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Vietnam, June - December 1965 ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. ROLE AND THE DECISION TO EXPAND THE U.S. COMMITMENT, JUNE 13 - JULY 28 1. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Saigon, June 13, 1965, 7:15 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV, Cables (B). Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to JCS. MACJOO 20055. Subj: Concept of operations--force requirements and deployments, SVN. Ref: A. MACV 070335Z. B. CINCPAC 112210Z./2/ /2/Reference A is telegram MACJOO 19118, vol. II, Document 337. Regarding Reference B, see footnote 5 thereto. 1. There has been an extended exchange of messages regarding the VC/DRV threat, the requirement for US forces, the concept of their employment and the details of their deployment. MACV proposes to treat each of these matters in an effort to bring the picture into closer focus. 2. The threat. State message 2873, 11 June 1965,/3/ raises questions about MACV's current estimate of the seriousness of the situation in SVN. This message will be answered separately by Embtel reflecting MACV views. Suffice it to say that ARVN has lost five infantry battalions on the battlefield in the last three weeks while rising casualties and high desertion rates have caused a moratorium to be proposed in connection with the formation of new battalions. Thus, ARVN battlefield strength is declining in the face of DRV reinforcements and a VC offensive. It is MACV's considered opinion that RVNAF cannot stand up to this pressure without substantial US combat support on the ground. /3/See ibid., Document 337, footnote 3. 3. Force requirements. MACV has asked for added forces in ref A. These consist of two battalions to round out the 3d Marine Division, a ROK division, an airmobile division, the retention of the 173d Airborne Brigade, tactical fighters and a corps headquarters plus combat and logistic support forces. We have also flagged the possibility of additional forces. 4. Concept of employment. A. CINCPAC analysis of the situation and concept of operations is properly focussed upon the population--that is, upon the people. There is no doubt whatsoever that the insurgency in South Vietnam must eventually be defeated among the people in the hamlets and towns. However, in order to defeat the insurgency among the people, they must be provided security of two kinds: (1) Security of the country as a whole from large well organized and equipped forces including those which may come from outside their country. (2) Security from the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer. B. MACV is convinced that US troops can contribute heavily in the first category of security as in paragraph 4A(1) above, but that only the Vietnamese can make real progress and succeed in respect to the problem in paragraph 4A(2) above. Unfortunately, the ARVN is being drawn away from the people and their security in order to meet the challenge of the main force VC/DRV offensive. The best illustration of this point is the fact that the II Corps Commander has removed most of the troops from the province of Binh Dinh with its nearly one million people in order to defend the relatively less important province capitals of Kontum and Pleiku. Therefore, the MACV concept is basically to employ US forces together with Vietnamese airborne and marine battalions of the general reserve against the hardcore DRV/VC forces in reaction and search and destroy operations, and thus permit the concentration of Vietnamese troops in the heavily populated areas along the coast, around Saigon and in the Delta. C. We have tailored logistic support forces to provide for some tactical flexibility so that forces may be shifted in accordance with the strength and movement of the VC. Continuous adjustments and redistributions undoubtedly will be necessary. It is likely that the war will continue to become more fluid and more mobile. We believe that the major bases at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh and Saigon-Bien Hoa provide the backbone support on which mobile forces can be supported and from which they can maneuver. D. It is not our concept that the US would take exclusive control of responsibility for any entire province although, in practice, only token GVN forces might remain. Thus generally, we must match our forces with the territorial organization of the GVN. We must strengthen and support the RVNAF structure to keep it alive and operative. We should generally concentrate US forces away from major population centers and whenever possible do the bulk of our fighting in more remote areas. 5. Deployments. A. MACV recognizes that the in-country location of ground combat forces has a bearing upon the size, nature and location of logistic support forces, ports, airfields and related facilities. For this reason, MACV has indicated from time to time the proposed initial location of the combat forces for which requirements have developed. However, as the number of combat forces requested and required increases and the number of combinations and permutations regarding location correspondingly increases, we rapidly approach a point where everyone will be confused and no useful purpose will be served. B. The VC are now maneuvering large forces up to reinforce regiments equipped with heavy weapons. Thus, we are approaching the kind of warfare faced by the French in the latter stages of their efforts here. It is entirely possible that the DRV can and will deploy three or more divisions into South Vietnam by infiltration. It is highly likely that one is already here. Therefore, it will be necessary to react to the introduction of DRV forces and to the shift and tactical play of the VC. Thus, tactical dispositions will change and only the major bases will be fixed. In short, we will be conducting mobile warfare from fixed and defended bases. Some of these bases will be major logistics centers at ports and airfields such as Chu Lai and Cam Ranh. Others will be tactical bases such as An Khe or Pleiku, the tactical bases will move as necessary and that may be with some frequency as the battle develops. C. With these thoughts in mind, a MACV review of the tactical situation corps-by-corps will indicate the probable deployment of required US forces: (1) I Corps. This corps is highly vulnerable to the introduction of DRV forces. It has virtually no reserve and is barely able to hold the major population centers, province and district towns. We believe that the 3d Marine Division augmented by two battalions as recommended can provide adequate reserve reaction forces for I Corps at the present level of VC activity. With a full division, the equivalent