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80. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Rowen) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. No classification marking. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this memorandum to President Johnson at 7:45 p.m. on July 22, noting in his covering memorandum that it was the "quick and dirty report" on calling up the reserves that he had mentioned on the telephone. SUBJECT Legally the Reserves may be called up either by Executive Order or through legislative action. Regarding Executive Order action, 10 U.S.C. 673 authorizes the calling up of up to one million Reserves. However, the President must first declare a new national emergency. 10 U.S.C. 673 does not permit the extension of enlistments except for the Navy and Marine Corps. The Reserves may also be called up by the Service Secretaries "in time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law . . ." (10 U.S.C. 672). This was the route used in 1961 during the Berlin crisis when Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to "order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an Armed Force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months." This law also limited the number of Ready Reservists on active duty (other than for training) without their consent under this section at any one time. The law also authorized the involuntary extension of enlistments or other obligated service for not more than twelve months. The Resolution was followed by an Executive Order/2/ delegating to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments the authority conferred by the Joint Resolution. /2/Executive Order 10957, August 10, 1961. This method of calling up Reserves seems far and away the best. It assures Congressional participation and support and avoids the problems involved in declaring a new national emergency. Finally, in light of experience we should think about including limitations on the maximum number of Reservists to be called up and the duration of active service under a Congressional Joint Resolution. Harry
81. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 10-9-65 Washington, July 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of this estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. A draft of SNIE 10-9-65 was submitted by CIA to President Johnson on July 20 with a covering memorandum stating: "This estimate is being given to you tonight in preparation for the meeting tomorrow morning. Admiral Raborn concurs in this estimate although the USIB has not formally considered it." (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII) The draft estimate, which is marked with an indication that the President saw it, varies in wording in several places from the final estimate and does not include paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 14, the annex, or the substitute language provided in footnote 3 by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO A
POSSIBLE The Problem To estimate foreign reactions, particularly those of the Communist powers, to a specified US course of action with respect to Vietnam. Assumptions For purposes of this estimate, we assume that the US decides to increase its forces in South Vietnam to about 175,000 by 1 November. We further assume related decisions to call up about 225,000 reserves, to extend tours of duty at the rate of 20,000 a month, to increase the regular strength of the armed services by 400,000 over the next year, and to double draft calls. We further assume (a) that the increase in forces would be accompanied by statements reiterating our objectives and our readiness for unconditional discussions, (b) that US forces would be deployed so that no major grouping threatened or appeared to threaten the 17th Parallel, and (c) that we might either continue present policy with regard to air strikes or extend these strikes in North Vietnam to include attacks on land (but not sea) lines of communication from South China/2/ and military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. /2/See Annex for a discussion and map of both land and current sea routes from China to North Vietnam. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is not printed.] The Estimate 1. Communists and non-Communists alike would see in the increased US military involvement in Vietnam a strong indication that the US saw little hope of early negotiations. This would be particularly true if, at the same time, the US extended its air operations in North Vietnam. I. Viet Cong and DRV Reactions 2. At present the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (DRV) leaders appear confident that their course in South Vietnam promises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on their part. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination of a deteriorating South Vietnamese army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of anti-Communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the US will to persist. 3. We do not believe that inauguration of the US actions here assumed would basically alter these expectations. The VC and the DRV probably have come to expect increased US commitments, and they probably believe that the VC, with increased North Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forces. Nor do we think that the extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area would significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South or persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting was unacceptably high./3/ /3/The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with the judgment made in this paragraph and would substitute the following: "3. We believe that inauguration of the US actions here assumed, which emphasize US willingness and determination to become more deeply involved in combat operations in the South and eliminate the concept of an area 'sanctuary' in North Vietnam, has a reasonable chance of basically altering the Communists' short-term expectations. While the VC and the DRV probably have come to expect some additional US commitments, and they probably believe that the VC, with increased North Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forces, such confidence could be quite quickly undermined by effectively expanded US combat operations. Extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area would pose the added threat that urban/industrial targets might be next. The selective and limited nature of US bombing target selections to date may have led Hanoi seriously to underestimate the extent of US determination to exert the power necessary to force discontinuance of DRV support for the VC. US military actions resulting from the assumed program could well persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting was becoming unacceptably high." [Footnote in the source text.] 4. If the extension of air attacks were to include sustained interdiction of land lines of communication leading from South China, these actions would obviously make the delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid more difficult and costly, and would have a serious impact on the limited industrial sector of the DRV general economy. It would still not have a critical impact on the Communist determination to persevere and would not, at least for the short term, seriously impair VC capabilities in South Vietnam. 5. If, in addition, POL targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were destroyed by air attacks, the DRV's ability to provide transportation for the general economy would be severely reduced. It would also complicate their military logistics. If additional PAVN forces were employed in South Vietnam on a scale sufficient to counter increased US troop strength, this would substantially increase the amount of supplies needed in the South. The VC also depend on supplies from the North to maintain their present level of large-scale operations. The accumulated strains of a prolonged curtailment of supplies received from North Vietnam would obviously have an impact on the Communist effort in the South. They would certainly inhibit and might even prevent an increase in large-scale VC military activity, though they would probably not force any significant reduction in VC terrorist tactics of harassment and sabotage. These strains, particularly if they produced a serious check in the development of VC capabilities for large-scale (multi-battalion) operations might lead the DRV to consider negotiations./4/ But the final decision on whether to seek negotiations would depend to a great extent on political developments in the Indochina area and elsewhere, and on the actual course of combat in South Vietnam. /4/The Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believe that in spite of greater damage and harassment caused by sustained air attack on lines of communication (LOC) and other targets, the capacities of DRV and Laos LOC are sufficient to permit support of the war in South Vietnam at the scale envisaged in this estimate. Other significant factors supporting this position are the impossibility of doing irreparable damage to LOC capacity; demonstrated Communist logistic resourcefulness and ability to move large amounts of war material long distances over difficult terrain by primitive means; and the difficulty of detecting, let alone stopping, sea infiltration. [Footnote in the source text.] 6. In response to the US program, the Communists would almost certainly undertake measures to increase their own strength in South Vietnam for a higher level of struggle. They are already augmenting VC units and dispatching additional PAVN forces to South Vietnam; the assumed US actions would probably result in a speeding up of this process. By the end of 1965, the total of PAVN regulars in organized units in South Vietnam could reach 20,000 to 30,000 men. Although the Communists are aware of the dangers of concentrating their troops in large numbers, they might, during the next few months, attempt major assaults against GVN forces and positions, seeking to shatter ARVN before the increased weight of US strength could be brought to bear. 7. In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, we believe that the Viet Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious Communist defect. Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended to bleed and humiliate US forces, trapping and destroying isolated units where possible. At a minimum, the Communists would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut land communication lines and would step up the dispatch of small, expendable teams on sabotage and assassination missions designed to make the US look impotent or foolish. The Communists might also seek to increase their activities in Laos. 8. Over the longer run, the Communists' strategy will depend upon the actual course of combat and their estimates of South Vietnamese stability and US will to persist. They are predisposed to attach great weight to signs of disintegration in Saigon and to manifestations of domestic US opposition to Administration policies. These boost popular morale on the Communist side and reinforce the leadership's conviction that Communist staying power is inherently superior. 9. Should future military and political developments bring this conviction into serious doubt, the DRV might express increased interest in negotiations. However, they would endeavor to preserve their own freedom of action while laying inhibitions on US/GVN military operations, hoping to promote disarray in Saigon and encourage US opinion in favor of withdrawal. 10. Faced with the buildup outlined in our assumptions, the DRV would probably request more air defense equipment from the USSR, including SAMs, fighters, technicians, and perhaps pilots, particularly if US air attacks were expanded. From the Chinese, Hanoi would probably request more radar equipment, anti-aircraft artillery, and technicians in addition to a further increase in shipments of infantry arms and ammunition. Hanoi might also request China (and, perhaps, North Korea) to furnish aircraft and pilots. In general, however, we believe that Hanoi would wish to maintain some limits on, and a rough balance between, Soviet and Chinese personnel. 11. Deployments on the scale here assumed would cause the DRV some concern about US invasion. This would be true even if US forces took up positions which were not suggestive of an invasion. We believe, however, that the DRV would not react to this concern by requesting the introduction of Chinese combat forces. It probably would make such a request only if actual invasion seemed clearly imminent. II. Chinese Communist Reactions 12. The Chinese are probably even more convinced than the Vietnamese Communists that if the DRV/VC remain firm, in the end the US will be wholly defeated in Vietnam. Renewed US determination, evidenced by the buildup assumed in this estimate, would give the Chinese some pause but, in our view, not much. They would believe that the US measures were sufficient only to postpone defeat while magnifying its eventual effect. 13. We do not believe that the Chinese would react to the assumed US moves including the present level of air attacks, by overtly intervening in the military struggle with combat forces. They are already stepping up their military assistance, including the introduction of some rear service elements into North Vietnam, and would give more aid if requested by the DRV. Moreover, they would try to increase alarm among non-Communists, especially the US public, by intensifying their propaganda and reiterating their willingness to accept hostilities if attacked by the US. They would probably continue to strengthen their forces in South China and might take some further overt steps toward mobilization. 14. If air strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention from Chinese bases would increase. This would particularly be true if the air strikes were effective in cutting the main roads and rail lines over which the principal supplies are moving. While we believe the Chinese would be reluctant to engage the US in an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations, we consider the chances are about even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China. We do not believe, however, that this would lead to greatly increased Chinese Communist participation in the conflict. In any case, if large numbers of US aircraft were operating close to the frontiers of China the likelihood of hostile encounters would be high./5/ /5/The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence); Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Director of NSA, do not agree with the judgment expressed in this paragraph. They believe that it should read as follows: "If air strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention from Chinese bases would increase. Nevertheless, we believe the Chinese would be reluctant to engage the US in an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations. We therefore consider it unlikely that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China." The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the chances are better than even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US under these circumstances. Even if air engagements were accidental they would have extremely dangerous repercussions and if they were deliberate they could not fail to lead to a wider war. [Footnote in the source text.] 15. If, in the circumstances described in paragraph 9, the Viet Cong and the DRV at some point wished to move toward negotiations, an important divergence might open up between Hanoi and Peiping. The Chinese are themselves not suffering direct military damage and they fear that negotiations would give the USSR a chance to increase its role in Vietnam. Thus they would exert strong pressures to dissuade the DRV from entering into negotiations. III. Soviet Reactions 16. The USSR hopes for an eventual Communist victory in South Vietnam, but it is more conscious than Peiping and Hanoi of the larger military risks. Moreover, the USSR wants to maintain or improve its influence over the DRV and in the world Communist movement generally; it does not wish the kind of Communist victory which would magnify the prestige and power of China. Unlike Peiping and Hanoi, Moscow is concerned with minimizing damage to East-West relations. In this situation, the USSR prefers a course of negotiations, but it cannot afford to appear laggard in supporting the DRV, and it is deepening its commitment to Hanoi's cause. 17. In the circumstances outlined in our assumptions, we believe that the USSR would see no alternative to continued support of the DRV and further expansion of its military aid. It would thus be likely to grant a DRV request for additional air defense equipment and personnel. It would probably feel compelled to comply promptly with DRV requests to replace air defense equipment destroyed by US attacks in the Hanoi area. The Soviet aid program might be hampered by Chinese restrictions on transit rights. 18. The USSR would probably indicate that, if the US remains unyielding in Vietnam, it faces trouble elsewhere in the world, as, for example, in Berlin. We do not think, however, that Moscow would confront us with a major challenge. Nor do we believe that the Soviets would wish to foreclose the possibility of negotiations at some future stage; indeed, they would probably work to keep this possibility alive on both sides. 19. We believe that the US decisions considered here would produce important reactions in general Soviet policy. Moscow would almost certainly harden its general stance toward the US. For example, although the Soviets have agreed to renewed disarmament talks, partly in order to check the deterioration in East-West relations, the assumed US course in Vietnam would probably lead them to devote the talks entirely to attacks on the US or even to break them off. 20. The assumed moves would carry total US military manpower above the 2.8-2.9 million total which we estimate for the USSR; they would also imply a reversal of the downward trend in US military spending which Kosygin cited in justifying the 1965 reduction in the overt Soviet military budget. We believe that the USSR's declared policy of restraining or even reducing military expenditures has been under attack by military spokesmen in recent months and is the subject of debate within the collective leadership. It is likely that the US moves, plus the worsening of general Soviet-US relations, would strengthen the position of those arguing for additional military appropriations. In those circumstances, the USSR probably would respond with an overt increase in its own military spending. IV. Non-Communist Reactions 21. Most non-Communist nations have already realized that the US, already heavily engaged in South Vietnam, is likely to increase its commitment if necessary. The measures here considered would nevertheless cause rising alarm because, in combination with Communist statements in response, they would revive and fortify fears of increased cold-war tensions and even of a much larger war. This might make some governments more reluctant to give public support to US policy, particularly governments in political difficulty, e.g., the UK, Canada, and Norway. Significant extension of bombing in North Vietnam would increase apprehension in these countries. Over the longer run, however, the more important reactions will depend on the subsequent course of the conflict. 22. In non-Communist Asia, Japan offers the most serious problem. We believe the Sato government would maintain its policy of supporting US policy in spite of howls from the press and opposition forces. Sato's position would be made much more difficult, however, if Okinawa or especially Japan were to become a greatly expanded conduit for support of US forces in Vietnam, or if it appeared that China was about to become involved in the fighting. India would deplore increased bombing of the DRV but would otherwise continue its position of public questioning and private acquiescence in US actions in South Vietnam. Pakistan, hoping to continue to receive American aid while remaining on good terms with China, would reaffirm its neutrality and its noninvolvement in Vietnam. V. Reactions to the Mode of Announcement 23. If the announcements were made in piecemeal fashion and with no more high level emphasis than necessary, the development of a crisis atmosphere might be mitigated. It is also possible that private assurances to the USSR that the US increase in overall military strength was directed solely toward the situation in Vietnam, and not meant to improve the US position vis-a-vis the Soviets, might soften the tone of the Soviet response. This avoidance of strident recriminations might in turn decrease somewhat the negative reaction of non-Communist countries. We believe, however, that the reactions of the Communist powers, particularly in the military field, would not be basically changed by the method of announcement. We also believe that there would still be increased apprehension among non-Communist countries.
