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70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 21, 1965, 10:20 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. SUBJECT 1. The main business of the general 11:30 meeting will be McNamara's report./2/ From 10:30 on the rest of us will be in the Cabinet Room, and my guess is that we will be ready for you earlier if you want to join us. /2/Document 67. 2. The people present will be those you checked last night,/3/ with the exception of Goodpaster and Yarmolinsky. I removed them because Bob McNamara expressed very strong feeling that there would be resentment among the JCS if junior officers were brought over while they were not. This does no immediate damage. I understand that Goodpaster has very interesting views of his own, and I will try to have a private talk with him in the next 24 hours. /3/On July 20, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to the President asking him to select from a list of possible participants those whom he wanted to attend the meeting scheduled for 11:30 a.m. on July 21 to discuss Vietnam. Johnson selected McGeorge Bundy, Moyers, Valenti, Cooper, Rusk, Ball, William Bundy, Unger, Lodge, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, McNaughton, Raborn, Helms, Rowan, and Marks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) 3. The military recommendations, as usual, are in pretty good order. On the political side, we have hard problems, also as usual. Lodge and McNamara have a disagreement on how far we should have a "peace offensive." This difference may turn out to be more apparent than real. 4. There is also a major political problem of U.S. leadership in Saigon below the level of the Ambassador. My own view is that the solution is to get not one but two outstanding deputies--Bill Sullivan and Frank Meloy. Meloy can run the ordinary Embassy work, and I think Sullivan can coordinate the pacification activities in a way in which no one else in government can. Lodge is no administrator--a fact which both McNamara and Chet Cooper report as fully confirmed from this trip. To give him two deputies is abnormal--but Vietnam is not normal. A little heat from you on the State Department would help, although my brother Bill is already sympathetic. Lodge's confirmation hearing has been put over until Tuesday. Both McNamara and I think it would be wise to keep him out of the immediate argumentation on your program, and Lodge himself wants a last few days of rest. I will know more after the 10:30 meeting. McG.B.
71. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 21, 1965, 10:40 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. They are quoted extensively in Valenti, A Very Human President, pp. 319-40. For another account of this meeting, see Document 72; more information on attendance is in footnote 1 thereto. For other first-hand accounts of the White House meetings on Vietnam on July 21 and July 22, see Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 147-148; and Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 399-403. William Bundy also wrote an account of the meetings. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, pp. 30-33) SUBJECT PRESENT (McNamara passed Top Secret paper/2/ to all in room to read. The paper was returned to McNamara.) /2/Document 67. McNamara made it clear that the paper was his own view of the situation--his specific recommendations had been concurred in by Lodge, Sharp, Taylor, Johnson, Westmoreland but the rest of the paper had not--he did not seek or receive their concurrence. Lodge: If I thought a diplomatic move would be successful, I would be for it. Now, it would harden the enemy. This is not the time to do it. Clarifying objectives is good for the world public, but not necessary for governments. They understand it. McNamara: Seems to me our call-up and increase in budget is evidence that we are not taking over North Vietnam. M. Bundy: Our public utterances will make it clear that we are not trying to take over North Vietnam. McNamara: Our public actions must do this. We must show that we are not in with Ky's objective to invade NVN. We are building such a force that NVN might think that is what we are trying to do. Lodge: Remember this "on to NVN" movement is part of a propaganda move and nothing more. M. Bundy: Isn't it true that most of the diplomatic moves come from other nations rather than the U.S. (in rebuttal to Lodge's hard position). McNamara: This is exactly what I am talking about. Lodge: The President has done a remarkable job of forming public opinion so far. Very skillful. M. Bundy: Are there divergences between GVN and US in troop use? McNamara: GVN wants us to use troops in the highlands. This is unacceptable to us. While GVN originally recommended this, they are now in agreement with us. Rusk: What is the capability of GVN to mobilize their own forces? McNamara: They are trying to increase by 10,000 per month. Our country team is optimistic. I am not. Desertion rate is high. They say it is lessening, but I do not agree. We did not find any thread of discontent among our troops. U.S. morale is of the highest order. Proud of their dedication and devotion. It reflects the belief they are doing something worthwhile. Wheeler: Agree. Advisors are pleased with Vietnamese. They speak very highly of Vietnamese common soldier. Officer corps very different. Some officers are not of highest quality. Not total however. Weakness in VN's forces are lack of adequate officer corps--in their training and attitude--but they are getting better. Rusk: Any summary of enemy troubles? McNamara: No, nothing more than we already know. They are suffering heavy losses. They are well supplied with ammunition. I suspect much of inflow of supplies is water-borne. Only part of our action that is unsatisfactory is our patrol of the seashore. But even if we did have tight control, it should make little difference in the next six to nine months. Rusk: What is the timing on how we should proceed? McNamara: There ought to be a statement to the American people no later than a week. Bundy: It is quite possible the message to Congress will be a message to the public. Rusk: We ought to get civilians in the Congressional testimony to abuse [disabuse] the feeling that the military is making the decisions. Bundy: Perhaps Rusk should follow up the President's speech with statement of total unanimity. Ball: It is one thing to ready the country for this decision and another to face the realities of the decision. We can't allow the country to wake up one morning and find heavy casualties. We need to be damn serious with the American public. McNamara: We discussed the command arrangements--they are to be left as they are--parallel commands. The President entered the meeting at 11:30 am McNamara: To support an additional 200,000 troops in VN by first of the year the reserves in the US should be reconstituted by like amount. I recommend calling up 235,000 a year from now, replace the reserves with regulars. In mid-1966 we would have approximately 600,000 additional men. President: What has happened in recent past that requires this decision on my part? What are the alternatives? Also, I want more discussions on what we expect to flow from this decision. Discuss in detail. Have we wrung every single soldier out of every country we can? Who else can help? Are we the sole defenders of freedom in the world? Have we done all we can in this direction? The reasons for the call up? The results we can expect? What are the alternatives? We must make no snap judgments. We must consider carefully all our options. We know we can tell SVN "we're coming home." Is that the option we should take? What flows from that. The negotiations, the pause, all the other approaches--have all been explored. It makes us look weak--with cup in hand. We have tried. Let's look at all our options so that every man at this table understands fully the total picture. McNamara: This is our position a year ago (shows President a map/3/ of the country with legends). Estimated by country team that VC controls 25%--SVN 50%--rest in white area, VC in red areas. /3/Not further identified. VC tactics are terror, and sniping. President: Looks dangerous to put US forces in those red areas. McNamara: You're right. We're placing our people with their backs to the sea--for protection. Our mission would be to seek out the VC in large scale units. Wheeler: Big problem in Vietnam is good combat intelligence. The VC is a creature of habit. By continuing to probe we think we can make headway. Ball: Isn't it possible that the VC will do what they did against the French--stay away from confrontation and not accommodate us? Wheeler: Yes, but by constantly harassing them, they will have to fight somewhere. McNamara: If VC doesn't fight in large units, it will give ARVN a chance to re-secure hostile areas. We don't know what VC tactics will be when VC is confronted by 175,000 Americans. Raborn: We agree--by 1965, we expect NVN will increase their forces. They will attempt to gain a substantial victory before our build-up is complete. President: Is anyone of the opinion we should not do what the memo says--If so, I'd like to hear from them. Ball: I can foresee a perilous voyage--very dangerous--great apprehensions that we can win under these conditions. But, let me be clear, if the decision is to go ahead, I'm committed. President: But is there another course in the national interest that is better than the McNamara course? We know it's dangerous and perilous. But can it be avoided? Ball: There is no course that will allow us to cut our losses. If we get bogged down, our cost might be substantially greater. The pressures to create a larger war would be irresistible. Qualifications I have are not due to the fact that I think we are in a bad moral position. President: What other road can I go? Ball: Take what precautions we can--take losses--let their government fall apart--negotiate--probable take over by Communists. This is disagreeable, I know. President: Can we make a case for this--discuss it