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40. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (C). Top Secret. Sent by Ball to McGeorge Bundy on July 1, with a covering note indicating that the paper was "for inclusion in your book for the President." Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 449-454. A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM 1. A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (US) troops we deploy. No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war--which is at the same time a civil war between Asians--in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point: (a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants. (b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off. (c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment. 2. The Question to Decide: Should we limit our liabilities in South Viet-Nam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term costs? The alternative--no matter what we may wish it to be--is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of US forces, mounting US casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road. 3. Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping. The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of US troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot--without national humiliation--stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives--even after we had paid terrible costs. 4. A Compromise Solution: Should we commit US manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy--or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so? 5. Costs of Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the costs to the United States of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Viet-Nam, the credibility of our commitments and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial US forces to combat in South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we have tended greatly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached memorandum. (Tab A) 6. With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:
(1) Complete all deployments already announced (15 battalions) but decide not to go beyond the total of 72,000 men represented by this figure. (2) Restrict the combat role of American forces to the June 9 announcement,/2/ making it clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 339. (3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets nearer to the Chinese border than those already struck.
(1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South Vietnamese Government was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a settlement it will probably be because the South Vietnamese Government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal or because we go forward quietly without advance pre-arrangement with Saigon. (2) So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe that there is any flexibility in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what in their terms is complete capitulation. (3) Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers, looking towards a solution based on some application of the self-determination principle. (4) I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties (the National Liberation Front, Moscow or Peiping). Hanoi is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The National Liberation Front has been silent. (5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers with Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi's four points and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious negotiation--including no pre-conditions. (6) If the initial feelers lead to further secret exploratory talks we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through local elections or some other device. (7) The contact on our side should be handled through a non-governmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated.) (8) If progress can be made at this level the basis can be laid for a multi-national conference. At some point obviously the government of South Viet-Nam will have to be brought on board but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of Hanoi. (9) Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree that once the conference is started (a) the United States will stand down its bombing of the North, (b) the South Vietnamese will initiate no offensive operations in the South, and (c) the DRV will stop terrorism and other aggressive acts in the South. (10) Negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with Hanoi in the form of a multi-national agreement guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to supervise its execution. George W. Ball
Attachment A/3/ /3/Top Secret. PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF We have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. There are three aspects of the problem which should be considered: First, the local effect of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia. Second, the effect of our action on the credibility of our commitments around the world. Third, the effect on our position of world leadership. A. Effect on Nations in or Near Southeast Asia Free Asian reactions to a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam would be highly parochial, with each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgency, and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment to its own security based on evidence other than that provided by our actions in SVN. Within this framework, the following groupings emerge: 1. The Republic of China and Thailand, staunch allies whose preference for extreme U.S. actions, including a risk of war with Communist China, sets them apart from all other Asian nations; 2. The Republic of Korea and the Philippines, equally staunch allies whose support for strong U.S. actions short of a war with Communist China would make post-settlement reassurance a pressing U.S. need; 3. Japan, an ally that would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Russian neighbors, or both; 4. Laos, a friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-US