82. Memorandum From Justice Arthur J. Goldberg to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. No classification marking. Attached to a note by President Johnson's secretary, dated August 17, that reads: "Fr. his [Johnson's] pocket, he has had it since Camp David, the weekend of July 23, 1965." Goldberg had agreed by the time he wrote this memorandum to become U.S. Representative to the United Nations, a position to which he was appointed on July 26. SUBJECT In my view, we should take the Viet Nam issue to the UN Security Council concurrently with the announcement about increases in U.S. military efforts there. I would recommend that we should propose and seek support for a simple Security Council resolution calling for unconditional talks. I would not recommend that the resolution go beyond this into the more controversial areas of cease fire and UN observers. The virtue of this is that it would emphasize that the President is pursuing a political solution at the same time that he is manifesting his determination that we will not be dislodged by military force. The judgment of Harlan Cleveland has been that we have the votes to pass the suggested resolution. This would have to be verified by consultations in New York to confirm the accuracy of Mr. Cleveland's conclusion in light of present and proposed developments. The arguments pro and con undoubtedly have already been adequately presented to you by Secretary Rusk. I have four pro arguments to add: 1. In my experience, I have never found that renewed expressions of the desire to seek a peaceful settlement through unconditional discussions undermine the firm position of the proponent not to settle by force rather than agreement. On the other hand, such expressions reinforce the support of the rank and file and even critical leaders for a firm policy. This was proved by your Baltimore proposal./2/ And the other side will judge us by what we do rather than what we say. /2/Reference is to the President's speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245. 2. Placing the matter before the Security Council may afford the Soviet Union an opportunity to blow off steam rather than to respond more drastically. 3. It is at least likely as a result of the developments next week that we will be in the dock of the Security Council on this subject as a defendant. There are obvious advantages in being the plaintiff rather than in a defensive role. 4. The UN desperately needs a concrete expression of renewed faith on your part that it can perform a vital role in keeping the peace. Draft Resolution on Viet-Nam/3/ /3/Drafted by Goldberg in hand on the reverse side of the second page of his memorandum. The Security Council Having considered the question of Viet Nam; Concerned at the potential threat to world peace involved in a continuation of the present situation; Believing that every effort should be made to resolve the problem through peaceful means; 1. Calls on all parties concerned to engage in immediate unconditional discussions looking toward a solution of the problem; 2. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices in facilitating the conduct of such discussions.
83. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 24, 1965, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Secret. Mr. President: I enclose two memoranda. One is from Joe Sisco,/2/ and the other is a paper on the history of troop recommendations which you instructed me to prepare in our meeting yesterday. /2/Not attached and not found. I also had a talk with Sisco, and my own belief is that with further effort we can find a way, showing our readiness to go to the UN without exposing ourselves to much danger in the Security Council. We did it successfully at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, and I think we can do it again. I believe that the public advantage of showing readiness to speak our peace [piece] in the Security Council outweighs the disadvantage of the Soviet response, and I also think that with appropriate pressures, we can keep at least 8 members of the Security Council on our side in keeping the focus sharply on the need for discussions. The members of the Security Council, for your information, are: US, UK, France, Nationalist China, and the Soviet Union--Permanent Members The Netherlands, Uruguay, Bolivia, Jordan, Ivory Coast, and Malaysia--Temporary Members Sisco himself says we can get the US, the UK, the ChiNats, the Dutch, and the two Latin Americans. I believe that strong diplomacy would give us Jordan, the Ivory Coast, and Malaysia as well--all three of them owe us a lot in different ways. McG.B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. Enclosure/4/ Washington, July 24, 1965, 8:15 p.m. /4/Secret. SUBJECT This story relates almost entirely to 1965. When you became President, US forces in Vietnam totaled 16,000. On 31 December 1964, they totaled 23,000. Today they are between 75 and 80,000, and you are considering increases of another 100,000 between now and November. In December and January, our attention did not focus upon increased ground forces. We were trying to get the Huong Government to pull up its socks, and we were preparing to authorize air strikes at the right moment. We had no recommendations from the military for major ground force deployments. At the end of January, after Bob and I discussed with you our growing doubts, you sent me to Vietnam. During that trip, the attack on Pleiku occurred and in February, you put into effect the program of limited air strikes against North Vietnam,/5/ and unlimited air action in South Vietnam. It is in this connection that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, and you approved, the deployment of Marines to Danang. Two battalion landing teams were approved for such deployment on February 25./6/ /5/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Documents 131 and 149. /6/See ibid., Document 170. The bombing did not reverse the situation and we did not expect it would. In the first week of March, you sent General Harold Johnson to Vietnam. He returned with three basic recommendations:/7/ /7/See ibid., Documents 179 and 197. First, a 21-Point program of small actions which was promptly approved; Second, a deployment of a tailored division force either to the highlands or to certain bases; and Third, a four division ground force to contain infiltration by land. The last two recommendations were tentative in form and were not pressed to a decision. General Taylor, in an important dispatch on March 16 (Saigon 3003) weighed the pros and cons of a single US division and recommended that judgment be reserved./8/ /8/Ibid., Document 204. Telegram 3003 was received on March 17. At the end of March, General Taylor visited Washington and there was discussion of a possible three-division force, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Taylor himself was skeptical and reported a similar skepticism in Prime Minister Quat./9/ The Secretaries of State and Defense recommended that the decision be deferred and that instead we should approve deployment of two additional Marine battalions and an 18-20,000 man increase in other US support forces. This recommendation was accepted in the first days of April./10/ /9/See ibid., Document 220. /10/See ibid., Documents 230 and 242. The study of ground-force deployment continued in April, and on Tuesday, April 20, McNamara, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp, Westmoreland, McNaughton, and William Bundy met in Honolulu./11/ At that point there were 2,000 Koreans and 33,000 US troops in the country, and an additional 18,000 were already approved. After the Honolulu discussions, McNamara recommended additional deployments leading to a total strength of 82,000--including 13 combat battalions. Part of this recommendation was given formal approval on April 21;/12/ and other parts on May 15. This set of recommendations was the most important