fully? Ball: We have discussed it. I have had my day in court. President: I don't think we have made a full commitment. You have pointed out the danger, but you haven't proposed an alternative course. We haven't always been right. We have no mortgage on victory. I feel we have very little alternative to what we are doing. I want another meeting before we take this action. We should look at all other courses carefully. Right now I feel it would be more dangerous for us to lose this now, than endanger a greater number of troops. Rusk: What we have done since 1954-61 has not been good enough. We should have probably committed ourselves heavier in 1961. Rowan: What bothers me most is the weakness of the Ky government. Unless we put the screws on the Ky government, 175,000 men will do us no good. Lodge: There is no tradition of a national government in Saigon. There are no roots in the country. Not until there is tranquility can you have any stability. I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does. As we move ahead on a new phase--it gives us the right and duty to do certain things with or without the government's approval. President: George, do you think we have another course? Ball: I would not recommend that you follow McNamara's course. President: Are you able to outline your doubts--and offer another course of action? I think it is desirable to hear you out--and determine if your suggestions are sound and ready to be followed. Ball: Yes. I think I can present to you the least bad of two courses. What I would present is a course that is costly, but can be limited to short term costs. President: Then, let's meet at 2:30 this afternoon to discuss Ball's proposals. Now let Bob tell us why we need to risk those 600,000 lives. (McNamara and Wheeler outlined the reasons for more troops.) 75,000 now just enough to protect bases--it will let us lose slowly instead of rapidly. The extra men will stabilize the situation and improve it. It will give ARVN breathing room. We limit it to another 100,000 because VN can't absorb any more. There is no major risk of catastrophe. President: But you will lose greater number of men. Wheeler: The more men we have the greater the likelihood of smaller losses. President: What makes you think if we put in 100,000 men Ho Chi Minh won't put in another 100,000? Wheeler: This means greater bodies of men--which will allow us to cream them. President: What are the chances of more NVN men coming? Wheeler: 50-50 chance. He would be foolhardy to put 1/4 of his forces in SVN. It would expose him too greatly in NVN. President: (to Raborn) Do you have people in NVN? Raborn: Not enough. We think it is reliable. President: Can't we improve intelligence in NVN? Raborn: We have a task force working on this. 1:00 pm--Meeting adjourned until 2:30 pm./4/ /4/William Bundy later recalled that the President had a private meeting with McNamara and Rusk before the second full meeting convened at 2:30. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 31) No other record of this meeting has been found. Resume same meeting at 2:45 pm Ball: We can't win. Long protracted. The most we can hope for is messy conclusion. There remains a great danger of intrusion by Chicoms. Problem of long war in US: 1. Korean experience was galling one. Correlation between Korean casualties and public opinion (Ball showed Pres. a chart)/5/ showed support stabilized at 50%. As casualties increase, pressure to strike at jugular of the NVN will become very great. /5/Not further identified. 2. World opinion. If we could win in a year's time--win decisively--world opinion would be alright. However, if long and protracted we will suffer because a great power cannot beat guerrillas. 3. National politics. Every great captain in history is not afraid to make a tactical withdrawal if conditions are unfavorable to him. The enemy cannot even be seen; he is indigenous to the country. Have serious doubt if an army of westerners can fight orientals in Asian jungle and succeed. President: This is important--can westerners, in absence of intelligence, successfully fight orientals in jungle rice-paddies? I want McNamara and Wheeler to seriously ponder this question. Ball: I think we have all underestimated the seriousness of this situation. Like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case. I think a long protracted war will disclose our weakness, not our strength. The least harmful way to cut losses in SVN is to let the government decide it doesn't want us to stay there. Therefore, put such proposals to SVN government that they can't accept, then it would move into a neutralist position--and I have no illusions that after we were asked to leave, SVN would be under Hanoi control. What about Thailand? It would be our main problem. Thailand has proven a good ally so far--though history shows it has never been a staunch ally. If we wanted to make a stand in Thailand, we might be able to make it. Another problem would be South Korea. We have two divisions there now. There would be a problem with Taiwan, but as long as Generalissimo is there, they have no place to go. Indonesia is a problem--insofar as Malaysia. There we might have to help the British in military way. Japan thinks we are propping up a lifeless government and are on a sticky wicket. Between long war and cutting our losses, the Japanese would go for the latter (all this on Japan according to Reischauer). President: Wouldn't all those countries say Uncle Sam is a paper tiger--wouldn't we lose credibility breaking the word of three presidents--if we set it up as you proposed. It would seem to be an irreparable blow. But, I gather you don't think so. Ball: The worse blow would be that the mightiest power in the world is unable to defeat guerrillas. President: Then you are not basically troubled by what the world would say about pulling out? Ball: If we were actively helping a country with a stable, viable government, it would be a vastly different story. Western Europeans look at us as if we got ourselves into an imprudent fashion [situation]. President: But I believe that these people are trying to fight. They're like Republicans who try to stay in power, but don't stay there long. (aside--amid laughter--"excuse me, Cabot") Ball: Thieu spoke the other day and said the Communists would win the election. President: I don't believe that. Does anyone believe that? (There was no agreement from anyone--McNamara, Lodge, B. Bundy, Unger--all said they didn't believe it.) McNamara: Ky will fall soon. He is weak. We can't have elections until there is physical security, and even then there will be no elections because as Cabot said, there is no democratic tradition. (Wheeler agreed about Ky--but said Thieu impressed him) President: Two basic troublings: 1. That Westerners can ever win in Asia. 2. Don't see how you can fight a war under direction of other people whose government changes every month. Now go ahead, George, and make your other points. Ball: The cost, as well as our Western European allies, is not relevant to their situation. What they are concerned about is their own security--troops in Berlin have real meaning, none in VN. President: Are you saying pulling out of Korea would be akin to pulling out of Vietnam? Bundy: It is not analogous. We had a status quo in Korea. It would not be that way in Vietnam. Ball: We will pay a higher cost in Vietnam. This is a decision one makes against an alternative. On one hand--long protracted war, costly, NVN is digging in for long term. This is their life and driving force. Chinese are taking long term view--ordering blood plasma from Japan. On the other hand--short-term losses. On balance, come out ahead of McNamara plan. Distasteful on either hand. Bundy: Two important questions to be raised--I agree with the main thrust of McNamara. It is the function of my staff to argue both sides. To Ball's argument: The difficulty in adopting it now would be a radical switch without evidence that it should be done. It goes in the face of all we have said and done. His whole analytical argument gives no weight to loss suffered by other side. A great many elements in his argument are correct. We need to make clear this is a somber matter--that it will not be quick--no single action will bring quick victory. I think it is clear that we are not going to be thrown out. Ball: My problem is not that we don't get thrown out, but that we get bogged down and don't win. Bundy: I would sum up: The world, the country, and the VN would have alarming reactions if we got out. Rusk: If the Communist world finds out we will not pursue our commitment to the end, I don't know where they will stay their hand. I am more optimistic than some of my colleagues. I don't believe the VC have made large advances among the VN people. We can't worry about massive casualties when we say we can't find the enemy. I don't see great casualties unless the Chinese come in. Lodge: There is a greater threat to World War III if we don't go in. Similarity to our indolence at Munich. I can't be as pessimistic as Ball. We have great seaports in Vietnam. We don't need to fight on roads. We have the sea. Visualize our meeting VC on our own terms. We don't have to spend all our time in the jungles. If we can secure their bases, the VN can secure, in time, a political movement to (1) apprehend the terrorist and (2) give intelligence to the government. The procedures for this are known. I agree that the Japanese agitators don't like what we are doing but Sato is totally in agreement with our actions. The VN have been dealt more casualties than, per capita, we suffered in the Civil War. The VN soldier is an uncomplaining soldier. He has ideas he will die for. Unger: I agree this is what we have to do. We have spotted some things we want to pay attention to. President: How can we get everybody to compete with McNamara in the press? We are trying to do so many other things with our economic and health projects. Constantly remind the people that we are doing other things besides bombing. Unger: Took this question up with Zorthian and press people.
72. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, July 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2 E, 1965 Troop Decision. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Cooper on July 22. Valenti's notes of the July 21 meeting do not list Cooper among those present; see Document 71. An attendance list attached to Cooper's record of the meetings indicates that, in addition to those listed by Valenti, Cooper and Busby of the White House staff and Marks of USIA were present for the morning and afternoon meetings. Clark Clifford was invited and attended the afternoon meeting. SUBJECT This is a summary of the discussion of Secretary McNamara's report and recommendations held in the Cabinet Room on Wednesday, July 21. There were three sessions: a preparatory meeting without the President at 10:30, a meeting with the President from 11:30 until 1:00, another meeting with the President from 2:30 until 5:30. A list of those present is attached at annex./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Preparatory Meeting--10:30 Secretary McNamara noted that the only Section of his report which contained specific action recommendations and the only one fully coordinated with the principals (Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, General Westmoreland, General Wheeler, and Ambassador Lodge) was paragraph 5. The four key recommendations follow: 1. The deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9 battalions promptly, to 43 battalions). The battalions--together with increases in other units, would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for the Korean failure). 2. Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately 235,000 men in the Reserve and National Guard. This number would provide approximately 36 maneuver battalions by the end of this year. 3. The regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men (approximately 250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This would provide approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966. 4. A supplemental appropriation of approximately $X for FY 1966 be sought from the Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the buildup in and for the war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be required later in the Fiscal Year. Although no attempt was made to coordinate the remainder of the paper, the comments of other members of the group were solicited. No attempt was made to resolve certain shades of difference, but Ambassador Lodge's concerns about early political moves to obtain a negotiated settlement (paragraphs 4c and 9) were recorded in footnotes. Ambassador Lodge emphasized that his concern with respect to political moves was basically on the matter of timing. He also felt that channels of communication with the VC and DRV already exist. McGeorge Bundy noted that such questions of the "liberation" of North Vietnam could be handled in our public utterances. As far as "negotiations" were concerned, third countries could be relied on to keep initiatives going. Secretary McNamara observed that the contemplated size of our forces and bases in South Vietnam could well give Hanoi the impression that we had the intention of "marching North." Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow should be made aware that this was not our intent. In a response to a series of questions from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara doubted that the GVN could raise the necessary forces to counter increasing VC capabilities (the country team was more optimistic, but we would be prudent to take a pessimistic and skeptical view of the abilities of the GVN--"a non-government"--to push forward with any major program); morale of US forces was excellent (General Wheeler heartily agreed); the monsoon offensive was under way and "there was more to come;" the VC lacked the capability to seize any of the major US bases, or Saigon. In connection with VC logistics, Secretary McNamara indicated that, although there was little information available, VC supplies appeared to be adequate. Both he and General Wheeler felt that much of the VC supplies were coming in by sea. Our capability to interdict sea supply was inadequate. This, and the lack of tactical intelligence ("POW interrogations must be tightened up") were the two most important operational problems we faced. The seeking out of VC main force units was generally regarded as a high priority matter. To a considerable extent this reflected the gaps in intelligence. General Wheeler pointed out that small US-ARVN "foraging teams" operating primarily in the Delta, attempt to locate VC units. Secretary Rusk stated that, if the McNamara report was accepted, a scenario for Congressional and public actions would be desirable. There was a general feeling that the President would have to move ahead on statements to Congress and the public early in the week of July 26. Although there was already a widespread expectation that we would be expanding our forces in Vietnam, the key question involved calling up reserves. Secretary Rusk felt that it was important that the new military proposals have civilian (i.e., State Department) endorsement. He thought he should participate in the Congressional testimony. Mr. Bundy suggested that the Congressional presentation should be a DOD responsibility and that Mr. Rusk should participate in the follow-up presentation to the public. Mr. Ball pointed out the need to paint "a sombre picture" and to dispel any idea that the post-monsoon period would see us over the hump. Secretary McNamara felt that we should make it clear to the public that American troops were already in combat. Meeting with the President--11:30 Mr. Bundy suggested an agenda for the discussion to follow: 1. The Action Recommendations (para. 5 of McNamara report) The President stressed the need for utmost care to avoid any leaks or speculation on the subjects under discussion. Secretary McNamara summarized his recommendations. The President indicated that, when the time came to call up the reserves, he wanted a full statement of the situation in Vietnam which required additional US troops. What consequences are likely to flow from a call-up? (The McNamara paper gives no sense of victory, but rather of continuing stalemate.) Why can't we get more third country troops? What are the alternatives available to us? We could tell the GVN that we are leaving, but is this an option we wish to pursue at this time? If we pull out of Vietnam now, will we have to call up more troops and suffer more casualties at some later date? We have explored all initiatives for a peaceful settlement, to an extent, perhaps, that we might already look weak. In short, what are our present options, why do we select the recommended number of troops rather than more or fewer? What will this increased force accomplish? Mr. McNamara discussed the deterioration in the situation: The VC has greatly expanded its control of the country, populous areas are now isolated, both the VC and ARVN have been suffering heavy casualties. Unless the US steps in with additional forces, the VC will push the GVN into small enclaves and become increasingly ineffective. The VC now controls about 25 percent of the population (CIA Director Raborn estimated that the VC controlled about 25 percent of the population during the day and about 50 percent at night). A year ago, the VC controlled less than 20 percent. The President felt that our mission should be as limited as we dare make it. General Wheeler agreed, but felt that we should engage in offensive operations to seek out and fight VC main force units. Although this is difficult because of the lack of tactical intelligence, we know where these base areas are. Director Raborn reported the CIA's estimate that the VC will avoid major confrontations with US forces and concentrate on destroying our LOCs and on guerrilla warfare, generally. General Wheeler felt that the VC will have to "come out and fight" and that this will probably take place in the highlands where they will probably attempt to establish a government seat. Mr. Ball thought, however, that the VC might not "accommodate" us by moving in "Phase III" operations. Mr. McNamara felt that if the VC did not choose to fight in large units, the ARVN could proceed with pacification activities and consolidate its oil spots. We don't know what the VC will do when confronted with 175,000 US forces, but they probably will contrive to use their main force units in large concentrations until they get badly mauled (probably by the first part of 1966). At the moment, terrorism is low in terms of VC capabilities. US forces can engage guerrillas as well as the main force units. Admiral Raborn believed that the VC/PAVN will attempt to achieve a decisive victory in the next six months. In response to the President's query as to the likelihood of this, Mr. McNamara stated that this