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Discussion on Ending the War and Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces, July 29 - November 26, 1965 98. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo 1965. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dean and Bundy. Copies were sent to the Department of Defense for McNaughton and to CIA for Colby. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Background: Mr. Duntov was interested in ascertaining the North Vietnamese attitudes and position because of the effect the Vietnamese situation has on Dreyfus' investments, and through M. Parisot, Foreign Editor of "France Soir," arranged to see Nguyen Van Chi in Paris in early May. Dissatisfied with the lack of substance in this contact, however, he asked M. Parisot to get him an interview with Mai Van Bo. This interview was arranged with little less than a week's notice. Mr. Duntov stated that he had had a two-hour conversation with Mai Van Bo in Paris on the evening of July 16, 1965. Also present were M. Parisot and Elli Maissi, the UPI diplomatic correspondent in Paris. Mai Van Bo explicitly asked that the conversation be regarded as confidential, but he assented when Mr. Duntov asked if he might pass the substance of the conversation to friends in Washington. Duntov gave Mai Van Bo an explanation of the Dreyfus Fund and of the necessity for keeping abreast of political and economic developments. Conversation almost immediately focused on the Viet-Nam situation. The following points were raised and discussed: 1. Hanoi's Attitude toward Negotiations. Duntov asked why Hanoi would not negotiate. Bo responded that Hanoi did want to negotiate, and that there were ample contacts in which negotiations might take place. However, there must first be a basis for negotiations. Bo first said that the proper basis would be the Geneva Accords of 1954. He then added that these accords are often misinterpreted and misquoted, and that the true interpretation is found in the Four Points laid out by Pham Van Dong. Thus these formed the proper basis for negotiations. 2. Unification of Viet-Nam. Bo stressed very strongly that Viet-Nam is one country and cannot be divided. When asked whether the US had not made clear its willingness to negotiate unconditionally, Bo replied that the President's Baltimore speech of April 7 was a trap, and that the President was really laying down conditions by his insistence on the necessity of an independent South Viet-Nam and guarantees for such a South Viet-Nam. One of the participants asked Bo whether his position was not in conflict with statements by the National Liberation Front to the effect that the Front favored an independent South Viet-Nam. Bo seemed somewhat taken aback by this question, but recovered and said that this would be all right, since an "independent" government in South Viet-Nam would in fact decide to join the north. 3. Internal Solution in South Viet-Nam. Bo insisted, somewhat emotionally, that there was one basic premise, self-determination by the South Vietnamese people, and that if this was accepted, a solution was possible. He referred at different times to the phrase, "self-determination," and to the Liberation Front program for the South (insistence on which, of course, is the third of Pham Van Dong's Four Points). In referring to "self-determination," Bo explained that, if this principle was recognized, an independent government could be formed. However, he went on to say that no "traitor" could be included, apparently meaning by this that at least the present South Vietnamese military leaders would be excluded. 4. Withdrawal of US Forces. Bo was asked what time schedule would be required--in the event of an agreement for an independent South Viet-Nam--on the withdrawal of US forces. Bo replied that this was no problem and that it was a technical detail that could be worked out as it had been with the French in 1954. The withdrawal could be discussed and could take place over a two- or three-year period. Bo related US withdrawal clearly, however, to acceptance of the principles he had laid down for "independence" and "self-determination" in South Viet-Nam. 5. Cease-fire or Cessation in Bombings. Bo mentioned the bombings of the North only in passing and with mild reproof. He gave no indication that a cessation of bombing was required before there could be discussions. Comment 1. The position taken by Bo in this conversation appears to be consistent with the latest statements from Hanoi, notably an article on July 16./2/ Bo appeared to be quite firm that there must be an agreed basis for discussions, and that this must be the Four Points. Although he persisted in using the phrase "self-determination" to describe the solution within South Viet-Nam, his parallel references to the Liberation Front program seemed to state that Hanoi would still insist that we accept in advance the principle that the Liberation Front be admitted to a coalition government (the core of the Front "program"). His reference to the exclusion of "traitors" also seems to point to a government that would be weighted in favor of the Liberation Front. /2/Reference is apparently to the "White Paper" on "US Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam" released by North Vietnam in English on July 16. For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part VI, B, 2, pp. 146-151. 2. In clearly not insisting on prior withdrawal of US forces before any discussions, and in avoiding mention of a cessation of bombings as a pre-condition, Bo was also consistent with the Hanoi July 16 statement. 3. Bo's great stress on the necessity for a unified Viet-Nam, and his failure to note the US reference to this subject in Secretary Rusk's speech of June 23,/3/ suggest that as of the date of the conversation Hanoi was not yet clear what the US position was on reunification. The President's July 28 statement,/4/ referring specifically to the possibility of "free elections . . . throughout Viet-Nam under international supervision," should make clear to Hanoi what our position is on this point. However, it is clear that Hanoi, in the wording of the Four Points and in Bo's stress on Viet-Nam being one nation, wishes an agreement that would effectively assume early reunification, and presumably without any holding of elections in the two Viet-Nams to see if the people wanted it. In other words, there remains a difference of substance between us on this point, but it seems doubtful that the US position could now be misunderstood in Hanoi./5/ /3/In an address to the American Foreign Service Association, Rusk called for a "free decision by the peoples of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification." For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1965, pp. 52-55. /4/See Document 97. /5/In a July 30 memorandum to William Bundy, Dean noted that Mai Van Bo appeared to be confused about the U.S. position on the Geneva Accords, unification, and self-determination. He suggested that "we clarify these points to Mai, and in turn give him a list of specific questions about Hanoi's position." Dean added that he felt that such a direct approach was necessary to get a firm reading of Hanoi's position. He felt that the danger of public disclosure of such an approach by a U.S. businessman was slight, in that Mai Van Bo had been discreet in the past. (Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 412, Mai Van Bo 1965) 4. The American source, Duntov, impressed us all as giving an honest and factual account of the conversation. He said that throughout the conversation he asked only clarifying questions and tried to make it clear that he had no message and no standing with the US Government. We were inclined to believe that Bo accepted this although Duntov's closing request to convey the substance to "friends in Washington" must mean that Bo will know that his views got through to us. 5. If we were to consider using Duntov for future contacts with Bo, we would be wise to have a security investigation, and we would also have to take account, despite Duntov's apparent personal discretion, of the fact that he apparently has wide newspaper and other associations who might learn of his approach, even if he did not tell them the substance of his conversation.
99. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ New York, July 29, 1965, 2:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 191. Subject: Vietnam. Reference: Deptel 138./2/ Subsequent to presentation credentials Goldberg accompanied by Plimpton and Yost spent hour yesterday afternoon with SYG accompanied by Bunche, Narasimhan and Rolz-Bennett./3/ /2/In telegram 138 to USUN, July 27, the Department of State reviewed previous exchanges with Thant on the question of Vietnam, and outlined the points that Goldberg should make with Thant in their first talk. Goldberg was instructed to explain the defensive character of the anticipated U.S. troop build-up in South Vietnam, and to suggest that it might be useful at some point for Thant to issue a personal appeal for a Geneva conference to establish conditions for the cessation of hostilities. The Department added that it remained interested in the question of whether the Security Council might play a useful role in connection with Vietnam. (Ibid.) /3/Francis T.P. Plimpton and Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Representatives at the United Nations. C.V. Narasimhan, Under Secretary for General Assembly Affairs and Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations, and Ralph J. Bunche and Jose Rolz-Bennett, Under Secretaries for Special Political Affairs. On Vietnam, Goldberg covered fully points made reftel and talking paper,/4/ including Harriman-Kosygin conversation./5/ Goldberg emphasized that we were suggesting SYG explore three possible steps: (1) an SC mtg concluding with simple res calling for negots; (2) a direct appeal by U Thant for negots; (3) North and South membership in UN. SYG comments on these and other points were as follows. /4/Not further identified. /5/See Document 68. SYG inquired whether Kosygin in conversation with Harriman had indicated receptivity to SC mtg. Goldberg replied that he had not but that he had during conversation, as evidenced by points Goldberg had just reported, shown degree of flexibility which seemed to warrant further exploration by SYG. Goldberg mentioned that Kosygin had referred to Vietnam as "small problem," though pointing out that he might have meant only that it is small in relation to such broader issues as disarmament and over-all US-Sov relations. SYG replied there had been no indication of flexibility concerning UN involvement in Vietnam on part of Sov reps in NY. They had been reluctant to talk about problem at all and had in particular been very negative about any SC mtg. French had also been opposed to SC mtg though less categorically. Thant mentioned that Stevenson had sounded him out in Geneva in early July on this same point/6/ and he had replied that he would explore possibility but was not hopeful. Subsequently in Paris he had sounded out Couve, who had been negative because he did not think Peking, Hanoi or Saigon would be willing to attend SC mtg. Thant also mentioned that Ben Bella, during their exchange concerning SYG's attendance at Afro-Asian mtg, had argued Hanoi would not agree to any UN involvement in Vietnam question because of absence from UN of ChiComs. Thant himself fears that in any SC mtg Sovs would have to take strong line against UN involvement and to veto any res. He is doubtful, therefore, as he told Secy at their mtg July 19, that there is any advantage in pursuing idea of SC mtg with Sovs and French./7/ /6/See footnote 7, Document 52. /7/Rusk and Thant met at 4:30 p.m. on July 19 at the United Nations in New York. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) As to SYG himself issuing some sort of appeal, Thant mentioned that he had some time ago been asked by Washington to delay cease-fire appeal and had done so. Goldberg expressed appreciation for his having delayed such an appeal and pointed out problem that would be created for us by unpoliced cease-fire. Thant suggested that desirability and character of appeal by him should be more fully explored next time he and Goldberg meet. SYG expressed disagreement with indication in Harriman report that Hanoi is moving away from Peking. It has been his impression that they are drawing closer to Peking, certainly closer than they were last autumn when Hanoi through Moscow, without clearing with Peking, agreed to meet with us. As to membership North VN and South VN in UN, Thant posed certain questions. Would Hanoi apply for membership? If it did, would Nationalist China veto admission? It is Thant's belief that Peking would oppose DRV membership and would tell Hanoi not to apply. However, SYG welcomed US "green light" on this point and said he would explore possibilities. SYG then made several comments on possible Geneva conf. He said it is matter of indifference to him whether conf precedes or follows cease-fire. In former case he concurred that cease-fire should be first item on agenda. However, it is essential that Peking should participate and, while he has had no contact with Peking since becoming SYG, he sees two possible impediments to their participation. First impediment would be problem of South Vietnamese representation. Peking would claim only Viet Cong should represent SVN. This of course is unrealistic and unacceptable. However, in SYG's view, it would also be unrealistic that only Saigon should represent SVN. Government of SVN changes from month to month and it would not be realistic to claim that Ky and Thieu, or whoever will be in their place at time conf convenes, are competent to represent S Vietnamese people. SYG recommends that SVN be represented at such conf by two delegations, Saigon and Viet Cong, having equal status. He mentioned incidentally that Hanoi would certainly reject Viet Cong appearing only as part of DRV deleg. SYG said he had sounded out both UK and France concerning his suggested dual SVN deleg, but both had said they preferred to await US reaction before commenting. Second possible impediment to Peking participation in Geneva conf is fact that Peking has insisted publicly, though not recently, that 1954 Geneva Accords must be reaffirmed and implemented by any new conf. Such implementation would of course include withdrawal foreign forces and bases, as well as elections. SYG noted however that Hanoi has apparently not insisted on withdrawal US forces before new conf. This subject was closed with agreement that SYG would consider suggestions we had presented and would explore them with Sovs and others where he considered appropriate and that conversations would be resumed upon Goldberg's return to NY./8/ /8/Goldberg also gave U Thant a personal letter from President Johnson, dated July 28, at this meeting. In the letter, Johnson indicated that he had instructed Goldberg to maintain contact with Thant on developments in Vietnam, and he welcomed Thant's efforts to move the conflict to the conference table. Thant responded on July 29 in a letter to Johnson in which he expressed his determination to pursue a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict with all the means at his disposal. On July 30, Goldberg sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he stated that the United States was prepared to work unconditionally with the members of the Security Council in search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to Southeast Asia. All three letters are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 892-894. Goldberg
100. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (B). Top Secret. SUBJECT Summarized below, as you requested, is an evaluation of the program of bombing North Vietnam. 1. Rationale for bombing the North. The program of bombing NVN began in an atmosphere of reprisal. We had had the August Tonkin Gulf episode; we had absorbed the November 1 attack on Bien Hoa Airfield and the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. The attacks at U.S. installations at Pleiku on February 7 and Qui Nhon on February 10 were the immediate causes of the first strikes against North Vietnam. The strike following Pleiku was announced as a "response"--a "reprisal"; our strike following Qui Nhon was called a response to more generalized VC terrorism. The major purposes of the bombing program, however, were: a. To promote a settlement. The program was designed (1) to influence the DRV to negotiate (explicitly or otherwise), and (2) to provide us with a bargaining counter within negotiations. b. To interdict infiltration. The program was calculated to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South--at least, to put a ceiling on the size of war that the enemy could wage in the South. Supplemental purposes of the program were (c) to demonstrate to South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the world the U.S. commitment to see this thing through, (d) to raise morale in South Vietnam by punishing North Vietnam, the source of the suffering in the South, and (e) to reduce criticism of the Administration from advocates of a bombing program. 