. The difficulties in Vietnam are not likely to be overcome by a handful of paid retainers and sycophants. The success of the new approach in Vietnam presupposes a great contribution of initiative and self-sacrifice from a substantial body of Vietnamese with capacities for leadership at all levels. Whether that contribution can be obtained remains to be seen. For in the last analysis it depends upon a diffusion of political power, essentially in a democratic pattern. The trends in the political life of Vietnam have not been until now in that direction despite lip service to the theory of developing democratic and popular institutions "from the bottom up" through the strategic hamlet program. To summarize, our policies and activities are designed to meet an existing set of internal problems in south Vietnam. North Vietnam infiltrates some supplies and cadres into the south; together with the Vietnamese we are trying to shut off this flow. The Vietcong has had the offensive in guerrilla warfare in the countryside; we are attempting to aid the Vietnamese military in putting them on the defensive with the hope of eventually reducing them at least to ineffectiveness. Finally, the Vietnamese peasants have sustained the Vietcong guerrillas out of fear, indifference or blandishment and we are helping the Vietnamese in an effort to win the peasants away by offering them the security and other benefits which may be provided in the strategic hamlets. That, in brief, is the present situation. As noted, there is optimism that success will be achieved quickly. My own view is that the problems can be made to yield to present remedies, provided the problems and their magnitude do not change significantly and provided that the remedies are pursued by both Vietnamese and Americans (and particularly the former) with great vigor and self-dedication. Certainly, if these remedies do not work, it is difficult to conceive of alternatives, with the possible exception of a truly massive commitment of American military personnel and other resources--in short going to war fully ourselves against the guerrillas--and the establishment of some form of neocolonial rule in south Vietnam. That is an alternative which I most emphatically do not recommend. On the contrary, it seems to me most essential that we make crystal clear to the Vietnamese government and to our own people that while we will go to great lengths to help, the primary responsibility rests with the Vietnamese. Our role is and must remain secondary in present circumstances. It is their country, their future which is most at stake, not ours. To ignore that reality will not only be immensely costly in terms of American lives and resources but it may also draw us inexorably into some variation of the unenviable position in Vietnam which was formerly occupied by the French. We are not, of course, at that point at this time. But the great increase in American military commitment this year has tended to point us in that general direction and we may well begin to slide rapidly toward it if any of the present remedies begin to falter in practice. As indicated, our planning appears to be predicated on the assumption that existing internal problems in south Vietnam will remain about the same and can be overcome by greater effort and better techniques. But what if the problems do not remain the same? To all outward appearances, little if any thought has been given in Saigon, at least, to the possibilities of a change in the nature of the problems themselves. Nevertheless, they are very real possibilities and the initiative for instituting change rests in enemy hands largely because of the weakness of the Saigon government. The range of possible change includes a step-up in the infiltration of cadres and supplies by land or sea. It includes the use of part or all of the regular armed forces of north Vietnam, reported to be about 300,000 strong, under Vo Nguyen Giap. It includes, in the last analysis, the possibility of a major increase in any of many possible forms of Chinese Communist support for the Vietcong. None of these possibilities may materialize. It would be folly, however, not to recognize their existence and to have as much clarification in advance of what our response to them will be if they do. This sort of anticipatory thinking cannot be undertaken with respect to the situation in Vietnam alone. The problem there can be grasped, it seems to me, only as we have clearly in mind our interests with respect to all of Southeast Asia. If it is essential in our interests to maintain a quasi-permanent position of power on the Asian mainland as against the Chinese then we must be prepared to continue to pay the present cost in Vietnam indefinitely and to meet any escalation on the other side with at least a commensurate escalation of commitment of our own. This can go very far, indeed, in terms of lives and resources. Yet if it is essential to our interests then we would have no choice. But if on the other hand it is, at best, only desirable rather than essential that a position of power be maintained on the mainland, then other courses are indicated. We would, then, properly view such improvement as may be obtained by the new approach in Vietnam primarily in terms of what it might contribute to strengthening our diplomatic hand in the Southeast Asian region. And we would use that hand as vigorously as possible and in every way possible not to deepen our costly involvement on the Asian mainland but to lighten it. It is uncertain what the prospects for doing so may be, even if we were inclined to the latter course. The experience in Laos