of one BLT will be available for employment throughout the corps in a reaction role away from the base area. (2) II Corps. This corps has a hopelessly large area to cover with the meager forces available. Additionally, the Vietnamese have a fixation on the importance of Kontum and Pleiku, probably derived from the history of the Viet Minh war. Recently, the corps commander has denuded Binh Dinh Province (with nearly a million inhabitants) in order to reinforce Kontum with two marine battalions. The VC control Phu Yen Province except for Tuy Hoa itself and, as reported earlier, the 325th Division may be deployed in Kontum, Pleiku and Phu Bon. The 23d Division is scattered so widely that it cannot react in strength to VC attacks against isolated province capitals and district towns. We are greatly concerned that such towns as Ham Tan in Binh Tuy and Gia Nghia in Quang Duc and even Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan may be attacked. Corps commanders without adequate reserves have shown conclusive evidence that they will move timidly and too late in a piecemeal manner upon the event of a VC heavy attack. This is resulting in the loss of ARVN battalions faster than they can be organized, trained and equipped. II Corps requires heavy reinforcements. We have asked for an infantry brigade, an airmobile division and a ROK division. We would generally employ these forces as follows: (A) The ROKs appear to be sensitive to the possibility of heavy casualties and would be pleased, we believe, to take over the security mission at the major logistic bases of Cam Ranh and Qui Nhon. Although two RCTs are not required for the defense of Qui Nhon, they can profitably be used there to extend the secure area and reinforce the ARVN in that populous and important province. If only one ROK RCT becomes available, we would employ it to relieve the 1st Division Brigade at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh. (B) Having been relieved by the ROKs of the security of Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh, we visualize the employment of the 1st Division Brigade in the general area of Highway 19 west of Qui Nhon toward An Khe. The security of Route 19 is important not only in the event of the deployment of major US forces on the high plateau, but is equally essential for the support of the population in that area and for the delivery of POL for current combat operations. The fact is that Highway 19 must be kept open. There is no feasible way into the high plateau from north or south. If the plateau is abandoned, it will form the first significant territory of the NFLSVN and will be recognized and supported by China through Cambodia. (C) We believe that Route 19 and the Pleiku-Kontum area present a challenge which must be met. We do not believe that the RVNAF can do the job. If the VC elect to fight a major campaign for Route 19 with DRV or VC forces, this is as good terrain as any, and better than most, on which such a battle should take place. It is vastly preferable to the populated lowlands. The problem in Vietnam has always been one of finding, fixing and fighting successfully the elusive VC. If Route [garble--19] becomes a magnet, it tends to solve several of these problems. With the mobility, communication and firepower of the air assault division supported by tactical air, we believe the battle of the road will be won and that the road can be used by the division. The division can be supported over the road for the bulk of its requirements, and can be backed up as necessary by a C-130 squadron on a contingency basis, augmented by C-123 and Caribou, as well as Chinook helicopters which are organic to the division. The air assault division consumes POL, ammunition, food and miscellaneous supplies at a rate which varies from 600 tons at the maximum to 100 tons or less at the minimum. When all aircraft are flying at the maximum rate and ammunition expenditures are the highest conceivable in this kind of war, the division might hit the 600 ton requirement. If on the other hand it is necessary to pull in the belt--defend the hard bases, curtail both flying and shooting--then the consumption comes down dramatically. In short, the division can subsist easily on air resupply while relatively inactive and yet defend itself. We would have a corps force with one US and one ROK division operating in the northern half of II Corps. This would permit the regrouping of the 22d and 23d Divisions so that more ample coverage could be provided in the south and would provide the kind of reaction force required to meet and defeat major VC attacks. The foregoing deployment relates to the situation as we know it now. If that situation changes or additional forces are introduced by the DRV, these forces will be shifted correspondingly. (3) III Corps. This corps is extremely weak on its northern and eastern flanks and has inadequate reserves to react to heavy VC attacks particularly in isolated areas. The VC attacks in Phuoc Long Province on 10 and 12 June illustrated the dire consequences of a piecemeal commitment of small battalions against a VC regiment in an intelligence vacuum. There are no prospects of additional ARVN forces in the near future. Thus, we foresee the eventual requirement for a full US division northeast of Saigon to meet the VC threat as it is now constituted. In the meanwhile, we wish to retain the 173d Airborne Brigade after the arrival of the brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. If for some reason the airmobile division is not deployed, we would station one of the airborne brigades at Pleiku. (4) IV Corps. At the moment, this corps is standing on its own two feet. The terrain in IV Corps lends itself to the full use of air mobility and the absence of cover compounds the difficulty of the VC. The units of the 7th and 21st Divisions have attained a high state of morale and certain units have achieved an outstanding record against the VC. We consider that, although the margin is favorable, it is certainly thin. Whether or not US forces will be required in this area cannot now be forecast. 6. The VC are destroying battalions faster than they can be reconstituted and faster than they were planned to be organized under the buildup program. The RVNAF commanders do not believe that they can survive without the active commitment of US ground combat forces. The only possible US response is the aggressive employment of US troops together with Vietnamese general reserve forces to react against strong VC/DRV attacks. To meet this challenge successfully, troops must be maneuvered freely, deployed and redeployed if necessary, and the challenge of Highway 19 and the high plateau must be met.
2. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 13, 1965, 10:20 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, Hue, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 4173. Part I. Curious calm has settled over Saigon in wake of military's return to power. No one (including military) appears to have clear idea what form new govt will take, and for the moment, Suu, Quat and his Ministers rest in place in caretaker capacity. Key civilian and military leaders did not meet on either Saturday or Sunday/2/ to discuss policies, governmental structure or personnel thus there have been no significant developments since Friday night. Quat, Do and Tuyen all gave impression they feel they are still very much in picture and in position strongly to influence final outcome. (A very definite element in our ability to obtain information is what Bui Diem frankly expressed to me the other day as the real sense of shame from Quat on down that they have not been able to make a go of civilian government.) /2/June 12 or 13. Civilian politicians are beginning to stir somewhat and their activity should increase sharply within next few days as they attempt to sell themselves or their favorites to Generals committee (in first instance Thieu and Ky) as ministerial material. Within military group there does appear to be some ferment. Some of younger officers apparently feel that Quat's invitation presents them with opportunity to bring about "real" revolution which they feel has been denied people ever since November 2, 1963. This group seems to include VNAF Commander General Nguyen Cao Ky, DGNP Lt. Colonel Pham Van Lieu and perhaps I Corps Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi. They may be reinforced in their thinking by such civilians as Dinh Trinh Chinh (Info Minister), Tran Quang Thuan, Bui Tuong Huan and possibly Bui Diem. As yet it is not possible to know precisely what form of govt will satisfy needs of "real" revolution, but as outlined roughly to EmbOffs by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Tran Quang Thuan, it will be lean, simplified and authoritarian, led by younger men with prime purpose of gearing nation for war. Noteworthy to us that such govt appears to have appeal to such disparate types as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on one hand and Tri Quang on other (see Hue tel 215 rptd Dept 4162)./3/ /3/Telegram 4162 from Saigon, June 12, repeated telegram 215 from Hue to Saigon, June 11, which reported on a conversation with Tri Quang on June 11. Tri Quang indicated that if Quat could not survive the political crisis without making concessions to the opposition, he felt that the military should take over again. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV) While it remains too early to assess with any precision the extent to which this ferment is widely shared among key individuals, there are certain characteristics to the attitude which might be noted: (a) its proponents are younger men who tend to be from the center or north and to share an intellectual affinity with Thich Tri Quang; (b) the attitude is strongly nationalistic with overtones of xenophobia; (c) it has a sense of disillusion with what is regarded as recent experiment with more democratic way of life, it desires to see concrete results rapidly taken through decisive governmental action; (d) it is, therefore, authoritarian; (e) it tends to oversimplify difficulty of complex questions and ability of antiquated bureaucracy to perform. In short, this attitude is, as it claims, both revolutionary and ultranationalistic, holding belief common in underdeveloped world that decisive action must be taken by governmental decision without undue concern for counter considerations. Such government likely be hard on local ethnic Chinese and French interests. It would be hard on "Sudistes" particularly French educated "bourgeois". Catholic attitudes in turn likely be shaped by degree government able effectively prosecute war plus indications of govt attitude towards them. It would probably present some difficulties in its relations with USG and from standpoint US public opinion. It remains to be seen, however, whether attitude is really dominant, if it is, whether it can remain so, whether it can successfully handle opposition it will tend to create, and whether it can produce results it demands. Most likely prospect is that strong revolutionary flavor will be watered down when government attempts frame realistic goals and policies and galvanize torpid administrative apparatus. Part II. Embassy inclined to feel that "revolutionary" label might be useful device for new govt to adopt to help it overcome apathy which many of populace might feel at yet another governmental change. If govt can successfully sell itself as "revolutionary" and get off the mark with a specific program, it might well be in position to move somewhat more effectively toward solving many of nagging problems (e.g., conscription, rice deliveries, irresponsible press situation) which have plagued its predecessors. However, it in turn will continue to be plagued by the deep seated inefficiencies of the administrative structure. To be in position to do this, govt would need some new faces and probably a new chief executive. But it is hard to see who they might be. Although Quat might be retained in some capacity, if revolutionary label is to have currency at all, someone new must head the ticket, but the person has not yet emerged. Possible he does not exist. As for governmental structure, it seems likely, based on current fragmentary information, that revolutionary govt will have some things in common with Minh-Tho govt that held power from Nov 1963 to Jan 30, 1964. Differences are essentially that this time military committee superimposed over govt will be smaller, presumably more wieldy body, and that govt, on basis experience other govts since Nov 2, 1963, will not be as diffident as Tho govt of technicians. It essential that executive under military committee act without bucking every question to military for decision. For efficiency executive should be single individual rather than executive committee as some have proposed. As adjunct to this govt, we believe that religious council should be established. (Quat had intended to form such body with representation drawn from all major religious groups.) This consultative body would not act as a legislative body, but would be brought in to handle any incidents of religious friction and would have an advisory voice in the drafting of legislation affecting the religions. Hopefully it could to some degree develop as a forum in which inter-religious fears and suspicions could have some airing. (For the moment Catholics and Sudistes can be expected to scrutinize emerging government with wary eye. Catholics will be most unhappy if Thi-Ky-Lieu [Thieu] combination appears clearly to be dominant and consolidating their position, particularly in the security services, and if efforts are not made to appease their suspicions that anti-Catholic actions are in works. Southerners will tend to interpret developments as consolidation of north-center political control, unless there is reasonable regional/religious balance in eventual Cabinet. Same attitudes likely prevail among Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, although these groups will remain split in prevailing factions. In short, groupings opposition to Quat will remain potential opposition, depending on their assessment of strength of Generals' intentions, steps may be taken to appease their interests, and possible momentum shown by new government in prosecuting the war.) As for any type of legislative body, we feel that decision on this should be deferred. If, after its establishment, govt draws heavy critical fire from "out" politicians, it might prove useful to provide them with forum such as Council of Notables in which they can talk without being able to do much harm. For the future, we feel that govt should go on record promising elections to a constituent assembly in about one year's time in order channel energies of peripatetic politicians. Unless Dept has some reservations on any of foregoing points in Part II, we would propose to bring what influence we can bring to bear in bringing them about./4/ /4/In telegram 2899 to Saigon, June 14, the Department of State agreed with this line: "We have for long time felt need for some forward, progressive look in SVN Govt." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) Johnson
3. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, June 14, 1965, 8:50 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Vietnam I. No classification marking. Drafted in Ball's office. Pres. asked that somebody summarize the paper on the 12 or 13 diplomatic channels we had./2/ Mac Bundy had mentioned earlier in the day we were going to ask Bruce to talk to Wilson and bring them up to date. It might be wise to ask Bruce to have a breakfast meeting or some kind of meeting with Menzies to go over it with him. If they want us to get out of Viet-Nam we can get out and they'll be in a fix. Bill had told the President of the lunch today. It is essential we survive the monsoon; we're in a very precarious position. /2/Presumably a reference to the paper prepared by the Department of State on June 10 and entitled "Recent History of United States Negotiating Efforts in Southeast Asia." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV) Ball told the President he would have a memorandum for him in the morning along the lines of his talk with Moyers./3/ Bill Bundy had suggested on the thirteen points rather than give them out as a release, or to use as one paper against another, we might incorporate them in a speech during the week. Perhaps the Secretary could do it--a speech that will set forth what we have tried to do in context to have an impact. President mentioned that the Secretary was getting him together a speech for Monday/4/ but he hasn't got it yet. McNamara wanted to do one, but President told him it should come from either the President or the State Department. Ball mentioned his speech in Pittsburgh at this point. President asked that he be given a draft; if he can make it he will, or . . . President said he particularly liked what Ball has been doing--raising the red flag and saying we ought to give thought to different approaches, etc. Initiatives are necessary. Anything we can get together, they will be rewarded and not criticized. He mentioned having talked with Fulbright. Ball told him he was seeing Fulbright tomorrow. President asked that he get all of his views. He will talk to him before he sees Dobrynin (the Secretary) and tell him Fulbright's views. Fulbright thinks we should say to the Russians what can you live with? He thinks it will be Tito. He believes if they will call a meeting with the British there is a chance. We should tell him what we would like to do--"The Ball Plan"/5/--we will stop bombing if they will stop; we will be willing to meet and work out supervised elections through the UN and let the people have a choice. Fulbright is hypnotized by them now. There will be trouble if we don't take him with us. Ball said he would talk with him. President advised Ball get his plan ahead of time. Tell Mac to send the Tito memorandum of four or five weeks ago./6/ President didn't know how we could sell something like this in this country. Dick Russell will back us up, although he is afraid of the ground troop thing. Mansfield is unhappy. President told him he wanted a united front; he does not want to be a dictator. If they will write the policy the President will try to execute it; he will consider their thoughts. They could put in a resolution or whatever they want. If they get the Committee Members together we are willing to explain everything and provide them all the debate they want. President advised Ball to put it to Fulbright hard; he thinks he is ready to go with us; he just wants to have something after the monsoon. President told Ball to get anybody he wanted, either in the Government or outside. Pick up the phone and tell him you will send a plane and get him down here for a talk. /3/Apparently a reference to Document 7. /4/June 21. Presumably Johnson is referring to a draft of the speech he delivered in San Francisco on June 25; see footnote 3, Document 19. /5/See vol. II, Document 287. /6/Not further identified. President said he wanted to get off the San Francisco hook./7/ He doesn't want to go out there. He doesn't have enough to say to them in this frustrated period. He wants somebody to find a reason why he doesn't have to go. Mentioned again he had asked the Secretary to have a speech for him but he hasn't got it yet. He asked that Ball get this in his teeth and have some recommendations for him tomorrow. /7/See footnote 3, Document 19.
4. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, June 16, 1965, 5:20 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET. Top Secret; Exdis. CAP 65331. For Ambassador Bruce from McGeorge Bundy. The following message has been passed to Derek Mitchell for the Prime Minister: 1. The President is keenly interested in the Prime Minister's imaginative proposal for a mission of Prime Ministers,/2/ and has just asked me to make sure the Prime Minister has full information on the President's own thinking about Vietnam at this stage. It is obvious that it is of the highest importance for our two governments to mesh their decisions and statements with great care in order to get the full advantage of our respective actions. /2/See Document 6. 2. I think Bruce has already told you we cannot move up the proposed special bombing operation in South Vietnam without weakening the plans for a prompt follow-up on the ground. A postponement would be manageable, but does not seem to help the Prime Minister. Accordingly, we think it best to proceed on schedule, but we will quite understand if the Prime Minister thinks it wise to conduct his discussions with other Prime Ministers in such a way as to leave them in no doubt of his belief that the Americans are determined to make increasing use of appropriate conventional weapons against concentrations of Viet Cong armed forces. We will also make it clear that this operation and the London proposal are wholly separate and unrelated in their origins. 3. I think Ambassador Dean also knows in a general way of our thinking about additional ground force deployments. McNamara will today be explaining our existing decisions to enlarge our number of ground force battalions to 13, with supporting air and logistic strength such that the overall force strength in South Vietnam will be about 70,000. He will also explain that while no further decisions have been taken, we expect to do what is necessary in South Vietnam. Within the next week or so the President is likely to face decisions which may lead to further deployments which would bring total U.S. forces there to a level between 90 and 100,000. (This last figure is for the Prime Minister's private guidance only; it is obviously extraordinarily sensitive and could easily be changed upward or downward after further analysis here.) These deployments again are in response to the overall increase in Viet Cong numbers and activity which has been developing over many months. 4. It is also probable that as the monsoon season continues, General Westmoreland will find it necessary to use his discretionary authority to commit U.S. ground forces to supporting combat action. Such a commitment very nearly occurred in recent days in the area of Dong Xoai and might occur at any time from now onward. 5. The President continues to reject the proposals which are urged by some in this country for radical extension of the bombing operations against North Vietnam. In particular, the operations are still carefully limited to military targets in which danger to civilians is minimized. The President has never believed that bombing would bring Hanoi to the conference table on the run. He believes rather that the real contest is in the south and the purpose of the bombing has been to interfere with supply and support from the north, and to give clear evidence to both sides in the south of American determination and strength. These limited objectives are being met and no unlimited objectives are being substituted for them. 6. The President equally rejects the notion of withdrawal and abandonment. This is not a point which needs to be argued to the Prime Minister. 7. A third course of action is simply to allow the increasing efforts of the Viet Cong in the south to go without effective reply. This course has also been rejected. The increased efforts which we will be making will, however, remain within the framework of our determination to support and assist the Vietnamese themselves. 8. We have made repeated efforts to get this dangerous business into a conference room. The record of intransigence in Hanoi and Peking is clear, and our own judgment is that no different answer can be expected until after the monsoon fighting. Nevertheless, the President welcomes the readiness of the Prime Minister to make another try. The President fully agrees with the view of the Prime Minister and of Sir Robert Menzies that even if the mission fails in its immediate purpose, it should succeed in showing just where the responsibility lies. 9. So far, I have spoken of the President's own thinking. Let me, in closing, report that I talked with Oliver Wright about the cease-fire question which was discussed between the Prime Minister and Bruce. I have not yet had a chance to discuss this with the President, but my guess is that he would strongly prefer to have any explicit discussion in this area start from here. The great difficulty about a cease-fire is that the U.S. can easily stop what it is doing by a single order and the results can be seen immediately. Terror and subversion and infiltration are not so easily monitored. We keep a continuing review of the possibility of actions and proposals in this field, however, and we fully understand the importance which might attach to this question in the light of other events scheduled for June.
5. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 17, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text; the telegram was received at 10:01 a.m. and passed to the White House. On a copy of this telegram, which was retyped for the President's reading file, there is an indication in the margin that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II (A)) 4220. For the President. My first action upon returning from Washington was to seek out Prime Minister Quat, General Thieu and General Ky to find out the meaning of the action of the Quat government in returning political power to the military. I presume that you have seen the result of this interview reported in Embtel 4190./2/ In essence, a ten-man National Leadership Council initially composed entirely of Generals will oversee the affairs of the government. The chairman and head of state will be General Thieu, who was formerly Minister of Defense, and General Ky, former Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, will become Prime Minister with the long-handled title of "Commissioner in Charge of Directing the Executive Branch". Ky as de facto Prime Minister will form a Cabinet largely of civilians and present it for approval to the National Leadership Council. /2/Dated June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 VIET S) While there are some favorable aspects in this situation, I am disturbed by the selection of General Ky as Prime Minister. While he is a well-motivated, courageous, and patriotic officer who has matured considerably over the past two years, he is completely without the background and experience necessary for an assignment as difficult as this one. The American General officer closest to him describes him as "a proud man and a fine military commander, although a naive, inexperienced politician and civil affairs administrator. I believe he will do his absolute best to succeed in his new position, but he will require a lot of technical assistance, moral support and a normal amount of conscientious understanding." We will do our best to provide these missing ingredients./3/ /3/In his diary entry for June 21-27, Ambassador Taylor wrote: "General Ky seems to be serious about fulfilling his campaign promises to stir up the country and get it on a war footing. Impetuous as some of his actions have been, they seem to have the honest intent of energizing an apathetic people and creating an atmosphere of urgency where day-to-day routine has been the rule. With his hip-shooting tendencies, Ky is likely to continue to take ill-advised actions from time to time such as his breach of relations with France but it is just possible that he will be able to create a new outlook favorable to getting things done." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 52, T-272-69) Second only to the importance of the political situation is the military. As you know, the Viet Cong monsoon offensive is clearly on, marked by another large battle (as Vietnamese battles go) at the district town of Dong Xoai. As in the engagement near Quang Ngai on May 29, the Viet Cong here sought to destroy regular GVN forces and were willing to take heavy losses to accomplish this objective. They succeeded to the extent of about two battalion equivalents of GVN casualties. The performance of the Vietnamese troops in this very hot engagement appears to have been first rate. It is clear that the primary objective of the Viet Cong is to chew up the regular forces of South Viet-Nam and to cause their attrition to a point where major geographic objectives can be taken and held for considerable periods of time. They are counting upon the habitual reaction of the GVN to come to the aid of remote posts attacked in areas favorable to Viet Cong ambushes. Since GVN forces come by helicopter with limited cargo lift, inevitably they arrive piecemeal on the battlefield and too often suffer heavy casualties upon landing. As a result, over the past three weeks, the number of GVN ineffective units has risen from two regiments and three battalions to four regiments and nine battalions. Ineffectiveness is caused largely by under-strength conditions resulting from battle losses. General Westmoreland is thoroughly aware of the problem and is studying new tactics to cope with the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, they are presenting us with two alternatives, both unattractive, either to intervene piecemeal as in the past and take the casualties, or to concede the loss of remote towns difficult to defend. While these towns are not important in terms of population, the effect of abandoning them can have a serious effect on national morale. It is unfortunate that the present political instability and the Viet Cong offensive coincide with preparations for the Algiers conference which begins on June 29./4/ In anticipation of this meeting, there is no doubt that the Viet Cong will take every action possible to undermine GVN prestige and to bolster the appearance of strength and legitimacy of the Liberation Front. /4/The second Afro-Asian conference, originally scheduled for March 1965, after having been postponed several times, was scheduled to meet in Algeria on June 29, but it was ultimately postponed; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 636-643. Taylor
6. Editorial Note On June 17, 1965, the Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth, meeting in London, issued a statement indicating that a four-member mission, consisting of the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Ghana, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago, would make contact with the governments principally concerned with the problem of Vietnam in an attempt to establish the basis for a conference leading to a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. (Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts To Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Viet Nam, Cmd. 2756, page 90) Ambassador to the United Kingdom David Bruce was informed by Prime Minister Wilson of the impending initiative on June 16. Wilson assured Bruce that he would not be a party to any arrangement that was not satisfactory to the United States. (Telegram 6012 from London, June 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET) The White House responded on June 16 with a personal cable from McGeorge Bundy to Bruce (Document 4). The Commonwealth proposal was directed to Saigon, Hanoi, Moscow, Peking, and Washington. On June 22, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam welcomed the proposal for a visit by the Commonwealth mission. (Cmd. 2756, pages 99-100) The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China rejected the proposal, however, on June 23 and June 25, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also rejected it on June 28. (Ibid., pages 92-95, 101, 103-104) In the face of these negative responses, the proposal was ultimately dropped. Documentation on the proposal and the U.S. response to it is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
7. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV, Memos (D). Top Secret. For President Johnson's reactions to this memorandum, see Document 11. SUBJECT I. The Need To Keep Control Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote: "Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind." Your most difficult continuing problem in South Viet-Nam is to prevent "things" from getting into the saddle--or, in other words, to keep control of policy and prevent the momentum of events from taking command. The best formula for maintaining freedom of decision is (a) to limit our commitments in time and magnitude and (b) to establish specific time schedules for the selection of optional courses of action on the basis of pre-established criteria. II. Outline of Specific Proposals The North Vietnamese are apparently using the monsoon season as a test period to determine whether they can impose enough local defeats to demoralize the South Vietnamese and discourage the United States. I propose that we also treat the monsoon season as a test period since we do not yet have enough experience with the direct employment of American combat forces to appraise our chances for military success in the South. But in launching a vigorous effort to halt the Viet Cong offensive during the monsoon period you should at the same time make it clear to your key advisers that, at the conclusion of that period, we will take a serious look at our accumulated experience and decide whatever long-range course of policy or action is indicated. For the fact is--and we can no longer avoid it--that, in spite of our intentions to the contrary, we are drifting toward a major war--that nobody wants. I recommend, therefore, the following program: 1. Decide now to authorize an increase of American forces in South Viet-Nam to an aggregate level of 100,000--but no more--additional forces. These should be deployed as rapidly as possible in order to deal with the Viet Cong offensive during the rainy season. 