between January and the present, and I attach McNamara's memorandum of April 21./13/ /11/See ibid., Documents 264 and 265. /12/See ibid., Documents 266, 269, and 271. /13/Ibid., Document 265. Early in May, you requested $700 million for Vietnam,/14/ and our defense of this request and related statements made it clear that additional forces were being sent. On June 16, McNamara gave a full public exposition, announcing the planned deployment of 15 battalions, with a total military strength of 70-75,000./15/ /14/See ibid., Document 283. /15/A transcript of McNamara's news conference is in the Johnson Library, Public Statements of Secretary of Defense McNamara, 1965, vol. 5, pp. 1791-1803. Meanwhile, on June 11, after discussions with MACV and Ambassador Taylor, the Joint Chiefs recommended additional deployments to a total of 116,000./16/ The most important element in this recommendation was the air-mobile division. On June 19 you gave approval to the necessary preparatory steps for these deployments, without deciding on the deployment itself. /16/See vol. II, Document 346. On July 2, the Joint Chiefs produced a further recommendation for a total troop strength of 179,000, again in coordination with MACV and Ambassador Taylor. Before approving this recommendation, you sent McNamara to Vietnam./17/ With marginal modifications, it is this recommendation which is now before you for decision. /17/See Document 49. The essence of this history, I think, is that initially we all had grave objections to major US ground force deployments. Even those in favor (like my brother Bill), wanted to try other things first, and none of us was prepared to urge on Westmoreland things he was not urging on us. Then when we got major bases of our own, largely for air action, we moved quite promptly to protect them. These deployments did not give us bad reactions, and it became easier for Westmoreland to propose, and for us to accept, additional deployments. Thus, between the end of March and the beginning of July--a period of only three months--we moved from recommended force levels of 33,000 to recommended force levels of 180,000. We also moved from the mission of base security to the mission of active combat in whatever way seems wise to General Westmoreland. I have found this review instructive. It suggests to me that McNamara's Plan 3 is better than his other two plans. I think we should now approve the recommended deployments through November. I think that at the same time we should explicitly and plainly reserve decision about further major deployments. After all, we have not yet had even a company-level engagement with Viet Cong forces which choose to stand their ground and fight. McG.B./18/ /18/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 24, 1965, 7:50 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok eyes only for Ambassador Johnson. Received at 8:21 a.m. on July 25 and passed to the White House. 266. Deptel 218./2/ In approaching the matter of obtaining additional commitments from GVN in advance of U.S. statement of expanded military effort, we would divide the matter into two parts; those commitments which we might seek privately and those which we might get GVN to state publicly or allow us to use publicly in U.S. /2/In telegram 218 to Saigon, July 24, the Department of State indicated that it expected an announcement soon of the expanded U.S. military effort in Vietnam and that an essential accompaniment was a clear understanding with the South Vietnamese Government that it would take every possible step to put the country on a war footing. (Ibid.) In private, there would be some advantage in informing the senior GVN officials that prior to undertaking to provide additional military aid we would like to verify following understandings: A. Our joint war aims are expressed in general terms in the four points announced by FM Do on June 22./3/ We will work together privately in refining and amplifying these general terms, meanwhile will avoid giving any public impression of divergence of views. /3/Not found. B. We will continue as agreed previously to keep each other informed of policy decisions of mutual interest in advance of public information. C. We will cooperate together to control inflation and to end the currency black market. In this regard we agree that there will be no increase in GVN budget or wage increases without prior consultation. D. We will always exchange views frankly on the subject of incompetent U.S. or GVN officials who are not performing adequately and will undertake to replace those who are found to be unsatisfactory to the joint effort. E. U.S. military forces will be employed as determined by General Westmoreland who will be guided by the White House statement of June 9 (Depcirtel 2470, June 9)./4/ /4/The statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1965, p. 1041. F. GVN will take timely action to provide real estate required by U.S. forces. G. We will continue to place emphasis on population and resources control. In presenting this list to Generals Thieu and Ky, we would avoid giving impression of asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increased aid commitments but would do so in context of seeking reaffirmation of understandings already explicitly or tacitly reached. As to a public statement, we believe that one could be prepared which would be acceptable to the GVN, making the following points: a. Determination of GVN to put country on a war footing and to control inflation. b. Plans to increase forces and reduce desertion. c. Recognition of importance of Chieu Hoi. d. Reaffirmation of Do's four points. To attempt to go beyond the foregoing modest program would probably be unproductive. We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged debate. The private assurances will be no better than subsequent performance which is likely to be spotty. The public statement will be viewed as government propaganda by most observers. We would recommend our taking up the matter in the foregoing terms at our meeting with Ky scheduled for July 27. Meantime we will send the Dept. a draft of the proposed public statement which we will give Ky as a suggested public release. Taylor
85. Notes of Meeting/1/ Camp David, Maryland, July 25, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. The meeting was held in Aspen Lodge. PRESENT Clifford: 1. Do not think it advisable to go to UN with resolution now. Don't need this to re-inforce peaceful intentions. Inconsistent with going in with additional troops. 2. Stop talking about Vietnam--on part of President, Rusk, Harriman, etc. No talking about where and why we are there. Don't think they are going to be forced to table by any UN proposal. Underplay Vietnam until January. 3. Both above based on this one: Don't believe we can win in SVN. If we send in 100,000 more, the NVN will meet us. If the NVN run out of men, the Chinese will send in volunteers. Russia and China don't intend for us to win the war. If we don't win, it is a catastrophe. If we lose 50,000+ it will ruin us. Five years, billions of dollars, 50,000 men, it is not for us. At end of monsoon, quietly probe and search out with other countries--by moderating our position--to allow us to get out. Can't see anything but catastrophe for my country. A resolution in the UN with dramatic debate is bad for us. President: (reading from letter)/2/ VN is not of intrinsic value--If /2/Document 79. There is no high principle involved. Basic issue is not to get thrown out under fire. Political questions are what we make them. 1. Instruct officials to stop saying all humankind is at stake. 2. Stop saying we are going to pacify the country. 3. Patience--pressure--quietly marking areas we can hold. Hold these for years if need be. Make a safe haven. 4. Vietcong cannot attack these places frontally. 5. Gradually stop bombings north and south. Maximum attention to it which is wrong. 6. Keep offer of negotiations open.
86. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Top Secret. SUBJECT Here is some information which you may not have. 1. Bill Buffum tells me that, over the weekend, the President talked to Joe Sisco a couple times about the desirability of asking for a Security Council session on Vietnam to accompany the forthcoming Vietnam announcements. 2. Joe, expounding the State Department view, thought that it would not be a good thing to have a Security Council session at this time; there would inevitably be a debate which would lead to such things as recommendations for a cessation of bombing and recommendations for including the Viet Cong in any negotiations as an equal negotiating party. Joe went on to suggest that we hold off on a Security Council meeting and possibly have one at a later date. 3. As I understand it, the President bought the State Department view. GC
87. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965, 12:30-3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. An hour before the meeting, McGeorge Bundy sent the President an agenda that included: the SAM site, taking Vietnam to the United Nations, a general plan for Congressional consultation and a public announcement of the build-up, and further consultation with the South Vietnamese Government. In a covering memorandum, Bundy noted that an additional item on covert negotiations was not listed on the agenda. Only he, Rusk, Ball, and McNamara were aware of it, and all felt that no one else should be informed. Bundy suggested that the President might want to have a small follow-up meeting in his office on the matter. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII) No record of such a meeting has been found. PRESENT President: Please, Bob, give us your findings and recommendations on SAM sites. Wheeler: SAM site that shot down the F4C is probably a mobile site, #6./2/ /2/On July 24, a U.S. F-4 aircraft was shot down by a surface-to-air missile launched from a mobile missile site believed to be approximately 30 miles northwest of Hanoi, the first aircraft lost to the SAM missiles deployed by Soviet technicians. Air reconnaissance located two mobile SAM sites in the area of the attack, identified as mobile sites 6 and 7 in the series of SAM sites established near Hanoi. In telegram 265 from Saigon, July 25, Taylor recommended an air attack against the sites "to show Hanoi how seriously we view this incident and to prepare political opinion for our subsequent anti-missile campaign." A copy of this telegram was sent to the President and there is an indication that he saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Cables) On July 26, however, Harriman advised against attacking the sites, since this would be seen abroad as an escalation and would prejudice efforts to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. Harriman also felt that Soviet leaders would interpret the attacks as a direct challenge, requiring some sort of retaliation. (Telegram 164 from Belgrade; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) (President and McNamara look at map showing where plane was shot down) President: Any indication that there are more than five sites? Wheeler: Yes, on Friday night we determined there are two more, #6 and #7. Site #4 is possibility, but 6 and 7 are better possibilities--more probably a mobile site. (President asked technical questions about sites and their shoot down capabilities) Wheeler: Chiefs recommendation: We don't know if any of these sites have equipment. We should attack all sites. At the minimum, we should take out 4, 6, 7. McNamara: Good, but I would take out only 6 and 7. President: Where does your intelligence tell you Russians are operating? Wheeler: In 6 and 7. President: Are you sure they are Russians? Wheeler: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]--that is the weight of our evidence. Rusk: I would not hit one of the sites close in to Hanoi. Only reason to hit 6 and 7 is to give warning to NVN. Very important if we strike that nothing be said about Russians being there. Political effect of hitting 6 and 7 is a warning to not move sites farther out from Hanoi. Not at all sure we'll hit anything--they may have moved them out from there. Intensify reconnaissance to see if we can pick up anything. President: Are we photoing regularly? McNamara: Yes, but we are careful over Hanoi. We are using drones more. President: What are you getting out of this? McNamara: No reports of radar activity at these sites. Wheeler: This is the first time we have heard their radar. President: How much personnel? Wheeler: About 1/2. President: How provocative will this be? Wheeler: When they sent up the missiles, they expected something. President: What would be our reaction to the Russians bombing our sites? Rusk: Various indications that if Russians and US collide, it would be dangerous. Killing the first Russians--[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. (Here President admonished the group NOT to speak to anyone about this. "This is a war--and the stakes are high".) President: You think, Dean, we should take out the sites even though the Russians are there? Rusk: I think it would be a warning. President: (I want the Secretary of State to draw up a document saying that if anyone wants to write article for Life he cannot participate.) Ball: This is a very hard decision. But our intelligence is not very hard at this time. There is no way to keep from identifying the casualties as Russians. Before we make this decision I'd like to know if we take out 6 and 7 there is something there to take out. Can we make some efforts to find out what is there. We don't have to take them the next day. If they are building an outer perimeter, then we have to take them out. Wheeler: We have already identified this site. Discussed low level rekky--staff advised against it because they will get out after rekky. President: The assumption is in your favor, but we don't know exactly where the missiles came from. McNamara: I don't see the logic to Ball's argument--If we strike and they are not there. President: Get bad story if we roam around and find nothing Bundy: We haven't addressed the question of turning [possible omission in the source text]. See advantage of not crossing this bridge until after making Presidential Statement. President: Let's not assume I am to make a speech. No one has decided that. Bundy: Rapidity of action in Pleiku gave Russians a talking point. Is our position affecting these sites better later than now--then take them out on our way to munitions plant. Can see advantage if we punish SAM sites quickly. Also reports are saying we shouldn't have let them go this long. Don't see the merit of waiting. The target is on authorized list--current Rolling Thunder list. McNamara: Record shows there is military purpose for going over these targets now. Ball: If we move promptly it will be a decision to step up war. In present heated tension of this decision making, this step will be viewed as a decision break-through--this will be a world impression. Am sympathetic with view of Bundy--of taking out SAM site with purpose of taking out military target--SAM only incidental. Also, if we wait we allow Goldberg to present his credentials./3/ We ought to disassociate the SAMs from the present heat. /3/Arthur Goldberg presented his credentials as U.S. Representative to the United Nations on July 28. Rusk: Harold Wilson pleads we let him know in advance if we take 6 and 7. He needs to keep his people in line. (Bundy shares this view.)