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50. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 5, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:39 a.m. on July 5. 41. Deptels 41 and 42./2/ The following are Alex Johnson's and my comments on plans for approach to NLF and DRV contained in reftels. /2/Documents 46 and 47. In a sentence, we are vigorously opposed to these proposed approaches because (1) they are premature now or in any short term future; (2) they are highly dangerous because of the effect on the GVN of a leak, either fortuitous or deliberate on the part of Communists; and (3) by our overeagerness to negotiate, they will nullify our past and present efforts to convince the VC/DRV that we have the will and determination to turn the tide against them sooner or later--so that they had better come to terms sooner rather than later. We are convinced that we are on a sound course now and should stay on it without letting ourselves be diverted to untimely actions on either the political or the military front. We are now engaged in the early phases of the ascending military confrontation of the monsoon season. We are taking losses and will take more; the same goes for the VC. At the end of this season, it should be our purpose to have so blunted and bloodied the monsoon offensive and to have so punished the approved targets of our bombing in NVN that the VC/DRV can no longer hope for a military victory and must admit it to themselves. If we can create that picture and in addition one of readiness for a counter-offensive in 1966, we would then think Hanoi might be ready for useful contacts. But it appears highly risky to seek shortcuts such as the reftels propose, as they will encourage and stiffen the resistance of the enemy and, if known, will be disastrous to our relations with the GVN. Apart from all the foregoing considerations, this evidence of overeagerness to negotiate will tend to defeat our purpose of leading Hanoi to the conference table if only because the Communist leaders must necessarily oppose anything that we are seeking. With regard to specifics within the two proposals, we have further comments which we would like to make if, in spite of the reasons set forth above, it is decided to pursue one or both of these proposals. Taylor
51. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 6, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:29 a.m. 58. For the President. This has been a relatively quiet week of orientation and organization for the new government of Generals Thieu and Ky. We had our first substantive session with its principal members at the joint US/GVN Council meeting on Friday where we had a useful exchange of ideas on such subjects as desertion control, the mobilization of paramilitary forces and the rice situation. With regard to the latter, the GVN has established a central supply committee with full powers to deal with the urgent logistical problems relating to the distribution of rice and other commodities to population centers, generally to the north of Saigon where shortages exist. In collaboration with our representatives, the committee is developing requirements for commodity transport and then arranging for the most efficient combination of coastal shipping, airlift and escorted truck convoys. The distribution problem is becoming increasingly difficult as the Viet Cong exert mounting pressure on communications by road and inland waterways as a part of the monsoon offensive. In the course of this offensive, military action moved on at a slightly increased tempo over last week with a high level of losses on both sides. During the week ending July 3, our side lost 264 killed in action as against 881 Viet Cong killed. It is hard to believe that the Viet Cong can stand indefinitely the effect of such losses which, on our side, have made combat ineffective roughly the equivalent of two divisions. Government units in the II Corps have been particularly chewed up and are going to need an injection of new vitality which can only come from U.S. sources. I would expect General Westmoreland to seek early employment of our troops in a strike role now that both the Marines and Airborne Brigade have had time for acclimatization and experience in patrol contacts with the Viet Cong. We shall watch very closely the effect of U.S. forces committed to these first actions, expecting these early experiences to help us form some judgment as to their effectiveness and hence the extent of the requirement for additional U.S. ground forces. We had a short but pleasant visit from Eugene Black and his party. Although the timing was not ideal because of the newness of the government, nevertheless it allowed him and his colleagues to form some impression of the Viet-Nam situation. Needless to say, we are looking forward to Bob McNamara's visit and the opportunity to discuss directly with him the important problems which lie ahead. Taylor
52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Secret. SUBJECT The papers Senator Morse has given you/2/ raise two basic questions: /2/Presumably reference is to the Attachment to Document 10 and to Morse's June 29 memorandum to President Johnson in which Morse proposed that the United States ask U Thant for a Security Council meeting on Vietnam. (Ibid., Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312) (a) Whether it makes sense to use the UN to help bring about a conference on Viet-Nam; and (b) Whether an effort should be made to get a UN peace force into Viet-Nam. With regard to (b), there has not been, and there is not now, a remote possibility to get a UN peacekeeping force into Viet-Nam except as a part of a settlement with the communists. With regard to (a), I personally have discussed this further with Senator Morse, Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Stevenson. Senator Morse seemed personally relaxed during my conversations with him/3/ and also was unaware of the information which I could give him about the influences which we thought the Russians were trying to exert to bring about some sort of negotiation or discussion of Viet-Nam. He indicated that, at a recent dinner meeting with Drew Pearson and Ambassador Dobrynin, the Ambassador had been asked point-blank what the Soviet Union's attitude would be toward a Security Council call for a conference of the Geneva powers to take up the question of Southeast Asia. He reported that Dobrynin had answered that the Soviet attitude would depend upon prior talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well as on the manner of presentation to the Security Council. Senator Morse seemed to think that this left some opening. /3/Rusk met alone with Morse at 9:25 a.m. on July 2 for approximately 25 minutes. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) As you know from my memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin, I explored this with Dobrynin last Saturday./4/ He flatly denied having made any such statement and reiterated that the Soviet Union did not think that the Security Council was the proper forum to take up any such proposal. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Union would not only oppose such a Security Council resolution but would be cast in the position of a harsh advocate of the Hanoi position. There is obvious disadvantage in our forcing the Soviet Union into an even more extreme position than they have taken, since we know there is still some flexibility in the Soviet view of negotiation. /4/Rusk met with Dobrynin at 11 a.m. on July 3. A memorandum of the conversation, together with McGeorge Bundy's memorandum forwarding it to President Johnson on July 4, is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Today I discussed further UN action with Ambassador Stevenson./5/ He has the same reservations which we in the Department have about the value of an all-out vindictive debate in the Security Council at this time. However, we agreed to recommend for you the following steps involving the UN: /5/Rusk had a luncheon meeting with Stevenson on July 6. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) (a) Stevenson will consult with U Thant about the desirability of a Security Council resolution calling for a conference of the Geneva powers; U Thant could then sound out the Soviet Delegation and ascertain directly whether there is any possibility of a Soviet abstention rather than a veto. (b) We might well now present in writing to the members of the Security Council a periodic report on events since February (the date of our last report)./6/ In this way we could recapitulate the various efforts which have been made to seek a peaceful settlement, their rejection by the other side, and a summary of the situation as we see it. There could be some value in a document of this sort which would be circulated to all the members of the UN. /6/For text of this report, dated February 7, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241. (c) We would say to U Thant that if he wished himself, as Secretary General, to call for a meeting of the Geneva powers, at which meeting the question of a cessation of hostilities would be the first order of business, we would indicate our readiness for such a conference. This would be entirely consistent with our basic view that we are prepared for discussions without conditions. (d) We would also say to U Thant that we could see some advantage in his undertaking any private exploration which he could make with Hanoi, Peiping or Moscow to ascertain whether there are any openings for a peaceful settlement. Such explorations might at least indicate that he had been a possible channel if any of the parties had anything of interest to say./7/ /7/In telegram 41 to Geneva, July 7, Rusk informed Stevenson (who was in Geneva for the meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council) that he had sent these four recommendations to the President for approval. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) During a telephone conversation on July 7, Stevenson told Rusk that he had talked that morning to U Thant, who said that the Soviet Union was "out of the Viet Cong business" and Federenko had instructions not to discuss the matter with him. Thant said that any suggestion for negotiation hinged initially on U.S. acceptance of Viet Cong representation. Thant indicated that he would transmit a message to Hanoi proposing negotiations. Rusk responded to Stevenson that the United States would not support such an initiative. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) On July 8, Stevenson reported, in telegram 31 from Geneva, that in view of U.S. opposition, U Thant would not put forward a negotiating formula that included the Viet Cong as a separate party. In response to the possibilities outlined in telegram 41, Thant said that he would talk with the Soviet delegation concerning a Security Council resolution calling for a conference of the Geneva powers, but he anticipated that the Soviets would insist on including the Viet Cong or would veto the resolution. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) If you approve, we will proceed on points (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. I would recommend that I give the gist of the above to Senator Morse orally,/8/ unless you believe that he should be provided a written reply to his informal memorandum (Tab A)./9/ /8/My preference. [Footnote in the source text handwritten by Rusk.] /9/Not printed. Dean Rusk
53. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 7, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. I attach outgoing and incoming telegrams to Saigon/2/ on the subject of negotiations with the Viet Cong and with Hanoi. The sum of their meaning is that Taylor and Johnson vigorously oppose any informal approach to either the Viet Cong or Hanoi at this time. They believe that such approaches are premature because of the tough summer ahead. They think they are dangerous because of the effect of a leak on the Saigon government. They think that overeagerness to negotiate "will nullify our past and present efforts to convince the Communists that we have the will and determination to turn the tide against them sooner or later." /2/Attached were telegrams 41 and 42 to Saigon (Documents 46 and 47) and telegram 41 from Saigon (Document 50). 2. This reaction was largely predictable, but its strength is somewhat surprising. Moreover, conversations with Lodge indicate to me that he has exactly the same view. 3. But the very same day we have a further message from Saigon reporting a contact made by a southern Catholic [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] asserts that there is a whole wing of the Liberation Front that is against Hanoi and in favor of some compromise solution. Since he is an influential and respected Catholic, the Embassy takes his view more seriously than other earlier reports of division in the Viet Cong. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is exploring these divisions on his own, and the Embassy appears to be quite willing to keep in touch with him. This may mark the bare beginning of contacts among Vietnamese in the South that could be helpful. /3/Telegram 44 from Saigon, July 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) McG. B.
54. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 7, 1965, 11:52 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II(A). Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McNamara. Repeated to CINCPAC with instructions to pass to General Westmoreland, who was visiting CINCPAC headquarters. The source text contains handwritten revisions by McNamara; see footnotes 2-4 below. DEF 5319. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor. From SecDef signed McNamara. The main purpose of our visit will be to receive from you your recommendations for the number of US combat battalions, artillery battalions, engineering battalions, helicopter companies, tactical aircraft, and total military personnel to be assigned to South Vietnam between now and the end of this year; the time schedule on which such forces are required; the results which we can expect to achieve with such force levels compared to those of alternative programs; the probable requirements for additional forces next year; and the program of political contacts which you propose as a complement to your military actions--we will wish to discuss possible additional political initiatives of our own, third party initiatives, our dealings with the Soviets, and the possibility of some form of contact with DRV and/or NLF./2/ /2/Before it was revised by McNamara, the latter part of this sentence read as follows: "we will wish to discuss measures, including possible additional initiatives of our own, third party initiatives, our dealings with the Soviets, and possibility of some form of contact with DRV and/or NLF for psychological warfare and other purposes." The two most basic questions we will ask in relation to your recommendations for expanding US forces will be: A. Assuming your proposals are fully accepted, what assurance do we have that with the resulting force level we can/3/ prove to the Viet Cong they cannot win, and thereby force them to a settlement on our terms? /3/At this point, McNamara deleted the phrase "in a reasonable time." B. Will large increases in the number and involvement of US combat units and military personnel in South Vietnam cause the Vietnamese Government, and especially the Army, to let up; will it create adverse popular reactions to our presence in the country? Subsidiary questions will include: 1. How did you determine the number of US and ARVN battalions required to effectively counter the current or prospective Viet Cong forces? 2. Where do you propose to station US combat units and where and how will they be used; what casualties do you expect? 3. How long do you think it will take with your recommended forces (a) to seize the initiative, (b) to prove to the Viet Cong that they cannot win, and (c) thereby to force them to a settlement on our terms? 4./4/ Would it be wise to withdraw GVN military and paramilitary forces from certain outlying or exposed positions in order to concentrate in positions of strength and to reduce the penalties of the serious shortage of Government troops? /4/McNamara deleted the original paragraph 4 and renumbered the subsequent paragraphs. The original paragraph 4 read as follows: "4. How good and timely is our intelligence as to VC locations and activities in SVN and in the corridor, and how can it be improved?" 5. What reaction to the expansion of US and third-country forces do you expect from the VC and the DRV? 6. Is the currently approved construction program adequate for the expanded force? 7. Is the current MAP program adequate? 8. What command arrangements do you propose for the expanded US force when engaged in combat? 9. What program of military pressure (bombing, mining, etc.) against North Vietnam, in terms of the types of targets, level of effort, etc., do you propose for the next six months as a complement to your plan of action in the South? 10. How effective has been the bombing of the Laotian infiltration routes; what Laotian bombing program do you recommend for the future in terms of specific targets and level of effort? 11. How effective have been the B-52 strikes; assuming 800 B-52 sorties are available each month, what bombing program do you recommend for the future in terms of specific targets and level of effort? 12. Exclusive of B-52 sorties, how many strike sorties and how many reconnaissance sorties per month do you recommend against targets in South Vietnam during the next six months; are all of your current requirements being met; if not, why not; should we be planning on additional airfields for South Vietnam and if so, by what date are they required and where should they be placed? 13. What has been the trend of each of the major indicators (population control, area control, desertions, weapons losses, terror incidents, price level, etc.) of the success or failure of the counterinsurgency campaign over the past year? 14. How does the freedom of movement today over the railroads and the major highways and waterways compare with that of a year ago? 15. What measures do we have of the success or failure of our efforts to prevent infiltration of men and equipment by sea; has the recently expanded program reduced such infiltration; if not, why not; are additional forces required? 16. Outline and appraise the effectiveness of alternative plans (including a barrier across the 17th Parallel) for the use of US troops in Laos for the purpose of preventing infiltration of men and equipment through that country into South Vietnam. 17. If you think it is possible militarily to cut off or very substantially cut down the infiltration of North Vietnamese personnel and materiel from the North to the South, when do you believe it will begin to have an important effect on VC activities and how decisive will that effect be? 18. Has the Hop Tac Program/5/ succeeded; if, as it appears to us, it has not, review the program in detail to throw light on the causes of its failure? /5/Reference is to a plan developed by General Khanh in 1964 to concentrate military resources in the Saigon area and progressively clear areas radiating outward from the capital. 19. Outline the original plan for the expansion of the GVN military, paramilitary and police forces; the progress to date against that plan; and changes, if any, which you propose for the future. 20. Do you concur in the conclusions of the recent RAND study of the morale of VC forces?x /6/See Document 27. 21. How important is the monsoon to military operations and to the military balance, and how should we expect military prospects to change when the monsoon ends? 22. Would it be possible to implement the Acheson Plan/7/ in the near future, starting in the 4th Corps; is it feasible to initiate such a plan in a particular area before it has been proven to the Viet Cong that they cannot win? /7/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 287. 23. After the deployment of the recommended US forces, how would the GVN react to an extended pause (six or eight weeks) in the bombing of the DRV? 24. Should we consider the imposition of press censorship after the expansion of US forces? 25. What contacts do the South Vietnamese now have with the NLF and the DRV; what additional contacts would you recommend that they or the US have with those parties or the Soviets; how should such US contacts be initiated and with what notice to the GVN? Assuming our party remains in Vietnam 4 or 5 days, certain members of the party, including myself, probably should visit an aircraft carrier, the major US bases at Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Phu Bai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay, the 2d Corps Headquarters in the highlands; and the Hop Tac area. We hope it will be possible for us to avoid large ceremonial dinners. Instead, we should like to dine with small numbers of Vietnamese, US or third-country nationals in an atmosphere so informal that they will feel free to provide us their personal comments on the Vietnamese scene. Upon our return, we expect that important policy decisions will be made. These may well require major legislative and executive action (including possibly the declaration of a national emergency, the calling up of reserve forces, large additions to the Budget, etc.) for which we wish to be fully prepared.
55. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 8, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 150, Meeting of Foreign Affairs Consultants. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy on July 10. VIETNAM PANEL/2/ /2/The Vietnam panel was a sub-panel of the President's Panel on Foreign Affairs, a senior advisory group of former military leaders and statesmen selected during the 1964 Presidential campaign. The group met for the first time, at the President's request, on July 8 at 11 a.m. in the Department of State to consider a variety of problems confronting the administration. The group was divided for discussion purposes into panels on Vietnam, Europe, and Latin America. The Vietnam panel consisted of General Omar N. Bradley, John J. McCloy, Roswell Gilpatric, Arthur Larson, and Dr. George Kistiakowsky. According to William Bundy, the idea of convening the advisory panel developed in early June, and the President approved the suggestion at the beginning of July. The group received extensive briefing materials on July 7, met in separate panels on the morning of July 8, and met again for a joint discussion after lunch. President Johnson met in the White House at 6:15 p.m. on July 8 with Dean Acheson, Arthur Dean, and Robert Lovett of the Europe panel; John Cowles of the Latin America panel; and General Bradley and McCloy of the Vietnam panel, and received the group's recommendations. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 15) This group consisted of Messrs. Bradley, Gilpatric, Kistiakowsky, Larson, and McCloy. It met with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Thompson, and Mr. William Bundy. The following are highlights: 1. Stakes and Objectives in South Vietnam. The group, with the possible exception of Mr. Larson, felt that the stakes were very high indeed. They concurred in the Administration judgment that Thailand could not be held if South Vietnam were taken over, and they thought that the effects in Japan and India could be most serious. They particularly felt that the effect in Europe might also be most serious, and that de Gaulle would find many takers for his argument that the US could not now be counted on to defend Europe. They also felt that South Vietnam was a crucial test of the ability of the free world and of the US to counter the Communist tactic of "wars of national liberation," and that a US defeat would necessarily lead to worldwide questioning whether US commitments could be relied on. It was the feeling of the group that these consequences would be accentuated if the US by its own decision withdrew from South Vietnam, of if the US suffered a military defeat there. On the other hand, the group felt that the consequences would not be much reduced if a Communist takeover took place as a result of a change in government in Saigon, as a result of which the US was asked to leave. Mr. Larson appeared to dissent from this assessment, in line with his over-all view that we should be seeking UN action or serious negotiations (see para 4 below). 2. Increase of Combat Forces in South Vietnam In line with their view of the grave stakes, the group generally felt that there should be no question of making whatever combat force increases were required. Several members of the group thought that our actions to date had perhaps been too restrained, and had been misconstrued by Hanoi that we were less than wholly determined. The group urged that, in connection with any decisions for further increases, there should be a full spelling out of the military situation and the facts making the increases necessary. One or two members of the group asked whether it was possible to undertake the closing of the South Vietnamese border as a military operation. They appeared, however, to accept Secretary McNamara's statement that this would be a very fast, major operation of uncertain effect, and that the job had to be done within South Vietnam, including the possibility of major forces in the plateau area--although this currently did not seem wise because of the fact that the main operation route (Route 19) was cut in several places and would have to be fully defended before forces could be sustained in the plateau other than by air supply. 3. The Policy on Bombing of the DRV Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and Ambassador Thompson, laid out the various factors--particularly the question of Soviet reaction--that had led us not to hit Hanoi and Haiphong. The consultants appeared to accept these points, and none pressed for any early change in this policy. However, General Bradley did raise the question whether we might not conduct individual raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in reprisal for specific outrages in the South. It was noted that this should not be done for outrages confined to Americans--but noted equally that most outrages were not likely to be of this character. 4. Negotiating and International Actions There was much discussion whether it would be useful to take the South Vietnam issue to the UN. Mr. Larson argued at length for this course, but much of his discussion related to whether it should have been done in 1961 before we went into the advisory build-up. At the present time, Mr. Larson said that his soundings indicated that there would be much support in the United Nations for a simple call for the convening of a Geneva Conference. Others doubted whether there would not be hookers such as a demand for the cessation of bombing. Mr. Larson himself did not see much use in convening the Geneva Conference, and appeared to have in mind that the UN itself might act to introduce forces or police a cease-fire. Others doubted very strongly that either of these was either practical or useful, and Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dean were vehement on the subject in the later plenary session. (Mr. Dean said that this was no time to "turn over our Far East policy to the UN.") Mr. Larson's basic underlying view appeared to be grave doubt that we would get a truly viable and democratic Vietnam even by causing Hanoi to pull out, and he repeatedly queried whether what we might get as a "success" would be that much better than what we might get now. Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the real difficulty might be the difference between a South Vietnam in which individuals now in the Viet Cong were free to engage in political activity--which would certainly have its difficulties--and a South Vietnam in which the Communist Viet Cong had become a part of a coalition government and were highly likely to take over. The matter was not really developed in detail, but it was clear that the group thought we needed to look hard at just what we did expect to come out in South Vietnam--and equally clear that none of the other members of the group were prepared to buy Mr. Larson's basic thesis. As to going to the UN, it should be noted that several members of the group, while clearly opposing Mr. Larson's line, thought that it might be useful at some time--perhaps in the context of increased military commitments--to do this, in order to make clear again that we were ready for negotiations. But the general feeling was that such a move at the present time would not be useful and would be a dangerous sign of weakness. (General Bradley particularly stressed this point.) In the plenary session, Mr. Hoffman (who, like Mr. Larson, had apparently been having extensive personal contacts in the UN corridors) more or less backed Mr. Larson's thesis in favor of an early move in the UN. He thought it was essential to persuade the Afro-Asian countries we were not acting as imperialists, and that many of them did have this view. He specifically suggested a UN call for talks which would include the two Vietnams, the US/USSR/UK/France/Communist China, but also the Liberation Front. The plenary session did not pursue the question of dealing with the Liberation Front, but the matter had been raised in the Panel, and the Panel members appeared to accept Secretary Rusk's statement of the many strong reasons why this would be unwise and unproductive in terms of real negotiations, and seriously damaging to the whole view of the war on which our actions were based. 5. Prognosis of the Situation Mr. McCloy spoke at some length--both in the Panel and in the later plenary session--on the degree to which he had been impressed during the discussion with the toughness of the situation. He thought that it was most unlikely that merely blunting the monsoon offensive would bring Hanoi to a negotiating mood, and that the situation would probably remain critical for a long time. He was particularly concerned that the Soviets might be brought increasingly to what he called an "annealing" of the Sino-Soviet relationship, i.e., the Soviets competing with the ChiComs and acting on parallel lines, although with no necessary resolution of the basic policy differences between them. While others did not express themselves at length on this question, it seemed clear that Mr. McCloy's views had many takers both in the Panel and in the plenary session. In the plenary session, Mr. Dean said that he thought there was a great deal of sentiment in the country for doing whatever it took, if we were going to go on at all. Mr. Lovett made the point that it was not useful to talk about "victory", that what was really involved was preventing the expansion of Communism by force; in a sense, avoiding defeat. This view seemed to be generally shared. 6. Specific Suggestions The importance of local intelligence was particularly stressed by General Bradley, including the importance of Americans throughout the countryside. Mr. McCloy and others stressed the great importance of the closest possible contact with our allies, and wondered if more could not be done particularly with the British, and, he thought, the Germans. Mr. Larson thought that it would be useful for the government, particularly as it took further decisions, to spell out a number of points that had been bothering the public. He specifically mentioned the legal justification for bombing in the North. Mr. Cowles thought that government sources had consistently painted too rosy a picture of the situation, and Mr. Lovett joined in this view. Mr. Cowles thought that one highly popular move in South Vietnam might be for the government to abolish taxes, with the US making up the deficit through increased economic aid.
56. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 13, 1965, 3:10 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 123. Crop destruction. Following is evaluation of past crop destruction missions and recommendations for new guidelines. 1. Evaluation. Rand Corporation has prepared preliminary report (being pouched)/2/ of impressions of interviews with 33 VC captives and defectors who had experienced or observed effects of defoliation and crop destruction. Report states that spray operations have successfully destroyed crops grown by VC production units, further reducing already scarce food supply for VC combat units and forcing VC to seek food elsewhere. On the other hand, report states that spraying of crops belonging to civilians and popular belief that sprays are harmful to humans have had "significant adverse effect" on population's attitude toward GVN and US. /2/Not found. MACV, however, points out that Rand findings are based on comparatively small sampling and that other intelligence sources do not support conclusion that adverse effect of chemical crop destruction has been sufficiently extensive to be described as significant. MACV also points out that Rand findings do not reflect procedures instituted recently to assure that psywar operations planned in connection with herbicide operations are in fact carried out. MACV has drafted evaluation of crop destruction in three major VC areas since July 1964, which will be pouched as soon as staffing completed. According to MACV evaluation, Binh Thuan operation (summer 1964) destroyed 80 percent of VC crops in area, forcing VC into open to steal or purchase food. Psywar program drew 252 people out of an area in which previous psywar efforts had been singularly unsuccessful. Psywar teams successfully demonstrated to population that VC had failed to live up to their promises of protection. Phuoc Long and Phuoc Thanh operation (October 1964) destroyed 3085 hectares of VC crops. There was confusion and lowering of morale among VC and supporters following spraying, and reduction in VC ability to conduct operations. Fact that only three hundred people were resettled from a much larger number of potential refugees attributed to lack of more aggressive psywar program. Binh Dinh operation (April-May 1965) destroyed 3145 hectares of VC crops. Three hundred sixty people have been resettled, and many more are dissatisfied but forcibly detained by VC, creating definite anti-VC feeling in area. This is substantiated by reported murder of two VC cadre by villagers. Available information, which thus far continues to be scanty, indicates following: 1. Chemical crop destruction has caused hardship to VC. 2. VC have attempted with limited success to turn peasant fear of unknown chemicals and loss of food against GVN. But Rand report found no evidence population has joined VC because of herbicide operations. 3. When VC experience food shortage, initial reaction is to make greater food demands on population, who therefore frequently bear brunt of loss. But even if VC succeed in this objective, it necessitates (a) creating ill will among peasant population through seizing and taxing methods; (b) diversion of increased percentage of VC manpower from military activity to food production; (c) in some cases movement of VC units into open area in search of food, making them more vulnerable to GVN action and decreasing VC offensive capability. Rand and MACV estimate one-third to one-half of VC manpower devoted to food production. Mission has come to recommendations below based on these findings and following considerations: 1. Conditions of war are hardening. Areas tightly controlled by VC pose dilemma for GVN forces which are faced with alternatives of (a) abandoning area and its population; (b) striking with aerial bombardment and strafing; (c) undertaking ground operations supported by air strikes and artillery; or (d) destroying food and thus starving VC and population out. Viewed in this context, Mission considers chemical crop destruction poses comparatively less risk to civilian population in area. 2. To be truly effective, operations must destroy all food in fairly extensive area. 3. Most effective areas for crop destruction are now northern and central highlands, which are among most critical areas of expected VC summer offensive. 4. There will undoubtedly be some resentment on part of population whose crops are destroyed. It is therefore crucial that this resentment be directed against VC rather than GVN. Rand evidence indicates need still exists for increased psywar/civil affairs program. MACV is actively pursuing this issue. Future operations will be approved here unless increased emphasis on psywar support is planned in each operation. Mission therefore recommends: 1. Extension of crop destruction operations sufficiently to result in major VC food denial. 2. That Department's guidelines (Deptel 1055, May 7, 1963)/3/ be amended to permit operations in less remote and more populated areas, provided they are strongly VC dominated and provided each operation offers significant military gain. Taylor /3/Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. III, pp. 274-275.