guarantee of support in the face of increased Vietnamese-Pathet Lao pressures; 5. Burma and Cambodia, suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonizing Communist China would increase their leaning toward Peking in a conviction that the US presence is not long for Southeast Asia; and 6. Indonesia, whose opportunistic marriage of convenience with both Hanoi and Peking would carry it further in its covert aggression against Malaysia, convinced that "foreign imperialism" is a fast fading entity in the region. Of these varied reactions, the critical importance of Japan and Thailand calls for more detailed examination. Japan According to our Embassy, Japanese public opinion is largely unreceptive to our interpretation of the situation in Viet-Nam. Many if not most Japanese consider that the US is endeavoring to prop up a tottering government that lacks adequate indigenous support. Public media stress the civil war aspects of the struggle, portray Hanoi's resistance as determined and justified, and question our judgment as to the dangers of an eventual war with Communist China. The government as such supports our strong posture in Viet-Nam but stops short at the idea of a war between the US and China. Governmental leadership can--to a considerable extent--influence the public reaction in Japan. Government cooperation would, therefore, be essential in making the following points to the Japanese people: (1) US support was given in full measure, as shown by our casualties, our expenditures, and our risk-taking; and (2) the US record in Korea shows the credibility of our commitment so far as Japan is concerned. Thailand Thai commitments to the struggles in Laos and South Viet-Nam are based upon a careful evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand's security. The Thais are confident that they can contain any threats from Indochina alone. They know, however, that they cannot withstand the massive power of Communist China without foreign assistance. Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They believe American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of shoring up a Saigon regime. They now assume that we really could take over in Saigon and win the war if we felt we had to. If we should fail to do so the Thais would initially see it as a failure of US will. Yet time is on our side, provided we employ it effectively. Thailand is an independent nation with a long national history and--unlike South Viet-Nam--an acute national consciousness. It has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plagues its neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area, in the Northeast, is well in hand so far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos, with Thai-US forces occupying the western half, or by some cover arrangement. Provided we are willing to make the effort, Thailand can be a foundation of rock and not a bed of sand on which to base our political-military commitment to Southeast Asia. South Korea As for the rest of the Far East, the only serious point of concern might be South Korea. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Viet-Nam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Viet-Nam by the provision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea. B. Effect on the Credibility of Our Commitments Around the World With the exception of the nations in the Southeast Asian area, a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam should not have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments around the world. Quite possibly President de Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, but even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of our activities in South Viet-Nam. Chancellor Erhard has told us privately that the people of Berlin would be concerned by a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. But this was hardly an original thought and I suspect he was telling us what he believed we would like to hear. After all, the confidence of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on news of events half way around the world. They have much to gain by the prevention of a confrontation between East and West elsewhere and by the gradual developments of a spirit of entente that might pave the way for ultimate reunification. In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NATO allies is that we have become too preoccupied with an area which seems to them an irrelevance and may be tempted to neglect our NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest in an easier relationship between Washington and Moscow. By and large, therefore, they would be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South Viet-Nam more as new evidence of American maturity and judgment than of American loss of face. These would be the larger and longer-term reactions of the Europeans. In the short run, of course, we could expect some cat-calls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on the part of Europeans jealous of American power. But that would, in my view, be a transient phenomenon with which we could live without sustained anguish. Elsewhere around the world, I would see few unhappy implications for the credibility of our commitments. No doubt the Communists will try to gain propaganda value in Africa, but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Viet-Nam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of our support for Malaysia. C. Effect on Our Position of World Leadership On balance I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involvement than by pursuing a carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers that have--in response to our pleading--given verbal support from feelings of loyalty and dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in it is perceptibly eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard us. We have not persuaded either our friends or allies that our further involvement is essential to the defense of freedom in the Cold War. Moreover, the more men we deploy in the jungles of South Viet-Nam, the more we contribute to the growing world anxiety and mistrust.
41. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (C). Top Secret. Included in memoranda sent to the President by McGeorge Bundy on July 1; see Document 43. William Bundy later recalled that this memorandum was sent to the President at the latter's request. Bundy drafted it after helping Ball prepare his June 28 paper (Document 26) advocating U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Bundy could not agree with that conclusion, and was influenced by U. Alexis Johnson, who believed that military reports from Vietnam were too bleak and that the introduction of more than 15 U.S. battalions would cause serious problems for the South Vietnamese Government. Accordingly, Bundy concluded that "there must be a presentation to the President of a military operation looking not to early compromise on the most crucial issue, but to a genuine trial period to see if the South Vietnamese were tough and American forces effective." The memorandum printed here was a summary of a longer memorandum, dated June 29, entitled "Holding On in South Vietnam," which was discussed on June 30 by the senior review group that earlier had discussed Ball's June 28 paper. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 26, p. 26 and Ch. 27, p. 7) Bundy's June 29 memorandum is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV. A "MIDDLE WAY" COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM This memorandum advocates the following military decisions as the basis for US action during the next two months: a. Complete the deployment of the balance of the Marine force at Da Nang (early July), and of the additional six battalions from the 1st and 101st Divisions (July 15 and July 28). This would bring combat strength to 18 battalions, and overall US strength to about 85,000. b. Revise the current decision on the Air Mobile Division so that this division is alerted and could be sent to South Vietnam three weeks after decision at any time, but not decide now that it will in fact be sent. c. Start now to weed out and prepare for deployment as many combat units as possible to meet the possible military need for 44 combat battalions by the end of the year, but defer any decision on deploying these units and on calling up major reserve units. (DOD should supply the time factors and indicate whether and to what extent such deferral would prevent our meeting the possible force needs if we later decided to do so.) d. Continue to avoid the urban areas of Hanoi and Haiphong in our bombing of the DRV, being prepared to attack SAM sites and airfields if but only if they are used to inflict militarily significant losses on us. Hitting these cities would not now lead Hanoi to give in but might on the contrary toughen it. It would almost certainly lose us the support of such key governments as the UK and Japan. Above all, it would inevitably intensify the Soviet commitment and probably remove the chance of the Soviets exerting restraint in the fall. e. Defer decision on mining North Vietnamese harbors and/or cutting the rail and road lines from China to North Vietnam. The harbor operation would tend to throw North Vietnam into the arms of Communist China and diminish Soviet influence. The rail and road operation could be useful added pressure but should be held in reserve; it would have much more effect if it came after a summer stalemate, and it cannot affect DRV capabilities in the short term or perhaps to any major degree. f. Maximum air action in the South, including B-52's. This military program would be accompanied by every effort to galvanize the political and economic programs of the Ky Government, in the direction of "maximum revolution and reform, but minimum repression." We would be preparing the way for a really major reform and amnesty program to be launched in the fall if the monsoon offensive is blunted so that such action would not have a note of weakness. The program also involves the possibility of discreet contacts with Hanoi, and cut-out contacts (not identified with the US) with the Liberation Front. These would not be with any serious negotiating expectations, but to open channels and to soften both up by playing on Hanoi's fear of Peiping and the possible Liberation Front fear of being totally under Hanoi's domination. In essence, this is a program to hold on for the next two months, and to test the military effectiveness of US combat forces and the reaction of the Vietnamese army and people to the increasing US role. Basic to the program is that US combat forces would be employed on a fairly strict interpretation of the June 9 White House statement, used in combat as reserves where a battle has been or can be joined and US military advantages are greatest, not in general countryside operations. The program rejects withdrawal or negotiating concessions in any form, and equally rejects a present decision to raise our force level above about 85,000. The latter appears unwise because: a. We have not tested whether our forces can really find and hit the VC. This program gives us enough reserves to give a fair test. b. We simply do not know, and probably cannot now know, whether raising the US force level and combat involvement to the point where we take over much of the combat load would (1) cause the Vietnamese government and especially the army to let up; (2) create adverse popular reactions to our whole presence, on "white men" and "like the French" grounds. So far things have been all right while we were sticking to secure areas and were not in combat; we just don't know what will happen when we start fighting and are in contact with the people in disputed areas. At some point, we could be playing into VC hands, and negating immediate military results, thus getting into a truly disastrous situation. Again, what we need now is to test; perhaps, these fears will be groundless, but we lose little by waiting, compared to the risks. And these risks are affected by pace and timing; we might be readily accepted if we moved gradually, but arouse the world fears and adverse reactions if we moved fast. c. While military effectiveness is the basic reason for holding at about 85,000, we must also reckon the Congressional and public opinion problems of embarking now on what might appear clearly to be an open-ended ground commitment. The present rationale of meeting the monsoon offensive and balancing DRV regulars has put us on a solid and sober footing for 85,000; any major increases would require a much broader base and explanation.
42. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 1, 1965, 5:50 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret. SUBJECT I have just come from another long session in the State Department on the draft papers/2/ for discussion tomorrow. These papers will offer two main alternatives: George Ball's preference for a negotiated withdrawal, and Bob McNamara's recommendation of a substantial increase of military strength, with a call-up of reserves during this summer. /2/Documents 38-41. I find that both Rusk and McNamara feel strongly that the George Ball paper should not be argued with you in front of any audience larger than yourself, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and me. They feel that it is exceedingly dangerous to have this possibility reported in a wider circle. Moreover, both of them feel great reticence about expressing their own innermost thoughts to you in front of any larger group. So they both would prefer a meeting limited to the five of us in the morning. The disadvantage of this is that it cuts you off from a chance to talk freely with some other men who have expert opinions--like Thompson and General Wheeler and Lodge (whom I can easily take care of in another way by having him read the papers and get ready to report separately to you at another time). In the light of Bob's and Dean's feeling, however, I now recommend we keep this meeting small. After you have had a chance to get your own thinking clear on the broad outlines of the problem, we can bring in Raborn, Wheeler, Thompson, and others in a later meeting for more intense discussion of a specific set of recommendations. My personal, private opinion is that both Rusk and McNamara are too diffident and that it would help you to have a few more people in the meeting. But it is a fact that they feel as they do, and this feeling will govern their effectiveness in a meeting./3/ /3/Two options were typed below Bundy's initials: "OK, Keep the meeting small" and "Speak to me." The President checked the first. McG. B.
43. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 1, 1965, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret. I attach four documents which are for consideration at the 11:00 o'clock meeting tomorrow./2/ /2/Documents 38-41. At Tab 1 is Dean Rusk's four-page statement of the basic issues. At Tab 2 is George Ball's paper on a compromise solution. At Tab 3 is Bob McNamara's recommendation for expanded military action. At Tab 4 is my brother Bill's program offering a middle course for the next two months. The positions within the government are roughly as follows: McNamara and Ball honestly believe in their own recommendations, though Bob would readily accept advice to tone down those of his recommendations which move rapidly against Hanoi by bombing and blockade. Dean Rusk leans toward the McNamara program, adjusted downward in this same way. The second-level men in both State and Defense are not optimistic about the future prospects in Vietnam and are therefore very reluctant to see us move to a 44 battalion force with a call-up of reserves. So they would tend to cluster around the middle course suggested by my brother. They would like to see what happens this summer before getting much deeper in. The Joint Chiefs are strongly in favor of going in even further than McNamara. Specifically they want now to take out the SAM site, the IL-28s, and the MIGs in the Hanoi area. My hunch is that you will want to listen hard to George Ball and then reject his proposal. Discussion could then move to the narrower choice between my brother's course and McNamara's. The decision between them should be made in about ten days, which is the point at which McNamara would like a final go-ahead on the air mobile division. I think you may want to have pretty tight and hard analyses of some disputed questions like the following: 1. What are the chances of our getting into a white man's war with all the brown men against us or apathetic? 2. How much of the McNamara planning would be on a contingency basis with no decision until August or September? 3. What would a really full political and public relations campaign look like in both the Bundy option and the McNamara option? 4. What is the upper limit of our liability if we now go to 44 battalions? 5. Can we frame this program in such a way as to keep very clear our own determination to keep the war limited? (This is another way of stating question 4.) 6. Can we get a cold, hard look at the question whether the current economic and military situation in Vietnam is so very bad that it may come apart even before this program gets into action? (I don't believe that it is that bad, but no one seems to be really sure of the facts today.) Friday's meeting/3/ is not, repeat not, for decisions, but for sharpening of the issues that you want studied. /3/July 2; see Document 44. McG. B.
