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10. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 21, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking. Attached is a note, dated June 21, which indicates that the President instructed his secretary to put Senator Wayne Morse's memorandum on his desk the next day, because "I've got to read that memorandum tomorrow." I think Morse's memorandum is tightly argued and complex,/2/ and if we answer it point by point at this stage, we will be almost sure to trip over ourselves as we make tactical decisions in the coming months. So it seems to me better to give him the soft answer which is suggested in the attached draft./3/ /2/Attached and printed below. /3/Attached but not printed. The draft response, which an attached note indicates Johnson approved, contains the assurance that "if, at any time, we think there is a real prospect of progress through the United Nations, we will be the first to move." And just because his paper is so well argued, I am sending a copy to Harlan Cleveland so that in anything we do we can take account of the possibility of flanking fire from Morse. McG. B. Attachment/4/ /4/No classification marking. SECTION I MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON 1. United States policies toward Vietnam should encompass at least the following essentials: (a) They should command widespread support and respect throughout the world and throughout the United States. This is not presently the case. (b) They must contemplate the cost of "victory" as well as defeat. The cost is already high and we have no sign of victory. (c) The United States will make a profound error if we do no more than prosecute the war. The longer it continues, the more likely it will escalate, and we cannot escalate it ourselves without China and Russia escalating their participation, too. It would be a very serious mistake to think the American people would support a stalemated ground war in Vietnam for a period long enough to force the Communists into negotiating. They refused to support that kind of war in Korea. It became a choice between going all out to win, or ending it on almost any terms. We alone cannot stop the war in Vietnam. But the United Nations could. The United States has more to gain from a U.N.-imposed peace than from a continuation of the fighting, leading we know not where. It is frequently alleged that the United States has three possible courses of action in Vietnam: to escalate, to get out, or to stalemate the issue until the other side gets tired. But there is another course of action which is positive in a world framework, even if the short range effects in Vietnam may be difficult, embarrassing, and involve loss of face. This course is for the United States to call on the United Nations to make the Vietnamese war its business. More is involved than suggesting that the Secretary General visit Hanoi and Peking. What is required is a specific application of U.N. procedures. 2. If we have a desire and determination to use the United Nations as prescribed in the Charter, there are many ways in which it can be done. If we desire only to make a gesture to the U.N., there are many ways in which we can make sure our gesture is rejected. On the record, our unilateral action has served to spread both the war and the degree of Communist control in South Vietnam. It is a real question whether the United Nations could do more poorly than we have done, if it is our objective to keep the peace and to forestall Communism. 3. Because North Vietnam--a non-member of the U.N.--said U.N. action was "inappropriate" in no way affects the jurisdiction of the Security Council or the General Assembly over any situation that threatens the peace. To give a veto to North Vietnam over this matter is a travesty on the power of the United Nations. Those of us who were here when President Truman rallied the United Nations in 1950 to throw back aggression in Korea remember that even the opposition of the Soviet Union did not stop us. She walked out of the Security Council and in her absence it took up the breach of the peace in Korea. When Russia came back and used her veto on the implementation of the decision to intervene, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, and it acted. North Korea was not invited to take part in the discussions, and she did not ask to take part; that did not deter the U.N. from acting. Like North Vietnam, North Korea was not a U.N. member. North Vietnam, mainland China, and South Vietnam are not members of the United Nations. None should be accorded a veto over prospective United Nations action in Southeast Asia, either by declining to take part in its discussions or by opposing what is proposed. 4. We could request the Vietcong to join us, South Vietnam, and possibly North Vietnam in negotiations. The use of acceptable mediators and conciliators could be discussed. The terms of the Charter provide certain steps to be taken when breaches of the peace occur. The first is Article 33: "1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. "2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." Our offers to negotiate with North Vietnam and with China have not been accepted. However, the Vietcong is a principal party to the dispute in South Vietnam, and until we offer to negotiate with them or undertake with them any of the other means of settlement above, we have not really explored the possibilities of this Article. Moreover, China could be left out of arrangements under this Article since she is not a party to the dispute. 5. Article 34 describes the jurisdiction of the Security Council: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Obviously, the war in Vietnam qualifies for at least "investigation" by the Security Council. Article 35 continues: "1. Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. "2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations to pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. "3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12." There is a considerable movement afoot among members of the British Labor Party to induce the British Government to act under this Article to put the Vietnam war before the Security Council. Article 99 of the Charter also empowers the Secretary General to bring before the Security Council a dispute he regards as a potential threat to peace. Since members, non-members, and the Secretary General all have the right to do it, the United States would be in the best position if it acts to seek U.N. jurisdiction before someone else does it and, in effect, makes the United States a defendant in the matter. 6. If we fail to get discussions, we should invite the Vietcong, North and South Vietnam to join us in laying the dispute before the Security Council. Article 37 is a clear statement of American obligation if we fail to settle the Vietnam problem by peaceful means of our own choosing: "1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. "2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute in fact is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate." Very likely the Vietcong and North Vietnam will never join us in referring the war to the Security Council. But they are not U.N. members, and we are. They do not claim to stand for the rule of law in the world, and we do. They could not muster anything like the support in the U.N. that we could. Like North Korea, they probably would not appear at all. But it is their objective to take control of territory they do not now control; and it is our objective to keep them out. A peace-keeping mission of the U.N. could very likely do more to achieve our stated objective than we are doing. 7. Public notice should next be served that we intend to lay the Vietnam war before the Security Council under Articles 35 and 37. Then we should engage in some realistic private talks with the Russians over what kind of U.N. action they would support, making it clear that if we fail to get Security Council action, we will go to the General Assembly. 8. As with many legislative matters, this is one of whether we want "an issue or a bill." If we want a "bill," in the form of U.N. action, we would have to deal with the other powerful U.N. members--chiefly Russia and France--to work out a United Nations program which they at least would not veto. After all, the Soviet Union did not veto the Cyprus peace force. And there is every reason to think Russia is anxious to see the Vietnam war brought under control so she will not continue being forced to come to the support of a sister Communist state. It is worth a great deal to us to find out whether Russia is interested in a U.N. jurisdiction over the war in the form of a peace mission that would stop it, or more interested in her rivalry with China over who does more to aid wars of liberation. Some say that bringing it up in the U.N. would force Russia to take China's part and drive them closer together. That is an excuse, not a reason. The longer the war continues, the more involved Russia must become simply because of her rivalry with China. 9. If we do find that Russia prefers the war to continue, or if France or Nationalist China poses some insurmountable obstacle, we can still go to the General Assembly. We have done it before, both with Korea and the Congo. 10. There is nothing in such a policy that would be inconsistent with our commitment of support to South Vietnam. Article 51 of the Charter affirms the right of individual or collective self-defense-- "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." We can help South Vietnam until the U.N. acts to restore peace. Moreover, our 1954 commitment was from an American president to a South Vietnamese president. It is not a treaty; but the American commitment to the U.N. Charter is a treaty. Our commitment to South Vietnam called for U.S. aid, meaning foreign aid, and we extended it "provided your government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied." The Government of South Vietnam was unable to fulfill its obligations. Yet we went infinitely beyond our obligation, into co-belligerency. By so doing, we have become involved in a situation that brings us under those provisions of the United Nations Charter to which I have referred. SECTION II SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE WHITE HOUSE POLICY At the risk of being presumptuous, I respectfully submit the following language for the President to consider using in his address in San Francisco./5/ /5/See footnote 3, Document 19. "I stand here today to rededicate the United States of America to the principles and purposes of the United Nations. I propose to do this not by word, but by deed. "Today there rages in Indochina an undeclared war. Some call it a civil war. Others call it a war of aggression. Others call it a war of liberation. "I care not what it is called. It is war. It can spread and destroy all man has built. Men and women and children are dying. Passions are rising, uncontrolled. "The United States is involved in this war. Let there be no mistake, the United States can win it. We believe great and fundamental issues are involved that may affect the future of mankind and the direction in which he grows. We believe that the independence of all small states is involved in Vietnam. "But we are ready to be judged by the conscience of mankind as represented in the United Nations. "I am, therefore, calling on the Security Council of the United Nations (Articles 34, 35 and 37) to vest itself of the situation in Vietnam as a 'dispute or situation . . . likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security . . .' "I also take this occasion to state that my government will abide by such decision as may be taken by the Security Council. I go further and say that if the Security Council should not be able to resolve the war in Vietnam, my government will call for a Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and place the situation before that body of world conscience. We will abide by its recommendations. "Finally, I have ordered the military forces of the United States to suspend all air and naval attacks north of the 17th parallel for a period of one month while the United Nations considers the threat to the peace implicit in the situation in Vietnam."
11. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)/1/ Washington, June 21, 1965, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Vietnam I. No classification marking. Transcribed by Jacquelyn Taylor in Ball's office. Moyers said the Pres had read the V-N memo/2/ over the weekend at Camp David and they had talked about it at lunch today. The Pres agrees in substance with most of the memo--one or two slight changes possibly. /2/Document 7. Following are notes taken by Moyers as stated by the Pres: "I don't think I should go over 100,000 but think I should go to that number and explain it. I want George to work for the next 90 days--to work up what is going to happen after the monsoon season. I am not worried about riding off in the wrong direction. I agree that it might build-up bit by bit. I told McNamara that I would not make a decision on this and not to assume that I am willing to go overboard on this--I ain't. If there is no alternative, the fellow here with the program is the way I will probably go." Ball asked Moyers if he had mentioned to the President about his request for a legal memo re V-N./3/ Moyers had forgotten to ask the President about it but said he would this afternoon. /3/See Document 24.
12. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 22, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:51 a.m. 4336. For the President. The new Ky government is now in office following the promulgation of a new charter on June 19,/2/ which states that, until a permanent Constitution can be established, the sovereignty of Viet-Nam is temporarily vested in its armed forces. On the same day, General Ky announced his Cabinet and an ambitious and "revolutionary" 26-point program of action./3/ /2/For text of this charter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 880-883. /3/The Embassy analyzed the new 26-point program in telegram 4311 from Saigon, June 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) On the whole, the new Cabinet seems a very good one by Vietnamese standards and potentiality. There are seven holdovers from Quat's team and a better regional balance of Ministers than Quat had, particularly in relation to the number of southerners. There is no particular religious complexion to the Cabinet which is outstanding for its number of young, competent technicians, many of whom in the past have hesitated to serve in a Cabinet. The main question mark remains General Ky himself, who thus far has been very cooperative and approachable in the limited dealings which I have had with him in the past few days. He has a rather disarming way of alluding to his inexperience and need for assistance in an unfamiliar role. The chief danger appears to be that of trying to go too far and too fast with an extreme reform program. While Ky's motives are of the best, the program of action which he has outlined could easily generate heavy opposition if he goes about it in a heavy-handed manner. I am afraid that he is likely to ignore the administrative weakness of his government and clog the machinery by injecting too many projects at one time. The charter which has been promulgated is an imperfect, hastily written document obviously designed to keep Ky under the control of his military peers. There is nothing of importance which he can do as Prime Minister without the approval of the directory of ten officers (of which he is a member) presided over by General Thieu. It looks as if this new government will be far more of an oligarchy than an autocracy. The intensity of military operations dropped off very considerably from the high level of previous weeks. There are a number of factors which could explain this decline. Several of the Viet Cong regiments have suffered heavy losses and are probably licking their wounds while others, not yet committed, are probably awaiting the word to pass to the offensive. On the GVN side, the losses of preceding weeks have caused commanders to prefer to stay on the defensive rather than initiate engagements which may cause additional losses. Little progress has been made in restoring the combat edge of the four regiments and nine battalions (roughly two division equivalents) which I mentioned in my last week's message/4/ as being ineffective from lack of strength. /4/Document 5. The use of B-52s of the Strategic Air Command from Guam in a bombing operation on a Viet Cong base 35 miles northwest of Saigon has aroused much interest and considerable discussion of the effectiveness of zonal bombing. Inevitably the effectiveness of such bombing depends upon the accuracy of intelligence, and good intelligence of conditions deep within a Viet Cong war zone is hard to come by. In this case, while the bombs themselves did little damage, they fell close enough to Viet Cong installations to shake their occupants and to facilitate the penetration of ground patrols which accomplished some damage. In future operations of this sort, I would hope that the exploitation by ground forces could be on a scale large enough to guarantee the destruction of Viet Cong personnel and installations which have escaped the effects of the bombing. We have been watching with interest the development of the Commonwealth proposal/5/ for finding ways and means of settling the situation here. I have been somewhat concerned over the readiness of our friends to talk of a cease-fire in connection with these activities. A cease-fire under the conditions existing here would be a very tricky affair requiring very careful definition to avoid the many possible pitfalls. We are sending a cable shortly on this subject which I hope will be called to your attention./6/ /5/See Document 6. /6/Not further identified. Taylor
13. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/ Washington, June 22, 1965, 7:44 p.m. /1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. JCS 2331-65. 1. I urgently need your personal views for upcoming discussions of courses of action available to us in Vietnam. The problem can be phrased as follows. What additional military actions can we take in South Vietnam and in the DRV, short of destroying North Vietnamese economic and population targets, which will apply additional pressures on the VC and on the DRV? 2. Please note the word "additional" because it is key to the problem I must address. In other words, I require your assessment of need for additional U.S. forces, their locations and missions, and an assessment of what they could accomplish in South Vietnam. As to actions against the DRV, I require your views as to targets, modes of delivery (B-52's as opposed to fighter bombers) and collateral actions such as mining Haiphong harbor. 3. The subject is regarded here as one of great sensitivity; therefore, I solicit your personal views and not a staff study. In particular, no one other than U.S. military should be consulted or apprised of my request. 4. As additional background you should know that thought here in some areas is to the effect that introduction of U.S. troop units over 10,000 (some 20,000 fewer than already requested) will convert the war into a second Vietnamese/French war in which we would play the role of the French. That is, Communist propaganda and the inherent xenophobic tendencies of the Vietnamese would surely convert the VNAF and loyal South Vietnamese into our enemies rather than the fact that the VNAF leaders have their necks on the chopping block. In sum, regardless of what happens the United States will survive; South Vietnam and its leaders will not. However, I would like your assessment of this point. 5. As stated earlier I need your views urgently. In the interest of speed you may have to omit rationale, but provide me as much as you can./2/ Regards. /2/For Westmoreland's response, see Document 17.
14. Agenda Prepared by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. Bundy sent this annotated agenda to the President at 4:15 p.m., under cover of a brief memorandum describing it. MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT Wednesday, June 23, 1965, 5:30 PM 1. VIETNAM (1) Rolling Thunder 20 Present: State Department Defense Department White House Central Intelligence Agency [Here follow agenda items dealing with Berlin and the Dominican Republic.]
Tab 1 VIETNAM 1. Rolling Thunder 20 Bob McNamara will have a chart and I think he and Dean Rusk will have an agreed position. You probably will not wish to discuss targets in detail, even with such a select group as this. Bob needs one good solid target, and I think he will have settled it with Dean before you come in. He already has my proxy. 2. Saigon's Breach of Relations with France The new military government has apparently decided to break relations with Paris. We all think this is a mistake because of the French power of retaliation. There remains a slight difference of opinion as to whether we should say out loud it is a mistake. You will want to hear Rusk on this point. 3. Future Use of B-52s Bob McNamara wants to go right on with the B-52s, and in principle, most of us agree. The real problem is not in the military decision but in the public relations handling. I have asked Doug Cater to study this one and he may have ideas. 4. Soviet Attitudes and What We Should Do About Them This is not an action matter, but I think it would be helpful for us all to hear Tommy Thompson's current thinking. The Soviets have just turned down the Wilson Peace Mission and in rather tough language. At the same time they are floating the notions that Tony Lewis picked up in the Times this morning--even hinting that we can do anything we want as long as we do it in South Vietnam. It is worth a moment's discussion. 5. Prospects of Prime Minister Wilson's Mission My brother Bill will have the latest on this one. We expect the British to move right ahead even though no Communists give them the time of day. 6. Political Progress of the Ky Government I have put this one in to keep everybody's attention focussed on the fact that our problem is indeed as much political as military. My brother will be ready to comment. [Here follow Bundy's comments on the agenda items dealing with Berlin (at Tab 2) and the Dominican Republic (at Tab 3).]
15. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, June 23, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, Chrono as DDP and DDCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret. Prepared by Helms on June 24. SUBJECT /2/The meeting actually began at 5:50 p.m. and ended at 8 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) For another record of this discussion, see Document 16. 1. Attendance at this meeting is set forth in the attached agenda./3/ Item No. 2, Berlin, was not discussed. /3/Not attached, but see Document 14. Attending were the President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Vance, William Bundy, McNaughton, Wheeler, Raborn, Helms, Thompson, Busby, Cater, Jack Vaughn, and U. Alexis Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) 2. That part of the meeting devoted to Vietnam was opened by Mr. Bundy who presented to the President a copy of the Javits resolution, herewith attached./4/ The President directed that it be permitted to run its normal course in the Congress. /4/Not printed. 3. Rolling Thunder 20 was approved, Target 43 being chosen instead of 51.12/82.15. 4. Regarding the anticipated South Vietnamese break in diplomatic relations with France, it was agreed that the United States would tell the French Government that we regretted this section on the part of General Ky and that we were not party to the basic decision. 5. There ensued considerable discussion of the B-52 strike which is scheduled for Sunday, 27 June. The President emphasized that the press releases on this strike should be handled in such a way as to convey the straight story to the public. He authorized briefing the press fully both in Washington and Saigon on the reasons for such raids and agreed that on this occasion the news of a raid should first be released in Saigon. There was general agreement that there should be a significant tightening up of security on the planning and execution of such raids. 6. Ambassador Thompson briefed on Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam and emphasized that these attitudes were hardening not only toward the United States but also toward Communist China. 7. There was some discussion of a proposal to place an international force across the 17th parallel in order to put an end to North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam. Secretary McNamara indicated that such a proposal was unrealistic and could not be implemented without a vast military force. He pointed out that sea patrols of the Vietnamese coast were not turning up significant amounts of equipment proceeding by sea. 8. The President expressed considerable concern about the Wilson mission and said that he saw no point in having the Prime Minister come to Washington if Washington and Saigon were the only capitals which would receive him. He expressed the view that a Wilson visit could be counterproductive, would achieve little in the interest of peace, and might turn out to be a further embarrassment to the United States foreign policy. 9. The remainder of the discussion on Vietnam is excluded from this Memorandum for the Record since the President made it clear he did not want it talked about outside the compass of the meeting. [Here follows brief discussion of the Dominican Republic.] Richard Helms/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
16. Editorial Note On June 23, 1965, President Johnson met in the White House at 5:50 p.m. with his senior advisers to discuss Vietnam. See Document 15 for a record of the discussion during the first part of the meeting. According to William Bundy's recollections, based on notes he took at the meeting, the discussion then turned to the question of the policy alternatives that would be open to the administration at the end of the summer. The general feeling, Bundy recorded, was that more forces would be needed. "Alexis Johnson, back from Saigon on consultation, was skeptical: 15 American battalions was a good level-off point, and we must accept that this would be a long war, without shortcuts and with only the grinding proof to the Viet Cong that they could not win. Ball at once chimed in, giving the gist of his argument that we should stop at 100,000 and then think hard--even about plans for cutting our losses and shifting our focus of action in Southeast Asia to Thailand. Rusk and McNamara objected to the last idea: Thailand, they thought, could not be held if SVN had given up. Rather, Rusk said, we would end up with the only secure areas Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and NATO, with even India falling to the Communist Chinese. It was an extreme statement, and my notes show an exclamation point in the margin--and a note to myself to get an estimate of the consequences of withdrawal from SVN. "After this exchange, McNamara moved in the opposite direction from Ball. His proposal was a combination of a lot more force, in the South and possibly selectively in the North as well, and a much more intensive negotiating effort than he felt had yet been made. At least, he said, let us show the President what might be done on these two lines, coordinated with each other. He had the ideas on additional forces, and Ball had the ideas on moves toward a settlement; perhaps the two meshed with each other, and were less contradictory than some might suppose. "The result was at least agreement on the next steps. The President, who had for the most part let the discussion rage around him without injecting his own views, directed McNamara and Ball, with one or two staff men each, to produce studies covering military and political moves over the next three months and beyond. These were to come back in a week, although there was of course no assurance that the issue would then be decided." (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Chapter 26, pages 22-23)
17. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Saigon, June 24, 1965, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. MAC 3240. Ref: A. JCS 2331-65 230144Z. B. MACJOO 070335Z./2/ /2/Reference A is Document 13. Reference B is telegram MACJOO 19118; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. II, Document 337. 1. Per your request in reference I have following views. Some items are based on studies; others are not. 2. By way of introduction, the premise behind whatever further actions we may undertake, either in SVN or DRV, must be that we are in for the long pull. The struggle has become a war of attrition. Short of decision to introduce nuclear weapons against sources and channels of enemy power, I see no likelihood of achieving a quick, favorable end to the war. The fabric of GVN civil functions and services has been rendered so ineffective and listless by successive coups and changes, and the military arm is in such need of revitalization that we can come to no other conclusion. In this context the following is submitted for your consideration. 3. I am becoming more convinced every day that US forces in appropriate numbers must be deployed to permit the Vietnamese with our help to carry the war to the enemy. Objectives would be to neutralize enemy power, give heart to the war weary ARVN and provide adequate maneuverable fire power to attack the enemy formations wherever they can be found and fixed. With regard to your comment that some in Washington consider that more than a 10,000 man US combat force will invoke visions of the French, I can only comment that force of that number will not give us a chance of winning or assure avoidance of defeat. Although the hazard exists, there is absolutely no logical reason to conclude that we will be cast in the role of the French. It's up to the US leadership in SVN to insure that we do not fall into such a role, by means of indoctrination, discipline, morale, positioning the masses of US combat forces away from population centers and administrative controls, all of which we now stress. I am confident that this one is manageable. 4. As a refinement and supplement to the forces which may be required as set forth in paragraph 10B, Ref B, I believe the following will also be required, sooner or later. A. A minimum of 7 more army helicopter companies than presently deployed or approved, and two more USMC helo squadrons in I Corps. Ratio is 2 companies (sqdns) per separate US brigade, 1 company per 3d country brigade. B. The 101st Abn Div Brigade and 173d Abn Brigade retained in country and both positioned in Bien Hoa area under a task force HQ to provide the heavy mobile punch to gain the initiative. C. Possibly at least another US infantry or airborne division to provide an offensive punch and get ARVN troops in the III Corps area on the offensive. VC order of battle in III Corps area, plus other mobile VC units nearby, are approaching the potential for sustained if not successful attack on communication centers. 5. The foregoing are big orders. However, believe it is time all concerned face up to fact that we must be prepared for a long war which will probably involve increasing numbers of US troops. If the Communists have the determination to make it such, they certainly have the capabilities and we have no choice but to match them, with an increment left over in our favor. 6. Actions which we may take against the DRV include several which I think will increase pressure on Hanoi and support our effort in SVN, but which do not involve unacceptable risk of provoking an escalation to the extent of ChiCom involvement. A. Use B-52's on isolated military targets remote from civilian populations. Several ammo and supply depots fit this description. A study could turn up more. B-52's could put massive fire power on such area targets with much more effectiveness and less risk than the equivalent in fighter bombers. B. Interdict the trans Nanning-Hanoi-Kunming Railroad. There are 5 key bridges whose destruction would be devastating. 10 percent of total import tonnages use this railroad to Hanoi; but we suspect the tonnages have a much higher qualitative value. C. Interdict Haiphong Harbor with repetitive mining. D. Accelerate leaflet operations targeted on the DRV population centers. E. Continue our air interdiction programs of LOC's. It takes a long time for cumulative results to produce a telling effect on primitive DRV LOC system. This is another aspect of the war of attrition which we must be prepared to prosecute in full measure despite mounting costs. 7. To conclude, I will emphasize some general thoughts which seem pertinent. A. It is difficult, if not impossible for me to imagine how we can commit and sustain US forces, air, surface and naval, without backing them up for the long pull by mobilization of manpower, industrial and training resources at least to a limited degree. I face the very practical problem of maintaining morale of people on their second combat tours, with many, many more to come, I suspect, when all the forces we require are committed. I understand almost the entire complement of aviators in the 1st Cav will be on their 2d tour by the time it gets here, while the average US citizen enjoys his butter at no inconvenience. B. It would seem that we should prepare US and world opinion for the rigors ahead by airing an objective, complete analysis of the problem we face and what we must do about it. The news couldn't be worse overall than it is now made out to be in piece-meal fashion by irresponsible or uninformed reporting and editorializing today. This could well be the most salutary thing we might do. The government would then be in a position to counterattack, in good faith, the distorted reporting of the crepe hangers.
18. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 24, 1965, 9:40 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential. SUBJECT 1. The Morse memorandum/2/ makes the tightest case I have seen for taking Vietnam to the UN. He recognizes that the Soviet Union might block action in the Security Council, and in that event he would press on into the General Assembly. He would "abide by" a majority vote in the General Assembly. /2/See Document 10. 2. What he does not say is what kind of resolution he would press for either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. It is on this point that I think he should be pressed. Does he want the UN to vote ways and means of getting the North Vietnamese out of South Vietnam? Or does he want the General Assembly to validate a Communist takeover? Or does he simply want it to "observe", as it is doing in the Dominican Republic? The last is about all we could really hope to get, and while it might be worth it, it would certainly not bring peace, in and of itself. 3. As you know, I myself think that we can and should take further initiatives to see what the UN can do about Vietnam. I think this is primarily a tactical matter, designed to show that the Soviet Union is not prepared to desert other "socialist" countries on this issue. The trouble with this tactical approach, of course, is that a man who holds Morse's basic view is likely to denounce it as a fraud unless we take it all the way through and actively work for a resolution which would get us out of there. And if we are going to get out of Vietnam, I do not think it serves any good purpose to blacken the reputation of the UN by trying unsuccessfully to unload this responsibility on it. No one would be fooled, and both the UN and the US would be damaged. 4. So I think the underlying difference between us and Morse is not whether we should take the case to the UN, but what we take it there for. I would take it there to pin the rose of aggression on the Communists. I think Senator Morse would take it there in order to cover a withdrawal and a Communist takeover. But I am not sure, and this is what a talk with him may uncover./3/ /3/At 12:20 p.m. on June 24, McGeorge Bundy telephoned Secretary Rusk and said that President Johnson wanted a draft paragraph prepared for the speech he was going to deliver in San Francisco the following day that would indicate the President intended to instruct Adlai Stevenson to take up the question of Vietnam in the U.N. Security Council. Bundy said the President asked him to find out more of what Rusk and Stevenson thought of raising the issue in the Security Council. Rusk said that he would try to contact Stevenson. He added that it might be possible to raise the issue in the context of a general report on the problem "without ginning up too much expectation that the Security Council will be able to act." (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) McG. B./4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
19. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 24, 1965, 1:05 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. No classification marking. I have talked with my brother Bill and with Dean Rusk/2/ and at their suggestion, also with George Ball. The Secretary is the least negative and Bill the most so. /2/See footnote 3, Document 18. The basic arguments against going to the Security Council now are three: a. that it would be unsettling in Saigon. This can be controlled, but not prevented. b. that it would require Moscow to take a harsh public line against us at a time when we still have some hope to engage them more usefully in negotiation. c. there is a danger that Hanoi would read this appeal as weakness. Given these difficulties, I am inclined now to back away from this one. I think it would be wiser to take the position that if there should ever be a prospect of effective action in the UN, we would be the first to work for it. Language which might do that sort of thing follows and could be fitted in to the present draft quite easily, I believe./3/ /3/In his address to the 20th anniversary commemorative session of the United Nations in San Francisco on June 25, President Johnson reviewed the Vietnam problem, noted that resort to the Security Council had been rejected by North Vietnam, and stated that the United States would support any effective action by the United Nations to promote a negotiated settlement of the conflict. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706) While in San Francisco, Johnson met on June 25 with U Thant and discussed Vietnam. No record of that conversation has been found except for U Thant's memoirs, View From the UN, pp. 67-69. If at any time there is a prospect of effective action for peace in Vietnam, through any of the agencies of the United Nations, the United States will be the first to work for UN action. McG. B. [Next documents]
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