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90. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965, 6:10-6:55 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed. PRESENT McNamara: Nothing has developed in our intelligence to show us any new data on missile sites. Thompson: As long as it looks as if the sites are all not Hanoi we are going after, I think their reaction will be mild. We should not say they are manned by Soviets--need to fuzz that up. It would be good if we can tie it in with something else. President: Would you take out ammunition dumps and sites simultaneously? McNamara: Take them out separately. Wheeler: Chiefs would take out all 7 sites at one time. If not, take out 4, 6, 7. There is the possibility that #4 was mixed up in this shoot-down. President: Why against #4, Bob? McNamara: #4 is a part of the Hanoi-Haiphong package. It would vex the Soviets. It is not directly associated with Lao Chi and ammunition dump. There is no operational need to take it out. It is too close to the Migs and would increase the number of aircraft in the air. We have never hit a SAM site and there is no need to make a difficult target more difficult. The chances of success are not perfect. They are about 50-50. President: If you find them, can you destroy them? McNamara: Yes, if we find them. However, we have narrow field of vision at 500 mph. President: If you go in, lose planes and fail to get them, how will we look in the eyes of the world? McNamara: I foresee no problem there. President: Is SAM like Hawk? Wheeler: It is a big van, high mass of radar--missiles like Nike-Hercules. Rusk: Would the cap come in only if Migs react? Wheeler: Yes. McNamara: Possibly, because of lack of friend-or-foe identification, they may shoot our planes if they are present. President: How far away are the Migs? McNamara: The Migs are 25-40 miles away. President: What protection do we have against Migs? Wheeler: Our cap--F4C--8 F104. Two levels of defense. President: Please summarize the pros and cons of going in to take out SAMs. McNamara: (Brought situation up to date chronologically) We think we should take out 6 and 7 because they lie athwart targets on our authorized list. If we don't, we will give an incorrect reading to Soviets that we are willing to omit targets because of SAMs. It is hard to explain to Congress and the people that we will take out ammo depots but not SAM sites. Rusk: While these sites are under attack, will radar be on them? McNamara: Yes. We have changed authorized routes. President: What about terrain or low level? McNamara: It is relatively flat in that area. Rusk: I see some advantage to striking other targets. However, it is unlikely we'll find anything to hit. They will have moved. I wouldn't rely on clearing out a path for the future. In terms of signals to the other side, would strike them and other targets quickly. McNamara: I would not complicate matters by hitting targets simultaneously. That's very difficult mission. Lodge: (In response to question from President) I would be in favor of hitting 6 and 7 and hitting ammo targets as soon as practical. President: Any objections to McNamara's recommendation to hit? Ball: No objection to recommendation, but let's have no illusions that it will not cause tremors of tension around the world. Raise question of whether to take out all sites then troop deployment, etc. McNamara: If Migs came out to attack us, we must destroy them. President: Would you pursue in case of fight? McNamara: No. Right now the orders are to fight only in the air. Goldberg: In light of danger of Soviet involvement; intelligence is not sure #4 is not involved; not sure SAM is not mobile; I think we ought to know they are there and #6 and #7 are the responsible ones before making this attack. I would send another memo to attack the target to make sure if they are knocked down that the SAM site is active. President: You don't mean sending boys over that SAM site? Goldberg: Yes. Raborn: We support Amb. Thompson 100%. Our Soviet experts tell us they are expecting us to come in. President: If we don't take them out, I want targets off list. If we do take them out, we can go on to better targets. I don't want to send boys over those sites where we know they will be shot down. We may be mis-leading Russians again. Kennedy called up reserves and put nation on war footing after Vienna and Soviets understood that. In missile crisis they understood that. For 20 months we have been restrained--and I don't want them to misunderstand us. Only pressure we can have is our bombing. We have nothing else to bargain. Can we find the targets--sites? Rusk: What happens if we incur additional losses from Migs? We should not make any decisions now to go into Hanoi-Haiphong area. If we do, we will be moving into something by mistake. I would think hard about going into Hanoi to kill Migs. President: This is not the subject of this meeting. Before we do that, you'll be heard. Clifford: We are not going to be pushed out of SVN. We show enemy our determination by taking out #6 and #7. Bargaining: Most valuable asset NVN has is the industrial complex they have laboriously built. If they think SAMs can protect their industry, they have won an important element. We have no bargaining point if their industry is safe. If Soviets put their men and material into a situation that knocks down American planes, they must expect retaliation. Thompson: On balance, I support the recommendation. Bundy: We ought to examine the way we'll discuss this decision. Rowan: We ought to understand that this will increase the "crisis atmosphere". Every European newspaper takes it for granted that Russians shot down our plane. I say that even though I support the recommendation to knock them out. The press reaction in Europe is bound to make the Soviets feel they have lost prestige if we knock out the sites. V. Pres: I'm much impressed with what Clifford said about long term prospects. If these targets