44. Editorial Note At 11 a.m. on July 2, 1965, President Johnson met in the Cabinet Room of the White House with Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, George Ball, and McGeorge Bundy to discuss the four papers submitted to the President the day before dealing with Vietnam policy (Documents 38-41). The meeting lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No other contemporary record of the meeting has been found, but William Bundy recalled the decisions made by the President during the meeting: "Like a Judge, the President expected to mull over the pleadings, and gave no direct indication what his final decision would be. Instead, he plucked ideas from each of the papers, and set them in motion. Averell Harriman should travel at once to Europe and set up the faint 'cover' of visiting Moscow on a sightseeing trip. McNamara should go to Saigon in mid-July with General Wheeler and with Cabot Lodge, now picked as Taylor's successor, to look over the situation and evaluate the military plans which Westmoreland was already working to project into 1966. Ball should work intensively to refine the negotiating possibilities, with a particular eye to his latest proposal of direct contact with the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, and a secondary look at how contact with NLF representatives, through private Americans, might be arranged and to what end." (Ibid., Papers of William P. Bundy, Chapter 27, page 13)
45. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 2, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80 B 01285A, Chrono as DDP and DDCI, 1 Jan-31 Dec 65. Secret; Sensitive. SUBJECT 1. In response to your memorandum of 1 July,/2/ we agree that it would be wise to inventory various modes and methods by which contact could be made with or messages discreetly passed to the National Liberation Front (NLF) should we want to decide, now or later, to take any such action. Our suggestions on this score are set forth in the attached annex./3/ The matter of passing the particular message proposed in your 1 July memorandum is a bit more complex. /2/Document 41. /3/Entitled "Review of CIA's Capabilities To Contact NLF"; attached but not printed. 2. As we understand it, that memorandum suggests a contact or contacts designed to do two things: a. Elicit information about the strength of "southern" sentiment in the NLF and "southern" concern over growing Hanoi (i.e., "northern") domination as the war in the south expands; b. Execute what we would call a covert action operation to plant a seed (or seeds) of concern over the future fate of southerners in the NLF movement if the war continues and "Hanoi moves in absolutely to the driver's seat". 3. There would certainly be no harm in trying to exert this kind of covert psychological pressure, but we doubt if the particular operation suggested would be very fruitful. Hanoi--i.e., the leadership of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party--has been absolutely in the "driver's seat" ever since it directed the NLF's creation in 1960. It is highly unlikely that anyone has been posted abroad as an NLF representative who does not know this and who is not quite willing to accept the fact of Lao Dong control. 4. As for the information elicitation, at best our cut-out(s) would be unlikely to learn much more than the private sentiments of the particular NLF representative(s) contacted. Such information would be interesting, but not necessarily representative. The views of NLF agents abroad could easily be far out of phase with the sentiments of the cadre actually waging war in South Vietnam. Furthermore, the chances of a casual contact's achieving even this much are quite slight; for in selecting the NLF's foreign representatives, the Communist leadership would certainly make every effort to screen out the kind of individual who would harbor dissident sentiments or be prone to bare his innermost political feelings to casual contacts. This information, of course, could best be obtained in South Vietnam itself, either through agent assets or through a manipulated contact. 5. A further point to bear in mind, and an absolutely crucial one, is the extreme delicacy of any such operation. We would, of course, be operating through third country cut-outs not themselves identifiable as acting on behalf of the United States Government. If security broke down in any phase of this operation, however, the results could be damaging. If the Communists become aware of United States sponsorship of these overtures, they themselves could use this fact to our political detriment. If we sounded out the GVN in advance about making any such overtures, the reaction of the GVN's new leadership would almost certainly be adverse and our very suggestions would raise grave doubts in their minds about United States constancy and reliability. If we made such an approach without advising the GVN beforehand and the Communists should learn that these approaches were United States sponsored, the Communists could do us serious political damage with our Vietnamese allies in Saigon by ensuring that the latter were made aware of the fact that the United States was dealing with the NLF behind the GVN's back. At a minimum, if the Communists realized that such overtures were of United States instigation, they would probably discount these overtures' immediate substantive content and construe the fact of the United States initiative in mounting them as a sign that the United States was so anxious to disengage in Vietnam that it was willing to soften its adamant stand on the NLF. This, in our opinion, would be more likely to encourage Hanoi with regard to the wisdom and eventual profit of its present obdurate course than to induce any matching gestures of conciliatory reasonableness. 