2. Instruct your top advisers--limited in this case, for security reasons, to the Secretaries of State and Defense (and possibly also the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs): (a) that you are not committing US forces on an open-ended basis to an all-out land war in South Viet-Nam; (b) that instead you are making a controlled commitment for a trial period of three months; (c) that on the basis of our experience during that trial period we will then appraise the costs and possibilities of waging a successful land war in South Viet-Nam and chart a clear course of action accordingly; (d) that, during the test period, in publicly stating American aims and purposes, American spokesmen should emphasize our willingness to stay in South Viet-Nam so long as we are wanted (a qualification that has tended to become submerged in recent months); and (e) that, in carrying out this limited decision, your advisers should--during the three-months period--press the war on the ground in South Viet-Nam as vigorously as possible, while seeking quietly and effectively to avoid those longer-term actions and commitments that would reduce your freedom of decision at the end of the period. 3. Direct your top advisers to prepare the following plans: (a) A plan for continuing the land war in South Viet-Nam on a stepped-up basis; (b) A plan for conducting a vigorous diplomatic offensive designed to bring about a political settlement; and (c) Plans for bringing about a military or political solution--short of the ultimate US objectives--that can be attained without the substantial further commitment of US forces. These last should be regarded as plans for cutting losses and eventually disengaging from an untenable situation. The reasoning underlying these proposals and the manner in which they might be carried out are elaborated in the balance of this memorandum. III. Where We Are Now--On the Threshold of a New War In raising our commitment from 50,000 to 100,000 or more men and deploying most of the increment in combat roles we are beginning a new war--the United States directly against the Viet Cong. Perhaps the large-scale introduction of American forces with their concentrated fire power will force Hanoi and the Viet Cong to the decision we are seeking. On the other hand, we may not be able to fight the war successfully enough--even with 500,000 Americans in South Viet-Nam--to achieve this purpose. Before we commit an endless flow of forces to South Viet-Nam we must have more evidence than we now have that our troops will not bog down in the jungles and rice paddies--while we slowly blow the country to pieces. A review of the French experience more than a decade ago may be helpful. The French fought a war in Viet-Nam, and were finally defeated--after seven years of bloody struggle and when they still had 250,000 combat-hardened veterans in the field, supported by an army of 205,000 South Vietnamese. To be sure, the French were fighting a colonial war while we are fighting to stop aggression. But when we have put enough Americans on the ground in South Viet-Nam to give the appearance of a white man's war, the distinction as to our ultimate purpose will have less and less practical effect. Nor is our position in Viet-Nam without its historical ambiguities. From 1948-1954 we identified ourselves with the French by providing almost $4 billions of United States aid to help the French in Indochina wage war against the Viet Minh. As soon as our aid contributions began to mount, Ho Chi Minh denounced American "imperialism". This campaign of denunciation was continued over the radio and through other propaganda media after the French withdrew and we began to help President Diem. Today no one can say for certain how many Vietnamese are for us or against us. We have trouble collecting intelligence because few Vietnamese are willing to risk their necks to aid the American effort. And our popularity will diminish even further as we are forced to indulge in more and more area bombing, crop burning, etc. Ever since 1961--the beginning of our deep involvement in South Viet-Nam--we have met successive disappointments. We have tended to underestimate the strength and staying-power of the enemy. We have tended to overestimate the effectiveness of our sophisticated weapons under jungle conditions. We have watched the progressive loss of territory to Viet Cong control. We have been unable to bring about the creation of a stable political base in Saigon. This is no one's fault. It is in the nature of the struggle. The French had much the same experience. They quoted the same kind of statistics that guide our opinions--statistics as to the number of Viet Minh killed, the number of enemy defectors, the rate of enemy desertions, etc. They fully believed that the Vietnamese people were on their side, and their hopes received intermittent shots of adrenaline from a succession of projects for winning the war--the De Lattre de Tassigny Plan, the Salan Plan, the Navarre Plan, etc. This does not mean that we cannot succeed where the French did not; we have things running for us that the French did not have. But we cannot yet be sure--and that is the reason for the trial period. For we have not so far seen enough evidence to be sure that the South Vietnamese forces will stand up under the heightening pressure--or, in fact, that the Vietnamese people really have a strong will to fight after twenty years of struggle. We cannot be sure how far the cancer has infected the whole body politic of South Viet-Nam and whether we can do more than administer a cobalt treatment to a terminal case. Yet the more forces we deploy in South Viet-Nam--particularly in combat roles--the harder we shall find it to extricate ourselves without unacceptable costs if the war goes badly. With large forces committed, the failure to turn the tide will generate pressures to escalate. There will be mounting domestic demands that we expand our air attacks on the North so as to destroy Hanoi and Haiphong. Yet if our air attacks threaten the total destruction of the North Vietnamese economy, Red China can hardly help but react. And our best Soviet experts do not believe that the Soviet Union could stand down in the event that we became involved directly with the Chinese. IV. Courses of Action To Be Followed Dependingon Results of Test Period A. Actions if the Fight Goes Well. If--on a careful appraisal of all the evidence accumulated during the test period--you are satisfied that United States military power can stop and throw back the Viet Cong without unacceptable United States losses, you are then in position to decide on a longer-term aggressive strategy, of which the elements would be: (a) to commit whatever force is needed to do the job in South Viet-Nam as quickly and cheaply as possible; (b) to continue our air attacks on North Viet-Nam but avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and keeping well south of the Chinese border; (c) to renew your assurances to the South Vietnamese and the world of our intention to stay the course; and (d) to initiate the Acheson plan and increase our diplomatic probes through third parties and a judicious use of pauses--while encouraging efforts of friendly countries to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table. All of this is, of course, contingent on the continued maintenance of a minimum level of political stability in Saigon. B. Actions if the Fight Goes Badly. If the evidence accumulated during the test period provides no reasonable assurance that the United States can conduct a successful land war in South Viet-Nam without a vast protracted effort, you should seek means of limiting the American commitment and finding a political solution at a level below the total achievement of our declared