are valuable, we have to do something about what blocks us. I am concerned that we have changed emphasis--that we do indeed have mobile units to face. McNamara: We are over-emphasizing the mobility of these units. They are semi-mobile. They haven't been mobile in the 99% cases we have examined. President: How long would it take to go? Wheeler: If we gave "go" in the next few minutes, we could "go" at about 1 or 2 in the morning our time. V. Pres: SAM sites #6 and #7 ought to be taken out. Caution: China is not Russia. Bundy: The conference in Geneva/2/ is primarily nuclear-proliferation oriented. /2/Reference is to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva. Valenti: This could be a piece of definitive action that would signal our determination. President: TAKE THEM OUT./3/ (Given at 6:55 pm) /3/A situation report prepared in the White House for the President at 11:15 p.m. on July 26 stated that, in response to the President's order, 44 Air Force strike aircraft were scheduled to attack SAM missile sites 6 and 7 that night. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (B)) A subsequent situation report for the President, prepared at 6:40 a.m., July 27, indicated that the SAM sites and their associated barracks had been struck, and the pilots reported the destruction of site 6. The results of the attack on site 7 were not clear. Six F-105 aircraft were reported lost in the attack. (Ibid.) Both reports have indications that the President saw them. On August 3, R.C. Bowman sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy in which he noted that the attacks on the SAM sites "may have been a DRV trap." Site 6, he noted, was evidently a dummy site, and there was probably no equipment at site 7. He added that General Wheeler had proposed to McNamara that strike aircraft be given authority to attack mobile SAM sites wherever they were discovered outside the Hanoi area. (Ibid.)
91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, July 27, 1965, 9:05 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 9:45 a.m. 284. Deptel 237./2/ Johnson, Manfull and I had very satisfactory meeting with Ky, Thieu and Co (Quang of IV Corps was also present but did not substantively participate) and after considerable discussion noted below obtained their full agreement to draft contained reftel. Also obtained Ky's agreement that he will seek make major address to nation, keyed to and immediately following USG statement. /2/Document 89. (He promised submit text to us for comment thus we will not propose statement on this subject to Dept.) Therefore would be greatest assistance if we could let him know as far in advance as possible the timing of our statement and final text./3/ /3/At 7:57 p.m. on July 27, the Department of State instructed the Embassy, in telegram 251 to Saigon, to inform the South Vietnamese Government that the President intended to make a public statement on July 28 along the lines of the draft agreed upon in telegram 237 to Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Discussion primarily revolved around (1) paragraph on reference to UN, (2) paragraph on NVN and SVN working out relations by peaceful means, including especially last sentence on elections and (3) paragraph on Geneva agreements. With respect to first point, they accepted our explanation that, although it was not likely constructive UN role could be found, it was important we demonstrate that we have exhausted every possibility to that end. It was notable that Thieu, as well as others, accepted second point. On question of elections, they accepted fact that Communists never have accepted international supervision of elections and can be expected to oppose in future. However they were somewhat bothered by inclusion of last phrase "just as soon as the end of aggression permits" and it seems to us that sentence is just as strong with omission of this phrase. Longest discussion revolved around Geneva agreements with Thieu making spirited exposition to effect that their "honor and political situation" did not permit them to recognize binding effect of document which French sought to impose upon them by signature of French General. We pointed out basic incompatibility of seeking to invoke Geneva Accords against the DRV on one hand while on other hand denying their validity. Thieu said they could accept the "factual situation" created in 1954 by the Geneva Accords but GVN could not change what had been consistent and basic position of all GVN's since 1954. However Ky said that GVN could take position that, while GVN had not signed accords, they had always and would continue to respect their principles. Thieu concurred and suggested that there be added to any such public position by GVN that GVN had not and would not seek reunification of country by military means. We concurred that this was sound and defensible position for GVN. During course of discussion Ky and Thieu, as well as Co, concurred that best possible outcome of present struggle might be that the war would passively "fade away", that is, there would be a return to the de facto 1954 situation and thus that "stronger and more lasting guarantees of 1954" which could presumably be obtained only through general conference were also not necessarily best outcome. We thus suggest consideration to deleting modifying sentence in which that phrase appears. Although Vietnamese did not catch or raise point, we question next to last two sentences of third paragraph from end, that is, sentence reading, "The first business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace." Thus it seems to us these sentences unnecessarily raise spectre of "cease fire" without effective agreement from other side. During course of discussion we also obtained Ky's, Thieu's and Co's affirmation on points of public and private understanding essentially as contained in Embtel 266 as modified by Deptel 236./4/ /4/Documents 84 and 88. Additionally, we obtained Ky's agreement that in his public address he will make specific reference to the Chieu Hoi program. Throughout our discussion we strongly emphasized sensitivity of draft statement contained Deptel 237 and fact that it was still in draft stage. Taylor
92. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 27, 1965, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret. SUBJECT You will want to know, before you meet the Leadership, that Taylor and Johnson had a very good meeting with Ky, Thieu, and Co on strengthening our international political position at the same time that we move forward with the planned U.S. reinforcements in Saigon./2/ Taylor and Johnson tried out on Ky and Thieu the political language which we drafted over the weekend./3/ They did not call it a Presidential statement, but simply a draft U.S. position which might be stated at some point by a high U.S. official. Ky and Thieu accepted the entire position, and that now allows us to use language equivalent to the paragraphs at Tab A./4/ This language takes us a long way forward and gives us a good political punch to go with our military decisions. The attached paragraphs can be shortened and tightened into whatever form of statement we make from here, and they can be expanded and elaborated in any following presentation by Secretary Rusk. What is new in these paragraphs is the following: /2/See Document 91. /3/See Document 89. /4/Attached but not printed. (1) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of using the UN if we can get it into the act. (2) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of free elections under international supervision. (3) Definite and clear-cut support for the purposes (but not the weak machinery) of the '54 agreements. (4) An offer of hope for the Viet Cong if they will turn from war to peace. (5) A concrete offer to discuss both their proposals and ours--this will be read as movement toward a negotiation in which their points and our points would both be on the table. All these are important from the point of view of men like Mansfield and Fulbright. A couple of them--like the offer to consider their proposals and the offer of hope for the Viet Cong after a peaceful settlement--may have real impact in Communist circles as well. Yet there is no weakness in them. And I repeat that Taylor has obtained Saigon's approval for them. McG.B.
93. Summary Notes of the 553d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, July 27, 1965, 5:40 p.m.-6:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. According to an attached list, the following attended the meeting: President Johnson, McNamara, Wheeler, McNaughton, Raborn, Helms, Rusk, Ball, Thompson, William Bundy, Lodge, Fowler, Rowan, Marks, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, Busby, Goodwin, Moyers, Cater, Smith, and Katzenbach. Valenti and McGeorge Bundy also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File, Box 1) SUBJECT The President: Before formalizing decisions on the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Vietnam, he wished to review the present situation with Council members present. Secretary Rusk will deal with the political situation and Secretary McNamara will describe the military situation. Secretary Rusk: a. The Chinese Communists are most adamant against any negotiations between the North Vietnamese and the U.S./South Vietnamese. The clash between the Chinese Communists and the Russians continues. b. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador, Tito got the impression during his visit to Moscow that "things would happen" if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have heard nothing to date in reply. c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other side--in Hanoi as well as in Moscow. Our purpose is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to give us. d. The U.S. actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are determined to prevent South Vietnam from being taken over by Hanoi. At the same time, we seek to avoid a confrontation with either the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union. Secretary McNamara: Summarized the military situation in Vietnam: a. The number of Viet Cong forces has increased and the percentage of these forces committed to battle has increased. b. The geographic area of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong has increased. c. The Viet Cong have isolated the cities and disrupted the economy of South Vietnam. The cities are separated from the countryside. d. Increased desertions from the South Vietnamese Army have prevented an increase in the total number of South Vietnamese troops available for combat. e. About half of all U.S. Army helicopters are now in South Vietnam in addition to over 500 U.S. planes. The military requirements are: a. More combat battalions from the U.S. are necessary. A total of 13 additional battalions need to be sent now. On June 15, we announced a total of 75,000 men, or 15 battalions. b. A total of 28 battalions is now necessary. c. Over the next 15 months, 350,000 men would be added to regular U.S. forces. d. In January, we would go to Congress for a supplementary appropriation to pay the costs of the Vietnam war. We would ask now for a billion, in addition to the existing 1966 budget. (Draft plan is attached as Tab A.)/2/ /2/Not attached and not found. The attack on the SAM sites in North Vietnam was necessary to protect our planes. Attacks on other priority targets in North Vietnam are required. Ambassador Lodge: Asked whether the ratio of government to guerrilla ground forces had to be 10:1. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had been asked this question. Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U.S. forces required if this traditional 10:1 ratio was valid. General Wheeler: The mobility and fire power of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces has put an imponderable element into the traditional ratio of 10:1. Perhaps 4:1 is the right ratio. With the additional forces to be sent to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland believes we can hold our present position and possibly move back into areas now contested. The one exception would be in the Fourth Corps. Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara expressed differences of view concerning a map brought to the meeting by Secretary McNamara which purported to show the amount of territory in South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. Secretary Rusk thought the map overstated the size of Viet Cong controlled areas. Secretary McNamara said it understated the area they control. At least 26% of the population of South Vietnam is controlled by Viet Cong, according to Secretary McNamara's figures. (The meeting was interrupted briefly to permit the photographers to take pictures.) The President: The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating. Even though we now have 80 to 90,000 men there, the situation is not very safe. We have these choices: a. Use our massive power, including SAC, to bring the enemy to his knees. Less than 10% of our people urge this course of action. b. We could get out on the grounds that we don't belong there. Not very many people feel this way about Vietnam. Most feel that our national honor is at stake and that we must keep our commitments there./3/ /3/According to Valenti's notes of the meeting, Johnson also said at this point: "Ike, Kennedy and I have given commitment." c. We could keep our forces at the present level, approximately 80,000 men, but suffer the consequences of losing additional territory and of accepting increased casualties./4/ We could "hunker up". No one is recommending this course. /4/Valenti's notes indicate the President said at this point: "You wouldn't want your boy to be out there and crying for help and not get it." d. We could ask for everything we might desire from Congress--money, authority to call up the reserves, acceptance of the deployment of more combat battalions. This dramatic course of action would involve declaring a state of emergency and a request for several billion dollars. Many favor this course. However, if we do go all out in this fashion, Hanoi would be able to ask the Chinese Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to their existing commitments. e. We have chosen to do what is necessary to meet the present situation, but not to be unnecessarily provocative to either the Russians or the Communist Chinese. We will give the commanders the men they say they need and, out of existing materiel in the U.S., we will give them the materiel they say they need. We will get the necessary money in the new budget and will use our transfer authority until January. We will neither brag about what we are doing nor thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians./5/ /5/Valenti notes that Johnson added at this point that the United States should say to Thieu: "You and your military help us there and make what gains we can. Meanwhile, we will explore ways to find peace." This course of action will keep us there during the critical monsoon season and possibly result in some gains. Meanwhile, we will push on the diplomatic side. This means that we will use up our manpower reserves. We will not deplete them, but there will be a substantial reduction. Quietly, we will push up the level of our reserve force./6/ We will let Congress push us but, if necessary, we will call the legislators back. /6/Valenti notes that Johnson added that the United States could not draw down its reserves for long if challenged on another front. We will hold until January. The alternatives are to put in our big stack now or hold back until Ambassadors Lodge and Goldberg and the diplomats can work./7/ /7/According to Valenti's notes, Johnson said that the decision narrowed down in his mind to the options he outlined in paragraphs d and e. Secretary Fowler: Do we ask for standby authority now to call the reserves but not actually call them? The President: Under the approved plan, we would not ask for such authority now./8/ /8/Valenti notes that Johnson added: "If Russia, England, etc. wouldn't get all excited about calling up reserves, I would do it right now." There was no response when the President asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon./9/ /9/In his memorandum of the meeting, prepared on November 2, 1968, from his handwritten notes dated July 27, 1965, McGeorge Bundy included the following statement: "The notes also record my own feeling that while the President was placing his preference for alternative five [e.], as against alternative four [d.], on international grounds, his unspoken object was to protect his legislative program--or at least this had appeared to be his object in his informal talk as late as Thursday and Friday of the preceding week--July 22, and July 23." Bromley Smith
94. Memorandum of Meeting With the Joint Congressional Leadership/1/ Washington, July 27, 1965, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy in December 1968 based on handwritten notes he took on July 27, 1965. According to a note by Bundy at the top of the source text: "Nothing not clearly stated in the notes is included." The parenthetical observations in the memorandum are Bundy's, added in 1968 when he transcribed the notes. The original handwritten notes are ibid., Papers of McGeorge Bundy. Valenti also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) Present were the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler, Admiral Raborn, Ambassador Lodge, Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Hickenlooper, Smathers, Kuchel, and Long; Speaker McCormack, Representatives Ford, Arends, Boggs, and Albert, and from the White House--Richard Goodwin, Moyers, Busby, Valenti, O'Brien, Cater, Califano and Bundy. The President began by outlining the five possible choices: first, to blow them up--not much thought had been