/4/ /4/On the evening of July 26, McGeorge Bundy sent a message through the British Embassy to Prime Minister Wilson informing him of the decision taken (see Document 90) concerning the SAM missile sites. (Telegram 462 to London, July 27; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) President: What do you think about this, Cabot? Lodge: 6 and 7 are 40 mi. away--the rest are 10 mi away. Would go ahead on the two that are 40 mi. away. But don't think it is of pressing urgency. Wheeler: If they announce that there are Russians in the site, it would make your decision more anxious. President: If we leave 6 and 7 for awhile, what would it do to Rolling Thunder? Wheeler: Would cut targets in half. Will cut down on armed rekky. Ball: It's going to make it difficult for us domestically if we don't take out these SAMs right now. We ought not let domestic politics guide us in making a small war larger. McNamara: It hasn't been necessary to take out SAM in order to get to a military target. President: Helms, do you have any intelligence on this? Are we sure they came from 6 and 7? Wasn't there a possibility it could have come from 4? Wheeler: Our pilots' intelligence--and depending on navigation--there is possibility it came from 4 or mobile site. President: How liberally is it mobile? Wheeler: According to Russian terminology this is semi-mobile site. Rusk: We have knocked a key bridge connecting China with NVN. We could expect the Russians to set up sites there. President: One of the great dangers is conveying wrong message by letting enemy miscalculate our motives. What will be reaction of enemy if he can knock down US planes and we do nothing about it? The sites are put there to destroy us. Are we going to sit and sit and let them knock down our planes? Are we going to let them move first? Bundy: Let's see if the sites impede Rolling Thunder. (Wheeler went over map to point out targets) Goldberg: It is difficult for the public to distinguish between 6 and 7 and the rest. What will be Russians reaction to this? This is what they have given to NVN. Where will they go for future? May be a specific reaction to pinpointing the target. Do we know enough out of this episode--is it worthwhile to know how these sites are to be utilized? Is this their policy--or is it a gesture? Is it definitely their policy or is it a trigger happy officer? Public reaction would be--this is Hanoi area. Bundy: I don't think we are facing a confrontation with the Russians that Amb. Goldberg suggests. I am attracted by the notion of waiting until we have to go. Real risk if we seem to be diverted by this episode--too much of our plans are operationally known by our military. President: Why do we ferret out ammo dumps, etc. and lose men--and fail to take out something that is more dangerous like SAM site. How do you justify this. You bring bombing to a standstill. If you are to continue bombing these targets, how can we not take out SAMs. Rusk: You cannot order pilots to bomb without helping them get back. We don't know enough about sites. President: Then we ought to cancel targets--we can't send pilots over the missile sites. V. Pres: We ought to face up to Russian involvement. What impact this will have on Russian relations, I don't know. All the press knows the Russians are in the site business. Wheeler says if we delay it will aggravate situation. They have to be taken out. If I were forced to decide, then if targets are to be kept, take out sites. If targets can be altered, 2 or 3 days later is not a matter of significance. We can't leave ourselves without response. But I think we can allow ourselves a little time. McNamara: We simply have to change targets--we can't keep target schedules with sites in. We are not going to learn anything more in the next 2 or 3 days. Raborn: Information on these sites was obtained on July 20. First read-out did not read out sites. Finally disclosed on Saturday morning, July 24. Will take coordinated intelligence effort to sort out where these sites are. This effort is underway--using all kinds of intelligence information to come up with answer. Until the effort is completed, I would recommend not going in. We know 6 and 7 are manned. McNamara: If striking 6 and 7 properly, at low altitude, we will be protected from 8, 9, 10. There are two problems: Should we take out 6 and 7 now--or wait. My decision on taking out 6 and 7 depends on taking out Rolling Thunder targets--as well as telling the Russians we won't allow them to conclude--we won't do anything. We don't want to send planes to Rolling Thunder targets if they must be shot down. Raborn: Study will be completed this afternoon. Suggest Thompson and CIA Russian expert tell us of Russian intentions. President: Next question is US position at United Nations. Do we want to make a proposal at UN at this time. Goldberg has shown me and Rusk a memo with his views./5/ What instructions do we want to give him? My thinking would be if we agree on Westmoreland requests on men, equipment, etc.--playing all our decisions low key, and not telling the Russians we intend to break our policy on economy and nuclear production cutback. /5/Document 82. Generally, want Goldberg to talk to every delegate including Secy. Gen. to tell them we are ready to talk unconditionally. Goldberg: My view is that when you do anything forceful, must say our objective is peace. How best can assurance of peace be done. 1) Laying before Security Council a resolution echoing Balt./6/ and confined to single topic--to endorse talks on VN with help of UN. People don't understand sophisticated complexities of UN politics. They do understand their President asking for unconditional talks. Sometimes the public exhibition of an attitude can start us on the way. I would hope we would do the necessary exploration to get the votes--by consulting with our friends. Some dangers may turn out to be virtues--such as Viet Cong. I think there is great advantage in President's saying simply we want to talk. /6/See footnote 2, Document 82. President: I said that in San Francisco. Goldberg: Even though I don't expect Russians to say in advance "Yes", but it doesn't mean they won't come around to this view. I think we need a new initiative--the effects of President's Baltimore speech have worn off. What would be the worst that could happen to us in the Security Council? Are we so lacking in friends that we won't be applauded? There must be equity in the final agreement. If I thought the war could go on quietly--then I would acquiesce--but I don't think the war can go on quietly. As we send in more troops--knock out SAMs--something must happen in UN and I want us to be the plaintiff, not the defendant. Rusk: UN is an organization to which we have a treaty commitment. We have an obligation to use the UN as effectively as we know. But Hanoi and Peking are not parties to this organization. Advantages: Help placate our critics. Disadvantages: Can't see how they would help. Maximum benefit is to reconvene conference. Very negative if we asked for meeting and didn't get it. International recognition of VC would undermine the Saigon government. We have to assume that a resolution that would meet our approval would draw Soviet veto. Might make it difficult for Soviets to push quietly for talks. Might draw amendments that would be inimical to us. If we didn't get at least 7 votes, it would appear that the UN had repudiated us. Recommend Goldberg talk with U Thant to sound out Soviets as to character and form of resolution and for us not to insist on resolution at this time. Lodge: Am in disagreement with Goldberg on resolution but there are things he can do--Can do it by a speech--UN couldn't possibly undertake our mission in Vietnam--it hasn't the money nor the muscle. We mustn't overlook the effect on SVN, Russia and China. Everytime we talk about negotiations, you lower the value of the ARVN. You don't impress China except when you've got blood in your eye. President: I'm tired of words. I've been giving words for 20 months. I told the UN in San Francisco that I would back any effort by the UN to bring this to the conference table. Lodge: We had to show the UN that what we are doing is entirely consistent with the UN charter. Clifford: Goldberg makes a persuasive case. But I am unalterably opposed to a resolution in the UN. But we are in a paradox. On one hand, we are ready to meet commitments, but we are really ready to get out. We can almost guarantee that a resolution would fail. The Soviets must stand by the NVN. I see them using the resolution as a propaganda asset--using bombing and white-vs.-Asians. Talking at this time publicly will not accomplish anything. If it is underplayed, we have a chance to justify our views. Lodge: How do you send young men there in great numbers without telling why? Clifford: We have already explained why we are there. We cannot win the war in SVN. China and Russia don't intend for us to win the war. They will match us in manpower. No matter how many men we send, they will match us. The great danger is that additional troops are not [sic] a notice to the world that we intend to make it a land war. We should get through the monsoon season and quietly see if we can work out an adjustment. I don't believe we will suffer prestige if we can't sustain. (Moyers wanted to know if he can release names of those present--President against it because of press hounding the people for information) President: (to Rusk) Try to determine what would go into Goldberg's statement to the UN--desirability of writing letter signed by me to Secy. General--generally along lines of San Francisco speech--after talking to allies Goldberg can buttress his arguments for resolution. Any objections to that? (No one expressed dissent) Meeting adjourned at 3:15 pm.