57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ CM-750-65 Washington, July 14, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. (TS) US/RVN air activity against North Vietnam during June 1965 increased by approximately one-third over that performed during May. During June, 86 strikes were made against JCS-designated and special targets. Of these, 78 strikes were flown by US aircraft and eight jointly flow by US/VNAF aircraft. In addition, 69 armed reconnaissance missions were flown against LOCs, targets of opportunity, and coastal shipping. 2. (TS) During the reporting period, DRV MIGs reacted to the presence of our aircraft over North Vietnam on two occasions, both actions resulting in air combat engagements. The first engagement occurred about 45 nm south of Hanoi on 17 June between two Navy F4B Phantom II jet fighters on barrier cap patrol over Thanh Hoa Bridge and Yen Phu Barracks and four MIGs in loose trail formation. The release of a Sparrow AAM from each F4B exploded two of the four MIGs. VHF intercept indicates a third MIG may have been destroyed. Available data indicates the MIGs were engaged in routine training at time of encounter, however, when visual contact was made the MIGs changed heading to collision course with the US fighters. The fourth MIG was observed making direct landing approach to Phuc Yen. In contrast, the second occurrence on 20 June, supported by sequence of events, indicates a deliberate enemy interception effort by two MIG-17/FRESCOs against four A1H Navy aircraft while providing air cover on SAR operation for a downed USAF F4C earlier involved in air attack against Son La Barracks 100 nm west northwest of Hanoi. During an approximate five minute engagement, the MIGs fired unguided rockets at extreme range which burned out before reaching the A1Hs. One MIG was hit and exploded upon crashing. In other activity, enemy reaction has been limited to frequent, intense antiaircraft fire. US losses for the month were 14 aircraft. No VNAF aircraft were lost in June. As of 30 June 1965, 55 US aircraft were lost in air actions against North Vietnam. 3. (TS/NFD) Our air strikes have increased the time required for traffic movements from Hanoi south and have reduced the capacity and flexibility of the national transport system. Motor transportation and coastal shipping requirements have greatly increased. There are some indications that concentration on internal needs has reduced the level of logistic support to the Pathet Lao. The DRV has demonstrated the capability to infiltrate supplies to SVN from the Haiphong area by sea. Movement of military supplies overland and across water obstacles, especially Route 1A, with the advent of the monsoon season will become increasingly difficult and may block routes into Laos. However, it is felt that the capability of the PAVN to perform its mission of (1) defense of homeland, (2) to provide training for its own forces and for infiltration forces for SVN and Laos, and (3) to provide logistic support for its own forces and the Communist forces of SVN and Laos at the present level of activity has not been effected to any appreciable degree. The reduction of road capacity due to attacks of LOC targets in the southern part of the country has however limited the ability of DRV to support any major offensive beyond its own borders into Laos or SVN. 4. (S) The economic effects of the air strikes have been minor in relation to total economic activity of North Vietnam. The combined effects of transportation difficulties, loss of electric power, and disruption caused by actual or anticipated air strikes have probably reduced the rate of total output of the GNP by only a few percentage points. The volume of freight carried on the Thanh Hoa-Vinh rail lines was on the order of 440 short tons each way per day, or less than five percent of the total tonnage carried by the entire railroad system of North Vietnam. Three electric power plants, comprising about nine percent of total national generating capacity, have been rendered inoperable and will probably require at least 12-18 months for restoration. Viewed from the outside, the economic effects of the air strikes do not seem to amount to much. However, Hanoi probably has a different view. The damaged and destroyed bridges and power plants represent years of construction work which was made possible only with foreign assistance. Costs of reconstruction of the bridges, power plants, and POL storage facilities will represent about four percent of total annual investment. However, the country is barely self-sufficient in food, industrial output is small, and there are ambitious plans for economic expansion. There are strains in all elements of the economy and any disruptions add to the serious problems faced by the regime. 5. (S/LD/NFD) Assessment of the effect of our air activity on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese Government and people is based on reports received by Free World sources and from statements made by DRV officials and citizens. From an analysis of available evidence there is nothing to indicate definitely that the bombings have caused either physical damage or lowered morale to an extent that would compel the DRV to negotiate. The bombings may be factors in some reports that the North Vietnamese Government is perhaps slightly more willing to discuss a settlement. It might be conjectured, however, that a concern for preventing escalation of hostilities is another factor--and a strong one in the case of the Soviet Bloc pressure that is manifested in reported conversations in various parts of the world. Postal intercepts indicate that despite some economic upset, destruction, and suffering, there is a spirit of resistance to the air strikes. 6. (TS/NFD) In summary, the DRV still seems ready to endure further air strikes. DRV logistic support problems in southern North Vietnam have increased and further reduction of an ability to support external overt aggression has taken place. However, the strikes have not yet reduced DRV over-all military capabilities to train and support covert infiltration to South Vietnam. Preoccupation with their own internal defense, however, has affected the level of their logistic support to the Pathet Lao. Similarly, expanded civil defense duties, if prolonged, may prevent achievement of agricultural production goals--a problem of chronic concern in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, the regime at this point appears determined to persevere in its present course of action. 7. (U) At Tabs A through D are more detailed discussion of specific aspects./2/ /2/None printed. Earle G. Wheeler
58. Special Memorandum/1/ No. 18-65 Washington, July 15, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions & Initiatives--Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. Forwarded to William Bundy by Sherman Kent under a July 15 covering memorandum. SUBJECT SUMMARY The new Soviet-DRV economic and military aid agreement implies a stepup in Soviet arms shipments and will have the effect of deepening the Soviet commitment in Vietnam. Partly in order to contain the risks of this commitment, the USSR has of late intensified private approaches to the US, indicating continued interest in a negotiated settlement. At the same time, it has threatened in low key to make trouble in Berlin if the US remains unyielding in Vietnam. We believe that this combination of tactics is intended to deter further US escalation in Vietnam. It is also meant to prepare for the time when negotiations might become feasible, and the USSR can play a larger role in Vietnam. [Here follows the 6-page estimate.]
59. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Moscow, July 15, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as enclosure 1 of airgram A-120 from Moscow, July 22. The meeting was held in Premier Kosygin's office in the Kremlin. Harriman sent a summary of this conversation to the President and Secretary Rusk in telegram 138 from Moscow, July 15. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to the President on July 15, under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that what was striking about the conversation was the routine character of Kosygin's comments, including a standard exchange on Vietnam. A notation on Bundy's covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) PARTICIPANTS USSR US [Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.] Premier Kosygin asked whether the U.S. seriously believed, "speaking in human terms between ourselves," that there is a real legal government in South Vietnam. He said he could not conceive of this. "You just can't believe this," he said. "Yet the U.S., for this so-called government, sheds the blood of its own soldiers and kills defenseless Vietnamese." Governor Harriman reported that he did not want to dodge that question but that he wished at that point to put another question on the table. Does the Soviet Union really believe, he asked, that without the support and direction of the North Vietnamese there would be a serious situation today in South Vietnam? Kosygin stated that he would answer Governor Harriman's question. He said he was thoroughly familiar with Vietnam and knew that the South Vietnamese would fight with bamboo sticks, if necessary, against the current regime there. A rotten regime cannot last, he said, and he offered to cite many examples from Russian history to prove his point. This happened in 1905 and 1917 in Russia and is about to happen in Vietnam, he said. Governor Harriman noted that the Vietnam situation was, of course, a major difference between the USSR and U.S. which see this problem differently. He noted that agreement had been reached on Laos between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev during their Vienna meeting. He stated that he came here twice in 1963 to try and persuade the Soviet Government that the North Vietnamese were violating the 1962 Geneva Agreement by sending people and arms to Laos. Khrushchev, however, did not want to talk about this and only stated that the Soviets were adhering to the Agreement and that the USSR did not have any other responsibility in the matter. We are regretful, the Governor stated, that the Soviet Union, as co-chairman, did not take a hand in stopping this violation of the Agreement. In Vietnam we are absolutely certain that the NLF is aided, abetted and directed by Hanoi, he said. There is no evidence whatsoever that the NLF movement is really an indigenous uprising, or that the people of South Vietnam want to be taken over by North Vietnam. We have an expression in English, "voting with your feet." One million people left North Vietnam to go to South Vietnam in 1954, the Governor said. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have left their homes in Viet Cong-dominated areas. It is true that it has been difficult to obtain political agreement in South Vietnam because of internal frictions, largely between the Catholics and the Buddhists. (As this last phrase was being translated into Russian Kosygin laughed and said "this cannot be serious".) However, the Governor stated, not one of the rival groups in South Vietnam stands for surrender to the North. We believe firmly that the majority of people in South Vietnam want to remain independent and do not wish to be taken over by the Ho Chi Minh clique. The President has stated that we are in favor of elections there once the war is over. The very fact that there have been so many changes of government in Saigon is evidence that we are not imposing our will on the Vietnamese people. It is the people of Vietnam who must decide the future of their own government. At this point Kosygin laughed again and said directly to Governor Harriman, "You don't believe what you are saying." Governor Harriman quickly replied that Premier Kosygin had hit on exactly the reason for his presence in Moscow and that the Premier's reaction had been expressed so naturally that Governor Harriman had to believe that it was a sincere reaction. Governor Harriman stressed that what he had just been saying is the real belief of the President, his advisors, Congress, and the American people. The Eisenhower Administration, he said, had made a commitment to Vietnam in 1954 and all successive U.S. administrations had carried through this commitment. What the U.S. is doing is in response to escalation from North Vietnam. We believe, Governor Harriman said, in strict adherence to the 1954 Geneva Agreement and we had adhered to it scrupulously. But starting in 1959 and 1960 terrorism organized by the North Vietnamese had disrupted a country which had been making great strides forward economically. This terrorist action and guerrilla warfare were in accordance with the theories of Mao Tse-tung. Governor Harriman stated that it is important for Kosygin to understand that we are not mistaken in our assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. During the past 3-1/2 years we have captured many prisoners and interrogated them. The weight of the evidence is overwhelming that on the orders of Hanoi the terrorism in South Vietnam has been started, dormant Communist cells had been reactivated and more and more people had been sent to the South from North Vietnam. Now, regular units of the North Vietnamese army had been dispatched to the South. The North Vietnamese seem to believe that they can win by force. However, President Johnson has stated that the honor of the U.S. is involved in this struggle. We deeply believe that we have proof beyond question that the NLF is not a spontaneous liberation movement and that it would collapse if it were not supported by Hanoi. If the Soviet Union is so sure that we are wrong, the Governor stated, then why not accept President Johnson's proposal and discuss the situation. We could discuss the possibility for future elections in Vietnam, he said. While this was not a proposal, it would certainly be a topic which could be discussed at some possible future conference. Kosygin stated that he was not authorized to negotiate on the question of Vietnam. However, he said, since Governor Harriman had touched upon this matter, he would speak his mind frankly. He said that he was profoundly convinced that Governor Harriman did not believe what he had just said. The information presented was completely at variance with reality. The U.S. knows that there is no duly constituted government in South Vietnam, he said. There is only a clique of military men paid by the U.S. which kills Catholics and Buddhists alike. Kosygin then cited desertions from the South Vietnamese army as perhaps another example of "voting with one's feet." Our information is good, he said. If the Vietnamese people were given a real chance to vote, the Saigon clique would be thrown out. He had been to Vietnam, he said, and talked to people there he trusted 100% and he believed them. How can the U.S. say that it is helping the South Vietnamese? he asked. "This is a monstrous statement. You are killing South Vietnamese. History will never forgive the U.S. for this crime. This will always be a blot on the U.S." Kosygin stated that he would like to offer for consideration one aspect of the Vietnam situation which he had been thinking about. He stated that, as the U.S. knew, differences exist in the international communist movement on questions of war and peace between the Chinese and the Soviets. The U.S. was now doing all it could to prove the Chinese right and the Soviets wrong on this question. "You follow pro-Chinese policies," he said. You are responsible for tensions in the area and the peoples of the East are turning against you. You only have your puppets there and by your actions and resistance to national liberation movements you only prove the Chinese point that war is inevitable. This is my personal view, he cautioned, and not for the press. He went on to state that the U.S. was trying to prove that war is inevitable whenever national liberation movements arise. You are thereby, he said, taking the view of those you profess to fight. You are taking a pro-Chinese stand. Governor Harriman stated that although the Premier's words