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30. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper and James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV. Secret. Recognizing that there are already several cooks preparing the soup, but confident that the chef is tolerant, we offer the following. Notes on a Vietnam Political Track In this proposal we suggest a three-fold initiative to be undertaken in the next two weeks. It is an initiative designed to probe the intentions of the other side more fully than has previously been attempted, to do so in such a way as to demonstrate our peaceful intent, but yet without undermining our military and political position in Vietnam. Despite the present unpromising outlook for political discussions, certain factors make the current context more favorable than future conditions might permit. The NLF remains internationally weaker than it will be once it is formally constituted as a government; the US and the USSR have not yet collided militarily in Vietnam--but by design or accident, such a collision will become increasingly likely--and dispassionate Soviet-American discussions less possible--as the conflict escalates; our room for diplomatic maneuver will become narrower as each Viet Cong outrage increases the pressure from the domestic right to retaliate against Hanoi/Haiphong and even Red China. At worst, the three-fold initiative suggested below will simply further prove the unwillingness of the other side to consider peace terms while their hopes for monsoon victories remain high. As a more favorable result, we may obtain useful new information about the views and calculations of Moscow, Hanoi, and Peking. At best, we might begin the slow process of moving the conflict to a conference table. The Proposal We suggest that three separate actions be taken, in a neutral capital (perhaps Algiers or Cairo), in Moscow, and in Washington, within the next fourteen days. The three actions are related, but need not be simultaneous; their timing should be dictated by certain other variables.
Prior to a rescheduled Algiers Conference, the U.S. should make an approach, at the highest level, to three friendly African governments of good international standing (e.g., Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Guinea). We should ask these nations to join together in conveying, on our behalf, a private message to both the DRV and NLF representatives in Algiers or elsewhere. This message should include: a. a statement of U.S. acceptance of Pham Van Dong's four points as one basis for further discussions; b. a statement of U.S. acceptance of Tran Van Do's peace proposals as another basis for further discussions; c. an offer to send U.S. officials to meet with DRV representatives secretly at any place of their choosing for informal discussions of both sets of proposals as possible bases for more formal negotiations; d. a proposal for a de facto cease-fire to be observed by both sides once these discussions are underway; e. a proposal that if these discussions show any promise, they should be enlarged to include representatives from the GVN and the NLF; f. a hope that agreement might be reached that would permit the convening of a Geneva-type conference.
A high-level U.S. official--ideally Averell Harriman--should be sent to Moscow, either without publicity or on some other pretext, in order to talk directly with Kosygin and others about Vietnam./2/ (Although the Gromyko channel has not proved promising, our efforts should not stop with him.) /2/We recognize that this is already under consideration. [Footnote in the source text.] Our emissary should clearly state (a) our determination to do whatever is necessary, regardless of the consequences, to keep South Vietnam from going Communist; (b) our view that our national prestige is inextricably tied to a non-Communist outcome in the South; (c) our concern that the actions of the VC, the DRV, and Peking may permanently damage our relations with the USSR and seriously threaten world peace; (d) our awareness of the considerable stakes that all parties, including the USSR, have in the conflict; (e) our willingness to consider face-saving compromises for a peaceful solution as long as the compromises left South Vietnam intact as a non-Communist state; (f) our interest in seeing the USSR play a peace-maker role--and get the credit--if necessary. The emissary should tell the Soviets of our initiative with the neutral states. He should ask for Kosygin's personal views on an urgent basis, to be transmitted back to the President.
On the basis of the outcome of the Moscow conversation, or perhaps in conjunction with both the Moscow and Neutral initiative, the President should authorize a 7-10 day pause in our air strikes against North Vietnam. The fact of this pause should be communicated to both the Soviets and the Neutrals. Public announcement by the White House should probably be avoided, however, so that we can retaliate if necessary against unusual spectaculars--and reinstitute the air strikes routinely if the initiatives produce no results. C
31. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Saigon, June 30, 1965, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. MAC 3320. Ref: A. JCS 2400-65, 290035Z. B. Saigon 4422 to State, 29 June./2/ /2/Documents 28 and 29. 1. We have no evidence, to date, that the DRV and/or the Viet Cong have any inclination to modify their objectives with respect to SVN, or their basic methods for attainment of these objectives. While we can only conjecture as to the extent to which US air action against DRV will be expanded, or what international initiatives may be taken over the next few months, we do not believe that developments in either field will significantly alter DRV/VC intentions over the next 6 months. 2. The foregoing said, the direct answer to your basic question is "no." In other words, a force of 34 US maneuver battalions and 10 3d country maneuver battalions together with appropriate tactical air and balanced ground combat and logistic support will not provide reasonable assurance of attaining the objective you postulate (convincing the DRV/VC they cannot win). The DRV/VC are too deeply committed to be influenced by anything but application of overpowering force. Consequently, while infusion of US/3d country combat strength on the scale contemplated should reestablish the military balance by the end of December, it will not per se cause the enemy to back off. 3. As you fully appreciate, the build up from the 17 maneuver battalions, in position on 1 August, to 40 plus battalions will extend throughout the remainder of the calendar year. Thus, over the next few months, the enemy will retain the capability of overrunning isolated district capitals; of severely interdicting land routes of communications; and of consolidating the rural areas he now dominates. As of January, and providing that the RVNAF has held its own in strength and combat effectiveness, we should be in a position to begin to wrest the military initiative, in selected areas, from the VC/PAVN forces estimated to be in SVN. At that juncture (or before), the enemy may elect to further augment his strength. 4. With the foregoing considerations in mind, I adhere to the 44 battalion package as the proper and necessary scope of deployment authority at this time. (Parenthetically, all should understand that the ROK division is a firm part of the military requirement during the next several months. If the ROK division does not materialize, a US division must be committed in its place in the same time frame.) There are very practical limitations locally in the logistics areas, quite apart from those which will predictably confront the services. We will be hard pressed to receive, and commit to combat forces of the magnitude contemplated over the next 6 months. 5. We cannot now state what additional forces may be required in 1966 to gain and maintain the military initiative. Obviously, many variables are involved--the most important of which is resources DRV may elect to commit. Instinctively, we believe that there may be substantial additional US force requirements. Analytic study of this whole subject is essential, and this we have initiated. We hope to have a fairly solid estimate by early August of the range of additional forces we may require. In this connection, following the Ambassador's conversation with AVM Ky as reported Ref B, I met with General Co yesterday and arranged for follow-on discussions between Depuy and JGS J-3 (Thang) on a closely held basis. Through Thang--and without commitment--we will seek JGS views of the future course of the war, analysis of overall force requirements and estimate of what additional forces, regular and regional, it will be within GVN capability to provide. These inputs will be of considerable value to our essentially unilateral study. 6. As seen from here, the requirement for some form of limited mobilization seems clear and pressing. Parenthetically, the impact of national decision to mobilize, albeit in limited degree, might well have more impact on Hanoi/Peking than the deployment of an army corps.
32. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, June 30, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:16 a.m. and passed to the White House. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to the President on June 30 with a covering memorandum in which he noted that the important aspects of the message were the "hard military and economic questions" outlined by Taylor. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV, Memos (C)) 4434. For the President. Whatever one may think of General Ky, he seems to be serious about fulfilling his campaign promises to stir up the country and get it on a war footing. Impetuous as some of his actions have been, they seem to have the honest intent of energizing an apathetic people and creating an atmosphere of urgency where day-to-day routine has been the rule. With his hip-shooting tendencies, Ky is likely to continue to take ill-advised actions from time to time such as his breach of relations with France but it is just possible that he will be able to create a new outlook favorable to getting things done. The unhappy event of the week was, of course, the execution of Sergeant Bennett on June 24 and the bombing of the My Canh restaurant on the following day. In combination, these two events constitute the bloodiest Viet Cong atrocity which we have suffered and forecast a new technique of further brutalities with the perpetrators shielded by threats of reprisals against U.S. prisoners. It was this prospect which led the U.S. Mission to recommend that Hanoi be held responsible and be made to pay a price for this incident. It seemed to us that the enemy had escalated and by the rules of the game we should respond--otherwise we would seem to accept this kind of thing as an inevitable new way of life. I have not yet received an indication of the countervailing reasons which led to the contrary decision in Washington but hope to receive them in due course. Military activities picked up during the week with renewed indications of Viet Cong offensive intentions in Kontum Province. Commanders in that area are being faced with the difficult decision of abandoning minor towns under attack or of sending relief forces into areas favoring the ambushes of the enemy. While the former decision is most distasteful to a military commander, there will be cases, I am sure, when the shortage of ARVN units will angle [argue?] strongly for it. While the number and intensity of Viet Cong incidents were increasing, Viet Cong harassment of communications routes continued to the point that all major routes leading into II Corps are now closed. As a result, we will be obliged to use airlift to assure the delivery of essential military and civilian supplies. Up to now, General Ky has only been aware of the air war and is now learning the hard facts of the ground campaign. As I reported in Embtel 4422,/2/ he has appealed to me for additional U.S. ground forces to tide over the monsoon offensive period. I have agreed to have General Westmoreland and the Vietnamese High Command make an estimate to determine where we want to be militarily at the end of the calendar year and what forces will be required to get us there. This should be a useful planning exercise requiring the Vietnamese to face hard facts which they have sometimes preferred to ignore. /2/Document 29. As suggested above, the economic situation is becoming difficult in the face of Viet Cong interference with road and river transport. This situation, added to the hoarding activities of rice merchants, has presented the new government with a threat of a serious rice shortage. It appears to have won a short-term victory by threatening the profiteers with shooting and at the same time offering modest price increases, a deal which has obtained the promise of delivery of 50,000 tons for the government stockpile. This action meets the immediate problem but Mr. Killen will wish to discuss the longer term aspects during his consultations in Washington next week. While the economic outlook for the government is far from clear, we are impressed by the competence and motivation of the economic members of the new Cabinet. If they are kept in place a few months, we think we can make progress with them. Taylor
33. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Confidential. SUBJECT It has been suggested in some quarters that the United States today finds itself in a position in Vietnam similar to that of the French in 1954. One implication is that we must expect an outcome to our present policy similar to that which befell the French in their defeat and withdrawal of that year. The actual content and applicability of this analogy are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 1. Vietnam in 1954
The central fact of French involvement in Vietnam was the persistent seven-year effort to re-establish French colonial rule. French forces were pitted against a Communist-led revolution for national independence; at no point did France offer Vietnam the alternative of non-Communist independence. The former Emperor Bao Dai served as the political facade for France's effort to maintain control through a Mandarin elite. Saigon cabinets came and went, while vested interests among Vietnamese and Frenchmen jockeyed for power; but little progress was made toward forming a government capable of rallying Vietnamese nationalist allegiance.
By early 1953, Viet Minh forces comprised seven regular infantry divisions, with independent regiments equal in strength to two additional divisions--a total of nine divisions. In numbers, the Viet Minh had about 125,000 regulars, 75,000 full-time regional and provincial troops, and 150,000 part-time guerrillas--a total of 350,000 men. To combat these forces, the French had committed 175,000 regulars (54,000 of whom were native Frenchmen, the rest Legionnaires, Africans, etc.) and 55,000 auxiliaries, plus a naval contingent of 5,000, an Air Force contingent of 10,000 and 225,000 local forces of the three Indo-China states--a total of 470,000 men. By 1952, eight percent of France's national budget was annually allocated to the Indochina war; in 1952-53 nearly 6,000 French and Legionnaire troops were killed, as well as 7,730 of their Vietnamese allies. These impressive statistics imply heavy conventional engagements. In early 1950 the Viet Minh had shifted from guerrilla to conventional warfare, and for the next four years large-scale assaults--ranging upward to 14-battalion strikes--were not uncommon. In 1952 a three-division assault in one province forced the withdrawal of over 20,000 French troops. By 1953 the French were generally engaged in a holding action; the brunt of their forces were tied to defensive duties, and the prospects for a military victory were nil. They had largely retreated to the Red River Delta in the North, some key towns in the Center, and the region around Saigon in the South. Only the equivalent of three divisions were actually available for offensive operations. By 1954 the war's unpopularity at home had brought mounting pressure for negotiation. The Geneva Conference was already under way by the time of France's spectacular tactical defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. 2. Vietnam in 1965
The two central facts of the South Vietnam situation today are the Viet Cong/Viet Minh struggle for control and the process of non-Communist social and political revolution. U.S. forces are present in rapidly growing numbers to help resist the Communists at the request of successive Saigon governments. Since Diem's fall, power in the urban South has been passing from the predominantly Catholic and French-educated elite to a more "Vietnamese," militantly nationalistic and potentially xenophobic group of which the political bonzes, students, and certain young generals are prime examples. While the Communists are seeking to exploit this revolutionary ferment, it remains something quite apart from the Viet Cong insurgency. Those who aspire to lead the revolution claim that, unless it is successful, the Viet Cong insurgency cannot be defeated. This shift in the alignment of fundamental forces is responsible for much of the political turbulence of the urban scene. It is a process that involves the striking of new power balances in the midst of a war and in the absence of parliamentary traditions or institutions for the channeling of political conflict. Despite their deep antagonisms, neither the Buddhists nor Catholics have acquired political dominance, with the result that each can check but not cancel the power of the other. The same is true of the myriad of other political factions pressing their own interests. While frequent changes in governments have had a debilitating effect on political and administrative stability, as well as on government efforts to create a national consciousness for support of the war effort, there remains an impressive resiliency among the Vietnamese people and their traditional way of life which is little affected by the cabinet changes in Saigon. Nevertheless, the most significant element of stability and strength, insofar as the struggle against Communist insurgency is concerned, remains the external factor of U.S. military, economic and political support. Without it, the country would quickly succumb to Communist domination.