88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965, 9:17 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Unger, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, and approved by Unger. 236. Saigon's 266./2/ Agree with your proposal to divide task of obtaining additional commitments into private and public expressions, and you are authorized take matter up with Ky in those terms at your July 27 meeting, subject to following modifications: /2/Document 84. 1. In private consultation we must have some better understanding that we are not now and do not expect to be engaged in efforts to change the regime in North Viet-Nam. While we recognize there may be some internal political problem for GVN we have impression that General Thieu's comments and GVN statement July 20 are gratuitous revival of issue which should be left dormant. Argumentation recorded Embtel 140/3/ seems appropriate and would hope it would be effective with GVN officials. /3/Dated July 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII) 2. It must also be understood with GVN that we do not reject 1954 Geneva Accords. While question remains open what role Accords will play in any eventual negotiation, they should not be rejected and Embassy will note our occasional references to our agreement with the essential purposes of the Accords. 3. Believe would be useful for Ky to include in public statement a reference to request for augmentation US forces in So. Vietnam made to McNamara group./4/ This should be in quite general terms and mention only approximate magnitudes. /4/See Document 60. 4. Suggest rewording Point A public statement to eliminate implication which could have unfortunate repercussions here that GVN even now not on war footing, in spite of real fighting and terror going on for several years now. 5. Public statement should also include some reference to economic and social measures to increase solidarity of people and their government. This could include some reference to General Ky's 26 points/5/ as well as program for financial technical assistance to aid rural economy, including measures to meet tenure problems. /5/Taylor discussed Ky's 26-point program in detail in telegram 4311 from Saigon, June 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) For your guidance there is quoted below possible text of statement to be issued at high level. This text, although subject to change and not to be seen in US Mission except by Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson, will provide indication of framework to which GVN undertakings will have to conform. Very tentative text follows: "Like every action the US has taken in Vietnam, these new deployments are ordered at the request of the Government of Vietnam and in support of the efforts of the Vietnamese people themselves. It is fully agreed and understood between that Government and the US that the main effort in South Vietnam must still be made by the Vietnamese themselves. Amb. Taylor has been assured that as US efforts are increased the Vietnamese Government itself is reenforcing its own measures to build up its armed forces and to meet the economic pressures caused by war. That Government is reaffirming its determination and announcing its own programs of increasing action at home, including certain measures in the economic and social fields to enhance the solidarity of the Vietnamese people and their government in their critical efforts." Septel/6/ contains rough first draft of possible US positions to be stated at a high level. You should show this draft to General Ky in your July 27 meeting and secure his concurrence, especially on US policy toward a settlement, which we construe as consistent with GVN position as stated by Tran Van Do in June. /6/Document 89. Rusk
89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965, 9:18 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Unger, cleared in substance by William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Unger. 237. Saigon's 266 and Deptel 236./2/ There follows rough first draft of possible US position to be stated at a high level concerning augmentation US forces South Viet-Nam. You should show this draft to General Ky in your July 27 meeting and secure his concurrence, as noted final para ref Deptel. In discussion with Ky you should not refer to other related actions (e.g. calling reserves) which may be taken in connection with these deployments but on which final decisions not yet made. /2/Documents 84 and 88. "In this last week the situation in Viet-Nam and the actions it requires have again been reviewed. This has been the most careful and sustained review that has been made at any time since President Johnson took office. The President has discussed the problem with members of the Cabinet--Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg. He has discussed it with distinguished Americans in private life who have earned the thanks of their country by earlier service, like Mr. Arthur Dean and Mr. John McCloy. He has had the advice of two great Ambassadors, Maxwell Taylor and Henry Cabot Lodge. He has talked at length with the leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives. By personal messages and diplomatic discussions the problem has been reviewed with friends and allies in foreign countries. Out of these deliberations have come three important decisions-- The first is that US policy and purpose in Viet-Nam are sound and right. The second is that the US must now take important additional military measures in support of that policy and purpose. The third is that the US should continue and intensify its diplomatic search for peace. The US purpose and policy in Viet-Nam are right. The US is there to keep a promise. That promise was and is to help the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to help themselves against attack supported from outside. This American commitment must and will be kept--both for its own sake and for its meaning to world peace. For the peace of the world cannot be kept if there is not respect for the given word of the United States of America. But there is more to it than that. South Viet-Nam is not the only small state which is threatened by external pressure and ambition. It is not the only country menaced by subversion and infiltration and terror. If South Viet-Nam is lost, then others are weakened. And finally, the US is there because it has a deep and enduring national interest in preventing the Communist conquest of Asia. It seeks nothing in Asia for itself, but the independence of the peoples of Asia is essential to the peace of the world and to American security itself. In pursuit of these great purposes, the US has supported and sustained its friends in Asia for a quarter of a century, in war and in peace. It has respected their choice of neutrality or alignment. It has respected their right to determine their own political and social systems. It has helped them to resist aggression--whether by open attack as in Korea, or