6. In sum, though we certainly second the idea of canvassing our assets now to determine how we might best be able to arrange discreet contact with the NLF should it ever become desirable to do so, we do not believe that the likely advantages of the particular approach outlined in your 1 July memorandum would be worth the political risks they would unavoidably entail. Richard Helms/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 3, 1965, 3:11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Unger and approved by Ball. 41. It may be that in coming weeks we will wish to establish some indirect contacts, probably through cutouts, with NLF in order to get better reading than provided by present random reports of Front's state of mind and intentions. We have in mind particularly recurring suggestions that in Front there is significant element of Sudiste thinking which, if properly nurtured, might draw at least part of NLF/VC away from Hanoi domination toward some accommodation with GVN on terms which not too unacceptable. Realize such contact, no matter how carefully managed and covered, may be leaked in such a way as to reach ears of GVN and raise with them acute worries about our intentions. While we presume there are numbers of avenues by which certain GVN officials themselves maintain more or less clandestine contact with Front, if it was learned that US maintaining such contact there would be immediate assumption we were looking for way out and intended to impose at least coalition government on SVN if not scuttle GVN outright in favor of NLF. Therefore if leaks occur we would deny categorically to GVN officials and also publicly if necessary that we have been in contact and contacts will of course have to be managed in such manner that our denial credible. Depending on what these contacts reveal and how over-all political situation develops we may later conclude it advisable to bring GVN into picture to some degree. In that case we will first wish to examine with you whether and how this can be done so as to avoid precipitating sharp and perhaps decisive loss in GVN confidence in our intentions. In order get dialogue underway with NLF and establish basis for efforts to alienate them from Hanoi we would contemplate approaching indirectly those individuals who are accessible and considered less enthusiastic about dependence on Hanoi and receptive to Sudiste appeal. We envisage approach taking following line, being conducted, of course, by someone who disclaims any official connection and whose reference to official US views would be in terms of his impression of thinking in Washington, to which he would claim to have some access: (1) You (NLF/VC) after years of fighting and privation are still getting nowhere and widening daily the gulf between yourselves and your brothers in the South. (2) Since Hanoi persists in pressing always harder in its effort to take over the South, using you in the process, and rejects all reasonable efforts which US, GVN, many neutrals and Afro-Asians and others have made to come to some peaceful settlement, you face dismal prospect. (3) Wonder to what extent we all find ourselves in this situation because there may be real misunderstanding of why US in South Viet-Nam and what it is seeking, or because we may not fully understand your true objectives. (4) Contact welcomed to see if misunderstanding can be reduced or removed for mutual benefit both our countries. (5) Central aim US is simple: a neutral Viet-Nam which is dominated by no outside power, whether from the North or elsewhere, and which can choose its own government and policies through consultation with all of its people. (6) US seeks no alliances or bases in South Viet-Nam. Persuaded US means to withdraw its forces the moment it becomes clear that efforts of North Viet-Nam to dominate and dictate to the South are at an end. (7) Do not believe you any more than we wish or consider it in your interest to make South Viet-Nam more of a bloody battleground than it already is or to be further used by the Northerners against your brothers in the South who also seek peace for your country. Hope therefore our contact can promote fruitful discussion. Your comments on foregoing plan for approach to NLF urgently requested. Rusk
47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 3, 1965, 3:13 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Unger, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Paris. 42. Deptel 41./2/ In coming weeks or months, in circumstances where it would not signal weakness, we may wish to make quiet effort to establish contact also with DRV in order explore more actively possibilities of some kind of negotiated settlement Vietnam situation. In spite of several rebuffs we and others have received to more formal, official overtures there have been indications that DRV might welcome opportunity to talk. This might be worked out through official but quiet and confidential lower level contact such as Mai Van Bo in Paris. It is possible though far from certain that North Vietnamese might wish and be able in this way to discuss position independent of Chinese. There may also be honest misapprehension on DRV part as to what is precisely our position on certain questions and direct dialogue might serve to dispel such. /2/Document 46. We would not be prepared to pay price of formal recognition of DRV which Hanoi may very well demand. This might, however, be a price we would be willing to pay for