The Viet Cong probably controls somewhat more than 3 million Vietnamese in half the total rural area of the country. The GVN continues to control rural areas inhabited by an estimated 4.4 million. The remaining rural inhabitants, some 5.4 million, are subject to various stages of governmental pacification, or else not controlled by either side. Viet Cong regulars, now estimated at 64,600, are full-time, professional soldiers organized in identified units of up to regimental strength. They are for the most part well trained and equipped. The regulars are distinct from an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 irregular Viet Cong who operate as guerrillas and self-defense militia troops. Another 30,000 armed political personnel staff the Viet Cong's party and administrative apparatus. The military activist figure may therefore be as high as 194,000. The Viet Cong regular force has the capability of mounting large-scale actions well above present levels of activity. Such actions could theoretically involve as many as nine simultaneous attacks in regimental strength; even a series of coordinated, widespread attacks of lesser magnitude could seriously tax South Vietnamese ability to respond with the limited general reserve battalions available. But the Viet Cong regular battalions vary widely in their combat effectiveness. Some are battle-tested veterans, while others are known to include relatively poorly trained young recruits or recently infiltrated North Vietnamese draftees with minimal training and little or no combat experience. It is not clear whether the Viet Cong will sustain their currently stepped-up pace, whether present activity is the forerunner of a major offensive, or whether Viet Cong plans have been set back by increased U.S. air activity and troop support. The concentration of Viet Cong forces in northern South Vietnam suggests Kontum, Pleiku or other GVN interior strongholds as their likely targets for a major victory, possibly accompanied by an attempt to drive to the coast from their own inland strongholds, thereby cutting South Vietnam in two. Arrayed against the Viet Cong is the South Vietnamese Army, numbering approximately 220,000 out of the total armed forces of roughly 250,000 men. The ARVN is capable of maintaining internal security in the major population centers, in some outlying areas, and along selected lines of communications. While its combat capabilities are affected by frequent command changes at top echelons, insufficient numbers of aggressive leaders and poor but improving logistics, the ARVN is well supplied with U.S. arms and equipment and has become gradually more effective in guerrilla operations. The ARVN, with continuing U.S. military support, has the capacity to prevent a Viet Cong military victory. In alliance with the ARVN are the U.S. forces in Vietnam which now approach 70,000--a combined US/GVN total of 320,000. Remaining in the background throughout the present conflict is the seasoned regular army of North Vietnam, numbering over 300,000 men. 3. France in 1954 Two key aspects of France's relation to the Indochina war in 1954 were the war's acute unpopularity and French political instability. France was never united or consistent in her prosecution of the war in Indochina. The war was not popular in France itself, was actively opposed by many on the left, and was cynically used by others for domestic political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh's political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period, in fact, were heavily influenced by his belief that the Communists would soon come to power in France.) For a long time, Paris tried to pretend that the war was not a war but a "police action." Not until July 1952 was the legal status of "veteran" given to Frenchmen who had served in Indochina, and the National Assembly never did permit conscripts to be posted to the Indochina theater. The ambiguous legal status of the conflict enabled French Communists to carry their opposition to the point of sabotage without incurring the legal charge of treason. Successive French governments had to contend with concerted and organized domestic opposition; resolutions favoring negotiation and early withdrawal were frequently proposed and occasionally passed by non-Communist parties. Leak and counter leak was an accepted domestic political tactic, and, as a result, even highly classified reports or orders pertaining to the war were often published verbatim in the pages of political journals. Pressures for negotiation and settlement mounted steadily in 1953, with a number of prominent politicians--especially Pierre Mendes-France--pushing such themes with vigor. The January 1954 Berlin conference gave new impetus to this pressure, and by February 18 it was decided that a conference should be held in Geneva in April to consider both Korea and Indochina. Dien Bien Phu fell on the day before the opening of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. Had Paris had the will to continue the fight, replacements for that battle's losses could have been sent from France, and the Indochina war might have continued for months if not years. Paris lacked the will, however, and the defeat at Dien Bien Phu made the French Government anxious to disengage as soon as possible. The fall of the Laniel cabinet on June 12 and the advent of Mendes-France as Premier on June 18 hastened the conclusion of a settlement. 4. The United States in 1965 The central themes of U.S. opinion regarding Vietnam appear to be considerable concern (over U.S. casualties, U.S. involvement, Saigon's political instability, the risks of general war, the use of air strikes and napalm, etc.) but general support for the Administration. In general, the public appears unenthusiastic but reconciled to our role in this conflict. While there is widespread questioning and uneasiness about the way in which we may be playing that role, the public as a whole seems to realize that the role must be played. Furthermore, open skepticism as to our tactics subsides at times of sharp crisis in the situation. The most articulate critics of our present policy in Vietnam have been elements within the academic community and church organizations. Although usually a minority within their own groups, they have stimulated extensive worry and inquiry in the nation as a whole. With the end of the academic year, this protest movement has temporarily subsided. Meanwhile, the Government's negotiatory posture since April 7th, and the apparent intransigence of the Communists, has made it more difficult to advocate persuasive alternatives to Washington's current track. Criticism continues to be focused on the air strikes, however, and on the U.S. Government's apparent refusal to consider negotiations with the NLF. The latest Harris Poll (June 28) shows that 62% of the public expresses overall approval of the President's handling of the Vietnam crisis. Well over 70% of the people believe that Southeast Asia will go Communist if we do not stand firm in Vietnam, and they approve the President's call for unconditional negotiations. Twenty-three percent are not sure about bombings in the North or the sending of more troops during the monsoon season. However, of those with an opinion, almost 80 percent approve of the bombing and over 60 percent believe we should send more troops. Skepticism as to the future of the conflict and our right to be involved in it are expressed by the fact that 35 percent of the people believe that China has the right to ask us out of an area so close to her borders and 32 percent believe we might get involved in a land war we can't win. The latest Gallup Poll (June 9) showed that the percentage of people who believed that we should continue our present course of action climbed from 13 to 20 percent in the last month. Those who believe that we should increase military action dropped from 23 to 21 percent and those who believed we should stop military action stayed virtually the same with only a one point rise to 26 percent. The number of those expressing no opinion dropped from 35 to 28 percent. With some exceptions, most editorialists and columnists support the President in his determination to keep Vietnam independent. This support for the broad objective is tempered by a noticeable strain of criticism over a "lack of frankness" on the part of the Administration in discussing the depth of our commitment. Such criticism was most discernible after the seeming contradiction between the Department of State and the White House over the combat role of U.S. troops and after the Government's handling of the B-52 affair. Those who oppose the Government in the press also seem to be presently concentrating on the demand that the U.S. negotiate directly with the Viet Cong and, to a lesser extent, that the bombings should be stopped again. In general, however, most newspapers appear convinced that the Administration is sincere in its desire to settle the conflict by negotiations and that the intransigence is on the Communists' side. The most vocal current comment on the Vietnam situation is coming from the Congress. Senators Morse and Gruening remain convinced that we must pull out. There is another group, somewhat larger, which could be termed "reluctant realists" whose viscera says get out but whose heads tell them the present policy is unavoidable. Senators Mansfield, Church and Fulbright seem to fall in this category. Once again, the problem is one of offering a plausible alternative that would assure the existence of a non-Communist South Vietnam. The most recent Congressional development is the attack spearheaded by Representative Melvin Laird who states that unless we go for total victory we shouldn't commit U.S. ground troops. He threatens withdrawal of Republican support in the House. It is too early to judge the appeal of this maneuver. Despite obvious Congressional disquiet, Congressional support has been demonstrated in the 512-2 vote last August on the Southeast Asia Resolution and in the votes approving the President's request for a supplemental Vietnam appropriation (408-7 and 88-3). 5. Conclusion It would seem clear from the foregoing analysis that despite superficial similarities, the situation faced by France in Vietnam in 1954 is not fundamentally analogous to that faced by the U.S. in Vietnam in 1965. France in 1954 was a colonial power seeking to reimpose its overseas rule, out of tune with Vietnamese nationalism, deeply divided in terms of French domestic opinion, politically unstable at home, the victim of seven years of warfare--the last four of them marked by military engagements on a scale far greater than anything yet encountered by the U.S. and the GVN. The U.S. in 1965 is responding to the call of a people under Communist assault, a people undergoing a non-Communist national revolution; neither our power nor that of our adversaries has been fully engaged as yet. At home we remain politically strong and, in general, politically united. Options, both military and political, remain to us that were no longer available to the French. McGeorge Bundy/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
34. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, June 30, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, 7/65 SVN Trip and Memos--Misc. Papers. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent to McNamara by Raborn, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the comments were in response to McNamara's request. SUBJECT /2/McNamara circulated a June 26 draft of his memorandum, prepared by McNaughton, to several senior Presidential advisers for comment. For text of the memorandum, as revised by McNamara and sent to the President on July 1, see Document 38. (Comments are keyed to the numbered sections in the subject memorandum) 1. We are in general accord with the main thesis of the basic paper that something like his "Course 3" is necessary if US objectives in Indochina are to be achieved or, indeed, if the US and its South Vietnamese allies are to avoid the real risk of a major political-military defeat in the next several months. We have reservations about some of the assumptions on which the argument of the memorandum seems to be based, as well as about certain specific actions advocated therein. 2. (Introduction) US objective as stated in the first sentence of the basic paper Introduction is very limited--"to force the DRV to the conference table." On its face, this seems to fall far short of US objectives since the holding of a conference itself gives no indication of the settlement that might come out of the conference. We wonder whether it was intended actually to narrow previously stated US objectives, or whether the formulation is simply a foreshortened statement. It is our understanding that US policy in Vietnam has had the three-fold end of (1) inducing, or forcing, the DRV to reduce the level of Hanoi-instigated, supported and directed insurgency in South Vietnam (this will require a combination of suasion, punitive pressure on North Vietnam itself and inflicting defeats on its insurgent forces in the field in the South) and, (2) building up the political and military strength of a non-Communist government in South Vietnam so that, (3) the US can eventually curtail its extraordinary commitment to and involvement in Vietnamese affairs but, when it withdraws, can leave behind a regime capable of coping with the level of politico-military pressures and problems likely to be prevailing at that time. At some point a conference may be a useful step in this process, but it is not an end, in itself, and probably negotiations when and if they take place will only ratify an equilibrium established by military and political power. We agree the VC may now be winning. They clearly believe they are. We doubt if it will be possible to demonstrate "to the DRV/VC that the odds are against their winning" unless and until they are in fact losing--which, as the memorandum rightly notes, is not now the case. We cannot realistically hope "to prove to the VC that they cannot win in SVN and therefore to turn the tide of the war" except by actually beginning to turn the tide against the VC. Obviously we cannot do this if US/GVN forces sustain a series of shattering setbacks during the next few weeks. To have any hope of turning the tide we must, at a minimum, avoid defeat and, under present conditions, some actions along the lines recommended in the memorandum are patently essential if defeat is to be avoided. If we succeed in not losing the war during this monsoon season (through October, say), what we will have won is a chance to settle down to a protracted struggle to contain Communist pressures from the North and help build a stable, viable independent South Vietnam. 3. (I-A) It appears obviously essential to provide a breathing spell in South Vietnam while the government of South Vietnam and its armed forces can prepare themselves to once again apply the political and military counter-insurgency measures necessary to put the VC on the defensive. It follows, therefore, that the augmentation and deployment of US forces in South Vietnam must be adequate beyond question to prevent an ARVN collapse this year. The total in-country military effect of this added US force commitment would of course depend largely on the effective use of the 49 ARVN battalions freed for other duties as well as on the use of the additional US and other foreign battalions. If foreign troops are given extensive pacification duties in heavily populated areas, the military results will probably be negligible and the political results adverse. If these troops are used to provide basic strategic defense (hence reassurance against total defeat), to assault fixed and certain concentrations of Communist regulars, and to bail out Vietnamese troops in difficulty, the results should be good. The more directly and effectively US forces can be used in combat against major concentrations and base areas of the Viet Cong, the sooner can it be demonstrated that VC/DRV efforts to win a decisive victory this year are fruitless. It should not be expected, however, that the Viet Cong will necessarily stand and fight against superior forces. Rather they may drop backward a step to smaller-scale harassment and hit-and-run raids in which they do not encounter superior US combat units. Not until they themselves are being hounded, harassed and hurt in many areas without prospect of relief will there be a likelihood of the VC/DRV seeking a respite via the conference table or by any other device. We would not normally presume to comment on the exact level and composition of forces required but we are inclined to side with MACV's views on the undesirability of tying too many US forces to the static defense of base installations. The added forces proposed would be of obvious value in giving the thinly stretched ARVN a strategic reserve it does not now have, screening the DMZ, and generally boosting Vietnamese morale, capabilities, effectiveness and fighting spirits. The net effect of the proposed B-52 sorties could, in our opinion, have a significant influence if promptly and thoroughly followed up on the ground in the areas attacked. 4. (I-B) The proposed expansion of aerial attacks on North Vietnam is probably broader than necessary, in view of our conviction that the issue must ultimately be settled in the South, and in view of some of the risks involved. The economic effects of mining the approaches to northern ports, in particular, are not in our view sufficient and in any case not likely to be quickly enough felt to warrant the awkward international political complications such action would entail. There is a better argument for choosing targets whose destruction would immediately put domestic political pressure on the Hanoi regime, e.g., dock facilities and harbor dredges, power plants and industrial targets, as well as do economic damage to Hanoi's military effort. Destroying the Haiphong harbor dredges alone would, in a short time, have a constricting effect on operation of the port, and in about six months make it virtually unusable because of silting. Moreover, if we increase the pressure on NVN as visualized, one of the quickest ways to signal our serious intent as well as protect our attacking forces would be to destroy the SAM sites and major airfields. While a major Chinese and/or Soviet response cannot be totally ruled out, the risk will not necessarily be increased by pressing our limited-objective attacks on NVN. 5. (II-A) While we approve of political gestures indicating our willingness to make a reasonable settlement in Vietnam, most of the initiatives mentioned have been tried to no avail. A serious, official high-level approach to the Soviets would almost certainly be rebuffed since it would expose them to such severe Chinese Communist criticism. This kind of approach could not be successful until we have demonstrated we can stop and turn back the VC/DRV attack and are able to face down Chinese Communist threats. Whenever this has been done and the Communist side has had enough in Vietnam, it will find a variety of doors open to a conference room and the Soviets may then assist them to pass through. We stand to gain by keeping the doors open, as we have, but not by over-stressing our anxiety to confer. 6. (II-B) The need for this type of initiative within South Vietnam is well established. The two proposals suggested are good starters but of themselves hardly scratch the surface. We feel far more attention must be devoted to the kind of civil and political programs which will be required not only to bring the insurgency under permanent control (even assuming military success), but also to permit South Vietnam to stand successfully against the Communists in the event that a negotiated settlement could be reached and the bulk of US forces withdrawn. It is certain that, in the wake of any such settlement, the Communists would continue their efforts against the Saigon government, either by political means or through outright violation of agreements. There is little point in spending US lives and treasure to obtain a conference or settlement which, in the absence of a viable non-Communist state, must lead either to US re-intervention or a subsequent Communist takeover. 7. (III) Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam. It might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a respite from attack would be one. Alternatively Hanoi might reduce the level of insurgent activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period of temporary tranquillity, domestic and international opinion would force the US to disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally, Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war turned back again in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South. This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency for which the US must be prepared.
35. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, June 30, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, 7/65 SVN Trip and Memos--Misc. Papers. Top Secret. This memorandum is designed to raise questions and not to answer them, and I am afraid it may sound unhelpful. The draft memorandum to the President of June 26/2/ seems to me to have grave limitations. /2/See footnote 2, Document 34. 1. It proposes a doubling of our presently planned strength in South Vietnam, a tripling of air effort in the north, and a new and very important program of naval quarantine. It proposes this new land commitment at a time when our troops are entirely untested in the kind of warfare projected. It proposes greatly extended air action when the value of the air action we have taken is sharply disputed. It proposes naval quarantine by mining at a time when nearly everyone agrees the real question is not in Hanoi, but in South Vietnam. My first reaction is that this program is rash to the point of folly. 2. The memorandum itself points out that the test of the success of any program in the near future will be in South Vietnam. I agree with this view. But I think it far from clear that these drastic changes will have commensurate significance in this decisive field. In particular, I see no reason to suppose that the Viet Cong will accommodate us by fighting the kind of war we desire. Fragmentary evidence so far suggests that they intend to avoid direct contact with major US forces and concentrate their efforts against the Vietnamese Army. I think the odds are that if we put in 40-50 battalions with the missions here proposed, we shall find them only lightly engaged and ineffective in hot pursuit. 3. The paper does not discuss the question of agreements with the Vietnamese Government before we move to a 200 thousand-man level. The apparent basis for doing this is simply the increasing weakness of Vietnamese forces. But this is a slippery slope toward total US responsibility and corresponding fecklessness on the Vietnamese side. 4. The paper also omits examination of the upper limit of US liability. If we need 200 thousand men now for these quite limited missions, may we not need 400 thousand later? Is this a rational course of action? Is there any real prospect that US regular forces can conduct the anti-guerrilla operations which would probably remain the central problem in South Vietnam? 5. The suggestion of a naval quarantine is particularly drastic and highly important. I think it should be separated from the rest of the paper. A blockade by mining would have both greater risks and much greater impact. It needs a kind of study it has not had (as far as I know) before it is seriously proposed. 6. This paper omits certain additional possibilities that should be considered before a specific program of pressure is adopted: (1) It is within our power to give much more drastic warnings to Hanoi than any we have yet given. If General Eisenhower is right in his belief that it was the prospect of nuclear attack which brought an armistice in Korea, we should at least consider what realistic threat of larger action is available to us for communication to Hanoi. A full interdiction of supplies to North Vietnam by air and sea is a possible candidate for such an ultimatum. These are weapons which may be more useful to us if we do not have to use them. (2) The paper passes by the possibility that stronger interdiction of north-south traffic might be possible by combining land, sea, and air action. I am not persuaded by what I have heard in casual comments of the impossibility of tightening these pressures by combined action. Is there no prospect that special forces could hold critical strong points in Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail? Is it impossible to tighten controls along the DMZ? Have we really done all we can in naval patrol? 7. The timing of an expanded effort needs examination. It is not at all clear that we should make these kinds of decisions early in July with the very fragmentary evidence available to us now on a number of critical points: the tactics of the VC, the prospects of the Ky Government, and the effectiveness of US forces in these new roles. 8. Any expanded program needs to have a clear sense of its own internal momentum. The paper does not face this problem. If US casualties go up sharply, what further actions do we propose to take or not to take? More broadly still, what is the real object of the exercise? If it is to get to the conference table, what results do we seek there? Still more brutally, do we want to invest 200 thousand men to cover an eventual retreat? Can we not do that just as well where we are? McG. B.
36. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 30, 1965, 7:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XI. Secret. RE We have had two long meetings on the planning of the political and military alternatives that grew out of our meeting with you last week./2/ Jack Valenti has given us time at 11:30 on Friday for a meeting with you, and your night reading for tomorrow will have the papers for Friday's discussion./3/ Meanwhile, I have one further thought that you may wish to be turning over in your mind between now and then. /2/The meeting "last week" was presumably the meeting held at 5:50 p.m. on June 23; see Documents 15 and 16. The two "long meetings" have not been identified with certainty, but one may have been a meeting held at 3:10 p.m. on June 29 in the Department of State, which is described in Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book as "with Sec. McNamara et al. (re Ball-McNamara paper)." (Johnson Library) /3/See Documents 43 and 44. During this week I have had a review made of the economic and informational situation in Vietnam and around the world. It is extraordinarily clear that any further action turns on what we can get the Ky government to do. In this situation, the quality and energy of our team in Saigon becomes decisive. Max Taylor is heavily preoccupied with the military situation, and the rest of his team is not geared to a full-steam operation with the new cabinet. So I begin to wonder if it would not be wise to settle hard on the plan for a Lodge-Sullivan team, and plan to get them out there together as soon as Lodge is briefed and Sullivan's successor is chosen. I have already told my brother Bill that Sullivan is the generally preferred choice for this job, and that he should accordingly find the right man quickly for Vientiane. But the decision on the timing of the Taylor-Lodge change is obviously one which only you can make. The more I think about it, the more I think the time of Lodge's takeover should be nearer 1 August than 1 September. McG. B.
37. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor) to Prime Minister Ky/1/ Saigon, July 1, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 VIET S. Secret. Transmitted to the Department of State as Enclosure 1 of airgram A-6 from Saigon, July 2. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: We of the United States Mission were very much impressed with the spirit and substance of your twenty-six point statement promulgated on June 19,/2/ which we assume is to serve as the overall guideline for impending actions by your government. Because we have been involved in many of the past plans and programs of the government which bear upon the objectives stated in this proclamation, I have asked the chiefs of United States agencies to review the twenty-six point statement and indicate their judgment as to which of the on-going plans and programs should be given top priority to accelerate the attainment of the objectives which you seek. This letter records some of their views and my own as to what needs to be done first to get decisive results fastest. /2/See footnote 3, Document 12. As I see it, the basic problem facing your government in the coming months is to increase the military effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces in relation to that of the Viet Cong while building the national economy and the national morale. We are deeply impressed that security is the first essential for the political, social and economic progress of your country and that the most praiseworthy efforts to achieve progress in these fields are of marginal utility unless a minimum level of security is established. Hence, we would say that in establishing priorities, number one should go to those measures which will increase the relative military effectiveness in the next few months. If this point of view is accepted, we would then place at the top of our list measures to remedy the critical lack of trained combat ready units in the RVNAF, particularly in the Army. The objective of the monsoon Viet Cong offensive is clearly to destroy as many ARVN units as possible; the countermeasures should be to punish the Viet Cong, to create new ARVN units and to rehabilitate those depleted in battle as rapidly as possible. Of the latter, there are presently 4 regiments and 9 battalions which are combat ineffective by reason of severe understrength which is the result of a high desertion rate as well as of enemy action. Hence, the great importance of the plans under way to increase the attractiveness of the military service and to bring down the desertion rate. The plans as we know them are well conceived, but the effect will depend upon carefully checked implementation. If the intake of manpower can be increased and desertion losses reduced, it may be possible, as General Thieu thinks, to increase the manpower goals for early 1966. To one of your military training, I need hardly comment upon the importance of good leadership as a prerequisite to improve military effectiveness. Somehow we need to learn better how to identify and reward the competent leader and identify and replace the incompetent. With regard to the latter, I have heard with regret of instances of officer failure in the presence of the enemy during recent battles. It would seem to me consistent with the state of war which the government has announced to take drastic disciplinary action against the officers who misbehave on the battlefield. The punishment of a few flagrant cases should have a salutary effect throughout the Army. It is important not only to find competent leadership but to keep it in place when found so that the presence of a strong leader may achieve a lasting effect on the unit which he commands, or on the post which he occupies. Since the fall of the Diem government, there has been a constant turnover of personnel both military and civilian which has had a most adverse effect upon the war effort. I would hope that your government would recognize the self-defeating nature of this practice and resolve to keep competent persons in place. In closing these comments on increased military effectiveness, let me say that my government will in the future as in the past continue to help with air, advisory and logistic support, with military equipment and with United States combat forces, the latter to assist in meeting the manpower shortage during this coming period. While recognizing the prime importance, in the short run, of increased military effectiveness, the correlated problems on the economic front bear heavily on both the short- and longer-term prospects for Vietnamese success in the present struggle. Like most countries in time of war, the South Vietnamese government is obliged to face a mounting budgetary deficit. Your experts and ours are in constant contact on this subject and have always worked effectively together. Thus far, they have protected the country from the potentially disastrous results of serious inflation, but I know that they are constantly concerned over its possibilities and will need your support in carrying out the anti-inflation measures which they may recommend from time to time. As has been illustrated in the recent threatened shortage of rice, there is a serious and growing problem in the distribution of commodities within South Viet-Nam. This difficulty arises both from the operations of the Viet Cong in interrupting land and river communications, and also from the hoarding and profiteering operations which you have vigorously condemned. Thus, the problem requires attention on two fronts; first, in the improvement of sea communications out of reach by the Viet Cong, and second, in the form of legal and police measures to discourage and eventually to break up hoarding and black market practices. The rice procurement and distribution agency which you have in mind is an important measure of such a program which should also include the further development of port capacities as another essential element. We are of the opinion that a great deal can be done to improve the tax collection system by bringing about a more effective collection of existing taxes and instituting certain additional taxes and customs levies. Such measures would be exactly in line with your announced intention of imposing an austere wartime regime upon the country. I believe the political value of longer-term economic and social development objectives which your government could espouse and support can be very great indeed. The key people in your economic and social ministries are well aware of the need for realistic but imaginative planning in these fields. Our people would welcome the opportunity to collaborate and assist in all possible ways. The timing of our efforts is most important because we should not attempt too much too fast to the detriment of the immediate war effort. But we should be ready to take action at the appropriate time on such an important matter as land tenure which could provide the theme for a most important reform program. I have been impressed with the complexity of this problem and the requirement for adequate time and careful preparation before embarking upon extensive measures. While most authorities seem to be in agreement that many improvements are possible and necessary, I believe they would also recommend against the diversion of the necessary administrative effort in a nation-wide reform program at this time. However, it is entirely possible to initiate certain pilot operations in a few selected provinces from which much experience could be drawn for future use. Such limited actions appear worthy of inclusion in your priority list in order to keep this idea alive. Now may I say a few words about the need to maintain the national morale in these critical times? Military and economic successes are not likely to occur or be sufficient in themselves if the national morale should begin to fail. While no one would argue this truism, it is not easy to decide what specific measures should be taken in first priority to maintain morale. Personally, I would be inclined to recommend focussing attention on the public relations field at the start. Most American observers would say that there has long been a basic problem of how to effect better communication between the government on the one hand and the people, the international world and the Viet Cong on the other. Better communication in turn is divisible into two parts, the technical and the substantial. On the technical side, we have and are continued to be prepared to assist in improving the equipment and organization in the radio and press fields. Also, when the time is propitious, we are ready to work with you at the problems incidental to the introduction of television. However, these technical improvements are of little avail unless you find persuasive spokesmen for your government able to communicate persuasive themes effectively to the three audiences which I have mentioned above. In communicating with the international world, your government has long been suffering from a dearth of official representation. At the present time, I am told that you have only seven Ambassadors in place in overseas posts. Certainly this reduced representation obliges Viet-Nam to labor under serious disadvantages in defending its case before the outside world. I have several times discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and am sure that he shares my views of the importance of recruiting and placing able Ambassadors as soon as possible. In speaking to the Viet Cong, a revitalized Chieu Hoi program might accomplish significant results in detaching the increasing number who are becoming uncertain of the outcome of the struggle. The month of May was the most successful in the history of Chieu Hoi, when over 1,000 rallies came over to our side. It is important to act quickly to take advantage of this trend and also to offset any impression that the importance of Chieu Hoi has been downgraded in losing its ministerial status. Apart from this matter of better communication with the people, there are a number of other areas which you have mentioned in your twenty-six points which will bear importantly on national morale. A nation-wide anti-corruption program is not only possible but most important for purposes of morale. We have some very practical ideas on ways of raising the ethics and conduct of the public service particularly with regard to corruption which we would be happy to put at your disposition. You have shown a keen awareness of the need to help the war veterans, widows and orphans, a concern which all of us applaud. Justice toward these sufferers of the war will not only raise morale but will also supplement the programs for increasing the Armed Forces and controlling desertion. The last morale-building act which I should like to mention is one which I have raised before. It is the simple matter of cleaning up Saigon and other principal cities. Cleanliness is a mark of pride and self-respect, qualities which normally go with good morale. Could we not demonstrate these two qualities in a practical way by cleaning up the streets and the alleys of this beautiful capital and of the other principal towns of Viet-Nam? This has been an overly long letter, Mr. Prime Minister, but I wanted to convey to you some of our serious thoughts on the priorities which are required in the present emergency to meet the goals you have set for your government. We have resources available to support most of the measures suggested herein and are most anxious to be of help in any respect. Please let me know if there is any action which you would like from me or other members of the United States Mission. Sincerely yours, Maxwell D. Taylor/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.