which, in effect, is an essay in that direction is not cause for sanguine expectation. On the one hand, there are the anticipated difficulties with the Pathet Lao. Their leader in Vientiane, Prince Souphanovong, is brilliant and capable but he is also hard-bitten and relentless. His relations with Souvanna Phouma are delicate and uncertain and there are reports that even the limited degree of cooperation which he has extended has come under attack from his own faction. The cooperation with Souvanna Phouma from the other Laotian group headed by Phoumi Nosavan has also been circumscribed and uncertain. These difficulties, of course, were to be anticipated and much depends on Souvanna Phouma if they are to be surmounted. It is our policy to support him fully and the American Ambassador is making a noble effort to carry out that policy. The latter needs and must have the cooperation of all departments in this effort. Moreover, his views as to what is necessary should be most carefully regarded in the design of his instructions. This point needs stressing, for one has the distinct impression in Laos that a great deal of executive branch energy is going into the preparation for contingencies in anticipation of the failure of the policy of neutralization under Souvanna Phouma and not enough into making the policy work. The job will be sufficiently difficult even in the best of circumstances and it is not at all unlikely that Souvanna Phouma may tire of it and abandon it unless the efforts of every department and agency of our own government which may be involved are bent energetically to the achievement of our policy under the direction of the Ambassador. If Laos does not yet offer much hope of an eventual lightening of our burdens throughout Southeast Asia, Cambodia stands in stark contrast. Its internal stability is exceptional for contemporary Southeast Asia. It is led by Prince Sihanouk with dedication, energy and astuteness. And it has made steady and most impressive social and economic progress in the past few years. It is an illustration of what can be achieved in the lush lands of the region in conditions of peace, with a vigorous and progressive indigenous leadership and a judicious and limited use of outside aid. It is also an experience which can shed light on the possibilities of eventually lightening our burdens in Southeast Asia. For that reason if for no other, it seems to me essential that we go very far in attempting to find practicable solutions which will meet the Cambodian desire for reassurance that it will not be overwhelmed from either Vietnam on the east or Thailand on the west. Cambodian fears exist. They are probably excessive fears at least in present circumstances. Nevertheless, they are powerful and deeply felt fears based in part on history and it would be most unwise to underestimate their potential influence on Cambodian policy. It would be most unfortunate if they pushed Cambodia further in the direction of China. Our relations with this little country have been, to say the least, erratic from the outset and, it seems to me, largely unnecessarily so. There have been unfortunate clashes of personality, lack of understanding and even more serious matters involved. Official relations now seem to me to be well-handled and insofar as we may be responsible for such strains as exist, they would appear ascribable to policy as it is formulated in Washington not as it is administered in Phnom Penh. The Cambodians are apparently prepared for a further reduction in the remaining one-sided aid commitment which has already been reduced considerably. We should welcome this opportunity and at the same time seek to broaden mutually advantageous relationships. The key to bringing about this transition without alienating Cambodia is to be found in its interrelationships and ours with its neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. It is, in my opinion, clearly desirable to search vigorously for this key. It is apparent that in Thailand, the bent of our policy with respect not only to Cambodia but to Laos as well is not appreciated and, at best, enjoys only a grudging tolerance. Cambodia is held in low esteem and the resentments over the recent adverse International Court decision still smolder. With respect to Laos, the Thais have either not wanted the policy of neutralization to work or have not believed that it would work from the outset. They are still clearly skeptical. It is probable that once it became clear that we would not commit ourselves militarily to the recapture of all of Laos, the Thais preferred a solution by military partition rather than the attempt at neutralization, with the United States committed to the defense of at least southern Laos. This may still be their expectation. American actions in Thailand appear to support the Thai skepticism at least to the point of providing heavily for contingencies in the event neutralization fails in Laos. Several new jet-ports have been built in eastern Thailand. In the recent withdrawal of the American combat unit, a great deal of heavy transport equipment, particularly for fuel, has been left behind. And, finally, the United States military command intends to put back into Thailand in the near future, a contingent of forces about equal in number to those being withdrawn for the purpose of constructing a fuel pipe line across that country. The cost of these various operations when added to the already immense and continuing input of aid of various kinds is cause for serious concern. Thailand is relatively prosperous. It has a very substantial foreign trade from which other nations such