2. Achievement of major purposes. The potential targets, targets struck and per cent of destruction are shown at Tab A. In terms of the purposes of the program, its results have been as follows: a. To promote a settlement. Obviously, this objective has not yet been attained. We recognized at the start of the program, as we do now, that the influence of the bombing on a settlement would not be great until the North Vietnamese had been disappointed in their hopes for a quick military success in the South. There is no doubt that the bombing program has become an important counter in the current tacit and explicit bargaining process and will be an important counter in any future bargaining. b. To interdict infiltration. It is believed that regular North Vietnamese units now in South Vietnam (estimated to be one division) require about 4 tons of supplies daily for the "current" level of combat but would require 67 tons of supplies daily for "light" combat. ("Current" levels are operations conducted largely in small units; "light" combat would involve larger elements in action on the average of every third day, with expenditures of one-third of each unit's basic load of ammunition on each action.) It is believed that regular North Vietnamese units and Pathet Lao forces in the Laos Panhandle require about 21 and 51 tons daily respectively for the two levels of combat. Viet Cong arms, ammunition and other supply requirements are estimated at 8 tons daily for "current" combat and 115 tons for "light" combat. The effect of the interdiction program on the movement of supplies is summarized below: The 440-ton per day rail traffic from Hanoi south to Vinh has been cut off at Ninh Binh (40 miles south of Hanoi). Supplies still move by sea and over the parallel highway system. The latter has been badly damaged and is subject to armed reconnaissance; sea traffic into SVN is under surveillance. At a minimum, supply is slower and less regular and delivered at increased cost in resources and energy expended. Roads into Laos have been subjected to similar interdiction and armed recce. Only limited interdiction has been imposed on the key rail and road net northwest of Hanoi, and none on the railway net northeast of Hanoi; and port destruction has been minimal. Thus, substantially uninterrupted supply continues from China by rail into Hanoi and by sea into Haiphong to meet major North Vietnamese military, industrial and civilian needs. The effect of the bombing on military operations is estimated to have been as follows: (1) For regular North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces. The interdiction program has caused North Vietnam increasing difficulty in supplying their units in Laos and South Vietnam. How severe this difficulty is or how stretched North Vietnam's supply capabilities are cannot be estimated precisely. Our interdiction efforts may have either prevented or deterred the North from sending more troops than they already have. The interdiction programs in North Vietnam and Laos also may have influenced a Communist decision to forego a 1965 offensive in Laos. (2) For Viet Cong forces. Because the VC require significantly less infiltrated arms and ammunition and other supplies than do the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, the interdiction program probably has had less of an adverse effect on their operations. By raising VC fears concerning adequacy of supplies, however, the program may have caused the VC summer offensive to be less intense, aggressive and unrelenting than it would otherwise have been. It should be noted that the program has not been a "strategic" bombing program; it has been limited to selected targets of fairly direct military relevance. Populations and targets such as dikes and basic industries have not been struck. Furthermore, the immediate vicinities of Hanoi and Haiphong have been avoided, partly because the targets there are primarily of the "strategic" type and partly because strikes there would involve even more serious risks of confrontations with the Soviet Union and China. 3. Other effects of the program. a. Deterrence of VC terrorism. There is no evidence that strikes against North Vietnam have affected one way or another the level or kind of VC incidents of terror in South Vietnam. b. Morale in South Vietnam. Morale in South Vietnam was raised by the initiation of the bombing program (as, later, by the deployment of additional troops). Now--with the bombing programs having become commonplace and with the failure of the situation to improve--morale in South Vietnam is not discernibly better than it was before the bombing program began. In a sense, South Vietnam is now "addicted" to the program; a permanent abandonment of the program would have a distinct depressing effect on morale in South Vietnam. c. Reduction of criticism of the Administration. Some critics, who advocated bombing, were silenced; others are now as vocal or more vocal because the program has been too limited for their taste. The program has generated a new school of criticism among liberals and "peace" groups, whose activities have been reflected especially in teach-ins and newspaper criticisms. d. Damage to peaceful image of the US. The price paid for improving our image as a guarantor has been damage to our image as a country which eschews armed attacks on other nations. The hue and cry correlates with the kind of weapons (e.g., bombs vs. napalm), the kind of targets (e.g., bridges vs. people), the location of targets (e.g., south vs. north), and not least the extent to which the critic feels threatened by Asian communism (e.g., Thailand vs. the UK). Furthermore, for a given level of bombing, the hue and cry is less now than it was earlier, perhaps to some extent helped by Communist intransigence toward discussions. The objection to our "warlike" image and the approval of our fulfilling our commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia. Within such allied countries as UK and Japan, popular antagonism to the bombings per se, fear of escalation and belief that the bombings are the main obstacle to negotiation, have created political problems for the governments in their support of US policy. e. Pressures to settle. More countries are now, as a consequence of the bombing program, more interested in taking steps to help bring the war to an end. f. Impact on US-Soviet detente. The bombing program--because it appears to reject the policy of "peaceful co-existence," because it involves an attack on a "fellow socialist country," because the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, because it challenges the USSR as she competes with China for leadership of the Communist world, and because US and Soviet arms are now striking each other in North Vietnam--has strained the US-Soviet detente, making constructive arms-control and other cooperative programs more difficult. How serious this effect will be and whether the detente can be revived depend on how far we carry our military actions against the North and how long the campaign continues. At the same time, the bombing program offers the Soviet Union an opportunity to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit for persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance that the scenario could spin out this way; if so, the effect of the entire experience on the US-Soviet detente could be a net plus. g. Risk of escalation. The bombing program--especially as strikes move toward Hanoi and toward China and as encounters with Soviet/Chinese SAMs/MIGs occur--may increase the risk of escalation into a broader war. 4. The future of the program. Even with hindsight, I believe the decision to bomb the DRV was wise and I believe the program should be continued. The future program should: a. Emphasize the threat. It should be structured to capitalize on fear of future attacks. At any time, "pressure" on the DRV depends not upon the current level of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of future destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations. b. Minimize the loss of DRV "face." The program should be designed to make it politically easy for the DRV to enter negotiations and to make concessions during negotiations. It may be politically easier for North Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make concessions at a time when bombing of their territory is not currently taking place. c. Optimize interdiction vs. political costs. Interdiction should be carried out so as to maximize effectiveness and to minimize the political repercussions from the methods used. Physically, it makes no difference whether a rifle is interdicted on its way into North Vietnam, on its way out of North Vietnam, in Laos or in South Vietnam. But different amounts of effort and different political prices may be paid depending on how and where it is done. The critical variables in this regard are (1) the type of targets struck (e.g., port facilities involving civilian casualties vs. isolated bridges), (2) type of aircraft (e.g., B-52s vs. F-105s), (3) kind of weapons (e.g., napalm vs. ordinary bombs), (4) location of target (e.g., in Hanoi vs. Laotian border area), and (5) the accompanying declaratory policy (e.g., unlimited vs. a defined interdiction zone). d. Coordinate with other influences on the DRV. So long as full victory in the South appears likely, the effect of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a settlement will probably be small. The bombing program now and later should be designed for its influence on the DRV at that unknown time when the DRV becomes more optimistic about what they can achieve in a settlement acceptable to us than about what they can achieve by continuation of the war. e. Avoid undue risks and costs. The program should avoid bombing which runs a high risk of escalation into war with the Soviets or China and which is likely to appall allies and friends. Robert S. McNamara
Tab A ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM'S MILITARY EFFECTS
* Only partly operational: 1/3 to 1/2 capacity
101. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (Ackley) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex ND 19/CO 312. No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that Johnson saw the memorandum. SUBJECT Summary The implications of the Vietnam situation for the economy appear to be these: It has affected, and may continue to influence, speculative commodity and financial markets. There are not likely to be significant effects on over-all prices, output, or employment in the next few months. If expenditures follow the path that Bob McNamara now visualizes as likely, they could provide a significant stimulus to economic activity during the first half of next year. We will need to intensify our concern about prices and wages. Budgetary and tax planning for fiscal 1967 will be affected. Analysis 1. Our economy has lots of room to absorb a defense step-up. There is still a $15-$20 billion margin of idle industrial capacity and excessive unemployment. Our productive capacity is growing by $25-$30 billion a year (apart from any price increases), making room for both more butter and, if needed, more guns. Apart from the defense effort, market demand would not be likely to grow as fast as productive capacity during the course of FY 1966, and unemployment would probably be creeping up. 2. The stock market is anxious about Vietnam news, because the financial community --generally hates uncertainties which could cloud the business outlook; and --specifically fears that a major escalation could bring on increased taxes and wage and price controls. 3. Vietnam news has had an important influence on the stock market. A 12 point drop in the Dow-Jones Index on July 20 is generally attributed to the Administration's appraisal of the war as "deteriorating." Since your statement Wednesday noon,/2/ the market has been strong, with a gain of 14 points to today's close. On learning that no drastic measures were planned, "Wall Street heaved a sigh of relief," said the Times. /2/July 28. Reference is to the President's statement at his news conference; see Document 97. 4. As the stock market rebounded on reassuring Vietnam news, speculative commodity markets retreated. On Wednesday, copper futures fell sharply. In the previous 2 weeks, they had risen more than 10%. Fortunately, many other commodity markets had topped out before the latest round of Vietnam news, and prices were not poised to leap ahead. 5. These markets will continue to reflect the ups-and-downs of military action and speculation. But there is no good reason for major flurries in the near future. Nobody can seriously expect that the kind of program you outlined is going to overheat the economy, strain industrial capacity, or generate a consumer buying boom. But speculative excitement inflames easily in the commodity markets, and we should be careful what we say and do. 6. The thought of direct controls on prices and wages is what frightens business most. The worry on this score is way out of proportion to the facts. Here are two examples on opposite sides in recent press comment. U.S. News reported--before your press conference--"If the Vietnam war continues to escalate . . . rising toward the scale of the Korean war, wage and price controls will return, many materials will be allocated, and an excess profits tax will again become a real possibility." But a knowledgeable broker argued in the Times, "Even if we assume the Vietnam war gets as big as the Korean war, this doesn't mean we would have to have excess profits taxes or commodity controls as we had then." Your Wednesday press conference should have been reassuring. We can say--and perhaps should emphasize publicly--that direct controls are simply not live possibilities. Only in the remote event that the Defense step-up for the near future got into the $10 billion range would we have to give serious thought to higher taxes, selective commodity allocations, or (last of all) to direct controls on wages and prices. 7. The analogy with Korea simply does not hold water. We started the Korean war with defense purchases running at a $12 billion rate; we doubled them in 9 months and tripled them in 15. Our defense capability is incomparably greater today. Even so, the real reason for the surge in prices in late 1950 and early 1951 was not the pressure of defense orders or outlays. Many businesses made frantic efforts to pile up inventories, and consumers went on a buying spree. Consumer spending jumped 7-1/2% in the third quarter of 1950 and took another 5-1/2% jump in the first quarter of 1951; consumers virtually stopped saving. Fresh memories of wartime rationing and shortages drove households into a hoarding binge. The consumer has been living in a world of plentiful supplies and well-stocked shelves for a dozen years now. He is not about to panic. 8. The current thinking in DOD, as relayed to me by Bob McNamara on a super-confidential basis, points to a gradual and moderate build-up of expenditures and manpower. In the closing months of 1965, when the reduction of steel inventories will be holding down our economic advance, the defense step-up will be small and any influence it has will be in the right direction. In the first half of 1966, the impact on output and employment will be more significant. But it means extra insurance against slowdown or recession during the period (when payroll taxes will jump)--not a threat of overheating. 9. We are certainly not saying that a Vietnam crisis is just what the doctor ordered for the American economy in the next 12 months. But, on a coldly objective analysis, the over-all effects are most likely to be favorable to our prosperity. 10. We were probably heading into a period of a slightly faster creep of wages and industrial prices without Vietnam. The new uncertainties will probably strengthen that tendency. This underscores the importance of Government-wide emphasis on the guideposts. It also means we should go slow on measures that will raise business costs--like higher minimum wages. And we may need to have larger stockpile releases, if commodity markets start to misbehave. 11. Vietnam will pose fiscal problems in our budget planning for FY 1967. Added defense outlays will take a chunk of the $7 billion normal year-to-year growth of tax revenues that we have to use in order to avoid a fiscal drag. The bigger the defense chunk has to be, the less room for domestic civilian programs or tax cuts. The uncertainties about defense needs, private demand, and Federal civilian programs prevent any conclusions as yet. It is now less likely that you will want to recommend a tax cut next year. But it remains a possibility that shouldn't be ruled out. Gardner Ackley
102. Editorial Note On August 1, 1965, Yugoslav President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Shastri issued a joint communique calling for a suspension of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, while a conference of interested parties attempted to resolve the Vietnam conflict on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. (The New York Times, August 2, 1965) Ambassador Harriman had met with President Tito at his summer retreat on the island of Vanga on July 31 and discussed this proposal. Tito indicated that he believed that North Vietnam was prepared to negotiate, and added that he and Shastri would be consulting with other non-aligned countries concerning the initiative. Tito felt that with a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreements, South Vietnam could emerge as an independent, democratic republic which would serve as a buffer against Chinese expansion in the area. (Telegram 479 from London, August 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harriman Talks on Vietnam, July and August 1965)
103. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 3, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. No classification marking. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the President on August 3, under cover of a memorandum in which he observed: "Lansdale appears quite ready to take over MACV--and yet he's not all wrong. Can we afford some creative tension?" Following is an excerpt from a memorandum to me from Edward Lansdale/2/ in response to a paper of mine to him on "Solving the 'politico' part of the 'Politico-Military' Vietnam problem."/3/ It contains ideas of which, I believe, you should be aware: /2/Lodge selected Lansdale to accompany him to Vietnam to establish a special operating staff in the Embassy to work on political action programs with the South Vietnamese Government. Lansdale arrived in Vietnam on August 29 with a hand-picked group of 10 counter-subversion specialists. He was designated as an assistant to Ambassador Lodge and appointed the U.S. liaison representative on the Central Rural Construction Council, created on July 30. /3/Not found. "'Politico'. Your paper states sound conclusions when it speaks of the need for an affirmative answer to the threat of Communist-Subversion/Terrorism", the need for good practical politics in Vietnam, the fact that our other programs even though excellent are no substitute for a real political program, and the need for underscoring the truth of promises through actual performance. Personally, I don't see how the Communists can be defeated without these positive steps. The military can suppress the Communist forces, even keep them suppressed by continued military action, but cannot defeat them short of genocide unless our side puts the war on a political footing in Viet Nam. "The enemy in Vietnam understands thoroughly the political nature of the war he is waging. The enemy sees his every act as a political act, and uses psychological, military, and socio-economic weapons to gain his political goals. This is a strict rule the enemy borrowed from Clausewitz. Lenin, Mao, Ho, and Giap have been clear and firm on this basic rule. The Viet Cong have obeyed it amazingly well. Our side has broken this rule over and over again. It is being broken daily right now. "Thus, when you ask my help to get a Counter-Subversion/Terrorism program moving, you really are asking me to help you to get our side to start obeying and applying the prime rule of the war in Vietnam. It isn't separate from the other programs. It is the basis upon which the war in Vietnam will be won or lost. The psychological, military, and socio-economic programs are its instruments, not ends in themselves. Political bankruptcy in Vietnam and the direct use of U.S. combat forces complicate your task vastly. (A U.S. commander, tasked to attack a suspected enemy position, is going to clobber it first by bombing or artillery to cut his own U.S. casualties to a minimum when they attack; casualties of Vietnamese non-combatants must be secondary to his responsibility to his own command and mission.) I point this out to underscore the fact that something brand new, perhaps of considerable difference from anything previous, will have to be worked out in Vietnam to put the war on the essential political footing. It might require heroic measures, such as moving non-combatants out of Central Vietnam into the far South, to permit the military threat to be resolved conclusively in Central Vietnam by military means while non-combatant refugees get a real chance at a new life. Again, this could be a wrong move. You are going to need some exceptionally expert help to solve this vital problem; for many reasons, it's your biggest."
104. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 3, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, President Eisenhower. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Goodpaster. SUBJECT 1. I met with General Eisenhower for an hour and a half in his office at Gettysburg this morning. I had arranged the visit with him previously by phone for the purpose of bringing him up-to-date on the situation and program actions relating to South Viet-Nam. 2. Before I began my remarks he expressed concern over one important aspect of recent actions. Citing Clausewitz, he pointed out that to every action we take, we must expect the enemy to take counter-action. It is important to avoid acting by "driblets." If we want to win, we should not base our action on minimum needs, but should swamp the enemy with overwhelming force. He recalled that he had previously pointed out that if the enemy has a battalion on a position and we use two battalions against him, we may take the position but losses can be high. If instead we use as much as a division we will take the objective and our losses will be much lower. 3. He said he thought we should avoid using specific numbers in announcing our buildup. Specifically, he was troubled about the announced figure of 50,000. Instead, he thought the statement/2/ should have been "sufficient to win." /2/Reference is to the statement President Johnson made at his July 28 press conference; see Document 97. 4. I brought out that the figure of 50,000 had been coupled with the kind of statement he proposed--"additional forces will be needed later and they will be sent," and that in fact planning and preparatory work is going forward to provide all that General Westmoreland has asked for at a very rapid rate. He reiterated his view that we do better to avoid specific numbers which tend to suggest to our enemies that we are limited in our determination. He would think it better simply to say that SVN within the past year or two has become an open battle ground of freedom against Communism, and that we will do whatever is needed to defeat Communism there. 5. He thought that the call for more draftees struck a good note because it showed our seriousness of purpose. He commented that he had been asked by many people while he was in Wisconsin, particularly by young people, just what we are going to do about Viet-Nam. He said his answer was that we must win there--we must stop the infiltration, stop the Communists from cutting South Viet-Nam to pieces, and give the South Vietnamese a chance to build a free society. He returned to his original point with a statement that this is no time for "piddling" steps, and that such--in the present situation, in which there has been an appeal to force--would be our greatest weakness. 6. At this point I reviewed in terms of major units the planned deployments to Viet-Nam in response to General Westmoreland's request. 7. I next discussed the concept for the employment of the U.S. forces as they close in the area. Secure bases will be provided at each of the key points selected. There will be an ample security force (a brigade or more), and normally a major logistics installation, and major tactical air base capable of general operations. As forces are built up further, they will be used for reaction operations, to fix and destroy Viet Cong units of battalion or greater size when they form for attack, and as a general reserve to locate, pin down and destroy Viet Cong main force units through offensive action, and to attack the Viet Cong base areas. As forces increase, the emphasis will shift toward offensive action on a sustained basis to carry the fight without letup to the Viet Cong. Maximum use will be made of air support, as well as artillery support, in these operations. General Eisenhower indicated he thought well of this concept of operations. I added that the Vietnamese will be expected to join in the foregoing operations to a limited degree (commensurate with their strength), but will particularly be responsible for locating and destroying pockets of Viet Cong smaller units and for establishing security in the countryside through wider areas. General Eisenhower thought these operations were of very great importance. He emphasized that propaganda activities should be intensified, and suggested that we be in position to extend to any village taken over from the Viet Cong immediate assistance in the form of food, medicines and the like. Such assistance, to be most effective, should be given at once. 8. In the course of this discussion I reviewed the general situation in South Viet-Nam, contrasting the situation observed in the Delta on my recent trip (where a highly capable corps commander has his troops on the offensive, carrying the fight to the Viet Cong with considerable effectiveness) with other areas where the Viet Cong encroachment continues, together with disruption of roads, railroads and all forms of communication. 9. I next commented on operations against North Viet-Nam. I told him consideration is being given at this moment to the question of expansion of the scope of attack operations to include attacks on POL, remaining LOC, and possible mining of major harbors. He said he considered that the selection of targets (speaking of military targets) amounts at this stage to deciding tactical matters. He thought that this is a matter for the field commander. It is important to comprehend what war is, and make sure we don't lose effect through detailed control away from the scene of conflict. He thought it was essential to go after the POL and the lines of communication, and would mine the harbors without delay, telling the world to keep shipping out of the area and making clear that there is to be no sanctuary. If this is not done, we will pay in U.S. casualties in South Viet-Nam. He emphasized that the way to keep international pressures down, and to save lives is to win the struggle as quickly as possible. 10. Referring to the surface-to-air missiles, he said that in his judgment we should have hit them before they became operational. He added that he had understood that we were going to do this. He said he would urge that we get the SAM's destroyed before they can be used. He said that, in fact, we should strike quickly whenever we see a new kind of danger building up, and not wait until it is in use. He commented that, operationally, there seems to him to be too much of a brake on everything we do. If the North Vietnamese use their SAM's and anti-aircraft in combination, as they are skillful enough to do, our air operations will become much more difficult and costly. 11. I then outlined the program for force expansion which the President had approved. I mentioned that the question whether to rely upon the draft or call up reserves had received the most searching analysis and careful consideration, culminating in a decision to rely upon the draft, extend terms of service where permitted, and bring selected reserves to a higher state of readiness. The net resulting difference between the two methods will not be large; there might be some limited additional delay in readiness of forces under the scheme adopted. This would be of significance in case a contingency should occur in Europe. General Eisenhower said he was not concerned over this point. If we were to become involved in war in Europe of any substantial proportions, he would not be for sending large forces into the area, but would be for using every bomb we have. [Here follows brief discussion of the Dominican Republic.] 13. General Eisenhower's principal suggestion was to recognize that we are at war in Viet-Nam, and not base our action on "minimum needs" or a weak strike program against the North, but to "swamp them." G.
105. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 3, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Public Affairs Policy Committee. Confidential. Prepared by Gordon Chase of the NSC Staff on August 4. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At Mr. Cater's invitation, the group met for dinner at the White House Staff Mess to discuss the Government's information program in the field of foreign affairs, and primarily as it pertains to the domestic audience. The discussion generally covered (a) the nature of the information problem and (b) general and specific ideas and agencies for meeting the information problem. 1. The Nature of the Information Problem (a) Mr. Cater said that, with respect to public information, we lack many of the strengths we once had. We don't seem to have independent validators of policy any more--the Vandenbergs and the Connollys. We don't seem to have elder statesmen any more--Eisenhower is the exception. We don't seem to have the newscasting we once had--the Ed Murrows and the Elmer Davises, to quieten us and to give us perspective; instead, the nature of T.V. is such that we always seem to get our news on a fragmentary basis. Finally, with the exception of the President, the Government does not seem to have the spokesmen it once had. Mr. Cater went on to say that our public posture is fragile; we rely too much on the President and too much on specific facts. There seems to be no basic understanding of the broader aspects on the part of the American people. And with this situation, we are extremely vulnerable to rumor, gossip, and quick reverses. (b) Mr. Greenfield, with specific reference to Vietnam, outlined a number of dimensions that he sees as part of the information problem. First, we are always meeting the crisis of the moment. In practice, there is little time to think about the long term or the philosophical. We only plug holes and run as fast as we can to stay even. Second, we seem to be obsessed by Vietnam. Foreigners especially believe that the President thinks of nothing else but Vietnam. This is not a healthy image. Third, we do not always keep the arithmetic in mind. There are almost 300 accredited correspondents in Vietnam and we must recognize that we are going to have to live with some unfortunate stories--e.g., brutality by Americans. Fourth, while our credibility with the press is improving, we are still not credible enough. We suffer substantial losses when we are not accurate, and there are plenty of inaccuracies. (Mr. Califano seconded this point.) Fifth, we do not have the highest quality military spokesmen in Vietnam; they should be improved. Sixth, we are involved in too many cliches. Some of them are all right but others may not be; we should re-examine them. For example, we should look again at "Our country's honor is at stake"; one day we may be sorry that we are tied too closely to this stand. Another cliche we ought to examine is "Our friends won't trust us if we desert the Vietnamese"; this one gives us trouble when foreigners say publicly that they want us out of Vietnam--in effect, pulling the rug out from under us. (Mr. Bundy and Mr. Cooper differed with Mr. Greenfield at this point; both agreed, however, that we should make more of foreign statements which support our argument--e.g., Willy Brandt's reference to the conflict as "our war.") Seventh, we should probably try to do something about this curious business involving newsmen who say "the American people don't know what's going on." When asked what they want, these newsmen say that they want more specific facts (e.g., how many tons of bombs were dropped); at the same time, they agree, when pressed, that the answer does not really bear at all on the essence of the Vietnam situation. Maybe this curious questioning relates to the proposition that the Vietnam war is different from anything we've seen and that we are all groping for ways to understand it. Mr. Cooper agreed that part of the information problem does relate to the fact that Vietnam represents a difficult and brand new type of warfare. While correspondents may not think it is important when B-52's hit a rice dump, it really is important. In short, we may not know how to fight the war in Vietnam but the correspondents don't know how to report it either. (c) Mr. Jorden said that an essential element in our Vietnam information problem is that the South Vietnamese don't say anything. They don't say why they are fighting or where they are going. We must get them to state their own case--that what they are doing is good, just, etc. It would not only help with their own people but with the outside world as well. Picking up on this thought, Mr. Cooper said that unfortunately the GVN is shadowy--there is not even a GVN ambassador here. As a matter of fact, for some time we have been trying in vain to get the GVN to do three relatively simple things--appoint an ambassador to the U.S.; appoint an information officer to the U.S.; and hire an American public relations firm to represent the GVN in the U.S. Partly as a result of the GVN's ineffectual and mushy public information program, the American people do not think we are really associated with anyone in Vietnam. Mr. Marks seconded this point and noted that the American people do not really understand that the South Vietnamese have committed 500,000 people to the struggle. (d) Mr. Chancellor said that this is indeed a remarkable situation; we are faced with an entirely different kind of war and there is no participation in the public information field by the people one would expect to hear from the most--e.g., South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong. (Some members of the group noted that the Viet Cong was indeed very active in the field.) In essence, perhaps we have, for the first time in our experience, a non-packageable commodity. Perhaps, therefore, we should try to emulate the 19th century British and try to get a sort of general commitment and support by the American people rather than a specific commitment and support for Vietnam. The "This is a long-term proposition--we are a world power and are stuck with this sort of thing" psychology may in fact bring greater comfort to the American people than the definition of the struggle as one of sharp confrontation. Mr. Bundy recognized the force in Mr. Chancellor's argument but added, among other things, that we could never hope for enough support, in the general sense, to do the job. We must get involved in the specifics as well. We are faced with a situation of instant transmission of village episodes. The Communists know this dimension and deal with it effectively; we, too, must cope with this dimension. (e) Mr. Leibman said that the American people do not yet really understand how we got into Vietnam in the first place; they have received only generalities and they need specifics. Mr. Bundy agreed that there is a problem here, but thought that this particular piece of exposition might simply not be manageable. Our best posture may be to say simply that somehow we are there and that we have to stay. (f) The group noted that the nature of the information problem in Vietnam is changing in some respects. Mr. Leibman said that the problem will be intensified immeasurably when the effects of the doubling of the draft are felt. Mr. Chancellor said that the press is just beginning to get active in Vietnam. With increased staffs, we are going to get fewer people doing general interpretive work and we are going to get more of the poignant, Ernie Pyle-type stories. This may help our effort in getting support from the American people as the war starts to hit them locally. In this regard, Mr. Leibman noted that it may be useful to consider building local heroes rather than national heroes. (g) The group discussed the similarities and differences between the Korean War and the Vietnamese war. Mr. Bundy said that the American people may have more patience than they did during Korea; twelve years have passed. He noted that people have been saying for the past several years that the American people would explode if nothing decisive happened in Vietnam; yet, there has been no explosion. Mr. Cater noted the anomaly of Korea which, in fact, was a real success story but was never understood as such by the American people. The job is even tougher in Vietnam. (h) Mr. Greenfield raised two questions which were largely left unanswered by the group: What reaction would we like to get from the American people and from foreigners? Why do people seem to understand that it is necessary to fight over Berlin but not over Vietnam? 