38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (C). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was drafted on June 26 and revised on July 1. A covering note on a copy circulated to the Joint Chiefs on July 1 by General Wheeler indicates that the memorandum was drafted by McNaughton. (U.S. Military History Institute, Johnson Papers, Miscellaneous) SUBJECT Introduction. Our objective is to create conditions for a favorable settlement by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. Under present conditions, however, the chances of achieving this objective are small--and the VC are winning now--largely because the ratio of guerrilla to anti-guerrilla forces is unfavorable to the government. With this in mind, we must choose among three courses of action with respect to South Vietnam: (1) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged; (2) continue at about the present level, with US forces limited to, say, 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks while recognizing that our position will probably grow weaker; or (3) expand substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and the North Vietnamese in the North and at the same time launch a vigorous effort on the political side to get negotiations started. An outline of the third of these approaches follows. I. Expanded military moves. The following military moves should be taken together with the political initiatives in Part II below. A. Inside South Vietnam. Increase US/GVN military strength in SVN enough to prove to the VC that they cannot win and thus to turn the tide of the war. 1. Increase combined US/GVN ground strength to the level required effectively to counter the current and likely VC ground strength./2/ On the assumption that GVN strength holds its own, a decision should be made now to bring the US/3d-country deployments to 44 battalions within the next few months. Their mission would include hounding, harassing and hurting the VC should they elect not to stand and fight. General Westmoreland says that infusion of such forces with such missions on the schedule proposed "should re-establish the military balance by the end of December."/3/ He continues that "it will not per se cause the enemy to back off."/4/ General Westmoreland's recommendations are shown below: /2/Discuss with Ky his view of the military outlook, his plan for improving the situation and his appraisal of the extent to which an increase in US presence along these lines (a) would arrest the deterioration and/or (b) would have a net counter-productive "French colonial" effect. If he suggests the latter, ask how he can offset the VC strength advantage without using additional US forces. [Footnote in the source text.] /3/See Document 31. /4/Westmoreland reports that he "cannot now state what additional forces may be required in 1966 to gain and maintain the military initiative." He says that "instinctively, we believe that there may be substantial US force requirements." He has a study under way, with a fairly solid estimate due soon. [Footnote in the source text.] MACV RECOMMENDED FOR 1965
2. Deploy 13 additional US helicopter companies and 5 additional Chinook platoons to increase effectiveness of US/GVN forces. 3. Deploy additional US artillery batteries and engineers to reinforce ARVN divisions and corps. 4. Carry out 800 B-52 sorties a month in strikes against VC havens (followed promptly by entry of ground-forces into the struck areas). B. Against North Vietnam./5/ While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war material to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow into and out of North Vietnam. /5/Because of the short lead-times involved in all of these actions, no decision with respect to them is needed now. Actions to quarantine the ports or to intensify the strike program against the North can on short notice be made a part of an increasing-pressures program. [Footnote in the source text.] 1. Quarantine the movement of war supplies into North Vietnam--by sea, rail and road. a. Mine the DRV harbors. Seaborne traffic accounts for 80% of the DRV foreign trade, including practically all POL, the single import most vital to the DRV (the DRV armed forces consume 40% of the POL and transportation most of the remainder). Sixty per cent of the bottoms are Free World under charter mainly to China, but almost all POL is carried by Communist tankers. Practically all of the seaborne traffic moves through four ports. Mining of those ports could be launched on 72 hours notice, and delayed fusing (three days) could be employed to permit ships time to exit after the fields were laid. A full mining effort to plant all fields would require 97 sorties; the fields could be sustained with 38 sorties per month. b. Destroy rail and highway bridges leading from China to Hanoi. There are 15 highway, 5 railroad and 8 railroad/highway bridges north and east of Hanoi. The railroads now carry between 1600 and 1900 short tons per day. Roads to Hanoi from China can support considerable truck traffic. It would take approximately 1000 sorties to carry out strikes on the 28 bridges, with 85% probability of dropping one span in each case. c. Conduct intensive armed reconnaissance of the LOCs from China. 2. Destroy the war-making supplies and facilities of North Vietnam wherever they may be located. There are 56 unstruck targets in this category--1 explosive plant, 1 airfield, 5 supply and ordnance depots, 7 ammunition depots, 9 POL storage, 12 military barracks/headquarters, 2 communications facilities, 6 naval base/port facilities, and 13 power plants. Approximately 1650 strike sorties would be required to attack all of these targets. About half of them would be suitable for B-52 attack. Only three are likely to lead to more than 100 civilian casualties under daylight alert conditions. 3. Interdict movement of war supplies within and out of North Vietnam by an expanded strike and armed reconnaissance program against LOCs west and south of Hanoi. a. Expand strike program against bridges, ferries, railroads and roads. Other than 6 locks-and-dams targets, only 4 bridges and 4 railroad shops and yards remain unstruck in this category. These eight targets would require approximately 266 sorties. Two of them--both railroad yards in Hanoi--would probably result in more than 100 civilian casualties. Three of them--the two Hanoi railroad yards and the Yen Vien railroad yard--would be suitable for B-52 strike. b. Expand armed reconnaissance against LOCs. These LOCs south and west of Hanoi, together with the LOCs north and east of Hanoi referred to in para 1c above, should be struck by 1000 sorties a week. This would increase the total strike-plus-armed recce sorties against North Vietnam from 1800 to 5000 a month. (Efforts should be continued in Laos to interdict the "trail" there, and at sea preventing infiltration by water.) 4. Be prepared to destroy airfields and SAM sites as necessary to accomplish the objectives of sub-paras 1-3 above. C. In the United States. Even if US deployments to Vietnam are no more than 100,000 men, we should: 1. Call up selected reserve forces (approximately 100,000 men). 2. Extend tours of duty in all Services. II. Expanded political moves. Together with the above military moves, we should take the following political initiatives in order (a) to open a dialogue with Hanoi, Peking, and the VC looking toward a settlement in Vietnam, (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam until the time when settlement can be achieved, and (c) to cement the support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. While our approaches may be rebuffed until the tide begins to turn, they nevertheless should be made. A. Political Initiatives. 1. Moscow. Place a high level US representative in contact with Moscow to discuss frankly and fully with Soviet leaders our intentions and our desire to find common ground to work with them rather than come into conflict. We would reiterate that US objectives are limited but at the same time we have a firm determination to achieve them. We would stress the dangers we see to both of us in Chinese expansion, and we would recognize the Soviet need to follow a course which does not destroy its leadership in the Communist world. We would press the Soviets to avoid any deeper involvement. We would emphasize that continuation of the military phase can only be harmful to the Communist cause and urge the Soviets to step in (perhaps with British Co-Chairman) to move the situation away from war and toward a peaceful settlement. 2. United Nations. As a prelude to expansion of the military effort, we should consider once more putting before the UN the Vietnam question for discussion with the Chicoms and North Vietnamese present. They will almost surely refuse to attend and will provide us with a better position for expanding military action; but if they accept we will have the prospect of negotiations without having stopped our bombing. 3. Other international forums. In all international forums and contacts, public and private, continue to demonstrate to the world who is responsible for the trouble in Vietnam and persuade them that our course of supporting the South, including bombings, must be accepted and if possible supported. Whenever we can provide further demonstrations of Communist intransigence and refusal to treat reasonably on this question, this will strengthen our case. 4. Geneva Conference. US should propose a Geneva Conference of all world powers (including France) with the subject, "Peace in Southeast Asia." 5. NLF and DRV. GVN--and US after consultation with the GVN--should initiate contacts with the Liberation Front and North Vietnam, making clear a readiness to discuss ways and means of achieving settlement in Vietnam. 6. Chicoms. If there is any sign of Chinese willingness to begin discussions, US should contact the Chinese to set forth US position including our limited objective and the dangers to China of continuation of the war, and should press the Chinese to bring the aggression against the South to an end. 7. UK, Canada, India, France, U Thant. Consult individually with the British, Canadians, U Thant, Indians, French and possibly other neutrals to enlist them in taking peace initiatives bilaterally, multilaterally or through international organizations however best calculated to bring about the participation of Communist Governments. 