NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
20. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, June 26, 1965, 11:58 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVI. Top Secret; Exdis. A note on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 11:25 a.m. and that the President saw it. CAP 65363. The following message from Max Taylor recommends reprisal action for the execution of Bennett and the restaurant atrocity./2/ Rusk, McNamara, and I all disagree with this recommendation. We do not believe that important escalation should be attached to a single episode at this stage. McNamara and I do think, however, that if terror and executions continue, we should substantially increase weight of Rolling Thunder attacks, probably including oil supplies in Haiphong area. Rusk is less certain. /2/On June 24, the Viet Cong executed Sergeant Harold G. Bennett, and on June 25, a Viet Cong bomb exploded in the My Canh floating restaurant in Saigon, killing 44 persons, including 13 U.S. citizens. We are considering usefulness of leaflet drops on Hanoi-Haiphong area which would say that if these outrages continue, necessary further action will be taken. Meanwhile you should know of Taylor's recommendation in case you wish to take his judgment and overrule Washington doves. Taylor's message follows: From: Embassy Saigon No. 4402/3/ /3/Dated June 26. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVI) This is a US Mission message. Viet Cong execution of Sergeant Bennett closely followed by My Canh restaurant atrocity brings into sharp focus blackmail potential VC and Hanoi possess in numbers of US hostages in their hands and the usefulness of this blackmail to support a stepped-up terrorist campaign. Since they well aware we place higher value on human life than do they, Hanoi/VC prepared use this weapon to own advantage. They have evidently decided that execution of US prisoners will be very sensitive issue for USG, and their experience with Hertz case in which they undoubtedly aware that we have caused GVN to delay execution of Hai, may have led them to believe that we will pay very high price to prevent execution of our personnel. They thus hope to cause political problems between US and GVN, to stir up US public opinion against Viet-Nam policy, to damage US troop morale, and also raise morale their terrorist cadre by showing their ability to retaliate for GVN executions and by possibility of delaying or halting further GVN executions. (We understand 5 or 6 convicted VC terrorists now awaiting carrying out of death sentence.) Text of announcement, which first made over Radio Hanoi, a fact we should emphasize as evidence of origin of this outrage, makes clear that Hanoi and VC are holding USG responsible for GVN action in executing three named terrorists. In our response to this outrage we should make clear we likewise hold Hanoi responsible. Announcement also makes clear that Sergeant Bennett was executed on orders of Hanoi cloaked as "orders of the NLFSV Central Committee" by the command of the South Viet-Nam Liberation Front, apparently without any pretext of a trial. Announcement also twice mentions policy of NLFSV toward "prisoners of war" as "humane and lenient" and as "correct and humane". It mentions prisoners of war in three contexts: executed terrorists are referred to as prisoners of war and are equated with US detainees; "rebel soldiers" (RVNAF) are referred to as prisoners of war and in obvious appeal to Vietnamese opinion, offer is made to release those who have "repented"; US detainees are called US "war prisoners" but their lives are said to be dependent on actions of US "aggressors". This is first use of term "prisoners of war" in any of these three contexts to our knowledge. We cannot permit ourselves to be placed in position of paying blackmail for lives of US prisoners in form of preventing GVN from executing terrorists who are tried and convicted of violating Vietnamese civil law. If not sternly repressed, terrorism is likely to become a VC tactic of increasing proportions. Even if we were willing to pay blackmail regardless of difficulties which it would cause internally for GVN and for our relations with GVN, we would soon find the price raised to some other even less acceptable level. The US Mission takes the general position that (a) convicted VC terrorists must be punished in accordance with GVN law regardless of possible reprisal actions against US prisoners in VC hands; (b) must hold Hanoi responsible both for terrorism and for reprisals against our prisoners; and (c) we should obtain maximum propaganda effect in condemning the Bennett and My Canh incidents in combination as international murder (the toll of dead so far--27 Vietnamese, 13 US, 2 French, 1 Swiss, 1 Filipino; wounded--62 Vietnamese, 16 US, 1 Swiss, 2 Germans). We therefore recommend (1) The immediate execution of a bombing attack in the Hanoi-Haiphong area with an appropriate statement of the reason for the departure from the Rolling Thunder pattern. This attack to be accompanied by major leaflet drops in NVN and by maximum exploitation by VOA and other media. (2) A Presidential statement voicing sense of outrage of American people at these wanton acts of murder and announcing that target in preceding paragraph was accordingly being attacked to show USG would not stand for blatant violation of all standards of humanity and international conduct. (3) A GVN statement similarly denouncing the My Canh atrocity and the wanton murder of Sergeant Bennett, contrasting latter with due process of law followed in trial of Tran Van Dang, who was caught redhanded preparing to blow up building in city of Saigon, charged, tried by competent court, and convicted under accepted standards of justice. (4) GVN protest to ICC. We believe and intend that above steps would lead to heavy public denunciation of VC terrorism and execution of US prisoner. If handled properly this should have opposite effect to that intended by VC of stirring American public opinion in support of US policy in Viet-Nam. We feel that the publicity campaign should get underway at once and the overall USG position should be established in the next few hours. We have asked GVN to make no statement for time being, but we will have difficulty keeping GVN quiet if matter drags. Taylor.
21. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, June 26, 1965, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Papers of George Ball, Vietnam I. No classification marking. Bundy said President agrees with Maxwell Taylor./2/ Ball said this was a dreadful decision. Bundy said it was not actually a decision--the President wants to hear the arguments. Ball said we have to recognize the fact that there will be incidents and we are either in a war or we are not--we should work out rational course of action to meet accidental or incidental events. Ball said we have not been prepared to make a decision to drop bombs on Hanoi-Haiphong up to now and he does not know why we make this decision on this basis. Bundy said he had said all of this and that he would like to have a meeting at 4:30./3/ Bundy said he has called Secretary but has not reached him yet because he is enroute from the office to his home. Bundy said meeting could be held at State Department and they could then give President their recommendations and choice. Bundy said he had to tell Ball, however, that the President feels strongly about this. Bundy said he thinks what is on the President's mind is that we did react after Pleiku and here is something bigger. President thinks country will feel strongly about this. Bundy asked Ball if he had seen AP 93, which is direct threat to Taylor and South Vietnamese leaders--they will be marked for death. Bundy said his personal judgment runs with Ball's. /2/See Document 20. /3/See Document 22.
22. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, June 26, 1965, 5:56 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVI. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 5:22 p.m. and shown to the President. CAP 65366. 1. Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Wheeler, Bill Bundy, and I have just met for an hour to review all aspects of possible reprisal for restaurant and Bennett outrages. 2. We concluded that if reprisal is ordered, best target is either power plant or POL depot in Hanoi-Haiphong area. No target outside this area is sufficiently important to be a noticeable departure from present Rolling Thunder pattern. 3. In order to strike a target in the Hanoi-Haiphong area with minimum international backlash, we all agree that we must consult major friendly nations. Attack without such consultation could easily drive Wilson and others clear off the reservation, and while they are not as much help to us as they think, we would not look smart if a single act of reprisal gave them an excuse to jump ship. 4. This consultation would probably lead to fairly heavy argument against attack in reprisal form. Allies could point out that repeated executions of prisoners by Nazis in World War II were not used to justify specific reprisals. They could point out also that once we moved to measured air operations in North Vietnam after Pleiku we avoided specific acts of reprisals as in the case of the Embassy bombing. 5. We believe nevertheless that by a strenuous diplomatic effort we could probably keep most allies with us, although not happy. But one condition of this effort would be that we emphasize military need for attacks on these targets and downgrade reprisal aspect. But if we are to use straight military argument with allies, we should use it with our own people too. 6. And that leads to the main argument which seems important to all of us--namely, that major new acts against the north should be undertaken in terms of our whole policy in Vietnam, and not in response to particular outrages. We don't all agree as to when and how it will be necessary to hit targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area. We do all agree that this is a major decision which should be made in a wider context than these atrocities. 7. Secretary Rusk also feels strongly that Gromyko/Kohler conversation forwarded separately/2/ shows at least a hint of Soviet readiness to work toward serious negotiations. Attack in Hanoi-Haiphong area right after this conversation might easily be misunderstood in Moscow. /2/See Document 23. 8. You should also know that Alexis Johnson is reported by George Ball to oppose reprisal action. 9. Finally, we believe that both public and private statements and messages can be used to make clear to Hanoi that American people are bound to react with great force to continued atrocities. We can and will make this point to allies as well, so that further outrages of this sort can be used to lay a base for such additional military actions as you may wish to authorize on overall grounds./3/ /3/In telegram 37 to Saigon, July 3, drafted by Ball, the Department of State informed Taylor that a "high level decision" had been made not to launch the retaliatory strike against the Hanoi-Haiphong area recommended by Taylor. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 10. Next following message contains text of statement as issued by Department of State: The regime in Hanoi and their puppet liberation front in South Viet-Nam have acknowledged their responsibility for the execution of Sgt. Bennett and for the bombing of the My Canh restaurant in Saigon, in which 44 persons, Vietnamese, American, French, Swiss, Filipino were killed and many more persons injured. They have compounded their brutal conduct by publicly bragging about their action and making threats to carry out even more outrageous acts. We in America and people around the world cannot help but be appalled and revolted by this show of wanton inhumanity. These Communist threats to intimidate, of course, will not succeed. Our determination to help the embattled people of South Viet-Nam to avoid their falling under a regime which is capable of such brutality will only be strengthened. Hanoi's recent statements have surely also made it clear to anyone who may have had any doubt that it is the power directing the policies and actions of the VC, its instrument in South Viet-Nam, and must bear full responsibility for these acts./4/ /4/The text of this statement was issued by Department of State Spokesman McCloskey on June 26. It is printed also in Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1965, p. 55.
23. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, June 26, 1965, 3:57 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVI. Confidential. A note on the source text indicates this telegram was sent to the LBJ Ranch at 6:41 p.m. CAP 65365. The following message is relevant to Taylor's suggestion,/2/ which we are reviewing at your request, because of what it shows of possible change in the weather in Moscow: /2/Apparently a reference to Taylor's message in Document 20. Message from Ambassador Kohler follows: From Embassy Moscow No. 3863 Foreign Minister Gromyko accompanied by Smirnovsky came to Spaso today for lunch in honor of George Kennan. Stoessel and Toon were only other guests present. I had originally invited Keldysh, MGU Rector Petrovsky and several other historians and academicians but all for various reasons declined. On behalf Gromyko, Foreign Office had initially expressed doubts that Foreign Minister would be able to attend but subsequently called Embassy to advise that after rechecking his calendar Gromyko had found it possible to accept. I suspect that when Gromyko reached this decision word was passed to other invitees they should decline in order permit Foreign Minister engage in private, frank conversation which in fact took place. Conversation ranged over wide spectrum and throughout Gromyko was affable and gave impression of genuine desire to resume dialogue on basic issues which initiated in post-Cuba period. Following are significant points in exchange relating to Vietnam and U.S.-Sov relations. After general discussion and frank exchange of views with Kennan on national liberation movement thesis--in which Kennan proved to be able and effective advocate our position, Gromyko turned to me and said he wished to convey two basic points. In first place, he said, Soviets are not authorized and cannot negotiate on behalf of North Vietnam. Vietnamese situation must be discussed with DRV. He would point out that so far as Soviet position is concerned, 4-point statement by DRV would be reasonable basis for negotiations. As he had told Secretary Rusk in Vienna, Gromyko would caution the U.S. that no progress could be made if any future approach to DRV should be cast in "insulting" terms as it had been previously. For us to announce suspension of hostile action against DRV and simultaneously to inform DRV that unless it behaved according to our prescription the punishment would be resumed was bound to lead us nowhere. Secondly, Gromyko stressed that it has been and continues to be fundamental Soviet policy to seek improvement in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. He was compelled to observe, however, that Soviet Government had been disappointed by drastic change in U.S. policy since elections, and Soviets could not avoid feeling that policy now pursued by President Johnson in most instances paralleled that endorsed by Goldwater in electoral campaign. I made following comments on Gromyko's remarks. I said U.S. Government fully recognized difficulties faced by Soviet Government in dealing with Vietnamese situation; obviously Soviet maneuverability was restricted by attitude of Hanoi and to certain extent Peking. On other hand we had hoped that Soviet Government would be prepared to bring its influence to bear on Hanoi in effort to bring about peaceful settlement of Vietnamese problem which neither of us, I felt, wished to see escalated to a dangerous degree. Meanwhile, I thought Gromyko should recognize that current U.S. policy of support for South Vietnam was laid down 10 years ago and had been followed consistently by three administrations. Recently, of course, degree of U.S. support had increased but this had only been in response to step-up in hostile and terroristic activities of forces controlled by North Vietnam rather than change in our basic policy. Equally, there had been no change in U.S. policy with regard to our bilateral relations with Soviet Union. We have consistently taken position that despite current difficulties, particularly in Vietnam, we desire continuing improvement in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations on which such significant start had been made in 1963. It was our impression from public statements of Soviet leadership and Soviet press comment that it was Soviet attitude that in this respect had undergone a basic change. They had in fact flatly stated both privately to me and then publicly, that U.S. activities in Vietnam were incompatible with continued improvement U.S.-Soviet relations. It was therefore reassuring to me personally to have Gromyko restate in positive terms his government's position in favor of improvement of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. I could assure him that we would do our part toward this end. Comment: It is entirely possible of course that reason for Gromyko's appearance at Spaso was simply to satisfy his curiosity about Kennan whom he had met only briefly shortly after the war to make appropriate official gesture following 1952 persona non grata action, and to attempt to influence views of a prominent representative of American academic community. However, it became obvious that Gromyko had come specifically prepared to make to me statement summarized above. It is obvious from this account that Gromyko was not prepared or authorized go much beyond officially stated Sov position, particularly on Vietnam. I had impression, however, particularly from his positive comment on U.S.-Sov relationship (which does, of course, differ from official position), his affable mood, and his almost wistful recall of 1963 atmosphere that there is perhaps some new flexibility in Sov posture. It seemed to me that he was trying to suggest that Soviet Government finds itself in extremely awkward position, that it genuinely desires to see the heat taken out of Vietnamese situation, that this can be done only by direct approach to Hanoi accompanied by cessation of bombing. He seemed to imply some hope that if this should be done Hanoi's response would be positive and the Sov Gov would then find it possible and desirable to resume the dialogue with U.S. and restore the hopeful relationship which existed in 1963. Kohler.
24. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 27, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. SUBJECT 1. The attached paper from George Ball was prepared for your use last Wednesday,/2/ but we did not get it to you before your departure Thursday. George asked me to say that he himself does not think the legal arguments about support for Vietnam are decisive. The commitment is primarily political and any decision to enlarge or reduce it will be political. /2/June 23. 2. My own further view is that if and when we wish to shift our course and cut our losses in Vietnam we should do so because of a finding that the Vietnamese themselves are not meeting their obligations to themselves or to us. This is the course we started on with Diem, and if we got a wholly ineffective or anti-American government we could do the same thing again. With a "neutralist" government it would be quite possible to move in this direction. McG. B.