by bombardment and threat as in the Formosa Straits, or by the more complex and destructive methods now in use against Viet-Nam. This course of action has been right, and it is right today. And now it is necessary that the US increase its effort in Viet-Nam. The battles of the spring and early summer have brought heavy losses to both sides. It is clear that over a period of many months there has been a growth in the infiltration of Communist forces from North Viet-Nam. The armed forces of South Viet-Nam continue to fight with great courage and with growing skill. But they need more help, and they will get it. Authorization has been given today for the movement to South Viet-Nam of additional forces which will bring US total troop strength in that country to 175,000 men by November. These enlarged forces will provide 34 combat battalions, 24 air squadrons, and 31 helicopter companies. Under the command of General Westmoreland--an officer who has earned the confidence of all his countrymen--these forces will be used where they are needed. And they will fight. Like every action the US has taken in Viet-Nam, these new deployments are ordered at the request of the Government of Viet-Nam and in support of the efforts of the Vietnamese people themselves. It is fully agreed and understood between that Government and the US that the main effort in South Viet-Nam must still be made by the Vietnamese themselves. Ambassador Taylor has been assured that as US efforts are increased the Vietnamese Government itself is reenforcing its own measures to build up its armed forces and to meet the economic pressures caused by war. That Government is reaffirming its determination and announcing its own programs of increasing action at home, including certain measures in the economic and social fields to enhance the solidarity of the Vietnamese people and their government in their critical efforts. The decisions announced today are decisions to do what is necessary--and only what is necessary. This has been US policy; it is US policy still. These new and increased actions are made necessary by the growing battlefield action of others. The ever closer partnership of the US with the people and Government of Viet-Nam is the inevitable answer which the US gives, with them, to the increasing efforts of the attackers. Yet the purpose remains unchanged. And it is a purpose of peace. While the US does all that is necessary to turn back the attackers in South Viet-Nam, it will do all that is possible to open the path to peaceful settlement. Again and again it has said that it is ready for unconditional discussion. The US and others have made fifteen efforts to get discussion started. These efforts have all been rejected out of hand. But the US will not be discouraged. In these last days, messages have been sent to all the more than 30 countries that have given concrete evidence of their concern for the people of South Viet-Nam. It has been emphasized again that just as there is need for wider effort to resist aggression, there is equal need for further effort to open doors to peace. America's friends in these countries know that all their efforts to this end are welcome to the United States. And the US will do more. Today Ambassador Goldberg has been instructed to consult most urgently with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see if there is not some way in which the good offices of the United Nations can be engaged for peace in Viet-Nam./3/ The earlier efforts of the Secretary General have met with rebuff, but no possibility of progress must be overlooked. Ambassador Goldberg will make it entirely plain that the United States continues to hope that a way can be found to bring the United Nations into action in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador will submit a full report on US actions there and its purpose of peace, both formally to the Security Council and informally to all the Delegates who seek to know the US stand. If it proves possible to engage the United Nations in Viet-Nam, the United States will actively support that engagement. /3/See Document 99. At the same time that the US seeks by every means to start the discussions that can bring peace, it and its friends in South Viet-Nam are making it plain that they are ready for the kind of peace that will be fair and honorable for all. Already in June, the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam and the Secretary of State of the United States have stated for all to hear the fundamental principles of such a peace: An end to aggression and subversion. Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape its own destiny by democratic principles and without foreign interference. An end of the military measures now made necessary by aggression, and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam. And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam. Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks forward to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means--including a free decision by the peoples of all Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification. These principles imply and include the use of free election under international supervision, just as soon as the end of aggression permits. These purposes in essence are the purposes of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The failure of the 1954 Agreements was not in purpose but in practice--not in the quality of the objectives, but in the effectiveness of the instruments. When there is a new settlement in Southeast Asia, it must be based on stronger and more lasting guarantees than those of 1954. But the purpose of peace remains as the US has stated it. The program of peace remains the same. And the program meets the interests of all who have a stake in Southeast Asia. For the people of South Viet-Nam--on both sides of the current contest--it will bring opportunity for an active and honorable part in the peaceful life of a freely growing society. For the people and Government of North Viet-Nam it will bring relief from the burdens of war and a prospect of new and peaceful relations with the people to the south. For the smaller neighbors of Viet-Nam it will mean an end to the danger of nearby warfare and a widened prospect of peaceful development for the whole area. For the people and Government on the Mainland of China, this plan of peace contains no threat and no danger. And on a still wider plane, a peace so clearly fair and reasonable for all can remove a clear obstacle to understanding between all of these who call themselves Communists and all of those who don't. For the real future of Southeast Asia is a future of peaceful progress, not a future of contest and conquest. While the US resists aggression--and probes for peace--it is planning for progress. Already there has been an encouraging response to the proposals put forward in April. The prospects for Asian development are good, and US readiness to help has been made plain. So today America appeals once again to those who have chosen the path of battle. Let them turn from terror to talk, and from subversion to settlement. Let all interested governments go to the conference table and let them bring with them any other parties that they choose. The US will come with its proposals--let them come with theirs. And let diplomacy replace destruction. The first business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace. The Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States are ready. This readiness comes not from weakness but from strength--not from weariness but from resolution. Until there is a settlement and an end of aggression, America's efforts will go on and they will grow. The deployments ordered today will be carried out. The Americans who go to Viet-Nam will do their duty. The forces of the United States will carry out the order to resist and to punish aggression. The US is ready for honorable peace, but it will persevere in the hard task of battle until others are ready, too." Rusk [Next documents]
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