given to that. Second, that we ought to get out. Some people felt that way but did not really come out and say what they thought until you pursued them. Third, we could leave things just as they are with 80,000 to 90,000 men there today and get Lodge out there and see if he can pull a rabbit out of the hat. Fourth, we could declare an emergency, call in the reserves, thousands of men and billions of dollars--tell the country that our best guess was Y billion dollars and X thousand men, and ask for it. That course had a good deal of appeal to the President because we should do what is needed, but there is an argument against it in the possible reaction of Hanoi. We did not want to have things get more violent just as we have a new man going to the U.N. We have hints from the Russians what we should take account of. The President did not want to make this any more provocative than necessary. He had reasons for not overstating the case. He did not himself believe that you can simply get in an airplane and settle this thing. The fifth choice would be to supply Westmoreland with the men and materials he had requested, increase draft calls (the notes say 17-20, 24-28-35), extend enlistment of sailors and marines, and go into the Senate for an additional appropriation of $1 or $2 billion and defer a full presentation of requirements until January, 1966. By then we would be through the monsoon. In the meantime, the Congress would keep its power to call itself back into session. Maybe by then we would be past the monsoon and the Communists would have further thoughts. If the Russians did not come in and if China was not gambling we might be able to say "Cut out your foolishness and come to the conference table." The President didn't think there was much chance of an early settlement but others kept saying we've got to try even though we have tried fifteen times. Before the President went into the districts of the Congressmen and Senators he would have done what Westy and Wheeler want done. Meanwhile he would lay plans for more reserves. The President also reported that the British pound was in great danger. In summary the President said the choice was between course four and course five. Either way he would give General Westmoreland what he wants. One course would be to go the full Congressional route now and the other way is to give the Congressional leadership the story now and the bill later. Concluding his presentation, the President said that he was prepared to stay in the meeting just as long as members of the Leadership wanted. The President was followed by the Secretary of State who gave a political analysis. He pointed out that there was no real reason for a basic difference between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on Vietnam, but that Moscow had no real influence on the ground. Furthermore, Moscow had a dilemma because of other Communist pressures. At the other end of the spectrum was Peking which was adamant against negotiations--bitter and harsh. (At this point Bundy was out of the meeting getting certain "Ike papers" for the President. When he returned the notes pick up again.) Secretary McNamara was discussing the SAM-site problem. The President then called on Ambassador Lodge who knocked down choices one, two and three--alternative one would not solve the problem, alternative two was worse than a victory for the Kaiser or Hitler in the two World Wars. Alternative three was no alternative at all since you needed a bigger perimeter and you also needed Camranh Bay. Congressman Albert then said that he agreed with the President's proposal. Senator Smathers said that we did not want to get into World War III but we did want to stay there. Was there any change in this policy? The President answered that there was no change in policy but that as their effort increased, ours must. Congressman Boggs asked if there was any major defection of GVN forces. Secretary McNamara replied in the negative. Congressman Boggs asked about the government and Secretary McNamara said it was a weak government and would be while the VC were free to attack it district by district. About this point the President told the Leadership why he did not call the Leadership earlier (the notes say that this statement was "per my memo to him on Lodge")./2/ /2/Not further identified. Congressman Boggs asked why we needed a ten-to-one ratio. General Wheeler took that question and said that perhaps four-to-one was a right ratio, but that ten-to-one was not necessary because the helicopter had provided a new mobility and that this was why the ARVN had been so successful until recently. The President remarked that we all know that it is a bad situation and we wish we were ten years back or even ten months back. Senator Long said that Ho Chi Minh talks of a twenty-year war but that he thought that it might be a hundred years long. We should look at the stakes and look at the fact that we have been touched up. Should we put in more men or take a whipping? We'd better go in. The Speaker said that he did not see any alternatives. Dedicated military leaders have asked for more help. He was impressed by the analogy to Hitler. The road to appeasement was a road to war. We have warned them. We do the things we should, hard as they are. (The notes here remark that "The Leadership seems mighty hawky so far.") The Russians had problems and weaknesses of their own. The President read parts of a message from General Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill at a time of crisis in Vietnam in 1954. The passage the President was reading came from "Mandate for Change."