Attachment Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/3/ Washington, June 23, 1965. /3/Secret. SUBJECT I. 1. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, when read together with its protocol, provides that in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack" against South Viet-Nam each party will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." 2. The United States has determined/4/ that there has been such aggression against South Viet-Nam, which has brought this Treaty obligation into operation. Although other SEATO powers are providing assistance to South Viet-Nam, the United States, to the best of our knowledge, is the only one that has made this determination. There has been no decision by the SEATO members to act collectively "to meet the common danger" in Viet-Nam. /4/The determination that North Viet-Nam was committing "aggression by armed attack" was explicitly stated in the so-called "White Paper" entitled "Aggression from the North" issued by the Department of State in February 1965. [Footnote in the source text; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 171.] 3. Since South Viet-Nam is not a party to the Southeast Asia Treaty, our obligation under the Treaty does not run directly to South Viet-Nam. Authorities on international law generally agree that only parties (and not "third-party beneficiaries") acquire rights under a treaty. However, since the United States has determined that there has been "aggression" against South Viet-Nam within the meaning of the Treaty, our assistance to the South Vietnamese Government to meet that aggression is in discharge of our treaty obligation. 4. Our provision of military assistance to South Viet-Nam is consistent with the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense--although it does not impose an obligation of collective defense on UN Members. 5. In addition to its treaty responsibilities with respect to South Viet-Nam, the United States has repeatedly promised the Government of South Viet-Nam to assist it in its struggle against aggression. These promises have been embodied in a series of messages and statements, beginning in October 1954 when President Eisenhower promised to aid "the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion and aggression through military means."/5/ The implied--and frequently expressed--conditions to the provision of United States assistance have been (a) the continuing request of the South Vietnamese Government for such assistance and (b) its will and ability to use that assistance effectively. /5/See ibid., 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 2167. II. 1. The consequences of an abrupt withdrawal of our assistance from South Viet-Nam should be judged not in juridical terms but in terms of its effect on the credibility of our commitments throughout the world. The relevant questions would be: a. To what extent would such withdrawal impair the confidence of other small nations on the periphery of Communist power that the United States had the will and resources to help them prevent a Communist takeover? b. To what extent would such withdrawal shake the faith of our partners in other security treaties--whether in Latin America, Europe, the Far East or elsewhere--that we would and could meet our treaty obligations? c. To what extent would such withdrawal reduce the prestige of the United States and hence diminish its power and effectiveness in its dealings with other governments? 2. The answers to these questions would not depend on the differences or similarities in the nature of our legal commitments. Our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, are quite different from our responsibilities for Viet-Nam under SEATO, since we have obligations running directly to each of our NATO partners to take action, including the use of armed force, in the event of an armed attack on any NATO power. Our obligations to West Berlin are covered not only by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty but by our status as an occupying power pursuant to the unconditional surrender of Germany at the end of World War II. We are obliged directly to the other American republics under the Rio Treaty of 1947 to come to their assistance in the event of armed attack. 3. In the longer term, we must judge a decision to withdraw assistance from South Viet-Nam primarily in terms of its effect on the ability of the United States to maintain its role of world leadership. That role is not an easy one. France could withdraw from Indochina or Algeria without wide-ranging consequences since it was not a great power and other nations did not depend on France for their own security. The United States must, however, always act with the consciousness that if it fails to discharge its role of leadership there is no other free world power capable of taking its place. George W. Ball
25. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 28, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 41-Point Program in Non-Military Sphere in SVN. Secret. SUBJECT Several months ago you asked that programs for Vietnam be reviewed to insure that all practical measures were being taken in the non-military sector. This led to numerous new proposals which you approved./2/ The Mission Council in Saigon then assigned a scale of priorities to these projects. This is a report on those actions as they relate to broader, overall Mission programming in major areas of activity. /2/See vol. II, Documents 173, 200, 228, 229, and 242. INTERNAL SECURITY Population and Resources Control The Viet Cong's continuing ability to move freely among the population led to increased emphasis on police training and counter-subversion operations. A substantial amount of additional instruction has been added to police training and increased emphasis has been placed on control operations. This has shown marked success particularly in the Hop Tac area. Informant Intelligence Operations The Special Branch of the National Police has the key responsibility for general information on Viet Cong political activities. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Bounties for Apprehending Viet Cong Leaders In April the Mission approved a bounty program aimed at apprehending selected Viet Cong leaders. The program calls for a two-month preparatory period, followed by a four-month operational phase, after which the program will be evaluated to determine future actions. Arrest and Detention Law A draft law was prepared last April with U.S. assistance and approved by the Ministry of Interior. In May Quat asked for minor changes to be made, but there is no indication that he signed the law before his government fell. PROVINCIAL OPERATIONS The brittle administrative structure of the National Government in Saigon has made it necessary to buttress the authority and responsibility of the province chiefs, while still improving their communications and ties with the Saigon authorities. Provincial Government A system of integrated provincial budgets was initiated in April. The position of the Province Chief has been strengthened by according him greater authority for technical services as well as for military and civilian administration. On May 30, provincial and municipal councils were elected to function as links between the people and provincial authorities. At the Mission's urging, Quat and various government ministers began frequent visits to the provinces to demonstrate Saigon's interest in the problems of local governments. Operations Against the Viet Cong CIA has considerably expanded its recruitment and training of local teams engaged in Viet Cong harassment, counter-terror and intelligence operations. By the end of this year there is scheduled to be almost 3,000 teams engaged in one or another of these activities. Improvement of Popular Forces MACV undertook to improve the equipment, morale and indoctrination of the provincial Popular Forces and to increase their medical support. The GVN has approved a substantial program for the construction and improvement of Popular Forces training centers. INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS Political instability has continued in the absence of a cohesive political infrastructure which could contain and channel the energies of such pressure elements as the students, Montagnards, Buddhists and Catholics. Several of the actions you approved were designed to minimize possibilities of conflict among these groups. Youth and Students Vietnamese youth and students remain volatile