was highly improbable. The President asked if there were any dissents from the McNamara recommendations. Mr. Ball felt that we were engaged on "a very perilous voyage." He had grave apprehensions about our ability to beat the VC because of the nature of the terrain, the softness of the political situation and other factors. However, he would go along with the McNamara report. The President indicated that he was aware of the dangers, but wondered about other courses open to us. Mr. Ball stated that he could not offer a course that would permit us to "cut our losses" easily. But we should weigh the costs of cutting our losses now as opposed to later. The pressures to move toward a larger war would be "almost irresistible." He based his views not on a "moral" position but on a "cold-blooded calculation." We will have to take the risk of Southeast Asia becoming Communist. However, he believed that the losses would be of a short-term nature. The President felt that Mr. Ball clearly identified the dangers before us, but did not get the impression that Mr. Ball opposes the McNamara course. The President wanted to minimize the dangers of this enterprise but felt that he had no other choice. He would seriously like to explore other alternatives, now or as we proceed. Mr. Rusk agreed that alternative options should be explored. He felt, however, that if we had met the challenge posed in 1961 by sending "50,000 men" to South Vietnam, Hanoi may have hesitated to proceed with its actions against the South. Mr. Rowan indicated he would go along with the McNamara proposal, but was worried about the prospects for GVN stability (page 3 of the report). Unless we can achieve stability, our forces will be severely handicapped. Mr. Lodge pointed out that we cannot count on stability in South Vietnam. Saigon has no roots in the countryside and needs peace to rule the country. In any case, if there were a strong stable government there wouldn't be a war. "We shouldn't take the Government too seriously." If the area is important to us, we must do what is necessary regardless of the Government. The President asked Mr. Ball to present his alternative proposal in detail at a meeting in the afternoon. Mr. McNamara proceeded to develop his option: In essence the VC now had the capability to push ARVN out of positions they now control with a consequent inevitable takeover of the Government. He would not recommend that we hold our forces at the present level. We should increase our forces or get out. General Wheeler pointed out that the ARVN strength had sharply declined because of casualties and desertions. With increased US forces we will have proportionately less casualties. He could not assure the President, however, that an additional 100,000 men would be sufficient. In response to the President's query why Hanoi couldn't match US man for man, General Wheeler indicated that large-scale PAVN forces would be a favorable development for us. He felt that the PAVN would be unlikely to put more than 25 percent of its own forces into South Vietnam (Note: the PAVN consists of approximately 250,000 troops). Admiral Raborn stated that CIA's estimate was that Hanoi would send 20-25,000 PAVN troops into South Vietnam by the end of the year. The President urged the DCI to increase CIA's capabilities for intelligence collection in the North. Anything that was needed to accomplish this would be made available. Mr. McNamara stressed the need to increase combat intelligence as well (CIA and MACV J-2 were working on this problem). The President indicated his deep concern about press stories from Saigon that US forces were bombing innocent civilians. These followed a general discussion on the overall press situation with the President urging State Department officials to work on the matter. The President closed this session with a request to Messrs. Ball and McGeorge Bundy constantly to explore alternatives to proposed policies. The session adjourned at 1:00 p.m. Afternoon Session--2:30 Mr. Ball developed the details of his policy alternative. He was basically skeptical of the ability of Westerners successfully to wage war on the terrain and in the political atmosphere of Vietnam. If the war could be won in a year with reasonable casualties, he would not be so concerned. But he feels that it will take at least two years and the fact that we will have put in so much US manpower with no early definitive results, would be a sign of US weakness in the eyes of the world. The fact that our tactical intelligence is so poor indicates the unfavorable political atmosphere in Vietnam. We have underestimated the seriousness of the problem since we started there. And we are still underestimating the seriousness of the situation. "It is like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case." The least harmful way to cut our losses is to let the GVN decide it doesn't want us. He has no illusions about the consequences of this in Vietnam or in Southeast Asia. He reviewed these consequences in detail, but felt that in the long run they would be less serious than they might appear at first. The President agreed that the situation is serious. He regretted that we were embroiled in Vietnam. But we are there. He believes the Vietnamese people want us there, despite the frequent changes of government. In response to the President's query, Mr. McNamara indicated his poor impression of General Ky, and his belief that the present GVN would be removed by the end of the year. General Wheeler stated that he had a good impression of General Thieu. He felt that the stability of the present government would depend on our support. The President stressed his concern about the GVN's instability. He noted two basic problems: 1. Can Westerners engage in a war in Vietnam? Mr. Bundy agreed with the McNamara proposals. He felt that no government which could hold power is likely to be one that will invite us to leave. The basic lesson of Mr. Ball's view is that: 1. The post-monsoon season will not see us in the clear. We will have to face up to the serious, ominous implications of our new policy. This is not a continuation of our present approach. "We are asking Americans to bet more to achieve less." We will have to engage in a much more massive political and economic effort. New organizational changes may be necessary in our mission in Saigon and in our governmental structure in Washington. There are no early victories in store, although early casualties are likely to be heavy. Mr. Bundy did not believe that Mr. Ball's "cancer analogy" was a good one. Immaturity and weakness, yes. A non-Communist society is struggling to be born. Before we take our decision to the American people, Ambassador Taylor should go back to the GVN and get greater, more positive assurances. There will be time to decide our policy won't work after we have given it a good try. (Mr. Ball disagreed here, feeling that the larger our commitment, the more difficult would be the decision to get out. "We won't get out; we'll double our bet and get lost in the rice paddies.") Mr. Bundy felt that the kind of shift in US policy suggested by Mr. Ball would be "disastrous". He would rather maintain our present commitment and "waffle through" than withdraw. The country is in the mood to accept grim news. Secretary Rusk emphasized that the nature and integrity of the US commitment was fundamental. It makes the US stance with the USSR creditable. It would be dangerous if the Communist leadership became convinced that we will not see this through. It is more important to convince the Communist leadership of this than to worry about the opinion of non-Communist countries. He is more optimistic about the outcome of the war than some. The effects of our force increment will be to force the VC into guerrilla activity, to remove the capability of the other side to use major forces against the GVN. The VC must now be faced with difficult decisions. An increased US commitment does not change the nature of the war--we have already gone a long way in the air and on the ground without escalating. Consequently, he wondered whether we should be too dramatic about the increase in US forces. (Mr. Bundy pointed out here that calling up the reserves will require a certain amount of "drama".) Mr. McNamara felt that Mr. Ball understated the cost of cutting our losses. He agreed with Mr. Rusk on the international effect of such an action at this time. Mr. Ball also overstates the cost of his (McNamara's) proposal. He agreed that it would take at least two years to pacify the country and we must be prepared to increase our forces by another 100,000. General Wheeler said that it was unreasonable to expect to "win" in a year regardless of the number of US troops involved. We might start to reverse the unfavorable trend in a year and make definite progress in three years. The President wondered whether we could win without using nuclear weapons if China entered the war. General Wheeler felt we could in "Southeast Asia." He believes US forces can operate in the terrain of Southeast Asia. This is the first "war of National Liberation"; if we walk out of this one, we will just have to face others. The President asked why, when we have been undertaking military efforts for 20 months, this new effort will be successful. General Wheeler felt that our additional forces will stave off a deteriorating situation. Ambassador Lodge disagreed with Mr. Ball's approach. He felt, however, that it was essential to get a political/civil program going. Ambassador Unger agreed with McNamara proposal. He found no unfavorable reactions in South Vietnam to an increase in US forces. The President raised again the problem of getting more economic/political information into the press. State Department representatives promised to give this increased attention. The President stressed his desire to get more third country troops into South Vietnam. He also raised the possibility of a Vietnam Task Force which would meet daily. The meeting adjourned at 5:30. CLC
73. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. No classification marking. The President invited alternatives to the McNamara proposal./2/ What follows, however, is not an alternative but rather an ancillary approach. /2/Document 67. This morning's discussion/3/ noted two possible military outcomes resulting from a substantial increase in US forces: /3/See Documents 71 and 72. a. The VC main forces will be forced by US forces into reverting to guerrilla warfare. b. The VC main forces will choose not to confront our units head-on and voluntarily revert to guerrilla actions. Either way, it would appear that we and the GVN will be faced with the problem of guerrilla rather than positional warfare. The fact that this may mean that the VC cannot achieve a military victory offers small comfort; neither we nor the GVN have as yet demonstrated that we can win this kind of war. The idea of leaving "pacification" duties to the ARVN (while we defend our bases and come to the relief of besieged ARVN units) will not, in itself, do the trick. In effect, the VC will be doing what it is best at. What is needed, if we are successfully to cope with the VC under the circumstances of widespread guerrilla warfare, is a political-economic-psychwar program as carefully developed and as massive in its way as the military effort envisaged in the McNamara proposal. In fact, it may well be that many of the US forces would be redundant under these circumstances and our hopes for "a favorable outcome" will be dependent on the success of our non-military efforts. In brief, I would recommend that if the McNamara proposals are accepted, there be developed simultaneously a major non-military program to deal with the guerrilla phase of the war. In fact, I do not see how the McNamara approach can succeed without such accompanying non-military planning. C
74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 21, 1965, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. SUBJECT Bill Moyers tells me we got through Wednesday/2/ with the White House press well enough, but I think the probability is that we will have rising pressure in the coming days. For this reason, I myself continue to think that the right time for your message--or a fireside chat--or both at once, is Monday./3/ We really cannot get an orderly and well-considered decision made before that, but I doubt if we can hold the fort any longer. /2/July 21. /3/July 26. I myself feel very strongly that we should not dribble out bits and pieces of this to the Press or to publishers before you make your final decision and announcement. The Press people we need most on this particular issue are the regular reporters, and the best thing we can do for them is to be sure they get the news straight, and from you, and on-the-record. If you didn't scare the meeting into silence today, I will be greatly surprised, and I think it makes good sense for your Government to deliberate for three days on an issue of this magnitude. On this basis, it seems to me that on Friday, or Saturday morning, we might announce that you are calling the Leadership to a meeting Sunday afternoon or Monday morning, and expect to go to Congress Monday noon or Monday evening. I have an additional reason for proposing this schedule. Dean Rusk is going to the Bohemian Grove to give a speech on Saturday, and he has been hoping to take a day of rest in the bargain. He would like to leave Friday morning and return Sunday afternoon. Yet he should clearly be very much on hand when we meet the Leadership. The schedule I have suggested meets both objectives. I have discussed this matter only with Bob McNamara, and I find that he concurs in this recommendation. On a separate matter--Bob is carrying out your orders to plan this whole job with only $300-$400 million in immediate new funds. But I think you will want to know that he thinks our posture of candor and responsibility would be better if we ask for $2 billion to take us through the end of the calendar year, on the understanding that we will come back for more, if necessary. Bob is afraid we simply cannot get away with the idea that a call-up of the planned magnitude can be paid for by anything so small as another few hundred million. Cy Vance told me the other day that the overall cost is likely to be on the order of $8 billion in the coming year and I can understand Bob's worry that in the nature of things, these projected costs will be sure to come out pretty quickly, especially if he looks as if he was trying to pull a fast one. I have not told Bob that I am reporting his worry to you; don't give me away. McG.B.
75. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Busby) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 21, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Horace Busby, Vietnam, Box 3. Secret. SUBJECT The following are some impressions--and personal reactions--to the Vietnam discussions/2/ which may be pertinent and useful: /2/See Documents 71 and 72. Personal Impressions: --Lodge: Strikingly more impressive, far more involved and committed than on any past occasion where I have seen him close-up. His year of reflection seems to me to have enhanced his vision--and value to you. --Rusk: Given only a degree or two more of warmth and heat, he would be imposingly persuasive as a public leader. He is too deferential, self-effacing. But his logic and impromptu articulation is devastatingly effective and clear-cut. He assesses the stakes in Vietnam more precisely and convincingly than anyone else I have heard. --Wheeler: A fortunate choice for his present post. I do wish other Joint Chiefs could hear more of these sessions. As for the views of Secretary Ball, These are my reactions--and suggestions. Given his point of view, Ball is impressively clear-headed and well-organized in his argument. He is conscientious, not a critic. Obviously, his thinking is influenced by two factors of a decade ago: (1) concern--held-over from the Stevenson 1952 campaign--for adverse U.S. reaction to efforts to keep any Asian war limited, and (2) his other strong personal involvement, i.e., with the French during their fiasco in Indo-China. Anyone emotionally involved in those two experiences would be cautious, as Ball is cautious. Significantly, his argument is not the argument of the academic intellectuals--it is much more sane and sound, and merits respect as such. Out of the discussions these thoughts occur: 1. Someone mentioned the Viet Cong are "creatures of habit." So are we. Your advisers have "the habit" of down-playing our role in Vietnam. Hence, a tendency is present to insist that whatever is done is, actually, only an extension of all we have been doing. This may be self-deceptive. 2. What we are considering is not whether we continue a war--but whether we start (or have started) a new war. The 1954-64 premises, principles and pretexts no longer apply. This is no longer South Vietnam's war. We are no longer advisers. The stakes are no longer South Vietnam's. The war is ours. We are participants. The stakes are ours--and the West's. 3. The two great needs are self-assessment--and clearer definition of objectives. a. On Self-assessment: It seems dangerous to insist, passively or vocally that the U.S. has not made mistaken judgments since 1961. We must have done so. It would be constructive to insist upon critical self-analysis to determine at least the pattern of our errors. b. Objectives: Clearly, the acceptable objectives in Vietnam--acceptable in proportion to U.S. sacrifice required--are world-size, not country-size. It is hard to define an acceptable objective in Vietnam: To seek one there leads inevitably to Ball's conclusion and thesis. The objectives--the acceptable objectives--must be in terms of Southeast Asia, the Pacific or even the broad East-West relationship. Rusk sees it in this dimension--and his logic prevails over Ball's. We do need, I believe, to equate our purposes in Southeast Asia with objectives broader and greater than the one country itself. Only that will justify what lies ahead. 