/3/ /3/An apparent reference to the April 4, 1954, letter from Eisenhower to Churchill, which is quoted in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (New York, 1963), pp. 346-347. It is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 1, pp. 1238-1241. Congressman Ford asked for clarification of choices four and five. The answer (the speaker is not clearly defined by the notes) was that in either case Westmoreland would get what he wants. The question was rather how you would go about the process--under four you would ask funds from the Congress now and under five you would come back in January and ask for them. The President said that we would ask for the money in any event. We can either guess about larger figures or go for a limited sum in the Senate now. He thought there were good reasons for not calling the reserves; if you call them now you really won't be ready. In January you would have it better worked out. Under alternative five he might tell the Leadership three times that he was sending an additional 30,000 or so, without saying X billion and 100,000 men if he could avoid it. Representative Ford said that under alternative five you would double draft calls--and how much of a burden would that place on training forces? The President said that the difference between four and five was that one was more dramatic and blunter and more powerful--if that is what you wanted. Secretary McNamara said that the draft calls under option five would be about the same as under option four--since when we called the reserves we would still have to double the draft calls. Secretary McNamara also pointed out that Sections 512A and C of the Appropriation Act gave authority to spend money and then get a deficiency appropriation. The President said again that under alternative four he would have to get a new bill and a great big reserve plan and go through a big process. Under five we would simply put $1.8 billion or whatever into the appropriation bills on the Senate side and then get in order for January. The Secretary of Defense said that the war was very difficult to predict, that under four we would be asking for a blank check because we did not know what would happen, while under five we would ask for what we see clearly between now and January. Congressman Arends asked what General Westmoreland's needs were. Secretary McNamara answered that he had an immediate requirement of thirteen battalions and 50,000 men. Beyond that there would be a need for further forces before January 1. The Secretary also said that we could supply forces faster than General Westmoreland could receive them. The Secretary of State remarked that while there were sharp engagements, the fighting had not reached the stage of Giap's phase three. The President referred to a speech by the Vice President and said that we were running the danger of saying to Ho what he wants to hear. He also said that he did not want Russia and China in it if he could help it. Senator Dirksen quoted President Woodrow Wilson to the effect that "the business at hand is undramatic." But the President was going to have to tell the country that we are in a very serious business. There was then an exchange with Secretary McNamara, about which the notes are unclear--McNamara's comment was that "there was more baloney on that than any other subject," but the notes do not show what he was talking about. Senator Dirksen apparently also asked about any possible diversion (?) of anticipated shipments. The President's comment is that every man who leaves will be announced. Senator Dirksen noted that he was receiving many questioning calls, and the President said he was going to tell the country just as soon as he got through telling the Leadership. Senator Dirksen said that he was not going to be like the Committee on the Conduct of the War. The President said that in the morning he was going to get to General Eisenhower. Senator Dirksen said that from now to January was five months and you could not wait that long if you need it. "If you need it you ought to ask for it." The President said that we would get what we needed. There would be a sizable supplementary in January--a few billion dollars. Senator Dirksen said we should make the country realize that this is dangerous, serious business. The President said he thought the country did realize it. Senator Mansfield asked the President's indulgence and read a statement/4/ in which there appeared remarks about apathy, disquiet, and apprehension. He thought that nothing should be put out from the meeting except by the President. He said he would support the President's position as a Senator and as Majority Leader. /4/Not found. Senator Hickenlooper asked if we were getting low on helicopters and whether we were increasing our orders. Secretary McNamara said we had built up our helicopters enormously. The loss rate was only one in 10,000 sorties and helicopters did not wear out. Up to now there was no basis for concern about numbers of helicopters. Nevertheless we were increasing production. Senator Hickenlooper said that alternatives one, two and three were out. That anything short of a result that would make a reliable buffer against Communism would be disastrous. A negotiated so-called peace that did not do this would merely compound the felony. He did not know just which way it should be done--and he remarked that over the years mistakes had been made. He differentiated between approval and support. He thought his decision now would be to support it but not approve it. The President remarked that he was in the same position as Senator Hickenlooper. He had supported the decisions of 1954 without approving them. Now there were 80,000 to 90,000 men out there asking for help and his answer was yes. Senator Kuchel asked what Westmoreland's orders were. Must he clean up all the red spots? The notes do not show what answer he got. Congressman Boggs said that alternative five was the logical way out. The President said that his object was to get the government together, to get the Allies together and to get the country together. And he would make his decision tomorrow. He spelled out three phases in the future and thought that by 1 November we would double our forces. Congressman Arends asked Secretary Rusk if the Allies could help us on limiting