and restless and are quite capable of making political trouble. To minimize this prospect and to direct their energies along more constructive lines, the Mission has supported a summer youth program designed to place several thousand urban youth into rural areas to participate in small-scale civic action activities. The program has been well received by various political and religious groups. CIA has initiated a supplementary program among student organizations. Montagnard Grievances In late April a Montagnard agricultural conference was held at Dalat attended by 100 Montagnard officials and a Saigon delegation. The Minister of Agriculture announced that the Montagnards would be given title to the lands they now farm and be permitted to cut timber from government forests. In May an Office of Ethnic Minority Affairs was established directly subordinate to the Prime Minister to deal with Montagnard and other ethnic minority grievances. CIA gave special attention to the Montagnards in expanding their local Viet Cong harassment and counter-terror teams. Buddhists and Catholics You approved an action calling for a revitalization of the Inter-Religious Council, where religious grievances could be aired and adjudicated without resort to political action. Mission contacts with principal religious leaders were expanded and efforts were made to exploit these contacts for the revitalization of the religious council. While the more moderate religious leaders supported this initiative, extreme militants among both Buddhists and Catholics were not forthcoming and the tension between them persists. An initiative with the Holy See in Rome has further encouraged the moderating influence of the Apostolic Delegate in Saigon. The new government is considering the formation of a "National Consultative Council" to include representatives of the religious sects and other important political factions. Labor The labor sector is a prime target for Viet Cong subversion. The Vietnamese Workers Confederation (CTV) embraces most unions and generally has a non-Communist orientation. However, its strength and support in aggressive anti-Communist actions have heretofore never been fully committed to any Vietnamese government. AID dispatched two teams of labor consultants to Vietnam and urged the AFL-CIO to directly assist the CTV. A permanent AFL-CIO representative is now in Vietnam. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] move the CTV into more aggressive anti-Communist action. We believe the CTV is now on the verge of fully committing its organizational strength to the GVN. INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS Implementation of Land Reform The Mission, with Washington encouragement, has repeatedly urged the GVN to develop a comprehensive program for land reform. An initial, positive result was the establishment of a Secretariat of Land Reform (sub-ministerial but independent) in the Cabinet reshuffle that led to Quat's downfall. Its continuation under the new government is apparently undecided. We have pressed for vigorous action. Refugees Severe floods together with increased Viet Cong activity have created an emergency refugee and disaster relief problem involving more than 200,000 Vietnamese. A program was initiated by the GVN with strong AID and voluntary agency assistance, and the problem is now under control. The International Rescue Committee, a registered American voluntary agency, will assume a sizeable part of the refugee relief burden in a private, non-governmental program. Emergency Quick-Fix Brigades To cope with other emergencies as they arise in the provinces, the Mission has begun to organize action teams composed of the province chief, the MACV sector advisor and the AID provincial representative, backstopped by their respective Saigon organizations. Flexible procedures will minimize bureaucratic impediments and enable the provincial teams to act immediately with local resources and, if necessary, obtain on a priority basis from Saigon personnel, commodities and funds. Coastal Water and Other Transportation Viet Cong interdiction of communications and transportation lines has created severe problems for the movement of foodstuffs, supplies and other commodities. Agreement was reached early in June between the GVN and AID for the urgent development of a national logistics system, with emphasis on expanding port and harbor facilities. Rural Electrification A survey team is preparing feasibility reports on three pilot electrification projects. The AID electric power project envisions providing 80 rural locations with small generating units in 1965. Urban Programs A recently completed AID study provides for a five-year $150 million low-cost housing and slum clearance project for the Saigon/Cholon area. The need for similar low-cost housing in other urban areas is being determined. A program to improve water supply facilities for 65 cities and towns is being accelerated. GVN PRESS AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS A high priority has been given to encouraging the GVN to assume greater responsibility for press briefings in Vietnam and to carry out a more aggressive external information program in order to underscore the predominant role of the GVN in the war against the Viet Cong. The installation for a GVN press center has been ready for use since mid-May, but despite continuous urgings, the GVN has yet to make use of this facility. Nor has the GVN responded to the critical need for an effective external information program. McGeorge Bundy/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
26. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 48, Memos to the President on VN Feb. 1965-Apr. 1966. Top Secret. Sent to Rusk and to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, McNaughton, and Unger under a June 28 covering memorandum from Ball, which explained that an expanded version of the paper would be circulated to the group prior to the meeting scheduled to discuss the paper on June 29. The text of the expanded paper is ibid. The text printed here, which was prepared in response to President Johnson's June 23 instruction, was drafted by Ball, with support from his staff, William Bundy, and several INR staff members. The final analysis and drafting was done by Ball. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 26, p. 23) William Bundy recalls that when Ball's paper was discussed in the Department of State on June 29 by the group to which it was circulated, it was the summary that was the focus of the discussion, and it was criticized as outlining "the worst way to lose if it came to that." The group felt that it was "absurd to insist on a new perfection just as the going was at its worst; to Asian eyes, it would have been the most cynical exit method possible." (Ibid., Ch. 27, p. 6) In light of this criticism, Ball modified his proposal in the paper he sent to the President on July 1; see Document 40. CUTTING OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM Summary This paper, written on the premise that we are losing the war in Viet-Nam, advances and supports the following propositions: 1. We cannot achieve our political objectives by expanding the bombing of North Viet-Nam. On the contrary, extending the geographical scope of our bombing will pose grave dangers of involving both Red China and the Soviet Union while isolating the United States from its friends and allies. 2. There is no assurance that we can achieve our objectives by substantially expanding American forces in South Viet-Nam and committing them to direct combat. On the contrary, we would run grave risks of bogging down an indeterminate number of American troops in a protracted and bloody conflict of uncertain outcome. This risk is so great, in fact, that those who advocate this course must sustain the burden of proof that commitment of American forces to combat will assure our objectives at an acceptable cost. 3. Combining expanded air attacks in the North with increased troop commitments in the South will not achieve the desired objective. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. 