4. On troop support from other nations: We may be thinking too narrowly on this. For many reasons, such support will not be forthcoming. One reason is that our oldest ally already is more involved--relative to strength--than we: i.e., Great Britain. If we can broaden the Nation's perspective and information by defining regional rather than one-country objectives, it would be helpful. Our efforts in Vietnam and Britain's efforts in Malaysia should be packaged together for public consumption. The more relevant line of action among allies would be to stop their trade with North Vietnam rather than pester them for troops. 5. Clearly, the fixation about working with the Vietnam government is a holdover from the ten-year effort to down-play our role there. Basically, we are there not solely because of Vietnam's invitation, but because of our obligations under SEATO. Our fidelity to a Treaty--not to a changeable government--deserves more emphasis abroad and at home. It also offers a predicate for the U.S. to run its own effort rather than stand by seeking permission from a government-that-is-not-a-government. 6. Overall, your initiative in insisting that everyone "think" is very satisfying, useful and stimulating. Defense, as well as State, should be encouraged to re-examine its own premises and past performance--or so it seems to me. Horace Busby/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
76. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 22, 1965, noon-2:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. They are quoted extensively in Valenti, A Very Human President, pp. 340-352. Valenti recalled that before this meeting, President Johnson told him: "All these recommendations seem to be built on a pretty soft bottom. Everything blurs when you get almost to the gate." (Ibid., p. 341) PRESENT /2/Clark Clifford was invited to this meeting at the President's request. (Ibid., p. 340) President: I asked McNamara to invite you here to counsel with you on these problems and the ways to meet them. Hear from the Chiefs the alternatives open to you and then recommendations on those alternatives from a military point. Options open to us
Disadvantages of #3--risk of escalation, casualties will be high--may be a long war without victory. President: I would like you to start out by stating our present position and where we can go. Adm. McDonald: Sending Marines has improved situation. I agree with McNamara that we are committed to extent that we can't move out. If we continue the way we are it will be a slow, sure victory for the other side. By putting more men in it will turn the tide and let us know what further we need to do. I wish we had done this long before. President: But you don't know if 100,000 will be enough. What makes you conclude that if you don't know where we are going--and what will happen--we shouldn't pause and find this out? McDonald: Sooner or later we'll force them to the conference table. We [They?] can't win an all out war. President: If we put in 100,000 won't they put in an equal number? McDonald: No. If we step up our bombing-- President: Is this a chance we want to take? McDonald: Yes, when I view the alternatives. Get out now or pour in more men. President: Is that all? McDonald: I think our allies will lose faith in us. President: We have few allies really helping us. McDonald: Thailand, for example. If we walk out of Vietnam, the whole world will question our word. We don't have much choice. President: Paul, what is your view? Nitze: In that area not occupied by US forces, it is worse, as I observed on my trip out there. We have two alternatives--support VN all over this country--or fall out from secure position we do have. Make it clear to populace that we are on their side. Gradually turn the tide of losses by aiding VN at certain points. If we just maintained what we have--more the Pres. problem than ours--to acknowledge that we couldn't beat the VC, the shape of the world will change. President: What are our chances of success? Nitze: If we want to turn the tide, by putting in more men, it would be about 60/40. President: If we gave Westmoreland all he asked for what are our chances? I don't agree that NVN and China won't come in. Nitze: Expand the area we could maintain. In the Philippines and Greece it was shown that guerrillas lost. President: Would you send in more forces than Westmoreland requests? Nitze: Yes. Depends on how quickly they-- President: How many? 200 instead of 100? Nitze: Need another 100 in January. President: Can you do that? Nitze: Yes. McNamara: The current plan is to introduce 100,000--with possibility of a second 100,000 by first of the year. President: What reaction is this going to produce? Wheeler: Since we are not proposing an invasion of NVN, Soviets will step up material and propaganda--same with Chicoms. Might have NVN introduce more regular troops. President: Why wouldn't NVN pour in more men? Also, call on volunteers from China and Russia. Wheeler: First, they may decide they can't win by putting in forces they can't afford. At most would put in two more divisions. Beyond that they strip their country and invite a counter move on our part. Secondly, on volunteers--the one thing all NVN fear is Chinese. For them to invite Chinese volunteers is to invite China's taking over NVN. Weight of judgment is that NVN may re-inforce their forces, they can't match us on a build-up. From military view, we can handle, if we are determined to do so, China and NVN. President: Anticipate retaliation by Soviets in Berlin area? Wheeler: You may have some flare-up but lines are so tightly drawn in Berlin that it raises risks of escalation too quickly. Lemnitzer thinks no flare-up in Berlin. In Korea, if Soviets undertook operations, it would be dangerous. President: Admiral, would you summarize what you think we ought to do? McDonald: 1. Supply forces Westmoreland has asked for. 2. Prepare to furnish more (100,000) in 1966. 3. Commensurate building in air and naval forces, step up of air attacks on NVN. 4. Bring in needed reserves and draft calls. President: Any ideas on cost of what this would be? McNamara: Yes--$12 billion--1966. President: Any idea what effect this will have on our economy? McNamara: It would not require wage and price controls in my judgment. Price index ought not go up more than one point or two. McConnell: If you put in these requested forces and increase air and sea effort--we can at least turn the tide where we are not losing anymore. We need to be sure we get the best we can out of SVN--need to bomb all military targets available to us in NVN. As to whether we can come to satisfactory solution with these forces, I don't know. With these forces properly employed, and cutting off their supplies, we can do better than we're doing. President: Have results of bombing actions been as fruitful and productive as we anticipated? McConnell: No sir, they haven't been. Productive in SVN, but not as productive in NVN because we are not striking the targets that hurt them. President: Are you seriously concerned when we change targets we escalate the war? They might send more fighters down. Can't be certain if it will escalate their efforts on the ground. Would it hurt our chances at a conference if we started killing civilians? McConnell: We need to minimize civilian killings. President: Would you go beyond Westmoreland's recommendations? McConnell: No sir. President: How many planes lost? McConnell: 106 all types--small percentage of total. President: How many out there? McConnell: 146 combat. We have lost 54 combat. President: How many Navy planes? McConnell: In the 30's--about 125 combat. Zuckert: It's worth taking a major step to avoid long run consequences of walking away from it. President: Doesn't it really mean if we follow Westmoreland's requests we are in a new war--this is going off the diving board. McNamara: This is a major change in US policy. We have relied on SVN to carry the brunt. Now we would be responsible for satisfactory military outcome. President: Are we in agreement we would rather be out of there and make our stand somewhere else? Johnson: Least desirable alternative is getting out. Second least is doing what we are doing. Best is to get in and get the job done. President: But I don't know how we are going to get that job done. There are millions of Chinese. I think they are going to put their stack in. Is this the best place to do this? We don't have the allies we had in Korea. Can we get our allies to cut off supplying the NVN? McNamara: No, we can't prevent Japan, Britain, etc. to charter ships to Haifong. President: Have we done anything to get them to stop? McNamara: We haven't put the pressure on them as we did in Cuba but even if we did, it wouldn't stop the shipping. Brown: It seems that all of our alternatives are dark. I find myself in agreement with the others. President: Is there anything to the argument this government is likely to fail, and we will be asked to leave? If we try to match the enemy, we will be bogged down in protracted war and have the government ask us to leave. Brown: Our lines of communication are long. President: How long? Brown: 7000 miles from the West Coast, but not too much greater than China's. Biggest weakness of political base is lack of security they can offer their people. President: Are we starting something that in 2-3 years we can't finish? Brown: It is costly to us to strangle slowly, but chances of losing are less if we move in. President: Suppose we told Ky of requirements we need--he turns them down--and we have to get out and make our stand in Thailand. Brown: The Thais will go with the winner. President: If we didn't stop in Thailand where would we stop? McNamara: Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, surely affect Malaysia. In 2-3 years Communist domination would stop there, but ripple effect would be great--Japan, India. We would have to give up some bases. Ayub would move closer to China. Greece, Turkey would move to neutralist position. Communist agitation would increase in Africa. Greene: Situation is as tough as when it started. But not as bad as it could be. Marines in 1st Corps area is example of benefits. Stakes:
If you accept these stakes, there are two courses of action:
How to win:
The enclave concept will work. Would like to introduce enough Marines to do this. Two Marine divisions and one air wing. Extend. 28,000 there now--additional 72,000. McNamara: Greene suggests these men over and above the Westmoreland request. President: Then you will need 80,000 more Marines to carry this out. Greene: Yes. I am convinced we are making progress with the SVN--in food and construction. We are getting evidence of intelligence from SVN. In the North--we haven't been hitting the right targets. We should hit POL storage--essential to their transportation. Also airfields destroyed, MIGs and IL28's. As soon as SAM installations are operable. President: What would they do? Greene: Nothing. We can test it by attacking POL storage. Then we should attack industrial complex in NVN. Also, they can be told by pamphlet drop why we are doing this. Then we ought to blockade Cambodia--and stop supplies from coming down. How long will it take? 5 years--plus 500,000 troops. I think the US people will back you. President: How would you tell the American people what the stakes are? Greene: The place where they will stick by you is the national security stake. Johnson: We are in a face-down. The solution, unfortunately, is long-term. Once the military solution is solved, the problem of political solution will be more difficult. President: If we come in with hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars, won't this cause them to come in (China and Russia)? Johnson: No. I don't think they will. President: MacArthur didn't think they would come in either. Johnson: Yes, but this is not comparable to Korea. Same situation--China bases and communications-- President: But China has plenty of divisions to move in, don't they? Johnson: Yes, they do. President: Then what would we do? Johnson: (long silence) If so, we have another ball game. President: But I have to take into account they will. Johnson: I would increase the build-up near NVN--and increase action in Korea. President: If they move in 31 divisions, what does it take on our part? McNamara: Under favorable conditions they could sustain 31 divisions and assuming Thais contributed forces, it would take 300,000 plus what we need to combat VC. Resor: I'm a newcomer--(interrupted by President) President: But remember they're going to write stories about this like they did the Bay of Pigs--and about my advisors. That's why I want you to think very carefully about alternatives and plans. Looking back on the Dominican Republic would you have done anything any differently, General? Johnson: I would have cleaned out part of the city and gone in--and with same numbers. President: Are you concerned about Chinese forces moving into NVN? Johnson: There is no evidence of forces--only teams involved in logistics. Could be investigating areas which they could control later. President: What is your reaction to Ho's statement he is ready to fight for 20 years? Johnson: I believe it. President: What are Ho's problems? Johnson: His biggest problem is doubt about what our next move will be. He's walking a tightrope between the Reds & Chicoms. Also, he's worrying about the loss of caches of arms in SVN. President: Are we killing civilians along with VC? Wheeler: Certain civilians accompanying the VC are being killed. It can't be helped. President: The VC dead is running at a rate of 25,000 a year. At least 15,000 have been killed by air--half of these are not a part of what we call VC. Since 1961 a total of 89,000 have been killed. SVN are being killed at a rate of 12,000 per year. Resor: Of the three courses the one we should follow is the McNamara plan. We can't go back on our commitment. Our allies are watching carefully. President: Do all of you think the Congress and the people will go along with 600,000 people and billions of dollars 10,000 miles away? Resor: Gallup Poll shows people are basically behind our commitment. President: But if you make a commitment to jump off a building, and you find out how high it is, you may withdraw the commitment. President: I judge though that the big problem is one of national security. Is that right? (murmured assent) President: What about our intelligence? How do they know what we are doing before we do it? What about the B-52 raid--weren't they gone before we got there? McNamara: They get it from infiltration in SVN forces. President: Are we getting good intelligence out of NVN? McNamara: Only reconnaissance and technical soundings. None from combat intelligence. President: Some Congressmen and Senators think we are going to be the most discredited people in the world. What Bundy will now tell you is not his opinion nor mine (I haven't taken a position yet) but what we hear. Bundy: Argument we will face: For 10 years every step we have taken has been based on a previous failure. All we have done has failed and caused us to take another step which failed. As we get further into the bag, we get deeply bruised. Also, we have made excessive claims we haven't been able to realize. Also, after 20 years of warnings about war in Asia, we are now doing what MacArthur and others have warned against. We are about to fight a war we can't fight and win, as the country we are trying to help is quitting. The failure on our own to fully realize what guerrilla war is like. We are sending conventional troops to do an unconventional job. How long--how much. Can we take casualties over five years--aren't we talking about a military solution when the solution is political. Why can't we interdict better--why are our bombings so fruitless--why can't we blockade the coast--why can't we improve our intelligence--why can't we find the VC? President: Gerald Ford has demanded the President testify before the Congress and tell why we are compelled to up the reserves. Indications are that he will oppose calling up the reserves. McNamara: I think we can answer most of the questions posed. Clifford: If the military plan is carried out, what is the ultimate result if it is successful? Wheeler: Political objective is to maintain SVN as free and independent. If we follow the course of action, we can carry out this objective. Wheeler: Probably after success, we would withdraw most of our forces; [some?] international or otherwise, would have to stay on. If we can secure the military situation, it seems likely that we can get some kind of stable government. Meeting adjourned at 2:15 pm
77. Meeting Agenda/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. The source text bears no drafting information, but the agenda was apparently drafted by McGeorge Bundy between the noon and 3 p.m. meetings; see Documents 76 and 78. Possible Items for Discussion July 22, 2:30 P.M. 1. How big a change in policy is this and how do we explain it--in political and military terms? 2. How do we inhibit Chinese and North Vietnamese response by both carrot and stick? 3. How do we combine a peace offensive with stepped-up military action? 4. Is this policy justified in terms of Vietnam, Asia or U.S. national interests--or all three? 5. How do we get a political and social effort within Vietnam that is equal in strength to the military effort? 6. What are our war aims? What is the answer to Walter Lippmann's question on this point?/2/ /2/Walter Lippmann's question is not further identified.
78. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 22, 1965, 3-4:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. PRESENT President: I don't think that calling up the reserves in itself is a change of policy. There is a [no?] question though that we are going into a new kind of activity in VN. Basic objective is to preserve the independence and freedom of VN. This is not necessarily tied in with calling up reserves. Rusk: The essence of policy is why we are there and what our war aims are. Moving from 75,000 to 185,000 men is a change of policy. Much is to be said for playing this low key. President: That one point needs to be stressed with Congressional leadership--also to explain with candor what we are doing to the American people. But when we do, we help the NVN get their requests fulfilled by China and Russia. McNamara: We can stay away from "change of policy" but it is a change in risk and commitment. We need to explain why it is in our interest to do it. Services have submitted budget request by [of?] $12 billion. We can cut this down by half or more. Moyers: I don't think the press thinks we are going to change basic policy, but the requirements to meet that policy. President: That's right and we ought to say it. Ball: I hope we can avoid a debate on whether it is a change. We always lose on this. We are becoming co-defendants with SVN. McCloy: The country is looking to getting on with the war. President: There are three alternatives: 1. Sit and lose slowly Rusk: If we bring out our message of decision while the Bucharest meeting/2/ is going on--it might bring them closer together. What we do in SVN is not of great concern to China. But a progressive step-up in bombing increases risk of China intrusion. /2/The ninth congress of the Romanian Communist Party, held in Bucharest July 19-24, was also attended by delegations of over 50 other Communist Parties, including a Chinese delegation and a Soviet delegation led by Brezhnev. President: But the Chiefs say what we are doing in the North is not enough, only pin pricking them, just goosing them. Rusk: But it is contradictory to do this when we can't find anybody in the South. Both China and the Soviets have pressure on them. A commitment in SVN is one thing, but a commitment to preserve another socialist state is quite another. This is a distinction we must bear in mind. We have a 1 in 5 chance of Russia's staying out if we make our commitment and if we bomb Hanoi. A commitment of large forces by us will lead to pressures on us to destroy Hanoi. This is the key point. McCloy: Do you think they will let go if they still have sanctuary? Rusk: Their only sanctuary is 1/5 of the country. A. Dean: What do you do if the war drags on--with mounting casualties--where do we go? The people say if we are not doing what is necessary to end it, why don't we do what is necessary? McNamara: We are begging the questions. If we bomb Haifong, would this end the war? and the answer is "No." We have only destroyed so far about 20% of the ammunitions capacity and a lesser percentage of barracks capacity. Dean: If this carries on for some years, we'll get in the same fix we were in Korea and the Yalu. Rusk: We were under no pressures to make it a larger war until the war was practically over. McCloy: If we could define our objectives specifically, what are our objectives in a discussion? What do we have to negotiate? Rusk: 1. Infiltration from the North must stop. 2. We have no interests in a permanent military base there. 3. 1954-1962 agreements ought to be solved by peaceful means and not . . . McCloy: When do the troops get withdrawn? Rusk: When proof of infiltration--stopping. Bundy: If we really were the ones for free elections, it would be good. It is difficult for Saigon to sign on. McCloy: Would we be willing to take a Tito government or a VC victory? Bundy: That's where our plan begins to unravel. Now--how to keep a reasonable peace offensive going-- President: We have got to keep peace proposals going. It's like a prizefight. Our right is our military power, but our left must be our peace proposals. Every time you move troops forward, you move diplomats forward. I want this done. The generals want more and more--and go farther and farther. But State has to supply me with some, too. We need Ernie Pyle out there interviewing soldiers who can tell how proud they are to do their duty. Rusk: Thinking of Bucharest meeting, I suggest you meet with the leadership on Tuesday/3/ and make a statement on Wednesday. /3/July 27. Ball: We have big problem of disarmament meeting on Tuesday in Geneva. McNamara: We can't delay this from the public. President: Congress ought to be briefed on Saturday or Sunday and go up Monday to Congress. We ought to decide what our decision is, write it, brief Ambassadors and then tell the people. Is the message a personal talk to the Congress or a normal message? Possibly a normal message. Meeting adjourned at 4:20 p.m.
79. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Johnson/1/ Cambridge, Massachusetts, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Confidential. Sent to President Johnson by Galbraith under a covering memorandum dated July 22, which states: "This is meant as a sympathetic suggestion on a problem that I know is worrying you." The covering memorandum is marked with an indication that the President saw Galbraith's memorandum. How to Take Ninety Percent of the Political Heat out of Vietnam I assume the following to be true, much official crap to the contrary. (1) Vietnam is of no great intrinsic importance. Had it gone Communist after World War II we would be just as strong as now and we would never waste a thought on it. (2) No question of high principle is involved. It is their rascals or ours. Both sides would lose in free elections! (3) The basic issue is that we must show that we can't be thrown out--that we don't give up under fire. This would also be bad here at home. (4) It is right to consider the politics of the problem. A great many people who make policy do not have to take the political heat. Rusk ran the Korean War and his career was made by it. Stevenson ran for office during the war and was destroyed. The same would have happened to Harry Truman had he been up. (5) Political questions are partly what we make them. Despite all of their efforts the Republicans could not make mileage last autumn out of Cuba. That was because nothing was happening there; it wasn't in the news and people couldn't be aroused. I urge we: (1) Instruct officials and spokesmen to stop saying the future of mankind, the United States and human liberty is being decided in Vietnam. It isn't; this merely builds up a difficult problem out of all proportion. It is also terrible politics. It directs maximum attention to where difficulties are bound to be greatest. (2) Stop saying that we are going to reconquer the whole country. We are not going to pacify Chicago or Harlem. The easiest way to have a failure is to set one up for ourselves by promising to do what can't be done. (3) Let us apply a policy of political patience in the area. That is a technique you understand. It means quietly marking out areas (including of course Saigon) which we can hold, protect and feed if necessary for years. Then we hold these and worry very little about the rest. This proves our main point which is that we can't be thrown out. There is a safe haven for Catholics and anti-communists. (4) The Viet Cong will not attack these areas frontally. Casualties will be low. High level trips and other contrived publicity should be kept to the minimum. (5) Stop or gradually suspend the bombing north and south. This has slight military value, alarms our people and other countries and, above all, keeps the place at the top of the news with maximum attention there and minimum attention where it belongs. (I think it may harden resistance to negotiation also--but on this no one can be sure and I am confining myself here to facts.) (6) Keep open the offer of negotiations. But we should not count on this policy forcing them to the table anytime soon. But someday they will come. Results: (1) Unless they attack head on, which we can rule out, we will prove our staying power. We won't be playing their game by sending our forces out into the jungle where ambush works. (2) The whole place will go on the back burner. Public attention will come back to areas of sound achievement of the Administration where it belongs. (3) The Republicans will bleat as Keating did about Cuba. That will hurt them more than us. (4) It will take the Russians off the hook and enable us to make progress there. Final Observations: I would think it worth running some risk of criticism to avoid calling up reserves. This will add to the publicity and wrong emphasis on Vietnam. I hope searching questions are asked on the need for these men. (Why not some from the divisions in Korea?) But after the initial flurry of publicity, this is still the right policy after a call-up. In the past there were two difficulties with this program. It would have undermined the South Vietnamese government and required the commitment of our troops. Now there isn't any Vietnamese government worth worrying about and our forces are committed. The great problem is our own eager beavers who do not consider the mood of our own people come the next election, and whose political teat is not in the wringer. J.K. Galbraith/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The covering memorandum is signed "Ken." [Next documents]
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