were harsh, he appreciated his speaking what was on his mind. Governor Harriman said that we have to speak frankly and openly in order to move forward in solving the problems which confront us. Kosygin replied that he had never said this to anyone else and he hoped Governor Harriman would communicate his thoughts to President Johnson. Governor Harriman stated that without sincerity we cannot solve the problems that face us and he assured Premier Kosygin that he was utterly convinced that what he had told him was the truth. Premier Kosygin stated that if he had the time he was sure that he could convince Governor Harriman that his own assessment of the Vietnam situation was the correct one. You may be convinced of what you say, he said. "If so, your convictions are completely erroneous, 100% erroneous. There are many disparate forces in South Vietnam, but by your own cruelty, by your barbarism you are uniting the people of Vietnam against you. If I were a Vietnamese, I myself would grab a stick and start to fight against you. By your actions, he said, you are helping those who favor war in the world." Indicating another engagement, he then stated he would like to bring the talk to a conclusion and asked Governor Harriman whether he could offer any new hypothesis or proposal (1) to reduce tensions in the world, or (2) to improve relations between the U.S. and USSR. "Or do you have nothing to offer?" he asked. Governor Harriman stated that Chairman Kosygin had put him in a difficult position by asserting that the President is wrong. Chairman Kosygin had to acknowledge first of all, he stated, that the President is sincere. You say you have been in Vietnam and know the situation there, but you have been deceived, the Governor said. You must accept the President's sincerity, he said, adding that he did not question Chairman Kosygin's sincerity even though he knew him to be wrong. Kosygin replied that he had not been deceived by anyone. "That is impossible." There are other sources of information than the U.S. is aware of. Your crude (gruby) actions have not only united the Vietnamese against you but will cause events in Vietnam to be repeated throughout Southeast Asia. Talks such as this, he said, will not solve the question. It will be solved, sooner or later by the people of Vietnam themselves. You cannot win by buying governments. He stated he could buy "these puppets of yours" tomorrow for one million dollars. And it is for these marionettes that you sacrifice the people of Vietnam and your own people as well, Kosygin said. Governor Harriman stated that he had come here in good faith and not to be abused. He recalled that when he was Ambassador here during the war, Marshal Stalin once told him that he accepted his sincerity because Governor Harriman had come to the Soviet Union in the 20's in order to help the Soviet people. Governor Harriman reminded Chairman Kosygin that he had had long experience with the leaders of the Soviet Union over the years and that nobody until now had questioned his good faith. He stated that he himself was not important. However, he vigorously stated that Kosygin must believe that the President is completely sincere and has no intention of allowing Ho Chi Minh, supported by the Chinese, to take over South Vietnam. We had faced a similar situation in Korea, the Governor stated, and did not flinch there. Our actions in Vietnam are based on what we believe to be incontrovertible evidence. The President is also absolutely sincere, he said, in wanting to go to the conference table. This, however, should not be interpreted as weakness. We must perhaps wait for Hanoi to realize that it cannot succeed in its efforts. Once Hanoi realizes this, the Governor said, perhaps we can then have a conference and come to some arrangement whereby the problem could be settled. In view of the Soviet dispute with Peiping, he said, he would have thought that the USSR would not favor the use of force as a means for the settlement of problems in the Far East. He assured Kosygin that the U.S. will not stand by and see country after country fall under Peiping's heel. He denied that those who supported the U.S. position in the Far East are "puppets", and asserted that many peoples in the Far East sincerely support us. The U.S. fought a bloody war with Japan in order to stop that country from taking over that area and it will not stand by and let China accomplish what Japan could not. Governor Harriman pointed out that we have great experience in the area and are well acquainted with the forces which are at work there. The way to reduce tension between the U.S. and USSR he said, was perhaps exemplified by India where both countries worked together to strengthen India's capacity to resist Peiping's aggression. But the first step in reducing tension is for the Soviet leaders to accept the sincerity and determination of the President, he said. Without that, there is little left to talk about. Premier Kosygin said that Governor Harriman was asking him to support President Johnson but that this completely contradicts the Soviet view of the problem and would be impossible for any humanist. Such an action could not be justified, he said. He stated that the Soviet people approve the actions which the Soviet Government has taken to support the Vietnamese and he was convinced that many American people do not support U.S. Government policy in Vietnam. He said that the U.S. pilots who destroy defenseless villages could not be considered heroes. No one could believe this, he said. "It would go against the grain of any humanist, any communist." Kosygin stated that when he had expounded his views, Governor Harriman had interpreted them as somewhat insulting. He said that Governor Harriman had referred to the fact that Stalin had valued his personal integrity. He stated that he had given Governor Harriman no cause for personal pique and had not meant to impugn his integrity. He added that he had been Deputy Premier during the war and knew how sharply Stalin could speak. The Soviet Union stands firmly for peaceful coexistence, he said. This view is shared by all Soviet leaders. The Soviets will continue this policy and will not embark on any military adventures. It was for this reason, he stated, that he had asked Governor Harriman whether the U.S. could offer any hypothesis to improve bilateral relations or to settle the Vietnam problem. Governor Harriman pointed out that discussions of the Vietnam situation were one possibility. Since the Soviet Union was co-chairman, he said, it should be thinking of finding ways to bring about negotiations. He emphatically stressed that President Johnson had the support of his advisors, of Congress and of the American people in pursuing his Vietnam policy. According to the latest public opinion polls in the U.S., 70% of the people supported the President. He added that he had never suggested that the USSR was in any way responsible for the acts of Hanoi and certainly not for those of Peiping. Kosygin said that the U.S. should not think that a peaceful initiative in Vietnam would be regarded as weakness. The French settlement of the Algerian war had been a sign of strength. Kosygin added that the U.S. would be making a mistake in equating Peking and Hanoi. He himself, he said, had talked to the Vietnamese leaders and knew that they do not rule out a possible political settlement. "You must find a way, an approach, to bring this about." He said that he had known Ho Chi Minh for more than thirty years and he could assure Governor Harriman that Ho is a heroic representative of the Vietnamese people, who love and admire him. The only way out in Vietnam is for the U.S. to start talks with the Vietnamese themselves and find a solution for this affair. What else is there? Fighting in Vietnam for many years to come will not help that country. He reiterated that a peaceful initiative in Vietnam would never be considered by the Soviet Union to be a sign of weakness and that the prestige of the U.S. would not sink if peaceful initiatives were undertaken. Governor Harriman replied that President Johnson is ready and anxious for talks but that thus far Hanoi had shown no interest in them. If this was Kosygin's suggestion, he said, then the U.S. will certainly follow it. Kosygin replied that "waiting is all right, but people with the noise of bombs in their ears are not anxious to negotiate." [Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.] [Next documents]
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