objectives. There are several ways of achieving this--none fully satisfactory. But a good general picks his own terrain and is prepared to execute tactical redeployments when events require it. Similarly, it is a part of good statesmanship to cut losses when the pursuit of particular courses of action threaten (a) to lead to a costly and indeterminate result; or (b) to produce an escalation of violence that could result in a major war. The technique of cutting our losses requires intensive study. No one has yet looked at the problem carefully since we have been unwilling to think in those terms. I would suggest, however, that there are several alternative possibilities which should be carefully examined. (a) Reducing Our Military Commitment The first is to devise a plan for limiting the defense perimeter within South Viet-Nam to the cities and major towns--particularly those having access to the sea. This would deny to the Viet Cong the administrative, commercial and industrial heart of the country. (b) Letting Nature Take Its Course A second approach is subtly to withdraw moral and political support from the Government in Saigon. In this way the non-Communist and neutralist forces might be encouraged to work out some sort of compromise with the Viet Cong. Such an operation would require great finesse. However, the Saigon Government is becoming more and more a fiction--in real terms South Viet-Nam has an army but no government. While putting in train any operation of disengagement we should, of course, simultaneously take steps to strengthen our position in Thailand and to create a diplomatic atmosphere around the world that would minimize the costs of US withdrawal. To do this, we would rely heavily on the qualified nature of our commitment--to help defend the South Vietnamese so long--but only so long--as they wished our help. (c) Other Possibilities As a third possibility, we might consider variant means by which there might emerge a South Vietnamese determination to go it alone. One approach might be to encourage our friends to call for elections in South Viet-Nam in order to permit self-determination by a people engaged in civil war. Another might be to let our friends crank up a fourteen-nation conference. During the past weeks we have concentrated on seeking a political solution that would fully meet our stated objectives in South Viet-Nam. Such a solution will not be feasible so long as the Viet Cong are winning or believe they are winning. Since we cannot yet be sure that we will be able to beat the Viet Cong without unacceptable costs, we would be prudent to undertake an additional study of the political means to achieve less than a satisfactory solution--or, in other words, a solution involving concessions on our side as well as the Viet Cong. The above suggestions are of the most preliminary kind. I am sure that other possibilities could be developed. George W. Ball
8. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the President saw the memorandum. SUBJECT The Case for Such a Move 1. It will dramatize the good faith of our quest for a peaceful solution. 2. It will further shift the onus for continued hostilities to Hanoi and Peking, if they fail to respond with action. 3. It may allow the USSR increased leverage in pressing Hanoi towards negotiations, if any such inclination exists within the Soviet leadership. (Very doubtful, on the evidence of May.) 4. It will permit a more careful testing of Hanoi's interest in negotiations, if any such inclination exists. 5. It will meet one persistent demand of our domestic critics and waverers. 6. It will ease the mounting domestic pressures on our allies (primarily the British and the Japanese, but also the Australians and Canadians) to stop their support of our Vietnam policy. 7. It will meet some persistent objections of unaligned nations and leaders (primarily the Indians and U Thant). 8. It will somewhat de-fuse the Algerian meeting by strengthening our supporters and putting the heat on our adversaries. The Case Against Such a Move 1. It may cause deep apprehension of US determination in the already weakened Saigon Government. 2. It may allow Hanoi to catch its breath, repair damaged communications, and increase its assistance to the Viet Cong. 3. It may appear to the Communist side to be an admission of the ineffectiveness of the bombings and an indication of US desperation for "negotiations now." 4. It will arouse strong criticism among domestic hardliners--particularly among Republicans who are looking for a way to make capital out of any signs of our softness in Vietnam. 5. It might make a return to air-strikes difficult in the context of inevitable international pressure to make the suspension permanent. If US forces were to get hurt during a pause, we would be giving a dangerous opening for Mel Laird;/2/ people just wouldn't understand it. /2/Melvin R. Laird, Republican Representative from Wisconsin. McG. B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
9. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 21, 1965, 7:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:35 a.m. and repeated to Algiers, Bangkok, Bonn, Canberra, Djakarta, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Seoul, Tokyo, Vientiane, Wellington, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Hue. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 4312. Prospects for new GVN. 1. The new GVN which was launched on June 19 has made a fresh start with regard to the organization of political institutions, but it faces the same basic divisions of Vietnamese society which have proved the undoing of four previous governments. This message presents the Mission Council views of the assets and liabilities of the new government as well as its immediate prospects. On the positive side, the GVN begins its tenure with the following assets: (A) In breaking with past, GVN has eliminated not only older political institutions, but also the pressure groups which had grown up around them have been cut adrift, at least for the moment. Conspicuous example of this advantage is removal from scene of Phan Khac Suu and his entourage from a strong position of influence. (B) Military has accepted full responsibility for government although not excluding civilians from sizeable participation. Army represents country's principal base of power, and its engagement in political control and responsibility responds to reality of situation. Despite numerous changes of membership, organization of top Generals--as an entity--has maintained a high degree of unity and has been body of ultimate decision in Vietnam, providing country with its most important single institution of national cohesion since downfall of Diem regime. At least for the present, top Generals appear to retain this communal unity. Strength which this brings to government will make it somewhat more difficult for opposition groups to successfully attack government. (C) Desire for "revolutionary" government has been widely expressed especially among younger Generals and junior officers, bureaucrats and university youth. The program of action which GVN has announced should initially elicit support from such individuals and groups. Whether this support is retained will depend upon performance. As noted in septel,/2/ however, program of action strikes at interests of many powerful special groups, majority of whom will not view happily the prospect of being organized for greater service. /2/Presumably a reference to telegram 4311 from Saigon, June 21, in which Taylor analyzed the government's new 26-point program. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) (D) Cabinet is composed for most part of competent technicians, for the most part young, and in many cases dynamic. For example, the economic wing is in our judgment the most capable, experienced and highly motivated group to have served since November 1963 coup. Southerners are more widely represented in this cabinet than they were in the Huong and Quat governments, which may relieve some of sudiste sense of grievance. (E) Apostolic Delegate Palmas appears ready to play more active role in working to prevent Catholic involvement in civil disorders. This could make major contribution to easing political life for new government. (F) The new government has indicated its intention to act strongly and this no-nonsense attitude may also smooth its political way. If fears of military dictatorship do not rise above threshold point, reluctance of discontented individuals and groups to tangle with determined military leadership will be factor working to dissuade public disturbances. 