2. Meeting the Information Problem (a) Mr. Cooper ticked off some of the specific projects that are now under way. First, there are the "American Friends of Vietnam." While they still have a long way to go, they have done some good work; they work with students, publish a journal, run a speakers' bureau and have an elaborate mailing list. While the Government has been helping and advising this group, we can't get too involved; if it becomes too closely identified with the U.S. Government, its credibility will be badly affected. Second, we have sent 30 students to Vietnam. Our follow-up will, of course, be crucial. Third, we have brought some Vietnamese intellectuals over here. Fourth, we have been providing kits to certain speakers. There are other projects too. (b) Mr. Leibman said that the key elements that had been raised are the complexity and built-in contradiction of policy and the need for perspective and continuity. With regard to continuity, we should use more effectively the President's experience. Remember that "he was there" for 30 years. Mr. Leibman went on to say that part of the answer lies in using the private sector effectively. The private sector is anxious to be used. Mr. Leibman then went on to describe a number of possible projects that might be explored. First, perhaps the private sector could brief journalists and editors. There are plenty of institutions and schools that would be willing and anxious to do the job. Second, we could put into effect the "That Was the Week That Was" concept to get across the idea of perspective and "the whole chessboard." Third, we could make use of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces graduates. Fourth, with respect to high school teachers, there are three different types of programs that could be used--(a) special summer institutes on appropriate political subjects; (b) special programs for all teacher attendees at summer school; (c) year-round programs for teachers as part of in-service training. Fifth, we could use trade association forums. Mr. Leibman added that these ideas are only illustrative. The point is that there is a vacuum. If we don't fill it, then it will be filled against us. He went on to emphasize that the teach-in problem is almost here again and that we should be ready. (c) Mr. Greenfield noted that the only thing that makes our present posture swing is that the people have confidence in the President. Mr. Leibman added that this is one reason why the President must always be absolutely credible. Mr. Cater interjected that this is evidence of how fragile our posture is and went on to say that the President should not have to bear the whole burden of explanation. (d) Mr. Califano made the point that there was great merit in repetition. The President and other spokesmen in the Administration should keep repeating the same facts again and again. (e) Mr. Cooper noted Mr. Chancellor's point that there will be an increase in coverage of Vietnam. He went on to suggest that we give serious consideration to educating the editors so that they know which stories are significant and fit to print. (f) Mr. Greenfield said that we can only use the private sector effectively if there are effective Government spokesmen to support. And there are only four people who can give the Government position effectively--the President, Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. Mr. Chancellor said that Bundy is probably not good for the housewife in the back yard; unfortunately, Bundy appeals to the sophisticated and the sophisticated are already rigid in their confusion or in their position pro or con the Administration in Vietnam. Only the other three can do the job that is needed--and, for that matter, McNamara probably less than Rusk. (g) The group talked at some length about the problem of coordination of the information effort. Mr. Leibman, while recognizing the dangers of too much coordination, noted that it seemed to him that all sorts of people were involved but that no one was clearly carrying the ball or coordinating the effort. Mr. Califano said that there is a real need for orchestration on the Government side. Moreover, the only one who can really do the coordinating job effectively and get the right response from the major players is Bundy or Moyers. Mr. Cater said that what is needed is a sort of Tsar on the outside--a man with great prestige, preferably from New York, who could pull together and coordinate on the private side. Mr. Bundy agreed that there is a coordination problem as well as the ever-present problem of "finding the right man." He went on to say, however, that the private sector would probably not sit still for a ringmaster. He also suggested that perhaps we do not want to get so heavily organized either in the Government or in the private sector in the area of public information./2/ /2/A follow-up meeting was held on August 4. (Memorandum for the record by Chase, August 4; ibid.) See also Document 117. GC
106. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 4, 1965, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. Confidential. SUBJECT 1. You should know that the British have followed up very briskly on Goldberg's letter of last week to U Thant./2/ Foreign Minister Stewart has sent word to Dean Rusk that the British, as Chairman of the Security Council this month, feel that they would be seeming to question our sincerity if they did not press very hard to find ways of having an early meeting of the Security Council on Vietnam. In presenting this view, the British have also presented a resolution which would match an end of our bombing against an unpoliced North Vietnamese undertaking to send no more forces into the South--a notion which is plainly unacceptable to us./3/ /2/See footnote 8, Document 99. /3/Rusk and British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean met on August 2. The draft resolution cited here is attached to the memorandum of conversation. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: FRC 83 A 57, August 1965) 2. Dean Rusk has given the British a very skillful answer, stressing the need for intense private consultation before there is any Security Council meeting, and pointing out the defects in the UK draft resolution. Meanwhile, Yost talked yesterday to U Thant in New York and found him still adamantly opposed to a Security Council meeting./4/ The Russians have told him they would have to use such a meeting for violent denunciation of the U.S. U Thant has said the same thing to the British, and it may be that Stewart will be cooled off. /4/Thant said that such a meeting would be "disastrous." (Telegram 236 from USUN, August 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3. It is obviously going to be hard for State and Goldberg to keep the right balance between good sense and a forthcoming posture at the UN, but so far they are doing very well. It remains to be seen whether Foreign Minister Stewart is really as unhelpful as this particular demarche suggests. Up till now, he has been our best defender in the UK, but there is a fishy smell to this one. McG.B.
107. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII, Memos (B), 8/1-12/65. Top Secret. SUBJECT A New Element Last night's attack on the POL facility at Danang has introduced a new factor into the considerations of a pause. If a pause is to have the desired propaganda and political effect, it must be abundantly clear that we have voluntarily held back our vast power. While the attack on our POL storage facilities in Danang will, in fact, have no effect on our capabilities to bomb the North, the Communists can make a good case that any early pause was merely making a virtue of necessity. (You will recall that the VC and Hanoi proclaimed that our earlier pause was dictated by a lack of fuel and the need to repair our planes.) Thus, this overnight development might detract somewhat from the propaganda effect of an early pause. But the political signal we will be sending will not necessarily be muted; Moscow, Hanoi, Peiping and even the VC know that our logistic capabilities in the Far East cannot be significantly reduced by the destruction of a few POL tanks, and they know that we have sufficient capability within the 7th Fleet alone to destroy everything of value in North Vietnam. If they are waiting for a signal, they can still read this one loud and clear. In any case, a few news stories about our large POL reserves in the area and our impressive resupply capability, a continuation of our bombings on the North until the pause, and a heavy bombing program in the South might jointly remove much of the air from the propaganda balloon. Timing and Announcement If we decide on a pause (pros and cons are discussed below), I think we should implement it soon enough so that it appears to be part of the President's package of July 28,/2/ i.e., within a week or so. There are other advantages to doing it sooner rather than later: /2/See Document 98. Ambassador Lodge will still be here, and it will be easier to deal with any Communist responses and U.S. counter-moves on the political/diplomatic front when he is in Washington. Of lesser importance, but still worth noting, is that a pause prior to Nkrumah's trip to Hanoi (if, indeed, he decides to go) would give us propaganda points in Africa; a pause prior to Sukarno's 17th of August speech/3/ might tone him down a little; a pause at this stage of the disarmament conference might also help the atmosphere at Geneva. /3/Sukarno addressed the 20th Anniversary Celebration of Indonesian Independence August 17 in Djakarta; his address is printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 757-758. My own view would be to stop the bombing without a prior public announcement, but with prior confidential discussion with key allies and the USSR. If possible, the DRV and VC (but not the Chinese--let's keep them stewing on the outside) should be informed through trusted intermediaries. Obviously, a day or two without bombing will arouse great curiosity. In answer to queries, we can state that we are testing the atmosphere, following up on the President's statement, giving Nkrumah a leg up, etc., etc. We should make no commitments in public or private about the duration of our suspension. The Pros and Cons
1. It will continue the momentum toward settlement created by the conciliatory portions of the President's press conference statement; the fact that a pause is taking place in an interval of military build-up and after additional sizeable military appropriations should minimize a possible interpretation of "weakness". 2. It will create, specifically, the most favorable possible climate for Nkrumah's exploratory trip and should increase the pressure on Hanoi for a more conciliatory response to Nkrumah. 3. It will ease the mounting domestic pressures on our allies (above all, the Japanese, whose difficulties are becoming severe, but also the British, Canadians, and Australians). 4. It will meet the persistent objections of friendly unaligned nations and leaders (primarily U Thant, the Indians, and the Yugoslavs). 5. Even if a pause produces no response, it can increase our own room for maneuver within our military track by establishing early an understandable pattern of strikes and pauses; in this regard, each week that passes without a second pause compounds the significance--and the controversial nature, in the U.S. Government and general public--of the pause concept itself. We need to de-fuse this issue in order to free our hands. 6. It will improve the atmospherics, although having no effect on the substance, of the Geneva disarmament talks. 7. It will meet one persistent demand of our domestic critics and waverers. 8. It will further dramatize the good faith of our quest for a negotiated solution. 9. It will permit a more careful testing of Hanoi's interest in negotiations, if any such inclination exists. 10. It may allow Moscow increased leverage in pressing Hanoi toward negotiations, if any such inclination is present within the Soviet leadership. At the same time it may develop strains between Hanoi and Peiping and develop yet additional strains between Moscow and Peiping.
1. It may cause deep apprehensions regarding U.S. determination within the already-weakened GVN. 2. An extended pause will permit the DRV to catch its breath, repair damaged communications, and increase its assistance to the Viet Cong. 3. It will appear to the Communist side an admission of the ineffectiveness of the bombings and an indication of U.S. desperation for "negotiations now". 4. It will arouse strong criticism among domestic proponents of toughness--particularly among Republicans who are looking for a way to make capital out of any signs of Administration softness in Vietnam. 5. It might make a return to air strikes difficult in the context of predictable international pressures to keep the suspension permanent (although resumption of bombings after the last pause was not that difficult). 6. It is a move to which such intermediaries as the Yugoslavs wistfully refer, but not with fierce conviction; it is not a move that the Soviets are pushing with vigor. On Balance I favor a pause starting in the next week or so. However, I also think we should give some urgent attention to what sort of signal from Hanoi or the VC we would regard as significant. (Surely we don't really expect the DRV to withdraw its Division from South Vietnam during the period of cessation. On the other hand, we should expect something meaningful in terms of a drop in the scale of VC military activity or a clarification or modification of Communist talking terms.) We should also give thought now to the problem of communication with the other side after the initiation of a pause. None of the would-be intermediaries (the French, the Algerians, etc.) are entirely trustworthy or satisfactory for such a serious and delicate task. This raises the inevitable question of direct U.S. access to the DRV and the VC. We should now identify the best sites and channels for such direct conversations (this problem will be the subject of a subsequent memorandum). C
108. Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 5, 1965, 2:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII. Secret. Agenda for the 5:45 Meeting You have said that the main item on your mind is the Goldberg suggestion of a pause,/2/ but before you come to it, you may wish to have brief reports from Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara on their testimony and Congressional reaction this week./3/ You may also want to have a report from General Taylor, as we said yesterday we would. So I suggest an order somewhat like this: /2/See Document 116. /3/The texts of Rusk's statement on August 3 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and McNamara's statement on August 4 before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee were released in Why Vietnam (The White House, 1965). 1. Brief report by Dean Rusk. 2. Brief report by Bob McNamara. 3. Final report by Max Taylor. 4. Discussion led by the President on the possibility of a bombing pause. In this discussion, the following would be important commentators: Goldberg--(pro) Arthur can make his own case better than anyone else, if not more briefly. It is surely important that everyone understand the fact that it is the bombing which is now the target of international pressure. Some, but not all, of this pressure is orchestrated from Moscow. Interestingly enough, the bombing is not the centerpiece of propaganda from Hanoi or Peiping, nor is there any indication from either of these Asian capitals that a pause in the bombing would have any effect whatever. McNamara--(con for now) While Bob believes strongly that at some point a substantial pause may be an important diplomatic card, he would not play the card at a time when it might be thought to come from weakness. He would prefer a sustained pause at a somewhat later stage, after we have shown that we can hold our own, and perhaps even make some money in the South. Marks--I think Leonard should be asked for comment on the world opinion aspect of this matter. I do not know his current judgment. Wheeler--if you call on him--will surely go very hard on the military advantages of continuous bombing. Even if he does not make the argument explicitly, he will remind those present that many Americans will find it odd to pause in the bombing that is supposed to restrict aggression just at the time when we are sending ground forces to take casualties in resisting that same aggression. Rusk--(pretty much con) Dean is inclined to think that we ought not to have a pause until there is some clear signal that it would be matched in some way by the other side. You may wish to ask him what specific matching action we would find acceptable. We need to have a more solid opinion on this point than we have now. (My own judgment is that it will be hard to find a realistic short-term matching action, because such action needs to be visible and provable in order to be acceptable to us, and the only visible actions are in South Vietnam, where the people in Hanoi have to maintain that they have no influence. This is one reason why a long pause at a time of relative U.S. strength seems to me more sensible than a short one now. From a position of strength, we would not have to insist upon public and prompt matching action; we could simply let matters develop for a while with the diplomatic pressure on the other side.) Just as a checklist, I list the following set of pros and cons: Pro 1. Pause will sustain peaceful momentum of press conference. 2. Pause will help our allies deal with domestic pressure, especially Japanese. 3. Pause will reassert our flexibility and give us leeway to move up and down in the future. 4. Pause will please domestic peacemakers. 5. Pause may put some diplomatic pressure on Hanoi, during Nkrumah visit. Con 1. Pause may arouse apprehension in South Vietnam. 2. Pause will give real military advantage to Hanoi. 3. Pause may seem sign of weakness to the Communists--or even a reward for propaganda pressure. 4. Pause may be sharply criticized by Republicans and other hardliners. 5. Pause will do no real good diplomatically. I am afraid this memorandum is not as evenly balanced as I would like, but that defect at least shows you where I myself come out. McG.B. [Next documents]
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