as Japan and Western Germany profit greatly along with Thailand. There is talk of aid from other sources but it is almost entirely talk of aid on a loan or trade basis, with a clear expectation of direct and tangible returns to the donors. At the same time, we are carrying, virtually, the entire burden of aid for Thailand's defense and other purposes which carry little in the way of tangible return. This sort of an arrangement leaves us with the onerous burdens while others reap the fruits. It is an arrangement that will probably be continued as long as we are prepared to countenance it. Sudden changes in our willingness to sustain these burdens might produce serious adverse consequences. But it seems to me that a constant pressure must be maintained to bring about a progressive reduction in our commitment by having the Thais themselves and others take on more of the onerous burdens. That pressure is not in evidence in our policies and their administration at the present time. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in Burma and in Malaya, we have a minimum of commitment. In the case of Burma, this fortuitous state of affairs would appear to be largely one of Burmese choice. The Burmese have settled the border question with China along the McCarthy line (an extension of the McMahon line) and to their satisfaction. They are fumed inward in their attitudes, seeking only to stay clear of the India-China dispute. They are also fearful of antagonizing China by too dose dealings with us. But there is no assurance that in the future a Burmese government, hard-pressed to maintain itself in an internal political situation which is never far from chaos, will not seek substantial aid from the United States. It seems to me that we must steel ourselves against that day. And, in all honesty, it seems to me that the key to staying clear of still another costly commitment on the Asian mainland is to be found in restraining our own bureaucratic eagerness to help. In the case of Malaya, except for a large and expanding Peace Corps, we are maintaining relatively orthodox and inexpensive relationships with a minimum of commitment on our part. However, this excellent state of affairs may be strained by the effort to bring Malaysia into existence. It is probable that the British hope, by the unification of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo, to lighten their burdens in that region while retaining as much as possible of their influence and their highly profitable economic position. Without criticizing this attempt, it should be noted that our approach must be one of the greatest delicacy, primarily because of the attitudes of the Philippines. There are already indications of a measure of collaboration developing between the Philippines and Indonesia in resisting the formation of Malaysia. It is a collaboration which we should do nothing to stimulate by inadvertent statements or actions. It is likely that Malaysia will come into existence some time next year. There are already feelers being put out for the establishment of an aid program from the United States. It seems to me, again, that we must resist this effort to deepen our commitment and, again, the key is to put restraints on our own bureaucratic eagernesses. It is one thing to provide loans to a nation such as Malaysia which is clearly a good risk or to send Peace Corpsmen to the remote areas of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo where a little technical knowledge can go a long way. But it is quite another thing to take on major and continuing tasks of military organization and supply and the internal development of still one more country in Southeast Asia, responsibilities which we assume in name at least and also to some degree in fact, every time we establish these aid-missions. It would seem appropriate that any continuing aid to Malaysia should remain the responsibility of the U.K. and the Commonwealth rather than being shifted to the United States. Viewing Southeast Asia as a whole, the situation is one of varying conditions of stability. The future of freedom in the area is far from certain. Except for some significant and effective French efforts in Cambodia and Commonwealth efforts in the Malayan situation, the principal externally borne burdens fall upon us. If we were to withdraw abruptly from beneath these burdens, there would be a major collapse in many places and what would follow is by no means certain. Obviously, much would depend upon the capacity and urge of the Chinese to move into the vacuum. We cannot afford to withdraw suddenly from these burdens. While we must make every effort to have others share them, we would, I believe, be deluding ourselves if we expected very much help from other outside sources in the near future. The real question which confronts us, therefore, is how much are we ourselves prepared to put into Southeast Asia and for how long in order to serve such interests as we may have in that region? Before we can answer this question, we must reassess our interests, using the words "vital" or "essential" with the greatest realism and restraint in the reassessment. When that has been done, we will be in a better position to estimate what we must, in fact, expend in the way of scarce resources, energy and lives in order to preserve those interests. We may well discover that it is in our interests to do less rather than more than we are now doing. If that is the case, we will do well to concentrate on a vigorous diplomacy which would be designed to lighten our commitments without bringing about sudden and catastrophic upheavals in Southeast Asia.
331. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, December 19, 1962, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/12-1962. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad. 604. Deptel 603./2/ All things are relative, and an "explosion" of the Vietnamese Armed Forces is not likely to take on the characteristics of a similar phenomenon occurring in the US military establishment. The word may be unfortunate but the objective, I think, is sound and essential: it is to get a relatively prompt return on the very substantial military investment that has been made here./3/ /2/Telegram 603, December 14, asked for a description and status of the Explosion Plan. (Ibid., 751K.5/12-1462) /3/Next to the first paragraph in the source text Heavner had written: "Shall we call it 'poof'." General Harkins and the rest of us have fostered and watched the really formidable build-up of Vietnamese military and paramilitary capabilities over the last year, and we are very conscious of the fact that these increased capabilities have not yet been fully used. There is no change in our (or GVN's) basic concept of operations. This basic concept remains that of extending the govt's authority and the services of govt throughout the country. The primary means of doing this continues to be the Strategic Hamlet Program in all its aspects. But the success of this program and the speed with which it proceeds depend absolutely on the parallel and coordinated military effort to destroy VC regular forces or, at a minimum, to keep them off balance. The explosion operation--for which we shall find another name and which is not to be advertised as a once-and-for-all nationwide offensive--is, we believe, a sound means of using to the fullest one of our major resources in the overall counterinsurgency operation. There is no detailed plan of operations as yet. Such a plan will only be developed as VC strongholds and units throughout the country are identified and marked by intelligence and operahona1 reconnaissance. After this has been done, there will be an effort to strike these strongholds and units simultaneously insofar as possible. There is no thought that this will be a one-time operation: what is involved is moving to a higher intensity of operations which it is recognized may have to be continued indefinitely. The emphasis will not be on large operations but rather on simultaneous or consecutive attacks on identified VC units with the forces required for each. There is no possibility, we recognize, of achieving strategic surprise. There is no thought of diverting resources from clear-and-hold operations or the Strategic Hamlet Program. On the contrary, a fuller employment of available forces should bring more rapid progress in overall pacification. In short, I believe this concept is sound and psychologically necessary at this juncture. The concerns registered in reftel we have very much in mind and will try to guard against them. This is not meant to be a dramatic operation but it appears timely and necessary in the near future to spur on a sustained, vigorous offensive. The forces and organization on our side are ready for this, or nearly so, and the VC are hurting. I feel strongly that we should not hold back from trying to exploit these factors to the utmost. In conversation with Diem today touching on this question, I gathered that he is also thinking in the terms indicated above, and that, having achieved something in the nature of a national mobilization, he too is eager to pursue the present advantage. To be clear, I should like to repeat that we should be very careful not to bill this concept or operation as the final climax of the struggle here. General Harkins concurs with the above./4/ /4/On the source text between the last line of text and the signature Heavner had written: "Oh alright already." Nolting
332. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)/1/ RFE-66 Washington, December 19, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret; Noforn. Signed by Hilsman. A stamp on the source text shows that it was received by the NSC on December 26. Copies were also circulated to the Special Group (CI) on December 31. Also printed in part in Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 451-453. SUBJECT The strategic concept for South Vietnam calls for military, political, economic, and social actions on such a scale and so coordinated as to constitute a national response to the Viet Cong challenge. Broadly, the concept calls for: 1) developing military and para-military counterguerrilla
capabilities; There appears to be no reason as yet to question the soundness of the concept. But there is a very real question as to how well and wholeheartedly it is being put into effect. The purpose of this paper is to assess the implementation of the concept during 1962. Counterguerrilla Capabilities This phase of the concept is relatively separable and non-political and the one in which direct US aid and advice play the largest role.
There has been notable progress in improving counterguerrilla capabilities, largely as a direct result of US military aid and advice. --Vietnam's forces are now supplied with the weapons and instructed in the tactics suitable for counterguerrilla warfare. --US helicopters and radios have vastly improved Vietnamese tachca1 mobility. --Vietnamese forces are beginning to engage the Viet Cong in small-unit achons. Night operations, though skill limited, are increasing. --Nearly 2,000 US-trained Montagnards are now conducting armed patrols designed to provide intelligence and, to some extent, to interdict Viet Cong access routes through Laos. --Self Defense Corps and Civil Guard units have been roughly doubled in the past year and are being further expanded in order to provide local defense to the strategic hamlets. --During September and October, the GVN forces were able for the first time to capture more weapons from the Viet Cong than they lost
These increased capabilities, however, have not yet been exploited as effectively as they might be. --GVN military forces continue to rely heavily on large-scale operations and conventional tactics. --Excessive use of air strikes in the absence of ground contact with the enemy continues to kill a lot of innocent peasants. --Inadequate delegation of authority and political interference by the Vietnamese leadership has restricted initiative in the field. --Independent and offensive deployment of Civil Guard and SDC units has weakened strategic hamlet defense and produced heavy casualties. Isolating the Viet Cong and Winning the Peasants Establishment of strategic hamlets and systematic military-political pacification are distinct but necessarily integrated phases of the strategic concept. The purpose of these measures is to isolate and protect the peasants from the Communists, to gain their support in the counterguerrilla effort, and, ultimately, to produce lasting political and socio-economic gains at the local level.