3. On negative side, government starts with following liabilities: (A) A potential opposition grouping lies in the recent temporary alliance of Catholics with southern regionalists. This coalition might tend to regard present GVN as being in a sense Quat's spiritual heirs. One of major roots of Catholic enmity towards Quat had been belief that he was in league with leaders of central faction of UBA (Tri Quang-Thien Minh) and was consolidating his power through backing of coalition of Generals and police officials whose hostility towards Catholics they believed was clear. If it now appears to them that after Quat's removal, coalition behind him has moved to forefront of government, their discontent will continue. Some priests have in fact already made this interpretation. As yet, however, there are points that remain unclear about the new GVN, such for example as the precise position and conduct of Police Director Pham Van Lieu, whom Catholics regarded as important member of Thi-Ky coalition and whom they regarded as especially hostile to themselves. Furthermore, more active role by Apostolic Delegate as well as reluctance of such leaders as Father Hoang Quynh to see his people engage in confrontation with army itself are important moderating factors. Nevertheless, state of feeling against Ky personally and against new military government in general is high amongst Catholic extremists at this point. Attitude of sudistes not yet so clear. They are more prominently represented in present government than they were under Quat, including such key posts as Defense and Interior. This may remove some of edge from their feeling, although many will undoubtedly continue to resent large number of "carpetbaggers" who remain in positions of great power over them. However, still true that sudistes remain poorly organized and lack means (such as Phan Khac Suu as Chief of State) for bringing pressures to focus, although many of "politicians" among them would of course serve to swell ranks of opposition, if leadership were provided from somewhere else (for example, by Catholics). Furthermore political scene is clouded by extent to which Saigon intellectuals continue to enjoy conspicuous--and unmerited--influence. For these men as class, opposition politics is traditional--unless they should happen to find selves on inside of government--and political intrigue and maneuver are more important to them than war. To existing nucleus of opposition, new GVN may add other key groups if it presses its program of action vigorously. Such groups might include businessmen, some students and other youth, the wealthy, and possibly higher-level civil servants (see septel). (B) Organization of government especially at echelon involving senior Generals may well bog down in a structure of interlocking committees resulting in a diffusion of authority and responsibility. (C) If attempt is made to press 26-point program of action vigorously, not only will key groups be alienated, but there is real danger of serious administrative and economic dislocations. There is a finite limit on the number of programs which can be implemented simultaneously. (D) Although they have possessed the ultimate power of decision in Vietnam since downfall of Diem regime, senior military men have not proven their capacity to govern more effectively than civilians. In facing immediate problems of country, skill and finesse in governing will be at premium. (E) Abilities of Nguyen Cao Ky at this juncture are in question. He has created image of brash, courageous young officer, who has led squadrons on attack missions and who was apparently willing to employ air force against city of Saigon if necessary to break coup attempts. He will have difficult task in changing this image, which he will have to do if he is to acquire stature which Vietnamese people as whole will desire to see in their national leader. He clearly lacks experience in art of government, and until now has had no opportunity to demonstrate whether or not he possesses the qualities needed to make a good Prime Minister. His rise in the military does suggest that he possesses decisiveness and leadership abilities, both of which qualities are among the pre-requisites for being an effective PM. However, he was considered by his principal MACV advisor as a poor administrator. Furthermore, it should be noted that Ky's role, while obviously very important can still be overstated since it appears likely that Generals will continue to watch and moderate his actions as needed. This control may safeguard but it also may retard, depending on how it is applied. (F) By very fact of engaging itself so directly in responsibility of government, club of top Generals adds to divisive pressures playing upon it. As noted earlier, unity of this group as an entity has been a major factor in preserving unity of nation. Adding another element to centrifugal forces at work, is fact that grouping of central Buddhists has begun to zero in on General Thieu. Tri Quang as well as Thien Minh apparently intend to hold their fire, at least temporarily, probably because they do not wish to add to problems of government with which they are in sympathy. However, if things should go badly for Ky government, there is excellent chance that they would flex their muscles in center to make clear that they remain force to be reckoned with. (G) In addition to whole range of other problems, GVN must at same time face major military threat represented by VC monsoon offensive, perhaps supported by PAVN elements. 4. Prospects for new GVN. The range of problems confronting this government are formidable in number as well as in depth and complexity. Most important single factor in its success or failure will be degree of administrative and political skill which new government brings to bear in managing these problems. It is as yet too early to assess this element. The problems themselves are formidable. Opposition to previous governments has often been based less on what these governments have actually done than on fears (usually ill-founded) of religious and regional groupings as to what that government might do in future. These basic religious and regional antagonisms and divisions remain unchanged and constitute facts of life for this GVN as for any other. At present, as noted in foregoing, this government starts with Catholics predisposed against, UBA in favor (though opposed to Thieu); Sudistes probably against anything but pure Sudiste government, Centristes (following Tri Quang) in favor; Saigon politicians against (as they are against any government that excludes them from power). Because there are numerous uncertainties to present situation, there will probably be at least some period of time during which a wait-and-see attitude is adopted and during which certain of these predispositions may be hardened or possibly modified. If prosecution of war proceeds vigorously and effectively, this would mollify Catholic attitude, and would impress Buddhists also. Nonetheless, despite the inherent hazards that confront all governments in South Vietnam, and the strengths and weaknesses of this particular government, both of which have just been enumerated above, the present government is likely to be as good as can be reasonably expected at this juncture. At a time of increasing Viet Cong pressures, it also appears probable to us that the Generals are less likely than any purely civilian government to panic and abandon the war effort in favor of negotiations and neutralism. Accordingly, it will serve our best interests to strengthen, support and endorse this government. Summary: Four factors stand out as probably of determining importance to future of Ky government, apart of course from military operations. These are (1) extent to which the military remain unified and in support of Ky and his Cabinet and policies, (2) whether Ky can erase present image of bravado and shallowness and develop as leader of stature, (3) degree to which GVN can implement selected program having real importance to people, and (4) extent to which government succeeds in handling opposition groupings. Taylor [Next documents]
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