shipping to the DRV. Secretary Rusk answered about help in South Vietnam from Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Arends persisted on shipping. The Secretary of State said that there had been some improvement and that through various devices we could get a cutback in shipments to Hanoi which might make us feel better but would not really change the situation. Senator Hickenlooper said that we were treating symptoms; there was a great danger of a negotiated stalemate, and we needed a reliable settlement. The President said that Senator Hickenlooper should talk to Mike Mansfield and Bill Fulbright and see what the three could agree on. Right now settlement was not a practicable problem, because the Communists thought they were winning. The question of settlement was a good long way away. Senator Hickenlooper said the big question was what we were going to do. The President said that we are going to try to bring about a situation where the government of South Vietnam will be able to defend itself against foreign ideology. "Westmoreland wants help--I'm going to give it--the question is how." The Speaker closed the meeting by saying that the President would have united support. This was a historic meeting. The President would have the support of all true Americans. After the meeting with the Leadership, the President held a small meeting in his office. Present were the President--the two Secretaries, Goodwin, Moyers, Busby, and Bundy. The President remarked that we were prolonging the agony for 90 days and that he wanted a statement of 700 words, the essence of which would be that he was giving Westmoreland what he needed. Secretary McNamara repeated the thirteen battalion, 50,000 men figure, and expressed his confidence on the handling of the matter.
95. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 27, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965. Secret. SUBJECT In accordance with your instructions, messages were delivered Monday to approximately 29 countries which are contributing assistance in Vietnam./2/ France was omitted for political reasons and Laos, Ecuador, and Guatemala for political reasons or because their contributions have in fact been insignificant. /2/Circular telegrams 127 and 128, July 25, conveyed instructions to deliver on Monday, July 26, a personal letter from President Johnson to the head of government outlining the necessity to increase the number of U.S. troops involved in South Vietnam, and asking for support and increased assistance in the struggle in Vietnam. The telegrams were sent to Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Bonn, Tehran, Dublin, Rome, The Hague, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Bern, London, Ankara, Canberra, Rio de Janeiro, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, Wellington, Manila, Bangkok, Athens, and Karachi. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) To date, we have received reports from 23 Embassies, which have presented the Presidential message on Vietnam to the heads of government or highest government official of the host country. These reports show sympathy of our principles of action--resistance to aggression while working for peace--but yield little tangible evidence of prospects of substantially increased assistance. Some countries--notably Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Philippines--express a willingness to consider an additional effort urgently, but our Ambassador in Ottawa cautions against over optimism while our Ambassador in Manila advises against encouraging the Philippines to diffuse its effort. In several cases no comment was offered by the foreign government at the time of receipt of the message but comment may be forthcoming later. Thus, Ayub/3/ has promised a reply in two days. /3/President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. There was general appreciation of advance notification of our plans. Details of replies received to date are given in the attached memorandum./4/ /4/Attached but not printed. William P. Bundy/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
96. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 27, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266, #14. No classification marking. SUBJECT Subsequent to our telephone conversation, I met with the following Senators in my office at 3:30 this afternoon: Russell I opened the meeting by reporting fully on the Leadership discussion of Viet Nam this morning. There was a general sense of reassurance that your objective was not to get in deeply and that you intended to do only what was essential in the military line until January, while Rusk and Goldberg were concentrating on attempting to get us out. A general desire to support you in this course was expressed. It was felt that one of the best ways this could be done would be by communicating the feelings of some of the senior Members of the Senate to you in this fashion. Among the major points which were raised by various of the Senators in attendance during the discussions were the following: 1. The estimate of 100,000 men by the end of the year was probably short, that the more likely figure would be 150,000. 2. The Russians feel that they have an obligation to aid the North Vietnamese not unlike ours towards a Western European country which might be attacked and if we expect them to help in getting negotiations started before this situation gets out of hand we have to provide them with some basis for helping. 3. The United Nations may be an important link in a way out of the situation but this possibility is clouded by the issue of Article 19; it may not be opportune to insist upon enforcement of the Article at this time; but heat is already being generated on the issue in the House and some prompt Presidential initiative on the point in public may be desirable. 