4. Since the measures discussed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above offer no assurance that we can win the war by substantially greater US commitments, we should undertake either to extricate ourselves or to reduce our defense perimeters in South Viet-Nam to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment. 5. This is our last clear chance to make this decision. If we go forward with Phase III combat, even at the present level of troop deployment, a substantial number of Americans will be killed. This will make it much harder and more costly to extricate ourselves or reduce our commitments. We should, therefore, revise current orders to return to Phase II and we should maintain our present levels of deployment while we seek to get out of the quagmire and cut our losses. 6. By pursuing a systematic and careful plan for cutting our losses we should be able to create the conditions under which we can get out of a dangerous situation without excessive loss of American prestige and influence. How To Think About the Problem To determine a proper course of action we must balance the risks and costs of a war fought by United States forces against the risks and costs of a carefully organized tactical withdrawal of the United States from South Viet-Nam or a systematic reduction of our territorial commitment to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment. Obviously, if a curtailment of our commitment in South Viet-Nam would place the United States in imminent peril, we would be justified in taking long chances in pouring troops and equipment into that beleaguered country and in running large risks of escalation. On the other hand, if we could accomplish such curtailment in a manner that would minimize the costs and dangers to the United States, the indicated formula would be quite different. The ultimate decision, therefore, involves a hard-nosed judgment as to the relative costs and dangers to America--both short-term and long-term--of these two courses of action. Plan for Cutting Our Losses Against the background of these propositions, we propose a plan that should either create the conditions for a systematic US extrication or--less likely--establish a sound basis for our continued involvement at present levels of commitment. This plan consists of the following elements: Step 1 The President should make the firm decision that he will not commit United States land forces to combat in South Viet-Nam. Step 2 We should use every occasion to re-emphasize what has been clear ever since the first Eisenhower letter/2/ but has not been recently stated--that our assistance is being provided on two explicit conditions: /2/Sent to President Diem on October 1, 1954. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2166-2167. (a) that there is a government genuinely representing the people of South Viet-Nam which continues to ask for our support; and (b) that such government maintains an adequate standard of performance, both in the conduct of the war and the making of necessary political, economic and social reforms. Step 3 1. Since Americans are dying in South Viet-Nam, the United States has both the right and duty to demand of Saigon that it fashion a stable Government of National Union. We should, therefore, make the following demarche not only on General Ky but on the leaders of all principal groups in Saigon--the Catholics, the Buddhists, the Cao Dai, the military, the Dai Viet: (a) unless, within a month's time, those leaders are able to put together a Government of National Union under civilian leadership, the United States will have to reconsider the extent of its commitment until such a Government is formed; (b) a Government of National Union must have authentic representation of all key ethnic, religious, and regional groups with a commitment to national elections as soon as hostilities cease; (c) such a Government must announce and begin to implement a broad program of political, social and economic reforms, including a cancellation of all peasant debts, land reform, seed and fertilizer programs, etc. (d) the Government must announce the essentials of the Acheson Plan/3/--including a major amnesty effort--in order to attract and protect defectors from the Viet Cong so as to provide a sound intelligence base for our military operations and a transition to a post-hostility reconstruction of South Viet-Nam as a national entity. /3/See vol. II, Document 287. The ability of the Saigon Government to accomplish these objectives is not dependent on the course of the war. If there is to be genuine unity, it can come about regardless of whether the ARVN is winning or merely holding its own during the rainy season. In fact, the worse the war, the greater the crisis that should instill a willingness to abandon internecine strife and unite against the common enemy. If no such willingness prevails in Saigon, we cannot take over the war ourselves. Step 4 If the leaders of the various factions in Saigon prove unwilling or unable to put aside petty factional jealousies and comply with the US demarche we must be prepared to follow through. We must be prepared to advise the Ky Government--or whatever government may then be in power--that we cannot maintain even the present level of our assistance. It is more than likely that a notice of this kind from the United States Government would have the effect of either (a) inducing the Ky Government to adopt an extreme nationalist position and announce it would go it alone without United States help; or (b) bring about the fall of the Ky Government in favor of a government prepared to try to find a political solution with the Viet Cong. In either event, we would not expect that American forces would leave quickly. Rather we would expect a protracted discussion between US representatives and representatives of the various Vietnamese factions. Should Ky or his successor demand the immediate removal of US forces from South Viet-Nam, he would almost certainly be ousted by more moderate elements. Even if those elements were neutralist, they would still tend to regard our presence for a period of time as essential to prolonged bargaining with the Viet Cong and Hanoi. Our willingness to cooperate in this negotiating phase could permit us to remain in South Viet-Nam for a considerable period and thus avoid any public appearance of a precipitate and undignified withdrawal. We could use this interval profitably to establish the justice and wisdom of our position with our friends and allies. We could also undertake the necessary diplomatic and economic actions in Thailand and Laos designed to offset so far as possible the immediate shock of the developments in South Viet-Nam. Defensive and Affirmative Actions In our anxiety to build up support for the struggle in South Viet-Nam, we have tended to exaggerate the consequences for US power and prestige of a tactical withdrawal from South Viet-Nam. Admittedly, such a withdrawal would create short-term problems, especially in Thailand, but by taking prompt and effective defensive and affirmative measures we should be able to avoid any serious long-term consequences. By and large, the world knows that the government in Saigon is a joke, and if our withdrawal resulted from an effort to face this problem squarely, friendly nations would not interpret it as a US failure to keep its commitments. More likely most nations would consider that we had more than kept our commitments to Viet-Nam--and that our decision to force the issue of stability was a mark of prudence and maturity. The following memorandum/4/ contains a discussion of some of the measures which should be taken to avoid damage to our position in specific countries and areas. /4/Presumably a reference to the expanded version of this paper cited in footnote 1 above. Renvoi The position taken in this memorandum does not suggest that the United States should abdicate leadership in the cold war. But any prudent military commander carefully selects the terrain on which to stand and fight, and no great captain has ever been blamed for a successful tactical withdrawal. From our point of view, the terrain in South Viet-Nam could not be worse. Jungles and rice paddies are not designed for modern arms and, from a military point of view, this is clearly what General de Gaulle described to me as a "rotten country". Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled white from twenty years of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong--as is shown by the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study/5/--are deeply committed. /5/See Document 27. Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The "government" in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no government. In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land war in South Viet-Nam would be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical withdrawal, this is it.
27. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 28, 1965, 1:05 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw it on June 28. SUBJECT The RAND Corporation has recently completed studies of Viet Cong motivation and morale based on interviews with Viet Cong PWs and defectors. The studies indicate that while older, hard-core VC have a deep commitment to Communist objectives, the younger, newer recruits have a much more shallow sense of commitment. Morale of the VC armed units has been significantly affected by air attacks within South Vietnam. Indeed, preliminary and unpublished findings based on recent interviews indicate that morale has fallen significantly over the past few months as a result of our air harassment. MOTIVATION AND MORALE The Viet Cong movement embraces a mass of Vietnamese, ranging from the casual peasant supporter who occasionally buys supplies for the Viet Cong on a trip to the local market, to the most deeply dedicated cadre in the main forces. The main forces fall into two generations of recruits: the hard-core Viet Cong cadre and Party member who usually is a Southern Vietnamese "returnee" from North Vietnam where he received, after 1954, five to ten years of systematic training and indoctrination; and the younger generation comprising those recruited mainly after 1958. The Hard Core Cadre This group fought as Viet Minh against the French. Many of them were regrouped in the North, but some remained underground in the South. These men form the backbone of the revolutionary effort in the South, which they regard as a continuation of the war of independence against the French. The regroupees were bitter at the United States and the GVN for the cancellation of 1956 reunification elections and the consequent prolonged separation from their homes in the South. Although many were antagonized by the harshness of the DRV land reform of that period, they nonetheless appear to have maintained their faith in the wisdom of the leadership in Hanoi. The Younger Generation Whereas the older group joined the Viet Cong mainly for nationalist reasons, the younger generation joined for a variety of motives: protest against social injustice at the village level, lack of opportunities on the GVN side for education and employment, avoidance of the GVN draft, fun and games. Intertwined with these as a result of Viet Cong political indoctrination is a desire to protect Vietnam from "the American imperialists and their lackey, the GVN." Although coercion is used in recruitment by the VC, it is usually combined with persuasion and patriotic appeals. Both Generations The Viet Cong claim that they "live splendidly and die gloriously," even though their living conditions are in fact miserable. Most of those interviewed believed that the war would last a long time and would end as a result of a gradual exhaustion of the enemy, rather than through a dramatic VC victory. Defections from the Viet Cong have resulted mainly from personal rather than ideological factors. While defectors and some PWs did criticize the Viet Cong, they more frequently expressed embarrassment or guilt over their own inability to stand the rigors of guerrilla life. The second generation of Viet Cong has a shallower comprehension of Communist doctrine and cites the revolution's goals as simply "peace, independence, democracy and neutralism." Both generations regard the revolution as an indigenous Southern movement, albeit with some welcome assistance from Hanoi. The nationalistic idealism of the movement is stressed rather than Socialism or Communism. Many Southerners appear uninformed on the extent of Hanoi's role in the war. RAND (and we) are convinced that the flow of defectors could be markedly increased by improved GVN treatment of its PWs. The Viet Cong is now able to convince its men that surrender to or capture by the GVN will only bring torture or execution. (As indeed it too often does.) We have a special mission out on this one now. EFFECT OF US-GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON VC BEHAVIOR On the basis of its interviews of Viet Cong captives and defectors, RAND suggests that air harassment should be a major objective of our operations in Vietnam. The Viet Cong are especially fearful of detection and attack from the air, and intensified and continuous air surveillance and harassing activities by day and night are likely to have a major disruptive effect on Viet Cong living conditions, morale, movement, and operations. Air envelopment operations, because of surprise, have a major effect on Viet Cong morale and inflict heavy losses. Recent interviews, not yet published, indicate a growing belief that the VC can no longer win the war militarily. Artillery fire is feared by the Viet Cong. Because of good Viet Cong intelligence, however, there seems to be a need for more ARVN artillery and frequent changes in the location of the pieces and concentrations. The interviews suggest that intensified ground patrolling has had a significant disruptive effect on Viet Cong operations, and that protracted ground sweeps should be assessed primarily in terms of their harassing impact rather than the casualties they inflict on the Viet Cong. RAND CONCLUSIONS "Although the interviews indicate that certain weapons, tactics and operations have a significant effect on the Viet Cong, their impact will depend not only on their scale and intensity, but also on the way they are integrated into and supported by a range of political, psychological, economic, and social programs designed to exploit fully their effects on the Viet Cong. For example, Viet Cong morale may significantly decline as a result of intensified aerial surveillance and harassment, but the rate of Viet Cong defections will continue to depend largely on the treatment the GVN accords to its Viet Cong captives and defectors. Similarly, aerial harassment and attacks may directly lower the scale, intensity and effectiveness of Viet Cong activities, but in the end only the ground forces can transform the Viet Cong from hunters into hunted, defeat them decisively, and establish complete control and security over the population." McG. B.
28. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)/1/ Washington, June 28, 1965, 6:35 p.m. /1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. JCS 2400-65. References: A. MAC 3275./2/ B. MAC 3283./3/ /2/In this telegram to Wheeler, June 26, Westmoreland discussed the disposition of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in Vietnam and stated that the United States should not make any major change in its policy of supporting the RVNAF. "It is a Vietnamese war," and "they are the only ones that can win it." (Ibid.) /3/In this telegram to Wheeler, June 27, Westmoreland discussed plans for augmenting U.S. military forces in Vietnam. (Ibid.) 1. As you know from my earlier cables we are considering urgently expanded military actions both in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Our objective in South Vietnam is to prove to the VC/DRV that they cannot win in South Vietnam. To do this we propose to increase U.S./GVN military strength to the level required to counter current and likely VC ground strength. In North Vietnam our objective is further to curtail by airstrikes their capability and will to continue support to the VC. 2. At the present time you have in-country seven Marine battalions, two Army battalions and one Australian battalion. We have en route to you six U.S. Army battalions and two additional Marine BLTs with support including an F4B squadron and other elements totaling 8,000 Marine personnel. This will provide you by 28 July a total of seventeen U.S. and one Australian battalions. There seems to be good reason to believe that Korea will provide one division; however, the timing is unclear. 3. We are considering deploying to South Vietnam the air mobile division of eight battalions, the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division with six battalions and one MAB of three BLTs, a VFMA squadron and necessary support for a further Marine augmentation of 8,000 personnel. Additionally, we propose to deploy two 105-mm howitzer battalions, one 175-mm artillery battalion and thirteen companies plus two platoons of helicopters (initially five Army and eight Marine Corps), eight platoons of Chinook helicopters and three Hawk battalions. With a field force headquarters, four additional attack fighter squadrons, and additional logistic support, the total U.S. deployment will approximate 175,000 men. The force would comprise thirty-four U.S. maneuver battalions and ten third-country maneuver battalions. 4. In your judgment, is this proposed augmentation of U.S./GVN strength sufficient to give us reasonable assurance of achieving the objective set forth in paragraph 1, assuming the VC strength continues to be of the magnitude of your present estimates? Obviously, if the VC sizably augment their forces the situation will be changed. In other words, do you need now or foresee the need for more forces than those cited in above references and summarized (I hope correctly) in preceding paragraphs. 5. Once more I must ask you to give me your reply ASAP. I must have a paper on the JCS agenda on Wednesday which reflects your views. FYI: In another cable/4/ the JCS is querying you regarding the need for additional airfields of aluminum matting which would provide you greater in-country fixed-wing air support. /4/Not further identified.
29. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 29, 1965, 9:15 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 10:18 p.m. on June 28 and repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House, the Department of Defense, and CIA. 4422. When I called on General Ky afternoon June 28 to take up several minor matters, I found him with Generals Thieu, Chieu and Co, the latter having just reported to Saigon as new MinDef. They were all sober-faced and depressed, probably in wake of discussion by Co of military situation in II Corps. Ky went straight to his principal point, need for additional US ground combat forces. He is sensing for first time difficulty which we have anticipated for some time of fielding sufficient combat-ready ARVN units to cope with growing number of VC units during next few months. He is impressed with need for injection of additional US (or other third country) forces to tide over monsoon offensive period and to take off VC pressure while mobilization measures are being taken and, to use his expression, "while rear is being cleaned up". By latter term, he appears to mean actions needed to stimulate pacification, to energize public opinion, and to establish better security measures against VC terrorists. (With regard to latter, he indulged in some reflections on need for reprisal executions of VC prisoners in retaliation for atrocities like the My Canh bombing.)/2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 20. I told him that on US side we have long been conscious of growing shortage of trained military manpower. We had justified to our govt introduction of US combat forces as means to assist in alleviation of shortage. I reminded him of our announced intention to bring in six additional battalions which, I thought, represented our maximum effort between now and August. What we might consider doing thereafter would depend upon requirements of situation as we might evaluate them. It appeared timely to me for General Co and General Westmoreland to undertake comprehensive review of military manpower requirements between now and end of calendar year, to establish goals for period in terms of year-end position to be sought and of means, particularly of personnel, required to reach it. In general terms, it seemed to me that our objective for period should be to hold population and territory presently under govt control, to blunt and bloody VC monsoon offensive and to make preparations for passage to offensive in early 1966. Generals agreed to this thumbnail estimate of situation and agreed that Co and Westmoreland should undertake analysis required. General Ky mentioned that press had questioned him with regard to command relationships in joint US/GVN ground operations. He had answered to effect that we have been accustomed to operating on basis of combat support with US helicopters and aviation and see no particular reason for drastic change. In any specific tactical situation, command would be worked out in accordance with good sense and sound military principles. He is obviously most anxious to play down issue, recognizing it is sensitive to both parties. I took advantage of discussion of US ground forces to obtain his concurrence for landing of one Marine company at Qui Nhon to add to US defensive strength in this area pending arrival of US brigade next month. This approach was made at General Westmoreland's request. With regard to current issues facing his govt, Ky said that he had just had satisfactory meeting with newspaper publishers whom he had threatened with closing on July 1. They have agreed to attempt to reduce their number to 20 by consolidations to be worked out among themselves. Those who cooperate will be allowed to continue to publish but recalcitrants will be put out of business. Ky has also given them pep talk on subject of loyalty to govt and its policies. Ky does not propose to apply censorship but those who do not show "self-control" can expect trouble from him. From subject of press, we passed to that of better communications between govt and people. Ky says he is aware of inefficiency of govt radio operations and agrees to make new efforts to improve them. I told him that we on our side were prepared to talk television if his people can show improvement in radio field. I mentioned that Barry Zorthian is our contact point for TV discussions. Since Chieu Hoi program is form of communication, I took occasion to plug for better attention to this activity. Ky indicated that it is being temporarily run out of Ministry for Psychological Warfare but eventually will be absorbed into Secretariat for Rural Reconstruction. With regard to visit to Seventh Fleet carrier, Ky indicated he would like to make trip on Thursday, July 1, following trip to Hue-Danang on Wednesday. Because of involvements with Eugene Black visit on that date,/3/ I have arranged for General Westmoreland to accompany him to carrier and thereafter bring him back to Saigon in time to meet with Mr. Black and his party. /3/Documentation on Black's visit to Saigon is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Taylor [Next documents]
|