8. Other initiatives. In connection with paras 1-7 above, US and GVN would make it clear they stand ready to take any reasonable action which does not endanger their military posture which might improve the chances of success of any peace initiatives. This could include a bombing "pause." It could include an explicit restatement of US intention of withdrawing from South Vietnam at the appropriate time, a South Vietnamese announcement of responsible treatment of NLF-VC personnel who remain in the South, emphasis on implementation of President's April 7 offer for economic development in South East Asia,/6/ etc. /6/See vol. II, Document 245. B. Initiatives inside South Vietnam. Take steps to induce VC defections and to increase support for the Ky government--among other steps, these: 1. Economic program. Sharply expand program of economic aid in South Vietnam--including a major construction program, junk building, increased rice and pig output, improved distribution and marketing procedures. 2. Chieu Hoi program. Improve and expand Chieu Hoi program--with a good man in charge on the US side, and bounties, amnesties, work and educational opportunities, and other inducements. III. Evaluation of the above program. A. Domestic US reaction. Even though casualties will increase and the war will continue for some time, the United States public will support this course of action because it is a combined military-political program designed and likely to bring about a favorable solution to the Vietnam problem. B. Communist reaction to the expanded programs. 1. Soviet. The Soviets can be expected to continue to contribute materiel and advisors to the North Vietnamese. Increased US bombing of Vietnam, including targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, SAM sites and airfields, and mining of North Vietnamese harbors, might oblige the Soviet Union to enter the contest more actively with volunteers and aircraft. This might result in minor encounters between US and Soviet personnel. 2. China. So long as no US or GVN troops invade North Vietnam and so long as no US or GVN aircraft attack Chinese territory, the Chinese probably will not send regular ground forces or aircraft into the war. However, the possibility of a more active Soviet involvement in North Vietnam might precipitate a Chinese introduction of land forces, probably dubbed volunteers, to preclude the Soviets' taking a pre-eminent position in North Vietnam. 3. North Vietnam. North Vietnam will not move towards the negotiating table until the tide begins to turn in the south. When that happens, they may seek to counter it by sending large numbers of men into South Vietnam. 4. Viet Cong. The VC, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways of continuing almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced with some regular PAVN units. A key question on the military side is whether POL, ammunition and cadres can be cut off and if they are cut off whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent. A key question on the political side is whether any arrangement acceptable to us would be acceptable to the VC. C. Estimate of success. 1. Militarily. The success of the above program from a military point of view turns on whether the increased effort stems the tide in the South; that in turn depends on two things--on whether the South Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they have not been tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam--a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy. (South Vietnam has 141 battalions as compared with an estimated equivalent number of VC battalions. The 44 US/3d country battalions mentioned above are the equivalent of 100 South Vietnamese battalions.) 2. Politically. It is frequently alleged that such a large expansion of US military personnel, their expanded military role (which would put them in close contact and offer some degree of control over South Vietnamese citizens), and the inevitable expansion of US voice in the operation of the GVN economy and facilities, command and government services will be unpopular; it is said that they could lead to the rejection of the government which supported this American presence, to an irresistible pressure for expulsion of the Americans, and to the greatly increased saleability of Communist propaganda. Whether these allegations are true, we do not know. The political initiatives are likely to be successful in the early stages only to demonstrate US good faith; they will pay off toward an actual settlement only after the tide begins to turn (unless we lower our sights substantially). The tide almost certainly cannot begin to turn in less than a few months, and may not for a year or more; the war is one of attrition and will be a long one. Since troops once committed as a practical matter cannot be removed, since US casualties will rise, since we should take call-up actions to support the additional forces in Vietnam, the test of endurance may be as much in the United States as in Vietnam. 3. Generally (CIA estimate). Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam. Hanoi might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a respite from attack would be one. Alternatively it might reduce the level of insurgent activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period of temporary tranquility, domestic and international opinion would force the US to disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally, Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war turned back again in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South. This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency for which the US must be prepared. Robert S. McNamara
39. Paper by Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Top Secret. According to William Bundy, Rusk did not circulate this paper before submitting it to the President. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 11) VIET-NAM 1. U.S. Objective The central objective of the United States in South Viet-Nam must be to insure that North Viet-Nam not succeed in taking over or determining the future of South Viet-Nam by force. We must accomplish this objective without a general war if possible. The "war aim" of the United States is not concerned with what the South Vietnamese would do if they were left alone. There are many problems in the country which only the South Vietnamese can solve. U.S. forces are present in South Viet-Nam only because of the aggression of Hanoi in sending men and arms into the South. If this aggression were removed, U.S. forces could be withdrawn. We would not use U.S. forces to settle issues in South Viet-Nam among the Buddhists, Catholics, the sects, the local Chinese and Cambodian communities, the Montagnards, and the genuinely "indigenous" Viet Cong. The sole basis for employing U.S. forces is the aggression from the North. 2. U.S. Commitments There can be no serious debate about the fact that we have a commitment to assist the South Vietnamese to resist aggression from the North. If the South Vietnamese were to ask us to withdraw our help, we would have to do so. There is no present likelihood that they will do so. The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world. 3. Comment on the present situation There is no question but that the situation in South Viet-Nam is critical. It is said that we are "losing"; this means that we are not making headway, but rather falling behind, in the effort to stop the infiltration and to pacify the country. But that does not mean that the Viet Cong are "winning"; they have the power to disrupt, but they are not capable of occupying and organizing the country or any major part of it. The Viet Cong can be denied a victory, even if complete pacification will be a long and tortuous prospect. 4. The Risks There are obvious risks in any engagement between free and communist countries, especially where large communist countries are contiguous to the area of conflict. But these risks are present for the communists as well. If they discover that we are less resolved than they, the prospect for the future is exceedingly dark. Moscow and Peiping do not wish a general war with us over Southeast Asia. Our problem, therefore, is to deny to Hanoi success in South Viet-Nam without taking action on our side which would force the other side to move to higher levels of conflict. If they decide to move to a larger war rather than fail to absorb South Viet-Nam, we could not shrink from that eventuality; but such a decision on their part does not appear likely. It is least likely in relation to what we do in South Viet-Nam. 5. Main Courses of Action a. Maximum South Vietnamese effort. We must use the leverage of U.S. presence and assistance to insist that South Vietnamese leaders declare a moratorium on their bickering and knuckle down to the increased effort needed to defeat the Viet Cong. They must be told bluntly that they cannot take us for granted but must earn our help by their own performance. b. A level of U.S. effort in South Viet-Nam, as a supplement to the best the South Vietnamese can do, to deny a Viet Cong success. Even present levels of U.S. forces are not yet reflected in corresponding damage to the Viet Cong. Reinforcements now in course should open the way to a war plan to engage concentrations of Viet Cong with punishing effect. c. Maintenance of present character of air action against North Viet-Nam, both for its practical effects and to establish that there is no sanctuary for participants in the war. The elimination of the sanctuary is the principal brake upon direct Chinese participation. We should not, for the present, attack targets in the immediate Hanoi-Haiphong area. Priority should be given to any need for air strikes on targets in South Viet-Nam. d. Intensify the mobilization of "other flags" in support of South Viet-Nam. e. Pursue our readiness to seek a peaceful solution through any available channel. f. Initiate as soon as possible the "Acheson Plan" in South Viet-Nam; if not for the entire country, perhaps in the III and IV Corps, or in selected provinces around Saigon. [Next documents]
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