4. Bridges to Eastern Europe need to be kept open and continued encouragement of the evolution of these nations (Yugoslavia, in particular) towards full independence, political and economic, under their own unique forms of organization is of the greatest importance. 5. The Russians are deeply concerned that we are abandoning the policy of peaceful co-existence; some tangible reassurance that we are not, perhaps through the consular convention, is desirable. 6. The country is backing the President on Viet Nam primarily because he is President, not necessarily out of any understanding or sympathy with policies on Viet Nam; beneath the support, there is deep concern and a great deal of confusion which could explode at any time; in addition racial factors at home could become involved. 7. The main perplexity in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you still do not come out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a "vital" area of U.S. concern as it was described by Lodge at a hearing this morning. 8. There is reason for concern and irritation at Cao Ky's statement that we should fight on the perimeter while the Vietnamese military is organizing the rear. 9. The President was ill-advised to begin the bombing of North Viet Nam in the first place and the error was then compounded by the limited character of the bombing. 10. In clarification of what would follow a failure of the Goldberg-Rusk effort between now and January, it was pointed out that it would mean that we would probably have to add very substantially to manpower at that time. 11. The military concept of a greatly extended bombing in Viet Nam is sound. 12. Another cessation of bombing of longer duration than the previous one might be desirable as a means of getting discussions underway. 13. Underground contact might be sought not only with the Russians but with the Chinese as well; it could be particularly useful in bringing about talks in the event another pause in the bombing is attempted. 14. France, who has the best contacts in Indochina, has been virtually ignored as a possible avenue of approach to negotiations. 15. The situation at Pleiku is highly dangerous; if the U.S. garrison is attacked it could be another Dien Bien Phu and it could mean increased pressure for our deeper involvement. 16. The French parliament, at no time, permitted conscripts to be used in Indochina. 17. The Viet Cong are highly skilled and formidable fighters; the South Vietnamese forces are of dubious quality and larger and larger desertions can be anticipated. 18. The important thing in a situation like this which is clearly detrimental to us is to concentrate on finding a way out; a possibility might exist in a combination of the coastal enclave strategy, a cessation of aerial bombardment and the use of all possible contacts to get negotiations underway. 19. McNamara has been a disappointment in his handling of this situation, probably because he is being used in a way in which he ought not to be used. It should be noted that there was obviously not a unanimity among the Members present on all of the points listed. But there was a very substantial agreement on many of them. Moreover, there was full agreement that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned we are deeply enmeshed in a place where we ought not to be; that the situation is rapidly going out of control; and that every effort should be made to extricate ourselves./2/ /2/At the President's request, McNamara prepared a memorandum commenting on Mansfield's first 18 points, which the President forwarded to Mansfield on July 28 under a covering letter that reads: "With respect to the 19th point, as I have often said, I consider Bob McNamara to be the best Secretary of Defense in the history of this nation." (University of Montana, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 102, Folder 13)
97. Editorial Note On July 28, 1965, President Johnson opened a mid-day press conference at the White House with a statement in which he explained that U.S. involvement in the conflict in Vietnam would be expanded. He stated that the United States intended "to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power." He said that General Westmoreland had outlined the forces needed to meet the "mounting aggression" in South Vietnam, and he added: "We will meet his needs." He had therefore ordered U.S. forces in Vietnam increased from 75,000 to 125,000, and he noted that additional forces would be dispatched as they were requested. To meet the necessary increase in active forces, the draft call would be raised over a period of time from 17,000 to 35,000 per month. The President reiterated that the United States was ready at any time for unconditional discussions to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. The transcript is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pages 794-796. The Joint Chiefs of Staff began implementation of the President's decision on July 28 by approving the deployment of the Air Mobile Division and the Marine Amphibious Brigade to South Vietnam. (Telegram 263 to Saigon, July 28; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Embassies throughout the world were instructed to convey the substance of the President's announcement to their host governments. (Circular telegram 141, July 27; ibid.) In Vietnam, the U.S. Information Agency released the text of the Presidential announcement to the local press and via radio, distributed some 200,000 illustrated pamphlets, and prepared 1 million leaflets with excerpts from the announcement for airdrop into North Vietnam. (Telegram 361 from Saigon, August 3; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (B)) On August 2, Bromley Smith reported to the President that 30 countries had reacted favorably to the announcement, 5 were apprehensive, and Ghana and all of the Communist states, except Yugoslavia and Romania, were critical. (Memorandum to the President; ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII) [Next documents]
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