The government has given high priority to the strategic hamlet program which since March has been progressively infused with a systematic military-political pacification effort. --According to the GVN, more than 3,500 strategic hamlets have been completed, more than 2,000 are under construction. The current rate of construction is 300-400 a month. It is not certain, however, how much of the strategic hamlet program has been carried out. In many, nothing seems to have been done but to construct a barbed wire or bamboo fence. --The hamlets have become a major Viet Cong target, suggesting that Viet Cong feel that their access to the people is being threatened. However, we cannot generalize about the success with which hamlets have withstood Viet Cong attacks. --In March 1962 President Diem approved the "Delta Pacification Plan"/2/ which provides for a systematic military-political pacification of eleven provinces integrated with the strategic hamlet program. Similar plans have since been drawn up for individual provinces elsewhere. Pacification operations are actually in progress in six provinces--Binh Duong (Operation Sunrise, later expanded to parts of Tay Ninh and Phuoc Tuy), Phu Yen (Operation Sea Swallow), Binh Dinh (Operation Let's Go), and Quang Ngai (Operation Royal Phoenix). Plans for four more provinces (Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Binh, and Long An) have recently been approved. /2/See Document 51. --Preliminary results of the integrated pacification programs are encouraging. The strategic hamlets in these areas are generally well organized and defended. Considerable effort is being devoted to follow-up social and political measures aimed at improving the lot of the peasants and developing their identification with the government's counterinsurgency effort. Peasant discontent over mistreatment, forced labor, and probably inadequate compensation has been reduced perceptibly in recent operations.
However, the hamlet program on the whole has been precipitous and uncoordinated and the pacification plans slow to be implemented. --Vietnamese leadership looks upon the strategic hamlet program as a panacea, and there is skill considerable confusion among local officials as to the objectives of the program and procedures for implementing it. --Strategic hamlets have been and are still being thrown together in the absence of a coordinated pacification effort, such as conceived in the Delta Plan, and with only perfunctory attention to defense, social, economic, and administrative improvements. In spite of government efforts to maintain standards and to provide personnel to administer such hamlets effectively, many are inadequately defended and few are providing benefits to the peasants. --Pacification operations have been applied to only six of the South Vietnam's 41 provinces and have been completed in none. Although Diem formally assigned top priority to the Delta Plan provinces in August, he has failed-probably for political reasons-to subordinate the strategic hamlet program to the Delta Plan and, indeed, to the general pacification effort itself. Assessment The GVN has developed an effective strategic concept for counterinsurgency and has in fact mounted a nabona1 effort to implement it. The principal defects appear to arise mainly from improper emphasis applied to various aspects of the concept. --The Army has overemphasized large-scale actions and the use of artillery and airpower, as compared with small-unit actions and intelligence collections. Although emphasis on patrols and ambushes appears to be increasing, continued and excessive use of air power and crop destruction-however well controlled-may well develop a militant opposition from the peasants and their positive identification with the Viet Cong. --The GVN has overemphasized the establishment of strategic hamlets per se and has only begun to fit them into integrated military-political pacification efforts. --GVN failure to emphasize political, social, and economic reform at the outset may deprive the entire effort of much of its impact. Much depends on the ability of the government to show convincing evidence of its intent to improve the lot of the peasants. Instead, government efforts appear to be aimed largely at increasing government control over the peasants.
333. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President/1/ Washington, December 21, 1962. /1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. INCREASE IN U.S. AIR FORCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM I attach a memorandum from Secretary Gilpatric to you recommending an increase in the U.S. air capability in South Vietnam. The memorandum also recommends an investigation of the possibility of obtaining Chinese Nationalist pilots to fly C-47 aircraft for the GVN. I understand that they are to be used only on transport missions thus releasing the SVN pilots now so engaged for combat. Although there are a number of Chinese Nationalists working for the GVN, none are pilots. Despite his worries about increasing U.S. military presence in South Vietnam at this time and the use of air power for strategic attacks on targets which are not clearly identified as solely Viet Cong, Governor Harriman approves Secretary Gilpatric's proposal. Governor Harriman believes that the proposal is justified, because close-in air support to the increased activities of the ARVN in defending strategic hamlets is essential to the success of the program. We are still very sensitive to the necessity of assuring that air strike targets are selected so as to minimize the adverse political consequences of killing uncommitted peasants. This is one of the problems which Roger Hilsman and myself will try to look into during our visit to South Vietnam./2/ /2/In January 1963. MVForrestal/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
[Attachment] Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President Washington, December 20, 1962. SUBJECT 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed two requests from the Commander in Chief, Pacific, both of which are related to providing additional combat air capability in support of military operations in South Vietnam (SVN). The first is a request for early augmentation of Farmgate by 18 aircraft (5 T-28s, 11 B-26s, 2 C-47s) and 117 USAF personnel (95 combat, 22 air base support). Farmgate is the current code name of the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron that you authorized on 11 October 1961 to be introduced into Vietnam./4/ The second request is for approval to initiate talks with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) on the subject of the use of Chinese Nationalists as Vietnamese Air Force C-47 pilots. /4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 156. 2. A review of operations by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and paramilitary forces for the past six months shows that practically all ground actions now are coordinated with some air support effort. This has resulted in continually increasing requirements for air support. Appreciation of the role of air support by the Vietnamese is evidenced by the increasing numbers of combat missions flown the past several months in support of convoys, strategic hamlet defense, heliborne assault, interdiction, conventional ground operations, and paramilitary operations. In September 1962, the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) fighter aircraft flew 620 combat sorties as compared with 150 combat sorties the previous January. This increase dramatically illustrates the growth in the number of air support sorties. The impact of these increasing requests for air support has been so great that requirements exceed the combined capabilities of the VNAF and Farmgate. In fact, CINCPAC states: "We are daily losing opportunities to destroy Viet Cong due to inability of VNAF to answer valid requests for air strikes. This situation results primarily from VNAF pilot shortage. Farmgate pilots are being overflown averaging 100 hours per month and cannot fill the gap." Farmgate, and for all practical purposes the VNAF, has reached optimum operating capabilities. Their combined efforts are not able to fill all valid requests for air support. 3. During the next several months, which CINCPAC states will be critical, the need for air support is expected to continue to increase because of the following factors: a. Increase in offensive operations as the Vietnamese forces continue to become more active and aggressive. b. The addition of the ninth division to the Army by the end of 1962, and the steadily expanding capabilities of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. c. Increased number of air mobile operations made possible by the recent addition of two helicopter companies. d. Support of President Diem's nation-wide offensive planned for early 1963. e. Expansion of the Citizens Irregular Defense Groups and paramilitary programs. f. Improvement in weather which favors military operations supportable by air. 4. In addition to the above, General Harkins visualizes dispersal of certain strike teams for air support into three areas of SVN. This decentralization is designed to provide an air strike capability in each of these areas and thereby decrease the reaction time for air support. In the past, the majority of Farmgate aircraft have been concentrated in the Saigon area due to limitations in maintenance, availability of pilots, and equipment. As a result, penalties have been paid in terms of targets lost and slow reaction times. The dispersal of strike teams will alleviate this problem, but at the same time will increase the requirement for facilities, pilots, and equipment to accomplish the air support role. Therefore, to meet increasing requirements for air support which will be necessitated by the foregoing developments, additional air support capability is needed now in SVN. 5. The continual growth of coordinated ground and air operations induced by the increasing numbers of heliborne operations and the steady increase of air support capabilities in SVN over the past year has been instrumental in producing a unifying effect within the RVNAF. Prior to the influx of air support/heliborne operations, military planning on the part of the Vietnamese forces basically was isolated, noncoordinated, "do what you can" action with very little rapport between the armed forces and other elements of the GVN. With the continuing growth of air capability, there has been a marked improvement in coordinated military planning and in the use of all national resources. Significantly, the growth of air support and heliborne operations has given U.S. advisors a firm entree into RVNAF planning and has resulted in a marked increase in military initiative and successes. This entree must continue to be exploited. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed the requirement for air support in SVN. It is our opinion that the requirement will increase in the next few months as set forth by CINCPAC and that every reasonable effort should be expended to insure that adequate and timely air support is available for current military and paramilitary operations as well as for the planned nation-wide offensive. Recognizing the concern over direct U.S. commitment in SVN, we have examined a number of possible solutions. It is considered that actions now underway to increase VNAF pilot training and aircraft equipage ultimately will make possible the desired reductions in direct U.S. commitment. Programs are now underway to increase Vietnamese student pilot training and to provide additional combat aircraft phased with the expanded pilot output which will result. Currently student pilots total 131 for fixed wing aircraft and 66 for helicopters. In about 12 months it may be possible to reduce U.S. participation in combat close support operations (Farmgate) as this new group of Vietnamese pilots becomes operationally ready. The extent of this reduction will depend on the extent of the need for Farmgate aircraft to train the VNAF in special tactics and on the number of valid air support requests as ground operations expand in the coming months. CINCPAC does not at this time foresee a need for further Farmgate augmentation beyond that recommended herein. 7. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, the overriding conclusion is that an immediate increase in the air support capability is needed and should be provided without losing sight of the necessity for continuing to increase the capability of the VNAF to fill Vietnamese air support requirements. From our review of possible methods of increasing air support capabilities immediately, we conclude that the most favorable options are those recommended by CINCPAC: immediate augmentation of Farmgate as outlined in paragraph 1 and introduction of 30 Chinese Nationalist pilots. We anticipate that the latter could not be realized as an increase in RVNAF capabilities earlier than four months after initiating discussions with the GVN. 8. Therefore, I recommend that you approve the augmentation of Farmgate as requested by CINCPAC and initiation of discussions with the GVN on the possible use of 30 Chinese Nationalist pilots to fly transport aircraft in the RVNAF. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation./5/ /5/On December 31, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to Gilpatric stating that the President had approved the recommendations set forth in paragraph 8. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series) Roswell Gilpatric
334. Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner)/1/ Washington, December 27, 1962. /1/Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 22.1 Mansfield Visit to Saigon. Secret; Limit Distribution. SUBJECT According to Frank Meloy, who accompanied Senator Mansfield on his recent visit to Viet-Nam, the Senator's chief impressions of the Viet-Nam situation are as follows: 1. Senator Mansfield still believes that Diem is personally incorruptible. He sees no alternative to Diem, and feels we must continue our present policy. However the Senator was disappointed by Diem's two and one-half hour monologue during which the Senator got the impression that Diem is a good deal older and more withdrawn from reality than when he last saw him. The Senator was a little miffed because Diem insisted upon recounting the whole history of his regime as though the Senator were a stranger to the Viet-Nam situation. The Senator also got the impression that the Nhu's now had more real power than ever before, and he considers this unfortunate. 2. Senator Mansfield had an overall impression of having faced the same problems and the same kind of situation in 1954 and 1955. He feels we are in a sense back again in the beginning. 3. The Senator feels that in the years from 1955 through perhaps 1959 Diem failed to get rice roots support among the peasants, and that the early drive and enthusiasm which characterized his government was somehow lost. He believes the key to winning the present struggle is not just extending the authority of the government but the extension of popular support and acceptance of the government. The government must be closer to the people. 4. The Senator was extremely critical of the past AID program. He directed his criticism in particular against former USOM Director Arthur Gardiner, whom he regards as a "disaster". The Senator feels that part of the blame for the lost opportunity during the years 1955 to 1959 rests with our misguided AID program and our misdirected military training effort. (He feels the military training effort was misdirected in that it was aimed exclusively at meeting the threat of overt invasion from the north rather than the threat of guerrilla warfare.) 5. Nevertheless the Senator feels that the thrust of our present AID and military effort is right. He feels the strategic hamlet program may well succeed. He thinks we must continue our present efforts in pretty much their present form. 6. At the same time the Senator was dismayed by the prospect of huge and endless aid expenditures for Viet-Nam. He was not impressed by General Harkins estimate that the war can be won in one year--in fact, he was apparently annoyed by Harkins "undue optimism." 7. If the present effort in Viet-Nam fails, Senator Mansfield believes our only alternative is to attempt to neutralize the whole area. [end of document]
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