an acceptable resolution of overall problem of Vietnam, but this would be a possibility to be acknowledged only much later should it ever be possible to get fruitful discussions underway. As in case our possible contact with NLF, we recognize GVN would be immediately suspicious and most uneasy if it becomes aware of our contact with DRV. Nevertheless we presume that, as Quat once hinted to us, contact with DRV not really so great political problem and we have after all long since declared ourselves prepared to enter into discussions with any government. Therefore we believe that we should keep GVN informed if any contact established, reassuring them that this being undertaken for purpose of making sure no avenue to settlement left untried and that possibility of settlement not being obstructed by misunderstanding which could be corrected; at same time we have no intention negotiating behind their back any arrangements they could not accept and we will keep in constant consultation with them. Furthermore, they might wish to consider themselves possible utility of their making contact independent of ours, in which case we would of course also expect be kept informed. For contact with DRV we envisage some appropriate US official, depending upon locality, who could conduct conversations inconspicuously. On initial contact we would envisage he would follow line something like following: 1. US has been deeply disappointed at negative responses from Hanoi to numerous efforts made in recent months to explore peaceful means of settling unhappy Vietnam situation. 2. US position remains unchanged in that we are determined to help South Vietnam as long as this is necessary preserve that country's independence. At same time we are ready without preconditions to discuss ways of moving toward a peaceful settlement and bringing military activity to an end. 3. We have said and we mean without qualification that we seek no bases in South Vietnam and are prepared to withdraw our forces from that country as soon as its continuing independent existence is assured. We favor a neutral Vietnam. We have no designs whatsoever on North Vietnam and no intention of trying to change its kind of government. We believe the question of unification of the two parts of Vietnam is a matter for the North and South to decide when each is in a position to make a free decision; otherwise we take no position on whether Vietnam should be unified or remain at least for some time divided. 4. We have noted the four points put forward by Premier Pham Van Dong on April 8/3/ and frequently pressed since that time. We have also noted the four points put forward by the Government of South Vietnam on June 22./4/ /3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245. /4/The GVN's four points were announced in an address by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do on July 22; for text of his address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 883. We regard all of these and other statements of objectives put forward from other sources as worthy of our attention and suitable subjects for discussion. Naturally we would not enter into discussion on any understanding that the resulting conclusion would be fixed in advance and would presume this would also be the DRV position. 5. There are many elements in Premier Pham Van Dong's four points which appear to be acceptable, assuming that further discussion would confirm our understanding of what is intended. There are others which, if we correctly interpret their purport, would in our view jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and therefore not be acceptable. 6. Thus we return again to our initial thought that free and open discussion without preconditions might prove to be useful and we hope that the DRV would agree to undertake these. Your early comments requested on proposal for approach to DRV on lines set forth above. Rusk
48. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 3, 1965, 3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret; Exdis. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. Since one of the critical variables in Vietnam is the attitude of the Vietnamese toward U.S. troops, we have asked the Embassy in Saigon for a careful review of the evidence on this point to date. That review is coming next week, but in the meantime the mission has sent us a quick assessment/2/ whose summary judgment is interesting, as follows: /2/Not further identified. 1. U.S. forces have drawn a variety of local reactions which, overall, are moderate in tone and mildly favorable in content. Criticism expressed so far deals with specific localized incidents rather than broader questions of sovereignty. 2. There is general recognition of the military need for U.S. forces and respect for their effectiveness and fire power. There is some psychological letdown because U.S. forces have not quickly ended the war, and on the other hand where U.S. forces are solidly emplaced, the residents appear to be pleased with their improved physical security. There have been local episodes of friction, but there have also been reports of village opinion that U.S. troop behavior is better than that of Vietnamese. Intensive Viet Cong propaganda against U.S. presence has not been effective in secure areas, nor has there been any incident of a situation which constitutes a significant hazard to U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation or to effective prosecution of U.S. force missions. 3. The respect of one service for another probably makes this summary slightly optimistic, but it remains important and encouraging. McG. B.
49. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, July 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II(B). Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. CAP 65391. Following two telegrams, to and from Max Taylor, show that we are over the hump on the Lodge transition except for details. Taylor accepts both Lodge appointment and McNamara/Lodge visit in good cheer and his preference for a short turn-around period is in accordance with ours. I think this means that the McNamara trip should be announced Tuesday/2/ and the Lodge appointment later in the week. We will be sending draft announcements to Taylor with the notation that they are subject to your review and approval after his comment. /2/July 6. To Saigon number 39, July 3, 1965/3/ /3/The Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only During this past week the President and his principal advisers have been wrestling hard with the extent to which we should augment ground combat forces between now and the end of the year. Understand Westmoreland is filling you in on his exchanges with Wheeler, which indicate the program under consideration. We are especially concerned with the question whether a 44 battalion force would mean taking over the war to the extent that would diminish GVN and ARVN performance and perhaps at some point stimulate further Vietnamese popular opposition. No attempt was made this week to resolve the issue and we would welcome comment from you and Alex that would help us with our thinking next week. In view of far reaching decisions the President believes that it would be useful to us all if McNamara could visit Saigon starting about July 15 for five or six days. Wheeler and someone from Department would accompany. As you know, President is deeply grateful for your willingness to stay on for short period beyond your original commitment of last year but he also feels a personal obligation to that commitment. He plans to name Cabot Lodge as your successor and he could be in position to report for duty about August 15. President is very eager that Lodge should accompany McNamara in order to get fully and locally briefed before meeting Senate committee for confirmation and to take part in decisions which he must largely carry out. If Lodge should accompany McNamara this again raises question of when public announcement of your retirement and his nomination should be made. In order to avoid slightest speculation that McNamara visit led somehow to your replacement there could be advantage in announcing change in Ambassadorship when party leaves Washington for Saigon. As you know, President has unlimited regard for the job you have done and the sacrifices it has entailed on your part. I am quite sure that he would wish to have your own reactions to the handling of the changeover before pushing any buttons. Viet Nam situation is sufficiently special to set aside normal practice in which one Ambassador in no way appears until his predecessor has departed. But we also realize that handling of South Vietnamese situation between public announcement and your departure is of considerable importance. Please let me have your comments soonest. Rusk. From Saigon nr. 38, July 4, 1965/4/ /4/Also ibid. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only Party most welcome July 15 or sooner since time is pressing for decisions on deployments. Please let us have desires of party with regard to program members wish arranged. We will update US Mission estimate of situation and forward it prior to departure of party. Agree with desirability of Lodge coming with Secretary McNamara and of Washington announcement of plan for Ambassadorial succession at time of departure from Washington. However, I would not want to stay on for month as "lame duck" Ambassador, and would like to depart Saigon shortly after departure of visiting group. Suggest announcement of McNamara visit without mention of Lodge soonest since preparatory measures for visit will soon become visible and leak is likely. Lodge announcement would then be made on departure from Washington./5/ /5/In telegram 61 to Saigon, July 6, the Secretary indicated that the feeling in Washington was that it would be best to combine the announcement of the McNamara visit and the Lodge appointment. (Ibid.) The White House announced the visit and the appointment on July 8. (The New York Times, July 9, 1965) In his July 8 letter to Taylor accepting his resignation, President Johnson stated that he did so "only because I am bound to honor the understanding we had at the time of your initial appointment." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (A)) I would appreciate opportunity to comment on draft text of both announcements. Taylor. [Next documents]
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